2S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

53L

SHRI KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS

THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS.

[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA

AYYA&; )AFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]

Fundamental Rights, lnfringment of-Act settling fair and equitable rent restricted to a part of the State-Settlement of rent of diffe1ent localities on different dates on decennial average-Possibility of variatio11 in rates of rent-If amount to denial of equality before laru-Deprivation of landlo1d'.c right to realise 1"C11ts freely and without hindrance, if invasion of right to property-Retrospective enfcrcement of rates of rent, if amoU.'lts to violation of right to property and acquisition ruit/10ut compensation-Such power conferred on Settlement Officer, if arbitrmy-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(l)(f), 31(2)-Marwar Land Revenue Act (XL of 1949), ss. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86.

The petitioners, who arc jagirdars of Marwar, sought to impugn the constitutional validity of ss. 81 to 86 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act which embody a scheme for fixing fair and equitable rents payable by cultivating tenants on the ground that they infringed their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.

Their contentions were that after the merger of Marwar in thi:- State of Rajasthan the Act had become discriminatorv as it applie<l only to the jagirdars of Marwar and not to the entire body of jagir dars of the State of Rajasthan, that settlement of rents made with reference to different areas on different dates on the basis of previous ten years' average of collections might result in different rates of rent and lead to inequality such as is prohibited by Art. 14, that the Act deprived the landlords of their right to realise rents from the tenants freely and without hindrance and invaded their right to hold property guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution, that the power conferred on the Scttlem.ent Officer by s. 86 of the Act to enforce the rates of rent retrospectively is an invasion of their right to hold property and amounts tci acquisition of property without compensation and that it confers absolute and uncontrolled discretion on the Settlement Otlicer and is an encroachment on the right to hold property.

Held, repelling these contentions, that Art. 14 only prohibits unequal treatment of persons similarly situated and a classification might properly" be made on territorial basis, if that was germane to the purposes of the enactment and no tenancy legislation can be held to contravene the article solely on the ground that it does not apply to the entire State. Before the petitioners could succeed it was

September 2 7

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incumbent on them to show that conditions obtaining in other parts of the State were similac. to those in Marwar and this they had failed to do.

Bowman v. Lewis [1879] IOI U.S. 22: 25 Law. Ed. 989, referred to.

That the provision in the Act for assessment of rents with ref erence to a portion of the area to which the Act applies is not a contravention of Art.' 14. To hold otherwise would be to make it impossible for any State to carry on its settlement operations.

Biswa~ Singh v. The State of Orissa and others, [1954] S.C.R. 842, and- Tfiak.ur_ Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, applied. - That the fundamental right to hold property in the ease of a landlord in respect of his tenanted lands is no more than the right to receive reasonable rents and no legislation which has for its object the settlement of fair and equitable' rents can contravene Art. 19 (i)(f) of the Constitution even though it may give such rents retros pcctive operation.

That the provision in s. 86 of the Act empowering the Settle 1nent Officer to give retrospective operation to the rates of rent docs not contravene Art. 19(1)(f) and, therefore, no question as to whc~ ther such a provision is not of a regulatory character and as •Such prohibited by Art. 19(5) can at all arise.

That it is well settled that a law which regulates the relation of a landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within the meaning of Art. 31 (2) even though it has the effect of reducing his rights. Consequently, there is nq contravention of Art. 31(2} of the Constitution.

Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, [1943] 6 F.L.J. 55: A.LR. 1943 F.C. 29 and Thakur Jagannath Buksh v.

United Provinces, L.R. 73 I.A. 123, relied on.

That s. 86 of the Act does not confer an absolute and uncontrolled discretion on the Settlement Officer and such power as it gives does not constitute an encroachment on the right to hold property within the meaning of Art. 19(i)(f) of the Constitution.

Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards. Ajm<r and another, f1953] S.C.R. 1049, explained and distinguished.

ORIGINAL JurusmCTION : Petitions Nos. 621, 655 and 678 of 1955.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

N. C. Chatterjee (S. K. Kaptir and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the petitioners.

M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Kan Singh and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No. 1.

K. R. Chowdhury, for Goma, Ghisa and Rama, respondents in Petition No. 655 and Dhira, respondent in petition No. 678.

1955. September 27.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATARAMA

AYYAR J.-These are aplictios under article 32 of the Constitution by certam pg1rdars of Marwar, challenging the constitutionality of sections 81 to 86 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act No. XL of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that they infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners under article 14, article 19(1) (f) and article 31 (2) of the Constitution.

These sections provide for fixing fair and equitable rent payable by the tenants and prescribe the procedure to be followed therefor.

Section 81 of the Act provides that when any local area has been brought under settlement operations by a notification under section 64, the Settlement Officer or an Assistant Settlement Officer shall inspect every village in the local area, divide it into soil-classes and assessment circles, select rent rates for the area and publish them in such mannr as may be prescribed.

If objections to these proposais are received, he has to consider them, and submit his report to the Board of Revenue.

The Board has the power to sanction the proposals with or without any modifications, and it has also the power to direct further enquiry into the matters. With a view to arriving at fair and equitable rates, the Settlement Officer is required under section 82 to have regard to the collection of rent and cesses in the nature of rent during the ten years p1eceding the settlement excluding such years as the Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be abnormal, the average of the prices of agricultural produce during the same period, the nature of the crops grown and the quantity of the produce and their value. Section 82(2) provides that the rent rates shall not

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exceed one-third of the value of the produce of unirrigated lands and one-fourth of the value of the produce of irrigated lands.

Under section 84, the Settlement Officer shall determine rents whether by way of abatement, enhancement or commutation payable for all holdings in the occupation of tenants on the basis of the rates sanctioned by the Board of Revenue. Section 86 enacts that any rent fixed by order of the Settlement Officer shall be payable from the hrst day of July next following the date of such order, "unless the Settlement Officer thinks fit for any reasons to direct that it shall be payable from some earlier date".

Acting under section 81 of the Act, the Settlement Officer formulated certain proposals with reference to the rent rates in the villages comprised in the jagirs of the petitioners and they were published in the Gazette on 12th December 1953.

Objections to those rate$ were filed by the petitioners on the 12th January,

1954. On 13th October 1954 the Additional Settlement Commissioner submitted his final proposals to the Settlement Officer, who forwarded the same to the Board of Revenue for sanction.

After making further enquiry, the Board passed an order on 4-12-1954 determining the rent rates payable. Subsequent to this, an order was also passed under section 86 of the Act bringing the sanctioned rate into operation from 1-7-1954.

This order is not itself the subject of attack in these proceedings, and it cannot be, seeing that Petition No. 621 of 1954 was filed on 24th November 1954 before that order was, passed, and Petitions Nos. 655 and 678 of 1954 merely repeat verbatim the allegations in Petition No. 621 of 1954.

Before us, the petitioners conceded that they were not impugning the correctness of the order ' passed under section 86 in so far as it gave operation to the rates of rent from 1st July, on its merits, but that they were attacking the section :is bad only as a step in establishing that the scheme of the Act, of which section 86 is an integral part is, taken as a whole. an infringement of their fundamental rights under articles 14, 19 and 31 (2).

We have now to consider

whether sections 81 to 86 of the Act are bad as mfringing the above prov1s10ns of the Constitution.

Ti1e contention that sections 81 to 86 of the Act are void as being repugnant to article 14 is sought to be made out on two grounds It is stated firstly that the Act applies only to what was prior to its merger the State of Marwar, that the present State of Ra1asthan comprises Marwar and 17 other States which have merged in it, and that as the Act, as it stands, is

dircted against the jagirdars in one area of the State and not the whole of it, it has become discriminatory and void.

This contention is clearly untenable. What article 14 prohibits is the unequal treatment of persons similarly situated, and therefore before the petitioners can claim the protection of that article, it is incumbent on them to establish that the conditiom which prevail in other areas in the State of Rajasthan are similar to those which obtain in Marwar. But of this, there has been neither allegation nor proof. On the contrary, it is stated by the respondents in para 10 of their statement that the tenants in the jagirs of Marwar were paying much more by way of rent and cesses than those in the Khalsa area of the State, that with a view to remove the inequality between the two classes of tenants within the State, a law was passed in 1943 providing for settlement of rent, and that again on 1~1-1947 another law was passed abolishing all cesses

(lags) and fixing the maximum share of rent payable in kind. These special features, it is argued, form sufficient justification for a eparate legislation for this area.

It is also stated that the other States had their own rent laws suited to their conditions.

There are no materials on which we could hold that the impugned Act is discriminatory in character, and we cannot strike it down merely on the ground that it does not apply to the whole of the State of Rajasthan.

A si.milar question arose for decision in Bowman v.

Lcrvis(1 ).

There, some of the areas in the State of Missouri were governed by a judicial procedure diff-

(1) [1879) IOI U. S. 22: 25 Law. Ed. 989.

Shri Kishan Singh

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erent from that which prevailed in others. Repelling the contention that this differentiation offended the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court observed :

"Each State has the right to make political subdivisions of its territory for m'unicipal purposes, and to regulate, their local government. As respects the administration of justice, it may establish one system of courts for cities and another for rural districts; one system for one portion of its territory and another system for another portion. Convenience, if not necessity, often requires this to be done, and it would seriously interfere with the power of a State to regulate its internal affairs to deny to it this right ......... .

If a Mexican State should be acquired by a treaty and added to an adjoining State or part of a State in the United States, and the two should be erected into a new State, it cannot be doubted that such new State might allow the Mexican laws and judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion and the common law and its corresponding judicature in the other portion. Such an arrangement would not be prohibited in any fair construction of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It would not be based on any respect of persons or classes,. but on municipal considerations alone and regard to the welfare of all classes within the particular territory or jurisdiction".

This Court has also repeatedly held that classifiotion might properly be made on territorial basis if tbot was germane to the purposes of the enactment.

Having regard to the fact that the conditions of tenants vary from locality to locality, we have no hesitation in holding that a tenancy legislation restricted to a portion of a Sate cannot be held on this ground alone to contravene article 14.

The second ground urged in support of the contention that article 14 has been infringed is that discrimination must result from the settlement of rent being taken up only with reference to portions of the

area to which the Act applies and not to the whole of it, because the rent rate is to be fixed on the basis of

the average of the ten years preceding the settlement; and if the proceedings arc started for different areas on different dates, that might results in different rates being fixed, and that would make for inequality such as is prohibited by article 14.

We are unable to agree with this contention.

Settlement operations can be conducted only by a specialised staff having technical knowledge and administrative experience, and it might be beyond the capacity of the State to undertake them for the whole area at one and the same time.

To accede to the contention of the petitioners would, in effect, be to prevent the States from carrying on settlement operations It was held by this Court in Bi'swambhar Singh v.

The State of Orissa and others(1) and in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Raiasthan(2) that a provision authorising the taking over of estates on different dates was not repugnant to article 14, , md the principle of those decisions would apply to the present case as well.

The contention that the impugned provisions are in contravention of article 14 must, therefore, be rejected.

It is then contended that the provisions in question are repugnant to article 19 ( 1) ( f) of the Constitution, because they deprive landlords of their right to realise rents from the tenants freely and without hindrance, and are an encroachment on their right to hold property.

The provision in section 82 that the Settlement Officer should, in determining the average collection for the previous ten years, exclude from consideration abnormal years as notified by the Government was particularly attacked as a device to reduce the rent payable to the landlord and an invasion of his rights to the property.

We are unable to agree with this contention.

The fundamental right which a citizen has to hold and enjoy property imports only a right to recover reasonable rent when the lands are cultivated by a tenant, and therefore, :i legislation whose object is to fix fair and equitable

(I) [195+] S.C.R. 842, 845.

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rent cannot be said to invade that right.

The contention that the provision in section 82(1)(a) that abnoxmal years as notified in the Gazette should be excluded in determining average collections is calculated to reduce the rent, and is therefore unreasonable is unfounded, because a declaration that a year is abnormal is made not only when there are bumper crops but also when the yield is very low, and the provision is intended equally for the benefit of the tenant and of the landlord. A provision of this kind is usual in all tenancy legislation, and there is nothing unreasonable or unfair about it.

It was next contended-and this was the contention most pressed on us-that section 86 is bad as it confers on the Settlement Officer a power to bring the rent rates into operation from a date earlier than the succeeding year and even retrospectively from a date prior to the settlement, and that such a power was repugnant to both article 19(1) (f) and aricle 31(2).

The argument with reference to Article 19(1)(f) is that section 86 is an encroachment on the rights of a person to hold property, and can be valid only if it falls within article 19(5), that it is only a law of a regulatory character that is protected by article 19 (5), that there could be regulation only with reference to rights to be exercised in future, and that a law giving retrospective operation is consequently outside article 19(5).

This contention rests on an assumption for which there is no basis.

The question whether a law is valid under article 19(5) can arise only when there is a viobtion of the fundamental right declared in article 19(1) (f), and if the right to hold property imports, as we have held it does, only a right to recover reasonable rent from cultivating tenants, that right cannot be held to have been invaded by a law fixing reasonable rent, even when it is retrospective in operation.

If the rent fixed is reasonable with .reference to a period subsequent to the settlement, it must be reas0!lable for the period prior to it as well, and if the settlement is not an encroachment on the rights of the holder as regards the future-and th1t

is conceded-it cannot be an encroa.chment as regards

the past.

A consideration, therefore, of the question whether a law under article 19(5) should be regulatory, and whether a law with retrospective operation could be said to be regulatory would be wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present controversy.

The argument in support of the contention that section 86 is repugnant to article 31(2) is that to the extent that it gives retrospective operation, it deprives the landlord of the right to rent which had accrued prior to the settlement, and that is taking property without payment of compensation.

But it is well settled that a law which regulates the relation of landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within article 31(2), even though it has the effect of reducing his rights.

In Thak.ur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces( 1 ), the question 3rose for decision whether the provisions of Act XVII of 1939, United Provinces, under which the rent payable to a landlord became diminished were obnoxious to section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.

It was held by the Federal Court that they were not and in affirming this decision on appeal, the Privy Council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces(2) observed:

"The appellant relies on c_ertain express provisions of the Government of India Act. Thus he relies on section 299 of the Act which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law, and that neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes save on the basis of providing for the payment of compensation.

But in the present case there is no question of confiscatory legislation.

To regulate the relations of landlord and tenant and thereby diminish rights, hitherto exercised .: by the landlord in connection with his land, is different from compulsory acquisition of the land".

It was finally urged that section 86 in so far as it

(I) (1943] 6 IU.J. 55; A.LR. 1943 F.C. 29.

(2) [19-!6] L.R. 73 I.A. 123.

Shri Kishan Sinzh

and others

TM State of Rqjasthan snd

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conferred authority on the Settlement Officer to give retrospective operation to the rent rates was bad, because l:/le !!Xercise of il!at authority was left to his arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion, that the Act laid down no rules and prescribed no conditions under which the discretion had to be exercised, and that the power conferred in those terms must be held to be unconstitutional.

The decision in Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Aimer and another( 1 ) was relied on, in support of this contention.

There, the question was as to the validity of a power conferred on the Court of Wards to take over the management of ; m estate "if a landlord habitually infringes the right of a tenant".

Under the Act, the decision whether the condition aforesaid was satisfied depended on the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Commissioner, apd that was final and not liable to be questioned in civil courts.

It was held that a power which could be exercised at the absolute discretion of the authority was an encro:ichment on the rights of a citizen to hold property under article 19(1) (f) and that it was not saved by article 19(5).

But, in the present case, section 86 of the Act expressly lays down that if a Settlement Officer decides to bring rates into operation from a date earlier than the following 1st of July, it must be for reasons. There is no force in the contention that section 86 does not lay down under what circumstances such an order could be passed, because the very nature of the thing requires that a large discretion should be left to the authority.

Discretion which is wide is not necessarily arbitrary.

It was said that under section 233 of the Act the civil courts are debarred from enquiring into the reasonableness of the order; but that is because matters concerning revenue and settlement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts, and under section 62 of the Act, the Board of Revenue has revisional jurisdiction over all orders passed in connection with settlement.

We think that the power conferred on the Settlement Officer to fix an earlier date for giving operation to the rent rate is reasonable and valid,

(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049.

2S, C.lt SUPREME COUllT REPOR'I'S 541

and that it invades no fundamental rights of the landlord.

For the reasons given above, we must hold that the scheme embodied in sections 81 to 86 of the Act docs not transgress any of the Constitutional limit:rtions, and is valid.

In the result, the petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.

STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.

K. M. RAJAGOPALAN

[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ]

Indian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo. VI, C. 30)- s. 10(2) (a)-The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947- Article 7(1)-Inde.pendence, Conferral of-Automatic and legal termination of service-Persons holding civil posts in India-Previous to Independence-Whether deemed to have been appointed and continue in service after Independence-Government of India Act, 1935, ss. 240

(2) and 247.

The respondent was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by open competition in 1936 and joined duty in the Province of Madras in October 1937. Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal. He went on leave in June 1947. While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947.

He sent a reply expressing his willingness to continue in service.

On 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947.

The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service. The High Court granted the declaration prayed for accepting the respondent's contention that the order terminating his service was in violation of the

1!155

Shri Klihan Singli

/llUl lllltds v.

TM Stille ef ilJJJflltltan °"' others

V enkalarama

..tyyar J.

S1pumber27

KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS

THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

S. R. DAs

BHAGWATI

AFER IMAM

Constitution of India

Arts. 14, 19(l)(f), 31(2)

Marwar Land Revenue Act

ss. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86

ss. 81 to 86

Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 31(2)

Marwar

State of Rajasthan the Act

Art. 14

Art. 19(l)(f)

s. 86

Art. 14

September 2 7

Rqjulhan

Marwar

S. 22

[1955] 2 S.C.R. 303

Art. 19

s. 86

Art. 19(1)(f)

Art. 19(5)

Art. 31

L.R. 73 I.A. 123

Article 32

N. C. Chatterjee

S. K. Kaptir

Ganpat Rai

M. C. Setalvad

Kan Singh

P. G. Gokhale

K. R. Chowdhury

VENKATARAMA

AYYAR

article 32

sections 81 to 86

article 14

article 19(1)

article 31

Section 81

section 64

section 82

Section 82(2)

Kishan Singh

K.Uhatt Singh

State of Raja.st/um

section 84

Section 86

section 81

12th December 1953

12th January,

1954

13th October 1954

section 86

24th November 1954

section 86

section 86

articles 14, 19 and 31

sections 81 to 86

sections 81 to 86

article 14

article 14

Rajasthan

Khalsa

State of Rajasthan

Missouri

S. 22

Kishan Singh

State of Rajaslhan

Venkalaram

United States

article 14

article 14

article 14

article 14

article 14

article 19

section 82

Kishan Singh

section 82(1)(a)

section 86

article 19(1)

Article 19(1)(f)

section 86

article 19(5)

article 19

article 19(5)

article 19(5)

article 19(1)

article 19(5)

section 86

article 31(2)

article 31(2)

section 299(2)

Government of India Act, 1935

section 299

India

section 86

L.R. 73 I.A. 123

Kishan Sinzh

State of Rqjasthan

Vmkatarama

article 19(1)

article 19(5)

section 86

1st of July

section 86

section 233

section 62

S 541

sections 81 to 86

VIVIAN BosE

JAGANNADHADAS

B. P. SINHA

}AFAR IMAM

Indian Independence Act, 1947

s. 10(2)

Article 7(1)

ss. 240

Madras

Government of Madras

Dindigal

Government of India

British Government

Dominion of India

15th August, 1947

9th August, 1947

7th August, 194 7

14th August, 1947

State of Madras

Union of India

7th August, 1947

Klihan Singli


2S, C.lt SUPREME COUllT REPOR'I'S 541

and that it invades no fundamental rights of the landlord.

For the reasons given above, we must hold that the scheme embodied in sections 81 to 86 of the Act docs not transgress any of the Constitutional limit:rtions, and is valid.

In the result, the petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.

STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.

K. M. RAJAGOPALAN

[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ]

Indian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo. VI, C. 30)- s. 10(2) (a)-The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947- Article 7(1)-Inde.pendence, Conferral of-Automatic and legal termination of service-Persons holding civil posts in India-Previous to Independence-Whether deemed to have been appointed and continue in service after Independence-Government of India Act, 1935, ss. 240

(2) and 247.

The respondent was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by open competition in 1936 and joined duty in the Province of Madras in October 1937. Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal. He went on leave in June 1947. While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947.

He sent a reply expressing his willingness to continue in service.

On 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947.

The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service. The High Court granted the declaration prayed for accepting the respondent's contention that the order terminating his service was in violation of the

1!155

Shri Klihan Singli

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TM Stille ef ilJJJflltltan °"' others

V enkalarama

..tyyar J.

S1pumber27

!955

T/,. Stale ' ef Madras and

another

IL. M. Rajagopalan

statutory guarantee relating to his service under s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which remained in force till the midnight of the 14th August, 1947.

Held, I. The conferral of .Independence on India brought about an automatic and legal termination of service on the date of Independence.

Reilly v. The King ([1934 J A.C. 176) and Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., ([1940] A.C. 1014), followed.

2. But all persons previously holding civil posts in India arc deemed to have been appointed and hence to continue in service, except those governed by "general or special orders or arrangements" affecting their respective cases: vide Article 7( I) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 read with section !0(2)(a) of the Indian Independence Act and sections 240(2) and 247 of the Government of India Act as adapted.

3. The guarantee about prior conditions of service and the previous statutory safeguards relating to disciplinary action continue to apply to those who are thus deemed to continue in service but not to others.

4. Those previously holding civil posts in India had the right> and were in fact given the option, of declining to "continue in service" under the new regin1e and in the event of their exercising that option they ceased to serve on and from the date of the passing of the Constitution.

5. Equally the new GoYernment had the right to refuse to continue them in service and intimation of this fact given to persons ahead of time came into operation and had legal effect from the moment the new Government assumed office on 15-8-1947.

6. As the petitioner was informed that his services would not be required after 14-8-1947 his services terminated on that date because this was a special order within the meani_qg of Article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947.

Accordingly there was no continuance of service in his case after 14-8-1947 under the deeming provisions of that Order.

La/l's case (1948) F.C.R. 44 West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King (1905) 2 K.B. 391, Virendra Singh

v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1955) I S.C.R. 415, Raj Rajendra Malojirao Shitole v. The State of Madhya Bharat (1954) S.C.R. 748, Ladore v.

Bennett (1939) A.C. 468 and Govindan Sel/appah Nayar Kodakon Pillai v. Punchi Banda Mudanayake (1953) A.C. 514, referred to.

Crv1L

APPELLATE Juruso1cTION : Civil Appeal No. 203 of 1954.

On appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 30th March 1954 of the Madras High Court in

C. S. No. 216 of 1952.

M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, V. K. T.

Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (R. Ganapathy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the appellant.

M. K. Nambiar (C. V. L. Narayan, with him), for the respondent.

1955.

September 27.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.

JAGANNADHADAS J.-'"fhis IS an appeal by the State of Madras and the Union of India against the judgment and decree of the High Court on a certificate granted by that Court under article 133 of the Constitution.

The appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent herein, who was a member of the Indian Civil Service, for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947, purporting to terminate his services as from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947, is null, void and inoperative and that he must be deemed to continue in the Indian Civil Service as a Member thereof.

The suit was filed on the original side of the High Court of Madras and after having been partly tried by a Single Judge who recorded the evidc:nce, was thereafter heard by a Bench of two Judges in view of the important constitutional question that arose for consideration in the case.

The Bench found in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit and hence the appeal by the State to this Court.

The case for the plaintiff is short and 5imple. He was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by open competitive examination in 1936 and joined duty in the then Province of Madras in October, 1937. Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras .in various situations.

The last office he held was as Sub-Collector and Joint Magistrate at Dindigal.

On the 2nd June, 1947, he went on leave.

While on leave, he received a letter from the Government of India dated the 19th June, 1947, wherein he was asked whether he was willing to continue in the service of

Slate of Madra.

and another

K. M. Rajagopalata

1955 Sef Modral ""'.,..,,,,, v.

K. M. Rajago; o/a•

J4gannadhadas ].

SUPREME COURT llEPORTS [19551

the Government after the then contemplated transfer of power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947. The plaintiff sent a reply expressing his willingness. On the 9th August, 1947, however, he received a communication from the Government of Madras dated the 7th August, 1947, and signed by the Chief Secretary thereof, stating that it was decided not to retain him in service from an<i after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would therefore be terminated as on the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947.

He was directed, therefore to apply for extension of leave for which he was then eligible so as to avail himself of the full period of leave which was to his credit.

On receiving the order of termination of his services, he made attempts to get it cancelled, by interviewing the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister of the Madras State at the time. But the attempts proved futile.

In the course of these interviews he says he . wa$ given the impression that the order of termination, though issued under the signature of. the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras was in fact so issued under the sanction of the Secretary of State for India, which, according to him, subsequently turned out not to be a fact. Being then under that mistaken impression, he reconciled himself to the situation and availed himself of the full period of leave and accepted the compensation which was awarded for premature termination of services and also began drawing his pension.

Later on he came to know from one Shri Seshadri, another young Civilian, who was in a similar plight and who had also filed a similar suit that certain documents produced in the course of that suit showed that these orders were passed without the sanction of the Secretary of State for India.

He accordingly brought these matters again to the notice of the Government and made further attempts to get the order in his case reversed.

These again proved futile.

He thereupon filed an application for a writ in the High Court on the 7th November, 1951, to quash this alleged illegal order against him. But the High Court rejected it on the ground of there having been

loqg delay since the passing of the orders sought to be quashed: The plaintiff thereafter gave the requisite notice to the Government under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and filed this Suit on the 15th July, 1952.

In the plaint h~ made the offer to refund the amount of compensation paid to him after making such adjustments asi may be called for towards his claim for salary for the intervening period.

The plaintiff's claim is based on the contention that the termination of his services by the order dated the 7th August, 1947, . is in violation of the statutory guarantee relating to his service under section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which continued to be operative till the midnight of the 14th August, 1947, and he relies on Lall's case(1 ). To this suit both the State of Madras and the Union of India were impleaded as defendants and their defence was substantially the same.

It is to be found in paragraph 6 of the written statement filed by the State of Madras which is as follows :

"This defendant states that on the transfer <>f power to the newly constituted Dominion of India m pursuance of the Indian Independence Act .as and from the appointed day, viz., 15th August, 1947, the tenure of the service of the plaintiff came to an end and he had no legal claim to continue in service thereafter.

The; plaintiff was holding office only during His Majesty's pleasure.

When His Majesty's Government decided to transfer its power to the Dominion of India as and from the 15th day of August, 1947, the career of the plaintiff under covenant with the Secretary of State came to a legal termination \ as and from the 15th day of August, 1947.

It is, therefore, not correct to state that there was any termination by the Government of Madras and that there has been . utter lack of legality in the order passed by the said Government. It is further submitted that the alleged termination of the plaintiff's services was only from the 15th August, 1947, and that on such date the

11) [1948] F.C.R. 44.

195!t

Sia# of Modrtu

arrd onollwr

K. M. RqjagopaJa11

Jaztllllllll/hadtl$ ].

Stal• of Madras

and anotlur

Jr. M. Rajagopo/an

Jagannadhadas J.

Province of Madras acting under the instructions from the Government of India were competent to decline to accept the offer to continue in service made by the plaintiff".

There were other minor pleas such as estoppel, etc. which, it is unnecessary to notice at this stage. The High Court negatived the defence of the State and accepted the contention of the plaintiff and granted him the declaration prayed for.

The main contention of the learned Attorney- General before us appearing for the State is that the plaintiff has misconceived the legal position, that what happened in this case was not a wilful order of termination of the services of the plaintiff which fell within the scope of section 240 of the Government of India Act,. 1935, and whose validity was liable to be tested with reference thereto.

According to him the political changes which came into force from the 15th August, 1947, operated in law to terminate the set vices of all persons in the position of the plaintiff as and from the 15th August, 1947, that in that sitilation it was open to the new Dominion Government of India or the Governments of the various Provinces either to invite such persons to continue to be in their respective services or to intimate that they were no longer required, and that it was in the exercise of this option that the Government of Madras com municated to the plaintiff an advance intimation on the 7th August, 1947, that he would not be retained in service as and from the 15th August, 1947. The substantial question therefore, for our decision is whether this contention put forward by the learned Attorney-General is correct.

It may be mentioned that, as appears born their judgments, the learned Judges of the High Court appear to have been under the impression that this defence of automatic termination of the services was abandoned during the course of the arguments before them by the learned Advocate-General of Madras.

This impression seems to be erroneous.

In any case there is nothing to preclude the question which is purely one of law being reopened before us with our leave in view of its being

one of considerable importance.

The learned Attorney-General has based his contention as regards automatic termination of such services on three grounds :

(1) The political change which came into operation on the 15th August, 1947, resulted in creating a new Sovereign State of India and on the creation of such Sovereign State, the pre-existing contracts of service under the previous Government became automatically terminated.

(2) The contract between the Secretary of State for India and the plaintiff being one of service became terminated on the Secretary of State ceasing to have control in respect or the services contemplated under the contract.

(3) The statutory changes which came into operation as from the 15th August, 1947, by themselves brought about a termination of such services and the

potection of section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was no longer available to a person in the situation of the respondent.

For the purpose of appreciating the above arguments it is necessary to notice the various events that lead up to the political changes, and the statutory provisions by which they were brought about, in so far as they relate to the class of services with which we are concerned in this case. The starting point of these changes was the announcement of his Majesty's Government dated the 20th February, 1947, that power would be transferred to Indian hands by His Majesty's Government by June, 1948, in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan of May, 1946.

Since then the attention of the Government was engaged in the various. steps to be taken to bring about the transition as smoothly as possible.

One of the steps taken in this directiQll, in so far as it concerns this case, was the announcement by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 30th April, 1947. That announcement purported to relate to "grant of compensation for premature termination of their service in India to Members of Civil Services app0inted by the Secretary of State and to regular officers and British Warrant

Stal• of Madra£

and another v Ir. M. Rq, agopaku.

Jagannadhadas J.

Stoll qf Mi111ras

"""""""" v.

ICM. R4jagopalan

]4gamwJ/uldas ].

Officers of the Indian Naval and Military Forces", and was inter alia as follows :

"I. His Majesty's Government have announced their intention that the British Government's authority in India will be finally transferred to Indian hands by June, 1948.

It is the aim of His Majesty's Government that the transfer of power should be effected in an orderly and regulated manner so that the new authorities may assume their responsibilities in conditions conducive to the best interests of India and maintenance of good relations with Great Britain.

His Majesty's Government are confident that during this period of transition the Services and all those who man them, whether British or Indian will respond to this call.

2. To those serving under covenant or other form of agreement with the Secretary of State for India or who hold commissions from His Majesty the King, the transfer of power will mean premature termination on that date of a career under the ultimate authority of His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament; and for many there is added to the heavy call of present duty the burden of anxiety for their QWn future and that of those who depend on them.

3. The Government of India are naturally and rightly most anxious and His Majesty's Government share their anxietv that the administration shall not be weakened by the loss of experienced officers.

To this end, Government of India undertake that those members of the Secretary of State's Services who continue to serve under the Government of India after the transfer of power shall do so on their present terms as to scales of pay, leave, pensionary rights, and safeguards in matters of discipline and that provisions to this effect should be made in the Treaty to deal with matters arising out of the transfer of power.

The Government of India will now propose to Provincial Governments that they should give similar assurances to members of the Secretary of State's $Crvice who agree to join Provincial services.

4. The Government of India recognise that some [ndian members of the Secretary of State's services

may be genuinely anxious about their prospects under the Provincial administrations where they are at present employed, and every effort will be made to arrange suitable transfers in such cases.

5. The Government of India agree that compensation should be payable to such Indian Officers of these services as- ( 1) are not invited to continue to serve under the Government of India after transfer of power; or

(2) can satisfy the Governor-General that their actions in the course of duty during their service prior to the transfer of , power have damaged their prospects, or that the appointments offered to them are such as cannot be regarded as satisfactory in the altered circumstances; or

(3) can show to the satisfaction of the Governor- General that they have legitimate cause for anxiety about their future in the Province where they are now serving, and that no suitable transfer can be arranged.

B\lt the Government of India feel that sentiments of patriotism will naturally impel Indian Officers to continue to serve their country and that, in the light of the undertaking that they have given, and the consideration that in fact Indian members of the Ser vice will have improved prospects, there is no ground, save in these special cases, for payment of compensation to Indian officers on account of the transfer of power.

6. His Majesty's Government have been reviewing the whole position. They have noted the undertaking which the Government of India have given in regard to officers whom they desire should continue to serve under the Government of India. They recognise the force of Government of India's arguments, and they agree that to Indian Officers compensation should not be admissible except in the cases which I have just mentioned.

Many Indian members of the Secretary of State's services will however become members of provincial services and in their cases His Majesty's Government's agreenient that they need not be compensated is conditional upon the Provincial Governments guaranteeing the existing terms of scr-

19$5

St(#f of M/JIJNI

qnif !lfllllhlr

V• fl. M. Jl4jagf1J4la"

]ago'fltWfihatlas J.

Stat1 of Madras

and another

v. .K. M. Rajagopalan

Jagannadhadas J.

vice. If they are not prepared to do so His Majesty's Government reserv.e the right to reconsider the matter.

7. With these reservations I am now authorised by His Majesy's Government to inform members of the Secretary of State's services that they accept the obligation to see that they are duly compensated for the termination of their careers consequent on the transfer of power ................ " After this announcement was issued, His Majesty's Government, for various political reasons, decided to advance the date of transfer of power and made an announcement on the 3rd June, 1947, detailing various steps which were proposed to be taken to bring about an early transfer of power.

Paragraph 20 of that announcement ran as follows:

"The major political parties have repeatedly emphasized their desire that there should be the earliest possible transfer of power in India With this desire His Majesty's Government are in full sympathy, and they are willing to anticipate the date of June, 1948, for the handing over of power by the setting up of an independent Indian Government or Governments at an even earlier date.

Accordingly, as the most expeditious, and indeed the only practicable way of meeting this desire, His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legislation during the current session for the transfer of power this year on a Dominion Status basis t'o one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a result of this announcement.

This will be without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India in respect of which they have authority will remain within the British Commonwealth".

In persuance of what was indicated herein, the Indian Independence Act was passed on the 18th July, 1947.

In pursuance of the power vested in the Governor- General thereunder a number of legislative orders were passed by him.

The relevant provisions of the Indian Independence Act as well as of some of the legislative orders will be presently noticed.

But it

will be convenient at this stage to state the further steps taken by the Government relating to the services

of the kind we are concerned with, in pursuance of their plan announced on the 3rd June, 1947, to speed up the transfer of power.

Within about two weeks after the announcement of His Majesty's Government dated the 3rd June, 1947, a circular letter was issued by the Government of India to the Chief Secretaries of all the Provincial Governments on the 18th June, 1947, which inter alia stated as follows :

"That in view of the latest announcement of His Majesty's Government (dated the 3rd June, 1947), it is essential to ascertain with the least possible delay, the wishes of individual officers to whom His Excellency the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April 1947 applies in regard to continuance in service after the transfer of power.

This will enable Government to decide which officers they should continue to retain in service after the transfer of power and to make arrangements to replace officers who desire to quit service, of their own accord or whom Government may not wish to continue in service".

The Chief Secretaries were accordingly asked to make arrangements "to send immediately to every officer belonging to any service specified in the schedule, and serving under the Provincial Government, a copy of the enclosed letter from the Government of India to the officers concerned, where!_>y the officer was asked to communicate within ten days of the receipt of the letter whether he wishes to continue in the service of the Government or whether he desires to retire from service".

The circular letter of the Government of India to the Chief Secretaries further asked them that in forwarding the replies received thereto from the individual officers, they may inform them, in case cl. persons who have decided to quit service, the earliest -date on which the Government will be in a position to release the officer and in case of persons who offer to continue in service, whether for any reason, they would prefer him not to continue in the service, notwithstanding the officer's desire to remain in the

StaMqfMabu

and ono#wr

v. r;, M. RajagoJoltm

Jagannadhatlas J.

l!lS5

Sl.U of Muas

andonotltn

K. M. Rajogopalan

J•g-..UU. . ., J.

service and pointed out that in the latter case the Provincial Government will be incurring liability to pay compensation.

In pursuance of these instruc.. tions the individual letters to the officers concerned were presumably sent and replies were obtained, and the necessary orders were passed in respect, at any rate, of such of the officers whom the various Governments were not prepared to retain in service after the transfer of power.

Pausing here, it will be seen that the announcement of the Viceroy dated the 30th April, 1947, and the circular letter issued by the Govern ment of India to the Chief Secretaries on the 18th June, 1947, as well as the individual letters issued by and under the authority of the Government of India to those officers on the same date asking for information from them as to their desire to continue in service or not, were all based on the assumptions clear!, stated or indicated therein, (1) that transfer of power brings about an automatic premature termination of the services, (2) on such termination, it woulJ be open to the servant concerned either to decline to continue in the service of the new Government or to offer to continue his services, and (3) that in case the individual servant intimated his desire to continue in service, it was open to the Government either to accept the offer or not.

Thus the continuance of service was contemplated only in respect of such of the previous servants who intimated their desire for the continuance of their services and whose offer in this respect was accepted.

While, therefore, discontinuance of service was to be brought about by the option of either of the parties and on such discontinuance the servant was to become entitled to compensation the continuance of the service was a matter which would depend upon the mutual consent of both, viz., the individual servant and the Government concerned.

That the position so taken up must have been perfectly within the knowledge of every one of the persons to whom these circular letters were sent is virtually admitted by the plaintiff himself in his evidence and also appears clearly froni the fact that a copy of the Vicroy' s announcement dated the 30th April,

1947, appears to have been enclosed with the individual letters dated the 18th June, 1947, sent to each of the officers by the Government of India.

The plaintiff himself in his letter dated the 2nd July, 1947, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, wrote as follows :

"I am in receipt of your Memorandum No. 2738 of 1947-4, Public (Special) Department, dated 5th June, 1947, enclosing the announcement of His Excellency the Viceroy. I wish to state that I desire to continue to serve the Madras Government and that I desire no transfer to any other Province". (The reference to the date 5th June, 1947, is probably a mistake since it is clearly admitted in the plaint that the plaintiff intimated his desire to continue in service in reply to the letter dated the 18th June, 1947.) To complete the course of events as regards the imlividual case of the plaintiff, the further facts may be stated. After receiving this reply from the plaintiff dated the 2nd July, 1947, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras wrote to him a letter dated the 7th August, 1947, as follows:

"I am to say that with reference to your reply to the letter cited electing to continue in service after the transfer of power, the Government have decided not to retain you in service after 15th August, 1947.

Your services will he terminated on the afternoon of 14th August 1947 and you may proceed on leave (your present leave will be automatically converted into leave) preparatory to retirement as from 15th August

1947. You may therefore apply for the leave (extension of leave) for which you arc eligible direct to Government.

The Accountant-General is being asked to certify the amount of leave for which you are eligible.

A formal communication will issue to you shortly from the Government of India terminating your services as from 14th August, 1947 A.N.

I am to express regret that the decisions in your case has been delayed so long".

This is clearly an advance intimation that the termination of the services of the plaintiff would become I 7-83 S. C. India./59.

Sla/4 of Madrt11

Olldoaothlr

E. M. Rqjagopala•

JagaMalllulllas J.

Sim of Madras

and anothu

K. M. Rlgagopalan

Jagannadluzdas ].

operative at the very moment when the transfer of power comes into force, i.e., on the midnight of 14th/ 15th August, 1947.

The mention of the termination on the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947, was clearly because of the official practice that a person who hands over charge of his office in the afternoon of a particular day, continues in service and draws the salary for that day. (Vide Audit Instruction (1) at page 163 of the Fundamental Rules, 3rd Edition).

A letter was immediately addressed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras under date 8th August 1947, to the Under Secretary of State for India, India Office, London, and ; i copy thereof was sent to the plaintiff. The letter runs thus:

"I am directed to say that Mr. K. M. Rajagopalan, I. C. S. proceeded on three months' leave on the 3rd June, 1947, and that as he will not continue in the service of Government in India, al; ter the transfer of power, he will be entitled to compensation or settlement grant, as the case may be, as from the 15th August, 1947".

On the 8th August, 1947, a formal Government Order No. 377 was passed which is as follows :

"Mr. K. M. Rajagopalan, I.C.S. proceeded on three months' leave on the 3rd June, 1947, and that as he will not continue in the service of Government of India after the transfer of power, he will be entitled to compensation or resettlement grant, as the case may be, as from the 15th August, 1947".

This order was published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated the 19th August, 1947. Presumably this order (along with other similar orders) was also intimated to the Government of India and the Government of India sent a telegram to the Government of Madras on the 14th August, 1947, as follows: •

" ...... No objection to your proposal to terminate services of .......... Rajagopalan".

On the 29th September, 1947, the Government of Madras pas<ed a G. 0. sanctioning pavment of £4,500./ as compensation for the plaintiff and ordered disbursement thereof by the Accountant-General.

This compensation was drawn by the plaintiff in April,

1950. In the light of this background it is now necessary to notice the various statutory prov1S1ons which brought about the political change and particularly those which relate to the services.

The instrument which brought about the transfer of power from the British Government to the Dominion Government of India in a.:cordance with the announcements of His Majesty's Government dated the 20th February, 1947 and the 3rd June, 1947, is the Indian Independence Act, 1947, (10 & 1i Geo. 6, Ch. 30) passed by the British Parliament and which became law on the 18th July,

1947. The preamble thereto is as follows :

"An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Govern~ ment of India Act, 1935, which apply outside those Dominions and to provide for other matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions".

By section 1 of the said Act two independent Dominions to be known respectively, India and Pakistan, were to be set up in India as from the 15th day of august, 1947, with territories assigned to each of them as indicated in sections 2, 3 and 4 thereof. Under section 5, there was to be a Governor-General for each of the Dominions to be appointed by His Majesty who was to represent His Majesty for the purposes of the government of the Dominion.

By section 6 it was provided that Legislature of each of the new Dominions was to have full power to make laws for that Dominion including laws having extra-territorial operation and laws which would be valid notwithstanding any repugnancy to the law of England or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of the Parliament.

It was also provided that the assent to the laws as made by the Legislatures, was to be given by the Governor-General in the name of His Majesty without any power of disallowance by His Majesty and without any power of reservation of laws for the significance of His Majesty's pleasure. By section 7, :it was specifically provided that as from the 15th

!955

Stat• of Madras

and onothn

K. M. Rajagopalon

Jagannadhat!as J,

Slal1 of Madras

and anotktr

Ir. M. Rqjagopalan

]agOIUladMdas J.

August, 1947, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was to have no responsibility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India.

Temporary provisions as to the Government of each of the new Dominions as from the 15th August, 1947, until such time that each of the two Dominions evolves its own independent Constitution were made by sections 8 and 9. By Section 8(1) the respective Constituent Assemblies of India, and Pakistan which had already come -into existence and were functioning for the purpose of evolving a new Constitution for each of the Dominions, the first by virtue of the Cabinet Mission Plan of May, 1946, and the second by reason of the announcement of His Majesty's Government dated the 3rd Tune, 1947, were recognised as interim Legislatures for each of the Dominions.

By section 8(2) the pre-existing Government of India Act, 1935, with modifications and adaptations to be made by the Governor-General and subject to any other provision or alteration to be made by the Constituent Assembly functioning as the interim Legislature, was to continue in force.

By section 9 of the Act, the Governor-General was given various and extensive powers to make provisions in order to bring the provisions of the Indian Independence Act into operation and for removing difficulties arising in connection with the transition of power from the British Government to the Dominions and to carry on the business of the Governor-General in Council in the interim period. It was specifically provided that the Governor-General's power in this behalf was to be retrospective as from the 3rd June, 1947.

It will be seen that by virtue of the Indian Independence Act a completely independent Dominion of India was set up with a wholly independent Lcgisl:lture and with a COl?lpletcly independent Government free from any kind of fetters as regards thcit functioning, either from the British Parliament or from the British Government.

The Government of the Dominion, however, was still to be carried on in the

name of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, by the Governor-General of India to be appointed by His Majesty.

The learned Attorney-General strenuously contended that these changes resulted in the emergence of India as an independent Sovereign State and that it followed therefrom, on well-recognised principles of international law, that this brought about automatic termination of the contracts of service between the prior Government and its servants.

In support of this principle of international law, the k1rned Attorney-General cited a number of authorities as also the case in West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King(1), which was quoted by this Court in Virendra Singh v.

The State of Uttar Pradesh(2). On the other hand, Shri Nambiar for the respondent stressed the fact that however independent the new Dominion Government may be as regards the functioning of its Legislature and of its executive Government, the new Government was still to function in the name of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and that, therefore, the Dominion is not on the same footing as an independent sovereign State, which obtains sovereignty over a new country by virtue of conquest or cession.

He urged that the principle of international law relied upon would not apply to such a case. In support of his contention he drew our attention to various other provisions in the Indian Independence Act and to the various legislative orders passed by the Governor-General by virtue of powers vested in him under section 9 of the Indian Independence Act as also to adaptations made in respect of various existing laws. The question as to whether the Indian Independence Act brought about a full oovereign State for each and every purpose is one of considerable importance and is not free from difficulty.

We do not wish to decide that question on the present occasion. It appears to us that the present case has to be decided with reference to the question as to what exactly has been brought about by the Indian Independence Act and the subsidiary legislatirn.1 which followed thereupon, in so far as they relate

(!) [1905] 2 K. B. 391.

(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 415, 427.

!955

Stall of MaJro.r

and anotMr

K. M. R.ajagopalaa

Jagannadhado.r J.

Stale of Madras and .,.,,,,,,.

K. M. ll<efa10/Jflkm

-JaganMdhada1 J.

to the tenure of persons in the position of the plaintiff.

For this purpose it is necessary in the first instance to have a clear idea as to what was the tenure of service of the plaintiff prior to the 15th August, 1947 Persons in the position of the plaintiff were recruited directly by the Secretary of State for India by virtue of the powers conferred on him under section 244(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 (or under the corresponding provisions in the prior Government of India Acts).

The persons so recruited, were appointed to the service called the Indian Civil Service.

Each person so recruited had to enter into a covenant by means of an indenture between himself and the Secretary of State.

The indenture (whose form is to be found as Appendix I of the Indian Civil Service Manual) recited that the person was appointed by the Secretary of State to serve His Majesty as a Member of the Civil Service of India and that such service was to continue during the pleasure of His Majesty, to be signified under the hand of the Secretary of State for India with liberty for the covenantor to resign the said service with the previous permission of the Secretary of State or of the Government under which he was, for the time being, serving. The indenture incorporated various covenants by the appointee with reference to the exercise of his functions during the period of h_is service such as, (1) general fidelity,

(2) obedience to orders of general nature, (3) keeping of regular accounts, preservation and due delivery and production of private accounts, ( 4) not to misapply or employ for improper purposes the prcr pcrty entrusted to his care, (5) not to divulge secrets, ( 6) not to accept corrupt presents or to make corrupt bargains, (7) not to trade contrary to law or regulations, (8) not to quit India without leave and to satisfy all debts due to His Majesty before departure, and (9) to make prescribed payments towards pension, etc. Apart from these covenants, his tenure was regulated by a number of statutory provisions under the Government of India Act.

Section 240 .• while affirming that the service was at the pleasure

of His Majesty provided that dismissal or reduction in rank should be preceded by a reasonable opportunity for showing cause against the action proposed and that dismissal (or removal) from service could only be by an authority not subordinate to the appointing authority-which in the present case meant that the appellant could be dismissed or removed only by the Secretary of Stae.

The Government of India Act contained also a number of provisions specially applicable to a person recruited by the Secretary of State.

The conditions of his service as regards pay, leave, pension and other matters were to be such as may be prescribed by the rules to be made by the Secretary of State and (in the absence of any specific rules by the Secretary of State) by the rules to be made by the Governor-General or the Governor of a Province in accordance as he was in service under. the Government of India or the Provincial Government [section 247 (1) ] . In the matter of promotions or leave exceeding three months or in the matter of an order of suspension, he was to be directly under the authority of the Governor-General or the Governor, as the case may be, exercising their respective individual judgments [sections 247 (2) and (3) ]. No award of pension less than the maximum pension under the rules could be made except with the consent of the Secretary of State [section 247 (6) l He had the right to approach the Governor-General or the Governor in the exercise of tbeir individual judgment if he had any grievance or complaint in respect of his service and a right of appeal to the Secretary of State as against the order of any authority which punished or formally censured him or interpreted any rule to his disadvantage (section 248).

The Secretary of State had to make rules specifying the number and character of the civil posts under the Crown which were to be reserved for and to be filled by persons belonging to the Indian Civil Service recruited by him (section 246).

If the conditions of the service were adversely affected by reason of anything done under the Act or for any other reason which might have appeared to the Secretary of State to justify payment of compensation, he was entitled

Stau qf Madr, M

and anothw

IC. M. Rajagopallltl

JagtJtltl4dhadtU J.

SlaU qf Madt-tu

W OMl/tu v.

K. M. Rtgaaopolan

JaglllllltJdiiadtu ].

thereto, the compensation being such as the Secretary of State might fix. The said sum was payable from the revenues of the Government of India or the Provincial Government as the case mav be (section 249).

It will be seen from the above that the tenure of an Indian Civil Servant was basically contractual but with conditions and prospects of such service regulated by statute.

A person recruited to such service was in a very special position, in comparison with persons holding other civil posts of the Government of India or the Provincial Government. He enjoyed a number of rights and privileges attached to him by virtue of the fact that he belonged to a specially recruited service with certain high posts reserved for him and having the right of appeal to the Secretary of State in respect of matters relating to his service by virtue of sections 244, 246, 247, 248 and 249.

Thus the Indian Civil Service was a specially privileged class of service under the Crown with the essential characteristic of direct and ultimate protection by the Secretary of State representing His Majesty's Government. .

Now it is necessary to notice the fundamental changes brought about in this behalf by the Indian Independence Act.

In the first instance the Secretary of State who, as a Member of British Cabinet, acting in the name of the Crown and responsible to the British Parliament, was exercising such control as was vested in him in respect ot the affairs of India and in particular as regards these services, completely disappeared.

It was specifically provided by section 7

(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, that as a consequence of the setting up of the new Dominions as from the appointed day (15th August, 1947) "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day were included in British India". There was a further specific provision by way of section 10 in the Indian Independence Act as regards the Secretary of State services which was as follows:

"10. Secrettwy of State's services etc.

( 1) The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, shall not continue in force the provisions of that Act relating to appointments to the civil services of, and civil post~ under, the Crown in India by the Secretary of State, or the provisions of that Act relating to the reservation of posts".

Now the India (Provisional Constitution) Order of 1947, which was issued by the Governor-General on the 14th August, 1947, under the power of adaptation vested in him under section 9 ( 1 )( c) of the Indian Independence Act and which was to come into operation simultaneously with it, gave effect to the above two provisions, viz., section 7(1)(a) and section 10(1) of the Indian Independence Act, by specifically deleting from th, e Government of India Act, 1935, the various sections relating to the Secretary of State and his services, i.e., sections 244, 246, 248 and 249 and 278 to 284-A (vide schedule to the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947). Changes were also made by the same order in sections 240 and 247 relating to conditions of service which will be noticed presently, whose chief purpose was. to withdraw the responsibility of the Secretary of State as regards matters covered by these sections. The resultant position was clearly this. (1) There was no. further recruitment to a special covenanted service by the Secretary of State.

(2) There was to be no statutory reservation of posts to be made by the Secretary of State.

(3) The conditions of service as made by the Secretary of State

no longer continued in operation. ( 4) No :right of ; ippeal or approach to the Secretary of State for redress of any personal grievances relating to such servants, or right of compensation, etc. for any adverse action to be, determined by the Secretary of State, continued to subsist.

True, some of the conditiom of service previously governing these persons were continued . by section 10(2) of the Indian Independence Act and the adaptations made thereunder which will be noticed presently.

But apart from the question whether such continuance is available to all the previous members of the service-a matter which will be

!955

State of Madras

anti anothtr

K. M. Rajagopalan

Jagannadhadas J.

Slate of Madras

and anot!:tr

K. M. Rajazopalan

Jagannadhadtu].

dealt with presently-the ultimate responsibility for the framing and maintenance of the conditions of service was no longer with the Secretary of State.

It is also true that in respect of such of these civil servants whose services were retained by the new Dominion Government the service continued to be under the Crown (as shown by the adaptation of section 240 of the Government of India Act).

But this was only because in theory the new Government of India was still to be carried on in the name of His Majesty. This was no more than a symbol of the continued allegiance . to the Crown. The substance of the matter, however, was that while previously the Secretary of State's services were under the Crown in the sense that the ultimate authority and responsibility for these services was in the British P\}Iliament and the British Government, this responsibility and authority completely vanished from and after the 15th August, 1947, as envisaged in the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April, 1947, and as specifically affirmed by section 7(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act.

Thus the essential structure of the Secretary of State services was altered and the basic foundation of the contractual-cum-statutory tenure of th~ service disappeared.

It follows that the contracts as well as the statutory protection attached thereto came to an automatic and legal termination as held by the Privy Council and the House of Lords in somewhat analogous situations in Reilly v. The King(') and Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.(2).

To repel the above view of the change brought about by the Indian Independence Act. learned counsel for the respondent relied on certa; n other provisions which may now be noticed. These provisions far from supporting the contention of the respondent, clearly confirm , the above view.

The first of these is section 10(2) of the Indian Independence Act, which is as follows:

"10.

(2) Every person who-

(a) having been appointed by the Secretary of State, or Secretary .of State in Council, to a civil (I) [1934j A.C. 176.

(2) (1940} A.C. 1014.

service of the Crown in India continues on and after the appointed day to serve under the Government of either of the new Dominions or of any Province or part thereof;

shall be entitled to receive from the Governments of the Dominions and Provinces or parts which he is from time to time serving .................. .. the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects the tenure of his office or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit, as that person was entitled to immmediately before the appointed day".

The contention of the learned counsel is that this prov1s10n clearly indicates that persons previously appointed by the Secretary of State to the Indian Civil Service continue under the new Government and that they are entitled to similar conditions of service as they had before.

According to him the order of termination of plaintiff's service being invalid, he must be deemed to continue in service.

But, it is to be noticed that the above provision does not say that all persons previously appointed shall be continued in service.

It is very carefully worded and merely guarantees the same conditions of service, etc. to persons who ·"having been appointed by the Secretary of State ................ rnntinue on and after the appointed day to serve under the Government ........ ".

This section has nothing to say as to who are the persons who continue in service and receive the benefit.

That was obviously left to be provided by delegated legislation in the shape of orders of the Governor- General by virtue of section 9(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act. The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, referred to above deals with this matter in article 7(1) thereof which runs as follows :

"Subject to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting his case, any person, who immediately before the appointed day is holding any civil post under the Crown in connection with the

State of Madras

and another

K. M. Rajagopalan

Jagannadhadas J.

Stat1 of Madras and another

K. M. Rajagopalan

JagaMadhadas J.

affairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of a Province other than Bengal or the Punjab shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India or as the case may be, of the Province".

The Schedule to this Order also shows the adaptations made in respect of sections 240 and 247 of the Government of India Act to give effect to section 10(2) of the Indian Indepoodence Act above quoted.

Now section 247 of the Government of Indi.a Act as adapted is as follows:

"The conditions of service of all persons who, having been appointed by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State in Council to a civil service of the Crown in India, continue on and after the date of the establishment of the Dominion to serve under the Government of the Dominion or of any Province, shall- ( a) as respects persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Dominion, be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Governor-General;

(b) as respects persons serving in connection with the affairs of a Province- ( i) in regard to their pay, leave, pension, gen~ ral rights as medical attendance and any other matter which immediately before the establishment of the Dominion was regulated by rules made by the Secretary of State, be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Governor-General; and

(ii) in regard to any other matter, be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Governor of the Province".

Section 240(2) as modified is as follows:

"No such person as aforesaid (referring to the persons mentioned in section :240(1) which includes persons appoirited by the .Secretary of State) who having been appointed by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Sate in Council continues after the establishment of the Dominion to serve under he Crown in India shall be dismis.sed from the savice of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to the

Governor-General or the Governor according as that person is serving in connection with the affairs of the Dominion or of a Province, and no other such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed".

Taking these various provisions together, it is clear that the guarantee of the prior conditions of service and the previous statutory safeguards relating to the disciplinary action are now confined to such as continue in service on and after the establishment of the Dominion to s, erve under the Crnwn, i.e., of the Government of the Dominion or of a Province, as the case may be.

Who the persons are who fall within the category of persons so continuing is clearly indicated by implication in article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, already quoted, which says that any person who immediately before the appointed day is holding any civil post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of a Province, shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India or, .as the case may be, of the Province. It is clear that the continuance contemplated by section 10(2) (a) of the 1ndian Independence Act and by section 240(2) and section 247 of the Government of India Act, as adapted, is the continuance impliedly brought about by this deeming provision in article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order.

But it has to be noted that this provision is specifically preceded by the qualifying phrase "subject to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting his ta3e".

Thus all persons who were pteviously holding civil posts are deemed to have been appointed and hence to continue in service, excepting those whose case is governed by "general or special orders or arrangements affecting his case".

Now, omitting "general orders" which has no application in this case, there can be no reasonable doubt that the special orders or arrangements contemplated herein, in so far as the

Stalt of Madraa

anti anothtr

K. M. Rajagopalatt

Jagannadhadas J.

State of MadraJ

and anothn ; .... v.

K. M. R•jagopal1111

Jagamurdhadu J.

member. of the Secretary of State's services are concerned, are the special orders or arrangements which followed on the Viceroy's announcement dated the 30th April, 1947, in pursuance of which the individual civil servants had been circularised and their wishes ascertained, and the Governments concerned had finally intimated their option not to invite the continuance of the service of particular individuals as has happened in the case of the present plaintiff.

To repel this conclusion, the learned counsel for the respondent urges ( l) that . the "special orders or arrange1I)ents" contemplated by article 7 ( 1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 194'.7, must be valid orders or bilateral valid arrangements made by the appropriate authority, amongst which category according to him, the order of termination of the service of the plaintiff-respondent, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 8th August, 1947, does not fall, and (2) that the previous history commencing from the announcement by the Viceroy is not admissible .to construe the meaning and effect of the Indian Independence Act and the legislative orders made by the Governqr-General thereunder.

As regards the first objection above, there is no reason , to. think that the words "special orders or arrangements" . indicate either. a valid order or a bilateral and valid arrangement.

In view of the his t!Jry as set out above and the extreme urgency with which all these steps had necessarily to be taken before the appointed day in order to facilitate a smooth transition, the legislative authorities concerned must be taken to have proceeded on a recognition of the factual situation as it then existed. .For a similar approach in a similar situa):ion see for instance Raj Rajendra M alojirao Shitole "· The. State of Madhya Bharat(') where this Court held that article 385 of the Constitution proceeded on_ a recognition of the factual situation, at the time, relating to the matter involved,_ Even apart from _-this answer to the objection, the .objection itself appears to be based on a misapprehension.

It is true there is no clear evidence in the

(1) [1954) s.c.R. 748, 757.

case that the order of termination of the service of the plaintiff was one made with the sanction of then Secretary of State.

It may also be that the decision not to retain his services as and from the 15th August, 1947, was based on his past record as admitted in the written-statement and works serious hardship in view of his not having had an opportunity to shpw cause.

But it was an order to come into operation at the precise moment when the Indian Independence Act came into force.

At that moment the Secretary of State's concern with this matter was at an end. There i:s no reason to think that an order of this kind with the sanction of the Central Government, not purporting to exercise a power of termination of services, but acting on the assumption implicit in the Viceroy's announcement that the services would come to an automatic termination and intimating the decision of the appropriate Government not to retain the services of the plaintiff as and from the 15th August, 1947, is not within the competence of the: very Government under whose service, the plaintiff wanted to serve. The very nature of the situation demanded the taking of such anticipatory decisions and the communication of the same to the person concerned, in order to become operative at the crucial moment of the transition of power. As regards the second objection, it appears to us that the contention as regards the inadmissibility of reference to the announcement of the Viceroy and the action taken thereupon by the Central and the Provincial Governments, both in its general aspect as also with reference to -individual cases like that of th.e plaintiff, is without any substance.

The phrase "special orders or arrangements affecting his case" in article 7(1) of the India (Ptovisional Constitution) Order, 1947,. <:an on:ly refer to. this and similar other material culminating in the orders and arrangements relating, to the -concerned individuals. That there were any other kind of special orders or arrangements contemplated by this provision concerning' the Secretary of State's servites has not been suggested and it is clear there were none. That such pre':'iOU'li material which led up to the particular legislative prov $ion is

Stat• of Mtidt1JS

~ IDWl/tn ....

Ir. Al. lllljagopalan

Ja1atlllihadas ].

Slatt of Madras

and anolher

K. M. Rajagopalan

Jagannadhadas J.

admissible in evidence has been so held in Ladore v.

Bennet(') which was held valid in Govindan Sellappah Nayar Kodakan Pillai v. Punchi Banda Mudanayake( 2 ).

As pointed out by Lord Atkin in the case in Ladore v.

Bennett(') at page 477, such documents indicate the materials which can be taken to have been before the Governor-General when he passed the relevant legislative order. This material indicates quite clearly that while the initial option to continue or not in service was with the servant concerned, the final option to continue him or not to continue him was with the appropriate Government and that the special orders or arrangements contemplated were the action taken in pursuance of that final option.

It was faintly suggested that the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April, 1947, was before His Majesty's- Government decided' to advance the date of transfer of power by nearly a yar and that the original announcement contemplated a treaty between the British Government and the future Dominion Government to regulate all these matters and that since no such treaty has in fact been entered into, the announcement was not admissible in evidence.

The fact that the transition of power took the form of legislation by the British Parliament and not of a regular treaty between the two Governments in view of the changed circumstances is not a matter which can in any way effect the situation so far as it relates to the particular matter with which we are con cerned.

It is that very announcement that has been acted upon after the further announcement of the 3rd June, 1947.

This appears clearly from the fact that the circular letter of the Government of India to the various provincial Chief Secretaries referred to this very _announcement a:nd from the further fact that the letter which was sent to each and every individual civil servant was accompanied by a copy of the said announcement.

It is clear, therefore, from the above discussion that a part from the fact that the Secretary of State

(1) (1939) A.C. 468.

(2) (1953] A.C. 514, 528.

and his services disappeared as from the 15th August, 1947, section 10(2) of the Indian Independence Act and article 7 ( 1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order proceeded on a clear and unequivocal recognition of the validity of the various special orders and the individual arrangements made and amount to an implicit statutory recognition of the principle of automatic termination of the services: brought about by the political change.

In our opinion, therefore, the services of the plaintiff came to an automatic termination on the emergency of Indian Dominion.

The special order and arrangement affecting his case that was made in pursuance of the Viceroy's announcement resulted in his service not being continued from and after the 15th August, 1947, and the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration prayed for.

The learned Judges of the High Court in corning to the conclusion they did, have with respect, missed the significance of the phrse "special orders or arrangements affecting his case" used in article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, and failed to appreciate that this was to be construed in the light of all the relevant events that proceeded, commencing from and following upon the -announcement of the Viceroy dated the 30th April, 1947.

The result is that the appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances without costs.

18-83 S.C.India/59

Slal1 of Madrar

and. anat/rer

K. M. Rqjagopaltm

Jagannadhatlas J ~

S 541

sections 81 to 86

STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER

M. RAJAGOPALAN

VIVIAN BosE

BHAGWATI

JAGANNADHADAS

B. P. SINHA

AFAR IMAM JJ

Indian Independence Act, 1947

s. 10(2)

Article 7(1)

ss. 240

Madras

Government of Madras

Dindigal

Government of India

British Government

Dominion of India

15th August, 1947

9th August, 1947

7th August, 194 7

14th August, 1947

State of Madras

Union of India

Klihan Singli

s. 240

Government of India Act, 1935

Article 7( I)

sections 240(2) and 247

India

Article 7(1)

(1948) F.C.R. 44

V. K. T.

Chari

R. Ganapathy Iyer

Porus A. Mehta

P. G. Gokhale

M. K. Nambiar

M. K. Nambiar (C. V. L. Narayan, with him), for the respondent.

C. V. L. Narayan

article 133

7th August, 1947

High Court of Madras

2nd June, 1947

On the 2nd June, 1947, he went on leave.

K. M. Rajagopalata

and another

K. M. Rajagopalata

1955 Sef Modral ""'.,..,,,,,

K. M. Rajago

v.

K. M. Rajago; o/a•

J4gannadhadas ].

Seshadri

7th November, 1951

section 80

15th July, 1952

section 240

Government of India Act, 1935

Lall

Union of India

Dominion of India m pursuance of the Indian Independence Act

15th day of August, 1947

[1948] F.C.R. 44

K. M. RqjagopaJa11

195!t

Siaof Modrtu

arrd onollwr

K. M. RqjagopaJa11

Jaztllllllll/hadtl$ ].

M. Rajagopo

Jagannadhadas

section 240

section 240

Government of India Act, 1935

20th February, 1947

30th April, 1947

Britain

British Parliament

.K. M. Rajagopalan

3rd June, 1947

18th July, 1947

18th June, 1947

30th April 1947

M. RajagoJoltm

persons who have decided to quit service, the earliest -date on which the Government will be in a position to release the officer and in case of persons who offer to continue in service, whether for any reason, they would prefer him not to continue in the service, notwithstanding the officer's desire to remain in the

StaMqfMabu

and onowr

v. r;, M. RajagoJoltm

Jagannadhatlas J.

l!lS5

Sl.

Jagannadhatlas

K. M. Rajogopalan

U of Muas

andonotltn

K. M. Rajogopalan

J•g-..UU. . .,

30th April,

1947

Madras Government

2nd July, 1947

15th August

1947

E. M. Rqjagopala•

JagaMalllulllas

K. M. Rlgagopalan

London

K. M. Rajagopalan

8th August, 1947

On the 8th August, 1947, a formal Government Order No.

19th August, 1947

Rajagopalan

29th September, 1947

On the 29th September, 1947, the Government of Madras pas<ed a G. 0.

Dominion Government of India

Indian Independence Act, 1947

18th July,

1947

India Act, 1935

section 1

Pakistan

15th day of august, 1947

sections 2, 3 and 4

section 5

section 6

England

Parliament

section 7

K. M. Rajagopalon

Jagannadhat!as

M. Rqjagopalan

agOIUladMdas

sections 8 and 9

Section 8(1)

3rd Tune, 1947

section 8(2)

Government of India Act, 1935

section 9

Government of the Dominion

Nambiar

section 9

K. M. R.ajagopalaa

K. M.

K. M. ll<efa10/Jflkm
JaganMdhada1 J.

to the tenure of persons in the position of the plaintiff.

section 244(1)

Government of India Act, 1935

Government of India Act

Section 240

section 247

sections 247

section 247

section 248

Indian Civil Service

section 246

K. M. Rtgaaopolan

section 249

sections 244, 246, 247, 248 and 249

section 7

Indian Independence Act, 1947

United Kingdom

British India

section 10

section 9

section 7(1)(a)

section 10(1)

Government of India Act, 1935

sections 244, 246, 248 and 249 and 278 to 284

sections 240 and 247

section 10(2)

K. M. Rajagopalan

K. M. Rajazopalan

section 240

British P\}Iliament and

section 7(1)

section 10(2)

section 9(1)

article 7(1)

State of Madras

Stat1 of Madras

JagaMadhadas

sections 240 and 247

section 10(2)

section 247

Section 240(2)

article 7(1)

section 10(2)

section 240(2)

section 247

article 7(1)

K. M. Rajagopalatt

State of MadraJ

K. M. R•jagopal1111

Jagamurdhadu

article 7

Raj Rajendra M alojirao Shitole

State of Madhya Bharat

State of Madhya Bharat(') where this Court held that article 385 of the Constitution proceeded on a recognition of the factual situation, at the time, relating to the matter involved, Even apart from _-this answer to the objection, the .objection itself appears to be based on a misapprehension.

article 385

Central Government

article 7(1)

Al. lllljagopalan

Atkin

section 10(2)

article 7

article 7(1)

K. M. Rqjagopaltm

anat/rer

K. M. Rqjagopaltm

Jagannadhatlas J ~