2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 88l

TOPANDAS

ti.

THE ST ATE OF BOMBAY

[BttAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.

SINHA JJ.]

Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 120-A, 120-B-Crimin, i/ conspiracy-Two or more persons must be parties thereto--Onc person alone cannot be held guilty-If other alleged co-conspirators .are acquitted of the charge.

According to the definition of criminal conspiracy in s. 120-A .of the Indian Penal Code two or more persons must be parties to such an agreement and one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy for the simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself.

Where, therefore, 4 named individuals as in the present case were charged with having committed an offence under s. 120-B, I.P.C. and three out of those four were acquitted of the charge, the fourth

accused could not be held guilty of the offence of criminal conspir- "1cy.

CRIMINAL

APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1955.

On Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 8ih October 1954 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1954 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 6th January 1954 of the Court of the 4th Presidency Magistrate, Bombay in Cases Nos. 639-40/P-1955.

H. f. Umrigar, f. B.

Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain for the appellant.

Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale for the respon- .dent.

1955. October 14. The Judgment of the Court was .delivered by '

BHAGWATI J.-The accused No. 1, the Appellant before us, and accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were charged that they, at Bombay, between about June 1950 and November 1950, were parties to a criminal conspiracy hy agreeing to do certain illegal acts, to wit: Firstly,

Topanda,

'Th~ State of Bombay

Bba, gr~; afi].

that they used as genuine forged bills of entry which included bills of entry Exhibit Z; Secondly, that they cheated the Deputv Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, by fraudulently and dishonestly inducing him to deliver to the firm of J. Sobhraj & Co., :m import licence bearing No. 248189/48 to import cycles from United Kingdom of the value of Rs. 1,98960; Thirdly, that they cheated the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, by falsely and dishonestly inducing him to deliver to the firm of J. Soblm; & Co.; an import licence bearing No. 203056/48 to impo:t watches from ' Switzerland of the value of Rs. 3,45,325; and Fourthly, that they cheated the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, by fraudulently and dishonestly inducing him to deliYer to the firm of J. Sobhraj & Co., an import licence bearing No. 250288/48 to import artificial silk piece goods from Switzerland of the value of Rs. 12,11,829; and the abovesaid illegal acts were done in purouance of the said agreement and that they thereby committed an offence punishable under ection 120-B of the Inrfon Penal Code. There were also charges against all the accused under section 471 read with section 465 and section 34 and also under section 420 read witli section 34 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of each of the three illegal acts aforesaid.

The learned Presidency Magistrate. 2ird Court.

Esplamde, Bombav, tried all the accused for the said offences and acquitted all of them. The State of Bombay. thereupon took an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombav, and the High Court reversed the acquittal of accused No. 1 and held him guilty of all the offences with which he had been charged including the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The acquittal of accused 2, 3 and 4 was confirmed .•

The High Court, even though it acquitted accused 2, 3 and 4 of the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, was of the opinion that the deed of assignment put forward by the accused No. 1 in his defence was a false and fabricated document and the said document along with its accompaniments was

forged or was got forged by or with th~ knowledge or connivance of the accused No. 1 and his co-conspimtors and it was impossible to believe that this conspiracy carried out with such meticulous care could be the work of only accused No. 1.

There was no evidence on the record to warrant any inference that the accused No. 1 was acting in the matter in collaboration with any other co-conspirators and the only evidence was in regard to the various acts alleged to have been done by accused 2, 3 and 4 in the matter of the conspiracy and the furtherance of the objects thereof. while considering the question of sentence to be passed on the accused No. 1 who, in spite of the circumstances aforesaid. was convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, the High Court obseryed that "the conspirators, whoever they were, had shown considerable ingenuity and daring in carrying out the object of the conspiracy .and that it felt no hesitation in coming to the conclmion that it was not straitened circumstances or financial difficulties which were the basis of the conspiracy but it was the greed for money on such a large scale as could never be regarded as an extenuating circumstance".

It, therefore, directed that the accused No. 1 should undergo rigorous imprisonment for 18 months for the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.

The application for \eaye to appeal to this Court filed by accused No. 1 was rejected by the High Court.

The accmed No. 1 thereupon applied for and obtined

special 11.'.ave to appeal against the decision of the High Court. The special leaYe was, however, limited to the question of law, whether the com1ct10n under section 120-B is maintainable in view of the fact that the other alleged conspirators had been acquitted.

The charge as framed under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was levelled against 4 named indi.· viduals, the accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. It was not a charge aainst them and other persons unknown wit] 1 the resu1t that if accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that charge, there remained only accused No. l and

Topandas v.

The State of Bombay

Bhagwati J•

1955 ropanJ.,,

The Stall of Bombay

Bhagwati J.

the question, therefore, arises for our consideration whether, under the circumstances, the accused No. 1 could be convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.

Criminal Conspiracy has been defined in section 120-A of the Indian Penal Code :-"When two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done (i) an illegal act, or (ii) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal con-- spiracy".

By the terms of the definition itself there ought to be two or more persons who must be parties to such an agreement and it is trite to say that one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy for the simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself. If, therefore, 4 named individuals were charged with having committed the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, and if three out nf these 4 were acquitted of the charge, the remaining accused, who was the accused No. 1 in the case before us, could never be held guilty of the offence of criminal conspiracy.

If authoritv for the above proposition were needed, it is to be found in Archbold's Criminal Pleading, faidence and Practice, 33rd edition, page 201, paragraph 361 :-

"Where several prisoners are included in the same irnlictment, the jury may find one guilty and ocquit the others, and. vice versa.

But if several are indicted for a riot, and the jury acquit all but two, they must acquit those two also, unless it is charged in the indictment, and proved, that they committed the riot together with some other person not tried upon that indictment. 2 Hawk. c. 47. s. 8. And, if upon an indictment for a conspiracy, the jury acquit all the prisoners but one, they must acquit that one also, unless it is charrred in the indictment, and proved, that he conspired with some other person not tried upon that indictment. 2 Hawk. c. 47. s. 8; 3. Chit. Cr. L., (2nd ed.) 1141; R. v. Thompson, 16 Q.B.D. 832; R. v.

Manning, 12 Q.B.D. 241; R. v. Plummer r1902] 2 K.B. 339". .

Tlie Ki11v: v. Plummer ([19021 2 K.B. 339) which is

cited in support of this proposition was a case in which, on a trial of indictment charging three persons jointly with conspiring together, one person had pleaded guilty and a judgment passed against him, and the other two were acquitted. It was held that

1 he judgment passed against one who had pleaded guilty was baci and could not stand.

Lord f ustice Wright observed at page 343 :-

"Then~ is much authority to the effect that, if il1e appellant had pleaded not guilty to the charge of conspiracy. and the trial of all three defendants together had proceeded on that charge, and had resulted in the conviction of the appellant and the acquittal of the only alleged co-conspirators, no judgment could have been passed on the appellant, because the verdict must have been regarded as repugnant in finding that there was a criminal agreement between the appellant and the others and none between them and him: see Harrison

v. Errington (Popham, 202), where upon an indictment of three for riot two were found not guilty and one guilty, and upon error brought it was he1d a "void verdict'', and said to be "like. to the case in 11 Hen. 4 c. 2, conspiracy against two, and only one of them is found guilty, it is void, for one alone cannot conspire"."

Lord Justice Bruce at page 347 quoted with approval the statement in the Chitty's Criminal Law, 2nd ed., V oL III, page 1141 :-

"And it is holden that if all the defendants mentioned in the indictment, except one, are acquitted, and it is not stated as a conspiracy with certain persons unknown, the conviction of the single defendant will be invalid, and no judgment can be passed upon l:iim".

The following observation~ made by Lord jGstice Jruce ate apposite in the context before m :-

"Thr noint of the passage turns upon the circumstance that the defendants are included in the same

indi-:tment, and I think it logically follows from the naiurc of the offence of conspiracy that, where two or mnre rersons are charged in the same indictment with cornpiracy with one another, and the indictment

Topa11dt1.<

T/:e State of

Bomba_v •

Bhagwati],

Topo."ldas

1he State of Bombay

Bhrzgwati ].

contains no charge of their conspiring with other persons not named in the indictment, then, if all but one of the persons named in the indictment are acquitted, no valid judgment can be passed upon the one remaining person, whether he has been convicted by the verdict of a jury or upon his own confession, because, as the record of conviction can only be made up in the terms of the indictment, it would be inconsistent and contradictory and so bad on its face.

The gist of the crime of conspiracy is that two or more persons did combine, confederate, and agree together to carry out the object of the conspiracy".

This position has also been accepted in India. In Gulab Singh v. The Emperor (A.LR. 1916 All. 141) Justice Knox followed the case of The King v. Plummer, supra, and held that "it is necessary in a prosecution for conspiracy to prove that there were two or more persons agreeing for the purpose of conspiracy" and that "there could not be a conspiracy of one".

To similar effect was the judgment in King-Emperor

v. Osman Sardar (A.LR. 1924 Cal. 809) where Chief Ju<tice Sanderson observed that "the gist of an offence under section 120-B was an alleged agreement between the two accused and when the jury found that one of them was not a party to the agreement and acquitted him of that charge, it followed as a matter of course that the other accused could not be convicted of that charge. The assent of both of them

~'as necessary to constitute tl1c agreement which was the basis of the charge".

Ratanlal in his Law of Crimes, 18th ed., page 270, has summarised the position as it emerges from the above two cases in the manner following :--

"Where, therefore, three persons were charged with having entered into a conspiracy, and two of them were acquitted, the third person could not be convicted of conspiracy whether the conviction be upon the verdict of a jury or upon his own confes- . ,, s1on .

The position in law is, therefore, clear that on the charge as it was framed against the accused Nos. l, 2, 3 and 4 in this case, the accused No. 1 could not

be convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code when his alleged co-conspirators accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that offence.

In our opinion, therefore, the conviction of the acoised No. 1 of the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was clearly illegal. The appeal of the accused No. 1 will, therefore, be allowed to the extent that his conviction under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code ::md the sentence of rigorous impri,; onmeut of l 8 months awanletl to him as the result thereof would be quashed. 'Ve are not concerned here with th~ conviction of the accused No. 1 of the offences under section 471 read with section 465 and also his conv; ction for each of the three offences under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the concurrent sen<ences of rigorous imprisonment for one year in respect of each of them passed by the lower Courts upon him in regard to the same.

These convictions and sentences will of course stand.

PURSHOTTAM GOVINDJI HALAI v.

Sf-LS.EE R M. DESAI. ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR

OF BOMBAY & OTHERS. f S. R.

DAs, AcTING C.J.. Vrvr,1"' BosE,

DAS.

J,1n1t brA:vr and

CHANDRM'EKHARA

JAGANNADHA-

ArYAR JJ.]

Constitution of India, Arts. 13(1 ), 14, 21-l ndian Income T 11x Act 1922 ,(Act XI of 192:!), s. 46(2)-Whether offends Arts. 13(1), 14 & 21 of the Constitutio11-Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876 (Boml.1y

Act !! of 1876)-IV!ietlier offends Art. 14 of the Co11stitutio11.

The assessee carrying on business in the City of Bombav was

ascsscd to income-tax for the years 1943-44 to 1947-48 and 1951-52 by the Income-tax Officer C-1 \Vard Bombay.

As the assessee did not pay the income-tax due the Income-tax Officer issued in April 1951 to the Additional Collector of Bombay a recovery certificate under s. 46(2) nf the Indian Income tax Act, 1922.

In February 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand an.cl as no payment was made he attached the good will and tenancy rights of the assessee's premises by a warrant of attachment dated 24th March 1954.

Topandas

V• The Stal' of

Bombay

Bha; wali ].

October i-f.

88l

TOPANDAS

THE ST ATE OF BOMBAY

SINHA JJ.

Indian Penal Code

ss. 120

s. 120

Indian Penal Code

s. 120

I.P.C

H. f. Umrigar

f. B.

Dadachanji

Rajinder Narain

Porus A. Mehta

P. G. Gokhale

BHAGWATI J.

United Kingdom

Bombay

J. Sobhraj & Co.

Switzerland

Penal Code

section 471

section 465

section 34

section 420

section 34

Indian Penal Code

Esplamde

Bombav

State of Bombay

High Court of Judicature at Bombav

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

section 120

Indian Penal Code

State of Bombay

Bhagwati

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

Archbold

s. 8

s. 8

Bruce

jGstice Jruce

India

Knox

Sanderson

section 120

Ratanlal

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 471

section 465

section 420

Indian Penal Code

Constitution of India

Arts. 13(1 ), 14, 21

s. 46(2)

Arts. 13(1), 14 & 21

Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876

Art. 14

s. 46(2)

Indian Income tax Act, 1922

Stal' of

Bombay


2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 887

be convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code when his alleged co-conspirators accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that offence.

In our opinion, therefore, the conviction of the acoised No. 1 of the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was clearly illegal. The appeal of the accused No. 1 will, therefore, be allowed to the extent that his conviction under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code ::md the sentence of rigorous impri,; onmeut of l 8 months awanletl to him as the result thereof would be quashed. 'Ve are not concerned here with th~ conviction of the accused No. 1 of the offences under section 471 read with section 465 and also his conv; ction for each of the three offences under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the concurrent sen<ences of rigorous imprisonment for one year in respect of each of them passed by the lower Courts upon him in regard to the same.

These convictions and sentences will of course stand.

PURSHOTTAM GOVINDJI HALAI v.

Sf-LS.EE R M. DESAI. ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR

OF BOMBAY & OTHERS. f S. R.

DAs, AcTING C.J.. Vrvr,1"' BosE,

DAS.

J,1n1t brA:vr and

CHANDRM'EKHARA

JAGANNADHA-

ArYAR JJ.]

Constitution of India, Arts. 13(1 ), 14, 21-l ndian Income T 11x Act 1922 ,(Act XI of 192:!), s. 46(2)-Whether offends Arts. 13(1), 14 & 21 of the Constitutio11-Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876 (Boml.1y

Act !! of 1876)-IV!ietlier offends Art. 14 of the Co11stitutio11.

The assessee carrying on business in the City of Bombav was

ascsscd to income-tax for the years 1943-44 to 1947-48 and 1951-52 by the Income-tax Officer C-1 \Vard Bombay.

As the assessee did not pay the income-tax due the Income-tax Officer issued in April 1951 to the Additional Collector of Bombay a recovery certificate under s. 46(2) nf the Indian Income tax Act, 1922.

In February 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand an.cl as no payment was made he attached the good will and tenancy rights of the assessee's premises by a warrant of attachment dated 24th March 1954.

Topandas

V• The Stal' of

Bombay

Bha; wali ].

October i-f.

1!155

Pu.rshotlam Govintlji Halai v.

Shrtt B.M, Dtjai, A1ditior.al Colh'Clor of Bomba;·

nnd othtrs

A sale was held in February 1955.

The sale proceeds not being sufficient to satisfy the assessed t.ax the Additional Collector is.c; ued a notice under s. 13 of the Bombay City Land Rc\enne Act, ] 876 requiring the assessee to appear hcforc him and show cause \Vhy he should not be apprehended and confined to civil prison in s:lti:, f;1ction of the said certified dernand. In default of as:; csSee's app':":arance and showing cause a warrant for his arrest was issued u11der s. 13 of the Bombay Act, 11 of 1876 and he was actually arrested on 1st July 1955.

An application t{) the Bombay High Court tinder Art. 226 of the Constitution for a \Vrit in the nature of a writ of habca,• corpus having proved unsuccessful, an application un<lr.r .i\rt. 32 \Vas filed in the Supren1e Court for the san1e relief. 1\vn n1ain points urged on behalf of the assessce were ·

(a) that ~. 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act under which the Income-tax Officer' issued the recoYery certificate to the Additional Collector of Bombay \Vas void, under Art. 13( l) of the Con'; titutiort in that it offended Art. 21 and Art. 14 of the Constitution;

(b) that s. 13 of the Bombay Land Revenue Act, 1876 (llom hay Act II of 1876) under v:hich the warrant of arrest \Va~ is:iued by the i\<lditional Collector was void under Art. 13( 1) of the (on stitution as the same was repugnant to Art. 14 of the Con<:1it11tion.

1-leld (as regards a) (i) that there \Vas no violation ol fur; da n1ental rig-hts under Art. 21 of the Constitution inas1nuch ;.i-; s. 13 of the Bn1bay Act II of 1876 under which warrant of :nrc-.<; t was issued for the recovery of the de1nand certified under s. 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax A.ct constituted a procedure estahlished by l.:nv.

Both s. 13 of Bombay Act II of 1876 and s. 46 of the ln:!ian fn .. come-tax Act under which action had been taken against th~ assessee were not void and therefore no question of violation of fuildJ- 1ncntal rights under Art. 21 could arise at all;

(ii) the contention that s. 46(2) of the Indian Inc01nc-~.1:-: Act provides for tv.•o <liffeent and alternative 1nethods of recoYcry of the dues and clothes the Collector 'vith the unfettered and unguiJcd power to apply either of the two nlethods inas1nuch a:; it enables the Col1ector at his will to discri1ninate between t\VO defaulters "'ho :ire similarly situated and thus viob.tes the equal protection d:1use of the Constitution V.'as \Vithout force because sub-section (2) of s. 46 does not prescribe t\Vo different procedures. The proviso enartcd therein does not indicate a ditferent and alternative n1ode of recoYerv of the certified amount of tax but only confers aJtlitonal

po\ves on the Collector for the better and more effective application of the only 1node of recoYery authorised by the body of sub-ection

(2) of s. 46 and therefore, there was no question of possibility of discrirninarion at. all;

(iii) the further contention tht s. 46(2) of the Indian Jncoine-

1:1-.: Act viOl:i.tes the equal protection clause of the Constitution and

has thus become void under Art. 14 of the Constitution as s. 46(2) rrquired the Collector, on receipt of the requisite certificate front

ZS.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 889

the. Inc9rne-tax Officer, to recover the amount specified in the certificate as if it were an arrear of the land revenue and there are diffuent laws adopted by different States for the recovery of land revenues and thus 1 here is discrimination on the ground that defaulters :ere treated differently in different States is also without force be- <ause discrimination complained of is a permissible classification and does not offend the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. i 4 as the grouping of the income-tax defaulters in separate categories or dasses State-wise is a territoria 1 classi li.ca ti on which is based on an intelligible differentia and there is a reasonable nexus or co-relation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Income-tax Act. The fact that the income-tax demand is a Union public demand makes no difference in the legal position.

Held, (as regards b) that the contention that s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 became unconstitutional under Art. 13( 1) of the Constitution in that the procedure prescribed by s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 in respect of a defaulter residing in the City of Bombay was harsher and more drastic than the procedure laid down in s. 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 in respect of a defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay was without force because s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 was amended on 8th October 1954 and a new law laid down a law similar to the law laid down by s. 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 and thus the vice of unconstitutionality 'if any' was removed.

State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh & Another ([1953] S.C.R. 254), Shaik Ali Ahmed v. Collector of Bombay (1.L.R. 1950 Born. 150),

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India ( [ 1950] S.C.R. 869) lludhan Chaudhry and other; v. The Swe of Bih1ir ( \ 19551 1 S.C.R.

1045), Middleton v. Texas Powe,. and Light Company (249 U.S. 152), Bowman v. Lewis (101 U.S. 22; 25 L.Ed. 689), The State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manoha1 Singhji ([ 19541 S.C.R. 996), Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Another ( [ l 955J 2 S.C.R. 589) and Erimmal Ebrahim l-lajee v. The Collector of Malabar ( [ 1954 J 26 l.T.R. 509), referred to.

ORIGINAL 1955.

JURISDICTION : Petitior.

No. 270 of

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a Writ in the nature o~ Habeas Corpus.

Hemendra Shah, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the petitioner.

M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.

Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, ( B. Sen and R. H. Dlzebar, with them) for the respondent No. 1. 19-84 S. C. India/59

Pursizottan Govindji Halai

Shree B. M. Desai,

Additional ( .'r1l4 leclor of Bo1 •b 1y

and oth11r.r

Purshottam Govi1uiji Halai v.

Shrte B. M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay and others

1955. October 14.

DAs AcTG. C.J.-This rule was issued on a petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution by one Purshottam Govind ji Halai, a citizen of India, calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued by this Court directing the Superintendent, House of Correction, Byculla, being the second respondent herein, to produce before this Court one Govindji Deoji Halai, the father of the petitioner, who is also a citizen of India, for the purpose of being released forthwith.

The facts which are not in dispute may be shortly stated as follows.

The said Govindji Deoji Halai (hereinafter referred to as the "assessee") is the sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style of Indestro Sales and Service Co. at No. 50-52, Lahar Chaw! Street in the City of Bombay. Two private limited companies, namely, Indestro India Ltd., and Indestro Eastern Ltd., also carry on business and have their respective offices in the same premises.

The assessee is said to have some connection with the two companies the nature of which, however, is not quite clear on the record before us. In respect of his own business of Indestro Sales and Service Co., the assessee was assessed to income-tax for the years 1943-44 to 1947-1948 and !951-1952 by the Third Income-tax Officer, C-1 Ward, Bombay, at and for Rs. 40,178-4-0. The assessee not having paid up the assessed amount of tax the Income-tax Officer on the 10th April 1951 issued to the Additional Collector of Bombay, the first respondent herein, a recovery certificate under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act. It may here be mentioned that the Indestro Eastern, Ltd., was also asessed to income-tax at and for Rs. 1,92,000 and a recovery certificate was also issued by the Income-tax Officer to the Additional Collector of Bombay.

On the !st February, 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand on the assessee for payment of the assessed amount of tax.

No payment

having been made, the Additional Collector attached the goodwill and tenancy rights in the said premises by a warrant of attachment issued on the 24th March

1954. The sale proclamation was issued on the 15th January 1955. The sale was held on the 25th Febru ary 1955 fetching a price of Rs. 33,000 and it wa6 confirmed on the 30th March 1955. The sale proceeds not being sufficient to satisfy the assessed tax the Additional Collector on the 7th June 1955 issued a notice under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876, requiring the assessee to appear before him in person on the 16th June 1955 and show cause why he, the assessee, should not be apprehended and confined to civil jail in satisfaction of the said certified demand. The assessee did not appear in person on the appointed day but on the next day, the 17th June 1955, an Advocate acting on behalf of the assessee wrote a letter to the Additional Collector purporting to show cause why the assessee should not be arrested and sent to the civil jail. The contentions put forward on behalf of the assessee not being considered satisfacto.-y the Additional Collector on the 30th June 1955 issued a warrant for the arrest of the assessee under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876. The assessee was actually arrested on the 1st July 1955.

On the 8th July 1955 an application was made by the present petitioner to the Bombay High Court under article 226 complaining of the arrest of his father, the assessee, and praying for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus for the production and release of the assessee. A rule was issued by the High Court but eventually on the 24th August 1955 the High Court (Chagla, C.J. and Desai, J.) discharged the rule. No application was made to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court from the decision of that High Court but on the 2nd September 1955 the present petition was filed in this Court under article 32 of the Constitution for the relief hereinbefore menfr>ne<l. On the 7th September 1955 a rule was issued by this Court on that petition subject to the question of its maintainability in view of the dismissal by the

20-84 S.C. India/59 ·

Parshouam Gouindji Halai v.

Skree B.M. Desai,

Additional Cot. lector ef Bombay and others

Das Actg. c .. J.

Purslwttam Govin.dji Halai v.

Shree B.M. Desai,

Additional Collector of Bombay and others

Das Aclg. c. ].

High Court of the petition under article 226 from which no leave to appeal to this Court had been sought or obtained. The rule has now come up before us for hearing. In the view we have taken about the merits of the petition it is not necessary for us to consider the question of its maintainability after the dismissal of the petition under article 226 or to make any pronouncement, on this occasion, on the scope and ambit of article 32 of the Constitution in that situation.

The principal contentions urged by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner are as follows, namely,-

(a) that section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act under which the Income-tax Officer issued the recovery certificate to the Additional Colle.:tor of Bombay is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution in that the same offends article 22(1) and (2), anicle 21 and article 14 of the Constitution;

(b) that section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 under which the warrant of arrest was issued by the Additional Collector is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution as the same is repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution.

We proceed to deal with the objections seriatim.

Re. (a) : Section 46 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act which is impugned before us runs as follows :-

"46. (1) ......................... .

(2) The Income-tax Officer may forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears due from an assessee, and the Collector, on receipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover from such assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue : Provided that without prejudice to any other powers of the Collector in this behalf, he shall for -the purpose of recovering the said. amount have the powers which under the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (Act V of 1908), a Civil Court has for the purpose of the recovery of an amount due under a decree.

" The first objection to. the above sub-section is that it

contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (1) and (2) of article 22. In view of the decision of this Court in the State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh & Another( 1 ) this objection has not been pressed before us and we need say no more about it.

The second objection to section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act is that it is violative of article 21.

Article 11 gliarantees that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law.

In this case the assessee has been arrested and is being detained in jail in execution of a warrant of arrest issued under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 for the recovery of the demand certified under section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. As long as those sections stand no complaint can be made of infringement of article 21, for those two sections constitute a procedure established by law. It is only if those sections are void that the question of violation of the fundamental right under article 21 can arise at all.

We have, therefore, to pass on to the third objection to section 46(2) founded on article 14 of the Constitution which alone has been strenuously insisted on before us by learned counsel for the petitioner.

Article 14 is invoked in two ways. It is pointed out that the first part of section 46(2) provides that the Collector, on receipt of a certificate from the Income-tax Officer, shall proceed to recover from the defaulting assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue. It is next said that the proviso to the sub-section invests the CollectOi with all the powers a Civil Court has under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of the recovery of the amount due under a decree. It is submitted that section 46(2) provides for two different and alternative methods of recovery of the dues and clothes the Collector with the power to apply either of the two methods, that is to say, he may issue a warrant of arrest under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 against one defaulter and keep him in detention for a period which may

ll)[i953] S.C.R. 254.

Purshottam Govindji H alai v.

Shree B.M. Desai,

Additional Collector of Bombay

and othns

Das Actg. C. J.

Purshottam GoVindji Halai v.

Skree B.M. Desai,

Additional Collector of Bombay

and others

Das Actg. C. ].

work out to be much longer than six months and he may proceed against another defaulter under the Code of Civil Procedure and arrest and detain him for the maximum period of six months.

The powers that are thus conferred on the Collector by section 46(2) are unfettered and unguided and enable the Collector, at his will, to discriminate between two defaulters who are similarly situated and thereQy violate the behests of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. This argument appears to us to be founded on a misapprehension about the true meaning of section 46(2). On a proper reading, that sub-section does not prescribe two alternative modes of procedure at all. All that the sub-section directs the Collector to do is to proceed to recover the cettified amount as if it were an arrear of land revenue, that is to say, he is to adopt the procedure prescribed by the appropriate law of his State for the recovery of land revenue and that in thus proceeding he is, under the proviso, to have all the powers a Ci vii Court has under the Code.

The sub-sectioh does not prescribe two separate procedures.

The statement to the contrary in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shaik Ali Ahmed v. Collector of Bombay(' ) does not appear to us to be correct. In our opinion the proviso does not indicate a different and alternative mode of recovery of the certified amount of tax but only confers additional powers on the Collector for the better and more effective application of the only mode of recovery authorised by the body of sub-section (2) of section 46. Viewed in this light, there is no question of the possibility of any discrimination at all. This part of the argument cannot, therefore, be accepted.

The other way in which the protection of article 14 is invoked is founded on a comparison of the provisions of the different laws adopted by the different States for the recovery of land revenue. Section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act requires the Collector, on receipt of the requisite certificate from the lncometax Officer, to proceed to recover from the assessee the amount specified in the certificate :is if it were an

(1) I.L.R. [1950] Born. 150, 155.

arrear of land revenue. This means that the Collector must take such proceedings as he would have done if he were engaged in recovering land revenue. Thus a Collector in the City of Bombay in recovering the certified amount of income-tax must proceed under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 (Bombay Act II of 1876) and arrest and detain him for the period therein mentioned which, prior to the 8th October 1954, might have worked out to a period much longer than six months. On the other hand, the defaulting assessee in all other parts of the

State of Bombay has to be proceeded against under section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bombay Act V of 1879) under which he cannot be detained for more than the period limited by the Code of Civil Procedure for the detention of a judgment-debtor in execution of a decree for an equal amount of money. So, even in one State there were two procedures to which defaulting assessees could be subjected according as they were in or outside the City of Bombay. A Collector in the State of Madras in recovering the certified amount of income-tax has to proceed under section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Madras Act II of 1864). When the Collector finds that the certified amount cannot be liquidated by the sale of the property of the defaulting assessee and the Collector has reason to believe that the defaulter is wilfully withholding payment or has been guilty of fraudulent conduct in order to evade payment, the Collector may, under section 48 of that Act, cause the arrest and imprisonment of the defaulter, not being a female.

But that section goes on to say that no person shall be imprisoned for a longer period than two years or for a longer period than six months if the arrear does not exceed Rs. 500 or for a longer period than three months if the arrear does not exceed Rs. 50. A Collector in Wes~. Bengal proceeding to recover the certified amount udder the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 (Bengal Act III of 1913) cannot, under section 31 of that Act, direct the detention of the defaulting assessee in prison for more than six months if the amount is more

Purshottam Govindji Halai

V• Shree B.M. ai,

Additional Coluctor of Bombay

and othlrs

Das Actg. C. ].

PW'shottam Gvvindji Halai v.

Shre B.M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bomba;

and others

Das Actg. C.J.

than Rs. 50 or in other cases for more than six weeks.

The defaulter in the Punjab cannot, under section 69 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Punjab Act XXVII of 1887), be kept in civil jail for more than one month. Section 148 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (U.P. Act III of 1901) limits the period of detention D 15 days and also exempts many persons, e.g. Talukdars and women, from any imprisonment.

The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (Reg. I of 1886) does. not insist on imprisonment at all. A cursory perusal ot the provisions of the different Acts referred to above will at once show that in the matter of recoverv of arrears of land revenue the different States have piescribed different machinery, some obviously harsher than others. The argument is that income-tax being a subject with respect to which the Union alone may make law and the recovery of it being the Union responsibility, the machinery for the recovery of income-tax should be framed on a uniform all-India basis, for to the Union all defaulters who may not pay up the Union demand are similarly situated; but the Indian Income-taX Act by section 46(2) authorises the Collectors in different States to adopt machinery which differs from State to State, so that defaulters are treated differently in different States.

The contention is that section 46(2) which sanctions such discrimination is clearly violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution and has, therefore, become void under article 13( 1 ).

The learned Attorney-General appearing for the respond<; pts seeks to meet the aforesaid argument in two ways. In the first place, he urges that the impugned sub-section does not by itself make any discrimination.

All that it says is that the certified ataount of income-tax is to be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue and there its operation ends.

In recovering the certified demand the Collector has to have recourse to the machinery av:!ilable to him for enforcing a demand for arrears of land revenue hut the provisions of the State laws which prescribe that machinery are not incorporated in section 46(2).

If the State laws are discriminato:-y that vice cannot be imputed to section 46(2).

There is good deal to be said on either side. The State laws prescribe the procedure for the recovery of arrears of land revenue only and they are not, in terms and by themselves, concerned at all with the recovery of income-tax demand.

That machinery is made . available for the purpose of recovery of income-tax by virtue only of section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. In the matter of recovery of income-tax the Collectors adopt the procedure laid down by the State laws, not because the State laws enjoin them to do so but because section 46(2) directs them to do so. In other words, it is section 46(2) which tells the Collectors of Madras to follow the procedure under section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 as if those provisions are set out in the Indian Income-tax Act in extenso and it tells the Collectors of all other States to adopt the procedure prescribed by their own State laws as if the provisions prescribing that procedure were set out in that section. In such a situation it is a plausible argument to say that all the provisions of all the State laws are, mutatis mutandis, to be read into section 46(2) and that, therefore, if there be any vice of discrimination in the State laws that vice cannot but be regarded as having crept into section 46(2). On the other hand, to hold that all the provisions of all the State laws for recovery of arrtars of land revenue have been referentially. incorporated in section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act will lead us into difficulties.

Will the subsequent amendments of the State laws be also incorporated in section 46(2)?

Section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act havingincorporated the State laws as they then stood, how can any State Legislature which has no power to make any law "'.ith respect to income-tax alter or amend section 46(2)? Are the State laws as incorporated in section 46(2) at the time it was enacted to be treated as crystallised and to be applied by the Collectors,

although the State laws for the recovery of arrears of J,.nJ revenue may be materially altered by sub-

Purshottam Govindji Halai

y.;..· Skree B. M. Desai,

Additional Colkctor ef Born/Jay

and others

Dtl.fActg.C.J.

Pun hot tam 'Govindji Halai ... :'Shrtt B. M. Dtsai,

Additional Col~ Jectur of Bombay

and others

IJa1 Actg.C.J.

sequent amendment? These are some of the questions which will have to be answered before we can come to a decision on this point. In the view we take of the second part of the learned Attorney- General's argument to which we shall presently refer it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this part of his argument.

The learned Attorney-General then argues that assmning that section 46(2) by incorporating the cliff- . ereni State laws which are not uniform has become discriminatory such discrimination' is permissible and does not offend the fundamental right guaranteed bv artic!e 14. This argument appears to . us to be well founded.

The meaning, scope and effect of the article in question have been explained by this Court in a serie~ of decisions beginning with that in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Tlze Union of India(') and ending with that in Budhan Chowdhury and others v •. The State of Bihar(').

The following passage in the unanimous judgment of the Full Court in the last mentioned case at p. 1049 briefly summarises the true intendment of the constitutional provision :-

" .......................... It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,

(i) that the classification must. be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the ol:>-

ject sought to be achieved by the statute in question.

The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is :also well-established by the decisions of this Court

(1) [1950] S. C.R. 869.

(2) [1955] I S. C.R. 1045.

that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure".

The respective contentions now put forward as to the validity or otherwise of section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act have to be judged in the light of the principles so laid down by the Full Court.

The Indian Income-tax Act imposes a liability on persons who are amenable to it to pay the tax assessed against them. The assessed amount is a public demand of the Union and has to be recovered, if not voluntarily paid up. The assessees are scattered all over the Union and machinery has to be devised for that purpose. On looking round the Union finds that there is machinery in every State for recovery of land revenues which are State demands.

Each State in its wisdom has devised a machinery which it has considered appropriate and suitable for the recovery of its own public demand.

As was said by the Supreme Court of America in Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Company(1)-

"There is a strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds".

It is conceded that each State is well within its rights to devise its own machinery for the recovery of its own public demand and that no person belonging to one State can complain that the law of his State is more rigorous than that of the neighbouring State. The reason is obvious, for the people of one State are not similarly situated as people of another State. Their needs, as understood by their own Legislature, are different from those of the people of other States. If in the matter of recovery of arrears of land revenue defaulters of one State cannot complain of denial of equal protection of the laws on the ground of the difference in the modes of recovery prevailing in other States. can it be said to be unreasonable for the Union to adopt, for the recovery of its public demand from defaulters of each State, the same mode of recovery

(I) 249 U.S. 15'!, 157.

l'W'sholta.Nt GJ,111tiji Hal4i

"' Shtu B. M. Dual,

Additional Colil{lor ef Bom~

a/Id othArs

Das Adg. C. ].

Purshottam Govindji Halai

Skree B. M. Desai,

Additional Collector of Bomba.J

and gthlrs

Das Actg.C.J.

of public demand prevailing in that State?

Here the defaulters are classified on a territorial or geographical basis and this basis of classification has precisely the same correlation to the object of the Indian Income-tax Act as it has to the object of the different Public Demands Recovery Acts. The objects of the two Acts in this behalf are in pari materia and the same considerations must apply to both.

People of each State .are familiar with and used to the coercive processes which each State finds it necessary to impose on its own people for the recovery of public demand and there can be no hardship and consequently no objection to their being put to the same processes for the recovery of the public demand of the

Union.

The grouping of the income-tax Lcfaulters into separate categories or classes Statewise is certainly a territorial classification which is based on an intelligible differentia and the subjection, for the purposes of the recovery of the certified demand, of, each of such classes of defaulters to the same coercive pre>- cess devised by their own State, on a consideration of local needs, for the recovery of their own public demands, cannot be regarded as bereft of a reasonable nexus or correlation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Indian Income-tax Act any more than it can be so regarded with respect to the respective State laws.

The fact that the income-tax demand is a Union public demand appears to us to make no difference in the legal position.

The Indian Income-tax Act classifies people into various groups for the purpose of imposing the tax and taxes them differently. e.g, insurance companies which are taxed differently from an ordinary business concern and in some cases exempts them altogether, e.g., agriculturists and persons with income below a certain level. There can, on the same principle, be no objection to people of a backward area who may be in need of aid in the shape of tax remission to be exempted from taxation either wholly or in part. If this js right when a question of imposition is concerned. it cannot be wrong when the matter is one of recovery.

The two together illake up the full measure of the

burden and if it is permissible to vary the burden at one end it must be equally valid to vary it at the other for the same or similar reasons.

It is said that the income-tax demand being a Union demand there should be uniformity in the punishment to be meted out to defaulters and it can be done easily by suitably amending section 46(2) so as to provide for the detention of all defaulters for the same period in all cases in all States. In the first p!ace, it is a fallacy to regard arrest and detention of a defaulter who fails to pay income-tax as -a punishment or penalty for an offence. It is a coercive process for recovery of public demand by putting pressure on the defaulter.

The defaulter can get himself released bv paying up the dues. In the next place, the Court is only concerned to interpret the law and, if it is valid, to apply the faw as it finds it and not to enter upon a discussion as to what the law should be. The whole problem before us is whether the apparent discrimination can be supported on the basis of a permissible classification.

The case of Bowman v. Lawis(') is in point. \Ve do not, however, find it necessary to express any opinion on the extreme contention urged

b~ the learned Attorney-General, on the authority of that decision. that a mere territorial classification, bv itself and without anything else, is enough to place the law beyond the operation of the equal protection clause.

Indeed. in that very case it was recognised that it '>Vas not impossible that a distinct territorial establishmel}t and jurisdiction might be intended as or might have the effect of discrimination against a particular race or class where such race or class should happen to be the principal occupants of the disfavoured area. For the purposes of this case it will suffice to sav that the discrimination complained of is not uncostitutional for the simple reaso'n that the impugned law is based on a territorial classification having a reasonable nexus or correlation between that basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Our decision in The State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singh; i(2) which is relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is easilv (I) 101 U.S. 22; 25 L. Ed 989.

(7) [1954] S. C.R. 996.

Purshottam Govindji Ha/ai

!, I; Shree B. , If. Desai~

Additional Collector of Bombay

and others

Das Actg. C. ].

PUl'shottam Govindji Halai

\), Shree B. M. Desai,

Additional Collector of Bombay

and othns

Das Mg.C.J.

distinguishable on facts, for, the law impugned in that case for the first time imposed certain disabilities on Jagirdars of a certain area of the State and there was no evidence that those J agirdars were in any way different from the J agirdars of the other areas of the State. In the present case the classification has been made Statewise and it is clear that in the matter of payment of public. demands of the States the people of different States are not similarly situated and their own States have imposed on them such coerciYe pr<>- cesses as the circumstances and needs of each State require. The law impugned before us has .only :idopted, for its own purpose, the same coercive process which was devised by tbe States for their own purposes which are closely akin or similar to the purpose of the Union. The same or similar considerations apply to both cases. There is the same or similar correlation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved bv the Indian Incometax Act. To deny this power to the Union on constitutional grounds urged before us will lead us to hold that no new offence created by law can be made triable according to the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, for that Code sanctions different modes of trial in different areas, namely, bv a Section 30 Magistrate in some areas, by the Sessions Judge with assessors in certain areas and by .the Sessions Judge with jurors in other areas. Adoption of an existing machinerv devised for a particular purpose cannot. if there be no vice of unconstitutionalitv in the machinery, render it unconstitutional if it is made to subserve a purpose closelv akin or similar to the purpose for which it had been devised. The first objection formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner must, therefore, be rejected.

Re. (b).-As already stated under section 46(2), the Collector, on receipt of the certificate from the Income-tax Officer, has to proceed to recover the certified demand as if it were an arrear of .land revenue.

This means that the Collector of a particular place has to take steps as indicati; d in the State law relating to the recovcrv of arrears of land revenue. As already stated, _ in the State of Bombay there are two

statutes regulating the procedure for the recovery of arrears of land revenue according as the defaulter resides in the City of Bombay or in any other area within the State of Bombay. Section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 applies to the City of Bombay and section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 applies to the rest of the State.

Prior to the 8th October 1954 the portion of section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 which is relevant for our present purpose was as follows :-·

•'lf the sale of the defaulter's property shall not produce satisfaction of the demand, it shall be lawful for the Collector to caus<:i him to be apprehended and confined in the civil jail under the rules in force at the Presidencv for the confinement of debtors, for which purpose a certificate of demand under the Collector's signature sent with the .defaulter shall be the sheriff's sufficient warrant, equally with the usual legal process in ordinary cases of arrest in execution of judgment for debt :

Provided, however, cease at any time upon that it shall in no case of the said sum".

that such imprisonment shall payment of the sum due, and exceed one day for each rupee

Section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 which provides for the arrest and detention of the defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay contains the following proviso :-

"Provided that no defaulter shall be detained in imprisonment for a longer period than the time limited by law in the case of the execution of a decree of a Civil Court for a debt equal in amount to the arrear of revenue due by such defaulter".

A cursory perusal of the two sections will show at once that the procedure prescribed by section 13 of

t~ Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 for the recovery of arreai; s of land revenue was harsher and more drastic than the procedure laid down in section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 in that a defaulter residing in the City of Bomba.y could be kept in detention for a day for every rupee of the arrears which might considerably exceed the maximum period of six months which is the iperiod

Pursh-OUam Govindji Halai v.

Shree B. M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay and others

Das Actg. C. J.

Purshotlam Govindji Halai v.

Shret B. M. Desai,

Additional Collector of Bombay

and others

.Das Actg. C. J.

limited by the Code of Civil Procedure for the detention of a judgment-debtor in civil jail. The argument is that on the aJvent of the Constitution section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 became void under article 13 ( 1) in that it denied to the Bombay defaulter equality before the law in comparison with the defaulter outside the City of Bombay, for he could be detained for a longer period of time. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to express any opm1on whether the discrimination brought about by the two sections was supportable on the ground of a reasonable classification based on territorial considerations so as not to offend the constitutional inhibition.

Assuming, then, but not . deciding, that section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 became inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 and, therefore, became void to the extent of such inconsistency, it was not, as recently explained by this Court in Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Another( 1 ), obliterated from the statute book for all times or for all purposes or for all people. The effect of article 13 ( 1) is that the law could not stand in the way of the enjoyment of fundamental rights. The law was not dead. Further, the law was amended on the 8th October, 1954 when the proviso to section 13 quoted above was replaced by the following proviso :-

"Provided that such imprisonment shall cease at any time upon payment of the sum due and that it shall in no case exceed- ( i) A period of six months when the sum due 1s more than Rs. 50; and

(ii) A period of six weeks in any other case".

This amendment is nothing less than an enactment of a new pr11vision. It lays down a new law which is similar to the law laid down by section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. Therefore, the disparity that prevailed between the original proviso to section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 and the proviso to section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 is now removed.

The

(I) [195512 S. C.R. 589.

disparity between the two provisions as they originally stood being thus eliminated, the vice of unconstitutionalitv is also removed and section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876, as it now stands, cannot be assailed as repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution.

It was faintly suggested that as the assessment proceedings hag been started . and the certificate had been issued by the Income-tax Officer to the Additional Collector of Bombay and the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand and actually attached the properties prior to tl1e amendment; the assessee must be governed by section 13 as it originally stood and not by it as subsequently amended.

We do not think there is any substance in this contention.

It is true that the warrant of attachment of the property was issued on the 24th March 1954 but the sale proclamation was issued and the sale was actually held after the date of amendment. The defaulting assessee might have paid up the dues in which case there would have been no occasion for sale.

It is, therefore, his default that occasioned the sale.

Again, the sale proceeds might have been sufficient to cover the certified demand, in which case there would have been no occasion for the issue of warrant for his arrest. It is only after the sale proceeds were found to be insufficient to satisfy the assessed amount and the assessee failed to pay up the balance that the question of the arrest of the defaulter arose. By that time section 13 had been amended and the warrant of arrest was issued on the 7th June 1955, that is to say, long after the amendment of the section.

In our opinion, the second ground urged by the learned coumel must also he negatived.

We may mention that our attention was drawn to the decision of the Madras High Court in Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee v. The Collector of Malabar(') but learned counsel could not rely upon it as an authority as it was itself under appeal before this Court.

The result, therefore, is that this application must be dismissed.

ii) [1954] 26 I. T. R. 509.

Purshottam Govindji Halai v.

Shre• B. M. Desai,

Additional Collector •f Bo,,..ay

and otkn

Das Actg.C.J.

Purshottam Gf)l)indJi Halai v.

Skree B. M. Desai,

Additional Col~ lector of Bombay

and others

Chandrasekhara

A!Jar. J.

CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-I agree rather reluctantly. The reluctance is not because there is anything in the reasoning of the judgment pronounced just now by my Lord which does not appear to be sound but because I am not happy about the result.

We have to face and accept wholly different consequences for non-payment of income-tax according as the assessee belongs to one State or another. The nature of the tax is one and the same, and it is levied under a single Central Act, and yet the ultimate coercive processes for recovery differ in nature and extent between State and State.

We have to attribute to the legislature a rational classification based on geographical areas, the susceptibilities of people in those areas, and their reactions to the adoption of methods of recovery.

For arrest and detention, wilful default or fraudulent conduct is required in Madras. In Assam, there can be no imprisonment at all.

The periods of detention vary between Bengal, U.P. and the Punjab. Taluqdars in U.P. are completely exempt. Are we to assume that people in Madras are more amenable and generally ready and willing to pay as compared with those in Bombay wno are a tenacious lot and must be subjected to a longer process of detentive coercion? hre the Taluqdars in U.P. exempt from arrest because of possible political repercussions if such influential persons are subjected to such treatment? What is the rationale in providing different periods of detention for Bengal and the Punjab?

We must be in a position to postulate some reasonable basis for the differentiation and we cannot ge~ away - from this necessity by vague references to the wisdom of the legislature or by indulging in pure speculation as to what might have been at the back of its mind. Speaking broadly, for the enforcement of the levy of a central tax like the Income-tax there should be uniformity of procedure .and identity of consequences from non-payment. The machinery for recovery might be different between the several States but the defaulting assessees must be put on the same footing as regards the penalties.

But the law as it now stands can be supported on the grounds mentioned by my Lord and I do not propose to differ.

GIPN-86-84 S. c. India/59-24-7-63 -1,000.

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 471

section 465

section 420

Indian Penal Code

PURSHOTTAM GOVINDJI HALAI

SHREE B.M ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY & OTHERS

DAs

1"' BosE

Constitution of India

Arts. 13(1 ), 14, 21

s. 46(2)

Arts. 13(1), 14 & 21

Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876

Art. 14

Bombav

s. 46(2)

Indian Income tax Act, 1922

s. 13

s. 13

1st July 1955

Bombay High Court

Art. 226

Income-tax Act

Art. 13( l)

Art. 21

Art. 14

s. 13

Bombay Land Revenue Act, 1876

Art. 13( 1)

Art. 14

Art. 21

s. 13

s. 46(2)

s. 13

Bombay Act II of 1876

s. 46

Art. 21

s. 46(2)

s. 46

s. 46

s. 46(2)

Art. 14

s. 46(2)

Income-tax Act

s. 13

Bombay Act II of 1876

Art. 13( 1)

s. 13

Bombay Act II of 1876

s. 157

Bombay Act V of 1879

s. 13

Bombay Act II of 1876

8th October 1954

s. 157

Bombay Act V of 1879

S. 152

S. 22

Article 32

Constitution of India

Hemendra Shah

B. Dadachanji

Rajinder Narain

M. C. Setalvad

C. K.

Daphtary

B. Sen

R. H. Dlzebar

B. M. Desai

article 32

Purshottam Govind ji Halai

India

Govindji Deoji Halai

Indestro Sales and Service Co.

Indestro India Ltd.

Indestro Eastern Ltd.

Third Income-tax Officer, C-1 Ward,

10th April 1951

section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

Indestro Eastern, Ltd.

st February, 1954

24th March

1954

15th January 1955

25th Febru ary 1955

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

30th June 1955

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

article 226

24th August 1955

Chagla

Desai

article 32

Das Act

article 226

article 226

article 32

section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

article 13(1)

article 22(1)

article 14

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

article 13(1)

article 14

Section 46

Income-tax Act

Code of Civil Procedure

article 22

section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

article 21

Article 11

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

article 21

article 21

section 46(2)

article 14

Article 14

section 46(2)

the Code of Civil Procedure

section 46(2)

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

Purshottam Govindji H alai

Shree B.M. Desai

Das Act

Das Act

the Code of Civil Procedure

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

Ci vii Court has under the Code

section 46

article 14

Section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

Bombay Act II of 1876

State of Bombay

section 157

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879

Bombay Act V of 1879

the Code of Civil Procedure

Madras

section 48

Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864

Madras Act II of 1864

section 48

Bengal Act III of 1913

section 31

Purshottam Govindji Halai

Shree B.M. ai

Das Act

section 69

Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887

Punjab Act XXVII of 1887

Section 148

Land Revenue Act, 1901

Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886

Income-taX Act

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

article 13( 1 )

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

section 48

Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864

Income-tax Act

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

section 46(2)

Section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

section 46(2)

article 14

article 14

section 46(2)

Income-tax Act

Income-tax Act

Supreme Court of America

S. 15

Shtu B. M. Dual

Income-tax Act

Income-tax Act

Income-tax Act

section 46(2)

S. 22

Purshottam Govindji

Das Act

Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 30

section 46(2)

Section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

section 157

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

Section 157

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

section 157

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879

Das Act

the Code of Civil Procedure

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

article 13

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

article 14

article 13

8th October, 1954

section 13

section 157

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

section 157

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879

section 13

Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876

article 14

section 13

24th March 1954

section 13

7th June 1955

Madras High Court

Skree B. M. Desai

A!Jar

CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR

Assam

Bengal

U.P.

Punjab


2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

THE STATE CF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.

V. SRINIV ASA A YYANGAR.

[N. H. BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and

B. P. SINHA JJ.]

Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, (Madras Act XXVI of 1948), s.1(3)(4), s. 3(b)-Madras Estates Land Act I of 1908, s. 3(2)-Notification under s. 1(4) of Madras Act XXVI of 1948-Comprising a part of village-Darmila or post-settlement inam in respect of portion of village-Whether the part vests in the Stat!! under s. 3(b) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948-Estate within the meaning of s. 1 (3) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 read with s. 3(2) of Madras Act I of 1908-Whether includes part of th& estate-Compensation to Darmila Inamdar-Darmila minor inam- W hether protected by s. 20 of the Act XXVI of 1948.

At the time of passing of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Madras Act XXVI of 1948), a 15/16th portion of village Karuppur situated within the Zamindari of Ramanathapuram was held by the inamdars under a pre-settlement grant confirmed by the British Government, the estate being permanently settled in 1802.

The remaining one-sixteenth portion was held by the holders of darmila or post-settlement inams made by the proprietor of the estate.

In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 1 ( 4) of. the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 the State of Madras issued a notification dated 22nd \'..!gust 1949 bringing the Act into force as

regard~ the Ramanatha;,, uram estate from 7th Seot 0 'Tlber 1949, the latter Zamindari including one-sixteenth part of Laruppur village. " )e respondent-the holder of the one-sixteenth inam-contended

tfat ur.der s. 1 ( 3) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 the State of Madras had power to notify only what would be estates as defined in s. 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act I of 1908 and that onesixteenth part of the village of Karuppur included in the notification was 1wt an estate as dcfir.e<l in that section and the notification was therefore ultra vires.

Held (repelling the contention) that when th<': <larmila inam does not relate to the entire village but only to a fraction of it, it must be held to retain its chara:ter as part of the estate in the hands of tl1e inamdar al'.d when the est:.c1te is notified under s. 1 ( 4) of the Madras Act XXVI of i 948 the inam will vest in the State under s. 3 ( b) of the Madras Act XXVI of l 948 and therefore one-sixteenth portion of the village of Karuppur forming a darmila inam will vest in the State.

Under the provisions of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 the darmila minor inamdar is entitled to claim compensation for the ttansfer of his portion of the estate to the Government. 3-85 S.C. lndia/59.

October 21.

The State of Madras and another v.

V. Srinivasa Ayyangar

Darmila 1ninor inam is not protected by s. 20 of the Act.

B1"o1hmayya v. Achiraju ( [19~2] I.LR. 45 Mad. 716) and Narayana~·:i'j<! v. Suryanarayudu ( f 19391 66 1.1\. 278)) referred to.

CIVIL

APPELLATE JuRrsmcnoN : Civil Appeal No. 219 of 1954.

On appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 4t:1 day of April 1952 of the Madras High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 8302 of 1950.

V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (R.

Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the appellant.

R. Kesava Iyengar, (M. S. K. Iyengar, with rum) for the respondent.

1955.

October 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This appeal raises a question of considerable importance as to the rights of holders of darmila or post-settlement inams of portions of a village under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras Act XXVI of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The subject-matter of this appeal is an onesixteenth share in the village of Karuppm situated within the ambit of the Zamindari of Ramanatha puram. The holders of this ancient Zamindari were, during the 18th Century, the virtual rulers of that part of South India, and were known as Sethupathis or the Lords of Rameswaram and the adjacent isles and seas.

In 1757 Muthu Bijaya Ragunatha, the then Rajah of Ramanathapuram, made a grant of the whole of the village of Karuppur to a number of persons for various charitable purposes.

In 1802, the estate was permanently settled and an rstimrari sanad was issued in favour of the Rajah. Before that date, the donees under the grant of 1757 representing an one-sixteenth share had abandoned the village, and in consequence, the inam had eo extanti been resumed.

At the permanent settlement, thi• one-sixteenth part was included in the assets of the

Zamindari, and taken into the account in fixing the peishkush thereon.

Subsequent to the permanent settlement, on some date which does not appear on the record, Rani Mangaleswari, the then holder of the Zamindari, made a fresh grant of the one-sixteenth part which had been resumed, to the inamdars who held the remaining 15/16th portion of the village under the grant of 1757.

On 31-12-1863 the Inam Commissioner confirmed the grant of 1757, and issued an inam certificate in respect of the 15/16th portion of the village. The position, therefore, when the Act was passed was that while a 15/16th portion was held by the inamdars under a pre-settiement grant confirmed by the British Government, the remaining one-sixteenth portion was held under post-settlement grant made by the proprietor of the estate.

The Act came into force on 19-4-1949. Under section l ( 4) of the Act, certain sections thereof were to come into force at once and the other sections on such date as the Government might by notification appoint in respect of any zamindari; under-tenure, or inam estate.

In exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the appellant issued a notification on 22-8-1949 bringing the Act into force as regards tht Ramanathapuram estace from 7-9-1949.

Among the villages mentioned as comprised in the Zamindari was "Karuppur (part)" described as an under-tenure.

It is common ground that the part referred to in this notification is the one-sixteenth part, which forms the subject-matter of this appeal.

The respondent who represents the holders of this inam filed the application out of which the present appeal arises, under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the notification dated 22-8-1949 as ultra vires. The ground of attack was that under section 1(3) of the Act, the State had power to notify only what would be estates as defined in section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908

(Madras Act I of 1908), and that the part of the village of Karuppur included in the notification was not an estate as defined in that section. Section 3(2) of Act I of 1908, so far as is material, is as follows :

The State of Madras and another v.

V. Srinivasa

,4.Y)'angar

Venkatarama Ayyar J.

The State of Madras and another v.

V. Srinivasa

A)!Yangar

Venkatarama

M•' J.

"Estate" means-- ( a) any permanentiy settled estate or temporarily settled zamindari ;

(b) any portion of such permanently settled estate or temporarily settled zainindari which 1s separately registered in the office of the Collector ; ( c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir ; ( d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors m title of the grantee or grantees.

* * • * ( e) any portion consisting of one or more villages of any of the estates specified above in .clauses (a),

(b) and ( c) which is held on a permanent undertenure".

The contention of the respondent was that as the grant in question related only to a fraction of a village, it could not be notified as an under-tenure, as under section 3(2) ( e) an under-tenure would be an estate only if it related to a whole village or villages. The appellant conceded that the inam in question was not an under-tenure as defined in section 3(2)(e), as it comprised only part of a village, but contended that even though it was not in itself an estate, it vn1s, nevertheless, {Jart of the Zamindari of Ramanathapuram, being a post-settlement grant of portion of a vilbge comprised therein, and that when that estate was notified, the entiretv of it including the inam i11 question must. vest in the Government under section 3 (b) of the Act. The respondent demurred to this contention.

In addition, he raised the further contention that even if post-settlement minor inams were within the operation of the Act, they would be protected by section 20 of the Act, which runs as follows:

"20(1) In cases not governed by sections 18 and 19, where, before the notified date, a landholder has created any right in any land (whether by way of lease or otherwise) including rights in any forest,

mines dr minerals, quarries, fisheries or ferries, the transaction shall be deemed to be valid ; and all rights and obligations arising thereunder, on or after the notified date, shall be enforceable by or against the Government : Provided that the transaction was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time :

Provided further that any such right created on or after the 1st day of July 1945 shall not be enforceable against the Government, unless it was created for a period not exceeding one year : Provided also that where such right was created for a period exceeding one year, unless it relates to the private land of the landholder within the meaning of section 3, clause (10), of the Estates Land Act, the Government may, if, in their opinion, it is in the public interest to do so, by notice given to the person concerned, terminate the right with effect from such date as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than three months from the date thereof".

The argument of the respondent was that a postsettlement minor inam would be a right in land created by a landholder falling within section 20, that the notification of the estate under section 1(3) would not ipso facto divest the inamdar of his title to the lands, and that he would be entitled to hold them subject to any action that might properly be taken by the State under section 20.

The learned Judges of the Madras High Court agreed with the appellant that post-settlement minor inams fell within the operation of the Act ; but they accepted the contention of the respondent that they were governed by section 20 of the Act.

As it was common ground that the State had not proceeded under that section, they held that the notification was ultra vires, and accordingly quashed the same in so far as it related to the inam forming part of Karuppur village. The appellant applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court against this decision, and though the value of the subject-matter was far below the appeaiable limit, the learned Judges granted a certificate under article 133(l)(c) on the

19'55

The Stau of Madras and

another

V. Srinivasa

Ayyangar

V enkatarama

AyyarJ.

The State of Madras and

anothn

Y. Sriniua.ro

bangar

Ymkatarama

41,., J.

ground that the question involved was one of great public importance. That is how the appeal comes before us.

Two questions arise for decision in this appeal : (1) Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 ? (2) If they are, are they governed by section 20 of the Act ?

On the first question, the appellant does not contend that the inam in question is in itself an estate as defined in section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act and liable as such to be notified under the Act.

His contention is tllat when the Zamindari of Ramanathapuram was notified-and there is no dispute that it was validly notified, as it was a permanently settled estate falling within section 3(2) (a) of the Madras Estates Land Act-minor post-settlement inams of lands within the Zamindari would vest in the State as part of the Zamindari under section 3(b) of the Act. Section . 3(b) is, omitting what is not material, as follows :

"With effect on and from the notified date and save as otherwise expressly provided in mis Act, ....... . . . . . . . the entire estate . ... shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them, free of all encumbrances".

The point for decision is whether post-settlement minor inams are parts of the estate out of which they were granted. If they are, then they will vest in the Government under section 3(b ). If they are not, they will remain unaffected by the notification of the parent estate.

The status of holders of these inams had been the subject of considerable divergence of judicial opinion in the Madras High Court. To appreciate this, reference must be made to the following definition of 'landholder' in section 3(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act:

"Landholcicr" means a person owning an estate or part thereof and includes every person entitled to collect the rents of the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of any transfer from the owner or his predecessor-in-title or of any order of a competent

Court or of any provision of law".

Leaving out the inclusive portion of the definition as not relevant to the present question, it will be seen that owners of parts of an estate would also be landholders. The question then arose for decision whether darmi!a minor inamdars were landholders as defined in section 3(5). of the Estates Land Act. If they were, the tenants would acquire occupancy rights under section 6, and proceedings against them could be taken only in the revenue courts and not in the civil courts, and in general, the rights and obligations of the inamdar and the tenants would be governed by the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act. One view was that as the inamdars had to pay quit rent or jodi to the grantors, their, status could not be that of owners and therefore they could not be said to own parts of an estate. The contrary view was that the inamdars were in substance owners of the lands granted to them, and that the liability to make a fixed annual payment did not detract from their character as owners, and they would be landholders owning parts of an estate. In view of this conflict of opinion, the question was referred to the decision of a Full Bench in Brahmayya v. Achiraju(t ), which held by a majority that minor darmila inamdars were landholders as defined in section 3(5) of the Estates Land Act.

This decision was based both on the ground that the inamdars were in the position of owners of parts of an estate and that they were also persons entitled to collect rent, within the inclusive portion of the definition. · In Narayanaraju v. Suryanarayudu( 2 ), the question whether the grantee of a portion of a village subsequent to the settlement was a landholder as defined in section 3(5) came up for decision before the Privy Council.

After reviewing the authorities and the conflicting views expressed therein, the Board agreed with the opinion expressed by the majority of the learned Judges in Brahmayya v. Achiraju( 1 ), and held that the

grantee of a post-settlement minor inam would be a landholder on both the grounds mentioned in their

(!I [1922] I.L.R. 45 Mad. 716.

(2) [1939] 66 I.A. 278.

The Slate of Madras and

another

V. Srinivasa

Ayyangar

Venkatarama

Ayyar J.

TM StaJe of Madras and

another

V. Srinivasa

Ayyangar

Venkatarama

Ayyar ].

judgments.

They discarded "the doctrine that so long as the zamindar reserves any mterest, however insignificant, the permanent grantee from him cannot be the owner'', and observed that the words "part of the estate" occurring in the definition must be given their prima facie meaning. The Board felt greater difficulty in accepting the view that the inamdar was a landholder entitled to collect rent within the inclusive portion of the definition.

But they expressed themselves satisfied on either ground that "the Full Bench decision of 1922 represents a careful and reasonable solution of a stubborn ambiguity in the Act, and that it ought not now to be overruled having regard to the time which has elapsed and to the character of the interests affected thereby". Thus, it was settled law in Madras at the time when Act XXVI of

1948 was passed that minor darmila inamdars were owners of parts of an estate. Construing section 3(b) in the light of the law as then accepted, when a notified estate vests in its entirety in the State under that prov1S1on, a minor darmila inam which forms part of it must also vest in it.

Sri R. Kesava Ivengar learned counsel for the respondent, argued that decis; ons on section 3(5) ot the Madras Estates Land Act on the meaning of the word 'landholder' as defined therein, could not he usefully referred to for construing the true scope of section 3(b) of Act XXVI of 1948, as the definition in the Madras Estates Land Act was only for purposes of settling the right5 of landlords and tenants, and would be irrelevant for determining the rights of the inamdar as aga; nst the State. But the ground of the decision in Bralzmayya v. Ac!ii•aju(') and Narayanaraju v. Suryanarayudu(') is that the grantee of the inam is in the position of an owner of the part of the estate granted to him, and that would be relevant when the controversy is as to his true status, whether the dispute is between the landlord and the tenant or between the inamdar and the State. If the inamdar is owner in relation to his tenants, it would be illogical to hold that he is not that, in relation to (!) [1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 716.

(2) [1939) 66 I.A. 278.

the State. The question is, in our opinion, concluded by section 2(8) of Act XXVI of 1948 which defines a landholder as including a darmila inamdar, and that is a statutory recognition of the doctrine laid down in Brahmayya v.

Achiraju (1) and Narayanaraju v.

Suryanarayudu(2) that darmila inamdars are owners of parts of an estate. The result then is that when the <larmila inam does not relate to the entire village but only to a fraction of it, it must be held to retain its character as part of the estate in the hands of the inam<lar, and when the estate is notified under section 1 ( 4) of the Act, the inam will vest in the State under section 3(b).

It is next argued for the respondent that the Act makes no provision for award of compensation to minor darmila inamdars, and that as a statute is not to be construed as taking away the property of any person unless there is a provision for payment of compensation therefor, these inams should be held to be outside the operation of the Act. Reference was made in this connection to section 45 of the Act under which the compensation payable in respect of an impartible estate-and Ramanathapuram is oneis to be apportioned dfter payment of debts among the members of the family. It is said that under this section the respondent would have no right to share in it. This contention is clearly erroneous. The material provisions relating to the award of compensation are sections 25, 27, 37 and 44.

Under section 25, the compensation is to be determined for the estate as a whole and not separately for each of the interests therein. Section 27 lavs down how the basic income in the case: of zamindari.s is to be fixed.

Under section 27(i), it has to include one-third of the gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of all lands in the estate, and under section 27(iv) "one-third of the average net annual miscellaneous revenue derived from all other sources in the estate specified in section 3 (b) ".

Thus, the income from the lands comprised in the minor inam which is a part of the estate is included in the total income of the zamindari. Under section (I) [1922] I.L.R. 45 Mad. 716.

(2) [1939] 66 I.A. 278.

The State of Madras and

another

V. Srinivasa Ayyangar

VenkataramQ

,4.yyar ].

The State of Madras and

another

Y. Srinivasa

Ayyangllf'

Yenkatarama

Ayyar ],

37, the compensation payable in respect of an estate is calculated in terms of the basic income on the scale prescribed therein: Section 44 enacts that the Tribunal is to "apportion this compensation among the principal landholder and any other persons whose rights or interests in the estate stand transferred to the Government' under section 3(b )". There cannot be any doubt on . these provisions that the darmila minor inamdar is a person who is entitled to claim compensation for the transfer of his portion of the estate to the Government. Then comes section 45 on which the respondent bases his contention.

That applies only to the distribution of the compensation determined under section 44 as payable to the principal landholder, when he is the holder of an impartible estate.

It leaves untouched the rights of minor darmila inamdars to claim compensation under section 44. The contention of the respondent that the Act provides no compensation to them, and that they should therefore be held to fall outside the Act must accordingly be rejected. ·

(2) That brings us on to the second question whether a post-settlement minor inam is a right in land created by a landholder within the intendment of section 20 of the Act. At the very outset, it seems somewhat inconsistent to hold that a darmila minor inam is patt of an estate, and also that it is governed by section 20. If it is part of an estate, it must automatically vest in the Government under section 3(b ). But if it falls within section 20, the title to it will continue to stand in the inamdar with a right in the.

Government to take action underthe third proviso, subject to the conditions laid down therein. It was argued for the respondent that section 3 operates on its own terms only "save as otherwise expressly provided herein", and that section 20 was such a prov1s10n.

It is somewhat difficult to follow this argument, because if section 20 applied to darmila minor inams, then they could never fall within the operation of section 3'(b ). And how is . this result to be reconciled with the conclusion that they are parts of

the estate, and that the inamdar is a landholder for purposes of the Act ?

But it is argued for the respondent that the words "rights in land created by landlord" are of the widest import and would take in d; irmila minor inams. The point for decision is whether this contention is correct.

We start with this that a darmila minor inamdar is a landholder as defined in section 2(8) of the Act, and he is that, by reason of his being the owner of a part of the estate. Can such a person be held to be one who has obtained a right in the land from the landholder within section 20 ? The Act makes a clear distinction between estates held by landholders and rights and interests held by other persons in or over estates.

Section 3(b) enacts that when there is a notification under section 1 ( 4), the entire estate shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in it.

We have held that the part of the estate belonging to a darmila inamdar would vest in the Government.

Section 3 ( c) provides that on notification all rights in or over the estate shall cease and terminate.

Section 3(b) and section 3(c) deal with two distinct matters which may respectively be described in broad terms as ownership of the estate and rights in or over estate not amountir.g to ownership, and these two categqries are mutually exclusive. Now, turning to section 20, it protects rights in land by way of lease or otherwise created by the landholder before the notified date. In this context, and having regard to the distinction between estates under section 3 (b) and rights over estates under section 3 ( c), the rights mentioned in section 20 can only refer to the rights dealt with in section 3(c), and not to ownership which is within section 3 (b). When, therefore, the transaction for which protection is claimed under section 20 is one which vests ownership of the estate or a portion thereof in the transferee, it will fall outside the section.

In other words, section 20 has no application to transactions by which a person becomes a lanr1holder by reason of ownership of even a part of the estate being transferred to him, and that being the character of a darmila minor inam it is not pro-

The State of Madras and

another

V. Srinfoasa

Ayyangar

Venkatarama

Ayyar J.

The State of .. \1.adras and

another

V. Srinivasa

Ayyangar

Venkatarama

Ayyar ].

tected by section 20.

There are also indications in the language of section 20 pointing to the same conclusion.

Section 20(2) provides that the persons whose rights are terminated under the proviso to section 20(1) shall be entitled to compensation having regard to the value of the right which is terminated and the unexpired portion of the period for which the right is created.

These words are more appropriate to connote rights which are to be exercised for specified periods, such as lease or contract for the exploitation of mines or forests for a term than "ownership of the estate".

There is one other consideration, which lends support to this conclusion. The object of the Act was to establish direct relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil, and to abolish all intermediate tenures.

In Madras, the rights and obligations of intermediate tenure holders were regulated by the Madras Estates Land Act, and under that Act the intermediaries consisted not merely of the holders .of the estates as defined in section 3(2) of that Act but also holders of post-settlement minor inams as settled by decisions of the highest authority. If the purpose of the Act is to be fully achieved, it would be necessary to abolish not merely estates as defined in section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act but also darmila minor inams. But jf the co11tention of the respondent is to be accepted, it is only the estates mentioned in section 3(2) that will, on notification, vest in the Government and not the minor i nams.

These will continue to be held by the inamdars under section 20 until they are terminated in accordance with the proviso tl1erein, and survve as islets in the landscape even after the parent estates have .disappeared from the scene. The legislation must to this extent be held to have failed to achieve its purpose.

And this is not all. If the contention of the respondent is correct, then the minor inamdars will not mere! y be unaffected by the Act but will actually be better off for it. Under section 3 (a) of the Act, the Madras Estates Land Act stands repealed on and from the notified date, and as it is by virtue of this

Act that the tenants became entitled to occupancy rights, the inamdars would, on notification, be free to eject tenants. and settll:'. their own terms with them. \Ne cannot accede to a contention which results not merely in the frustration of the object of the Act but further produces consequences, the reverse of what were intended. On the other hand, the contention of the appellant that minor inams fall outside section 20 and would vest straightaway in the State under section 3 (b) will have the effect of extinguishing the rights of the inamdars, and enabling the State to issue ryotwari pattas to the tenants in oceupation. We prefer to accept this contention, as it fully effectuates the intention of the legislature. In the result, we must hold that the one-sixteenth portion of the village of Karuppur forming a darmila inam will vest in the Government under section 3 (b) of the Act, and that the only right of the inamdars is to share in the compensation under the terms of the Act. The petition of the respondent in so far as it relates to this inam must be dismissed.

This appeal is accordingly allowed, and in accordance wit~1 the terms of the certificate granting leave, the appellant will pay the costs of the respondent in this Court. The parties will be:.ir their own costs in the court below.

ANANDA BEHERA AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER

[S. R. DAs, AcnNG C. J.,

VIVIAN BosE,

]AGAN-

NADHADAS,

JAFF.R IM.'\M and

CHANDRASEKHARA

AIYAR JJ.] Ft; ndamental Rights, Enforcement of-Oral sale of fishery rights for future years by owner of estate before it vested in the State by legislation-Nature of such rights-Profit a prendre, if immovable property requiring registered imtrument for transfer-Such sale, if creates any right to property-Non-recognition by the State, if transgresses any fundamental 1ights-Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1) (/), 31(1)-0rissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (Orissa Act I of 1952) -Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 54.

Thi Stat• of Madras and

anothu

V. Srinivcstt

Ayyangar

Vmkatarama

Ayyar].

Octob., 2 7.

THE STATE CF MADRAS AND ANOTHER

SRINIV ASA A YYANGAR

N. H. BHAGWATI

B. P. SINHA JJ.

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

s. 3(b)

Madras Estates Land Act

s. 3(2)

s. 1(4)

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

s. 3(b)

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

s. 1

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

s. 3(2)

Madras Act I of 1908

s. 20

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

Karuppur

British Government

s. 1

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

State of Madras

s. 1

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

s. 3(2)

Land Act I of 1908

s. 1

s. 3

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

s. 20

CIVIL

APPELLATE

V. K. T. Chari

R.

Ganapathy Iyer

P. G. Gokhale

R. Kesava Iyengar

M. S. K. Iyengar

Madras Act XXVI of 1948

Karuppm

South India

Muthu Bijaya Ragunatha

Rani Mangaleswari

article 226

section 1(3)

section 3(2)

Madras Estates Land Act, 1908

Madras Act I of 1908

Section 3(2)

Venkatarama Ayyar

section 3(2)

section 3(2)(e)

section 3

section 20

sections 18 and 19

1st day of July 1945

section 3

section 20

section 1(3)

section 20

Madras High Court

section 20

Karuppur village

article 133(l)(c)

Stau of Madras

State of Madras

Ymkatarama

section 20

section 3(2)

Ramanathapuram

section 3(2)

section 3(b)

section 3(b )

section 3(5)

section 3(5)

section 6

section 3(5)

section 3(5)

Slate of Madras

Madras

section 3(b)

R. Kesava Ivengar

section 3(5)

section 3(b)

section 2(8)

section 1

section 3(b)

section 45

Ramanathapuram

sections 25, 27, 37 and 44

section 25

Section 27

section 27(i)

section 27(iv)

section 3

State of Madras

Section 44

section 3(b )

section 45

section 44

section 44

section 20

section 20

section 3(b )

section 20

section 3

section 20

section 20

section 3

section 2(8)

section 20

Section 3(b)

section 1

Section 3

Section 3(b)

section 3(c)

section 20

section 3

section 3

section 20

section 3(c)

section 3

section 20

section 20

State of .. \1.adras and

section 20

section 20

Section 20(2)

section 20(1)

section 3(2)

section 3(2)

section 3(2)

section 20

section 3

section 20

section 3

section 3

ANANDA BEHERA

STATE OF ORISSA

CHANDRASEKHARA

AIYAR

Constitution of India

Arts. 19(1)

Estates Abolition Act, 1951

Orissa Act I of 1952

Transfer of Property Act

s. 54