THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS

SANGRAM SINGH

ELECTION TRIBUNAL; KOTAH,

BHUREY LAL BAY A

[VIVIAN BosE, B. JAGANNADHADAS and

BHUVANESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, JJ.)

Reprcse11tation of tht' People Act (XLIIJ) of 1951, section 105-Effect of-Finality and condusi"£Jeness of orders of Election Tribunals-Article 136 of Constitution-7urisdiction of -:supreme Court-1urisdiction and powers of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution-Whether in any way affected-Writ of Certiorari-Principles governing grant of-Laws of procedure-Grounded on natural justice-Designed to promote justice-Representation of the People Act of 1951, sub-section (2) of section 90-Procedure

for trial of Election petitions-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, sections 27, 30 and 32-Disiinction between "Penalty" for non-appearance of parties to suir and consequences flowing from non-appearance in response to summons---Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 5, rules 1 and 5 and Order 8, rules 1 and 14, Order 9, rules 6(l)(a), 2, 7, 12 and 13-0rder 15, rule 3-0rder 17, rules 1(1) and 2- Trial of suits-First hearing and adjourned hearing-Disfinction- Conseq11c11ces of 1wn-appearancc-Ex part<! he<1ri11g and 'ex parte order-Principles i; m•erning discretion of Courts-Adjournment af hearing---{,'om•euiencc of wit11esses.

Notwithstanding the provision in section 105 of the Representation of the People Act (Act XLill) of 1951 that every order of an Election Tribunal made under the Act shall be final and conclusive, the High Court and the Supreme Court have unfettered jurisdiction to examine whether the tribunal, in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, has acted kgally or otherwise. This jurisdic-· tion cannot be taken away bY. a legislative device that purports to confer power on a tribunal to act illegally. The legality of an act or conclusion is somethipg that exists outside and apart from the decision of an inferior tribunal. It is a part of the law of the land which cannot be finally dett"rmined or altered by any tribunal of limited jurisdiction. The High Courts and the Supreme Court alone can determine what th.: law of the land is i•is-a-vis all other Courts and tribunals and they alone can pronounce with authority and finality on what is kgal and what is not. All that an inferior tribunal can do is to reach a t.:ntativc conclusion which is subject to review under Artidt>s 226 and 136 nf the Constitution. The jurisdicti1)n of th.: High Courts under Anick 226, with rhat of thi.: Supreme Court above them, n:mains to its fullest extent despite section 105

March 22

1Y55

Su11gran1 Singh

E/e,1iou Tribunal, Ko1uh, Bhurey Lat

Bay a

of the Representation of the People Act. Limitations on the exercise of such jurisdiction can only be imposed by the Constitution.

The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution are i::liscretionary and, though no limits can be placed upon that discretion, it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrarily. In the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Courts should not act as Courts of Appeal or revision to correct mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense.

It is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about special rights, as in election cases, decided as speedily as may be. The High Courts should not therefore en:crtain petitions for prerogative writs lightly in this class of case.

The appellant filed an election petition under section 100 of the Representation of the People Act. He appeared on the first and subsequeqt hearing at Kotah. The proceedings were then adjourned for certain hearings at Udaipur. The appellant did not appear on the first three hearings at that place so the tribunal proceeded "' parte. His counsel appeared on the fourth hearing but was not allowed to take any further part in the proceedings because no good cause was shown for the earlier non-appearance and so the tribunal refused to set aside its "ex parte order".

Held, (I) J, Tnder section 90(2) of the Representation of the People Act the procedure for the trial of election petition is to b~, as near as may be, the same as in the trial of suits under the Civil Procedure Code;

(2) under the Civil Procedure Code there is no such thing as an "ex parte order for non-appearance" which precludes further appearance at an adjourned hearing until the Order is set aside. If a party. appears at an adjourned hearing the court has a discretion (which must be exercised judicially) either to allow him to appear on such terms as it thinks fit, or to disallow further appearance; but

(3) if he is allowed to appear then, unless good cause is shown under Order 9, rule 7 for the earlier non-appearance the proceedings must continue from the stage at which the later appearance 1s entered and the party so appearing cantlot be relegated to the position he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hearing or hearings; also,

( 4) in exercising its discretion the court must see that justice is done to all concerned, including the witnesses.

Rule 6(1) (a) of Order 9 of the Civil Procedure Code is confined to the first hearing of the suit and does not apply, per se to subsequent hearings. 0.9, r.7 gives a pany a right to he relegated to .the position he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hearing or hearings if he shows good cause. It does not per se prevent further appearance when no good cause is shown. 0. I 7, r.2 applies at the adjourned hearing and there, the Court is given a wide discretion to make such order as it thinks fit.

1955 A code of procedure is a body of law designed to facilitate justice and further its ends, and should not be treated as an enactment providing for. punishments and penalties. The laws of pro- Sangram Singh cedure are grounded on the principl~ of natural justice which rev. quires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions Elect ion Tribunal, should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that Kotah, Bhurey Lal affect their Ii ves and property should not continue in their absence Baya and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.

Subject to clearly defined exceptions the laws of procedure should be construed, wherever reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. The court is invested with the widest possible discretion to see that justice is done to all concerned. No hard and fast rule can be laid down; and the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion will have, in a given case, to determine what consequences are to follow from non-appearance. An order awarding costs, or an adjournment, or the consideration of the written statement and the framing of the issues on the spot, can in some cases meet the ends of justice. In other cases, more drastic action may be called for.

By "ends of justice" is meant not only justice to the parties but also to witnesses and others who may be inconvei:ltenced. The convenience of the witnesses, which deserves the greatest consideration, is ordinarily lost sight of in this class of case. Justice strongly demands that this unfortunate section of the general public compelled to discharge public duties, usually at loss and inconvenience to themselves should not be ignored in the over-all picture of what will best serve the ends of justice; and it may well be a sound exercise of discretion in a particular case to refuse an adjournment and permit the plaintiff to examine the witnesses present and not allow the defendant to cross-examine them. But broadly speaking, after all the various factors have been taken into consideration and carefully weighed, the endeavour should 'be to avoid snap decisions and to afford the parties a real opportunity of fighting out their caso::s fairly squarely.

The Court must in e\ery case exercise the discretion given to it. Its hands are not tied by a so-called "ex parte order", and, if it thinks they are tied by rule 7 of Order 9 of the Code, then it is not exercising the discretion which the law says it should, and in ii given case interference may be called for.

Held, that the Election Tribunal did not exercise the discretion given to it by law because of a misapprehension that it had none.

It was directed tO do so now and to proceed with the further hearing of the case in accordance with law.

Hari Vishnu v. Ahmed Ishaque ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104), Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghurai Singh ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 267), and .Raj Kruhna Bose ".· Binod Kanungo ([1954] S.C.R. 913, 918), apphed. Harzram v. Pnbhdas (A.LR. 1945 Sind 98, 102), distinguished. Sewaram v. Misrimal (A.I.R. 1952 Raj. 12, 14), overruled.

Venkatasubbiah v. Lakshminarasimham (A.l.R. 1925 Mad. 1274), approved. Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar (I.L.R. 40 Mad.

Sa11gra111 Singh

Electio11 Trih1111al, KotaJ,, B!iurey Lal

Bay a

793), T. M. Ba,.,.et v. African l'roducts Ltd. (A.LR. 1928 P.C. 261,

262) and Sa/1ibzada Zei111<labdi11 Khan v. Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Khan (5 I.A. 233, 236), applied.

Case remilfed 10 the Trih1111a!:

CIVIL

APPELLATE

.IURISDIC110N: No. 214 of 1954.

Civil Appeal

Appeal under Article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 17th July 1953 of the High Court of Rajasthan (Bapna and Ranawat JJ.) in Civil Writ Application No. 128 of 1953.

R. K. Ras1ogi and Gan pat Rai. for the appellant.

R. C. Prasad, for S.l. Chhihhrr. for respondent No. 2.

1955. March 22.

The; Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BosE J.-The second respondent Bhurey Lal filed an election petition under section 100 of the Representation of the People Act against the appellant Sangram Singh and two others for setting aside Sangram Singh's election.

The proceedings commenced at Kotah and after some hearings the Tribunal made an order on 11-12-1952 that the further sittings would be at Udaipur from the 16th to the 21st March, 1953. It was discovered later that the 16th was a public holiday, so on 5-1-1953 the dates were changed to "from the 17th March onwards" and the parties were duly notified.

On the 17th the appellant did not appear nor did any of the three counsel whom he had engaged, so the Tribuna I proceeded ex pa rte after waiting till

1-15 P.M. . " The Tribunal examined Bhurey Lal and two witnesses .on the 17th. five more witnesses on the 18th

ari~ , on the 19th the case was adjourned till the 20th.

"~On the"20th one of the appellant's three counsel, Mr. 'Bhartit Raj, appeared but was not allowed to

' ..

take any part in the proceedings because the Tribu- 1955 nal said that it was proceeding ex parte at that stage.

Sangram Singlr Three more witnesses were then examined. v.

On the following day, the 21st, the appellant made Election Tribunal. an application asking that the ex parte proceedings be Korah, Bhurey Lal set aside and asking that he be allowed to cross-ex- Baya amine those of Bhurey Lal's witnesses whose evidence BoseJ. had already been recorded.

The Tribunal _heard arguments and passed order the same day rejecting the application on the ground that the appellant had

"failed to satisfy ourselves that there was any just or unavoic; lable reason preventing the appearance of respondent No. l himself or of any of his three learned advocates between the I 7th and the I 9th of March. 1953". and it added-

"at all events, when para 10 of the affidavit makes it clear that Shri Bharatra.i had already received instructions to appear on 17-3-1953 there was nothing to justify his non-appearance on the I 8th and 19th of March. I 953. if not. on the I 7th as well".

The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan and further proceedings before the Tribunal were stayed.

The High Court rejected the petition on 17-7-1953 on two grounds- ()) "In the first place. the Tribunal was the authority to decide whether the reasons were sufficient or otherwise and the fact that the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the reasons set forth by counsel for the petitioner were insufficient cannot be challenged in a petition of this nature" and

(2) "On the merits also, we feel no hesitation in holding that counsel for the petitioner were grossly negligent in not appearing on the date which had been fixed for hearing. mol'C than two months previously".

Five months later. on 16-12-1953, the Hieb Court granted a certificate under article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution for leave to appeal to this Court.

:?-8 SCI IND182

1955 The only question before the High Court was whe- Sangram Singh ther the Tribunal was right in refusing to allow the v. appellant's counsel to appear and take part in the Election Tribunal, proceedings on and after the 20th of March, 1953, and Kotall, Bhnrey Lal the first question that we hve to decide is whether Baya , that is sufficient ground to give the High Court jurisdic- Bore J. ti on to entertain a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. That, in our opinion, is no longer res integra. The question was settled by a Bench of seven. Judges of this Court in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad !shaque(') in these terms:

"Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice".

That is exactly the position here.

It was urged that that cannot be so "in election matters because of section 105 of the Representation of the People Act of 195 l (Act XL III of 195 )), a section which was not considered in the earlier case.

It runs thus:

"Every order of the Tribunal made under this Act shall be final and conclusive".

It was argued that neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court can itself transgress the law in trying to set right what it considers is an error of law on the part of the Court or Tribunal whose records are under consideration. It was submitted that the legislature intended the decisions of these tribunals to be final on all matters, whether of fact or of law, accordingly, they cannot be said to commit an error of law when, acting within the ambit of their jurisdiction, they decide and lay down what the law is. for in that sphere their decisions are absolute, as absolute as the decisions of the Supreme Court in its own sphere.

Therefore, it was said, the. only question that is left open for examination under article 226 in the case of an Election Tribunal is whether it acted within the scope of its jurisdiction.

(1) [1955) I S.C.R. 1104, 1121.

. i

But this, also, is no longer open to question. The 1955 point has been decided by three Constitution Benches sungram Sillch of this Court. In Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Jshaque(') v. the effect of section 105 of tht< Representation of the Elec1io11 Trib1111at, People Act was not c<:msidered, but the Court laid Kotah, Blmrey Lat down in general terms that the jurisdiction under Baya article 226 having been conferred by the Constitution, BoseJ. limitations cannot be placed on it except by the Constitution itself: see pages 238 and 242. Section 105 was, however, considered in Durga Shankar Mehta v.

Raghuraj Singh(') and it was held that that section cannot cut down or affect the overriding powers of this Court under article l 36. The same rule wa~ applied to article 226 in Raj Krusl111a Bose v. Binod Kanungo and others(') and it was decided that section l 05 cannot take away or whittle down the powers of the High, Court under article 226.

Following those decisions we hold that the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 is not taken away or curtailed by section 105.

The jurisdiction which articles 226 and 136 confer entitles the High Courts and this Court to examine the decisions of all Tribunals to see whether they have acted illegally.

That jurisdiction cannot be taken away by a legislative device that purports to confer power on a tribunal to act illegally by enacting a statute that its illegal acts shall become legal the moment the tribunal chooses to say they are legal.

The legality of .an act or conclusion is something that exists outside and apart from the decision of an inferior tribunal. It is a part of the law of the land which cannot be finally determined or altered by any tribunal of limited ju.risdiction. The High Courts and the Supreme Court alone can determine what the law of the land is vis-a-vis all other courts and tribunals and they alone can pronounce with authority and finality on what is legal and what is not. All that an inferior tribunal can do is to reach a tentative conclusion which is subject to review under articles 226 and J 36. Therefore. the jurisdiction of the High

(I) (1955] I S.C.R. 1104. 1121.

(2) f1955] I S.CR. 267.

(3) 1954 S.C.R. 913, 918.

Sangram Singh

Courts under article 226 with that of the Supreme Court above them remains to its fullest extent despite section 105.

Election Tribunal, .

That, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised whenever there is an error of law.

The High Courts do not, and should not, act as Courts of appeal under article 2.26. Their powers are purely discretionary a11d though 110 limits can be placed upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrarily; and one of the limitations imposed by the Courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in this class of case unless substantial injustice has e11sued, or is likely to ensue. They will not allow themselves to be turned into Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though no legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special rights decided as speedily as may be.

Therefore, writ petitions should not be lightly entertained in this class of case.

Kotah, Bhurey Lal

Baya

Bose J.

We now turn to the decision of the Tribunal. The procedure of these tribunals is governed by section 90 of the Act. The portion of the section that is relevant here is sub-section (2) .which is in these terms: . - "Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder. every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) to the trial of suits":

We must therefore direct our attention to that portion of the Civil Procedure Code that deals with the trial of suits".

Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such.

It is procedw,-, something designed to facilitate justice

and fort11er its ends: not a penal enactment for puni-

. 1

shment hnd penalties; not a thing designed to trip ' people up.

Too kdrnic:d a con st rncti"n uf si:dicms that leaves no room for ieasonable elasticity of inter-

' I

2S.C.R.

SUPREi\1E COURT REPORTS 9

1955 pretation shou.ld therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) Jest Sa11gram Singh the very means designed for the furtherance of justice v. be used to frustrate it.

Electio11 Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Next, there must be ever present to the mind the Baya fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a Bose!. principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they .should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to.

But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.

The existence of such a principle has been doubted, and in any event was condemned '1S unworkable and impractical by O'Sullivan, J. in Hadram

v. Pribhdas(').

He regarded it as an indeterminate term "liable to cause misconception" and his views were shared by Wanchoo, C. J. and Bapna, J. in Rajasthan: Sewa Ram v. Misrimal('). But that a law of n_atural justice exists in the sense that a party must be heard in a Court of law, or at any rate be afforded an opportunity to appear and defend himself, unless there is express provision to the contrary, is, we think, beyond dispute. See the observations of the Privy Council in Balakrishna Udayar

v. Vasudeva Ayyar("), and especially in T. M. Barret

v. African Products Ltd.(') where Lord Buckmaster said "no forms or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence". Also Hari Vishnu's case which we have just quoted.

In our opinion, Wallace, J. was right in Venkatasubbiah v.

Laksluninarasimham(') in holding that "One cardinal principle to be observed in trials by a Court obviously is that a party has a right to

(I) A.I.R. 19•15 Sind 98. 10~.

(2) A.J.R. 1952 Raj. 12. 14.

(3) I.LR 40 Macl. 79.1. ROO.

(4) A.T.R. 1928 P.C. 261, 262.

(5) A.LR. 1925 Mad. I 27J.

Sa1tz,-am Singh v.

Election Tribuna(, .Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya

BoseJ.

appear and plead his cause on all occasions when that cause comes on for hearing", and that "It follows that a party should not be deprived of that right and in fact the Court has no option to refuse that right, unless the Code of Civil Procedure deprives him of it".

Let us now examine that Code; and first, we will turn to the body of the Code. Section 27 provides that

"Where a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim".

Section 30 gives the Court power to

"(b) issue summonses to persons whose attendance is required either to give evidence or to produce documents or such other objects as aforesaid".

Then come the penalties for default. They are set out in section 32 but they are confined to cases in which a summons has been issued under section 30.

There is no penalty for a refusal or an omission to appear in response to a summons under section 27. It is true certain consequences will follow if a defendant does not appear and, popularly speaking, those consequences may be regarded as the penalty for nonappearance, but they are not penalties in the true sense of the term. They are not punishments which the Court is authorised to administer for disregard of its orders. The antithesis that section 32 draws between section 27 and section 30 is that an omission to appear in response to a summons under section 27 carries no penalty in the strict sense, while disregard of a summons under section 30 may entail punishment.

The spirit of this distinction must be carried over to the First Schedule. We deprecate the tendency of some Judges to think in terms of punishment and penalties properly so called when they should instead be thinking of compensation and the avoidance of injustice to hoth sides.

We turn next to the Rules in the First Schedule.

It is relevant to note that the Rules draw a distinction between the first hearing and subsequent hearings,

and that the first hearing can be either (a) for settlement of issues only, or (b) for final disposal of the suit.

First, there is Order V, rule I :

1955 --- Sangram Sinzh

. V. " b . d .................. a summons may e issue the defendant to appear and answer the claim on day to be therein specified".

to Election Tribunal, a Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya

This summons must state whether the hearing is to be for settlement of isues only or for final hearing (rule 5). If it is for final hearfog, then (rule 8):

"it shall also direct the defendant to produce, on the day fixed for his appearance, all witnesses upon whose evidence he intends to rely in support of his case".

Then comes Order VIII. rule I which expressly speaks of "the first hearing". Order IX follows and is headed "Appearance of parties and consequence of non-appearance".

Now the word "consequence" as opposed to the word "penalty" used in section 32 is significant. It emphasises the antithesis to which we have already drawn attention. So also in rule 12 the marginal note is "Consequence of non-attendance" and the body of the rule states that the party who does not tippear and cannot show sufficient cause

"shall be subject to all the provisions of the foregoing rules applicable to plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, who do not appear".

The use of the word "penalty" is scrupulously avoided.

Our attention was drawn to rule 6(2) and it was argued that Order IX does contemplate the imposition of penalties. But we do not read this portion of the rule in that light. All that the plaintiff has to do here is to pay the costs occasioned by the postponement which in practice usually means the cost of a fresh summons and the diet money and so forth for such of the witnesses as are present; and these costs the plaintiff must pay irrespective of the result.

Rule 1 of Order IX starts by saying-

"On the day fixed in the summons for the defendant to appear and answer ............................ ..

Bowl.

Sa11gra1n Singh

V, Election Trihunal, Kntoh, Bhure.v Lal Bay a

Bose J.

and the rest of the rules in that Order are consequential on that. This is emphasised by the use of the word "postponement" in rule 6 (I) (c), of "adjournment" in rule 7 and of "adjournment" in rule L Therefore, we reach the position that .Order IX, rule 6(1 )(a), which is the rule relied on, is confined to the first hearing of the suit and does not per se apply to subsequ\:nt hearings: see Sahibzada Zeinulahdin Khan v. Sahihzada Ahmed Raza Khan(').

Now to analyse rule 6 and examine its bearing on the first hearing. When the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, if it is proved that the summons was duly served-

"(a) ........................ the Court may proceed ex parte".

The whole question is, what do these words mean?

Judicial opinion is sharply divided about thi.s.

On the one side is the view propounded by Wall ace, J. in Venkatasuhbiah v. Lakshminarasimham(') that ex

parte merely means in the absence of the other party, and on the other side is the view of O'Sullivan, J., in Hariram v. Prihhdas(') that it means that the Court is at liberty to proceed without the defendant till the termination of the proceedings unless the defendant shows good cause for his non-appearance. The remaining decisions, and there are many of them, take one or the other of those two views.

In our opinion, Wallace, J. and the other. Judges who adopt the same line of thought, are right.

As we have already observed, our laws of procedure are based on the principle that, as far as possible, no proceeding in a Court of law should be conducted to the detriment of a person in his absence. There are of course exceptions, and this is one of them. When the defendant has been served and has been afforded an opportunity of appearing, then, if he does not appear, the Court may proceed in his absence. But, be it noted, the Court is not directed to make an ex

(I) 5 I.A. 233, 236.

(2) A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1274.

13) A.1.R. 1945 Sind 98. 102.

partc order. Of course the fact .that it is proceeding ex 1955 parte will be recorded in the minutes of its proceedings Sa11gram Singh but that is merely a statement of the fact and is not v. an order made against the defendant in the sense of Election Tribunal, an ex parte decree or other ex parte order which the Kotah, Bhurey L.al Court is authorised to make. All that rule 6 (l) (a) Baya does is to remove a bar and no more.

It merely BoseJ. authorises the Court to do that which it could not have done without this authority, namely to proceed in the absence of one of the parties. The contrast in language between rules 7 and 13 emphasises this.

Now. as we have seen, the first hearing is either for the settlement of issues or for final hearing. If it is only for the settlement of issues, then the Court cannot pass an ex /; arte decree on that date because of the proviso to Order XV, rule 3(1) which provides that that can only be done when

"the parties or their pleaders are present and none of them objects".

On the other hand, if it is for final hearing, an ex parte decree can be passed, and if it is passed, then Order IX. rule 13 comes into play and before the decree is set aside the Court is required to make an order to set it aside. Contrast this with rule 7 which does not require the setting aside of what is commonly. though erroneously, known as "the ex pa rte order".

No order is contemplated by the Code and therefore no order to set aside the order is contemplated either.

But a decree is a command or order of the Court and so can only be set aside by another order made and recorded with due formality.

Then. comes rule 7 which -provides that if at an adjourned hearing the defendant anpears and shows good cause for his "previous non-appearance", he can be heard in answer to the suit

"as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance".

This cannot he read to mean, as it has been by some learned Judges, that he cannot be allowed to appear at all if he does not show good cause. All it means is that he cannot be relegated to the position he would have occupied if he had appeared.

3-R SCT IND/82

1955 We turn next to the adjourned hearing. That is Sangram Singh dealt with in Order XVII.

Rule l (]) empowers the v.

Court to adjourn the hearing and whenever it does so Election Tribunal, it must fix a day "for the further hearing of the suit", Koiah, Bhurey Lal except that once the hearing of the evidence has begun Baya it must go on from day to day till all the witnesses in Bo.<eJ. attendance have been examined unless the Court considers, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that a further adjournment is necessary. Then follows rule 2-

"Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf bv Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit''.

Now rule 2 only applies when one or both of the parties do not appear on the day fixed for the adj{)lm1ed hearing. In that event the Court is thrown back to Order IX with. the additional power to make "such order as it thinks fit".

When it goes back to Order IX it finds that it is again empowered to proceed ex parte on the adjourned hearing in the same way as it did, or could have done, if one or other of the parties had not appeared at. the first hearing, that is to say, the right to proceed ex parte is a right which accrues from day to day because at each adjourned hearing the Court is thrown back to Order IX, rule 6. It is not a mortgaging of the future but only applies to the particular hearing at which a party was afforded the chance to appear and did not avail himself of it.

Therefore, if a party does appear on "the day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned", he cannot be stopped from participating in the proceedil)gs simply because he did not appear on the first or some other hearing.

But though he has the right to appear at an adjourned hearing, he has no right to set back the hands of the clock. Order IX, rule 7 makes that clear. Therefore, unless he can show good cause, he. must accept all that has gone before and be content to proceed from_ the stage at which he comes in. But what exactly does that import? To determine that it will be necessary to hark back to the first hearing.

We have already seen that when a s11mrcons is 1955 issued to the defendant it must state whether the sangram Singh hearing is for the settlement of issues only or for the v. final disposal of the suit (Order V, rule 5) Jn either Election Tribunal, event, Order VIII, rule I comes into play and if the Kotah, Bhurey Lal defendant does not present a written statement of his Baya defence, the Court can insist that he shall; and if, on Bose J. being required to do so, he fails to comply-

"the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit' (Order VllL rule JO).

This invests the Court \\(.ith the widest possible discretion and enables it to see that justice is done to ho!l1 sides; and also to witnesses if they are present: a matter on which we shall dwell later.

We have seen that if the defendant does not appear at the first hearing, the Court can proceed ex partc. which means that it can proceed without a written statement; and Order IX, rule 7 makes it clear that unless good cause is shown the defendant cannot be relegated to the position that he would have occupied if he had appeared. That means that he cannot put in a written statement unless he is allowed to do so, and if the case is one in which the Court considers a written statement should have been put in, the consequences entailed bv Order VIII. rule IO inust be suffered.

What those consequences should be in a given case is for the Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion, to determine. No hard and fast rule can be laid down.

~ In some cases an order awarding costs to the plaintiff would meet the ends of justice: an adjournment can be granted or a written statement can be considered on the spot and issues framed.

In other cases, the ends of justice may call for more drastic action.

Now when we speak of the ends of justice, we mean justice not only to the defendant and to the other side but also to witnesses and others who may be in- • convenienced. It is an unfortunate fact that the convenience of the witness is ordinarily lost sight of in this class of case and yet he is t'.e one that deserves

1955 the greatest consideration. As a rule, he is not partisa11grum Singh cularly interested in the dispute but he is vitally v. interested in his own affairs which he is compelled to Election Tribunal, abandon because a Court orders him to come to the Kotah, Bhurey Lal assistance of one or other .of l he partiesto a dispute.

Baya His own business has to suffer. He may have to leave BoseJ. his family and his affairs for days on end.

He is usually out of pocket. Often he is a poor man living in an out of the way village and may have to trudge many weary miles on foot.

And when he gets there, there are no arrangements for him.

He is not given accommoc.lation; and when he reaches the Court, in most places there is no room in which he can wait.

He has to loiter about in the verandahs or under the trees, shivering in the cold of winter and exposed to the heat of summer. wet and miserable in the rains: and then, after wasting hours and sometimes days for his turn, he is brusquely told that he must go back and come again another day. Justice strongly demands that this unfortunate section of the general public compelled to discharge public duties, usually at loss and inconvenience to themselves. should not be ignored in the over all picture of what will best serve the ends of justice and it may well be a sound exercise of discretion in a given case to refuse an adjournment and permit the plaintiff to examine the witnesses present and not allow the defendant to cross-examine them, still less to adduce his own evidence. It all depends on the particular case.

But broadly speaking, after all the various factors have been taken into consideration and carefully weighed, the endeavour should be to avoid snap decisions and to afford litigants a real opportunity of fighting out their cases fairly and squarely. Costs will be adequate compensation in many cases and in others the Court has almost unlimited discretion about the terms it can impose provided always the discretion is judicially exercised and is not arbitrary.

In the Code of 1859. there was a provision (section 119). which said that- ..

. . '~No appeal shall lie from a judgment pass7, d l'Y

pare)ainst a defendant wh?. has not appeared :

The Privy Council held in Sahibwda Zeinulabdin Khan 1955

v. Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Khan(') that this only Su11gra111 Singh applied to a defendant who had not appeared at all v. at any stage, therefore, if once an appearance was Eiec1io11 Trib1111at, entered, the right of appeal was not taken away. One Kotah, Bhurey Lal of the grounds of their decision was that- Baya

'"The general ruk is that an appeal lies to the High Court from a decision of a civil or subordinate Judge, and a defendant ought not to be deprived of the right of appeal, except by express words or necessary implication".

The general rule, founded on principles of natural justice, that proceedings in a Court of justice should not be conducted behind the back of a party in the absence of an express provision to that effect is no less compelling. But that apart. It would be anomalous to hold that the efficacy of the so-called ex parte order expends itself in the first Court and that thereaftr a defendant can be allowed to appear in the appellate Court and can be heard and can be permitted' to urge in that Court the very matters he is shut. out from urging in the trial Court; and in the event that the appellate Court considers a remand necessary he can be permitted to do the very things he was precluded from doing in the first instance without getting the e.>;: parte order set aside under Order IX, rule 7.

Now this is not a case in which the defendant with whom we are concerned did not appear at the first hearing. He did. The first hearing was on 11-12-1952 at Kotah. The appellant (the first defendant) appeared through counsel and filed a written statement. Issues were framed and the case was adjourned till the 16th March at Udaipur for the petitioner's evidence alone from the 16th to the 21st March. Therefore. Order IX, rules 6 and 7 do not apply in terms. But we have been obliged to examine this order at length because of the differing views taken in the various High Courts and because the contentiori is that Order XVII, rule 2 throws one back to the position under Order IX, rules 6 and 7. and there. according to one set of

(1) 5 I.A. 233.

BoeJ.

IY55 views, the position is that once an ex /Hirte "order"

S1111irr11111 Singh is "passed" against a defendant he cannot take fur- . v. ther part in the proceedings unless be gets that Elec1io11 Trih1111at, ''order" set aside by showing good cause under rule Kota/I, Bl111rey Led 7. But that is by no means the case.

Bay a

BoseJ.

If the defendant does not appear at the adjourned hearing (irrespective of whether or not he appeared at the first hearing) Order XVII, rule 2 applies and the Court is given the widest possible discretion either "to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit",

The point is this. The Court has a discretion which it must exercise.

Its hands are not tied by the socalled ex (Hirte order; and if it thinks they are tid by Order IX, rule 7 then it is not exercising the discretion which the law says it should and, in a given case, interference may be called for. ·

The learned Judges who constituted a Full Bench of the Lucknow Chief Court (Tulsha Devi v. Sri Krishna(')) thought that if the original ex parte order did not enure throughout all future hearings it would be necessary to make a fresh ex parte order at each succeeding hearing. But this proceeds on the mistaken assumption that an ex pane order is required. The order sheet, or minutes of the proceedings, has to show which of the parties were present and if a party is absent the Court records that fact and then records whether it will proceed ex parte against him, that is to say, proceed in his absence, or whether it will adjourn the hearing; and it must necessarily record this fact at every subsequent hearing because it has to record the presence and absence of the parties at each hearing. With all due deference to the learned Judges who hold this view, we do not think this is a grave or a sound objection.

A much weightier consideration is that the plaintiff may be gravely prejudiced in a given case because, as the learned Rajasthan Judges point out, and as O'Sullivan, J. thought, when a case proceeds ex parte,

(1) AJ, R. 1949 Oudh 59.

:t I

' . .#

the plaintiff does not adduce as much evidence as he 1955 would have if it had been contested. He contents Sangram Si11gh himself with leading just enough to establish a prima v. facie case. Therefore, if he is suddenly confronted Election Trib1111al, with a contest after he has closed his case and the Kotah. Bhurey Lal defendant then comes forward with an army of wit- Baya nesses he would be taken by surprise and gravely pre- BoseJ. judiced. That objection is, however, easily met by the wide discretion that is vested in the Court. If it has reason to believe that the defendant has by his conduct misled the plaintiff into doing what these learned Judges apprehend, then. it might be a sound exercise of discretion to shut out cross-examination and the adduction of .evidence on the defendant's part and to allow him only to argue at the stage when arguments are heard. On the other hand, cases may occur when the plaintiff is not. and ought not to be, misled. If these considei; ations are to weigh. then surely the sounder rule is to leave the Court with an unfettered discretion so that it can take every circumstance into consideration and do what seems best suited to meet the ends of justice in the case before it.

In the present case, we are satisfied that the Tribunal did not exercise its discretion because it considered that it had none and thought that until the ex /Hirte order was set aside the defendant could not appear either personally or through counsel. We agree with the Tribunal, and with the High Court, that no good cause was shown and so the defendant had no right to be relegated to the position that he would have occupied if he had appeared on 17-3-J 953, b!-lt that he had a right to appear through counsel on 20-3-1953 and take part in the proceedings from the stage at which they had then reached, subject to such terms and conditions as the Tribunal might think fit to impose, is, we think, undoubted. Whether he should have been allowed to cross-examine the three witnesses who were examined after the appearance of his counsel, or whether he should have been allowed to adduce evidence, is a matter on which we express no opinion, for that has to depend on whatever view the Tribunal in a sound exercise of judicial discretion will

/955

Sa11gra111 ..5i11{!/J

Ele<lion Tribunal, Kota/1, Blmrey Lat'

Bay a

Bn:eJ.

20 SUPREl\llE COURT REPORTS [ 1955]

choose to take of the circumstances of this panicular case, but we can find no justification for not at least allowing counsel to argue.

Now the Tribunal said on 23-3-1953-

"The exact stage at which the case had reached before us on the 21st of March 1953 was that under the clear impression that respondent No. l had failed to appear from the very first date of the final hearing when the n parfr order was passed, the petitioner must have closed his case after offering as little evidence as he thought" was just necessary to get his petition disposed of ex parte. Therefore, to allow the respondent No. 1 to step in now would certainly handicap the petitioner and would amount to a bit of injustice which we can neither contemplate nor condone".

But this assumes that the petitioner was misled and closed his case "aftei: offering as little evidence as he thought was just necessary to get his petition disposed of ex parre". It does not decide that that was in fact the case. If the defendant's conduct really gave rise to that impression and the plaintiff would have adduced more evidence than he did, the order would be unexceptional but until that is found to be the fact a mere assumption would not be a sound basis for the kind of discretion which the Court must exercise in this class of case after carefully weighing all the relevant circumstances.

We, therefore, disagreeing with the High Court which has upheld the Tribunal's order, quash the order of the Tribunal and direct it to exercise the discretion vested in it by law along the lines we have indicated. In doing so the Tribunal will consider whether the plaintiff was in fact misled or could have been misled if he had acted with due diligence and caution. It will take into consideration the fact that. the defendant did enter an appearance and did file a written statement and that issues were framed in his presence; also that the case was fixed for the "petitioner's" evidence only and not for that of the appellant; and that the petitioner examined all • the witnesses he had present on the I 7th and the I 8th and did not give up any of them; that he was given

an adjournment on 19-3-1943 for the examination of 1955 witnesses who did not come on that date and that he Sungram Singh examined three more on 20-3-1953 after the defendant v. had entered an appearance through counsel and Election Tribunal, claimed the right to plead; also whether, when the Kotah, Bhurey Lal appellant's only protest was against the hearings at Baya Udaipur on dates fixed for the petitioner's evidence BoseJ. alone, it would be. legitimate for. a party acting with due caution and diligence to assume that the other side had abandoned his right to adduce his own evidence should the hearing for that be fixed at some other place or at some other date in the same place.

The Tribunal will also consider and determine whether it will be proper in the .circumstances of this case to allow the appellant to adduce his own evidence.

The Tribunal will now reconsider its orders of the 20th, the 21st and the 23rd of March 1953 in the light of our observations and will proceed accordingly.

The records will be sent to the Election Commission with directions to that authority to reconstitute the Tribunal, if necessary, and to direct it to proceed with this matter along the lines indicated' above.

There will be no order about costs.

4- 8(SCI ND/8Z

REPORTS

SANGRAM SINGH

ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KOTAH, BHUREY LAL BAYA

VIVIAN BosE

B. JAGANNADHADAS

BHUVANESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, JJ.

section 105

Article 136

Article 226

Representation of the People Act

section 90

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

sections 27, 30 and 32

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order 5, rules 1

Order 8, rules 1

Order 9, rules 6(l)(a)

section 105

Representation of the People Act

Election Tribunal made under the Act

Supreme Court

s 226 and 136

section 105

Su11gran1 Singh

of the Representation of the People Act

Article 226

Article 226

section 100

Representation of the People Act

Kotah

Udaipur

section 90(2)

Representation of the People Act

Order 9, rule 7

Sangram Singh

Kotah

Bhurey Lal

[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104

[1955] 1 S.C.R. 267

Article 133(l)(c)

Constitution of India

Bapna

Ranawat

R. K. Ras1ogi

Gan pat Rai

R. C. Prasad

BosE

Bhurey Lal

section 100

Representation of the People Act

Sangram Singh

21st March, 1953

Bhurey Lal

Bhartit Raj

Sangram Singlr

Bharatra.i had

19th of March. I 953

article 226

High Court of Rajasthan

article 133(l)(c)

Kotall

Bhnrey Lal

article 226

section 105

Representation of the People Act

article 226

section 105

article 226

Section 105

article 226

article 226

article 226

section 105

articles 226 and 136

articles 226

article 226

section 105

article 2

Kotah

Bhurey Lal

Baya

Bose

section 90

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

O'Sullivan

Wanchoo

Buckmaster

Hari Vishnu

Wallace

Bhurey Lal Baya

the Code of Civil Procedure

Section 27

Section 30

section 32

section 30

section 27

section 32

section 27

section 30

section 27

section 30

First Schedule

First Schedule

Bhurey Lal Baya

section 32

Wall ace

Sa11gram Singh

Kotah, Bhurey L.al Court

Koiah

sangram Singh

Bose

section 119

Bay

Lucknow Chief Court

Sangram Si11gh

17-3-J 953

Sungram Singh

Baya Udaipur


19S5

Raf .Kali }(11er

•• Ram Ratu1n

Pa11dey

Jagannadhadas.J.

April 7

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1955]

that tht: claim of the plantiff-appellant is made out and that she is entitled to succeed.

The:: discussion above. is more germane to the case of a public t"mple wherein the idol has been Shastrically installed and consecrated and the worship is in accordance with the Shastras. There is nothing on the record to shbw whether the temple in this case falls within this category. If; however, the temple

s a private one or idol therein is not one Shastri cal!y consecrated, the case in favour of the plaintiff is much stronger and her right cannot be seriotisly challenged.

At this stage, it is desirable to mention one other matter.

In the present case the emoluments attached to the office ar.e stated to be the daily and other offerings made to the deity at the worship hy the visiting devotees.

Both the parties to thi~ case have come up to Court on the common footing that it is this which constitutes the emoluments.

Whether and how far such votive offerings can be appropriated by a Pujari for his emoluments if the temple is a public institution, (i.e., not a private famiiy temple) and whether any usage i'l this behalf is valid is a matter which does not arise before us in this case.

In the result, the appeal must be allowed with costs throughout and the decree of the trial court must he restored.

RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.

THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND

ANOTHER

fMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA

and IMAM J.T.] .

Constitution of India-Art. 145(3)-Cottstruction of-Supreme Court-Whether competent to split Up the case for he purpose of hearing and decision.

Held (Per MUKHERJEA C:T, DAS, VIVIAN HOSE. and IMAM .TJ SINHA J. dissentini:) that a Constitution Bench of five or more Judges before which a cace happrns to be posted in the first. instance

is competent to split up the case by deciding the constitutional questions and leaving the rest of the case to be dealt with ai:id disposecl of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges on merits in conformity with the opinion of the Constitution Bench.

The splitting up of cases ino different stages fol' hearing and decision is not repugnant to the Constitution or the general principles of procedural law. The underlying principle of the Constitution is clear and all that it insists upon is that all Constitution questions should be heard and decided by a Bench of not less than five Judges.

As long as this requirement is fulfilled there can be no constitutional objection to the rest of the case being disposed of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges, so as to saYe the time of the Constitution Bench of five or more Judges.

There is no general rule of indivisibility of a case for the purpose of its hearing and decision : vide proviso to Article 145(3) and Article 228 of the Constitution, s. 24' and Order 18, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and ss. 350, 526, 528 and 556 of the Cod'! of Criminal Procedure.

Article 145(3) of the Constitu:ion cannot be so construed as to deprive the Supreme Court of the. inherent power of splitting up a case for the purpose of hearing and decision.

Per SINHA J.-The Constitution while laying. down clause (3) of Article 145, contemplates the whole matter in controversy arising in a 1.:a, e, which may include substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Coastitution as also other questions. The main clause (3), excepting cases coming wjthin the purview of the proviso, d<'cs not contemplate a splitting up of a case into parts, one part involving substantial questions of law as to the interpretation oF the Cons; itution and another part .or parts not involving such questions.

The language ot dausc (3) of Article 145 does not warrant the hearing of a case. pie(:cmeal by different Benches unless it comes within the purview. of the proviso. The proviso is meant to cover onlv a limit('d class of cases which otherwise would have come within the purview of the main clause (3). But the proviso cnnot have a larger effect than is justified by its language. viz., that only a question of that description has to be referred for the opinion. of the larger Bench. the case itself remaining on the file of the smaller Bench. The proviso th.tis makes a clear distinction between a "case'' and a "question".

Maufoi Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz !L.R. 24 I.A. 22), Burrowe~ v. High Commission Court (3 Buist.

48) and Hobibar Rahman v. Saidannessa Bibi (l.L.R. 51 Cal. 331), referred to.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.

Petition No. 40 of 1955: lJnder Article 32 of the Constitution for a Writ of Ha/was Corp11s.

19$5

Rao Shiva Bohadur Singh

v.

The Stale of Vimlhya Pradesh

and lllWlhr ·

Rao Shiva.

Baltadur Si•g/t

Tile Stal• qf Yiodhya Prad_, h

and anothf

SUPRE1'1E COURT REPORTS [1955]

Purshottam Trikumdas, (K. B. Asthana, Syed Murtaza Faz/ Ali and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioner.

M. C. Seta/vad, Attorney-General for India and C; K. Daphtary Solicitor-General for India (Porus A.

Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with them) for the respondents.

1955. April 7. The Judgment of Mukherjea C. J., Das, Vivian Bose and Imam JJ. was delivered by Dils J. Sinha J. delivered a separate Judgment.

DAs J.-This is a petition for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus calling upon the respondents to show cause why the petitioner, who is now confined in the Central Jail at Rewa, should not be set at liberty.

The petitioner's grievance is that he has been deprived of his liberty otherwise than in accordance with procedure established by law. A rule nisi ; having been issued, the respondents have filed an affidavit by way of return to the writ. The question for our decision is whether the return is good and suft1cient in law.

The facts leading up to the present petition are few and simple. In the years 1948 and 1949 the petitioner was the Minister of Industries in the Government of Yindhya Pradesh which was at that time an acceding State within the meaning of section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935 as amended in 1947.

On the 11th April, 1949 the petitioner was arrested in Delhi on the allegation that he had accepted illegal , gratification in order to show favour to fanna Diamoncl Mining Syndicate in the matter of the lease of the Diamond Mines at Panna. In December, 1949 the petitiom:r along with one Mohan Lal, who was the then sel!retary in the Ministry of Industries. was put up for trial before the Court of Special Judge, Rewa, c0nstituted under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendments (Special Courts) Ordinance No. V of

1949.

The charges were under sections 120-B, 161 465 anc1 466 of the Indian Penal Code as adantecl for

\li:i,.lhva l'rJc.ksh hv the Indian Penal Corle l/\pplicat>nn to Vindhya Pradesh) Ordinance No. XLVTH of

2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 209

1949. By his judgment pronounced on the 2()th July

1950 the Special Judge acquitted both the accused.

The State preferred an appeal against that acquittal to the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh. By his judgment pronounced on the 10th March 1951 the Judicial Commissioner reversed the order of acquittal, convicted both the accused and sentenced them to different terms of rigorous imprisonment under the different sections in addition to the payment of certaln fines. On the application of the petitioner and his co-accused the Judicial Commissioner on the 1,2th March 1951 issued a certificate to the effect that

fon~ points of law raised in the case and formulated by him in his order were fit for the consideration of this Court in appeal under article 134 of the Constitution ot India. A petition of appeal was filed in this Court on the strength of this c_ertificate of fitness and it was registered as Criminal Appe;:i.l No. 7 of 1951.

As the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, it was, in April 1953, placed before a Bench of five Judges of this Court as required by article 145t3) of the Constitution. For convenience of reference we shall call

~ Bench of five or more Judges as the Constitution Bench. The validity of the convictions and sentences was challenged before the Constitution Bench 9n the ground that there had been infringements of articles 14 and 20 of the Constitution.

A further point of law was raised that no appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal by the Special Judge.

By their judgment pronounced on the 22nd May 1953 the Constitution Bench rejected all these objections.

The: judgment concluded with the following direction: "The appeal is accordingly directed to be posted for consideration whether it is to be heard on merits''.

This was evidently done in view of the fact that the certificate of fitness granted by the Judicial Commissioner was limited only to four points of law.

The constitutional points having been disposed of, the appeal was placed before a Division Bench of three Judges who on the 20th October 1953 ordered

Rao fihfra Bahatlur Singh

v.

The State of Vindhya Pradesh and another

Das .r.

Rao Shiva Ba/UJdur Sin6h

The State of Vindlrya Prtuksl.

and D'10l/rer

DusJ.

SUPREJ\1E COURT REPORTS

L1955

the appeal to be heard on the merits. The appeal Was accor_dingly put up for hearing before another Division Bench consisting of three Judges.

On the 5th- March 1954 this Division Bench allowed. the appeal of Mohan Lal and acquitted him but dismissed tbe appeal of the petitioner with respect to his conviction under sections 161, 465 and 466, Indian Penal Code, as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, but set aside his conviction on the charge under section 120-B.

The sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment was mamtained but the sentence of fine was set aside.

On the 18th March 1954 a petition for review was filed on behalf of the petitioner. It was directed against the judgment of the Constitution Bench pronounced on the 22nd May 1953 repelling the constitutional points as well as against the judgment of 'the Division Bench dated the 5th March 1954 dismissing the petitioner's appeal on the merits. On objection being taken by the Registry against one applicat10n being filed for the review of two judgments one of which had been pronounced much earlier than the period allowed for tiling a review ; ipplication, the petitioner filed a second application for review of the judgment of the Constitution Bench _rnd prayed for condonation of the delay in liling the same. On the 5th April 1954 the application for review was pnt up for hearing before the same Division Bench which had pronounced the judgment on the me1:its dated the 5th March 1954. After considering the points of review relating to that judgment the Division Bench on the same day came to the conclusion that no ground hfld been made out for review of that judgment and accordingly dismissed the petition. An order was drawn up as of that date directing the petitioner who had been previously enlarged on bail to

.urrender and serve out his sentence.

On the 12th April 1954 another petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner praying that the review matter relating to the judgment of the Constitution Bench delivered on the 22nd May 1953 be placed before a Constitution Bench for final disposal. That review application was put up before a Constltc1tion

Bench which on the 17th May 1954 declined to entertain the same.

In the meantime the petitioner had in the last week of April 1954 surrendered and has since then been confined in the Central Jail at Rewa. The present application has, therefore, been made for a writ of

Jwhcas corpus on the allegation that the petitioner has been and is being deprived of his liberty otherwise than in acc.ordance with procedure established by law.

Jn the present petition the petitioner has again urged that the Court of the Judicial CoJnmissioner of Vindliya Pradesh was not the proper forum for entertaming the appeal against the judgment of the Special Judge and consequently the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner setting aside the acquittal of the petitioner convicting and imposing sentence of imprisonment was void and inoperative. Alternatively, 1t has been urged that, assuming .that the Judicial Commissioner had jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Special Judge and his judgment was in accortiance with procedure established by law, the appeal filed by the petitioner in. this Court against the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner should have been, under article 145(3) of the Constitution. heard and completely dis!)osed of by the Comtitution Bench. As regards the first point as to the incompetency of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner to entertain the aooeal from the decision of the Special Judge the same has been fully deriit with bv the Constitution Bench and cannot bereagitflted.

Tncleed, learned counsel anpearing in supoort of this petition has not pressed the same.

The only point urned before us is the alternative plea mentioned above which deoends for its decision on a true construction of article 145.

Article 145 bv clause (1) authorises this Court. sub- 1ect to the provisions of anv law made bv Parliament and with the approval of fhe President, to make rule~ for r~!!nlatinQ: Q:enerally the !)ractice and procedure of the Court. 'inclnding. amongst others. rnles as to the pr0cerl11re for hearing anneals. as to the entertHinment of appeals under s11h--clause (c) of clause 0) 0f artklP

RaD Shiva Baluulur Sin'h

T~ State of Vinrihya Pras/J

1111d another

DasJ.

i955

Rao Shifa Bahadur Sing/I

V.

Tlte State 11f Vindhyl, l 'Pmtfi•sh

im.1 another

Das .f.

134 and as to the conditions subject to which any judgment pronounced or order made by the Court

may be reviewed and the procedure for such review.

Clauses (2) and (3) of the article are in the terms following:-

"(2) Subject to the provisions of clause (3), rules made under this article may fix the minimum number of Judges who are to sit for any purpose, and may provide for the powers of single Judges and Division Courts.

(31 The minimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of thi~ Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under article 143 shall be five:

Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this Chapter other than article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of the hearing of the appeal the. Court . is satisfied that the appeal involves substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Con"

stitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court sh:ill refer the question for opinion to a Court constituted as required hy this clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on receipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion".

The contention of the petitioner is that the question whether a particular case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is to be examined at the time when the case first comes .before. this Court. If at that stage it is found that it is a case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of. the Constitution it becomes irrevocably impressed with that charact.er and quality and the minimum number of Judges who are. to sit for the purpose of deciding suc)l case must be a Constitution Bench, that is to say, a

Bench of at least five Judges. The argument then proceeds to sav that once the Con9titution Bench takes seisin of the case and starts the hearing that

Bench and that Be; nch alone must decide the whole of 1953 such case, that is to say, decide all questions, consti- Rao Shiva. tutional or otherwise, arising in the case. Sri Pur- Balradur Sin~ shottam Trikumdas who appears in support of this 77re ateJt: petition has i:trongly relied on the language used i~ 'f'i"::J0anZn. clause (3) and contends that "the case" cannot be spht up and that the clause requires the entire case to be DasJ. disposed of by the Constitution Bench. He, therefore, urges that the Division Bench had no jurisdiction to take up the case involving substantial question~ of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and consequently the judgment of that Division Bench pronounced on the 5th March, 1954 was illegal and void.

According to him, his client's appeal, in the eye of the law, remains undisposed of and as he had been let out on bail until the disposal of his appeal, his detention in jail pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench, which is a nullity, amounts to deprivation of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with procedure established bv law and is an infringement of his fundamental right under articie 21 of the Constitution. The argument at first sight certainly appears to be plausible but on a deeper consideration of the constitutional provisions bearing on the subject and the general principles regulating the procedural powers of Courts we are unable to accept the same as sound or well-founded.

In this very case the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh had granted a certificate of fitness under article 134(1)(c). Consequently under the proviso to clause (3) of article 145 the appeal might . weJl have been placed before a Division Bench consisting of less than five Judges. In that situation, being

satisfied that the appeal involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitu~ ti on the determination of which was necessary for the disposal of the .appeal, that Division. Bench could refer the question for the opinion of a Constitution Bench and on receipt of the opinion dispose of the appt>al in. conformity with such opinion: lrut to accede to the ari:i; ument of Sri Purshottam Triknmdas will !e?d us to hold that while a Division Bench of three

. 28-8 SCl'ND:82

Rao Shiva Bohadur Singh v.

The State of Vindhyu Pratfe sh

aRd another

Dasi.

Judges could split up this very case, had it been posted before it in the first instance, by referring the constitutional questions to a Constitution Bench for its opinion and then, after receipt of that opinion, disposing of the rest of the case on merits in conformity with such opinion, a Constitution Bench of five or more Judges before which the case happened to be posted in the first instance could not split up the case by deciding the constitutional questions and leaving the rest of the case to be dealt with and disposed of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges on merits in conformity with the opinion of the Constitution Bench thus saving the time of the Constitution Bench.

Reference may also be made to article 228 which authorises the High Court, if satisfied that a cae pending in a Court subordinate to it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the cjisposal of the case, to withdraw the case and either to dispose of the case itself or determine the said question of law and return the case to the Court from which it has been so withdrawn so as .to enable the said Court to proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with the judgment of the High Court. Here ag11in learned counsel's argument leads us to hold that while the . High Court can split up a case involving a su \->5tantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution a Constitution Bench of this Court cannot do so. Apart from these provisions of the Constitution thereare provisions made by procedural statutes which result in a case being partly heard by one Judge arid partly by another Judge. To cite only a few instances.- reference may be made to section 24 and Order 18. rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 350. 526. 528 and 556 of the Code of Crim111al Procedure. The argument of Sri Purshottam Trikumdas .. oushed to its logical conclusion, must amount to this that althou!l:h Courts ooerating under the ordinarv procedural code mav solit uo cases intn r!ifferent sta!l:es for the nurnose of hearin'! and <lecision. a Constitution Bench of this Court cannot do so if a case involving substantial 'que5tions of law as to

the interpretation of the Constitution happens to be posted before it in the first instance.

Learned counsel for the petitioner recognises the incongruity that results from his argument but contends that it cannot be helped because the relevant provisions referred to above expressly sanction the splitting up of cases whereas the body of clause (3) of article 145 does not. His argument is that in the cases mentioned above splitting up of cases has to be dllowed because the special provisions of the- Constitution or other statutes provide for such splitting up in those cases. He contends that the very fact that these provisions had to be made dearly indicates that but for them there could not have been any splitting up of the case. It is said that these provisions are exceptions to the general rule of indivisibility of a case. We are unable to accept this reasoning as correct.

In the first place the proviso to article 145(3), article 228 and the other provisions of the Codes referred to above quite clearly•indicate that the splitting up of cases into different stages for hearing and decisions is not repugnant to the Constitution or the general principles of procedural law. The underlying principle of the Constitution is clear and all that it insists upon is that all constitutional questions should be heard and decided by a Bench of not Jess than five Judges. As long as this requii:ement is fulfilled there can be no constitutional objection to the rest of the case being disposed of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges. so as to save the time of the Constitution Bench of five or more Judges.

In the next place we are not aware of any such general rule of indivisibility as is being insisted upon by learned counsel. There is nothing in principle which requires that a case must always be decided in its entirety by one Judge or one set of Judges even though such a case may conveniently be dealt with in two or more stages. Indeed, in Mau/vi Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz(') the Privy Council pointed out that where a Judge had before

(I) L.R. 24 I.A. 22.

Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh v.

The State of v; ndhya Pradesh

and another

DasJ.

1955 him a case consisting of two parts, a question of title Rao Shiva and an incidental question of account dependrng on Bahadur Sin, h title, it did not require any provision of the Civil The siate of Procedure Code to authorise him to decide the first Vindhya Prad.sh question and reserve the second for further investigaand another tion and that to treat such a proceeding as beyond DasJ. the power of the Court and as an error which barred the proceedings reserved for further decisions was a serious miscarriage of justice. Indeed, the Court often exercise its inherent power, if it thinks fit to do so, to decide questions of jurisdiction or limitation or the like as preliminary questions reserving other questions of fact for future investigation. The decision of a case at two or more stages may and often does result in the case not being decided by the same Judge, for the Judge who decided at the first stage may, by reason of death, retirement or transfer, be not available for deciding the case at the later stages.

It follows, therefore, that no argument can be founded on any supposed general rule of indivisibility of a case for the purpose of its hearing and decision.

The consideration that there is no such general rule as is relied on by learned counsel and that the split.- ting up of cases not generally repugnant to law and in particular to the Constitution, leads us to the conclusion that in construing clause (3) of article 145 no quality of indivisibility need be attributed to the words "the case" used therein. A case may, to begin with, involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, but it may cease to do so at a later stage, Suppose a case which involves a constitutional question is placed before a Constitution Bench but learned counsel appearing in support of the case intimates to the Bench that he does not press any constitutional point, surely he cannot, in that situation, insist that the time of a Bench of five or more Judges should be spent on the determination of a case which, by his own election, has ceased to involve any constitutional question. Likewise, when the constitutional questions involved in the case are disposed of by a Constitution Bench what

remains of the case cannot properly or appropriately be described as still a "case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution". It should be borne in mind that when a case or appeal is properly admitted to. this Court all that the partie~ are entitled to is a decison of this Court and not of any particular Bench. So long as the minimum number of Judges which the Constitution and the rules framed by this Court prescribe are present to hear and decide the questions raised from stage to stage, they represent the Court for the purpose of giving decisions on its behalf and the parties get all that they are entitled to under the law. If a Court is entitled to decide a case in stages, as the Privy

Council has held it can, there is no reason why article 145(3) should be so construed as to deprive this.Court of that inherent power. It will involve no violation of any principle of natural ju, stice or of any legal principle if we co11strue clause (3) of article 145 as requiring only that the minimum number of five Judges must sit for the purpose of deciding any case in so far and as long as it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution. We find nothing in the language of clause (3) of article 145 which militates against this interpretation of that clause. Indeed, it is on this interpretation that the practice has grown up in this Court for a Constitution Bench to dispose of all constitutional questions and to leave the other subsidiary questions for disposal by a Divisron Bench of less than five Judges in conformity with the opinon of the Constitution Bench.

There is nothing that we find in the body of clause (3) of article 145 which compels us to depart from the famous maxim cursus curiae est lex curiae which was laid down by Lord Coke in Burrowes v. High .Commission Court(') and which was quoted with approval in Habibar Rahman v. Saidannessa Bibi(').

For reasons stated above we consider that a good and valid return has been made by the respondents to the rule nisi issued to them and this application must be dismissed. We order accordingly.

(I) 3 Buist. 48, S3.

(2) I.L.R. 51 Cal. 331, 335.

Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh

TM State of Vindhya Pmditsh

and another

Das J.

Rao .Shiva Bahadur Singh v.

The State qf Vtndhya Pradesh

and another

SUPRE1\1E COURT RFPORTS [1955]

SINHA J.-I regret to have to differ from my learned brethren on the construction of article 145(3) of the Constitution which is the main question in controversy in this case. Clause (3) of article 145 is in these terms:-

"The 1ninimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under article 143 shall be five:

Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this Chapter other than article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for opinion to a Court constituted as required by this clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on rece.ipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such . . " op1111on .

It is noteworthy that the Constitution has not vested this Court with complete power to make rules as to the constitution of Benches for hearing matters coming before this Court in its Original, Appellate or Advisory Jurisdiction. Clause (2) of article 145 has invested this Court with power to make rules fixing the minimum number of Judges who are to sit for any purpose and for defining the powers of single Judges and Division Courts. But this power is expressly made subject to the limitation laid down in clause (3) quoted above; that is to say, where any -case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution (omitting the words not material for our present purpose) the minimum number of Judges prescribed by the Constitution to decide such a case is five. A case may involve questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, as also other questions. In this case we have to determine whether clause (3) contemplates the whole case or a part of a

case. In my opinion, the Constitution while laying down clause (3) of article 145 contemplates the whole matter in controversy arising in a case which may include substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution as also other questions.

The main clause (3), excepting cases coming within the purview of the proviso does not contemplate a splitting up of a case into parts, one part involving substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and another part or parts not involving such questions. My reasons for coming to this conclusion are as follows:

Clause (3) itself read along with the proviso makes a distinction between a "case" and a "question" of the nature indicated in the proviso to the clause. The Constitution has clearly indicated that cases coming within the purview of the proviso may be split up so as to admit of the questions of constitutional importance being determined by a Bench of at least five Judges who may be described for the sake of convenience as a "Constitution Bench" in contradistinction to a Division Court consisting of less than five Judges, as is contemplated in the proviso. The main clause (3) requires a case of the description therein set out to be heard and decided by a Constitution Bench, whereas the proviso contemplates that only the question of constitutional importance (using a compendious phrase) has to be decided by a Constitution Bench and the case out of which such a question arises remaining in the seisin of the Division Court before which the case was originally placed for hearing.

The Constitution has placed cases involving substantial questions of law of constitutional importance on a special footing. If the framers of the Constitution had intended that not the whole case but only particular questions of the nature indicated had to be heard by a minimum number of five Judges. they would have used words similar to those used in the proviso makin.g it permissible for the Constitution Bench to give its opinion for the decision of the case by a Division Court in conformity with that opinion.

Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh

The State of Vindhya Pradesh

anti another

Sillh,, J.

Rao Shiva Bal; adur '6ingh

V, r1ie Stateof Vi11dhya Pmdtsh

and a!fotlrtr

Sinh• J'.

A reference to the terms of article 228 of the Constitution would also show that the framers 6f the Constitution were fully alive to the difference between the decision of the "case itself" and a "question of law" of constitutional importance involved in tha~ case. It has made clear in that article that the High Court shan either decide the whole case including the question of 'law as to the interpretation of the Constitution which was necessary for the disposal of the case or determine only such a question or questions and return the case to the original court for disposal in conformity with the judgment of the High Court on such question OT questions. The Constitution made these specific provisions to emphasize that there is a distinction between determining the case itself and determining a substantial question of law of constitutional. importance. ·

Can it be said that if clause (3) of article 145 had been enacted without the proviso, a case could be heard piecemeal first by a Constitution Bench which would determine only questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and then the residue of the case being heard and. determined by a Division Court? That, in my opinion, would not be in compliance with the imperative provisions of the main clause (3). The framers of the Constitution therefore enacted the proviso in the nature of an exception to the general rule laid down in the main clause (3). It has to be observed that the proviso is limited to appeals only, subject to the further exception that such appeals should not have come up to this (:ourt through the process laid down in article 132 of the Constitution. It is thus clear that not all cases contemplated in the main clause 13) but only appeals of a parti cular description would come within the qualifying provisions of the proviso.

The word "case" has not been defined but it may be taken as settled law that it is much wider than a "suit" or an "appeal". Hence whereas the proviso would apply to appeals brought up to this court, except those under article 132 of the Constitution. the main cluase (3) would apply to all appeals and all

other matters coming up to this Court in its Original, Appellate and Advisory jurisdictions. In my upinion, there canµot be the least doubt that the main provisions of clause (3) are all-embracing, and contemplate all cases coming up to this Court.

It has not been contended that the present case comes within the purview of the proviso but it has been said that if it is open to a Division Court to refer a question of constitutional importance to a Constitution Bench, why should not a Constitution Bench be competent to refer questions other than those of constitutional importance to a Division Court?

The answer is that whereas the former is contemplated by the Constitution in terms, the latter is not. Nor are there any rules to that effect.

But it has been further observed that the splitting up of a case into parts, one involving questions of constitutional importance and the remaining part not involving questions of that kind,. is not against the provisions of the Constitution. But, in my opinion, if the Constitution has made a specific provision as to the splitting up of a case 'into parts, one cognisable by a Court of higher jurisdiction like a Constitution Bench and the rest by a court of lower jurisdiction like a Division Court, the argument is not available

that a splitting up of a case apart from those specific provisions is also permissible. In this connection reference was made to certain provisions of the Co<, le of Civil Procedure as also of the Code of Criminal Procedure to show that those Codes do contemplate hearing of the same case in part by different courts, but those are all courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction in which the question of the power of the court itself relatively to the subject-matter of the case is not in question.

The court which originally dealt with the case and the court which finally came to hear and determine the matter were each one of them competent to deal with the whole matter or any part of it. That is not the position here.

In this case the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that as admittedly his appeal involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and as it did not come

29-SSnND s~

. 1955

Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll

The Stat" qf Vind/1yo P, aiks/s

and anotltu

SinhaJ.

J955 within the purview of the proviso to clause (3) of arti- Rao Shiva. cle 145 of the Constitution, it should have been dealt Bahadur Singh with throughout by a Constitution Bench. It was sug-

Tlie liaie of gested in answer to this.argument that after the ques- Vindhya Pradesh tions of law of Constitutional importance had been and another dealt with by the Constitution Bench the case ceased

Sinil•J. to be one involving such questions and therefore could have been heard by a Division Court. But the difficulty in accepting this argument is that once a Constitution Bench was seized of the case. it could not transfer it to another Bench for sharing the decision of that case with it. That Bench should have heard cut the whole case and it had not the power to direct. and it did not so direct, that the remaining part of the case should be heard by a Division Court. Once a Constitution Bench is seized of the case, it has to hear the case to its conclusion.

There was no process known to the rules framed under the rule-making power of this Court by which a case once it came before a Constitution Bench could get transferred from , that Bench to a Division Court either automatically or by orders of any authority. But it has been su~ gested that it may happen that a Constitution Bench may start the hearing of the case. and before the hearing is concluded one of the Judges is by reason of death or otherwise disabled from hearing out the case and in that event the Chief Justice has the power to constitute another Bench.

But that is quite a 4ifferent matter.

In that case the hearing by the previous Bench comes to nothing and the Bench constituted afresh by the. Chief Justice has to hear nut the whole case afresh.

It has also been suggested on the other side that a "case" may mean a part of a case. Jn my opinion. that submission is not well founded; because, if that argument were accepted and pushed to its logical conclusion, it may make the provisions of the main clause

(3) of article 145 nugatory. Article 132 of the Constitution has been, as indicated above, excepted from the operation of the proviso tn clau5e (3).

S11ppose an appeal is brought to this Court under article 132 of the Constitution as the case involved snbstanfr!l

questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

That case besides involving questions of that character, may also involve other questions. If the argument that a "case" includes part of a case were accepted, then it will be permissible for a Constitution Bench to hear the questions of constitutional importance and leave the rest of the case to be determined by a Division Court, though such a case is expressly excluded from the operation of the proviso and thus is directly within the terms of the main clause (3). Hence every case coming before this Court involving a question of constitutional importance may be dealt with in part in so far as it relates tp that question by a Constitution Bench and the remaining part by a Division Court. That, in my opinion, was not intended by the framers of the Constitution. The term "case" therefore tnust mean the whole matter in controversy before this Court. Such a matter may relate to one of several questions in controversy in the original court, if the determination of that question is sufficient to dispose of the case within the meaning of the Explanation to article 132 of the Constitution.

It was further argued by the learned Attorney- General that the whole clause (3) of article 145 along with the proviso must be read together.

But even so read, the language of clause (3) does not warrant the hearing of the case piecemeal by different Benches unless it comes within the purview of the proviso.

The proviso is meant to cover only a limited class of cases which otherwise would have come within the purview of the main clause (3). But the proviso cannot have a larger effect than is justified by its language, viz., that only a question of that description has to be referred for the opinion of the larger Bench, the case itself remaining on the file of the smaller Bench. The proviso thus makes a clear distinction between a "case" and a "question".

It has also been said there .is an inherent power in the court to transact its business according to its estahlished practice. Jn the first place. this Court is still in its formative stnges and it cannot he said to

Rao Shiva Buhadur Si11gli

The State of Vi11dliya Pradesh

and a11ot!ier

Sinha J.

Rao Shiva Bahadllr Singh

have an "established practice". Secondly, it cannot establish a practice in the teeth of the provisions of the Constitution which it is pledged to uphold.

The State ef Th f t h d · f h p C Vindhya Pradesh e re erence o t e ec1s1on o. t e nvy otmand anather -cil in Moulvi Muhammad Abd1;1l Majid v. Muhammad Sinh;;:,.

Abdul Aziz(') is not apt because in that case the hearing at the two stages of the trial was to be done by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction; that is to say, a court which could hear and determine the whole case or each of the two parts of the case taken separately by itself, unlike the present case in which the two parts of the hearing have been done by two courts of unequal power. Similarly the reference to the maxim "cursus C1Jriae est lex curiae" of Coke C.J. in Burrowes

v. High Commission Court(2), referred to in Habihar Rahman v. Saidannessa Bibi(') and to the other cases all proceed on the assumption that there is nothing in the statute law against such a course being taken.

But, in my opinion, such a nebulous practice is opposed to the positive provisions of clause (3) . of article 145.

In my opinion, therefore, the present case comes directly within the main clause (3) of article 145 of the Constitution and is admittedly not covered by the proviso to that clause. That being so. lhe petitioner's appeal to this court has not been heard and determined in accordance with the procedure established by this Constitution and therefore the petitioner is entitled to the benefit. of the protection afforded by article 21 of the Constitution. His appeal, therefore, has got to be heard and determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 145(3) of the Constitution. I would therefore allow the petition to this extent only that the appeal be heard by a Constitution Bench on a declaration that the judgment of the Division Court dated the 5th March 1954 is not that of a competent court.

BY THE COURT: - In accordance with the judgment of the majority, the petition is dismissed.

!I) L.R. 24 !A 22.

(2) 3 Buist. 48, 53.

(3) i.L.R. 51 Col. 331. 33,5.

Raf .Kali

Ram Ratu1n

RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH

S. R. DAS

VIVIAN BOSE

STNHA

IMAM J.T.

Constitution of India

Art. 145(3)

MUKHERJEA C:T

, DAS

VIVIAN HOSE

IMAM .TJ SINHA

Constitution Bench

Article 145(3)

Article 228

s. 24

Order 18, Rule 15

the Code of Civil Procedure

ss. 350, 526, 528 and 556

Article 145(3)

Supreme Court

SINHA

Article 145

Article 145

L.R. 24 I.A. 22

Article 32

Rao Shiva Bohadur Singh

Stale of Vimlhya Pradesh

Purshottam Trikumdas

K. B. Asthana

Syed Murtaza Faz/

Rajinder Narain

M. C. Seta

K. Daphtary

Porus A.

Mehta

R. H. Dhebar

Mukherjea

Das

Vivian Bose

Imam

Dils J. Sinha

DAs

Government of Yindhya Pradesh

section 6

Government of India Act, 1935

11th April, 1949

Delhi

fanna Diamoncl Mining Syndicate

Panna

Mohan Lal

Court of Special Judge, Rewa

sections 120

Indian Penal Code

2()th July

1950

10th March 1951

1,2th March 1951

article 134

article 145

articles 14 and 20

22nd May 1953

20th October 1953

State of Vindhya Pradesh

State of Vindlrya Prtuksl

Mohan Lal

sections 161, 465 and 466

Indian Penal Code

section 120

5th April 1954

5th March 1954

12th April 1954

17th May 1954

Rewa

article 145(3)

article 145

Article 145

clause 0

RaD Shiva Baluulur Sin'h

State of Vinrihya Pras

Rao Shifa Bahadur Sing

article 143

article 132

Pur- Balradur Sin~

shottam Trikumdas

5th March, 1954

Vindhya Pradesh

article 134(1)(c)

article 145

Purshottam Triknmdas

article 228

section 24

the Code of Civil Procedure

sections 350

Purshottam Trikumdas

article 145

article 145(3)

article 228

L.R. 24 I.A. 22

article 145

article 145(3)

article 145

article 145

article 145

Coke

Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh

article 145(3)

article 145

article 143

article 132

article 145

article 145

Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh

State of Vindhya Pradesh

Stateof Vi11dhya Pmdtsh

article 228

article 145

article 132

clause 13

article 132

Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll

article 145

Article 132

article 132

article 132

article 145

State of Vi11dliya Pradesh

Sinha

Rao Shiva Bahadllr Singh

State

Abdul Aziz

Coke C.J.

article 145

article 145

article 21

article 145(3)