{"document_id": "1955_1_1191_1201_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "< ;\n\n) I\n\n>.y\n\nS; C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1191\n\nto direct a retrial though this is. the rionnal course . when a jury frial is set aside on the grounds of i:nisdirection and non-direction. We tl).erefore discharge (nqt acquit) both the appellants leaving it to Government ither to drop t.he e.ntire matter or to poceed in such. manner as it may be advised.,. We do .this because the accused expressly asked that the • charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act shbuld be'' left over ·for a separate rial,. The two convictioµ:s re, ' therefore quashed and. also . the sentences: e. are . told that the first accused has already .served out his.; sentence. The fine if paid, will be refunded. The bail bond of the second accused will .be cancelled.\n\nMAHANT SALIG RAM v.\n\nMUSAMMAT MAYA DEVI.\n\n' (~: ~· DAS, BHAGWAT! and SYED JAFER IMA¥ JJ.] '.'\n\nCustom-succession-Non-ancestral property-Daughter virsus collateral within fourth degree-Saraswat Brahmins of Pathahl{ol •in the District of Gurdaspur-Riwaj-i-am-Entries ih'erein-Value of -Riwaj-i-am of Gurdaspur District of the year 1913-Whether a teliable document-,-Answer to questions 16 and 17.-Value of,\n\nIt is now well-settled that the general custoin of the Pnjab, being that a daughter excludes the collaterals from succession to the self-acquired property of her father. the initial onus, therefore, must, on principle, be on. the. collaterals to show that the general custom in favour of the daughter's succession to the. self-acquired property <1f her tather has been varied by a special local .custom . excluding tc, daughter which is binding on the parties. . . . , . •\n\nIt is also well-settled that though the entris in the' Riwaj-iam are entitled to an initial presumption in favour of their cortectne, s irrespective of the question whether or not the custom, 'as recorded, is in accord with the general custom, the quantum of evidence neces' sary to rebut that presumption will, however, 'vary with the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nWhere, for instance; the Riwaj-iam lays down a custoin in consonance with the general agricultural custom of the province, very strong proof would be required to dis- place that presumption; but where, on the other hand, the custom as recorded in the Ri waj'i-am is opposed to the custom generally prevalent; the presumption will be considerably weakeneq, Likewise1 40-89 S. C. India/59\n\n Shreekanliak .Ramayya Munipalli v.\n\nThe Stale of\n\nBomha.J\n\nBose].\n\nJanuary ~1\n\n!955\n\nMaharit 'Sillig Ram\n\nv; ' M11sammat Maya\n\nDtvi\n\nwhere. ; he Riwaj-i-:an1 affects ad\\ersely the fights Of the feffialeS who had ._no C!pportufiity tyhatever of appearing before the Revenue authOrities, the presumption will be \\Veaker still and only a few instances would be sufficient -to rebut it.\n\n~~ the Riw_j-i-am prOduced is a reliable and a trustworthy dot;:umeti.t, has'beeri. carefully prepared, and does not contain_ within its four corners cbntradictory s_taten1entiv ofcustom, and in \"the op1n1on of the! Settleinent Officer is not a record of the wishes of the persons appearing before him as to what the custom sµould be, it would. he a pr, r:sumpive piece of evidence in proof of the special custom se~ up, which i~ left unrebutted by the daughters would lead to a result faVOUrable to the colfaterals. If, on the other liand, it is not a docU:rUent .of the kind indicated above, then such a Riwaj-i-am will have flo value at all as a presumptive piece of evidence.\n\nThe Riwaj-i-ams of the Gurdaspur district prepared by Mr.\n\nKennaway in 1913 in so far as they purport to record the local custom as to the right of the daughter to succeed to the self-acquired property of hr. father are not reliable and trustworthy documents.\n\nThe answer to question 16 al)d the answer to question 17 recorded therein do l).Ot ontain the correct record of custom.\n\nHeld,. that the appellant-a collateral within fourth degreea saraswat Br3.hmin of Pathankot in the district of Gurdaspur had failed to discharge the onus that initially rested on him that the responde(ll (the. daughter) was excluded by him in respect of. the noiian~tral .property. _of her father and that therefore np burden was y cast op her. of adducing evidence of particular instances. ,\n\nThe ge.neral custom laid down in para 23 of Rattigan's Dige$t of ustornary .Law that \"a daughter is preferred to collaterals in regard to .the self-acquired property of her father\" was approved by the .S:iprCffie Court.\n\n' Buta Sing}l v. Mt. Harnamon (A.LR. 1946 Lah. 306); Gopal\n\nSigk v. Uiagar Singh ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 86), Mst. Subhani v. Nawab (I.L.R. [1940] Lah. 154), Beg v. Allah Ditta ([1916] L.R. 44 I.A. 89), Mt. Vaishno Ditti v. Mt. Rameshri ([1928] l.L.R. 10 Lah.\n\nI 186; L.R. '55 I.A. 407), Khan Beg v. Mt.\n\nFateh Khatun ([1931] 'c l.L:R. 13 Lah. 276), fagat Singh v. Mst. fiwan (A.LR. 1935 Lah. 617), Qamar-ud-din v. Mt. Fathe Bano ([1943] J.L.R. 26 Lah. 110), Mohammad Khalil v. Mohammad Bakhsh (A.LR. 1949 E.P. 252), Gudit Singk v. Mt. Malan ((1924] 1.L.R. 5 Lah. 364), Kesar Singh ~\n\nv. Achhar. Singh (A.LR. 1936 Lah. 68), Bawa Singh v. Mt. Partap\n\n(A.LR. 1935 Lah.' 288), Kesar Singh v. Gurnam Singh (A.LR. 1935 Lah: 696), Najju v. Mt. Aimna Bibi (A.LR. 1936 Lah. 493), Gurdit Singh v .. Mt. 1vlan Kaur (A.LR. 1937 Lah. 90), Labh v. Mt. Fateh Bibi (A.LR. 1940 Lah. 436), Ramzan Shah v. Sohna Shah ([1889] 24 P.R. 191), Nanak Chand v. Basheshar Nath ([1908] 43 P.R. 15)\n\nJ_. and Mt, Mnmn v. Sawan Mal (A.LR. 1935 Lah. 453), referred to.\n\n...\n\n< -.r•\n\nCrvrL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1953. ·\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Deree dated.· te 28th July 1949 of the High Court of Jud.icaiure, for\n\nthe State of Punjab at Simla in Civil , Regular ·.First Appeal No. 365 of 1946 ari, ing out of the Decree dated the 31st day of . October 1946 of the Court of the Su\\).\n\nJudg~, 1st Clas~, Patankot in Suit No. 110 of 1945'.. '. .\n\nRaji11der Narain, for the appellant. , K. L. Gosain (R. s. Narula and Naunit Lal, with\n\nj ( ; ' him), for the respondent.\n\n1955.\n\nJanuary 21.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDs J.-This is an itppeal by the plintiff i~.· a 'dit for a declaration of his title as collateral within four degrees of Gurdial, who . was a Sarswat. Brah'.mi~, resident of Pathankot. in the ' distriGt of 'Gurdlspu~ .nd the last male holder of tl1e .properties in suit. . ·. · ·\n\nGurdial died many years ago lea; ing. cetain' 'lands in villages Bhadroya, Kingarian • and Pathankot, Tehsil. Pathankot . in the district of . Gurdaspur, .. and le'aving him surviving his widow Musammat Melo an9 a daughter Musammat Maya Devi,. the . respond!; nt before us ... So111e time in the year 1926, a . portiop. of the land in village Bhadroya was . acquired for ... the Kangra. Valley Railway and a sum of Rs; l,539-7-0 was awarded to Musammat Melo. On an objection py the appellant this .amount .was deposited in. the Court of the Senior Subordtnate Judge, Gurdaspur, with :l' direction to pay the interest on this amount to Musammat Melo,\n\n On the 28th September 1944 Musammat Melo died and the . Revenue Courts ordered mutations in respect of the lands in the three villages in favour of the respondent .as the daughter of Gurdial.\n\nOn the 10th March 1945 the appeliani: filed the• s~!t out of which this appeal arises against the respondent for a declaration that he wa's entitled . to the , lands mentioned . in the plaint as well as to . the sum of\n\nMahant Salig Ram\n\nv.\n\nMuslltnmat M'!)la\n\n , Devi: ,,1\n\n'.\n\nMahant---Salig Ram v.\n\nMwammat Maya\n\nD6vi\n\nDas J.\n\nRs. ,1,539-7;0. in preference to 1the respondent under' the\n\nY ., custom governing the parties whereunder . the colla'\n\nt~als , of , the last male j:iolder excluded fhe daughter .. , . Te)·, espondent contes.ted.: th'.e suit ', mainly on, the\n\ngr9nd.~~- . ,':1 . · . ·, , . - i, ,. (i). that the 'suit '.tor ~.· iPere' . declaration was , n?t maintairiable,. . . . . 1 • , • •'\\- , (iif, t, hat, the . parties ~~e governed , by Hindu ' Law and not by custom, ~\n\n(iii) that the appellant was not a collateral of Gwc)ial., at all, . . . .. , . .. _ (iv) that the properties in sui\\ .were not an.cestr~I, and\n\n (v) that there was '.no custom whereunder the collaterals of the father who was the last tnak holder excluded the . daughter from succession to the , selfacq\\lie; f prperty .'of, her fathr. ' . ' ' ' . . . '.fhe .. l!bqrdinate Judge in his judgment pron0ttnceq\n\nOl)- 'fhe lt ,9c\\obef 1946 hld~ . . . .: , 1 .\n\n(i) that the !, ands, in. , suit being_ in. posession o~ tenants, the suit .for a declaration of title thereto was riiiinfainable but the ' suit' for . a: declaration iii respect of 'the' \"siiih of Rs .. 1,539-7-0 was not maintainable in'\n\nv\\w of:UJ.e prvisions of the Indian Succession Act rdating to succession' certificates, ·\n\n' '(ii)'that 'the parties were governed by custom atld not by Hindu Law, . . .'. (iii)'tha~ 'the 'appellant. was. a. collateral of 'Gurdlal within four degrees, ' . . ' . . ' '' (iy) 'that the land in Khata' No.' 2 of die' village Kihgarian Was ancestral while the ' rest' of the lands ill: si.iit 'Were 1 n:ofl-allcestral, ad ' .,, '' i, ' (v)\"that there was a custom according \"to which,' a daughter was excluded from inheritance by the collaterals up to the fourth degree ·, •with respect to ahC!!St, ral \"as weU •as self-acquired ·. property i:Jf the last male holder as laid down' in the case of Buta Si11gh v: Mt. Harnamon('). · · ' In .. the result, the, Subordinate Judge / decreed . the• suit in:-respe<; t only'.'of.. tile_ lands, iri sujt and order.ed. the parties to: beat. their , own costs. . ... , . .. 1 ·!-(I):A.I.ll.' 1946 Lah. 306.\n\n Against this judgment and decree the respondent preferred an appeal to the Lahore High Court.\n\nThe appellant preferred cross-objections against the .: order. as to costs and against the finding that the lands\" 'in the three villages except the land in Khata' No., 2, of village Kingarian were non-ancestral. After . the . parti-: -. . ~: tion of India the . appeal was transferred . to the . High ' , Court of East Punjab. . . , · · \" : • By its judgment dated the 28th July 1949 the <East' Punjab High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross\"objections on the following findings:- ·.. '1 •\n\n(i) that the suit' for .: declaration of titl~ to tn~· lands was maintainable as all the lands 'in suit wer~' in the possession of tenants, · · · (i:i) that, the lands iri suit except the land in Khata No. 2 of village Kingarian were nonancetrai; and , ·(iii) that according to the custom' prevaiiing iri the Gurdaspui: district a daughter was entitled to. s:iJo ceed to non-ancestral property iri preference to col-· laterals even ' though ' they were within the fourth degree. · ' ' ' \" 'r The, .High Court accordingly, modified the decree 'of the Subordinate Judge . to the extent. th.at the. decla~: ration . in the appellant'.s favour was made. to .. relate only to the land in. Khata No. 2 of village Kingarian which was held to be ancestral.\n\nQn an applica_tion: made by the appellant on the 26th August 1949 he.\n\nHigh Court, by its order dated the . 5th June 1950, granted him a certificate of fitness to appeal. ' . to ' the Federal Court.\n\nAfter the commencement of 'the Constittiti<?n of India the ; ippea~ has. cope before this ' Court for final disposal.· The firs~ question rai.sed before us . but not . v.ery\n\nt: seriously pressed is as to whether the : lands in .sui, t. other than those in Khata No. 2 in village, _Kingarial). were ancestral or self-acquired.\n\nOur , attentiop. , JJ.as not been drawn to any material. on tht; recon; l which. induces us .to take a view ' different from the view eon~ J.i currently taken by the . Courts _below.\n\nWe, _therefore, see n.o force or substance in this contention.\n\nMahant Sa/ig /Wm\n\nMusammat Maya\n\nDevi ·\n\nDas Ji\n\nMahant Salig Ram v.\n\nMusammat Mqya\n\n:..,, Devi\n\nDas J.\n\nThe main fight before us has been on the question as' to 'whether there is a_ custom in the Gurdaspur district governing' the parties under which a collateral within the fourth degree excludes the daughter of' the hist, male holder from succession to the -elf-acquired p'roperty _ of her father.\n\nThe customary --rights - of' succe_ssjcin of daughters as against the collaterals -of 'the father with reference to ancestral and non:ancestra:l lands are stated in paragraph 23 of Rattigan's Diget of Customary Law. It is categorically stated in subparagraph (2) of that paragraph that the daughter succeeds to the self-acquired property of the father in_ preference to the collaterals even though they are within -the fourth degree.\n\nRattigan's work has been. accepted by the Privy Council_ as \"a book _ of _ U!).- questioned authority in the Punjab\".\n\nIndeed, the correctness of this paragraph was not disputed before this Court in Copa/ Singh v. Ujagar Singh(').\n\nThe general custom of the Punjab being that a daughter excludes the collaterals from succession to the selfacquired property of her father the initial onus, therefore, must, on principle, be on the collaterals to show_ that the general custom in favour of the daughter's succession to the self-acquired property of her father has been varied by a special local custom excluding the daughter which is binding on the parties.\n\nIndeed, it -has been so held by the Judicial Committee in T:rfst.: Subhani v. Nawab( 2 ) and the matter is now We\\1-se, ttled.\n\nThe appellant claims to have discharged this -initialonus in two ways, namely (1) by producing the Riwaji-am of the - Gurdaspur district prepared by Mr: Kennaway in 19i3 and (2) by adducing evidenc~ showing that the collaterals of one Harnam _ Singh, who was also a Sarswat Brahmin of the Gurdaspur district and indeed a member of this very family of Gurdial succeeded in -preference to his daughter. It is pointe9 out that no instance has been proved on the part of the respondent showing that the daughter ever excluded the collaterals from succession to the self-acquired property of the father.\n\nThe trial Court (1j [19551 1 s.c.R. se.\n\n(2) LL.R. [1940) Lah. 154.\n\n'r .,\n\nas well as the High Court took the view that the evi~ dence as to the succession to the propertyof Harnam Singh was of no assistance to the appellant for the reason that the evidence was extremely sketchy; that it did not appear whether the properties left by Harnam Singh were ancestral or selfacquired or whether \" the .. properties left by him were of any substantial , .._._._,, value at all as would have made it worth while for the daughter to claim the same in addition to the properties gifted to her by her father during his lifetime: Further, the. fact that the daughter did .not contest the suq.:ession of the collaterals to the pro-· perties left by fiqfllaIU Singh, eyen if they were selfacquired, might well have been the result, as held by the High Court, of sorrie family arrangement.\n\nWe find . ourselves in agreement with the Courts below that the instance relied upon by the appellant is wholly insufficient to discharge the onus that was on him to displace the general custom recorded in paragraph 23(2) of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law.\n\nThe appellant contends that in any case he has fully discharged the onus that was on him by producing in evidence the Riwaj-i-am recording the. custom of the district of Gurdaspur which was compiled by Mr.\n\nKennaway in 1913.\n\nReference is also . made to the earlier Riwaj-i-ams of the Gurdaspur District prepared iri 1865 and 1893.\n\nAnswer to question\n\n16. as recorded in the Riwaj-i-am of 1913 shows that subject to certain exceptions, which are not material for our purpose, the general rule is that the daughters are excluded by the widow and 1llale kindred of the deceased, however remote.\n\nThis answer goes much beyond the answers to the same question as recorded in the Riwaj-i-ams of 1865 and 1893 for those. answers limit the exclusion in favour of the male kindred up to certain specified degrees.\n\nThe answer to question 17 of the 1913 Riwaj-i-am like those to question 17 of the 1865 and 1893 Riwaj-i-ams clearlyindi<;:ates . that except amongst the Gujjars of the Shakargarh tehsil all the remaining tribes consulted by the Revenue authorities recognised no distinction as to the rights of the daughters to inherit (i) the immovable or\n\n1955 ...\n\nMahant Salig Ram\n\n\"'.' •.\n\nMusamrnat Maya\n\nDevi -.· Das J.\n\nig55\n\nMdiiant Salig' Ra'Ji\n\nv,' '' MuSam1nat Maya\n\nDeVi1\n\niJ/u J.'\n\nantestral and (ii) the niovable or sdf acquired property of' their' respective fathers.. It is claimed that these answers _quite ': aequatdy displace the general custom and' shif\\ the onus to the . respondent to disprove the ptesrtmption arising on these Riwaj-i-ams by citing instan:2es of successioncontrary to these answers.\n\nIn stlj'lpOrt' °c:if this contention\" reference is made to the observations . of the Privy Conncil in Beg v. Allah Di'tta(1 ) 'that ·the statements contained in a Riwaj-iani. <£oi-ih a sttbng piece of evidence iff support of the c'uston\\. \"therein: entered subject to rebuttal.\n\nReliance is also .-placed on the observations of the Privy Council'in Mt. VaishnlY Ditti y. Mt. Rameshri(2 ) \"to the effect that 'the statements in the Riwaj-i-am might be accepted' even if unsupported by instances.\n\nThe conterttioii is that on production by the appellant of the Riwaj-icain of the Gurdaspur district the onus shifted to the respondent 'to prove instances rebutting the statements contained therein. This, it is urged, the respohdent has failed to do. ·\n\n:.There is n'o doubt or dispte :is to the value of the. entries . in the . Riwaj-i-am.\n\nIt is well-settled that tl}ough' they are entitled to an initial presumption . in favour \"of their correctness irrespective of the question whether or not the ' custom, as recorded, is in accord with the general custom, .the' quantum of evidence necessary to rebut that presumption will, however; vary ith_ the facts and . circumstances of each case.\n\nWhere, for instance, the Riwaj-i-am lavs down a ustni in . consonance with the general agricultural cust9m of the province, very strong proof would be required to displace that presumption; but where, on the oiher hand, the custom\" as recorded in the Riwaji-a'.~ , {s'. oppo; ed to the custom g'eneraliy prevalnt,. the'.presumption will be , considerably weal<ened.\n\nLikewise .where the Riwajci-am . affects adversely the rights of . the femals who had no opportunity whatever of ppearing before the Revenue authodties, _te presufI1ptio11 will be weaker still and only a fe.w mstances would be .sufficient to rebut it. [See Khan Beg v.' Mt.\n\n(i) (1916].i...R. 44.i. A. 89.\n\n(2) [tg~S] i.L.R. to Lah. 186; L.R. 55 I.A. 407.\n\ny ......\n\nFateh Khatun(1 ), Jagat Singh v. Mst. Jiwan( 2 ) ]. The principles laid down in these cases were approved of by the Judicial Committee in Mst.\n\nSubhani's case supra.\n\nLearned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that even if the presumption as to the correctness of the Riwaj-i-am be weak, the respondent has not cited a single instance of a daughter having excluded the collaterals from succession to the selfacquired property of her father and has, therefore, failed to discharge the onus that was thrown on her as a result of the production-by the appellant of the Riwaji-am of 1913 and, consequently, the appellant must succeed.\n\nThis argument overlooks the fact that m order to enable the appellant to displace the general custom recorded in Rattigan's work and to shift the onus to the respondent the appellant must produce a Riwaj-i-am which is a reliable and trustworthy document. It has been held in Qamar-ud-Din v. Mt.\n\nFateh Bano( 3 ) that if the Riwaj-i-am produced is a reliable and a trustworthy document, has been carefully prepared and does not contain within its four corners contradictory statements of custom and m the opinion of the Settlement Officer is not a record of the wishes of the presons appearing before him as to what the custom should be, it would be a presumptive piece of evidence in proof of the special custom set up, which if left unrebutted by the daughters would lead to a result favourable to the collaterals.\n\nIf, on the other hand, it is not a document of the kind indicated above then such a Riwaj-i-am will have no value at all as a presumptive piece of evidence.\n\nThis principle has been followed by the East Punjab High Court in the later case of Mohammad Khalil v. Mohammad Bakhsh( 4 ), This being the position in law, we have to scrutinise and ascertain whether the Riwaji-ams of the Gurdaspur district in so far as they purport to record the local custom as to the right of succession of daughters to the self acquired properties of their respective father are reliable and trustworthy documents.\n\n(1) [1931] l.L.R. 13 Lah. 276, 296, 297.\n\n(2) A.LR. t935 Lah. 617.\n\n(3) [1943] l.L.R. 26 Lah. 110.\n\n(4) A.LR. '949 E.P. 252.\n\nMahant Salig Ram v.\n\nMusammat Maya\n\nDeui\n\nDas].\n\nMahant Salig Ram v.\n\nMusammat Maya Devi\n\nDa> ],\n\nTwenty-two tribes including Brahmins were consulted by Mr. Kennaway who prepared ' the Riwaj-i-am of 1913.\n\nIn paragraph 4 of the Preface Mr.\n\nKennaway himself states that many of the questions related to matters on which there really existed no custom and the people had merely stated what the custom should be and not what it actually was.\n\nIn Appendix 'C' are collected 56 instances of mutuations rn which the daughter inherited.\n\nIn these there are four instances relating to Brahmins.\n\nAnswer to question 16, as recorded in this Riwaj-i-am, has been discredited and shown to be incorrect in at least three cases, namely, Gurdit Singh v. Mt. Malan('), Kesar Singh v. Achhar Singh(') and Buta Singh v. Mt. Harnamon ( 3 ) • The answer to question 16 as recorded in the 1913 Riwaj-i-am, it was pointed ont, went much beyond the answer given to the same question in the Riwaj-i-ams of 1865 and 1893.\n\nThe answer to question 17 of the 1913 Riwaj-i-am that no distinction is to be made between ancestral and self-acquired property has not been accepted as correct in not less than six cases, namely, Bawa Singh\n\nv. Mt. Partap( 4 ), fagat Singh v. Mt. fiwan( '), Kesar Singh v. Gurnam Singh( 0 ), Najju v. Mt. Aimma Bibi('), Gurdit Singh v. Mt. Man Kaur('), and Labh v. Mt.\n\nFateh Bibi('). The statements in a Riwaj-i-am the truth of which is doubted by the compiler himself in the preface and which stand contradicted by the instances collected and set out in Appendix 'C' of the same Riwaj-i-am and which have been discredited in judicial proceedings and held to be incorrect cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as a reliable or trustworthy document and cannot displace the initial presumption of the general custom recorded in Rattigan' s book so as to shift the onus to the daughter who is the respondent.\n\nThe appellant relies on the cases of Ramzan Shah\n\nv. Sohna Shah( 10 ), Nanak Chand v. Basheshar Nath(11 ), Mt. Massan v. Sawan Mal (,.) and Kesar Singh v. (I) [r924] LL.R. 5 Lah. 364.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1946. Lah. 306.\n\n(5) Ibid. 617.\n\n(7) A.LR. r936 Lah. 493\n\n(9) A.LR. 1940 Lah. 436.\n\n(n) 1908] 43 P.R. I5.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1936 Lah. 68.\n\n(4) A.LR. 1935 Lah. 288. r6) Ibid. 696.\n\n(8) A.LR. 1937 Lah. 90.\n\n(IO) [I889] 24 P.R. '9'\n\n(r2) A.LR. '935 Lah. 453\n\n~ I\n\nAchhar Singh(1), The first three cases are of no assistance to him although the second and third relate to Brahmins of Gurdaspur, for the properties in dispute in those cases were ancestral and the respondent does not now dispute the appellant's right to succeed to her father's ancestral properties.\n\nThese cases, therefore, do not throw any light on the present case which is concerned with the question of succession to selfacquired property.\n\nFurther, in the last case, the collaterals were beyond the fourth degree and it was enough for the Court to say that irrespective of whether the properties in dispute were ancestral or selfacquired the collaterals in that case could not succeed.\n\nIt is also to be noted that the earlier decisions were not cited or considered in that case.\n\nIn our opinion the appellant has failed to discharge the onus that was initially on him and that being the position no burden was cast on the respondent which she need have discharged by adducing evidence of particular instances.\n\nIn these circumstances, the general custom recorded in Rattigan's book must prevail and the decision of the High Court must be upheld. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nNANAK CHAND\n\nfl.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB.\n\n[S. R. DAs, BHAGWATI and\n\nSYED JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 34---Merely explanatory-No offence created thereby-Ss. 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code-Distinction between the two-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 233-Charge under s. 302 1ead with s. 149, Indian\n\nPenal Code-No speci'fic charge under s. 302, Indian Penal Code as required by s. 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-Conviction\n\nunder s. 302-Legality thereof.\n\nSection 34 of the Indian Penal Code is merely explanatory.\n\nIt does not create any specific offence.\n\nUnder this section several persons must be actuated by a common intention and when in further-\n\n(1) A.LR. 1936 Lah. 68.\n\nMahant Salig Ram\n\nMusammal Ml!)'a\n\nDevi\n\nDas].\n\nJanuary 25", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 438, "end_char": 466, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "MAHANT SALIG RAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 754, "end_char": 770, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHANT SALIG RAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUSAMMAT MAYA DEVI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 793, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Musammat Maya\n\nDevi", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Maharit 'Sillig Ram\n\nv", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2483, "end_char": 2505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nMaharit 'Sillig Ram\n\nv; ' M11sammat Maya\n\nDtvi\n\nwhere. ;"}}, {"text": "Kennaway", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3522, "end_char": 3530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Riwaj-i-ams of the Gurdaspur district prepared by Mr.\n\nKennaway in 1913 in so far as they purport to record the local custom as to the right of the daughter to succeed to the self-acquired property of hr.", "canonical_name": "Kennaway"}}, {"text": "Pathankot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3927, "end_char": 3936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the appellant-a collateral within fourth degreea saraswat Br3.hmin of Pathankot in the district of Gurdaspur had failed to discharge the onus that initially rested on him that the responde(ll (the."}}, {"text": "Gurdaspur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3956, "end_char": 3965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the appellant-a collateral within fourth degreea saraswat Br3.hmin of Pathankot in the district of Gurdaspur had failed to discharge the onus that initially rested on him that the responde(ll (the."}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 86", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4542, "end_char": 4560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 44 I.A. 89", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kesar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5023, "end_char": 5034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "364), Kesar Singh ~\n\nv. Achhar."}}, {"text": "Raji11der Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5900, "end_char": 5916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raji11der Narain, for the appellant. ,"}}, {"text": "K. L. Gosain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5939, "end_char": 5951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Gosain (R. s. Narula and Naunit Lal, with\n\nj ( ; ' him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5970, "end_char": 5980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Gosain (R. s. Narula and Naunit Lal, with\n\nj ( ; ' him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bhadroya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6433, "end_char": 6441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cetain' 'lands in villages Bhadroya, Kingarian • and Pathankot, Tehsil."}}, {"text": "Musammat Melo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdaspur, .. and le'aving him surviving his widow Musammat Melo an9 a daughter Musammat Maya Devi,."}}, {"text": "Musammat Maya Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6591, "end_char": 6609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdaspur, .. and le'aving him surviving his widow Musammat Melo an9 a daughter Musammat Maya Devi,.", "canonical_name": "Musammat Maya\n\nDevi"}}, {"text": "28th September 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Court of the Senior Subordtnate Judge, Gurdaspur, with :l' direction to pay the interest on this amount to Musammat Melo,\n\n On the 28th September 1944 Musammat Melo died and the ."}}, {"text": "Gurdial", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7203, "end_char": 7210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Revenue Courts ordered mutations in respect of the lands in the three villages in favour of the respondent .as the daughter of Gurdial."}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8730, "end_char": 8751, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9720, "end_char": 9737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this judgment and decree the respondent preferred an appeal to the Lahore High Court."}}, {"text": "Kingarian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9923, "end_char": 9932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, of village Kingarian were non-ancestral."}}, {"text": "High ' , Court of East Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10037, "end_char": 10066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High ' , Court of East Punjab. . . , · · \" : •"}}, {"text": "Mahant Sa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11772, "end_char": 11781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Sa/ig /Wm\n\nMusammat Maya\n\nDevi ·\n\nDas Ji\n\nMahant Salig Ram v.\n\nMusammat Mqya\n\n:..,, Devi\n\nDas J.\n\nThe main fight before us has been on the question as' to 'whether there is a custom in the Gurdaspur district governing' the parties under which a collateral within the fourth degree excludes the daughter of' the hist, male holder from succession to the -elf-acquired p'roperty  of her father.", "canonical_name": "MAHANT SALIG RAM"}}, {"text": "Musammat Maya\n\nDevi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11790, "end_char": 11809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Sa/ig /Wm\n\nMusammat Maya\n\nDevi ·\n\nDas Ji\n\nMahant Salig Ram v.\n\nMusammat Mqya\n\n:..,, Devi\n\nDas J.\n\nThe main fight before us has been on the question as' to 'whether there is a custom in the Gurdaspur district governing' the parties under which a collateral within the fourth degree excludes the daughter of' the hist, male holder from succession to the -elf-acquired p'roperty  of her father.", "canonical_name": "Musammat Maya\n\nDevi"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11813, "end_char": 11816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Sa/ig /Wm\n\nMusammat Maya\n\nDevi ·\n\nDas Ji\n\nMahant Salig Ram v.\n\nMusammat Mqya\n\n:..,, Devi\n\nDas J.\n\nThe main fight before us has been on the question as' to 'whether there is a custom in the Gurdaspur district governing' the parties under which a collateral within the fourth degree excludes the daughter of' the hist, male holder from succession to the -elf-acquired p'roperty  of her father."}}, {"text": "Rattigan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12609, "end_char": 12617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rattigan's work has been."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12718, "end_char": 12724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "accepted by the Privy Council as \"a book  of _ U!).- questioned authority in the Punjab\"."}}, {"text": "Gurdaspur district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13512, "end_char": 13530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant claims to have discharged this -initialonus in two ways, namely (1) by producing the Riwaji-am of the - Gurdaspur district prepared by Mr: Kennaway in 19i3 and (2) by adducing evidenc~ showing that the collaterals of one Harnam _ Singh, who was also a Sarswat Brahmin of the Gurdaspur district and indeed a member of this very family of Gurdial succeeded in -preference to his daughter."}}, {"text": "Kennaway", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13547, "end_char": 13555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant claims to have discharged this -initialonus in two ways, namely (1) by producing the Riwaji-am of the - Gurdaspur district prepared by Mr: Kennaway in 19i3 and (2) by adducing evidenc~ showing that the collaterals of one Harnam _ Singh, who was also a Sarswat Brahmin of the Gurdaspur district and indeed a member of this very family of Gurdial succeeded in -preference to his daughter.", "canonical_name": "Kennaway"}}, {"text": "Harnam _ Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13629, "end_char": 13643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant claims to have discharged this -initialonus in two ways, namely (1) by producing the Riwaji-am of the - Gurdaspur district prepared by Mr: Kennaway in 19i3 and (2) by adducing evidenc~ showing that the collaterals of one Harnam _ Singh, who was also a Sarswat Brahmin of the Gurdaspur district and indeed a member of this very family of Gurdial succeeded in -preference to his daughter.", "canonical_name": "Harnam _ Singh"}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14169, "end_char": 14181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as well as the High Court took the view that the evi~ dence as to the succession to the propertyof Harnam Singh was of no assistance to the appellant for the reason that the evidence was extremely sketchy; that it did not appear whether the properties left by Harnam Singh were ancestral or selfacquired or whether \" the .. properties left by him were of any substantial , ...._,, value at all as would have made it worth while for the daughter to claim the same in addition to the properties gifted to her by her father during his lifetime: Further, the.", "canonical_name": "Harnam _ Singh"}}, {"text": "fiqfllaIU Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14732, "end_char": 14747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fact that the daughter did .not contest the suq.:ession of the collaterals to the pro-· perties left by fiqfllaIU Singh, eyen if they were selfacquired, might well have been the result, as held by the High Court, of sorrie family arrangement."}}, {"text": "L.R. 55 I.A. 407", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18646, "end_char": 18662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fateh Khatun(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18675, "end_char": 18689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y ......\n\nFateh Khatun(1 ), Jagat Singh v. Mst."}}, {"text": "Subhani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18819, "end_char": 18826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhani's case supra."}}, {"text": "East Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20332, "end_char": 20354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle has been followed by the East Punjab High Court in the later case of Mohammad Khalil v. Mohammad Bakhsh( 4 ), This being the position in law, we have to scrutinise and ascertain whether the Riwaji-ams of the Gurdaspur district in so far as they purport to record the local custom as to the right of succession of daughters to the self acquired properties of their respective father are reliable and trustworthy documents."}}, {"text": "Mahant Salig Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20856, "end_char": 20872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Salig Ram v.\n\nMusammat Maya\n\nDeui\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "MAHANT SALIG RAM"}}, {"text": "Achhar Singh(1", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23211, "end_char": 23225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "453\n\n~ I\n\nAchhar Singh(1), The first three cases are of no assistance to him although the second and third relate to Brahmins of Gurdaspur, for the properties in dispute in those cases were ancestral and the respondent does not now dispute the appellant's right to succeed to her father's ancestral properties."}}, {"text": "NANAK CHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24432, "end_char": 24443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NANAK CHAND\n\nfl."}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24454, "end_char": 24469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24473, "end_char": 24482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, BHAGWATI and\n\nSYED JAFER IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24484, "end_char": 24492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, BHAGWATI and\n\nSYED JAFER IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SYED JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24498, "end_char": 24513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, BHAGWATI and\n\nSYED JAFER IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24520, "end_char": 24537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24557, "end_char": 24562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ss. 34 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24611, "end_char": 24625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24633, "end_char": 24650, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24679, "end_char": 24705, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24723, "end_char": 24729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24743, "end_char": 24749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24760, "end_char": 24766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24776, "end_char": 24786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24813, "end_char": 24819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian\n\nPenal Code", "statute": "Indian\n\nPenal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24821, "end_char": 24838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24854, "end_char": 24860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24868, "end_char": 24894, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24913, "end_char": 24919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24939, "end_char": 24949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24957, "end_char": 24974, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mahant Salig Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25162, "end_char": 25178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Salig Ram\n\nMusammal Ml!)'a\n\nDevi\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "MAHANT SALIG RAM"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1201_1214_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "~ I\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1201\n\nAchhar Singh(1), The first three cases are of no assistance to him although the second and third relate to Brahmins of Gurdaspur, for the properties in dispute in those cases were ancestral and the respondent does not now dispute the appellant's right to succeed to her father's ancestral properties.\n\nThese cases, therefore, do not throw any light on the present case which is concerned with the question of succession to selfacquired property.\n\nFurther, in the last case, the collaterals were beyond the fourth degree and it was enough for the Court to say that irrespective of whether the properties in dispute were ancestral or selfacquired the collaterals in that case could not succeed.\n\nIt is also to be noted that the earlier decisions were not cited or considered in that case.\n\nIn our opinion the appellant has failed to discharge the onus that was initially on him and that being the position no burden was cast on the respondent which she need have discharged by adducing evidence of particular instances.\n\nIn these circumstances, the general custom recorded in Rattigan's book must prevail and the decision of the High Court must be upheld. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nNANAK CHAND\n\nfl.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB.\n\n[S. R. DAs, BHAGWATI and\n\nSYED JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 34---Merely explanatory-No offence created thereby-Ss. 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code-Distinction between the two-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 233-Charge under s. 302 1ead with s. 149, Indian\n\nPenal Code-No speci'fic charge under s. 302, Indian Penal Code as required by s. 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-Conviction\n\nunder s. 302-Legality thereof.\n\nSection 34 of the Indian Penal Code is merely explanatory.\n\nIt does not create any specific offence.\n\nUnder this section several persons must be actuated by a common intention and when in further-\n\n(1) A.LR. 1936 Lah. 68.\n\nMahant Salig Ram\n\nMusammal Ml!)'a\n\nDevi\n\nDas].\n\nJanuary 25\n\n•955\n\nNanak Chand\n\nTht State of Punjab\n\nf y~ ance o that common intention a criminal act is done by them, -each of them is liable for that act as if the act had been done by him alone.\n\nThere is a clear distinction between the provisions of s. '14 and s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code and the two sections are not to be confused. The principal element in s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is the common intention to con1mit a crime.\n\nIn furtherance of the common intention several acts may be done by several persons resulting n the commission of that crime.\n\nI~ such a situaton ~· 34 !\"'y~ provides that each one of them would be liable for that crime in the same manner as if all the acts resulting in that cri1ne had been done ::; by him alone. There is no question of con1mon intention in s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nAn offence 1nay be committed by a member -of an unlawful assembly and the other members will be liable for that offence although there was no common intention betveen that person and the other members of the unlawful assembly to con1mit that offence provided the conditions laid down in the section are fulfilled. Thus if the offence committed by that person is in prosecution of the co1nmon object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of that asse1nbly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object, .every member of the unlawful assen1bly \\Vould be guilty of that offence, although. there may have been no comman intention and no participation by the other members in the actual con1mission of that offence.\n\nThere is a difference between object and intention, for although the object may be common, the intentions of the several members of the unlawful assembly may differ and indeed may be similar only in one respect namely that they are all unlawful, while the element of ,_, y. participation in action, which is the leading feature of s. 34, is replaced in s. 149 by membership of the assembly at the time of the co1n1nitting of the offence.\n\nA charge for a substantive offence under section 302, or section\n\n325 cf the Indian Penal Code, etc. is for a distinct and separate ,.. offence from that under section 302, read with section 149 or section 325, read with section 149, etc.\n\nA person charged with an offence read with s. 149 cannot be convicted of the substantive offence without a specific charge being f. framed as required by s. 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. \\..\n\nThere was uo roon1 for the application of s. 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the facts of the present case.\n\nThe provisions of s. 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can ) apply -only in cases where there is no doubt about the facts which can be proved but a doubt .arises as to which of several offences have been committed on the proved facts in which case any number of charges can be framed and tried or alternative charges can be framed.\n\nIn the present case there was no doubt about the facts and if the allegation against: the appellant that he had caused the injuries to the \\.1.- deceased with, taktva was established by evidence, then there could be no doubt that the offence of murder had been committed.\n\nIn the present case there was no question of any error, omission or irregularity, in the charge within the meaning of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because no charge under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code was in fact framed.\n\nThere was an illegality in the present case and not an irregula, rity which was curable by the provisions of ss. 535 and 537 ·of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nAssuming however that there : \" was merely an irregularity which was curable, the irregularity in the circumstances of the case was not curable because the appellant 't was misled in his defence by the absence of a charge under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nBy framing a charge under s. 302, read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code against the appellant, the Court indicated that it was not charging the appellant with the offence of murder and to convict him for murder and sentence him under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code was to convict him of an offence with which he had not been charged.\n\nIn defending himself the appellant was not called upon to meet such a charge and in his defence he may be well have considered it unnecessary to concentrate on that part of the prosecution case.\n\nBarendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor\n\n( [19251 I.L.R. 52 Cal. 197), Queen v. Sabid Ali and others ([1873] 20 W.R. (Cr.) 5) Panchu Das. v. Emperor ( [1907] I.L.R. 34 Cal. 698), Reazuaddi and Others\n\nv. King-Emperor ([1901] 6 C.W.N. 98), Emperor v. Madan Manda! and Others ([1914] I.L.R. 41 Cal. 662), Theethumalai Gounder and Others v. King-Emperor ( [1924\"] I.L.R. 47 Mad. 746), Queen-Emprm\n\nv. Bisheshar and Others ( [ 1887] I.L.R. 9 All. 645), Taikkottathil Kunheen ([1923] 18 L.W. 946), Ramasray Ahir v. King-Emperor ( [ 1926] I.L.R. 7 Patna 484 ), Sheo Ram and Others v.\n\nEmperor (A.LR. 1948 All. 162), and Karnail Singh and another v. State of Punjab ( (1954] S.C.R. 904 ), referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 132 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave granted by the Supreme Court by its Order dated the 3rd September, 1954 from the Judgment and Order dated the 15th June 1954 of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla in Criminal in Appeal No. 287 of 1954 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 14th April 1954 of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge in Session Case No. 4 of 1954.\n\n/. G. Sethi, (Naunit Lal, with him), for the appellant.\n\nr955\n\nNanak Chand\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nNanak Chand v.\n\nThe StaU of\n\nJJ_ury'ab\n\nGopal Singh and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent. 1955.\n\nJanuary 25.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J.-This appeal by Nanak Chand comes by special leave against the judgment of the Punjab (I) _, High Court.\n\nThe appellant was convicted by the High Court under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of death passed on him by the Additional Sessions Judge of Jullundur was confirmed.\n\nOn the facts alleged by the .Prosecution there can be no doubt that Sadhu Ram was killed on the 5th of November, 1953, at about 6-45 P.M. at the shop of Vas Dev P. W. 2.\n\nIt is alleged that the appellant along with others assaulted Sadhu Ram.\n\nThe appellant was armed with a takwa.\n\nNumerous injuries were found on the person of Sadhu Ram.\n\nAccording to the doctor, who held the post-mortem examination, injuries 1, 3 and 4 were due to a heavy sharp edged weapon and could be caused by a takwa.\n\nIt was denied by the prosecution that the deceased was assaulted bv any other person with a takwa.\n\nAccording to the Medicai evidence, injuries 1, 3 and 4 individually,· as well as collectively, were enough to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.\n\nIn the Court of Sessions the appellant along with others was charged under section 148 and section 302, read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe Additional Sessions Judge, however, held that the charge of rioting was not proved.\n\nHe accordingly found the appellant and three others guilty under section 302, read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nHe acquitted the other three accused.\n\nThere was an appeal by three convicted persons to the High Court and the High Court convicted the appellant alone under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, confirming the sentence of death but altered the conviction of the other accused from section 302/34 to section 323, Indian Penal Code.\n\nIt held that the provisions of section 34 of the Indian Penal Code did not apply.\n\nv ' 1\n\n....\n\n... l\n\nOn behalf of the appellant questions of law and questions of fact were urged.\n\nIt will be unnecessary to deal with the questions of fact if the argument on points of law is accepted.\n\nThe principal question of law to be considered is as to whether the appellant could legally be convicted for merder and sentenced under section 302, Indian Penal Code when he was not charged with that offence.\n\nIt was urged that as the appellant had been acquitted of the charge of rioting and the offence under section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code, he could not be convicted for the substantive offence of murder under section 302, Indian Penal Code, without a charge having been framed against him under that section.\n\nReliance has been placed on the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the framing of charges, the observations of the Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh\n\nv. Emperor( 1 ) and certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court to which reference will be made later on.\n\nIt was urged that for every distinct offence of which a person is accused, there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately except in cases mentioned under sections 234, 235, 236, 237 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nSection 149 of the Indian Penal Code creates a specific offence and it is a separate offence from the offence of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe provisions of sections 236, 237 and 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply to the facts and cJrcumstances of the present case.\n\nOn behalf of the Prosecution, however, it was urged that section 149 did not create any offence at all and therefore no separate charge was obligatory under section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that in any event the provisions of sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did apply and the appellant could have been convicted and sentenced under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, although no charge for the substantive offence of murder had been framed against him.\n\n(1) [1925] I.L.R. 52 Cal. 197.\n\n. 1955\n\nNanak Chand v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPurifah\n\nImam ].\n\n.Nanak C.arui\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nImam J.\n\nIt is necessary, therefore, to exammc the prov1s10ns of section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and consider as to whether tills section creates a specific offence.\n\nSection 149 of the Indian Penal Code 1s to be found in Chapter VIII of that Code which deals with offences against the public tranquillity.\n\nSection 149 of the Indian Penal Code reads :-\n\n'If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly m prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed m prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, 1s a member of the same assembly, 1s guilty of that offence\".\n\nThis section postulates that an offence 1s committed by a member of an unlawful assembly m prosecution of the common object of that assembly or such as a member of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed m prosecution of that object and declares that in such circumstances every person, who was a member of the same assembly at the time of the comm1ss10n of the offence, was guilty of that offence.\n\nUnder this section a person, who 1s a member of an unlawful assembly 1s made guilty of the offence committed by another member of the same assembly, m the circumstances mentioned m the section, although he had no intention to commit that offence and had done no overt act except his presence m the assembly and sharing the common object of that assembly.\n\nWithout the prov1S1ons of this section a member of an unlawful assembly could not have been made liable for the offence committed not by him but by another member of that assembly.\n\nTherefore when the ac- -cused are acquitted of riot and the charge for being members of an unlawful assemblv fails. there can be no conviction of any one of the~ for n offence which he had not himself committed.\n\nSimilarly under section 150 of the Indian Penal Code, a specific offence is created.\n\nUnder this section a person need n1)( be a member of an unlawful assembly and yet he would be guilty of being a member of an unlawful assembly and guilty of an offence which may be committed by\n\n' ..\n\nv •\n\n' .-~\n\n.-a member of the unlawful assembly in the c1rcum- -stances mentioned in the section.\n\nSections 149 and 150 of the Indian Penal Code are not the only sections in that Code which create a specific offence.\n\nSection -471 of the Indian Penal Code makes it an offence to , _fraudulently or dishonestly use as genuine any docu- ~ ment which a person knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document and it provides that such a person shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document.\n\nAbetment is an offence under the Indian Penal Code and is a separate crime to the principal offence.\n\nThe sentence to be inflicted may be the same as for the principal offence.\n\nIn Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code offences of false evidence and against public justice are mentioned.\n\nSection 193 prescribes the punishment for giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding or fabri- cating false evidence for the purpose of being used in .any stage of a judicial proceeding.\n\nSection 195 creates .an offence and the person convicted of this offence is liable in certain circumstances to be punished in the same manner as a person convicted of the principal ... __,. offence.\n\nSections 196 and 197 to 200 of the Indian Penal Code also create offences and a person convicted under any one of them would be liable to be punished in the same manner as if he had given false evidence.\n\nIt was, however, urged on behalf of the Prosecution that _section 149 merely provides for constructive guilt similar to section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSection 34 reads:\n\n\"When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone\". ( 'This section is merely explanatory.\n\nSeveral persons must be actuated by a common intention and when in furtherance of that common intention a criminal .act is done by them, each of them is liable for that .act as if tlie act had been, done by him alone.\n\nThis section does not create any specific offence. As was pointed out by Lord Sumner in Barendra Kumar ; Ghosh v. Emperor(1) \"'a criminal act' means that\n\n{1) [1925] I.L.R. 52 Cal. 197.\n\n1955 .\n\nNanak Chand v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPuiifah\n\nImam J•\n\nNanak Chand\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nImam j.\n\nunity of criminal behaviour which results m something, for which an individual would be punishable, if it were all done by himself alone, that is, in a criminal offence\".\n\nThere is a clear distinction between the provisions of sections 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code and the two sections are not to be confused~ The principal element m section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is the common intention to commit a: cnme.\n\nIn furtherance of the common intention several acts may be done by several persons resulting m the comm1ss10n of that cnme.\n\nIn sucb a situation section 34 provides that each one of them would be liable for that crnne 111 the same manner as if all the acts resulting m that cnme had been done by him alone.\n\nThere is no question of common intention m section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nAn offence may be committed by a member of an unlawful assembly and the other members will be liable for that offence although there was no common intention between that person and other members of the unlawful assembly to commit that offence provided the conditions laid down in the section are fulfilled.\n\nThusc if the offence committed by that person 1s m prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object, every member of the unlawful assembly would be guilty of that offence, although there may have been no common intention and no participation by the other members in the actual comm1ss10n of that offence.\n\nIn Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor(') Lord Sumner dealt with the argument that if section 34 of the Indian Penal Code bore the meaning adopted by the Calcutta High Court, then sections 114 and 149 of that Code would be otiose.\n\nIn the opm10n of Lord Sumner, however, section 149 is certainly not otiose, for 111 any case it created a specific offence.\n\nIt postulated an assembly of five or more persons, having a common object, as 'named m section 141 of the Indian Penal Code and then the comm1ss10n of an offence by one member of it in prosecution of that object and he referred to Queen v. Sabid Ali and\n\n(1) [1925) LL, R. 52 Cal. 197,\n\nr-- , OthersC ). He pointed out that there was a difference between object and intention, for although the object may be common, the intentions of the several members of the unlawful assembly may differ and indeed may be similar only in respect that they are all unlawful, while the element of participation in action,\n\n~ ~- ·which is the leading feature of section 34, was replaced in section 149 by membership of the assembly\n\n--<; at the time of the committing of the offence. It was argued, however, that these observations of Lord Sumner were obiter dicta.\n\nAssuming though not conceding that that may be so, the observations of a Judge of such eminence must carry weight particularly if the observations are in keeping with the ) provisions of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nIt is, however, to be remembered that the observations of Lord Sumner did directly arise on the argument made before the Privy Council, the Privy Council reviewing as a whole the provisions of sections 34, 114 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court were relied upon in support of the submission made, viz. Panchu Das v. Emperor(2), Reazuddi and Others v. King-Emperor( 3 ) and Emperor v. Madan Manda! and Others(4). These decisions support the contention that it will be illegal to convict an accused of the substantive offence under a section without a charge being framed if he was acquitted of the offence under that section read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. On the other hand, the\n\n.\\ I\n\nprosecution relied upon a decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in T heethumalai Gounder and Others v. King-Emperor(s ) and the case Queen- Empress v. Bisheshar and Others( 6 ). The decision of the Madras High Court was given in April, 1924, and ( reliance was placed upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court.\n\nThe decision of the Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh's case was in October, 1924.\n\nThe Madras High Court, therefore, did not have before it the decision of the Privy Council.\n\nIt is im-\n\n., LJ possible to say what view might have been expressed\n\n(1 J f1873] 20 vV. R. (Cr.) 5.\n\n(2) [1907] I.L.R. 34 Cal. 698.\n\n(3) [1901] 6 C.W.N. 98.\n\n(4) [1914] I.L.R. 41 Cal. 662.\n\n(5) (1924] LL.R. 47 Mad. 746.\n\n(6) [1887] LL.R. 9 All. 645.\n\nNanak Chand: v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nImam ].\n\nJV'anak Chand\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\n.fmam J.\n\nby that court if the Privy Council's judgment m the aforesaid case had been available to the court.\n\nThe view of the Calcutta High Court had been noticed and it appears that a decision of the Madras High Court in Taikkottathil Kunheen(') was to the effect that section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is a distinct offence from section 325 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nBecause of this it was thought advisable to refer the matter to a Full Bench.\n\nTwo questions were referred to the Full Bench: (1) When a charge omits section 149, Indian Penal Code, and the conviction is based on the provisions of that section, is that conviction necessarily bad, or does it depend on whether the accused has or has not been materially prejudiced by the omission ? (2) When a charge has been framed under sections 326 and 149, Indian Penal Code, is a conviction under section 326, Indian Penal Code, necessarily bad, or does this also depend on whether the accused has or has not been materially prejudiced by the form of the charge ? The Full Bench agreed with the view expressed by Sir John Edge m the Allahabad case that section 149 created no offence, but was, like section 34, merely declaratory of a principle of the common law, and its object was to make it clear that an accused who comes within that section cannot put forward as a defence that it was not his hand which inflicted the grievous hurt. It was -observed by Spencer, J. that a person could not be tried and sentenced under section 149 alone, as no punishment IS provided by the section.\n\nTherefore the omiss10n of section 149 from a charge does not create an illegality by reason of section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that for -every distinct offence of which any person 1s accused there shall be a separate charge.\n\nThey did not agree with the general statement m Reazuddi' s case(') that it IS settled law that when a person 1s charged by implication under section 149, he cannot be convicted of the substantive offence.\n\nA charge for a substantive offence under section 302, or section 325 of the Indian Penal_ Code, etc. is for a distinct and separate offence from that under section\n\n(r) [1923] 18 L.W. 946.\n\n(2) [1901J 6 C.W.N. 98.\n\n• ..\n\n302, read with section 149 or section 325, read with section 149, etc. and to that extent the Madras view is incorrect. It was urged by reference to section 40 of the Indian Penal Code that section 149 cannot be regarded as creating an 'offence' because it does not itself provide for a punishment.\n\nSection 149 creates an offence . but the punishment must depend on the offence of which the offender is by that section made guilty.\n\nTherefore the appropriate punishment section must be read with it.\n\nIt was neither desirable nor possible to prescribe one uniform punishment for all cases which may fall within it.\n\nThe finding that all the members of an unlawful assembly are guilty of the offence committed by one of them in the prosecution of the common object at once subjects all the members to the punishment prescribed for that offence and the relative sentence.\n\nReliance was also placed upon the decision of the Patna High Court in Ram; asray Ahir v. King-Emperor(') as well as the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sheo Ram and Others v.\n\nEmperor(2). In the former case the decision of the Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh's case was not considered and the decision followed the Full Bench of the Madras High Court and the opinion of Sir John Edge.\n\nIn the latter case the Allahabad High Court definitely declined to answer the question as to whether the accused charged with an offence read with section 149, Indian Penal Code, or with an offence read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, could be convicted of the substantive offence only.\n\nAfter an examination of the case referred to on oehaii of the appellant and the prosecution we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Calcutta High Court is the correct view namely, that a person charged with an offence read with section 149 cannot be convicted of the substantive offence without a specific charge being framed as required by section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIt was urged that in view of the decision of this Court in Karnail Singh and another v. State of Punjab( 3 ) a conviction under section 302, read with sec-\n\n(1) [1928] I.L.R. 7 Patna 484.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1948 All. 162.\n\n(3) 1954 s.c.R. 901J,·\n\nNanak Chano.\n\nThe State ef\n\nPunjab\n\nImam J,\n\n'955\n\n.N_anak Chand\n\nTh•Stal<of\n\nPunjab\n\nImam ].\n\ntion 149, could be converted into a conviction under section 302/34 which the trial Court did.\n\nThere could be no valid objection, therefore, to converting a con. viction under section 302/34 into one under section 302 which the High Court did. This argument is unacceptable. The High Court clearly found that section 34 was not applicable to the facts of the case and • acquitted the other accused under section 302/34, that is to say the other accused were wrongly convicted by the trial court in that way but the appellant should have been convicted under section 302.\n\nThe High Court could not do what the trial court itself could not do, namely, convict under section 302, as no separate charge had been framed under that section.\n\nIt was urged by the Prosecution that under the provisions of section 236 and section 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a person could be convicted of an offence which he is shown to have committed although he was not charged with it.\n\nSection 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is entirely dependent on the provisions of section 236 of that Code.\n\nThe prov1S1ons of section 236 can apply only in cases where there is no doubt about the facts which can be proved but a doubt arises as to which of several offences have been committed on the proved facts in which case any number of charges can be framed and tried or alternative charges can be framed.\n\nIn these circumstances if there had been an omission to frame a charge, then under section 237, a conviction could be arrived at on the evidence although no charge had been framed.\n\nIn the present case there is no doubt about the facts and if the allegations against the appellant that he had caused the injuries to the deceased with takwa was established by evidence, then there could be no doubt that the offence of murder had been committed.\n\nThere was no room for the application of section 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIt had been argued on behalf of the prosecution that no finding or sentence pronounced shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed.\n\nReliance was placed on the provisions of section 535 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n...\n\n~... .... Reference was also made to the provisions of section 537 of that Code.\n\nSection 535 does permit a court of appeal or revision to set aside the finding or sentence if in its opinion the noncframing of a charge has resulted in a failure of justice.\n\nSection 537 also permits a court of appeal or revision to set aside a finding or\n\n, . §entence if any error, omission or irregularity in the\n\n\\ y . charge has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice . . \"-' The explanation to the section no doubt directs that the court shall have regard to the fact that the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.\n\nIn the present case, however, there is no question of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge because no charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was in fact +. framed.\n\nSection 232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits an appellate court or a court of revision, if satisfied that any person convicted of an offence was misled in his defence in the absence of a charge or by an error in the charge, to direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks fit.\n\nIn the present case we are of the opinion that there was an illegality and not an irregularity ... V\" curable by the provisions of sections 535 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Assuming, however, for a moment that there was merely an irregularity which was curable, we are satisfied that, in the circumstances of the present case, the irregularity is not curable because the appellant was misled in his defence by the absence of a charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. By framing a charge under section 302, read with i section 149 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant, the Court indicated that it was not charging the appellant with the offen.ce of murder and to con- ( vict him for murder and sentence him under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was to convict him of an offence with which he had not been charged.\n\nIn defending himself the appellant was not called upon to meet such a charge and in his defence he may well , Lj have considered it unnecessary to concentrate on that part of the prosecution case.\n\nAttention has been\n\nNanak Chand\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nImam\n\nNanl'k Chand v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPu'f!; ab\n\nImam J.\n\ndrawn to the Medical evidence.\n\nWith reference to injury No. 1 the doctor stated that the wounds were not very clean-cut.\n\nIt is further pointed out that the other incised injuries on the head were bone deep.\n\nThe bone, however, had not been cut. Injuries on the\n\n\\ ~(\n\nhead although inflicted by a blunt weapon may some-. times assume the characteristics of an incised wound.\n\nReference was made to Glaister on Medical Jurispru-~ ·, .. , dence, 9th Ed., at page 241, where it is stated that under certain circumstances, and in certain situations 7 on the body, wounds produced by a blunt instrument may stimulate the appearance of an incised wound.\n\nThese wounds are usually found over the bone which is thinly covered with tissue, in the regions of the head, forehead, eyebrow, cheek, and lower jaw, among others.\n\nIt is also pointed that Vas Dev P.W. 2 had admitted that Mitu took away the takwa from the appellant after Sadhu Ram had been dragged out of the shop but no takwa blow was given outside the shop.\n\nPrakash Chand P.W. 4, another eye-witness,. also admitted that Mitu had taken the takwa from the appellant when they had come out of the shop.\n\nIt was urged that if a specific charge for murder had been framed against the appellant, he would have questioned the doctor more closely about the incised injuries on the head of the deceased, as well as the prosecution witnesses.\n\nIt is difficult to hold in the circumstances of the present case that the appellant was not prejudiced by the non-framing of a charge under section 302, Indian Penal Code.\n\nHaving regard to the view expressed on the question of law, it is unnecessary to refer to the arguments on the facts.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed and the conviction and the sentence of the appellant is set aside and the case of the appellant is remanded to the court of Sessions at Jullundur for retrial after framing a charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and in accordance with law.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n1 '\\\n\nI '", "total_entities": 247, "entities": [{"text": "Achhar Singh(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ I\n\nAchhar Singh(1), The first three cases are of no assistance to him although the second and third relate to Brahmins of Gurdaspur, for the properties in dispute in those cases were ancestral and the respondent does not now dispute the appellant's right to succeed to her father's ancestral properties."}}, {"text": "Gurdaspur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ I\n\nAchhar Singh(1), The first three cases are of no assistance to him although the second and third relate to Brahmins of Gurdaspur, for the properties in dispute in those cases were ancestral and the respondent does not now dispute the appellant's right to succeed to her father's ancestral properties."}}, {"text": "Rattigan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1115, "end_char": 1123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, the general custom recorded in Rattigan's book must prevail and the decision of the High Court must be upheld."}}, {"text": "NANAK CHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1262, "end_char": 1273, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NANAK CHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1299, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 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"start_char": 30998, "end_char": 31011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prakash Chand P.W. 4, another eye-witness,."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31515, "end_char": 31526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31528, "end_char": 31545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "court of Sessions at Jullundur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31816, "end_char": 31846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal is accordingly allowed and the conviction and the sentence of the appellant is set aside and the case of the appellant is remanded to the court of Sessions at Jullundur for retrial after framing a charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31888, "end_char": 31899, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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{"document_id": "1955_1_1215_1241_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nD. P. JOSHI\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND\n\nANOTHER.\n\n[ MuKHERJEA\n\nC. J.,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS, \\. -/ ] _ VENKATARAMA AYYAR and SINHA JJ.\n\n>- /\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 14 and 15-Rule laying down that no capitation fee should be charged from students-Bona fides residents of Madhya Bharat-But capitation fee should be charged from non- Madhya Bharat students-Whether infringes the Constitution.\n\nThe Government of the State of Madhya Bharat substituted the following new rule for the old rule for admission to the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College Indore, when it took over the administration of the College from a private committee.\n\n\"For all students who are 'bona fide residents' of Madhya Bharat no capitation fee should be charged.\n\nBut for other non-Madhya Bharat students the capitation fee should be retained as at present at Rs. 1,300 for nominees and at Rs. 1,500 for others\".\n\n'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was defined as : \"one who is--\n\n(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or\n\n(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in Madhya Bhara-t but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years at the date, on which he applies for admission, or ( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or ( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or ' which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government\".\n\nThe question for determination was whether the rule infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution.\n\nHeld, per VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. (MuKHERJEA C.J., VrvrAN BosE and SrNHA JJ. concurring, JAGANNADHADAS J. dissenting) that the rule did not infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 15(1) because residence and place of birth are two distinct conceptions with different connotations both in law and in fact, and when h Art. 15(1) prohibits discrimination based on the place of birth, it cannot be read as prohibiting discrimination based on residence.\n\nJanuary 27\n\n D. P. JosJii v The Stal• of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nDomicile of a person means his permanent home and is some~ times used in the sense of residence,\n\nHeld further, that the imposition of capitation fee on some of the students and not on others w.as not discrimin, atory as being in contravention of Art. 14 of the Constitution, because the classification was based on a ground which had a reasonable relation to the subject matter of the legislation as the object of the classification underlying the impugned rule was clearly to help to some extent' \" students who are residents of Madhya Bharat ill the prosecution Of their studies and it was quite a laudable object for a State to encourage , education within its .borders.\n\nA classification made on a , geographical basis would be eminently just and reasonable when it relates to .education which is the concern .primarily of the State.\n\nPer JAGANNADHADAS J.-There is o place for regional domicile in the existing I.ndian Law.\n\nIn the circumstances the phrase \"original domicile in Madhya Bharat\" is meant to convey the \"place of birth (of the applicant) in Madhya Bharat\". It is true that \"domi cile of origin\" and \"place of birth\" are two different matters. But that is so only where, the use of the phrase \"domicile of origin\" conveys a definite legal meaning.\n\nIn the present case however, the phrase \"domicile of origin in Madhya Bharat\" conveys no legal meaning, and if any meaning has to be attached to it, then it could only have reference to the \"place of birth\".\n\nTherefore, the rule in question has reference to place of birth in Madhya Bharat primarily, and offends Art. 15 of the Constitution.\n\nEvCn in le view that the rule has ieference to thf: juristic concept-··.,/ \"\" of regional domicle and for that reason does not fall within the scope of the inhibition of Art. 15, a distinction baSed on such domi- .-cile cannot, in any way, be considered reasonable with reference to Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nRustam Mody v. State: Sumitra Devi v. State (I.L.R. 1953 - Madhya Bharat 87), Whicker v. Hume ([1859] 28 L.J. Ch. 396), Somerville v. Somerville ([1801] 5 Ves. 750), Winans v. Attorney- . General (1904 A.C. 287), Udny v • .Udny ((1869] L.R. 1 Se. & Div. 441), Mcmullen v. Wadsworth ([1889] 14 A.C. 631), The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh and another ([1953] S.C.R. 254) and Om Pra- kash v. The State (A.LR. 1953 Punjab 93), referred to.\n\nORIGINAL Ju&1smCTION : Petition No .. \"3fi7 of 1954.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee and Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with them), for the petitioner.\n\nM. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorny-Gen_eral of India \"(Shiv rl..\n\nDyal and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for respondent No. 1.\n\n1955.\n\nJanuary 27. The judgment of Mukherjea\n\nC. J., Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha\n\nJJ. was delivered by Venkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nJagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is a petition under \"' .,,, article 32 of the Constitiition. There is at Indore , a\n\nMedical College known as the Mahatma .. Gandhi Memorial Medical College run by the State of Madhya Bharat. The petitioner who is a resident of Delhi was admitted as a student of this College in July 1952, and is now studying in the . third year class, M.B .. B.S.\n\nCourse. His complaint is that the rules' iI1 force in this institution discriminate in the . matter of fees between students wh<;> are residents of Madhya :Sharat A and. those w, ho are not, and that the latter have to pay in addition. to 'the tuition fees <J.ild charges payable by all the studepts a sum of Rs. 1,5QO per annum as capitation fee, and that this 'is in contravehti9n. of articles 14 anq . 15(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner accordingly prays ' that an appropriate . writ might .. pe i~&ued prohibiting ilie respondent (from\n\n~ / collecting from . him capitation. fee . for the , .'current\n\nyear, and directing a. refund of Rs. 3,000 colleted, Jrom him as capitation fee for the first two years.\n\nThe repcmdent contests . the petition. : In' the affidavit filed on its behalf, it is stated that the intitu tion in question ' had its origin in, private enterprise, and was µnd, er . the. management of a Committee; that it .was the, Committee that had made the ruJe. 'iniposing captation fee on students who did not belong to Madhya Bhart, that the , State took <>Ver the College subject to the .. conditions relating to reservation of. seats under .which it was 'being run, and that the requireme, i: of a capitation, fee from n.ori-residdni:s did not offend either article 14 or ari:icle 15 ( 1) of the Constitution. ... ,'\n\nA brief narration of the history of the. institution will be useful .for a correct appreciation of the conten- -'4 tions Offeither side. The beginnings of the institution go back to the year 1878, when a Dr. Beaumont started a Medical School at Indore under the •name of\n\nD. P.]oshi v.\n\nThe State ef Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nD. P.Joshi\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIndore Medical School, as an adjunct . to a hospital called the Indore Charity Dispensary.\n\nIt received considerable financial assistance from the rulers of Gwalior and other Indian States, and. became well established; and it is claimed on its behalf that the medical practitioners of Central India, Rajasthan and neighbouring States were largely recruited from its alumni.\n\nIn 1910 the name of the school was changed to King Edward Memorial School, Indore, and it was thereafter under the management of a Committee.\n\nIn 1940 the Committee decided to improve the status of the School, and started collecting funds for equipping it as a first-class Medical College.\n\nThe arrangements were completed in 1947, and in 1948 the institution was affiliated to the University of Agra.\n\nIt then came to be known as the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College.\n\nIn 1950 the College Council resolved to request the Madhya Bharat Government to take. over the running of the institution, subject to the arrangements entered into between the institution and certain States and donors for reservation of seat5 for their nominees.\n\nThe proposal was accepted by the respondent, and by resolution dated 17-3-1951 it took over the administration of the College.\n\nAccording to the rules relating to admission to the College which were in force at that time, the maximum number of students who could be admitted in any year was 50, and they were classed into two groups, nominees and ordinary students.\n\nThe Committee had arranged to raise funds for the institution on a promise that those who contributed Rs. 7,000 would be entitled to nominate one student each for admission in.to the . COilege, and that those students called nominees should pay, in addition to the usual fees and charges, a capitation fee of Rs. 1,300 per annum. Excluding the seats which have thus to be reserved for the nominees, the remaining seats were thrown open\n\n...... __ -~\n\nto all .eligible applicants who came to be called selfnominees, and the requisite number was selected 'from among them on the basis of merit.\n\nThen came the rl rule which is at the root of the present controversy.\n\nIt provided that \"Madhya Bharat students are\n\nexempted from capitation fees\". (Vide 1952 Calendar, page 5 and Exhibit G). After the State took over the management, it introduced certain modifications in the rules, and it is with these new rules that the 'present petition IS concerned, the petitioner having been admitted under them. In place of the rule that \"Madhya Bharat students are exempted from capitation fees\" a new rule was substituted, which runs as follows:\n\n\"For all students who are 'bona fide residents' of Madhya Bharat no capitation fee should be charged .\n\nBut for other non-Madhya Bharat students the capitation fee should be retained as at present at Rs. 1,300 for nominees and at Rs. 1,500 for others\". [Vide Exhibit 6/1 quoted in Rustam Mody v. State : Sumitra Devi v. State(1)J. 'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was defined as:\n\n\"one who is-\n\n(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile Is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or\n\n(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in Madhya Bharat but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years at the date, on which he applies for admission, or ( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or ( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government\".\n\nIn brief, the change effected by the new rule was that whereas previously exemption from capitation fee was granted in favour of all Madhya Bharat students whatever , that might mean, under the revised rule it was limited to bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat.\n\nNow the contention of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the\n\n( 1)T.L.R. 1953 Madhya Bharat 87, 99\n\n~1955 ,.,~- D. P. Joshi\n\nv The State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\n1955'\n\nD. P.Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatarama ' Ayyar J.\n\npet:ltioner is that this nile is in contravention of .articles 14 and 15(1);. and must therefore be struck down as' unconstitutional and void. Article 15(1) enacts :\n\n\"The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste; sex, place of birth or any, of them\".\n\nThe argument of the petitioner is that the rule under challenge in so far as it imposes a capitation fee on students who do not belong to Madhya Bharat while providing , an exemption therefrom to students of Madhya )3harat, makes a discrimination based on the place of birth, and that it offends artide 15 ( 1). Whatever . force there might have been in this contention \\f the question had arisen . with reference co' the . rule as it stood when the State took over , the administration, the rule was modified in 1952, and 'that, is , what we are' concerned with in this petition.· The •rule 'aS\n\nmodified is clearly not open to attaclc as infringing article 15 ( 1). The ground for exemption from payment . of capitation fee as . laid down therein. is bona fide residence in the State of Madhya . Bharatc , Residence and place of birth are two distinct conceptions with different connotations both in law ' and in fact, and when article 15(1) prohibits discrimination based on the. place of 'birth, . ii cannot be 'read as pri:ihibiting discrimination based on residence. , This is nor seriously disputed .. The argument that is pressed' on us is that though the tule, purports w grant , exemption based 'on residence within the State, , the definition of bona fide residence under the rule shows that' the exemption' is te.ally based on the place of birth. , Con- ,, iaerable emphasis' was laid on clauses (a) and '(b) of the . rule wherein . 'residence' . is ' defined .. in terms' 0£ domicile;. rid ' . it was arglled . 'that the otig'inal .. domicile, as it is termed in the rules, could in substance mean only {!lace of birth, and' that' therefore the :exemption based on domicil_e was, 'in effect, an_ exemp tion based on place of birth under an alias. 'That,\n\nhowever, is riot the true legal positio11'.: Domicile of a person , means his permanent home; \"Dtnicile meant permanent home, and , if that was not understood by itself no illustration could help to make it\n\n...,,._ ....\n\nintelligible\" observed Lord Cran worth in Whicker v.\n\nHume(1 ). Domicile of origin of a person means \"the domicile received by him at his birth\".· (Vide Dicey on Conflict of Laws, 6th Edition, page 87). The learned author then proceeds to observe at page 88 :\n\n\"The domicile of origin, though received at birth, need not be either the country in which the infant is born, or the country in which his parents are residing, or the country to which his father belongs by race or allegiance, or the country of the infant's nationality\".\n\nIn Somerville v. Somerville( 2), Arden, Master of the Rolls, observed :\n\n\"I speak of the domicile of odgin rather than of birth. I find no authority which gives for the purpose of succession any effect to the place of birth.\n\nIf the sori of an Englishman is born upon a' journey, his domicile will follow that of his father\". Mr. N .. C. Chttrjee argued 'that doicile of origin was often caUed domicile of . birth, arid invited . our attentio11 to certain observations of Lofd, Macnaghten in Winans. v .. Attorney-General(3). But then, the noble Lord went onto add that. the. use of the words \"domicile of birth\" was perhaps not accurate.\n\nBut. that apart, what has to be noted is that whether the expresion tised is \"domicile of origin\" or' \"domicile of birth\"' tjie concpt . involved in it . is something different from what the words \"place of birth\" singnify.\n\nAnd if \"domieile 'of birth\" and \"'place of birth\" canmi; t be taken as synonymous,·· then the prohibition enacted in article 15(1) against discrimination based on place of birth -cannot appiy to a discrimination based on domicile. · \" .\n\nIt was argued that under the . Constitution . there cail_ be only a single citizenship f<?r 'th2' whole of India, an(l. that it would run counter to that notion to . hold that the State could make laws basd on domicile within their territory.\n\nBut citizenship and domicile r;\".present two . different . conceptions.\n\nCitizenship has reference to . the political status . 9£ 'a person, and\n\n{I) [1859] 28 L.J. Ch. 396, 400.\n\n(2) [1801] 5 Ves. 750 at 786, 787, 31 E.R. 839, 858.\n\n(3) 1904 AC. 287, 290. . -\n\nD. P. Joshi v.\n\nThe State.of Madhya Bharat ,\n\nar.d arwther\n\nVenkatarama .\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nD. P~ Joshi\n\nVo The State of Madhya Bharal\n\nand another\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\ndomicile to his civil rights. A classic statem';'.nt of the law on this subject is that of Lord Westbury m Udny v. Udny( '). He observes:\n\n\"The law of England, and of almost all civilised countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal statuses or conditions : one by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country binding him by the tie of national allegiance, and which may be called his political status, another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political statuts. The political status may depend on different laws in different countries; whereas the civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicil, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status. For it is on this basis that the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marnage, succession, testacy or intestacy, must depend\".\n\nDealing with this question Dicey says at page 94 :\n\n\"It was, indeed, at one time hdd by a confusion of the ideas of domicile and nationality that a man could not change his domicile, for example, from England to California, wit.hout doing at any rate as much as he could to' become an American citizen. He must, as. it was said, 'intend quatenus in illo exuere patriam'. But this doctrine has now been pronounced erroneous by the highest authority\".\n\nVide also the observations of Lord Lindley in Winans v.\n\nAttorney-General(• ).\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. VI the law is thus stated at page 198, para 242:\n\n\"English law determines all questions in which it admits the operation of a personal law by the test of domicil. For this purpose it regards the organisa-\n\n0) [1869) L.R. I Sc. & Div. 441, 457. (2)\n\n1904 A.C. 287, 299.\n\n...\n\ntion of the civilised world in civil societies, each of which consists of all those persons who live in any territorial area which is subject to one system of law, and not its organisation in political societies or States, each of which may either be co-extensive with a single legal system or may unite several systems under its own sovereignty\".\n\nUnder the Constitution, article 5, which defines c1tlzenship, itself proceeds on the basis that it is different from domicile, because under that article, domicile is not by itself sufficient to confer on a person the status of a citizen of this country.\n\nA more serious question is that as the l:i.w knows only of domicile of a country as a whole and not of any particular place therein, whether there . can be such a thing as Madhya Bharat domicile apart from Indian domicile.\n\nTo answer this question we must examine what the word \"domicile\" in law imports.\n\nWhen we speak of a person as having a domicile of a particular. country, we mean that in certain matters such as succession, minority and marriage he 1s governed by the law of that country. Domicile has reference to the system of law by which a person is governed, and when we speak of the domicile of a country, we assume that the same system of law prevails all over that country. But it might well happen that laws relating to succession and marriage might not be the same all over the country, and that different areas in the State might have different laws in respect of those matters. In that case, each area having a distinct set of laws would itself be regarded as a country for the purpose of domicile. The position is thus stated by Dicey at page 83 : ·\n\n\"The area contemplated throughout the Rules relating to domicile is a 'country' or 'territory subject to one system of law'. The reason for this is that the object of this treaties, in so far as it is concerned with domicile,. is to show how far a person's rights are affected by his having his legal home or domicile within a territory governed by one system of law, i.e. within a given country, rather than within\n\nD P-Joshi\n\nThe Siate of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAY.)'ar J\n\n1). p. Joshi v. \"The State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\n•Venkatarama .Ayyar J\n\nanother. If, indeed, it happened that one part of a country, governed generally . by one system of law, was in many respects subject to special rules of law, then it would be essential to determine whether D was domiciled within such particular part, e.g.\n\nCaliforni~ in the United States; but in this case, such part would be pro tanto a separate country, in the sense in which that term is employed in these Rules\".\n\nThe following statement of the. \"iaw in f!:alsbury's Laws of Eagland, Volume Vl, page 246,. para 249 may also be quotecl : ·\n\n. . . . . . . . . . where that State comprises more than one system of law, a domicil is acquired\" in that ·part of thi: State 'Yhere the individual:resides\".'\n\nAn instructive d.ci; iop bearing \"on' thiS 'point . is Somervilk v, Som.erVille( '). There,' .the dispute related to the .i)ersonal . estate of Lord Somerville, who . 'had died intestate in Lond9n, his domicile of origin being Scotch. The. contest was between those . who 'were entitled to. inherit . if ' his domicile was Scotch;\" and\n\nthos~ who were entitled to !nb, erlt 'if , hi.s ddmii1e was English. It was urged . in support of . the claim of the latter that by reason of the death of Lord Soi:netville at Lndon,' sucession was govened by ' English. dbrriicile.\n\nIn discussing this question tlfr learned' ' Master of t:he R.ou; re£etr~<l to the fact thar tlie law cif'successiort in. the .. Pro'virice of.York was dlfferent from that prevailirig _iii. othe~ pts' of Enghnd, , and was 'akip io Scotch . law', and posed the question whethe'r if a Yorkshire man dlei:I intestate in. Loridbil, 'succession to his per~'onal estate would: be. govep;1ed , by the. Law of the Province' of York. or of England:'.' He observes:\n\n\"lt is surprising that questions of this so; t_. hae not arisen in this country when we consider that till a very fate ' period and even now for some ptiropses a different succession prevails in the' Province of York.\n\nThe custom' i's very analogous to the\" law of Scotland.\n\nTill a ' very late period the inhabitants . of York were restrained from disposing of their 'property 'by · testa• ment ........ ·, ... And the question then would have been\n\n(1) 11ao1rsn:.R. as9. - ·\n\nwhether during the time the custom and the restraint of disposing by testament were in full force, a gentleman of the county of York coming to London for the winter and dying there intestate, the disposition of his personal estate should be according to the custom or the general law\".\n\nThe principle that was laid down was that \"succession to the personal estate of an intestate is to be regulated by the law of the country, in which he was a domiciled inhabitant atthe time of his death; without any regard whatsoever to the place either of the birth or the death or the situation of the property at that time\". On the facts, the decision was that the domicile of origin which was Scotch, governed the succession. What is of interest in this decision is that it recognises that for purposes of succession there can be within one political unit, as many domiciles as there are systems of law, and that there can be a Scotch domicile, an English domicile and even a York domicile within Great Britain.\n\nUnder the Constitution, the power to legislate on succession, marriage and minority has been conferred under Entry 5 in the Concurrent List on both the Union and the State Legislatures, and it is therefore quite conceivable that until the Centre intervenes and enacts a uniform code for the whole of India, each State might have its own laws on those subjects, and thus there could be different domiciles for different States. We do not, therefore, see any force in the contention that there cannot be a domicile of Madhya Bharat under the Constitution.\n\nIt was also urged on behalf of the respondent that the word \"domicile\" in the rule might be construed not in its technical legal sense, but in a popular sense as meaning \"residence\", and the following passage in Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edition, page 344 was quoted as supporting such a construction:\n\n\"By the term 'domicile', in its ordinary acceptation, is meant the place where a person lives or has his home. In this sense the place where a person has his actual residence, inhabitancy, or commorancy, is some times called his domicile\",\n\nD. P. Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Prfadhya Bharat\n\n'utd another\n\nVenkatara1na Ayyar J.\n\n D. P.Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\narrd another\n\nVenkatara111a\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIn Mcmullen v. Wadsworth(1), it was observed by the Judicial Committee that \"the word 'domicil' in article 63 (of the Civil Code of Lower Canada) was used in the sense of residence, and did not refer to international domicile\". What has to be considered is whether in the present context \"domicile\" was used in the sense of residence. The rule requiring the payment of a capitation fee and providing for exemption therefrom refers only to bona fide residents within the State. There is no reference to domicile in the rule itself, but in the Explanation which follows, clauses\n\n(a) and (b) refer to domicile, and they occur as part of the definition of \"bona fide resident\". In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 28, page 5, it is stated:\n\n\"The term 'bona fide residence' means the residence with domiciliary intent\".\n\nThere is therefore considerable force in the contention of the respondent that when the rule-making authorities referred to domicile in clauses (a) and (b) they were thinking really of residence. In this view also, the contention that the rule is repugnant to article 15(1) must fail.\n\nThere was a good deal of argument before us on the validity of clause (d) of the rule. It was contended by the petitioner that that clause introduced a new element unconnected with domicile or residence which formed the basis of the previous clause, that it put foreign nationals on a more advantageous footing than Indian citizens, and that the entire rule niust be discarded as based on no rational or intelligible principle. No doubt, clause (d) strikes a new note. And it. may be that as a matter of policy the management of the institution decided that it would be an advantage to associate citizens of other countries with Indian citizens in educational institutions, and therefore reserved a few seats for them on the most-favoured nation treatment basis. The validity of this reservation, however, does not arise for decision in this petition, and as clauses (a) to (c) rest on a classification based on domicile and residence, and are\n\n(1) [1889] 14 A.C. 631,\n\ndistinct and severable from clause (d), they would be valid even if clause ( d) were to be held bad.\n\nIt must be mentioned that the rule relating to the payment of capitation fee discussed above was again modified by the management as a result of the decision of the High Court of Madhya Bharat in Rusf, am Mody v. State: Sumitra Devi v. State('). The rule as amended-and that is what is now in force-runs as follows:\n\n\"Only those students, who are bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat and have been selected for being admitted in accordance with the allocation scheme and the rules of admission to the seats specifically reserved for the residents of Madhya Bharat are exempted from the payment of Capitation Fees. All other students admitted to seats other than those reserved for the residents of Madhya Bharat shall be liable to pay Capitation Fees as prescribed\".\n\nUnder tbis rule also, tlre exemption is in favour of bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat\", and therefore with reference to the points now under consideration, the position under the present rule would appear to be the same as under the previous one. It is unnecessary to consider this matter further, as learned counsel on either side were agreed that the rights of the petitioner must be determined in accordance with the rule which was in force when he was admitted.\n\nIt is next contended for the petitioner that the imposition of capitation fee on some of the students and not on others is discriminatory, and is in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore void. The impugned rule divides, as already stated, self-nominees into two groups, those who are bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat and those who are not, and while it imposes a capitation fee on the latter, it exempts the former from the payment thereof. It thus proceeds on a classification based on residence within the State, and the only point for decision is whether the ground of classification has a fair and substantial relation to the purpose of the law, or whether it is purely arbitrary and fanciful.\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1953 Madhya Bharat 67,\n\nD. P. Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatara1na\n\nAyyar J.\n\nD. P.Joshi v.\n\nTire State of JUadhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatara111a\n\nAyyar J,\n\nThe object of the classification underlying the im- , pugned rule was clea.rly to help to some extent students who are residents of Madhya Bharat in the prosecution of their studies, and it cannot be disputed that it is quite a legitimate and laudable objective for a State to encourage education within its borders. Education is a State subject, and one of the directive principles declared in Part IV of the Constitution is that the State should make effective provisions for education within the limits of its economy.\n\n(Vide article 41). The State has to contribute for the upkeep and the running ofits educational institutions.\n\nWe are in this petition concerned with a Medical College, and it is well-kuown that it requires considerable finance to maintain such an institution. If the State has to spend money on it, is it unreasonable that it should so order the educational system that the advantage of it would to some extent at least enure for the benefit of the State? A concession given to the residents of the State in the matter o'f fees is obviously calculated to serve that end, as presumably some of them might, after passing out of the College, settle down as doctors and serve the needs of the locality. The classification is thus based on a ground which has a reasonable relation to the subject-matter of the legislation, and is in consequence not open to attack. It has been held in The State of Punjab v.\n\nAjaib Singh and another(') that a classification might validly be made on a geographical basis. Such a classification would be eminently just and reasonable, where it relates to education which is the concern primarily of the State. The contention, therefore, that the rule imposing capitation fee is in contravention of article 14 must be rejected.\n\nWe have proceeded so far on the assumption that the impugned rule is a \"law\" as defined in article 13.\n\nIfit is not that, article 14 would have no application.\n\nIt was indeed contended by the learned Attorney- General on behalf of the respondent that the rule in question is a mere administrative or executive order, and that however liberally the word \"law\" might be\n\n(! i ~1953) S.C.R. 254. . .\n\nconstrued, it should be limited to what is an expression of the legislative power and cannot comprehend what is an executive order. In support of this contention he relied on the decision in Om Prakash v. The State('). In the view which we have taken that even on the footing that it is a law, the rule does not offend article 14, we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on this question.\n\nOne other contention put forward by the respondent remains to be noticed. It was urged that as the institution was originally under private management and the State took it over subject to the conditions under which it was run, it was bound to enforce the rule relating to the payment of capitation fee which was previously in operation. But the terms under which the State took over expressly reserve only the agreement for reserving seats for the nominees of participating States and donors, and do not contain any undertaking to maintain the rule relating to imposition of capitation fee. Whether if such an undertaking had been given it could have been set up in answer to a fundamental right, does not therefore arise for decision.\n\nIn the result, the petition fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-I regret that I feel obliged to differ.\n\nThe question that arises is whether the petitioner who is a resident of Delhi and has been admitted in July, 1952, by the State of Madhya Bharat as a student in the :Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College at Indore and who has been called upon to pay a sum of Rs. 1,500 per annum as capitation fee, in addition to the tuition fees and other charges payable by all the students of the college in general, is entitled to a writ restraining the authorities concerned from levying that capitation fee on the ground that the rule under which he is asked to pay is repugnant to the Constitution. The history of the\n\n(1) A.LR. 1953 Punjab 93.\n\nD. P.Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkataratlla\n\nAyyar J.\n\nD. P. Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nJ agannadhadas J.\n\ninstitution and the relevant rules have been set out in the judgment of the majority just delivered and it is unnecessary to repeat them. It is desirable, however, to mention, at the outset two matters, The exact authority for these rules, that is to say, the question whether they are rules made under a rule-making power having a legislative basis, or whether they are merely executive orders, which it is open to the State Government to change as they please, has not been clearly elucidated. Though the learned Attorney- General suggested, in the course of his arguments, that these were merely executive orders and that as such they did not come within the scope of article 14 of the Constitution, the material placed before us throws no light thereon. Nor has the question as to whether these executive orders which are issued by the State and are general in their application within the ambit of their subject matter constitute laws falling within the scope of article 14, been sufficiently canvassed before us. The discussion has proceeded on the assumption that the validity of these rules may be judged with reference both to the article 14 and article 15, no other article obviously having any direct bearing.\n\nNow, as has been pointed out in the majority judgment, the relevant original rule by the date when the College was taken over by the State from private management was that \"Madhya Bharat students are exempted from capitation fees\". On the State taking over the College, this rule was substituted by the following new rule:\n\n\"For all students who are 'bona fide residents' of Madhya Bharat no capitation fee should be charged.\n\nBut for other non-Madhya Bharat students the capitation fee should be retained as at present at Rs. 1,300 for nominees and at Rs. 1,500 for others\". \"Bona fide resident\" for the purposes of the above rule was defined as\n\n\"(a) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or\n\n(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is\n\n4\"' -·\n\n~ . )(\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COl]RT REPORTS 1231\n\nnot in Madhya Bharat but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years, at the <; late on which he applies for admission, or ( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or ( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government\".\n\nThis, it is said, was the rule in force when the applicant was admitted into the College. This rule is again said to have been modified recently and the same is as follows:\n\n\"Only those students, who are bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat and have been selected for . being admitted in accordance with the allocation scheme and the rules of admission to the seats specifically reserved for the residents of Madhya Bharat are ex- empted from the payment of capitation fees. All other students admitted to seats other than those reserved for the residents of Madhya Bharat shall be liable to pay capitation fees as prescribed\".\n\nIn the affidavit filed in this Court by Shri H. L.\n\nGupta, Assistant Secretary to the Government of Madhya Bharat, it is stated that this was meant to be only a restatement by the Government of their real intention in order to clarify what the prior rule was meant to convey. Now, with reference to these rules, it is necessary to notice the suggestion made in the course of the argument that the rules by the use of the word \"exemption\" indicate that some students get the benefit of not paying what would otherwise have been payable and that therefore others cannot complain of any hostile action constituting discrimination. But a copy of the rules for admission to the regular\n\nM.B.B.S. courses (copied from Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College, Indore, Calendar of\n\n1954) with which we have been furnished as one of the\n\nD; P. Joshi\n\nv, The State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\n, Jagannadhadas J.·\n\nfJ. p, Joshi\n\nv .. t'he State •f MaJhy• Bharat and anothet\n\n• ]agannaJhadas J.\n\nenclosures to the affidavit of the . petitioner, and which is at pages 34 to 3!! of the paper-book, on a perusal thereof, clearly shows at page 37 that the capitation fee is in addition to the normal fees and that this is payable only in respect of some students, while all the students in general pay certain prescribed fees.\n\nBut whether the rule is in the nature of an exemption for some . students or is by way of an addition for the others, there is clearly discrimination between the two groups which affects the one adversely. The very use of the phrase \"capitation fees\" for this additional amount levied from some, is indicative of its discriminatory character.\n\nThe only question accordingly is whether this discrimination falls within the mischief of either article 14 or article 15. It is desirable for this purpose to have a clear understanding of what exactly the relevant rule at the date of the admission of the applicant .into the College signifies.\n\nIt has been stated that this rule has to be understood with reference to. t!J.e allocation scheme for admission of students which is said to be as follows in the affidavit of Shri . H. L. Gupta, Assistant Secretary to the Government of Madhya Bharat:\n\n\"The basis of allocation of seats at the time of admission each year is that out of the total number of candidates to be newly admitted a certain number of seats is reserved for 'nominees' of such States as also of such individuals with whom there is a contract of reservation of seats, and a certain number of seats is reserved for Madhya Bharat. The rest go to what are called 'self-nominees'.\n\nAll candidates (except Central Government nominees) are, however, admitted by a competitive examination and are selected in order of merit for each category\".\n\nIt has been stated by the applicant in his reply affidavit that, while the competitive examination is the same for all, it is only the marks of the candidates in each separate group that ate taken into consideration i'ttter se. However this may be, there appear to be, as stated :by the Assistant Secretary to . the . Madhya Bharat Government, three broad categories : (1) A\n\n} _._.111\" -\n\ncertain number of seats reserved for \"bona fide students of Madhya Bharat\". (2) A certain number of seats reserved for some specified States and the original donors, who in respect of their nominees have to pay capitation fees, somewhat lower in amount, and\n\n(3) The rest of the students who have to pay the higher capitation fees.\n\nThe second category above mentioned may be left oqt of consideration for , the present case, since that depends on certain pre-existing contractual obligations and different considerations may arise and the present. petitioner does not fall wihin this category.\n\nThe question of discrimination in this case arises really with reference to categories 1 and 3 above and turns upon the exact meaning of the phrase \"bona fide residents\" as defined in the rules. If this definition was meant to convey fairly and substantially, the qualification of residence in Madhya Bharat and nothing else, it may be, :that this is not hit by article 15 and that it may also be a reasonable classification, on the facts and circumstances of a particular State, for purposes of artide\n\n14.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General himself based his arguments, at one stage, on this view of the definition of \"bona fide resident\" in the rules. But the difficulty is that the learned Attorney-General . has not . committed himself, on behalf of the State, as to this being the only reasonable meaning of the definition. He put it as a . kind of alternative. The Assistant Secretary to the Madhya Bharat Government, Shri H. L. Gupta; in his affidavit clearly and categorically says that the charging of capitation fee, truly speaking, is not on the basis of residence. The restatement of the rule by the Government is not also definite or clear about it inasmuch as it uses again the phrase \"bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat\". Bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat, as defined, is clearly something quite different from . the class which can be designated ordinarily as \"residents of Madhya Bharat\". Now out of the four categories. comprised in the .. definition\n\noviously ( c) a1:1d ( d) have absolutely nothing to d~ with actual residence. It is also difficult to <liscover any principle with reference to which discrimination can be justified in favour of (1) a Pakistan migrant\n\n D.lP• Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\n and another\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n. 1955 :v, p, Joshi .v.\n\n- TheStakOf Madhya Bhiual\n\nand another\n\nJagannad/uulas J.\n\nwith the mere intention. to make Madhya Bharat his P=anent residence, and (2) aperson, belonging to the contiglious areas of Madhya Bharat, or the. contiguous areas of India (and excluding citizens of India from the - non-contiguous areas of -Madhya Bharat, like the applicant), The main categories, however, are those which fall within (a). and (b) of the definition. But it is difficult to say •even of these categories that they -are based merely on residence, as such, of the - person .concerned.\n\nCategory - ·(b) has reference to \"Domicile in Madhya Bharat\" plus residence in Madhya _ Bharat -for the . preceding five years.\n\nCategory (a) . has reference only to \"original domicile -in Madhya Bharat\" and by contrast with category\n\n(b) which requires precedent residence, is dearly intended not to insist on any precedent residence. Even if it be assumed that ·\"domicile\" -means \"permanent _home\" as stated by Lord Cranworth in Whicker v.\n\nHume( 1 ) this has no necessary reference to the applicant's actual residence at the relevant time.\n\nIt is difficult to see why the fact of the applicant's father having had his permanent home in Madhya Bharat at -the time of applicant's birth should be a ground of preference or why a person who has made Madhya Bharat his permanent home but left it for a time and returned only, say, an year previously should be denied it. Thus the definition of \"bona -fide resident\" taken as a whole or even confining it to categories (a),\n\n(b) and ( c) cannot be said tobe based merely on residence in Madhya Bharat. Nor can any intelligible basis of grouping be gathered therefrom by imputing to the word \"domicile\" the meaning \"residence\" or \"permanent home\"'.. It is interesting to notice, in this connection; that category (b) in requiring Madhya Bharat domicile and -precedent residence for five years followsclosely the pattern of Indian citizenship based on category ( c) of article 5 of the Constitution with \"domicile of Madhya Bharat\"· substituted for \"domicile of _ India\" and this raises the question of the concept •of . regional domicile (tending to the growth of the idea of - regional citizenship) which will be discussed. -pt:esently; . ..:-: - \" (1)'<(1859)28 L-; J. Ch. 396;398\n\n Now confining our attention to the category (a) which has given rise to the main controversy in this case, it appears to me quite clear that the phrase \"original domicile in Madhya Bharat\" used therein could not have been meant to indicate either the residence or the permanent home of the applicant in Madhya. Bharat. . What then is the meaning intended to be conveyed thereby. Is the word \"domicile\" in this phrase to be understood in the legalistic sense or as the likely framer of the relevant rule-possibly a lay man like the Director of Public Instruction of the\n\nState-would have . understood it to mean. It is necessary for this purpose to have a clear idea of the concept of \"domicile\" and its applicability in relation to any particular region within a country like India.\n\nNow the juristic concept of domicile is one which can be best gathered from the following passage in the classic judgment of Lord Westbury in Udny v. Udny(1).\n\n\"The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal statuses or conditions; one by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he . has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite differnt from his political status. The political status may depend on different laws in different countries; whereas the civil status is governed universally by one ingle principle, namely, that of domicil, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status. For it is on this basis that the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy, must depend\".\n\nThus domicile is that attribute of a person's status which according . to International Law. detenines\n\n, (1), [1869) L.R. I Sc. & Div. 441, 457.\n\nD. P.Joshi v.\n\nTht State of Madhya Bhflf'at\n\nand another\n\nJagannadhat!as J.\n\n.'D p; Joshi\n\nv •.\n\nT Ill State of , Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nJagannadhadas J\n\nthe personal 1aws by which he is governed and on which his personal laws depend. The question for consideration is whether this concept of domicile can apply to the word . \"domicile\" in the phrase \"domicile in Madhya Bharat\". Dicey in his Conflict of Laws (6th Edn.), at pages 43 and 78 says as follows : . '\"A person's domicile (meani_ng thereby the place of domicile) is the country which is considered by law to be his permanent home\" and at 'page 82 he says\n\n\"the area contemplated relating to domicile 1s a 'counqy' or 'territory subject to one system of law'\".\n\nFarnsworth in his book on the Residence and Domicil of Corporations ( 1939 Edition) says as follows at page 1:\n\n. \"In any consideration of domicil, the area contemplated has always been taken to be . a 'country' or\n\n'a territory subject to one system of law'\".\n\nIt is no doubt true that there are countries which though politically one unit have different personal laws, in different areas thereof. In such a case the sub-unit which is governed by one system of law is the area of domicile. Thus for instance, as has been pointed out, though Great Britain is one single political unit, the personal laws in Scotlana are different and therefore Scotch domicile is recognised. But. this is a matter of historical growth. Now, so far as India is concerned it appears to me that there has so far been no such concept of domicile of sub-units known or recognised by law, for the only purpose for which it is normally relevant and which attracts it, viz. personal laws of the citizens of India. The personal laws in India, as is well known, depend mostly on religious affiliations.\n\nThis has been ' so . from pre- British period.\n\nThe earliest British regulations have recognised this and the same has been continued by a specific provision being incorporated in the Civil Courts Act or analogous Acts of the . various Provinces or States to the effect that the Courts are to decide matters relating to Hindus and Muhammadans,' etc. with reference to their · personal laws. These Acts\n\n.:y-\n\n' • y\n\nhave invariably a provision by way of a direction to the Courts concerned, more or less in the following terms:\n\n\"To decide any question regarding succession, inheritance, marriage, or caste, or any religious usage or institution or the like by the Muhammadan law in cases where the parties are Muhammadans and by Hindu law in cases where the parties are Hindus\".\n\nIn respect of some of these matters as well as in respect of other matters which properly fall within the category of personal laws such as for instance minority, succession, etc., there have been legislative modifications.\n\nBut it is noteworthy that those modifications are almost entirely of an all-India character and not on any regional basis (viz. Indian Majority Act, Indian Succession Act). So far as I am aware there are only a few instances of Provincial or State legislation on any matters relating to personal laws and that too, to an extremely small and limited extent.\n\nThus it will be seen the the Province or the State of India to which a Hindu or Muslim belongs has no relevance or relation to his personal laws. Indeed, the contrary is emphasised by the fa.ct that, a Hindu at any rate, carries with him even his own school of Hindu law in spite of migration to a different Province or State. Now, so far as Indian citizens who are neither Hindus nor Muslims are concerned, such as, Indian Christians or Anglo-Indians, they are governed by personal laws which are all~India in charac• ter and not r.egional, as for instance the Indian Succession Act. (It may be mentioned that even in Europe until the middle ages, personal laws depended on race and not on domicile. See Phillimore on International Law, page 36). In this state of the factual situation as regards the personal laws of the various categories of persons who comprise the . bulk of the population of . India, it appears to me to be clear that thre has been in India up to the present moment no scope for growth of any concept of State or Provincial domicile as distinct from Indian domicile.\n\nThere is thus no place for regional domicile, in the existing Indian law. Nor is there any .reason\n\nD. f'. Josh_i v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand anot/¢r\n\nJagannadha4as J.\n\nD.P.-Joshi\n\nTM Slate Of Madhya Bharat\n\nand atUJthw\n\n• Jagannadhadas J.\n\nSUPREME (; OURT REPORTS [1955}.\n\nto think that such .a situation will arise in the future under the present Constitution. . For this purpose, it may be noticed that the exclusive legislative power of the State does not extend to personal laws. Personal laws are the subject matter of item No. 5 of the Concurrent Legislative . List. It is relevant in this connection also t9 notice that article 44 of the Constitution enjoins that \"the . State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the .territory of India\".\n\nIt is extremely unlikely therefore that regional personal laws will be allowed to become operative in any substantial measure. It may. be also mentioned that there is single citizenship under the Constitution for the whole of India and that \"citizenship and naturalisation\" have been listed within the exclusive competence of the Union Legislat:Ure. Of course citizenship is different from domicile. But I mention this here only to emphasize the view, that consistently with the Constitution, the concept of regional domicile which does not exist at the present day and which if recognised would tend to the growth of. claims of regional citizenship (as for instance in the . United States of America) .would be entirely foreign to the intendment of the Constitution.\n\nIt is with reference to the above considerations that the phrase \"domicile in Madhya Bharat\" in the relevant rule defining the phrase \"bana fide resident of Madhya Bharat\" has to be' considered and understood.\n\nSince the concept of domicile in Madhya Bharat, is,. in my view, unknown to the exiscing Indian law, I do not think it permissible to construe the phrase \"domicile in Madhya Bharat\" used in the relevant rule as having any thing to do with the regional domicile of the kind known to the English system of law.\n\nThe recognition of such a concept of regional domicile in English or 'American law does not necessitate that we should import the same idea into otir country contrary to the intendment of the Constitution. we have got to consider 'the meaning of the phrase \"original d9inicile in Madhya Bharat\" used in the relevant rule with reference to the existing state of 'law in India, which; I conceive, does not recognise such a regional domicile ' ·\n\n...\n\n,• -~- ... -\n\nI have already given my reasons for thinking that the meaning of \"residence\" or \"permanent home\" of the applicant cannot be read into the phrase \"domicile in Madhya Bharat\" used in clause (a). In the circumstances it appears to me to be reasonably clear that the phrase \"original domicile in Madhya Bharat\" is meant to convey the. \"place of birth (of the applicant) in. Madhya Bharat\".\n\nIt it perfectly true that \"domicile of origin\" and \"place of birth\" are two different matters. But that is so only where the use of the phrase \"domicile of origin\" conveys a definite legal meaning.\n\nBut where, as in the present case, the phrase \"domicile of origin in Madhya Bharat\"· conveys no legal meaning, as I have pointed out above, and if any meaning has to be attached to it, then it could only have reference to the \"place of birth\".\n\nThis would accord with what was likely to have been contemplated by the framer of the rule.\n\nNormally a person's domicile of origin is the place of his birth except in a few and exceptional cases. In this context the following passage from Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 28 at page 1095 may be noticed:\n\n\"A person's domicile of origin is the domicile of his birth.\n\nIt is generally but not necessarily the place of birth\".\n\nIn this connection it is to be remembered that the relevant rule is a substinite for the pre-existing rule which was as follows:\n\n\"Madhya Bharat students are exempted from capitation fees\".\n\nThe phrase \"Madhya Bharat students\" has no reference either to residence or domicile, and there can be no doubt . that it normally connoted students who were born in Madhya Bharat.\n\nIn my opinion when . the State authorities took over the management of the institution from private hands and made a change in the rule by coining a hybrid definition of the phrase \"bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat\" placing the category of citizens whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat in the forefront of that definition; they only attempted to camouflage the\n\n1955\n\n'D. P .. Joshi v.\n\nThe State of .Madhya Bharat.\n\nand another\n\n.' Jagannadhadas J.\n\nD. P.Jos!#\n\nTh.. Stat• ef Madhya. Bharat\n\nand another\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nimplication thereof so as to accord with the pre-existing rule, viz. that the benefits of the exemption from capitation fees should be available only to persons born in Madhya .Bharat and the burden of the capitation fees should be borne by persons .not born in Madhya Bharat. In the view I take of the real meaning and effect of the rule, which is , under discussion, neither an attempt at subsequent clarification nor the actual manner in which it is said to be administered or intended to be administered, as stated by the AS5istant Secretary to the Madhya Bharat Government, Shri H. L. Gupta, in his , affidavit, even if accepted as correct, can have any bearing. The fact that some of the admitted students of the Medical College who are residents of Madhya Bharat may not be entitled to . exemption from capitation fee under the rule as now sought to be interpreted is not reh vant so long as a student in the position of the applicant cannot have the benefit of the exemption, even if he got the highest marks in the competition. In my view, therefore, the rule in question has reference to place of birth in Madhya Bharat primarily, though .a number of other miscellaneous categories might also come in under other and different heads. Hence the rule offends article 15 of the Constitution.\n\nEven in the view . that the rule . has reference to the juristic concept of regional domicil and for that reason does not fall within the scope , of the inhibition of article 15, I am unable to see how, with reference to article 14, the distinction based on such domicile can be considered reasonable. No suggestion has been put forward ho:w '.'original domicile in Madhya .. Bharat\" is a reasonable ground for classification. In my opinion, therefore, the primary wntent of the rule relating to capitation fees which is contained in clause (a) of .the definition of \"bona fide resident of Madhya 'Bharat\" does operate to the disadvantage of the petitioner by way of unconstitutional discrimination.\n\nHence the State Government' cannot validly seek to levy capitation fees on . the. peti, tiOner with reference to that rule. . · .\n\nI. would, thefoe, allow this applieation. .\n\n...\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 1241\n\nI think it right to add that the question as to the 1955 existence or admissibility of the concept of regional D. P.Joshi domicile as distinguished from Indian domicile and as v. to the bearing of this on the meaning of the concerned The state of rule \\vere not canvassed or suggested at the hearing ~Iadhya Bharat before us and that the Court has not had the benefit and another of arguments on these and the connected matters. If, J \" -;;;; a J therefore, I have ventured to differ, notwithstanding a.anna a as • my respect for the views of the majority and potwithstanding the absence of assistance from the Bar, it is out of the conviction that the recognition, express or implied, of regional domicile by a decision ()f this Court would be contrary to the intendment of the Constitution.\n\nBY CoURT.::.:..In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the Petition is dismissed without costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nTHE AUTO~IOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD. v . .\n\nRUKl\\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS\n\n(And connected Appeal)\n\n[S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI and SYED JAFER ItAM JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ti.ct, 1950 (XLVJII of 1950), s. 22-Whether Labour Appellate Tribunal has iurisdic tion to impose conditions when granting pe1mission-Industrial Di~ putes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 83 and lndustrial Disputes (Ap\n\npellate Tribunal) Act, 19.50-S. 23-Jurisdiction of authority not only to decide whether there has been failure to obtain permission but also to give decision on the merits of an industrial dispute-Indus- trial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended), s. 88 and s. 88A-Ind1istrial Disputes ·(Appellate Tribunal) Act--Ss. 22 and 28-Meaning and scope of.\n\nHeld, (i) that the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the .\n\nLabour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes ·\n\n(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is appellate; (ii) that s. 22 of the Act confers on the appellate tribunal a special jurisdiction which is in the nature of original jurisdiction; (iii) that s. 23 also vests in the tribunal an additional jurisdiction to decide the complaint as if it\n\nwere an appeal pending before it; and (iv) that s. 23 confers on the\n\n'. ' ··-\n\nFebruary 3", "total_entities": 153, "entities": [{"text": "D. P. JOSHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. P. JOSHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jagannadhat!as", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 182, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SINHA JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213, "end_char": 228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 450, "end_char": 490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the State of Madhya Bharat substituted the following new rule for the old rule for admission to the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College Indore, when it took over the administration of the College from a private committee."}}, {"text": "Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College Indore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 564, "end_char": 610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the State of Madhya Bharat substituted the following new rule for the old rule for admission to the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College Indore, when it took over the administration of the College from a private committee."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 742, "end_char": 755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"For all students who are 'bona fide residents' of Madhya Bharat no capitation fee should be charged."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 812, "end_char": 825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But for other non-Madhya Bharat students the capitation fee should be retained as at present at Rs."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1043, "end_char": 1048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was defined as : \"one who is--\n\n(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or\n\n(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in Madhya Bhara-t but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years at the date, on which he applies for admission, or ( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or ( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or ' which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government\"."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bhara-t", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1207, "end_char": 1221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was defined as : \"one who is--\n\n(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or\n\n(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in Madhya Bhara-t but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years at the date, on which he applies for admission, or ( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or ( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or ' which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government\"."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1402, "end_char": 1410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was defined as : \"one who is--\n\n(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or\n\n(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in Madhya Bhara-t but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years at the date, on which he applies for admission, or ( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or ( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or ' which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government\"."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1418, "end_char": 1436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was defined as : \"one who is--\n\n(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or\n\n(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in Madhya Bhara-t but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years at the date, on which he applies for admission, or ( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or ( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or ' which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government\"."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1680, "end_char": 1704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Bona fide resident' for the purpose of this rule was defined as : \"one who is--\n\n(a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or\n\n(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in Madhya Bhara-t but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years at the date, on which he applies for admission, or ( c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or ( d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in respect of whom or ' which a Declaration of Eligibility has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government\"."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1807, "end_char": 1825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "VrvrAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1896, "end_char": 1907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. (MuKHERJEA C.J., VrvrAN BosE and SrNHA JJ."}}, {"text": "SrNHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1912, "end_char": 1917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. (MuKHERJEA C.J., VrvrAN BosE and SrNHA JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2031, "end_char": 2041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2172, "end_char": 2182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2621, "end_char": 2628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3954, "end_char": 3961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4154, "end_char": 4161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4880, "end_char": 4896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with them), for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4901, "end_char": 4910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with them), for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4913, "end_char": 4924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with them), for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4929, "end_char": 4939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with them), for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4974, "end_char": 4989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorny-Gen_eral of India \"(Shiv rl..\n\nDyal and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5039, "end_char": 5052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorny-Gen_eral of India \"(Shiv rl..\n\nDyal and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mukherjea\n\nC. J., Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha\n\nJJ.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5141, "end_char": 5152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mukherjea\n\nC. J., Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha\n\nJJ.", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5154, "end_char": 5171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mukherjea\n\nC. J., Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha\n\nJJ.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5176, "end_char": 5181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mukherjea\n\nC. J., Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha\n\nJJ.", "canonical_name": "SINHA JJ."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5226, "end_char": 5239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Venkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nJagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhat!as"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5329, "end_char": 5339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madhya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "matter of fees between students wh<;> are residents of Madhya :Sharat A and."}}, {"text": "articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6038, "end_char": 6049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6939, "end_char": 6949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Beaumont", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7207, "end_char": 7215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The beginnings of the institution go back to the year 1878, when a Dr. Beaumont started a Medical School at Indore under the •name of\n\nD. P.]oshi v.\n\nThe State ef Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nD. P.Joshi\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIndore Medical School, as an adjunct ."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The beginnings of the institution go back to the year 1878, when a Dr. Beaumont started a Medical School at Indore under the •name of\n\nD. P.]oshi v.\n\nThe State ef Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nD. P.Joshi\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIndore Medical School, as an adjunct .", "canonical_name": "State of , Madhya Bharat"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7394, "end_char": 7399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The beginnings of the institution go back to the year 1878, when a Dr. Beaumont started a Medical School at Indore under the •name of\n\nD. P.]oshi v.\n\nThe State ef Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nD. P.Joshi\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIndore Medical School, as an adjunct ."}}, {"text": "Indore Medical School", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7404, "end_char": 7425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The beginnings of the institution go back to the year 1878, when a Dr. Beaumont started a Medical School at Indore under the •name of\n\nD. P.]oshi v.\n\nThe State ef Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nD. P.Joshi\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIndore Medical School, as an adjunct ."}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7561, "end_char": 7568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It received considerable financial assistance from the rulers of Gwalior and other Indian States, and."}}, {"text": "Central India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "became well established; and it is claimed on its behalf that the medical practitioners of Central India, Rajasthan and neighbouring States were largely recruited from its alumni."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7705, "end_char": 7714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "became well established; and it is claimed on its behalf that the medical practitioners of Central India, Rajasthan and neighbouring States were largely recruited from its alumni."}}, {"text": "University of Agra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8162, "end_char": 8180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arrangements were completed in 1947, and in 1948 the institution was affiliated to the University of Agra."}}, {"text": "Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It then came to be known as the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College."}}, {"text": "17-3-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8590, "end_char": 8599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proposal was accepted by the respondent, and by resolution dated 17-3-1951 it took over the administration of the College."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat students", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9572, "end_char": 9594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It provided that \"Madhya Bharat students are\n\nexempted from capitation fees\". ("}}, {"text": "D. P. Joshi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11482, "end_char": 11493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now the contention of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the\n\n( 1)T.L.R. 1953 Madhya Bharat 87, 99\n\n~1955 ,.,~- D. P. Joshi\n\nv The State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\n1955'\n\nD. P.Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatarama ' Ayyar J.\n\npet:ltioner is that this nile is in contravention of .articles 14 and 15(1);.", "canonical_name": "D. P. JOSHI"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama AyyarJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11537, "end_char": 11556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now the contention of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the\n\n( 1)T.L.R. 1953 Madhya Bharat 87, 99\n\n~1955 ,.,~- D. P. Joshi\n\nv The State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\n1955'\n\nD. P.Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatarama ' Ayyar J.\n\npet:ltioner is that this nile is in contravention of .articles 14 and 15(1);.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama ' Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11620, "end_char": 11639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now the contention of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the\n\n( 1)T.L.R. 1953 Madhya Bharat 87, 99\n\n~1955 ,.,~- D. P. Joshi\n\nv The State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\n1955'\n\nD. P.Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkatarama ' Ayyar J.\n\npet:ltioner is that this nile is in contravention of .articles 14 and 15(1);.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11698, "end_char": 11719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11787, "end_char": 11800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12597, "end_char": 12607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12876, "end_char": 12889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arden", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14503, "end_char": 14508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Somerville v. Somerville( 2), Arden, Master of the Rolls, observed :\n\n\"I speak of the domicile of odgin rather than of birth."}}, {"text": "N .. C. Chttrjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14800, "end_char": 14816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N .. C. Chttrjee argued 'that doicile of origin was often caUed domicile of ."}}, {"text": "Lofd", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14942, "end_char": 14946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "our attentio11 to certain observations of Lofd, Macnaghten in Winans."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14948, "end_char": 14958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "our attentio11 to certain observations of Lofd, Macnaghten in Winans."}}, {"text": "article 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15452, "end_char": 15465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "D. P. Joshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16079, "end_char": 16090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Joshi v.\n\nThe State.of Madhya Bharat ,\n\nar.d arwther\n\nVenkatarama .", "canonical_name": "D. P. JOSHI"}}, {"text": "State.of Madhya Bharat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16099, "end_char": 16121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Joshi v.\n\nThe State.of Madhya Bharat ,\n\nar.d arwther\n\nVenkatarama .", "canonical_name": "State of , Madhya Bharat"}}, {"text": "D. P~ Joshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16163, "end_char": 16174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AyyarJ.\n\nD. P~ Joshi\n\nVo The State of Madhya Bharal\n\nand another\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\ndomicile to his civil rights.", "canonical_name": "D. P. JOSHI"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16183, "end_char": 16205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AyyarJ.\n\nD. P~ Joshi\n\nVo The State of Madhya Bharal\n\nand another\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\ndomicile to his civil rights.", "canonical_name": "State of , Madhya Bharat"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16393, "end_char": 16400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He observes:\n\n\"The law of England, and of almost all civilised countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal statuses or conditions : one by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country binding him by the tie of national allegiance, and which may be called his political status, another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political statuts."}}, {"text": "Dicey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17495, "end_char": 17500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with this question Dicey says at page 94 :\n\n\"It was, indeed, at one time hdd by a confusion of the ideas of domicile and nationality that a man could not change his domicile, for example, from England to California, wit.hout doing at any rate as much as he could to' become an American citizen."}}, {"text": "California", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17680, "end_char": 17690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with this question Dicey says at page 94 :\n\n\"It was, indeed, at one time hdd by a confusion of the ideas of domicile and nationality that a man could not change his domicile, for example, from England to California, wit.hout doing at any rate as much as he could to' become an American citizen."}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17954, "end_char": 17961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide also the observations of Lord Lindley in Winans v.\n\nAttorney-General(• )."}}, {"text": "Winans", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17965, "end_char": 17971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide also the observations of Lord Lindley in Winans v.\n\nAttorney-General(• )."}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18002, "end_char": 18010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol."}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18683, "end_char": 18692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20455, "end_char": 20466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is to show how far a person's rights are affected by his having his legal home or domicile within a territory governed by one system of law, i.e. within a given country, rather than within\n\nD P-Joshi\n\nThe Siate of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAY.)'ar J\n\n1).", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "•Venkatarama .Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20536, "end_char": 20555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. Joshi v. \"The State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\n•Venkatarama .Ayyar J\n\nanother.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20834, "end_char": 20847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by one system of law, was in many respects subject to special rules of law, then it would be essential to determine whether D was domiciled within such particular part, e.g.\n\nCaliforni~ in the United States; but in this case, such part would be pro tanto a separate country, in the sense in which that term is employed in these Rules\"."}}, {"text": "Somerville", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21414, "end_char": 21424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "estate of Lord Somerville, who . '"}}, {"text": "York", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22253, "end_char": 22257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Law of the Province' of York."}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22556, "end_char": 22564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The custom' i's very analogous to the\" law of Scotland."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22912, "end_char": 22918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whether during the time the custom and the restraint of disposing by testament were in full force, a gentleman of the county of York coming to London for the winter and dying there intestate, the disposition of his personal estate should be according to the custom or the general law\"."}}, {"text": "Great Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23756, "end_char": 23769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What is of interest in this decision is that it recognises that for purposes of succession there can be within one political unit, as many domiciles as there are systems of law, and that there can be a Scotch domicile, an English domicile and even a York domicile within Great Britain."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24288, "end_char": 24301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not, therefore, see any force in the contention that there cannot be a domicile of Madhya Bharat under the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "~Iadhya Bharat"}}, {"text": "Wharton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24539, "end_char": 24546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also urged on behalf of the respondent that the word \"domicile\" in the rule might be construed not in its technical legal sense, but in a popular sense as meaning \"residence\", and the following passage in Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edition, page 344 was quoted as supporting such a construction:\n\n\"By the term 'domicile', in its ordinary acceptation, is meant the place where a person lives or has his home."}}, {"text": "Venkatara1na Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24933, "end_char": 24951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this sense the place where a person has his actual residence, inhabitancy, or commorancy, is some times called his domicile\",\n\nD. P. Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Prfadhya Bharat\n\n'utd another\n\nVenkatara1na Ayyar J.\n\n D. P.Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\narrd another\n\nVenkatara111a\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIn Mcmullen v. Wadsworth(1), it was observed by the Judicial Committee that \"the word 'domicil' in article 63 (of the Civil Code of Lower Canada) was used in the sense of residence, and did not refer to international domicile\".", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "article 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25138, "end_char": 25148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26113, "end_char": 26126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Bharat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27376, "end_char": 27403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be mentioned that the rule relating to the payment of capitation fee discussed above was again modified by the management as a result of the decision of the High Court of Madhya Bharat in Rusf, am Mody v. State: Sumitra Devi v. State(')."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28616, "end_char": 28626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29904, "end_char": 29914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31124, "end_char": 31134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31245, "end_char": 31255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31276, "end_char": 31286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31871, "end_char": 31881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32939, "end_char": 32944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question that arises is whether the petitioner who is a resident of Delhi and has been admitted in July, 1952, by the State of Madhya Bharat as a student in the :Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College at Indore and who has been called upon to pay a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32989, "end_char": 33011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question that arises is whether the petitioner who is a resident of Delhi and has been admitted in July, 1952, by the State of Madhya Bharat as a student in the :Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College at Indore and who has been called upon to pay a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College at Indore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33033, "end_char": 33082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question that arises is whether the petitioner who is a resident of Delhi and has been admitted in July, 1952, by the State of Madhya Bharat as a student in the :Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College at Indore and who has been called upon to pay a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "agannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33643, "end_char": 33655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P.Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nVenkataratlla\n\nAyyar J.\n\nD. P. Joshi v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat and another\n\nJ agannadhadas J.\n\ninstitution and the relevant rules have been set out in the judgment of the majority just delivered and it is unnecessary to repeat them.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhat!as"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34331, "end_char": 34341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34628, "end_char": 34638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34800, "end_char": 34810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34815, "end_char": 34825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H. L.\n\nGupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36942, "end_char": 36954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit filed in this Court by Shri H. L.\n\nGupta, Assistant Secretary to the Government of Madhya Bharat, it is stated that this was meant to be only a restatement by the Government of their real intention in order to clarify what the prior rule was meant to convey.", "canonical_name": "H. L.\n\nGupta"}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36983, "end_char": 37010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit filed in this Court by Shri H. L.\n\nGupta, Assistant Secretary to the Government of Madhya Bharat, it is stated that this was meant to be only a restatement by the Government of their real intention in order to clarify what the prior rule was meant to convey."}}, {"text": "P. Joshi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37729, "end_char": 37737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But a copy of the rules for admission to the regular\n\nM.B.B.S. courses (copied from Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College, Indore, Calendar of\n\n1954) with which we have been furnished as one of the\n\nD; P. Joshi\n\nv, The State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\n, Jagannadhadas J.·\n\nfJ. p, Joshi\n\nv .. t'he State •f MaJhy• Bharat and anothet\n\n• ]agannaJhadas J.\n\nenclosures to the affidavit of the ."}}, {"text": "agannaJhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37867, "end_char": 37879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But a copy of the rules for admission to the regular\n\nM.B.B.S. courses (copied from Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College, Indore, Calendar of\n\n1954) with which we have been furnished as one of the\n\nD; P. Joshi\n\nv, The State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\n, Jagannadhadas J.·\n\nfJ. p, Joshi\n\nv .. t'he State •f MaJhy• Bharat and anothet\n\n• ]agannaJhadas J.\n\nenclosures to the affidavit of the .", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhat!as"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38653, "end_char": 38663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38667, "end_char": 38677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H. L. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39034, "end_char": 39045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Gupta, Assistant Secretary to the Government of Madhya Bharat:\n\n\"The basis of allocation of seats at the time of admission each year is that out of the total number of candidates to be newly admitted a certain number of seats is reserved for 'nominees' of such States as also of such individuals with whom there is a contract of reservation of seats, and a certain number of seats is reserved for Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "H. L.\n\nGupta"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41009, "end_char": 41019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "TheStakOf Madhya Bhiual", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42441, "end_char": 42464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TheStakOf Madhya Bhiual\n\nand another\n\nJagannad/uulas J.\n\nwith the mere intention."}}, {"text": "Jagannad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42479, "end_char": 42487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TheStakOf Madhya Bhiual\n\nand another\n\nJagannad/uulas J.\n\nwith the mere intention.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhat!as"}}, {"text": "uulas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42488, "end_char": 42493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TheStakOf Madhya Bhiual\n\nand another\n\nJagannad/uulas J.\n\nwith the mere intention."}}, {"text": "Cranworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43418, "end_char": 43427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if it be assumed that ·\"domicile\" -means \"permanent _home\" as stated by Lord Cranworth in Whicker v.\n\nHume( 1 ) this has no necessary reference to the applicant's actual residence at the relevant time."}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44414, "end_char": 44423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madhya. Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45034, "end_char": 45048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "396;398\n\n Now confining our attention to the category (a) which has given rise to the main controversy in this case, it appears to me quite clear that the phrase \"original domicile in Madhya Bharat\" used therein could not have been meant to indicate either the residence or the permanent home of the applicant in Madhya."}}, {"text": "Westbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45645, "end_char": 45653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now the juristic concept of domicile is one which can be best gathered from the following passage in the classic judgment of Lord Westbury in Udny v. Udny(1)."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhat!as", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46967, "end_char": 46981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P.Joshi v.\n\nTht State of Madhya Bhflf'at\n\nand another\n\nJagannadhat!as J.\n\n.'D p; Joshi\n\nv •.\n\nT Ill State of , Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nJagannadhadas J\n\nthe personal 1aws by which he is governed and on which his personal laws depend.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhat!as"}}, {"text": "State of , Madhya Bharat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47012, "end_char": 47036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P.Joshi v.\n\nTht State of Madhya Bhflf'at\n\nand another\n\nJagannadhat!as J.\n\n.'D p; Joshi\n\nv •.\n\nT Ill State of , Madhya Bharat\n\nand another\n\nJagannadhadas J\n\nthe personal 1aws by which he is governed and on which his personal laws depend.", "canonical_name": "State of , Madhya Bharat"}}, {"text": "Farnsworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47636, "end_char": 47646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Farnsworth in his book on the Residence and Domicil of Corporations ( 1939 Edition) says as follows at page 1:\n\n. \""}}, {"text": "Scotlana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48243, "end_char": 48251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus for instance, as has been pointed out, though Great Britain is one single political unit, the personal laws in Scotlana are different and therefore Scotch domicile is recognised."}}, {"text": "Indian Majority Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49847, "end_char": 49866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49868, "end_char": 49889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50639, "end_char": 50660, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Europe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50696, "end_char": 50702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that even in Europe until the middle ages, personal laws depended on race and not on domicile."}}, {"text": "Jagannadha4as", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51327, "end_char": 51340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Josh_i v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat\n\nand anot/¢r\n\nJagannadha4as J.\n\nD.P.-Joshi\n\nTM Slate Of Madhya Bharat\n\nand atUJthw\n\n• Jagannadhadas J.\n\nSUPREME (; OURT REPORTS [1955}.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhat!as"}}, {"text": "article 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51804, "end_char": 51814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52639, "end_char": 52663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "United States of America) .would be entirely foreign to the intendment of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "State of .Madhya Bharat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55743, "end_char": 55766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State authorities took over the management of the institution from private hands and made a change in the rule by coining a hybrid definition of the phrase \"bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat\" placing the category of citizens whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat in the forefront of that definition; they only attempted to camouflage the\n\n1955\n\n'D. P .. Joshi v.\n\nThe State of .Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "State of , Madhya Bharat"}}, {"text": "Madhya .Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56045, "end_char": 56059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the benefits of the exemption from capitation fees should be available only to persons born in Madhya .Bharat and the burden of the capitation fees should be borne by persons .not born in Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57143, "end_char": 57153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57343, "end_char": 57353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57397, "end_char": 57407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57552, "end_char": 57558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No suggestion has been put forward ho:w '.'original domicile in Madhya .. Bharat\" is a reasonable ground for classification."}}, {"text": "~Iadhya Bharat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58396, "end_char": 58410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 1241\n\nI think it right to add that the question as to the 1955 existence or admissibility of the concept of regional D. P.Joshi domicile as distinguished from Indian domicile and as v. to the bearing of this on the meaning of the concerned The state of rule \\vere not canvassed or suggested at the hearing ~Iadhya Bharat before us and that the Court has not had the benefit and another of arguments on these and the connected matters.", "canonical_name": "~Iadhya Bharat"}}, {"text": "AUTO~IOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 59020, "end_char": 59053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE AUTO~IOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD."}}, {"text": "RUKl\\IAJI BALA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59062, "end_char": 59076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RUKl\\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS\n\n(And connected Appeal)\n\n[S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI and SYED JAFER ItAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59114, "end_char": 59123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RUKl\\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS\n\n(And connected Appeal)\n\n[S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI and SYED JAFER ItAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "BnAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59125, "end_char": 59133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RUKl\\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS\n\n(And connected Appeal)\n\n[S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI and SYED JAFER ItAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SYED JAFER ItAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59138, "end_char": 59153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RUKl\\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS\n\n(And connected Appeal)\n\n[S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI and SYED JAFER ItAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ti.ct, 1950 (XLVJII of 1950)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 59160, "end_char": 59229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ti.ct, 1950 (XLVJII of 1950), s. 22-Whether Labour Appellate Tribunal has iurisdic tion to impose conditions when granting pe1mission-Industrial Di~ putes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 83 and lndustrial Disputes (Ap\n\npellate Tribunal) Act, 19.50-S. 23-Jurisdiction of authority not only to decide whether there has been failure to obtain permission but also to give decision on the merits of an industrial dispute-Indus- trial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended), s. 88 and s. 88A-Ind1istrial Disputes ·(Appellate Tribunal) Act--Ss."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59231, "end_char": 59236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59381, "end_char": 59386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59445, "end_char": 59450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59659, "end_char": 59664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59669, "end_char": 59675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 22 and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59724, "end_char": 59737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59950, "end_char": 59955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60084, "end_char": 60089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60226, "end_char": 60231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1241_1258_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 1241\n\nI think it right to add that the question as to the 1955 existence or admissibility of the concept of regional D. P.Joshi domicile as distinguished from Indian domicile and as v. to the bearing of this on the meaning of the concerned The state of rule \\vere not canvassed or suggested at the hearing ~Iadhya Bharat before us and that the Court has not had the benefit and another of arguments on these and the connected matters. If, J \" -;;;; a J therefore, I have ventured to differ, notwithstanding a.anna a as • my respect for the views of the majority and potwithstanding the absence of assistance from the Bar, it is out of the conviction that the recognition, express or implied, of regional domicile by a decision ()f this Court would be contrary to the intendment of the Constitution.\n\nBY CoURT.::.:..In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the Petition is dismissed without costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nTHE AUTO~IOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD. v . .\n\nRUKl\\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS\n\n(And connected Appeal)\n\n[S. R. DAs, BnAGWATI and SYED JAFER ItAM JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ti.ct, 1950 (XLVJII of 1950), s. 22-Whether Labour Appellate Tribunal has iurisdic tion to impose conditions when granting pe1mission-Industrial Di~ putes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 83 and lndustrial Disputes (Ap\n\npellate Tribunal) Act, 19.50-S. 23-Jurisdiction of authority not only to decide whether there has been failure to obtain permission but also to give decision on the merits of an industrial dispute-Indus- trial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended), s. 88 and s. 88A-Ind1istrial Disputes ·(Appellate Tribunal) Act--Ss. 22 and 28-Meaning and scope of.\n\nHeld, (i) that the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the .\n\nLabour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes ·\n\n(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is appellate; (ii) that s. 22 of the Act confers on the appellate tribunal a special jurisdiction which is in the nature of original jurisdiction; (iii) that s. 23 also vests in the tribunal an additional jurisdiction to decide the complaint as if it\n\nwere an appeal pending before it; and (iv) that s. 23 confers on the\n\n'. ' ··-\n\nFebruary 3\n\nThe Aidomobile\n\nl'roducts of\n\n- India Ltd. v.\n\nRukmaji B:?la\n\nand ot:iers\n\nSUPREJ\\IE COURT REPORTS (1955]\n\nworkmen an additional remedy wliich they did not have under the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7. ·\n\nThe to new ss. 33 and 33-A inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act 194 7 (XIV of 194 7) by Act XLVIII of 1950 confer dis\n\n-~ tinct benefits on the workmen and give some additional jurisdiction and power to the authorities mentioned therein.\n\nSection 33-A en joins the Tribunal b decide the complaint \"aSif it were a dispute referred to or pending before it\" and to submit its award to the ap-. propriate Government and provides that the provisions of the Act shall apply to the awaaj. The provisions of these two new ss. 33 and 33 A 'of the 194 7 Act correspond to and are in pari materia with the provisions of ss. 22 and 23 of the 1950 Act and are more Or less in similar terms. A ban has been put by s. 22 of 1950 Act and. s. 33 of the 194 7 Act upon the ordinary right, which the employer has under the ordinary law governing a contract of employment with a view to protect the workmen against victimisation by the employer and tO ensure the termination of the proceedings in connection with indus\"' trial disputes in a peaceful atmosphere and the only thing that the authority is called upon to do is to grant or withhold the permission i.e. to lift or maintain the ban. These sections do not confer any power on the authorities to adjudicate upon any other dispute.\n\nUnder s: 22 olthelndustrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (XLVIII of 1950) the Labour Appellate Tribunal has no juris diction to impose conditions as a pre-requisite for granting permission to the employer to retre_nch its workmen.\n\nUnder s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 ands. 23 of the 1950 Act the jurisdiction of the authority is not only to decide whether there has been a failure on the part of the employer to obtain the permission of the authority before taking action but also to give a decision on the merits of an industrial dispute and grant appropriate relief which when published by the appropriate Govern ment will become enforceable uncler the respective Acts.\n\nSerampore Belting Mazdoor Union v. Serampo1'e Belting Co., Ltd. ([1951] 1 Lab. L.J. 341), Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat BorO'U!Jh Municipality ([1952] 54 Bom. L.R. 922), Raj Narain v. Employers' Association of Northern India ([1952] 1 Lab. L.J. 381), The Queen v.\n\nCounty Council of West Riding of Yorkshire ([1896] 1 Q.B. 386), Carlsbad Mineral Works Co., Ltd. v. Their Workmen ([1953] 1 Lab.\n\nL.J. 85), Atherton West cf Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union ([1953] S.C.R. 780) and Bhattacharji v. Parry cf Co., Ltd., Calcutta - ([1954] 2 Lab. L.J. 635), referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE Ju~ISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2 and 4 of 1955. . Appeal by Special Leave from the Order. dated the 18th day of November 1954 of the Labour Appeli '\n\nlate Tribunal of India, Bombay in Application (Misc.) Bombay No. 773 of 1954.\n\nII. M.\n\nSeervai, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1955 and respondent in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1955.\n\nD. H. Buch and /. N. Shroff, for the respondents ,. in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1955 and appellants in Civil t- Appeal No. 4 of 1955.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi and- P. G. Gokhale with him), for the Intervener (Union of India) .\n\n1955. February 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, dated the 18th November 1954 which was made on an application made by the appellant company on the 6th September 1954 under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (Act XLVIII of 1950) which is hereinafter referred to as the 1950 Act.\n\nThe appellant company carries on business as assemblers of motor vehicles from \"completely knocked tlown\" assemblies imported into India.\n\nThere was some appeal pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal arising out of disputes between the appellant company and its workmen.\n\nIt is alleged that the name of the appellant company had been removed by the Government of India from the list of approved manufacturers maintained by them and that, in the result, it had been unable to secure further import licenses for the import of completely knocked down assemblies of motor vehicles and that consequently on and from the 1st November 1953 the company had to lay off a number of its workmen, for it had to operate the various departments of its factory at greatly reduced strength. As the appellant company saw no prospect of any increase in the scope of its present operation which would provide employment for the workmen who had been laid off, it had become neces-\n\nJ955\n\nThe Automobile .\n\nProducts oj India Ltd.\n\nRukmqji Bala and others\n\nThe Automobile ·\n\nPr0ducts of India Ltd. v.\n\nRukmaji Bala and others\n\nDas).\n\nsary to retrench the wrokmen named in Annexure A to the application. As those workmen were concerned with the appeal pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal the company applied to the Appellate Tribunal under section 22 of the 1950' Act for permission to retrench them.\n\nThe respondents through their Union, the Auto.: mobile Manufacturers' Empfoyees' Association, Bombay, filed a written statement on the 1st November 1954 making diverse allegations against the company and contending that the company had itself to blame for having brought about the lay off. It was con: tended that there was no immediate cause for making the application, that the company was motivated by ulterior motives to deprive the workmen of their dues which even according to the company would become due and payable to the workmen on the expiry of the one year of the said lay off period. It was further alleged that in or about April 1954 the company recalled some of the workmen out of those who had been laid off since November 1953 violating all princic pies on which a recall should have been made and that by such arbitrary and unscientific recall the company had imposed disproportionate work loads on the recalled workmen, thereby altering their conditions of service to their prejudice. The resp0ndents maintained that the application was not maintainable in law, was mala fide and should be dismissed. In the penultimate paragraph of the written statement it was submitted that in the event of the Labour Appellate Tribunal granting the permission in. whole or in part such permission should be granted subject to the following conditions :- ( 1) Payment of full wages with dearness allowance for the entire period of lay off;\n\n(2) Payment of one month's notice pay and retrenchment compensation at the rate of one month's wages including dearness allowance for every completed year of service and part thereof in addition to the gratuity as per the scheme in force in the company;\n\n(3) Alternatively to (2) above and in case the Labour Appellate Tribunal took the view that the\n\n' . '\n\n•· .. t -\n\nS.C.R ..\n\nSUPRf.ME COURT REPORTS 1245\n\nlay. off was governed by section 25-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, payment of compenstion at 50 per cent. of their wages plus dearness allowance for the entire period of lay off to the date of discharge in addition to the notice pay and gratuity as claimed in (2) above; and\n\n( 4) Payment of leave wages as per existing rules, taking the entire period of lay off as sei:vice.\n\nA number of documents were filed in support of the respective contentions.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal at the very outset of its judgment under appeal states its finding . on the merits of the action proposed to be taken by the come pany as follows:-\n\n\"There can be little doubt that the retrenchment has been occasioned by the failure of the concern to secure sufficient work owing to absence of licenses from Government and, therefore, retrenchment must be regarded as inevitable and the application before us bona fide. Permission to retrench cannot be refused but for the reasons that we shall state hereafter we make that permission conditional upon the fulfilment of certain terms by the concern\".\n\nThe company contended before the Labour Appellate Tribunal that its function, while dealing wit}l an application under section 22 of the 1950 Act, was only to give or withhold permission.\n\nThis contention was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal with the following observation:-\n\n\"That view is quite untenable as has ben repeatedly held by this Tribunal.· We are the authority tO whom an application has to be made for permission to retrench, and when such an application is made we must of necessity exercise our ju<; lgment and discretion and satisfy ourselves that when the company retrenches it does justice by its. employees\".\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal was clearly influenced\n\nby the consideration which, stated in its own words was as follows:- - \"'\n\n. \"We do not think that we will-~~ advaµclng -th~ mterest of the employees or of the concern by refusing 5-90 S.C. India/59\n\nThe Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd.\n\nY.¥' Rukmaji Bala -and others\n\nDas J.\n\n. ;1955\n\nThe Automobile~\n\nProducts of India Ltd. v.\n\nRukmaji Bala and others\n\nretrenchment because . the case for retrenchment has been established, and the sooner the workmen are allowed to leave and find for themselves other em ployment the better for them.\n\nBut in order to assure ourselves that on retrenchment the . employees receive what in justice they should have, we have decided to give permission to retrench subject to certain conditions which m our view are inherent under the Act, and which apart from the Act we consider to be just and equitable m the particular c!fcumstances of this case\".\n\nIn this view of the matter the Labour Appellate Tribunal definitely declined \"to leave over the question of compensation for lay off as a legacy of the present troubles; the employees to be retrenched have enough to worry them without having to make claims and have them decided after contest before a Tribunal\".\n\nIn the result, the Labour Appellat~ Tribunal gave the appellant company perm1ss1on to retrench \"subject to the terms and conditions of Act XLIII of 1953, provided that each workman is paid at the rate of half basic wages and dearness allowance for the whole period from the date of lay off up to thf date of retrenchmen~ (less sums already received as lay off compensation)\".\n\nLiberty was given to the company to set off the lay off compensation pro tanto against the retrenchment relief given by the Act.\n\nAggrieved by this decision the appellant companv applied for and obtained from this Court special leave to appeal against this order.\n\nThe respondents subsequently filed an application for special leave to appeal against this decision . in so far as the Labour Appellate Tribunal had not allowed their full claim as summarised above and m so far as the names of l 7 persons had. been struck off on the allegation of the company . that they were not workmen.\n\nThis application of the respondents was also acceded to and the two appeals have been heard together.\n\nThe Union of India asked for leave to intervene as important questions of construction of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the l947 Act) and the 1950 Act were involved.\n\nSuch\n\n. ..-\n\nleave was granted and we have heard learned counsel for the Union of India along with learned counsel for the parties. ·\n\nThe question as to the. propriety of permitting the names of 17 workmen to be struck off from the application has not been seriously pressed before us.· Only two questions have been canvassed at some length before us, namely:- • ·\n\n(1) Whether under section 22 of the 1950 Act the Tribunal has jurisdiction to impose conditions when granting the permission asked for; and\n\n(2) Whether the conditions imposed in this case are in conformity with law.\n\nIt is plain, however, that in case the first question is answered in the negative,. the second question will not call for any decision on the present occasion.\n\nIn order to correctly answer the questions it will be necessary to bear in mind the general scheme of the two Acts. The purpose of the 1947 Act is, inter alia, to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. In order to achieve this avowed object different authorities have been constituted under this Act. Thus section 3 provides for the constitution of Works Committee whose dutv is to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employers and workmen.\n\nThe appropriate Government is authorised by section 4 to appoint conciliation officers charged with the duty . of mediating irt and promoting . the settlement of industrial disputes and by section 5 to constitute a Board of Conciliation for promoting the settlement • of industrial disputes.\n\nSection 6 empowers the appropriate Government to constitute a Court of Inquiry for enquiring into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute.\n\nFinally, section 7 provides for the constitution of fndustrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 10 of this Act provides for reference of disputes to a Board, Court or Tribunal. It will be noticed that under this section it is the appropriate\n\nT ht Automobile\n\nProducts of ltidia Lid.\n\nRukmqji Bala and ofhers\n\nDasJ\n\nTh\"e Automobile\n\nProducts, of India Ltd .. y; Rukmaji Bala\n\nand others\n\nDas•]f •\n\nGovernment which alone can make the reference and set the authority in motion. The procedure, powers and duties of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts and Tribunals are elaborately prescribed and defined in sections 11 to 15. It is to be noted that the conciliation officer, Board, and Court are required to make a report to the appropriate Government while the Tribunal is enjoined to • submit its award to the appropriate Government.\n\nThe report of a Board or Court and the award of a Tribunal .are under section 17 to be published by the . appropriate .Government within a month from the date of their receipt. Section 17-A provides that the . award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of 30 . days from the date of its publication and, subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) shall come into operation from such date as may be specified therein and if no date is so specified from the date when the award becomes enforceable as aforesaid. Section 19 prescribes the period of operation of settlements and awards.\n\nChapter V deals with strikes and lock-outs. Sections 26 to 31 which are grouped together under the heading \"Penalties\" prescribe punishments.\n\nSection 31(1) provides that any employer who contravenes the provisions of section 33 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 .months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000 or with both. Section 33, a contravention of which is made punishable by section 31, as it stood before 1950, forbade an employer, during the pendency of any conciliation proceedirigs or proceedings before a Tribunal,. to alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned . in tl1e dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before such proceedings, nor, save with the express permission: of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case may be, to. discharge, dismiss or otherwise punish duririg the pendency of the proceedings any workman, except for misconduct not connected with the dispute; It may be noted that under this section the .ban on the alteration of the conditions of service was absolute and that permission was necessary only iri case of discharge or dismissal or\n\n..... ·-- ~\n\n. ,..\n\n...\n\n punishment and even in such case no permission was necessary when the workman was guilty of misconduct not concerned with. the pending dispute.\n\nThe only deterrent against a contravention by an emplo- yer of the provisions of section 33 was the prosecution of . the employer under section 31. This was hardly any consolation for the workmen, for if an employer took the risk of a prosecution and acted in contravention of section 33 the workmen could only raise an industrial dispute and ask the appropriate Government to refer the same to a Tribunal but if the Government declined to accede to. their prayer the workmen were without any remedy. This . was the position under the 1947 Act before it 'was amended in 1950.\n\nThe 19;50 \"_Act was enacted for establishing an Appellate • Tribunal . in relation. to industrial . disputes.\n\nChapter II of the Act deals with the constitution, composition. and functions of the appellate tribunal.\n\nSection 7 .formulates the jutisdictiori of the , appellai:e tribunal. Section 9 confers on the appeljate tribunal all. the powers which are vested . in a Civil Court when hearing_ an appeal under the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908. . Section 10 prescribes the .period of limitation within which appeals are. to be brought before the appellate tribunal.· Under section 15 the decision of. the appellate. tribunal becomes enforceable on. t}ie . expiry of 30 days from the date of its pronouncement,. provided that where . the appropriate Government is of opinion that it would be inexpedient, on public grounds, to \"give effect to the whole or . any part. of the decision the appropriate Government may; before the expiry of the said. period of 30 'days, by order in the Official Gazette either reject the decision or modify it.\n\nSection 22. of. this Act provide.s: \"22. During the . period . of thirty days allowed for the .filing of an appeal under section 10 or during the pendency of any appeal under this Act, no .employer shall- . . (a.) alter, to the prejudice . of .the workmen concerned in such appeal, the .conditions of . service applicable to them immediately before. the filing of such appeal, or\n\n'1955\n\nTM Automobile ['roducts of India Ltd.\n\n.Y Rukmaji Bala\n\naTUi others\n\nDs J.\n\n19,55\n\nThe Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd.\n\nv.\n\nRukmaji Baia\n\nand others Da; J.\n\n( b) discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such appeal, save with the express permission in writing of the Appellate Tribunal\".\n\nSection 23, on which reliance is counsel for the respondents and reads as follows:-\n\nplaced by learned for the intervener,\n\n\"23.\n\nWhere an employer contravenes the provi- sions of section 22 during the pendency of proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner to such Appellate Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint, the Appellate Tribunal shall decide the complaint as if it were an appeal pending before it, in accordance with the . provi5ions of this Act and shall pronounce its decision thereon and the provisions of this Act .shall apply accordingly\".\n\nSection 29 of .this Act provides for penalty for contravention of the provisions of section 22, namely, imprisonment. for . a term which may extend to six months,. or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, .or with both.\n\nFrom what has been stated so far four things are to be noted, namely, (i) that the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal is appellate, (ii) that section 22 of this Act confers on the appellate tribunal a special jurisdiction which is in the nature of original jurisdiction,\n\n(iii) that . section 23 also vests in the tribunal and additional jurisdiction to decide the complaint as if it were an appeal pending before. it; and (iv) that sei:tion 23 confers on the workmen an additional remedy which they did not have under the 1947 Act.\n\nTo fill up the lacuna in the 1947 Act section 34 of the 1950 . A.ct provided for certain amendments of the 1947 Act.\n\nAmongst other things, it substituted a new section for the old section 33 of the 1947 Act. The new section 33 runs as follows:-\n\n\"33.\n\nDuring the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute, no employer shall-\n\n. ...\n\n(a) alter, to the prejudice .of the wrkmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or . ( b) discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case may be\".\n\nIt will be noticed that this section has made several changes.\n\nThus under this section provision is made for obtaining permission as . a condition precedent both for altering the conditions of service and for discharging or punishing the workmen and no exception is made for a case of misconduct unconnected with the pending dispute. Besides this,, the following new section was added to the 1947 Act as section 33-A :\n\n\".33-A.\n\nWhere an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by, such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner to such Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint that Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisioris of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of of this Act shall apply accordingly\".\n\nIt may be pointed out that the new sections 33 and 33-A thus inserted into the 1947 Act confer distinct benefits on. the worki:nen and give some additional jurisdiction and power to the authorities mentioned therein.\n\nSection 33-A enjoins the Tribunal to decide the complaint '.'as . if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it\" and to submit its award to the appropriate Government and provides that the provisions of the Act shall apply to the award. It is quite clear that the provisions of these two new sections 33 and 33-A of the 1947 Act correspond to and. are in pari materia with the provisions of sections 22 and 23 of the. 1950 Act and are more or less. in similar terms. The question for our coriside-\n\n•.955\n\nThe Automobile Products of India Ltd. v.\n\nRukmaji Bala and others\n\nDas J.\n\n1955 --·- The Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd. v.\n\nRukmaji Bala\n\nand others\n\nDas].\n\nration is : . What are . the meaning, scope and effect of these sections.\n\nA cursory perusal of section 33-A of the 1947 Act as well as section 23 of the 1950 Act will at once show that it is the contravention by the employer of the provisions of . section 33 .in. the first case and of section 22 in the second case that gives rise to. a cause of action in favour of the workmen to approach and move the respective authority named in the section and this contravention is . the condition precedent to the exercise by the authority concerned of the additional\n\njuisdiction and powers conferred on it by the sections.\n\nThe authority referred to in the sections is, as we have seen, a Court of limited jurisdiction and must accordillgly be strictly confined to the exercise of the func; tions and powers actually conferred ori it by the Act which constinited it. What, then, are the scope and ambit of the functions and powers with which it has been vestedby these sections? .\n\nWhen an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 of the 1947 Act or of section 22 of the 1950 .Act the workmen affected thereby .. obviously have a grievance.\n\nThat grievance is two-fold.\n\nIn the first place it is that -the employer has taken a prejudicial action against them without theexpress permission in writing -of the authority concerned and . thereby deprived them of the salutary safeguard which the legislature has provided . for their protection against victimisation. In the second place, and . apart from the first grievance which may be called the statutory grievance; the workmen -may also have a grievance on merits which may be of much more seriousness and gravity for. them; namely, that in point of fact they have been un-. fairly dealt with in that their interest has actually been prejudicially affected -by the highhanded act of. -the .employer. These . sections give the workmen -the right to move the authority by lodging a complaint befor.e it ..\n\nThis is a distinct 'benefit. given to them, for, as we have seen,-· apart from these sections, the. workmen have. no right to refer. any dispute. for adjudication. This complaint is required to be made in the prescribed manner..\n\nForm DD prescribed. by rule 51-A -of the .Industrial:\n\nDisputes (Central) Rules, 1947, framed 'under section 38 of die 1947 Act, like Form E prescribed under sectiop 35 of the 1950 Act, requires the complaining.work- -men -to show ui their petition of complaint not only the manner m which the alleged contravention has taken place but also the grounds on which the order or the act of the management is challenged.\n\nThis clearly indicates that the authority to whom the complaint is made is to decide both the issues,\n\namely (1) the fact of contravention and (2) the merits of the act or order of the employer. It is also clear that under section 33-A of the 1947 Act the authority is to adjudicate upon the complaint \"as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it\" and under section 23 of the 1950 Act the authority is to decide the complaint \"as if it were an appeal pending before it\".\n\nThese provisions quite dearly indicate that the jurisdiction of the authority is , not only to decide whether there has. been a, 'failure on the part of the employer to obtain the permission of the authority before taking action but also to go into the merits 6,£ the complaint and grant appropriate . reliefs. The ext_reme contention that .under section 33-A of the 1947, Act, on a hnding that there has been 'a contravention of t_he provisions of section 33, the Tiibunal's duty is\n\nmly to make a declaration to that effect, leaving the workmen to take such steps under the Act as they may be advised to do, . has beeri negatived by 'the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Serampore Belting Mazdoor Union v. Serampore Belting Co:, Ltd.(1 ) and by\n\nthe Bombay High Court in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat lforough Municipality( i ). The same principle has been accepted and . applied by a Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal' to a case under section 23 of the\n\n1950 Act in Raj Narain v. Employers' Association of Northern India( 3 ). We find ourselves in agreemeni: with . the construction placed upon section '33-A of the }947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 . Act by these decisions. ln our view the scope and ambit of. the juris~ diction conferred on the authority ' named ill those\n\n(I) [i95J] 2 Lb.L.J. 341. , (2) [1952] 54 Bom. L. R; 922;\n\n(3) [l!l,52] I Lab. L.J. 381.\n\nThe Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd. .v.\n\nRukrnaji Bala and others\n\nDas J.\n\n.1955\n\nThtJ Automo'bile\n\n Products ef India Lid.\n\nRu!maji Bala\n\nand others\n\nDas].\n\nsections is wider than that conferred on the Criminal Court by section 31 of the 1947 Act and section 29 of the 1950 Act. The Criminal Court under the two last mentioned 5ections is only concerned with the first issue hereinbefore mentioned, namely, yea or nay whether there has been a contravention of the respective provisions of the sections mentioned therein, b11t the authority exercising jurisdiction under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and se-ction 23 of the 1950 Act is to adjudicate upon or decide the: complaint \"as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it\"· in the first case or \"as if it were an appeal pending before it\" in the second case. The authority is, therefore, enjoined to go into the merits of the act complained of under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of. the 1950 Act. In this sense the jurisdiction of the authority nanied in these two sections is certainly wider than that of the Criminal Court exercising jurisdiction under the penal sections . referred to above. Having regard to the scope of the enquiry under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act it must follow that the power of the authority to grant relief must be c<>oextensive with its power to grant relief on a reference made to it ar .on an appeal brought before it, as . the case may be. The provision that the authority concerned must submit its award to the appropriate Government and that the provisions . of the respective Acts would be applicable thereto also support the view that the decision of the authority is to partake of the nature of a decision on the merits . of an industrial dispute which when published by the apprnpriate Government will become enforceable under the respective Acts.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the authority referred to in these sections. must have jurisdiction to do complete justice between the parties relating. to the matters in dispute and must have. power to give such relief as the nature of. the case may require and as is also indicated by the prayer clause mentioned. in the tw'o Forms DD and E referred w above. In short, these two sections give to the workmen a direct right to approach the Tribunal or Appellate Tribun.al for the\n\n. ~\n\nredress of their grievance without the intervention of the appropriate Government which they did not possess before 1950 and they provide for speedy determination of disputes and avoid multiplicity of proceedings by giving complete relief to the workmen in relation to their grievances arising out of the action taken by the employer in contravention of the provisions of the relevant sections. It is significant that this jurisdiction or powers has been vested in the. Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal whose normal duty is to decide or adjudicate upon industrial disputes and not on any conciliation officer or Board who are normally charged with the duty of bringing about settlement of disputes.\n\nIt is submitted by learned counsel for the Respondents and of the intervener that the scope of section 33 of the 1947 Act and of section 22 of the 1950 Act is precisely the same as that of section 33-A of the 1947 Act .and . section 23 of the 1950 Act. The argument is that the two last mentioned sections were enacted only in order to afford an opportunity to the workmen to . do what they had beei; i. prevented from doing at the earlier stage by reason of the employer taking the law into his own hands and taking action against them without previously obtaining the sanction of the appropriate authority to do so.. If the law permits the workmen to ventilate their grievances at a later stage under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and sectio.n 23 of the 1950 Act there can be no logical reason why the law should not permit them to do so at the earlier stage under section 33 of the 1947 Act and section 22 of the 1950 Act. It is submitted that the purpose of labour legislation being to maintain industrial . peace and restore amity and goodwill between the employer and his workmen, it should be the attempt of the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribu-· nal at every stage to try to resolve all disputes which are connected with the matter which is brought before it. Finally, it is urged that whenever an authority is . vested with the power to do pr not to do an act it must be regarded as having , a discretion and\n\nThe Automobile\n\n.Products of India Ltd •.\n\nRukmaji Bala and others\n\nDas].\n\n19_5.5\n\nThe Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd. .v.\n\nRu.kmaji Bala ana .others\n\nDas J.\n\nthat iri exercise of such discretion the authority must be presumed to be vested with power to impose suitable coriditions.\n\nReliance is placed on the decision in The Queen v. Couilty Council of West Riding of' Yorkshire( 1 ). The argument is that the authority con' cerried rriay under section 33 of the 1947 Act and section 22 of the 1950 Act grant by way of imposing conditions the same relief which it can grant to the workmen under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act. We are unable to accept this contention as correi:t for\" reasons which we now proceed to state.\n\nThe object of section 22 of the 1950 Act like that of section 33 of the 1947 Act as amended is to protect the workmen concerned . in disputes which form the subject-matter of pendin_g proceedil}gs against victimisation by t!ie employer .on account - of. t1ieir having ra.ised industrial . disputes or. their. contim/ing .th~ pend~ ing proceedings. It . is further the object of the two sections to ensure tht proceedings: in . connecrin \"'.ith in'. dustrial disputes already . pending sjiould . be_ bro.ught to a termination in. a. peacef!-11 atmosphere and . that no employer, should during the pendency of those proceedings take any action of the kind mentioned in the sections . which,' may give ' rise to fresh. disputes likely to further exacerbate the already strained relation between the employer and the workmen.\n\nTo. achieve this. object.· a. ban , has been imp9sed. upon the. ordinary right which the employer has under the ordinary , lw governing' a 'contract ' of . employment.\n\nSection 22 of the 1950 Act and section 33 of the\n\n1947. Act \"'.hich impose the ban also provide for the removal of that ban bl;' the granting of express per: mission in writing in appropriate cases by tlie authority . mentioned therein. The : purpose of . the.se . t:Wo sectiOD.s heirig to determine 'whether • the ban should be removed. O( not, , all that is . required , of the authO:. r!tj exercising furisdiction under these sections. is to accord . or withhold .. permission. And . so . it has. been held-we .. think . rightly-by the Labour . Appellate Tribunal in Carlsbad Mineral _Works .co. Ltd . .v. T, heir\n\n(I)\n\n[1896) 2 Q.B. 386.\n\n' .,..\n\nWorkmen (1) which was a case under section. 33 of the 1947 Ai:. Even a cursory persual of section 33 of the 1947 Act will make it clear that the purpose of that section was not to confer any. general power of adjudication of. disputes. It will be noticed that under section 33 of the 1947 Act the authority invested with the power of granting or withholding permission is the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal. The . conciliation officer or the Board normally has no power, under the 1947 Act, to deide any industrial:· dispute but is only charged with the duty of bringing about a settlement of dispute. It is only the Tribunal which can by its award decide a dispute referred .to it; Section 33 by the same language confers . jurisdiction and power on all the three authorities. Power being thus conferred by . one and the same section,· it cannot\n\nmean one thing in relation to the conciliation officer or the Board and a different and larger thing in relation to the Tribunal. There is no reason to think that the legislature, by a side wind as it' were, vested in the conciliation officer and the Board the jurisdiction and power of adjudicating upon disputes which they normally do not possess and whfrh they may not be competent or qualified to exercise. Further, if the purpose of the section was to invest all the authorities named therein with power to 'decide industrial disputes. one . would have . expected . some provision enabling them to make and submit an award to which the provisions of the Act would apply such as is provided in ection 33-A of the 1947' Act or section 23 of the 1950 Act. There is no machinery provided in section 33 of the 1947 Act or section 23 of the 1950 Act for enforcing the decision of the authority named in those sections. This also indicates that those sections only impose a ban on the right of the employer and the only thing that the authority is called upon to do is to grant or withhold the permission, i.e. to lift or maintain the ban. And so it has been held by this Court in Atherton West & Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mzll Mazdoor Union( 2 ) which was a case under clause 23 of the U. P. Government Notification quoted on p. 785.\n\n(1) [1953] 1 Lab. L.J. 85.\n\n(2) [1953] s.c.R .. 780, 786-7.\n\nThe Automoile\n\n-Products of\n\nIndia Ltd. v: Rukmaji Bala and others\n\nDat\"J.\n\nT lit Autrnnobi/e\n\n Produ; IJ, of India Ltd. v.\n\nRukmaji Bala\n\nand othtrs\n\nPas J•\n\nSection 22 of the 1950 Act is in pari materia with section 33 of the 1947 Act and the above clause . 23 of the U. P. Government Notification and most of .the considerations noted above. in connection with these pr°\" visions apply mutatis mutandis to .section 22 of the 1950 Act. Imposition of conditions is wholly collateral to this purpose and the authority cannot impose any condition. And it has been so held-we think correctly-in G.\n\nC. Bhattacharji v. Parry & Co., Ltd., Calcutta(.'). In view of the scheme of these Acts summarised above and the. language of these sections the general principle laid down in the case of The Queen\n\nv. The County Council of West Riding supra can have no application to a case governed by these sections.\n\nIn our judgment the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that it had jurisdiction to impose conditions as a prerequisite for granting permission to the company to retrench its workmenand the first question must be answered in the negative.\n\nIn the view we have taken on the first question we do not consider it necessary on this occasion to express any op1mon on the other question canvassed before us.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed and .the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Labour Appellate Tribunal to de:il with the application of the company and make the appropriate order. according to law. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs. Appeal No. 4 of 1955 is dismissed also without costs.\n\n(!) [1954] 2 Lab. L.J. 635.", "total_entities": 144, "entities": [{"text": "~Iadhya Bharat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 338, "end_char": 352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 1241\n\nI think it right to add that the question as to the 1955 existence or admissibility of the concept of regional D. P.Joshi domicile as distinguished from Indian domicile and as v. to the bearing of this on the meaning of the concerned The state of rule \\vere not canvassed or suggested at the hearing ~Iadhya Bharat before us and that the Court has not had the benefit and another of arguments on these and the connected matters."}}, {"text": "THE AUTO~IOBILE PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 958, "end_char": 995, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Automobile PRODUCTS OF INDIA LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RUKl\\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1004, "end_char": 1029, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RUKl\\IAJI BALA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5219, "end_char": 5232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.\n\nSeervai, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5237, "end_char": 5252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.\n\nSeervai, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "D. H. Buch", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5349, "end_char": 5359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. H. Buch and /. N. Shroff, for the respondents ,."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. H. Buch and /. N. Shroff, for the respondents ,."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5481, "end_char": 5495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi and- P. G. Gokhale with him), for the Intervener (Union of India) ."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi and- P. G. Gokhale with him), for the Intervener (Union of India) ."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5544, "end_char": 5557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi and- P. G. Gokhale with him), for the Intervener (Union of India) ."}}, {"text": "Intervener (Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5577, "end_char": 5603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi and- P. G. Gokhale with him), for the Intervener (Union of India) ."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5733, "end_char": 5772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, dated the 18th November 1954 which was made on an application made by the appellant company on the 6th September 1954 under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (Act XLVIII of 1950) which is hereinafter referred to as the 1950 Act."}}, {"text": "6th September 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5873, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, dated the 18th November 1954 which was made on an application made by the appellant 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of motor vehicles and that consequently on and from the 1st November 1953 the company had to lay off a number of its workmen, for it had to operate the various departments of its factory at greatly reduced strength."}}, {"text": "1st November 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6660, "end_char": 6677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that the name of the appellant company had been removed by the Government of India from the list of approved manufacturers maintained by them and that, in the result, it had been unable to secure further import licenses for the import of completely knocked down assemblies of motor vehicles and that consequently on and from the 1st November 1953 the company had to lay off a number of its workmen, for it had to operate the various departments of its factory at greatly reduced strength."}}, {"text": "Rukmqji Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7055, "end_char": 7067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Products 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India/59\n\nThe Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd.\n\nY.¥' Rukmaji Bala -and others\n\nDas J.\n\n. ;", "canonical_name": "Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13449, "end_char": 13478, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13939, "end_char": 13949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Union of India asked for leave to intervene as important questions of construction of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "The Union of India asked for leave to intervene as important questions of construction of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14643, "end_char": 14652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14869, 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19177, "end_char": 19187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19303, "end_char": 19313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19771, "end_char": 19781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19892, "end_char": 19902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civii Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "TM Automobile", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20159, "end_char": 20172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the filing of such appeal, or\n\n'1955\n\nTM Automobile ['roducts of India Ltd.\n\n.Y Rukmaji Bala\n\naTUi others\n\nDs J.\n\n19,55\n\nThe Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd.\n\nv.\n\nRukmaji Baia\n\nand others Da; J.\n\n( b) discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such appeal, save with the express permission in writing of the Appellate Tribunal\"."}}, {"text": ".Y Rukmaji Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20198, "end_char": 20213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the filing of such appeal, or\n\n'1955\n\nTM Automobile ['roducts of India Ltd.\n\n.Y Rukmaji Bala\n\naTUi others\n\nDs J.\n\n19,55\n\nThe Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd.\n\nv.\n\nRukmaji Baia\n\nand others Da; J.\n\n( b) discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such appeal, save with the express permission in writing of the Appellate Tribunal\"."}}, {"text": "Rukmaji Baia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20286, "end_char": 20298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the filing of such appeal, or\n\n'1955\n\nTM Automobile ['roducts of India Ltd.\n\n.Y Rukmaji Bala\n\naTUi others\n\nDs J.\n\n19,55\n\nThe Automobile\n\nProducts of India Ltd.\n\nv.\n\nRukmaji Baia\n\nand others Da; J.\n\n( b) discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such appeal, save with the express permission in writing of the Appellate Tribunal\".", "canonical_name": "Rukrnaji Bala"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20491, "end_char": 20501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20671, "end_char": 20681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21154, "end_char": 21164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21238, "end_char": 21248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21555, "end_char": 21565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21698, "end_char": 21708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21985, "end_char": 21995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22128, "end_char": 22138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22164, "end_char": 22174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23146, "end_char": 23156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23219, "end_char": 23229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23590, "end_char": 23684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 33 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23747, "end_char": 23765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of of this Act", "statute": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of of this Act"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23930, "end_char": 23940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of of this Act", "statute": "Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of of this Act"}}, {"text": "sections 33 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", 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"end_char": 24864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24892, "end_char": 24902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25628, "end_char": 25638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25661, "end_char": 25671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26895, "end_char": 26905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27434, "end_char": 27444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27582, "end_char": 27592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28043, "end_char": 28053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28145, "end_char": 28155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28444, "end_char": 28461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "has beeri negatived by 'the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Serampore Belting Mazdoor Union v. 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Surat lforough Municipality( i )."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28633, "end_char": 28643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28827, "end_char": 28837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rukrnaji Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29111, "end_char": 29124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rukrnaji Bala and others\n\nDas J.\n\n.1955\n\nThtJ Automo'bile\n\n Products ef India Lid.", "canonical_name": "Rukrnaji Bala"}}, {"text": "ThtJ Automo'bile\n\n Products ef India Lid.\n\nRu!maji Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29152, "end_char": 29207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rukrnaji Bala and others\n\nDas J.\n\n.1955\n\nThtJ Automo'bile\n\n Products ef India Lid."}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29291, "end_char": 29301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": 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{"document_id": "1955_1_1259_1268_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "...,, ...\n\nS.C.R .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nti.\n\nKUMAR AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n(And connected Appeal)\n\n[S.\n\nDAs,\n\nBHAGWATI,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS,\n\nVENKATA-\n\nRAMA AYYJi.R and B. P. SINHA JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 5 and 7 and Proviso to Art. 7-Wife migrated from India to Pakistan after the ]st March, 1947-Her husband continued to be in India-Wife whether citizen of India- Art .. 7 ovem'ding Art. 5-Administration of Evacuee Property r; Jrdinance 1949 (XXVII of 1949)-Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Act XXXI of 1950)-Evacuee Property Ordinance (Bihar Ordinance No. III of 1949)-Evacuee Property-Definition of- W hether includes interest of an evacuee in property held as trustee or beneficiary and whether includes wakf property and interest therein.\n\nThe relevant portion of Art. 5 of the Constitutin reads :- \"At the commencement of this Constitution every person who\n\nha~ his domicile in the territory of India and who was born in the territory of fodia shall be a citizen of India\". ·\n\nArticle 7 of the Constitution lays down :- \"Notwithstanding anything in Art. 5, a person wh\\l has after the first day of March 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India\".\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the respondent Kumar Rani who had migrated from India to Pakistan in 1948 that she was, and continued to be, a citizen of India on the ground that she was born in India and her domicile continued to be that of her husband, who throughout continued to be in India and that her case was CO\\'.ered by Art. 5 of the Constitution.\n\nHeld (repelling the contention) that At. 7 of the Constitution clearly overrides Art. 5. As the respondent had migrated from India to .Pakistan after the 1st March, 194 7, her case fell under Art. 7 of the Constitution and that inasmuch as it was a case of an unauthorised issue of an invalid permit which had been properly cancelled the proviso to Art. 7 did not apply and that therefore the respondent could not be deemed to be a citizen of India.\n\nHeld also, that the definitions of the phrase \"evacuee property\" in the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 and the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 (XXXI of 1950) clearly include the interest of an evacuee in any property held as a trustee or beneficiary.\n\nThe definition of evacuee property in Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 (Bihar Ordinance No. III of 1949) is not\n\nFebtuary 10\n\n1955 different and the words used therein comprise also wakf property \"\" -f, The State of Bihar and any interest therein.' v.\n\nKumar Amar Singh and others\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 97 aod 98 of 1952.\n\nAppeals under Articles 132 ( 1) and 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment aod Decree dated .the 13th. October 1950 of the High Court' of Judicature at Patna in Miscellaneous Judicial Cases Nos. 140 and 107 of 1950.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attoriley-Generdl for India ( G. N.· Jorhi, Lal Narain Sinha .and P. G. Gokhale with him); for the appellant in C.A. Nos. 97 and 98 of 1952.\n\nB. Sen and I. N. 'Shroff, for the respondents Nos. 1 ~~ . . ·. ..\n\n1955. February 10.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJ AGANNADHADAS J .-These are two . connectecl appeals arising out of a common judgment of the High Court of Patna on two applications to it dated the 5th July, 1950 and 28th July, 1950, under article 226 of the Constitution. The State of Bihar. is the appellant in both the appeals. The first three respon-·\n\ndents in Appeal No. 97 are the sons of the fourth respondent therein, viz. Kumar Rani Sayeeda Khatoon (hereinafter referred to as Kumar Rani). The said Kumar Rani is also the first respondent in Appeal No. 98. The other. respondents in both the appeals are Government Officers under the appellant, the State of Bihar. The applications before the High . Court arose with reference to action taken against ( l) the property, and .(2}. the .person, of Kumar Rani by the Officers of the Government of Bihar, .under the following circumstances.\n\nKumar Rani was admittedly born in the territory of India and claims to be the lawfully wedded wife of\n\nCaptain Maharaj Kumar Gopal saran Narayan Singh of. Gaya by virtue of an alleged marriage between them in 1920 according to Arya Samaj rites and subsequently according. to Muslim rites. She owned and\n\n' .\n\n...\n\n~· .\n\n. -,,..{\n\npossessed considerable properties. In 1946 she created a wakf of her properties consisting of 427 villages for the maintenance and support of herself, her sons and their descendants, by executing a deed of W akf-ulal- Aulad dated the 4th May, 1946, by which she divested herself of all her interest in the said properties and vested them in Almighty God. She appointed, herself as the sole mutwalli for her life time or until relinquishment, and her three sons to succeed her as joint mutwallis. The deed also provided that the net income was to be spent for the maintenance of herself and her three sons with the direction that not more than half should be spent by the wakif a for her own use.\n\nIn July, 1948, Kumar Rani went to Karachi.\n\nIn December, 1948, she returned to India from Pakistan on a temporary permit and went back to Pakistan\n\nin April, 1949.\n\nOn the 21st June, 1949, the Bihar .\\dministration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949\n\n~Bihar Ordinance No. III of 1949) came into force.\n\nThe Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property issued a notification on the 2nd September, 1949, under section 5 of his Ordinance, declaring all the properties comprised in the abovementioned wakf estate to have vested in the Custodian as being evacuee property.\n\nHe took possession thereof between the 20th September and 2nd October, 1949. On the 14th May, 1950, Kumar Rani again came back to India under a permanent permit obtained from the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan. This permit was, however, cancelled on the 12th July, 1950, by the Deputy High Commissioner, on the ground that this was wrongly issued, without the concurrence of the Government, as required by the rules made under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949.\n\nIn view of this cancellation, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gaya, issued notice to Kumar Rani directing her that since her permanent permit had been cancelled, she should leave India by the 31st July, 1950. In view of these happenings two applications were filed before the High Court of Patna, one dated the 5th July, 1950, challenging the validity of the action taken by the Deputy Custodian declaring the wakJ estate as evacuee property and taking posses-\n\n6-90 S, C. India/59\n\nT/.e State of Bihm'\n\nKun; ar Amar Singh and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe State of Diliar\n\nKu, nar Antar Sing!i and others\n\nJ agannadliadas J.\n\n. . ·, . . sion thereof on the basis of that declaration, and another application dafed the 28th July, 1950, challenging the validity of the order of the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gay a, directing Kumar Rani to leave India. The first of-these applications was filed by Kumar Rani along with her three sons as petitioners and the second by Kumar Rani alone: Both these applications were allowed by the High Court and hence these appeals by the State on leave granted by the High Court.\n\nThese two connected appeals came up for hearing before this Court on the 26th and 27th October, 1953.\n\nThis Court after hearing counsel on both sides was of the opinion that one of the essential facts (to be mentioned in detail herein below when dealing with Appeal No. 97) requisite for a proper decision of Appeal No. 97 had been assumed without investigation and that it was necessary to hr:ve a finding thereupon after taking evidence.\n\nTliis Court accordingly remanded Appeal No. 97 to the High Court to submit a finding and directed that on the receipt of the finding both the appeals (Appeals Nos. 97 and 98) should be heard together.\n\nThe finding has now been received and the appeals have been reheard. It is necessary . at this stage to men ti on that. the ad voe ate who a ppeared for the respondents in both the appeals at the prior hearing appeared before us at this hearing and stated that he had been instructed to withdraw his appearance in these appeals and to allow the hearing to proceed ex parte.\n\nThe preliminary facts having been stated as above, it will now be convenient to deal with these two appeals separately.\n\nAppeal No. 98 which raises the fundamental question as to the continuing citizenship of Kumar Rani will be taken up first.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 98 of 1952. . This appeal arises out of the application to the High Court dated the 28th July, 1950, challenging the validity of the order dated the 23rd July, 1950, issued by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Ga ya.\n\nThis order is _challenged on the ground that Kumar Rani was, and throughout continued to be, a citizen of India and\n\n1~55 that the order dated the 23rd July, 1950, which, in substance, amounted to an order of her externment f I d fK R ., f d TheStateofBiTtar rom n ia, was in violation o umar ams un av. mental right under article 19 of the Constitution asa Kumar Amar citizen of India.· The question that arises is whether, Singhandothm in the circumstances, Kumar Rani was a citizen of - , .\n\nIndia at the date of the order.\n\nThe contention of JagannadhadasJ.\n\nKumar Rani is that though it is a fact that she did go to Pakistan in the year 1948, she went there only for a temporary purpose, viz. for securing the medical treatment of a reputed Hakim and that she was always and continued to be a citizen of India and that, therefore, the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan had no power to cancel the permit issued to her.\n\nAs regards her allegation that when she first went to Karachi in July, 1948, she did so temporarily for the purpose of medical treatment, the learned Judges of the High Court were not inclined to accept her story . . But, all the same, they held that she was and continued to be a citizen of India, n the ground that she was born in India and that her domicile continued to be that of her husband, Captain Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narayan Singh, who, it is not disputed, _throughout continued to be in India.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court apparently had article 5 of the Constitution in mind and acted on the view of the English law that the wife's domicile continues throughout to be that of her husband during the con- . tinuance of marriage. It appears to us, with respect, that the learned Judges of the High Court completely overlooked article 7 of the Constitution.\n\nThe relevant portion of article 5 of the Constitution says as follows: · \"At the commencement of this Constitution, every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and who was born in the territory of India shall be a citizen of India\".\n\nIn the view of the High Court since Kumar Rani was born in India and had the Indian domicile of her hus- Land, she was a citizen of India. But article 7 says:\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person\n\nTh'e state of Bihar\n\nKumar Amar Singh ana' others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n1264 SUPREME; CO.U:(lT REPORTS [1955] .\n\nwho has after the first day of March, 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India\".-\n\nThere is a proviso to this article which will be noticed presently. But before noticing the proviso and its effect, it is necessary to mention the following facts which may be taken to have been made out on the record. (1) Kumar Rani went to Karachi in July, 1948.\n\n(2) Her story that she went there temporarily for medical treatment has been doubted by the High Court _and appears to us to be unfounded. (3) When she came to India in December, 1948, she did so on a temporary permit stating in her application for the said permit that she was domiciled in Pakistan and accordingly representing herself to be a Pakistani national. ( 4) She went back to Pakistan in April, 1949, on the expiry of that temporary permit. (5) She made an attempt to obtain a permit for permanent return to India only after steps had been taken to vest the property in the Custodian and after the same was taken possession of. There can be no doubt on these facts that she must be held to have migrated from the territory of India after the 1st March, 1947. Even if therefore article 5 can be said to be applicable to her on the assumption that Captain Narayan Singh was her husband and that her domicile was that of her husband, the facts bring her case under article 7.\n\nArticle 7 clearly overrides article 5. It is peremptory in its scope and makes no exception for such a case, i.e., of the wife migrating to Pakistan leaving her husband in India. Even such a wife must be deemed not to be a citizen of India unless the particular facts bring her case within the proviso to article 7. This proviso is as follows :\n\n\"Provided that nothing in this article shall apply to a person who, after having so migrated to the territory now included in Pakistan, has returned to the territory of India under a permit for resettlement or permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law\".\n\nIt is contended with reference to this proviso that\n\n.. .\n\n-.,\n\n...\n\n.J. -\n\n. r\n\nsince she m fact returned under a permanent permit, she is entitled to the benefit thereof and that the subsequent cancellation of the said permit is both illegal and irrelevant. Rule 10 of the Permit System Rules, 1949, framed by the Central Government under section 4 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, provides that a permit for permanent resettlement in India may be granted by the High Commissioner or Deputy High Commissioner only after securing the agreement of the State or the Province where the applicant intends to settle. Rule 29 provides that every permit issued under the rules shall be liable to cancellation at any time, without any reason being assigned by the issuing authority. In the present case, ::he permit has been cancelled in a reasoned order on the ground that, on the facts of the case, the consent of the State Governmei1t concerned should have been obtained before the permit could be issued. This is a case, therefore. not of a valid permanent permit having been issued and the permit holder returning ro India on the strength thereof and .. the same. having been arbitrarily cancelled. It is a case of an unauthorised issue of an invalid permit which has been properly cancelled. Hence the proviso to article 7 can have no possible application. The applicant, is, therefore, not a citizen of India and the order passed by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gaya, dated the 23rd July, 1950, directing Kumar Rani to leave India was accordingly valid. This appeal must therefore succeed.\n\nCivil Appeal f!o. 97 of 1952.\n\nThis appeal arises out 'of the application to the High Court dated the 5th July, 1950, challenging the validity of the notification dated the 2nd September,\n\n1949, issued by the Deputy Custodian, under the Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, declaring the wakf estate as evacuee property and taking possesion thereof.\n\nThree main grounds on which this has been contested are as follows: (1) Kumar Rani was not an evacuee. (2) She had written a letter dated the 2nd June, 1949, addressed to her secorid son, 'Kurriar Fateh Singh, whereby she' relin--\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nKumar Amar Singh and others\n\nJagannadhadas j,\n\n•q'Jie-State ofBihar v. ·Kumar •Amar\n\n~Singh and .'.others\n\nJagannadhadas .J.\n\n\n, SUPREME '.COURT.1REP.ORTS [1955]\n\nquished the office of mutwidli in the .wakf estate, and therefore by virtue of the. said \"letter and. in pursuance of the terms .of the original deed of . wakf, her three sons, respondents : 1 to 3, had become the .joint mutwallis as well .as the owners of the beneficial interest in the wakf estate. It being undisputed that these three remained in India . throughout, it . is . contended that the property at the date of the no.tification was the property -of these three sons and not of Kumar Rani and that, therefore, the -Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, has no applica- . tion to the facts. (3) The Bihar Administration of :Evacuee Property Ordinance, .1949, .is not applicable to wakf property , and to, the beneficial interest of the applicants therein. So far as the first point is concerned an \"evacuee\" is defined as follows in the Bihar Administration of Evacuee .Property Ordinance, 1949 :\n\n\"A person who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of ciyil distmbances or the fear of such disturbances, .'.leaves or •has, On •or after •the 1st day of November, ·.J946, left, any ·Place in the 'Province of Bihar for any place outside the territories now forming part of India\".\n\nIt is clear that, as already found above, Kumar Rani . mi grated to Pakistan from .In.dia after the 1st March,\n\n1947. In view .of the £act that her plea .as to the reason for such migration has not been accepted, she can well be taken to have left India for Pakistan in the circumstances set out in this definition, and after the prescribed date. She has, therefore, been rightly taken to be an \"evacuee\" by the Custodian .. As regards the second point, the alleged relinquishment of the office of mutwalli by Kumar Rani and the vesting :of the interest in the wakf property in her three sons, respondents 1 to 3, as joint 0mutwallis thereof, by virtue of the terms of the deed of wakf, is based on a letter addressed -to. the second ; res- -pondent, her second son , Kumar Fateh Singh, •purporting to have been .. wri_tten by her and dated the 2nd June, 1949.\n\nThe gel).liineness of this letter has been challenged -and it is the issue as to itr.\n\n- f\n\n'-f'\n\n:S.C; R. -1267\n\n•genuineness that was remanded: to tthe -. High .Court for a finding by the ::previous otder of 'this Court. The\n\nHigh Court . having -:taken evidence on the matters at the hearing after remand and having considered the same, has clearly found that the letter was not genuine. We have gone through the finding arid the material relevant thereto, and can find no reason not to accept it. There is, therefore, no substance in this second contention. As regards the third point, the contention is based on the definition of the phrase \"evacuee property\" in the Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, which is as follows :\n\n\"Evacuee property means a:ny property in which an evacuee has any right or interest or which is held by him under any deed of trust or other instrument\". •It is contended that this definition does not apply either to the wakf property or to the beneficial interest of the mutwalli therein and that, therefore, the property in question did not vest in the Custodian. Now, •as already \"stated, the original notification vesting the wakf property in the Custodian was made under section 5 of the Bihar Admini-stration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949. This Ordinance was repealed by section 55(2) of Central Ordinance No. XXVII .of 1949.\n\nThe Central Ordinance defined \"evacuee property\" as\n\n\"any property in which an evacuee has any right or interest, whether personal or as a trustee or a:s beneficiary or in any other capacity\".\n\nThe Central Ordinance was in turn repealed by Central Act No. XXXI of 1950 and \"evacuee property\" has been defined therein .. as meaning\n\n\"any property of an evacuee whether held by him as owner or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or as a tenant or in any oi:her capacity\".\n\nThe word \"property\" is defined as meaning\n\n\"property of any kind and includes any right or interest in such property\". 'The Central Ordinance which repeale'd .. the Bihar Ordinance as well as the , central Act which repealed i:he Central Ordinance, each contain section 8(2) providing that\n\n•The State Of Bihar v.\n\nKumar Amar ···:Singh and other.<\n\nJagtmnadhadas J.\n\nThe State of Bihar .v.\n\nKumar Amar Singh and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nFe6ruary 22\n\n\"where immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance (Act) any evacuee property in a Province has vested in any person exercising the power of Custodian under any law repealed hereby, the evacuee property shall on the commencement of the Ordinance (Act) be deemed to have been vested in the Custodian appointed or deemed to have been appointed for the Province under the Ordinance (Act) and shall continue to so vest\". , ·, The definitions of the phrase \"evacuee property\" m the Central Ordinance and by the Central Act are clear and unambiguous so as to include the interest of an evacuee in any property held as a trustee or beneficiary. There is no reason to think that \"evacuee property\" as defined in the Bihar Ordinance was meant to be anything \"different. The words used in this definition are of sufficient amplitude and we are of the opinion that the Bihar 'definition comprised also wakj property and interest therein~ We are also of the opinion that the successive repeals of the Bihar Ordinance by the Central Ordinance and the Central Act and the continuance of the vesting in the Custodian, places the matter beyond any doubt.\n\nThis contention must, therefore, fail.\n\nThis appeal alw must accordingly succed.\n\nIn the result both the appeals are allowed. The appellant in the circumstances will get only the cost; incurred before the High Court on remand in Civil Appeal No. 97 of 1952.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nSHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB, AKKI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\nrvrvrAN BosE,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS and' B. P, SINHA JT.]\n\nBombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925 ·(Bombay Act XVlll of 1925), s. 19 as amended by Bombay Act LIV _of 1954-;-Lc_gal effect thereof-Validity of election-S. 35(3)(6)-Notice , of meeting-Provisions of s. 35(3)'-Whether directory or mimdatory-S. 35(6)-Presence or absence of public-Whether affects the validity of meeting.\n\n>--", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KUMAR AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUMAR AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 200, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 5 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227, "end_char": 240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256, "end_char": 262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 489, "end_char": 533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 812, "end_char": 818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Ordinance", "statute": "Evacuee Property Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1026, "end_char": 1035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Ordinance", "statute": "Evacuee Property Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Art. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1098, "end_char": 1104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Ordinance", "statute": "Evacuee Property Ordinance"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1190, "end_char": 1195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, a person wh\\l has after the first day of March 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India\"."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1229, "end_char": 1237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, a person wh\\l has after the first day of March 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1614, "end_char": 1620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1724, "end_char": 1730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1st March, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1797, "end_char": 1813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the respondent had migrated from India to .Pakistan after the 1st March, 194 7, her case fell under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1835, "end_char": 1841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1992, "end_char": 1998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2166, "end_char": 2215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2224, "end_char": 2267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "definition of evacuee property in Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2381, "end_char": 2446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kumar Amar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2629, "end_char": 2645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nKumar Amar Singh and others\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Articles 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The definition of evacuee property in Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949", "statute": "The definition of evacuee property in Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2786, "end_char": 2807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2968, "end_char": 2982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attoriley-Generdl for India ( G. N.· Jorhi, Lal Narain Sinha .and P. G. Gokhale with him); for the appellant in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "G. N.· Jorhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attoriley-Generdl for India ( G. N.· Jorhi, Lal Narain Sinha .and P. G. Gokhale with him); for the appellant in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3028, "end_char": 3044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attoriley-Generdl for India ( G. N.· Jorhi, Lal Narain Sinha .and P. G. Gokhale with him); for the appellant in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3050, "end_char": 3063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attoriley-Generdl for India ( G. N.· Jorhi, Lal Narain Sinha .and P. G. Gokhale with him); for the appellant in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3126, "end_char": 3132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and I. N. 'Shroff, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "I. N. 'Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3137, "end_char": 3150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and I. N. 'Shroff, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "J AGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3257, "end_char": 3271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJ AGANNADHADAS J .-These are two .", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3351, "end_char": 3370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "connectecl appeals arising out of a common judgment of the High Court of Patna on two applications to it dated the 5th July, 1950 and 28th July, 1950, under article 226 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3486, "end_char": 3500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar.", "canonical_name": "State of Diliar"}}, {"text": "Kumar Rani Sayeeda Khatoon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3641, "end_char": 3667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Rani Sayeeda Khatoon (hereinafter referred to as Kumar Rani)."}}, {"text": "Kumar Rani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the .person, of Kumar Rani by the Officers of the Government of Bihar, .under the following circumstances.", "canonical_name": "Kumar Rani"}}, {"text": "Kumar Rani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4107, "end_char": 4117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Rani was admittedly born in the territory of India and claims to be the lawfully wedded wife of\n\nCaptain Maharaj Kumar Gopal saran Narayan Singh of.", "canonical_name": "Kumar Rani"}}, {"text": "Maharaj Kumar Gopal saran Narayan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4218, "end_char": 4257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Rani was admittedly born in the territory of India and claims to be the lawfully wedded wife of\n\nCaptain Maharaj Kumar Gopal saran Narayan Singh of."}}, {"text": "4th May, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4671, "end_char": 4684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1946 she created a wakf of her properties consisting of 427 villages for the maintenance and support of herself, her sons and their descendants, by executing a deed of W akf-ulal- Aulad dated the 4th May, 1946, by which she divested herself of all her interest in the said properties and vested them in Almighty God."}}, {"text": "Karachi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5168, "end_char": 5175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In July, 1948, Kumar Rani went to Karachi."}}, {"text": "21st June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5306, "end_char": 5321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st June, 1949, the Bihar .\\dministration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949\n\n~Bihar Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5352, "end_char": 5384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5508, "end_char": 5527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property issued a notification on the 2nd September, 1949, under section 5 of his Ordinance, declaring all the properties comprised in the abovementioned wakf estate to have vested in the Custodian as being evacuee property."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "statute": "Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949"}}, {"text": "20th September and 2nd October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5735, "end_char": 5771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He took possession thereof between the 20th September and 2nd October, 1949."}}, {"text": "14th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5780, "end_char": 5794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 14th May, 1950, Kumar Rani again came back to India under a permanent permit obtained from the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "12th July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This permit was, however, cancelled on the 12th July, 1950, by the Deputy High Commissioner, on the ground that this was wrongly issued, without the concurrence of the Government, as required by the rules made under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949."}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6238, "end_char": 6242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this cancellation, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gaya, issued notice to Kumar Rani directing her that since her permanent permit had been cancelled, she should leave India by the 31st July, 1950."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6368, "end_char": 6383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this cancellation, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gaya, issued notice to Kumar Rani directing her that since her permanent permit had been cancelled, she should leave India by the 31st July, 1950."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6711, "end_char": 6724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these happenings two applications were filed before the High Court of Patna, one dated the 5th July, 1950, challenging the validity of the action taken by the Deputy Custodian declaring the wakJ estate as evacuee property and taking posses-\n\n6-90 S, C. India/59\n\nT/.e State of Bihm'\n\nKun; ar Amar Singh and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe State of Diliar\n\nKu, nar Antar Sing!i and others\n\nJ agannadliadas J.\n\n. . ·, . .", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "State of Diliar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6733, "end_char": 6748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these happenings two applications were filed before the High Court of Patna, one dated the 5th July, 1950, challenging the validity of the action taken by the Deputy Custodian declaring the wakJ estate as evacuee property and taking posses-\n\n6-90 S, C. India/59\n\nT/.e State of Bihm'\n\nKun; ar Amar Singh and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe State of Diliar\n\nKu, nar Antar Sing!i and others\n\nJ agannadliadas J.\n\n. . ·, . .", "canonical_name": "State of Diliar"}}, {"text": "26th and 27th October, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7361, "end_char": 7388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two connected appeals came up for hearing before this Court on the 26th and 27th October, 1953."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9104, "end_char": 9114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "JagannadhadasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9327, "end_char": 9342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of JagannadhadasJ.\n\nKumar Rani is that though it is a fact that she did go to Pakistan in the year 1948, she went there only for a temporary purpose, viz.", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "Captain Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narayan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10109, "end_char": 10156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, all the same, they held that she was and continued to be a citizen of India, n the ground that she was born in India and that her domicile continued to be that of her husband, Captain Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narayan Singh, who, it is not disputed, _throughout continued to be in India."}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10274, "end_char": 10283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10561, "end_char": 10570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10617, "end_char": 10626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10986, "end_char": 10995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11032, "end_char": 11041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "state of Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11058, "end_char": 11072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But article 7 says:\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person\n\nTh'e state of Bihar\n\nKumar Amar Singh ana' others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n1264 SUPREME; CO.U:(lT REPORTS [1955] ."}}, {"text": "Kumar Amar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11074, "end_char": 11090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But article 7 says:\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person\n\nTh'e state of Bihar\n\nKumar Amar Singh ana' others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n1264 SUPREME; CO.U:(lT REPORTS [1955] .", "canonical_name": "KUMAR AMAR SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "1st March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12354, "end_char": 12369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt on these facts that she must be held to have migrated from the territory of India after the 1st March, 1947."}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12389, "end_char": 12398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Captain Narayan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12458, "end_char": 12479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if therefore article 5 can be said to be applicable to her on the assumption that Captain Narayan Singh was her husband and that her domicile was that of her husband, the facts bring her case under article 7."}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12574, "end_char": 12583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12586, "end_char": 12595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12614, "end_char": 12623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12891, "end_char": 12900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Permit System Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13481, "end_char": 13506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13522, "end_char": 13540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 10 of the Permit System Rules, 1949, framed by the Central Government under section 4 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, provides that a permit for permanent resettlement in India may be granted by the High Commissioner or Deputy High Commissioner only after securing the agreement of the State or the Province where the applicant intends to settle."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13547, "end_char": 13556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Permit System Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Permit System Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14534, "end_char": 14543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15050, "end_char": 15106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15327, "end_char": 15341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) She had written a letter dated the 2nd June, 1949, addressed to her secorid son, 'Kurriar Fateh Singh, whereby she' relin--\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nKumar Amar Singh and others\n\nJagannadhadas j,\n\n•q'Jie-State ofBihar v. ·Kumar •Amar\n\n~Singh and .'.others\n\nJagannadhadas .J.\n\n, SUPREME '.COURT.1REP.ORTS [1955]\n\nquished the office of mutwidli in the .wakf estate, and therefore by virtue of the."}}, {"text": "Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16130, "end_char": 16186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16258, "end_char": 16284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16504, "end_char": 16528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st March,\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16960, "end_char": 16976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mi grated to Pakistan from .In.dia after the 1st March,\n\n1947."}}, {"text": "Kumar Fateh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17628, "end_char": 17645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the second ; res- -pondent, her second son , Kumar Fateh Singh, •purporting to have been .. wri_tten by her and dated the 2nd June, 1949."}}, {"text": "Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18394, "end_char": 18450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18951, "end_char": 18960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "statute": "the Bihar Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949"}}, {"text": "Bihar Admini-stration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18968, "end_char": 19025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 55(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19058, "end_char": 19071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Admini-stration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "statute": "the Bihar Admini-stration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949"}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19845, "end_char": 19857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Admini-stration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "statute": "the Bihar Admini-stration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949"}}, {"text": "Jagtmnadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19932, "end_char": 19945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<\n\nJagtmnadhadas J.\n\nThe State of Bihar .v."}}, {"text": "SHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21461, "end_char": 21485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB, AKKI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH\n\nAND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21502, "end_char": 21533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB, AKKI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH\n\nAND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "rvrvrAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21548, "end_char": 21560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rvrvrAN BosE,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS and' B. P, SINHA JT.]"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21563, "end_char": 21576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rvrvrAN BosE,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS and' B. P, SINHA JT.]", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "B. P, SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21582, "end_char": 21593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rvrvrAN BosE,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS and' B. P, SINHA JT.]", "canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA JJ"}}, {"text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21600, "end_char": 21634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21664, "end_char": 21669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "S. 35(3)(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21753, "end_char": 21764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21799, "end_char": 21807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "S. 35(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21840, "end_char": 21848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1268_1284_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "The State of Bihar .v.\n\nKumar Amar Singh and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nFe6ruary 22\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\n\"where immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance (Act) any evacuee property in a Province has vested in any person exercising the power of Custodian under any law repealed hereby, the evacuee property shall on the commencement of the Ordinance (Act) be deemed to have been vested in the Custodian appointed or deemed to have been appointed for the Province under the Ordinance (Act) and shall continue to so vest\". , ·, The definitions of the phrase \"evacuee property\" m the Central Ordinance and by the Central Act are clear and unambiguous so as to include the interest of an evacuee in any property held as a trustee or beneficiary. There is no reason to think that \"evacuee property\" as defined in the Bihar Ordinance was meant to be anything \"different. The words used in this definition are of sufficient amplitude and we are of the opinion that the Bihar 'definition comprised also wakj property and interest therein~ We are also of the opinion that the successive repeals of the Bihar Ordinance by the Central Ordinance and the Central Act and the continuance of the vesting in the Custodian, places the matter beyond any doubt.\n\nThis contention must, therefore, fail.\n\nThis appeal alw must accordingly succed.\n\nIn the result both the appeals are allowed. The appellant in the circumstances will get only the cost; incurred before the High Court on remand in Civil Appeal No. 97 of 1952.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nSHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB, AKKI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\nrvrvrAN BosE,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS and' B. P, SINHA JT.]\n\nBombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925 ·(Bombay Act XVlll of 1925), s. 19 as amended by Bombay Act LIV _of 1954-;-Lc_gal effect thereof-Validity of election-S. 35(3)(6)-Notice , of meeting-Provisions of s. 35(3)'-Whether directory or mimdatory-S. 35(6)-Presence or absence of public-Whether affects the validity of meeting.\n\n>--\n\n- f\n\n1 ..... ).,\n\nI 1\n\nThe first respondent-Municipality-governed by the Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 (Bombay Act XVIII of 1925) consists of 32 councillors, S, (the appellant) being one of them.\n\nThe last general -election to the Municipality took place on the 7th May 1951.\n\nThe term of the councillors was three years computed from the first\n\nmeeting held on 10th July 1951 after the general election. In that 'meeting the 4th and 5th respondents were elected President and\n\n- Vice-President respectively for a term of three years. Act XVIII of 1925 was amended by Bombay Act XXXV of 1954 under which the term of office of the councillors was extended from 3 to 4 years end- -'ing on 9th July 1955.\n\nAs the term of respondents 4 and 5 was to expire at the end of three years from the 10th July 1951 and as the term of the Municipality was extended by one year under the Amending Act XXXV of 1954 a fresh election of President and Vice- -President was necessary to fill up the vacancies thus occurring. The Collector called a special general meeting for the 30th July 1954 to elect a President and Vice-President for the remaining period of the quadrennium and nominated the Prant Official (the District Deputy Collector) to preside over that meeting. On the 30th July 1954 the Prant Officer adjourned the meeting to the 3rd August 1954 under instructions from the Collector without transacting any business. \"The objection raised by respondent No. 3 against the adjournment was overruled by the presiding Officer. The special general meeting was held on the 3rd August 1954.\n\nAn objection raised by S (the :appellant) that under the provisions of the Act a President could not\n\n-be elected for a term less than a year was overruled by the presiding Officer. On this 13 councillors (including S) out of the 32 who were present walked out on the ground that the President was to be •elected fora term less than a year contrary to the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe remaining 19 councillors elected the 2nd respondent as the President for the remaining period of the quadrennium. Immedi- ·.ately after that another meting presided over by the newly elected President elected respondent No. 3 as Vice-President.\n\nThe same point of order raised by S as in the case of the President was overruled, on which 6 councillors walked out and the meeting was held \"by the remaining councillors.\n\nAll the 32 councillors were present both on the 30th July 1954 and the 3rd August 1954. Ao application under Art. 226 of the Constitution presented by S questioning rhe validity of the meeting of the 3rd August, 1954, and consequently the validity of the election _of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 as President and Vice-President for the remaining period of the quadrennium was dismissed by the High Court.\n\n'Held, (1) that the meeting' of the 3rd Artgust 1954, in substance though not in form, complied with the requirements of the law for 'holding a valid special meeting and therefore the meeting was not invalid because the record of proceedings would show that whatever \"had been done on the 30th July 1954 and the_ 3rd August 1954 had been done under the orders of the Collector. The notice to the coun- <:illors required under s. 35(3) of the Act satisfied the requirements •of three cleat days, that the provisions: of s. 35(3) regarding the ser-\n\nShyab11ddinsab Mohid; nsab-Akki\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others\n\nc•1955\n\n'Shyab1Uidinsab 'Mohidinsab ~Akki\n\n\"'T-he' Gadat-Be_tgen\n\nMunicipal Borough\n\naM otliers\n\n., 1270\n\nSUPREME' COURT''REPORTS [1955)\n\n... vice Of n6tice· are .. fOirecto:ry:·aridi-not'1rn-a.rld!i.toty; i::andnthavH1ny omis~ > r\n\nsions in the manner'bf service-of thenOtice are 'mere irregularities \"\".rhich would not vitiate \"the proceedings unless it is :shown that those ; irregularities had prejudicially affected the proceedings which had not been alleged or proved in the present case. All the councillors constituting the Municipality were present on both the occasions namely the 30th July 1954 arid the •3rd 'August 1954 and thus had ample notice of the meeting to be held on the 3rd August 1954, the 'time arid plate 6£ the meeting and the busint:ss to be transacted, \"'?- That under the provisions of s. 35(3) of the Act the presence at or -... the absence from the meeting of the members of the' public has no 'legal consequence so far as the validity of the election is concerned;\n\n(2) that as s. 19 of the Bombay-Borough,.Act, (Bombay Act XVIII of 1925) had been amended by the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, •1954 (Bombay Act• LIV of 1954) .and was retrospective in its operation, .it had 1 the •effect .of curing any illegality or\n\nirregt.ilarity-in the election with reference to .. the provisions of s. 19 of the Act and therefore respondents Nos .. 2 and 3. had been validly elected as President •and Vice-President, respectively.\n\nKing v .. The .General Commission-ers of\" Income-tax rfor ·souihampton, Ex pane W. ; M. Singer ([1916] 2 K.B.'249)and Mukerjee, .Qfficial .\"Receiver v. Ramratan Kuer ([1935] L. R. 63 I. A.· 47),\n\nreferred tO.\n\n CrvrL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal 'No. : 215 of 1954.\n\nAppeal hy 'Special Leave' from the Judgment arid Order 'dated . the 23rd day of 'August 1954 of the High Court of Judicature .at Bomb; iy in Special Civil. Appli- . cation No. 1665 of 1954 under Aricle . .226 of the Con- . stitution of India.\n\nR . . :B. 'Kotwi:tl, I '.B. Dadachanji _and , Rajinder Narain, forthe appellant.\n\nNaunit:Lal,. for respondents Nos. 1 to 3. .).. i\n\n1955.\n\nEebruary 22. .The Juc.lgment .of .the .Court was delivered by\n\n.SINHA • J.-This is an.appeal-by. special.leave against\n\nt the judgment and •order <'dated 'the 23rd August 1954 of the \"High 'Court of I Judicature at 'Bombay, dismissing . the appellant's .petition for a writ of quo warrantr> or any other appropriate writ \"directed , against the , election of tihe •2rid .and 3rd •respondents as .President ~\"- ., and Mice, Presi'dent respectively of ·.the • Gadag-Berger?\n\n:S.C.R.\n\n., SUPREME. COURT, REPORTS 1271\n\n-\", .-MuniJ:ipal (8or-ough, .. the 1st , respondent tin this, , appeal.\n\nThe .facts of this case are not in .dispute ,, and may ,, shortly be stated .as follows : The 1st respondent is a municipality .governed by the provisions of the Munici- •rpal Boroqghs -Act (Bombay Act XVIII of 1925) which , hert; inafter . shall be referred .to as the Act for the, sake\n\n'1 • of brevity. The appellant is one of the 32 councillors constituting the municipality.\n\nThe last general election to the municipality took place on the 7th May 1951. The term , of the _councillors 1 was three years computed from the date of the first general meeting held after the general election aforesaid-in this case the 10th July 1951. In that meeting the 4th and 5th respondents were elected President and Vice-Presi-\n\n. .i... . dent respectively of the municipality for a term of\n\n, three years. The Act was amended by Bombay Act\n\nXXXV of 1954, under which the term of office. of the councillors was extended . from 3 to 4 years ending on the 9th July 1955. As the term of respondents 4 and 5 aforesaid . was to expire at the end of three years from the 10th July 1951 and as the term of the municipality was extended by one year under the amending t-, Act aforesaid, the vacancies thus occurring had to be filled up by , a . fresh election of President and Vice-President. The. Collector therefore called a special general meeting of the municipality to be. held on the 30th July 1954 to elect a President and Vice-President for the remaining period of the quadrennium. The Collector had nominated the Prant Officer (the District Deputy Collector) to preside over that special general meeting. On . the 30th July 1954 the Prant Officer\n\n-~- under instructions from the Collector adjourned the meeting to the 3rd August 1954 without transacting any business, the only item on the agenda being .the election of the President and Vice-President. , The 3rd respondent raised a point of_ order against the adjournment but the presiding _officer aforesaid overruled that objection. _Hence the special general .meeting . was held on the 3rd August 1954. At that meeting the appellant raised a point of order that _under the , provi- _ _, sions of the _Act a -president could not be elected for\n\nS Shyabuddinsab . . Mohidinrab Akki v The Gadag-Betgeri Munricipal Borougho , and otherr\n\nSinha].\n\nSll)'abuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki v.\n\nTht Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others\n\nSinha J\n\na term less than a year and that therefore the pre>· posed election would be in the teeth of those provisions. The presiding officer who was the same person who had adjourned the meeting on the 30th July 1954 overruled that objection too. Thereupon 13 out of the 32 councillors who were present walked out on\n\n, ... -,...\n\nthe ground that they did not propose to participate '\n\nin a\" meeting in which the proposal was to elect a .., President for less than a year contrary to the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe appellant was one of those 13 councillors who walked out. It may be added that the full strength of the municipality is 32 councillors all of whom were present 'both on the 30th July 1954 and the 3rd August 1954.\n\nThe remaining 19 councillors proceeded to transact business and elected the .-'- 2nd respondent as the President, the proposal being that he \"should be President of the municipality for the remaining period of the quadrennium\" and that was the proposal which was carried.\n\nImmediately after the election of the President another meeting was held for the election of the Vice-President under the presidency of the newly elected President (the 2nd respondent). The appellant raised the same point '-•\n\nof order as he had done in the case of the election of the President and that was also overruled.\n\nThereupon six of. the councillors present including the appellant walked out and the remaining councillors elected the 3rd respondent as the Vice-President:\n\nThe appellant moved. the High cOur.t o~ Bombay under art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ .of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ or order or _>.- directioi: against , the 2nd af\\d 3r.d respondents. \"restrain.ing them from usur.ping the office of , the President . il\"d .Vice' President . respectivelY. .· of the opponent No. 1 Muni, cipality and restraining them from performing any d.uties and from . exercising any powers 1s\n\nPrsident and V, ice-President, respectively\". The High Court held that the election of the 2nd and 3rd respoI\\dents. as '1\\ot illegal . and disII).issed tfi.e . application.\n\nIt held that on a proper cons.tfl!ction of the relevant provisions of the Act it was not correct to say that the term of office of the councillors or of the newly J ...\n\n\" \"elected President and Vice-President shall end with the 9th July 1955; that the intention was to elect the President and the Vice-President for the remaining term of the municipality which was not only a period\n\nof four years certain but an additional period up to the date when new President and Vice-President\n\n~ would be elected and take over after a fresh general ...- election; that the adjournment of the meeting of the 30th July was not beyond the powers of the presiding officer; and that consequently the meeting of the 3rd August was not vitiated by any illegality. It was also pointed out by the High Court that all the councillors constituting the municipality had nofr:;:: of the adjourned meeting and did as a matter of fact attend _... that meeting and that even if there was any irregularity in the adjournment on the 30th July 1954 that did not affect the illegality of the adjourned meeting and the business transacted therein.\n\nThe appellant moved the High Court for leave to appeal to this court but that application . was rejected. The appellant then applied to this court for special leave to appeal which was granted on the 3rd t' September_ 1954.\n\nIt has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the meeting held on 3rd August 1954 as aforesaid was invalid for the reasons :\n\n1. that it was not an adjourned meeting inas- • much as the meeting of the 30th July 1954 had not been validly adjourned,\n\n2. that it had not been called by the Collector, and\n\n--<-\n\n3. that the written notice required by section 35(3) had not been given and in any event, had not been served and published as required by law.\n\nSecondly it was urged that the meeting of the 3rd August being thus invalid, the business transacted at that meeting, namely, the election of the President\n\nwas equally invalid. Thirdly it was urged that the election of the President being invalid, the meeting held that very day under the presidency of the Presi-\n\n-~~ dent thus elected was also invalid and the election of the Vice-President consequently was illegal. It was\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki v.\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others\n\nSinha J.\n\n19·55)\\\n\nShjabulfdinSab_ Mohidinsabr Akki b.\n\nv •.\n\nThe; Gadag-Beigm \\ Municipal Borough.A.\n\namt.others~\n\nSiriha~.J.:\n\nfurther argued' that the .election •1 of the President and\n\nthe V:ice~President being.: in . violation of section 19 of the· Act:. was invalid. on that ground also; and finally, that the amendment of section 19 by the amending .\n\nAct LIV of. 1954 ' after leave to appeal had been granted by· this court could.· not affect;. the present proceedings which were then pending even though the amending.•Act purported to .make. it:retrospective~.\n\nOn behalf of respondents l,\" 2 and '.3 who only have appeared. in this' court, it has been urged that a President and Vice-President could be elected for a term of less than one year as section 19 of . the Act was . subject to section 23 ( 1) (A) ; that in any view of the matter, , section 19 as amended by the amending Act LIV of . 1954 rendered the election beyond question as the Act in terms was meant to validate .all' elections held between the passing of. the amending Act XXXV of 1954 and the amending Act LIV of 1954; that the presiding officer had inherent, if not statutory power to adjourn the meeting of the 30th July 1954 and that ' in any event: the meeting held on the 3rd August 1954 could be treated as a fresh meeting . called by the Collector and that any irregularity in serving the notice or in the appointment of the presiding officer was cured by the provisions of section 57' of the Act.\n\nIt was also argued that the appellant was not the councillor who had' objected to the adjournment of the meeting of the 30th July and-' could· not' therefore object to it at a later stage. Finally: it· was argued that' the appellant had\" no right to a•· writ or order prayed for as he had not been injured in any sense.\n\nIt • would thusappear that there are two main' questions in controversy .. between the, parties, namely,\n\n(1) whether themeeting-of the 3rd August, 1954 had been validly held; and\n\n(2) whether the president and, the vice-president having been elected. \"for; the remaining period of. the quadrennium\" had; been validly elected,\n\nThere are a number of subsidiary questions bearing upon thesetwo' main questions which h:\\ve been canvassed before\"'us:·\n\nS.G.Ri.\n\nSUPREME~COUR'f REPOlliTS• 1275\n\nA good deal!ofrargument was addressed to us contending that the presiding. officer had no power to .. ad-· journ the meeting• of the 30th July, 1954 in view of the provisions of section .35 ( 11) of the Act. In this connection reference was\" also made. to .• the proviso,. to ..\n\nsection\n\n19-A(2).\n\nThose provisions, it was, argµed,'., point to the conclusion that the powers of the presiding officer . are• the same as . those of the president of a. municipality when presiding, over an ordinary meeting of the municipality except that section,. 35(11) relat-: ing to adjournments had been qualified only to this extent by the proviso aforesaid, that the Collector or '. the officer presiding over the meeting for the purpose . of holding an. election of the president or r vice-preside.rJ.t: may refuse to 1 adjourn such a , meeting, in. spite of the wishes of the majority. of the members present tothe contrary. It was also argued that the High court had wrongly taken the view that the. presiding. officer had the inherent right to adjourn the meeting.\n\nReference was made to certain passages in \"The Law of Meetings\" by Head, \"The Law . on the Practice of Meetings\" by Shackleton, and \"Company. Meetings'1 by Talbot. In our opinion, it is unnecessary. for the\n\npurpose of. this case to pronounce upon the merits of that controversy in the view we• take of the meeting of the 3rd August, 1954, assuming that the meeting of1\n\nthe 30th July, 1954 had been adjourned without authority.\n\nIt is common ground that it was the Collector who called the meeting of the 30th July 1954 and that it• was under instructions from the Collector that that meetjng was adjourned. Under the provisions of section 23 ( 1 )(A), on the expiry of the term of office . of the president. or vice-president as determined by the municipality under section 19(1) of. the Act, a new presidentor vice-president shall be elected within 25 days from the date of such expiry. The provisions of section 19-A which relate to the procedure for, calling a meeting of a, newly constituted municipality for the election of a president and. vice-president have·\n\nbeen made applicable to the calling. of a meeting and the procedure to be followed at such' meeting. for the ·\n\n1955,,.\n\nShyabuddinsnb ,, Mohidinsab-Akki •\n\nTh£ Gadag-Betgeri-.\n\nMunifipal Bnrough •\n\nand. othtrs .\n\nSinha,].\n\nShjabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki v.\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others\n\nSinha J. ·\n\nelection of a president. Section\n\n19-A requires the Collector to call a meeting for holding such an election. Such a meeting shall be presided over by the Collector or such officer as the Collector may by order in writing appoint in this behalf. The Collector or his nominee, when presiding over such a meeting, shall have the same powers as the president of a municipality when presiding over a meeting of the municipality has, but shall not have the right to vote.\n\nOn the 30th July, 1954 a special general meeting had been called by the Collector for the election of the President; In the proceedings of that meeting it has been recorded that \"Under instructions from the Collector of Dharwar the presiding authority adjourns the meeting to i 3rd August 1954 at 3 P.M.\". At that meeting all the 32 councillors were present and admittedly in their presence the presiding officer declared openly that the meeting will be held on the 3rd August 1954 under instructions from the Collector concerne<l. When the meeting was held on the 3rd August 1954 at 3 P.M. as previously notified, again the 32 councillors were present. The proceedings show that the same Prant Officer \"occupied the chair as authorised by the Collector\".\n\nThe presiding authority read out and explained to the members present the following telegraphic message from the Collector :\n\n\"Government have directed to hold election of President of Gadag Municipality on 3rd August as already arranged.\n\nHold election accordingly today without fail\".\n\nAt this meeting the appellant raised two points of order, (1) that the election of the president for . the remaining period of the quadrennium as mentioned in the agenda was illegal, and (2) that the meeting was not an adjourned meeting of the municipalitv and was also illegal because it was under the instructions of the Collector that the adjourned meeting was being held and that the Collector had no such power.\n\nThe minutes of the proceedings further show that \"the presiding authority ruled out the points of order on the ground' that this was a special meeting called by the Collector for the election of the President and\n\n..• .\n\n} ...\n\n• . •\n\n_ ...\n\n...\n\n the election has to be held as already fixed\". After the ruling given by the presiding authority, 13 mem-· bers including the appellant expressed a desire to walk out and walked out with the permission of the presiding authority. The remammg members, as already. indicated, continued the business of the meeting and the proposal that the 2nd respondent should be elected president of the municipality for the remaining period of the quadrennium after having been duly made and seconded was carried unanimously and the meeting terminated.\n\nIt would thus appear that the meeting of the 3rd August 1954 for the election of the president had been called by the Collector who had authorized the Prant Officer to preside over that meeting and that the 2nd respondent was duly elected president. Under section 35(3) of the Act, for such a special general meeting three clear days' notice has to be gwen \"specifying the time and place at which such meeting is to be held and the business to be transacted thereat shall be served upon the councillors, and posted up at the municipal office or the kacheri or some other public building in the municipal borough and also published m a local vernacular newspaper having a large circulation if such exists\".\n\nIt has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the notice required by section 35(3) contemplates a written notice to be served and published in the manner specified, and that the meeting of the 3rd August 1954 could not be said to have been held after complying with the terms of sub-section\n\n(3) of section 35, It 1 was also contended that the requirements of section 19-A(l) and (2) have also not been complied with because there is no evidence that the Collector had called that meeting or that he had made an order in writing that the presiding authority had been authorized to preside over that meeting. In our opinion, there is no substance in any one of these contentions. From the record of the proceedings of the proposed meeting of the 30th July 1954 and the actual meeting on the 3rd August 1954 it is clear that whatever had been done had been done under the orders of\n\n• 7-90 S.C. In1ia/59\n\nShyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki.\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri\n\nMunicipal Borough\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955\n\nShyabuddi'ISab Mbhidinsab Akki\n\nTM- Gadag-BUgen Municipal BorougN\n\nand others\n\nSinlia ].\n\nthe Collector. He: had called the meeting of the 30th July as also of the 3rd August 1954. It was he who had appointed the Prant Officer as the presiding officer for both those meetings. It is true that the notice of the meeting of the 3rd August 1954 had not been given in writing but had only beerr intimated to all the councillors who were present at the meeting of the 30th July\n\n1954. The notice amply satisfies the requirement of three days' clear notice, though it was not in writing. It had indicated the time of the meeting and the business to be transacted. Under section 35(4) the ordinary venue of a meeting is the municipal office unless otherwise indicated in the notice. It is also true that ; the notice was not served in the manner indicated in sub-section. (3) of section 35 of the Act There is no evidence that there existed a local vernacular newspaper with large circulation, in which the notice of the meeting could be published. The question is, do those omissions render the notice ineffective in law. That could only be so if those provisions were held to be mandatory. The following provisions (omitting the words not material to this case) would show that those provisions of section 35(3) are directory and not mandatory. and that any omissions in the manner of service of the notice are mere irregu-· larities which would not vitiate the proceedings unless it was shown that those irregularities had prejudicially affected the proceedings :-\n\n\"No resolution of a municipality .......... shall be <kerned im, alid on account of any irregularity in the service of notice upon any councillor or member provided that the proceedings of the municipality ..... . . . . . . . . . were , not prejudicially affected by such irregularity''.\n\nFortunately for the respondents, all the councillors constituting the municipality were present on both the occasions, namely, 30th July and 3rd August, 1954.\n\nHence they had ample notice of the meeting to be held on the 3rd August, 1954, the time and place of the meeting and the business to be transacted.\n\nIt has not been either alleged or proved that the irregularities in the service of the notice or the omissions com-\n\n\"\"\"\\ • plained' of had prejudicially affected the proceedings.\n\nBut it was contended that as the notice had. not been posted up at the municipal office or the_ local kacheri or some other public building and had also not been published in a local vernacular newspaper, if there were one, though all the councillors were present on 3rd August, 1954, the members of the public had no • 1 such notice and naturally therefore could not be pre- ,. sent at that meeting.\n\nIn this connection it was pointed out that sub-section ( 6) of section 35 provides that every such meeting shall be open t~ the public, unless the presiding authority directs to. the contrary.\n\nIt is evident from the provisions of that sub-section that though the presence of the public at such meet~ ings may be desirable, it is not obligatory. The presence at or the absence from such a meeting of the members of the public has no legal consequence so far as the validity of the election is concerned. It must therefore be held that the meeting of the 3rd August, 1954 in substance, though not in form, complied with the requirements of the law for holding a valid special general meeting and that therefore that meeting was not invalid, assuming, as already said, that the order r\" of the presiding authority adjourning the meeting of the 30th July, 1954 was not authorized. It has to be remembered in this connection that such a special general meeting can be presided over only by the Collector or the person author.ized by him and if either the Collector or his nominee does not hold the meeting, it is not competent for councillors present to elect their own chairman for presiding over such a meeting.\n\nTherefore if the presiding authority admittedly under instructions from the Collector refused to proceed with the elections on the 30th July 1954, the councillors present could not hold a meeting of their own with a president of their own choice and transact the only business on the agenda, namely, the election of president. Hence, rightly or wrongly, if the meeting called for the 30th July was not held, another meeting had to be held for the purpose within 25 days of the occurrence of the vacancy.\n\nIn this case, as a\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akkf\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri.\n\nMunicipal Borough\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nShyabuddinsab, Mohidinsab Akkf - v, The Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough ·\n\nand othe'rs\n\nSinha J.\n\nSUPREME.COURT REPORTS [1955],\n\nresult of the 1 expiry of the original term of office f the president and vice-president, another meeting giving the 'required three days statutory notice had to be held.\n\nThe meeting held on the 3rd August. 1954 was such a meeting. Indeed, there were some. omissions in the manner of publication or service of the notice but those in law were mere irregularities which do not have the effect of vitiating the election held at that meeting.\n\nThe election of the president therefore, if not otherwise invalid, could not be assailed on the ground of the irregularity in the service or publication of the notice, in the special circumstances of this case.\n\nIf all the councillors had not been present on the 30th July or had not been informed of the proposed meeting of the 3rd August 1954, other considerations may have arisen but in this case it is clear that there was absolutely no prejudice to any, party or individual or the municipality as a whole.\n\nBut it was further contended that the walking out of the .13 councillors rendered the meeting infructuous. In our oprmon, such a result does not follow from the voluntary act of the 13 councillors who chose to walk out. It was not even suggested that there was no quorum for the special. general meeting after the 13 councillors walked out.\n\nThe next question is whether the provisions of section 19(1) as they stood on the 3rd August 1954 render the election of the president and the vice-president on the 3rd August 1954 invalid as it was \"for the remaining period of the quadrennium\".\n\nThe High Court has taken the view .that the remaining period of the quadrennium would not necessarily end on the 9th July 1955, in view of the proviso to section 19( 1) \"that the term of office of such president or vice-president shall be deemed to extend to and expire with of the on which his successor is elected\". In view of the events that have happened it is not necessary for us to pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of that decision. After the judgment of the High Court and after the grant of special leave by this court, the Bombay Legislature enacted Act LIV of 1954 which was published in the Bombay Gazette on the 14th\n\n' -\n\n.• '*\n\nS.C.R.\n\nOctober 1954. Sections 2 and 3 of the amending Act are in these terms :\n\n\"2. In section 19 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, in sub-section (1),-\n\n(1) after the words 'not less than one year' the words 'or not less than the residue of the term of office of the municipality, whichever is less' shall be inserted;\n\n(2) for the words 'three years' the words 'four years' shall be substituted. ·\n\n3. (1) The amendments made by this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the date on which the Bombay District Municipal arid Municipal Boroughs (Amendment) Act, 1954, came into force (hereinafter in this section referred to as 'the said date') and all elections to the office of the president or vice-president, held on or after the said date and before the coming into force of this Act, shall be deemed to be valid as if this Act had been in force on the said date; and any person elected to the office of the president or vice-president at any of such elec-\n\n- tions shall not be deemed to have been illegally elected merely on the ground that the residue of the term of\n\noffice of the municipality being less than _one year at\n\nthe time of such election, he would hold his office for a term less than one year in contravention of section 19 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, as it was in operationbefore the coming into force of th~A~ -\n\n(2) Nothing contained in this section shall affect the judgment; decree or order of any competent court, passed before the coming into force of this Act, holding any of such elections invalid on the ground specified in sub-section (l)\".. _\n\n- It has not been contended that section 19 as amended\n\nby Act_ LIV of 1954 does not in terms cover the elections now impugned; nor that section 3 of the amending Act quoted above is not retrospective; but it has been urged on behalf of the appellant that it is not . retrospective to the extent of affecting pending proceedings. In terms the amendment ip question is deemed to have come into force on the 11th May 1954\n\n.. Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki\n\n. v • . The Gailag-Betgeri\n\nMunicijal Borough\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955\n\n.S/rJtibuddinsab 'Mohidinstib Aiki\n\n:v. rhe ~Gadag.!_Bttgtri 'Munitipal Boroirgh\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1.'282 'StJP.REME COURT .RrEPORTS [t955]\n\non which date the .amending Act XXXV of 1954 had come into force. Section 3 in terms .also declares that .all .eleations to .the office of president and vice-president held on or .after the llih May .1954 and before .the coming into force of the amending Act shall be .deemed to 'have been valid. The section also declares in unequivocal terms that such an. election .shall riot be questioned simply on the ground of contravention of section 19 on which the election. of the 2nd and 3rd respondents had been questioned before the High Court.,· The legislature . apparently thought fit to declare 'beyond all controversy that an election of president or vice-president . for the unexpired portion of -the term of a municipality .could not b.e questioned on the ground that the provisions of section 19 as it stood before the amendment had been contravened.\n\nBut it .was argued on behalf of the appellant that in terms the amendment had not .been. made applicable to pending litigation and that therefore this court should hold that the amendment did not have the effect .of validating the elections which . were already under challenge in a court. Np authority. has been cited . before us in support . .of the contention that unless there are express words in the . amendi'ng statute to ihe effect that the amendment shall apply to pending proceedirgs _also, it cannot affect such proceedings. There • is . clear. : a11thority . to , the contrary in the following dittum of. Lord Read.ing, C.J. in the case of The King v. The General Commissioners of. lncometax for .Southampton; Ex .. parte. W. M. $inger(• );-\n\n\"I -.cannot accept the contention of the applicant that· an enactment 'can only take away vested rights of .action for which .legal proceedings have been .commenced if there are in the enactment express words to that •effect. '.Phere is' no authority for this proposition,· and 'I -do .not see . why in principle it .should. be the law: But it is necessary that dear . language should be used -to .make the retrospective . effect aP.plicable to proceedings . commenced .. before . the : passing . of ' . the statute'!, · 'Tfuif 'was a\" case fo w1Uch the Act in 'queStion had\n\n(I), 1Cl91GjzicJi.249,25g;'\" '.•: . '\"'' .,. :o;, '\n\n' .\n\n) ....\n\n\\ ...\n\nvalidated assessments made by commissioners for wrong parishes. It was held by the court that the retrospective effect of the relevant section extended to proceedings for a prohibition commenced before the Act came into force and the rule nisi for a prohibition was therefore discharged. In every case the language of the amending statute has to be examined to find out whether the legislature clearly intended even pending proceedings to be affected by such statute.\n\nA number of authorities were cited before us but it is only necessary to refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Mukerjee, Official Receiver v. Ramratan Kuer (1), which is clearly in .point.\n\nIn that case while an appeal had been pending before the Judicial Committee the amending Act had been passed clearly showing that the Act was retrospective in the sense that it applied to all cases of a particular description, without reference to pending litigation.\n\nIn those circumstances their Lordships pointed out that if any saving were to be implied in favour of pending proceedings, then the provisions of the statute would largely be rendered nugatory. Those observations apply with full force to the present case, inasmuch as if any saving were to be implied in favour of cases pending on the date of the amendment, the words \"all elections to the office of the president or vice-president, held on or after the said date and before the coming into force of this Act, shall be deemed to be valid\" could not be given their full effect. As there are no such saving clauses in express or implied terms, it must be held that the amendment was dearly intended by the legislature to apply to all cases of election of president or vice-president, whether or not the matter had been taken to court. It is the duty of courts to give full effect to the intentions of the legislature as expressed in a statute. That being so, it must be held that the amending Act had the effect of curing any illegality or irregularity in the elections in question with reference to the provisions of section 19 of the Act.\n\nFor the reasons afores; i.id it must be 'held that the ' . ' . ' ·. (I)' [1935] t.R. 63!.A. 47,\n\n•955\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Ak(<i\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough\n\nanil others\n\nSinha J.\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidin.Jab Akki\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri\n\nMunicipal Borough and others\n\nSinha J.\n\nFebruary 23\n\nmeeting of the rd August 1954 had. been validly held and that there is no illegality in the election. of the 2nd and 3rd respondents as president and vice-president respectively. We accordingly affirm the orders of the High Court, though not for the same reasons.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nHANS MULLER OF NURENBURG .\n\ntJ.\n\nSUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,\n\nCALCUTTA AND OTHERS.\n\n[MuKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, .\n\nBHAGWATI and }AGANNADHADAS JJ.)\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 14, 21 and 22-Entry 9 and entry 10 in Union list of Seventh Schedule to Constitution-Preventive Detention Act 1950 (Act V of 1950), s. 3(1)(b)-Whether ultra vires Constitution-Foreigners Act 1946 (Act XXXI of 1946), s. 3(2)(c)- Whether ultra vires , Constitution-Extradition Act 1870 and Foreigners Act, 1946--Distinction between.\n\nThe petitioner, a West German subject, was placed un<; Ier preventive detention by an order of the West Bengal Government under ' 3( 1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 on the ground that he was a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 and that it had becoine necessary to make arrangements for his expulsion from India ahd tht; refore he was required to be detained until the issue of an appropriate order from the Central Government.\n\nThe questions for determination in the case were :-\n\n(i) whether s. 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act was ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it contravenes Arts. 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and whether it w:is beyond the legislative\n\ncompetence of Parliament to enact such a law; '\n\n(ii) whether, in any event, the detention was invalid as .it was made in bad faith.\n\nHeld that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act and i. 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act on which it is based are not ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch a:~;\n\n( i) in view of Entry 9 and Entry 10 0£ the Union list of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the language of which must be given the widest meaning, the legislative competence of Parliament to deal with the question of preventive detCntion of foreigners ·\n\n) ..", "total_entities": 114, "entities": [{"text": "Jagannadhadas J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jagannadhadas J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1541, "end_char": 1565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB, AKKI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH\n\nAND OTHERS.", "canonical_name": "Shyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki"}}, {"text": "GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1582, "end_char": 1613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHYABUDDINSAB MOHIDIN$AB, AKKI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH\n\nAND OTHERS.", "canonical_name": "GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH"}}, {"text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1680, "end_char": 1714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744, "end_char": 1749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "S. 35(3)(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1833, "end_char": 1844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1879, "end_char": 1887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "S. 35(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Mnicipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "first respondent-Municipality-governed by the Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2033, "end_char": 2107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XVIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XXXV of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2573, "end_char": 2596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amending Act XXXV of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2878, "end_char": 2903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th July 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3266, "end_char": 3280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th July 1954 the Prant Officer adjourned the meeting to the 3rd August 1954 under instructions from the Collector without transacting any business. \""}}, {"text": "3rd August 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3328, "end_char": 3343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th July 1954 the Prant Officer adjourned the meeting to the 3rd August 1954 under instructions from the Collector without transacting any business. \""}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4497, "end_char": 4505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "3rd August, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4588, "end_char": 4604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution presented by S questioning rhe validity of the meeting of the 3rd August, 1954, and consequently the validity of the election _of respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5310, "end_char": 5318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "The Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5372, "end_char": 5418, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE GADAG-BETGERI MUNICIPAL BOROUGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Shyab1Uidinsab 'Mohidinsab ~Akki\n\n\"'T-he' Gadat-Be_tgen\n\nMunicipal Borough\n\naM otliers\n\n., 1270", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice to the coun- <:illors required under s. 35(3) of the Act satisfied the requirements •of three cleat days, that the provisions: of s. 35(3) regarding the ser-\n\nShyab11ddinsab Mohid; nsab-Akki\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others\n\nc•1955\n\n'Shyab1Uidinsab 'Mohidinsab ~Akki\n\n\"'T-he' Gadat-Be_tgen\n\nMunicipal Borough\n\naM otliers\n\n.,"}}, {"text": "•3rd 'August 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the councillors constituting the Municipality were present on both the occasions namely the 30th July 1954 arid the •3rd 'August 1954 and thus had ample notice of the meeting to be held on the 3rd August 1954, the 'time arid plate 6£ the meeting and the busint:ss to be transacted, \"'?-"}}, {"text": "s. 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6235, "end_char": 6243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6430, "end_char": 6435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XVIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6741, "end_char": 6746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XVIII of 1925", "statute": "Bombay Act XVIII of 1925"}}, {"text": ".General Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "King v .. The .General Commission-ers of\" Income-tax rfor ·souihampton, Ex pane W. ; M. Singer ([1916] 2 K.B.'249)and Mukerjee, .Qfficial .\"Receiver v. Ramratan Kuer ([1935] L. R. 63 I. A.· 47),\n\nreferred tO.\n\n CrvrL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal 'No. :"}}, {"text": "B. 'Kotwi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7401, "end_char": 7410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. 'Kotwi:tl, I '.B. Dadachanji _and , Rajinder Narain, forthe appellant."}}, {"text": "I '.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7415, "end_char": 7432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. 'Kotwi:tl, I '.B. Dadachanji _and , Rajinder Narain, forthe appellant."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7440, "end_char": 7455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. 'Kotwi:tl, I '.B. Dadachanji _and , Rajinder Narain, forthe appellant."}}, {"text": ".SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7596, "end_char": 7602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The Juc.lgment .of .the .Court was delivered by\n\n.SINHA • J.-This is an.appeal-by.", "canonical_name": ".SINHA"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XVIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8312, "end_char": 8336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "7th May 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8566, "end_char": 8578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last general election to the municipality took place on the 7th May 1951."}}, {"text": "Bombay Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8941, "end_char": 8951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12035, "end_char": 12043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Muni", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12320, "end_char": 12324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Muni, cipality and restraining them from performing any d.uties and from ."}}, {"text": "3rd t' September_ 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13916, "end_char": 13938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then applied to this court for special leave to appeal which was granted on the 3rd t' September_ 1954."}}, {"text": "section 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14294, "end_char": 14307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ShjabulfdinSab_ Mohidinsabr Akki", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14929, "end_char": 14961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki v.\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others\n\nSinha J.\n\n19·55)\\\n\nShjabulfdinSab_ Mohidinsabr Akki b.\n\nv •.\n\nThe; Gadag-Beigm \\ Municipal Borough."}}, {"text": "; Gadag-Beigm \\ Municipal Borough", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14975, "end_char": 15008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki v.\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others\n\nSinha J.\n\n19·55)\\\n\nShjabulfdinSab_ Mohidinsabr Akki b.\n\nv •.\n\nThe; Gadag-Beigm \\ Municipal Borough."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15145, "end_char": 15155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15239, "end_char": 15249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15667, "end_char": 15677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15708, "end_char": 15718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15764, "end_char": 15774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16371, "end_char": 16381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17488, "end_char": 17499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shackleton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18383, "end_char": 18393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the Practice of Meetings\" by Shackleton, and \"Company."}}, {"text": "Talbot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18423, "end_char": 18429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meetings'1 by Talbot."}}, {"text": "30th July, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18642, "end_char": 18657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this case to pronounce upon the merits of that controversy in the view we• take of the meeting of the 3rd August, 1954, assuming that the meeting of1\n\nthe 30th July, 1954 had been adjourned without authority."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18900, "end_char": 18910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19035, "end_char": 19048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19175, "end_char": 19185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyabuddinsnb", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19458, "end_char": 19471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shyabuddinsnb ,, Mohidinsab-Akki •\n\nTh£ Gadag-Betgeri-."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19643, "end_char": 19648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shjabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki v.\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others\n\nSinha J. ·\n\nelection of a president.", "canonical_name": ".SINHA"}}, {"text": "Section\n\n19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19680, "end_char": 19691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dharwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20343, "end_char": 20350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th July, 1954 a special general meeting had been called by the Collector for the election of the President; In the proceedings of that meeting it has been recorded that \"Under instructions from the Collector of Dharwar the presiding authority adjourns the meeting to i 3rd August 1954 at 3 P.M.\"."}}, {"text": "Gadag Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21065, "end_char": 21083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The presiding authority read out and explained to the members present the following telegraphic message from the Collector :\n\n\"Government have directed to hold election of President of Gadag Municipality on 3rd August as already arranged."}}, {"text": "section 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22629, "end_char": 22642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23157, "end_char": 23170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23387, "end_char": 23397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23448, "end_char": 23458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23991, "end_char": 24021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the record of the proceedings of the proposed meeting of the 30th July 1954 and the actual meeting on the 3rd August 1954 it is clear that whatever had been done had been done under the orders of\n\n• 7-90 S.C. In1ia/59\n\nShyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki.", "canonical_name": "Shyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki"}}, {"text": "Shyabuddi'ISab Mbhidinsab Akki", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24090, "end_char": 24120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gadag-Betgeri\n\nMunicipal Borough\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955\n\nShyabuddi'ISab Mbhidinsab Akki\n\nTM- Gadag-BUgen Municipal BorougN\n\nand others\n\nSinlia ].", "canonical_name": "Shyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki"}}, {"text": "section 35(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24754, "end_char": 24767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24962, "end_char": 24972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25383, "end_char": 25396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th July and 3rd August, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26068, "end_char": 26098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fortunately for the respondents, all the councillors constituting the municipality were present on both the occasions, namely, 30th July and 3rd August, 1954."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26896, "end_char": 26906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akkf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28569, "end_char": 28598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, as a\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akkf\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri.", "canonical_name": "Shyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki"}}, {"text": "August. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28990, "end_char": 29002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The meeting held on the 3rd August."}}, {"text": "section 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30133, "end_char": 30146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th July 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30446, "end_char": 30459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has taken the view .that the remaining period of the quadrennium would not necessarily end on the 9th July 1955, in view of the proviso to section 19( 1) \"that the term of office of such president or vice-president shall be deemed to extend to and expire with of the on which his successor is elected\"."}}, {"text": "section 19( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30487, "end_char": 30501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th\n\n' -", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30967, "end_char": 30976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the judgment of the High Court and after the grant of special leave by this court, the Bombay Legislature enacted Act LIV of 1954 which was published in the Bombay Gazette on the 14th\n\n' -\n\n.• '*\n\nS.C.R.\n\nOctober 1954."}}, {"text": "Sections 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31007, "end_char": 31023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31073, "end_char": 31083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31091, "end_char": 31126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32241, "end_char": 32251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32259, "end_char": 32294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32633, "end_char": 32643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32737, "end_char": 32746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33024, "end_char": 33053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In terms the amendment ip question is deemed to have come into force on the 11th May 1954\n\n.. Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Shyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki"}}, {"text": "Gailag-Betgeri\n\nMunicijal Borough", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33067, "end_char": 33100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gailag-Betgeri\n\nMunicijal Borough\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955\n\n.S/rJtibuddinsab 'Mohidinstib Aiki\n\n:v. rhe ~Gadag.!_Bttgtri 'Munitipal Boroirgh\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1.'282 'StJP.REME COURT .RrEPORTS [t955]\n\non which date the .amending Act XXXV of 1954 had come into force."}}, {"text": "Munitipal Boroirgh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33192, "end_char": 33210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gailag-Betgeri\n\nMunicijal Borough\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955\n\n.S/rJtibuddinsab 'Mohidinstib Aiki\n\n:v. rhe ~Gadag.!_Bttgtri 'Munitipal Boroirgh\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1.'282 'StJP.REME COURT .RrEPORTS [t955]\n\non which date the .amending Act XXXV of 1954 had come into force."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33342, "end_char": 33351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33710, "end_char": 33720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34066, "end_char": 34076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "W. M. $", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34868, "end_char": 34875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W. M. $inger(• );-\n\n\"I -.cannot accept the contention of the applicant that· an enactment 'can only take away vested rights of .action for which .legal proceedings have been .commenced if there are in the enactment express words to that •effect. '"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37613, "end_char": 37623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Ak(<i", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37740, "end_char": 37770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I)' [1935] t.R. 63!.A. 47,\n\n•955\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Ak(<i\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough\n\nanil others\n\nSinha J.\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidin.", "canonical_name": "Shyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki"}}, {"text": "Shyabuddinsab Mohidin.Jab Akki", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37832, "end_char": 37862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I)' [1935] t.R. 63!.A. 47,\n\n•955\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Ak(<i\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough\n\nanil others\n\nSinha J.\n\nShyabuddinsab Mohidin.", "canonical_name": "Shyabutidinsab Mohidinsab Akki"}}, {"text": "HANS MULLER OF NURENBURG", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38267, "end_char": 38291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HANS MULLER OF NURENBURG ."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38357, "end_char": 38366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MuKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, ."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38373, "end_char": 38382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MuKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, ."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38400, "end_char": 38408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI and }AGANNADHADAS JJ.)"}}, {"text": "AGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38414, "end_char": 38426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI and }AGANNADHADAS JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhadas J."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38433, "end_char": 38454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38456, "end_char": 38475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union list of Seventh Schedule to Constitution-Preventive Detention Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38500, "end_char": 38576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38594, "end_char": 38604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Union list of Seventh Schedule to Constitution-Preventive Detention Act 1950", "statute": "Union list of Seventh Schedule to Constitution-Preventive Detention Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Whether ultra vires Constitution-Foreigners Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38605, "end_char": 38657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38678, "end_char": 38688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether ultra vires Constitution-Foreigners Act 1946", "statute": "Whether ultra vires Constitution-Foreigners Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Constitution-Extradition Act 1870", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38712, "end_char": 38745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38750, "end_char": 38770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38941, "end_char": 38970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39035, "end_char": 39054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39133, "end_char": 39138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, a West German subject, was placed un<; Ier preventive detention by an order of the West Bengal Government under ' 3( 1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 on the ground that he was a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 and that it had becoine necessary to make arrangements for his expulsion from India ahd tht; refore he was required to be detained until the issue of an appropriate order from the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39235, "end_char": 39253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, a West German subject, was placed un<; Ier preventive detention by an order of the West Bengal Government under ' 3( 1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 on the ground that he was a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 and that it had becoine necessary to make arrangements for his expulsion from India ahd tht; refore he was required to be detained until the issue of an appropriate order from the Central Government."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39321, "end_char": 39331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39424, "end_char": 39443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39522, "end_char": 39532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and whether it w:is beyond the legislative\n\ncompetence of Parliament to enact such a law; '\n\n(ii) whether, in any event, the detention was invalid as .it was made in bad faith."}}, {"text": "Held that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39642, "end_char": 39704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39727, "end_char": 39741, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39877, "end_char": 39893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Held that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Held that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1284_1302_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Shyabuddinsab Mohidin.Jab Akki\n\nThe Gadag-Betgeri\n\nMunicipal Borough and others\n\nSinha J.\n\nFebruary 23\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nmeeting of the rd August 1954 had. been validly held and that there is no illegality in the election. of the 2nd and 3rd respondents as president and vice-president respectively. We accordingly affirm the orders of the High Court, though not for the same reasons.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nHANS MULLER OF NURENBURG .\n\ntJ.\n\nSUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,\n\nCALCUTTA AND OTHERS.\n\n[MuKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, .\n\nBHAGWATI and }AGANNADHADAS JJ.)\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 14, 21 and 22-Entry 9 and entry 10 in Union list of Seventh Schedule to Constitution-Preventive Detention Act 1950 (Act V of 1950), s. 3(1)(b)-Whether ultra vires Constitution-Foreigners Act 1946 (Act XXXI of 1946), s. 3(2)(c)- Whether ultra vires , Constitution-Extradition Act 1870 and Foreigners Act, 1946--Distinction between.\n\nThe petitioner, a West German subject, was placed un<; Ier preventive detention by an order of the West Bengal Government under ' 3( 1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 on the ground that he was a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 and that it had becoine necessary to make arrangements for his expulsion from India ahd tht; refore he was required to be detained until the issue of an appropriate order from the Central Government.\n\nThe questions for determination in the case were :-\n\n(i) whether s. 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act was ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it contravenes Arts. 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and whether it w:is beyond the legislative\n\ncompetence of Parliament to enact such a law; '\n\n(ii) whether, in any event, the detention was invalid as .it was made in bad faith.\n\nHeld that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act and i. 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act on which it is based are not ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch a:~;\n\n( i) in view of Entry 9 and Entry 10 0£ the Union list of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the language of which must be given the widest meaning, the legislative competence of Parliament to deal with the question of preventive detCntion of foreigners ·\n\n) ..\n\nis clear and this covers not only s. 3(l)(b) of the Preventive Deten\n\ntion Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946, in so far as it deals with the powers of expulsion and the right of the Central Government to restrict the movements of foreigners in India and prescribe the place of their residence and the ambit of their movements in the land;\n\n(ii) the Preventive Detention Act was a comprehensive Act dealing with preventive detention and was framed with the limitations of Arts. 21 and 22 in view. Section 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act was enacted to bring the unrestrained power given by s. 4(1) of the Foreigners Act into line with the provisions of the Constitution;\n\n(iii) section 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act is reasonably related to the purpose of the Act, namely preventive detention, inasmuch as the right to expel a foreigner conferred by s. 3(2) of the Foreigners Act on the Central Government and the right to make arrangements for expulsion include the right to make arrangements for preventing any breach or evasion of the order; and the Preventive Detention Act confers the power to use the means of preventive detention as one of the methods of achieving this end;\n\n(iv) the State Government is competent to make an order of detention under the law in anticipation of an order of expulsion that is about to be made, or which may be made by the Central Government on the recommendation of the State Government which, though seized with certain powers of Government is not competent to make an order of expulsion itself. Unless a State Government has authority to act in anticipation of orders from the Centre it might be too late to act at all;\n\n( v) the impugned section does not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as differentiation between foreigner and foreigner as envisaged ins. 2(a) ands. 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act 1946 and s. 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act is based on a reasonable and ration~! classification.\n\nThere is no individual discrimination, and reasons of State may make it desirable to classify foreigners into different groups.\n\nOn the question of good faith, held, that the circumstance of the case . did not show bad faith on the part of .the . West Bengal Government.\n\nThe Foreigners Act 1946 is not governed by the provisions of the Extradition Act 1870.\n\nThe two are distinct and neither impinges on the other. Even if there is a requisition and a good case for extradition, Government is not bound to accede to the request.\n\nI~ is given an unfettered right to refuse, vide s. 3(1) of the Extradition Act, and has got an absolute discretion to choose the less' icumbrous procedure of. the F:oreigners Act when a foreigner is concerned. As the Government is-given the right to choose, no question of want of good faith can arise merely because: it exercises the\" tight of choice which the law confers. ·\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNurenburg v: Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nHans Muller:of Nurenburg\n\nSperinUndent, Presidency Jail, .C1lcutta and others\n\nORIGINAL :JurusmcrrnN : Petition No. 22 -of 1955.\n\nUnder Article 32 -of the 'Constitution .for a Writ .in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nSdhan Chandra Gupta (The Petitioner also . present)· for the. petitioner.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General .of India (B. Sen, and /. N. Shroff, fot P. X. Bose, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1955. February 23. The Judgment of the , Court was delivered by -BosE J.-The .petitioner, Hans .Muller, who is not a citizen of India, and who is said to be a West German subject, was arreste.d by the 'Calcutta Police oh the 18th September, 1954 and was placed under preventive detention. The order was made by the West Bengal Government under section 3 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act of -1950 (Act IV of 1950) on the ground that. his detention was \"w, ith a . view to making arrangements for his 'explusion from India\". ·\n\n' .\n\nThe grounds were served on the 22nd of September, ~--\\\n\n1954. The second ground runs-\n\n\"That you are a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (Act XXXI of 1946) and that . it has become _ necessary _to make <l!\"rangements for your expulsion from India and for this purpose , you are required to be detained under -section 3(1) (b} of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 until the issue of an appropriate order of expulsion from the Central ). Government\".\n\nOn the day after his arrest, namely on -the 19th .September, 1954 he wrote to .the Consul\"General of West Germany at •.Calcutta saying that he had been arreste_d and asking for .·-an early interview. This Was , granted.. · On the 21st of September 1954; .the petitioner wrote •to the West Bengal' Goverrunelif asking it \"to b~-kind enough. to pass .• an.ord~-for our !ID-_ \",{ - mediate repatriation from India\" ,\n\n• f\n\nS.C.R. sUPREME COURT .REPORTS 1287\n\nand \"to do the necessary arrangement :for our :transmission out of India\".\n\nOn the 9th of October 1954 the Calcutta Police handed .the petitioner's . passport over to the West German Consul at the Consul's request. . This passport was issued to the petitioner by the West German Government at Nurenburg. in West Germany on the 27th of November\n\n1953. When the passport was handed over to the West German Consul it had on it a number of visas, including an Indan, all of which had on them the col; ldition \"while the. passport is valid''.\n\nWhen the West German . Consul got the passport he made the following entry on it :\n\n\"Valid only for the return' voyage to the Federal Republic of Germanyuntil the 8th January 1955\".\n\nThe pet:itiorier complains that this invalidated all the other visas and as, according to . this fresh entry, the passport ceased to be valid after the 8th of January 1955, he now has no passport. . . . . .\n\nOn the same day, the .9th of October 1954, the West German Government wrote to . the West Bengal Government saying that a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner in West Germany in connection with a. number of frauds and that legal proceedings . in connection with those warrants. are still , pending. . The Consul also said that he had received information that similar charges had been made against . the petitioner in Lebanon and in Egypt and he concluded-\n\n\"The Government 'of the Federal Republic of Germany . will . apply for Muller's extradition through diplomatic channels whilst at the same time submitting the 'supporting documents. As i:hiswill Tetjuite a certain amount of time, I am directed to give you advance 'information of '.this step and . hereby <.request the Government of West Bengal to issue a provisional warrantof arrest which ensures Muller's . .detention up to the date of his extradition to Germany. '\n\n. I .Thi;; COnsulate I Ws ; already . afrariged . ' for., .Muller's 'repatriation oy:,·· ;'tl).e\"_:,' Gerfrian boat . :'KANDELFELS' due to arrive' 'in 'Cakutta'~ dn\" the 19tlf'' ifilrtiiiL :An\n\n.Hans Muller nf\n\nNurenburg\n\n.y.\n\nSuperintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and otherS;\n\nBose J.\n\nIQ55\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNurttoburg\n\nv. _ Superintendent, Presidnicy Jail, Calcutta arul others\n\nBose J.\n\nexpenses in connection with Muller's repatriation will be borne by the Government of , the Federal Republic of Germany\". , . On receipt of this letter the Secretary to the Gov- , ernment of West Bengal recorded the following note : ,\n\n\"I suppose there would be 'no objection to our keeping Muller in detention till the 19th instant. We must issue order of his release as soon as his boat is ready to sail\". .\n\nThe West Bengal Government had no, power' to deport the petitioner.\n\nOnly the Central Government could do that, and up till the 20th of October the Central Government had not passed any orders. On that date the petitioner applied to the High , Court of Calcutta .for a writ in the nature of . habeas . , corpus under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure, Code.\n\nBecause of that, and, because this matter has been pending in the courts ever since, no orders have yet been issued for his expulsion from India though we are told by the learned Attorney-General that they have been 'made and sighed but are being held in abeyance pending the decision of this petition.\n\nThe petitioner contended that 'his detention was invalid for the following, among other, reasons :~\n\n( 1) Because section 3( 1) (b) ' of the Preventive Detention Act, the section under which the order was made,. is u'ltra vires 'the Constitution on three grounds- ( a) that it contravenes articles 21 and '22; \"\n\n(b) that it contravenes article 14, and\n\n(c) that it was beyond the legislative compe- . tence of Parliament to. enact such a law;,\n\n(2) Because section 3(1)(1;>), is. not a law of preventive detention within the meaning. of article 22(3) and , therefore. it . contravenes , article., 22 (1) and (2); and\n\n(3) Because,. in any event, the o; dr. was µ; de in bad faith. The High Court decided against the . petitioner on all points and. dismissed the. petition. on 1().o12-1954.\n\nHe thereujJ9nJ made the px:esent petition to this, Court <1n the same grounps, presumably under .. article. 32 of the Constitution. It was filed on 10-1-1955.\n\nI..\n\n. ( v\n\n', ' ; ' •\n\n' I ; i: .; I• ' j • i • ! ,.1 • t (.,., We will first consider the vires of section 3(1)(b).\n\nIt is iri: these terms : \"The Ceiitral Government or the State Government may-'-· .\n\n\" t ' ...................................................\n\n(b) if stisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in'. Iridia or with a view to making arrangemnts for his expulsion 'from India, it is necessary so to do, 'make an order directing that such person be detained\". . · The detention ord.er is. by a State Government and not by the Centre. The portion of the section on which the order is based is the part that gives a State Government power. to make an order of detention against a foreigner, on satisfaction, \"with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India\".\n\nThe competence of. the Central Legislature to enact a law dealing with this aspect of preventive detention is derived from Entry 9 of the Union List read with Entry 10. The portion of Entry 9 which concerns us is as follows :\n\n\"Preventive detention for reasons connected with .............. Foreign Affairs ............ \"\n\nThe scope of the expression \"Foreign Affairs\" is indicated in Entry 10 :\n\n\"Foreign Affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relation with any foreign country\".\n\nIt is well settled that the language of these Entries must be given the widest scope of which their meaning is fairly capable because they set up a machinery of Government and are not mere Acts of a legislature subordinate to the Constitution.\n\nGiving Entry 9 its widest range we find it impossible to hold that legislation that deals with the right of a State to keep foreigners under preventive detention without trial does not bring the Union into relation with a foreign country. Every country claims the right to the allegiance of its subjects wherever they may be arid in return guarantees to them the right of diplomatic\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNnrenburg.\n\nTo Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\nH/Jns Muller <if\n\nNurenburg\n\nSuperinundenl, Presidency Jail~ Calcutta and 'others\n\nBi:JseJ•\n\nprotection . .when abroad.. It is therefore . the privilege, and the anxiety, of every civilised nation . to keep vigilant watch over is subjects ab.road . and to. ensure for them, as far as that is possible through diplomatic channels, fair play and justice administered ' along lines of what is called, broadly for want of a better term, natural justice. A foreign State has a very direct interest in what ls done to its 'subjects in a for: eign land. Therefore,· legislation that confers jurisdiction upon Governments in this country to deprive foreigners of therr liberty cannot but be a matter that will bring the Union into relation with foreign States,. particularly when there is no public hearing and no trial in the ordinary courts of the land. But in this particular case, the relation is even more direct, for the provision here is for detention with a view to making arrangements for a foreigner's expul'sion from India. A foreign State has a very deep interest in knowing where and how its subjects can be forcibly expelled against their will. The legislative competence of Parliament to deal with this question is, we think, clear; and this covers not only section 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946 (Act XXXI of 1946) in so far as it <leals with the pC>.wers @f expulsion anru llhe right of the Central Government to restrict the movements of foreigners in India and prescribe the place of their residence and the ambit of their movements in the land.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General sought to base the legislative competence upon other Entries as well and claimed that Parliament is not confined to Entry 9 in\n\n1 .\n\nList I and Entry 3 in List III (the only Entries that ). touch directly on preventive detention). He claimed; for example, that laws for the preventi\"e detentioR of foreigners can .also be based upon Entry 17 in List I which relates to aliens and Entry 19 which relates to expulsion from India•; and also upon the portions of Entries 9 in List I and 3 in List III that deal with the \"security of India,'' and the \"security of the State\" and the \"maintrnance of public order\", provided always that they comply with articles 21 .. ). and 22 of the Constitution. We express no opiniOR\n\n• I\n\nabout this. as we can uphold the portion of the Statute that is impugned here on the narrower ground we have set out above.\n\nThe next question is whether the limitations imposed on this power by articles 21 and 22 have been observed.\n\nArticle 21 guarantees the protection of personal liberty to citizen and foreigner alike. No person can be deprived of his personal liberty\n\n\"except according to procedure established by law'', and article 22 prescribes the minimum that the procedure established by law must provide. There can be no arrest or detention without the person being produced before the nearest magistrate within twenty four hours, excluding the time necessary for the journey, etc., nor can he be detained beyond that period _without the authority of a magistrate. The only exceptions are (1) enemy aliens and (2) \"any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention\". .\n\nThere are further limitations, but they were not invoked except that the learned Attorney-General explained that the unrestricted power given by section 4(1) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (a pre-constitution measure) to confine and detain foreigners became invalid on the passing of the Constitution because of articles 21 and 22. Therefore, to bring this part of the law into line with the Constitution, section 3(l)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act was enacted. It was more convenient to insert new provisions about the confinement and detention of foreigners in the Preventive Detention Act rather than amend the Foreigners Act because the Preventive Detention Act was a comprehensive Act dealing with preventive detention and was framed with the limitations of articles 21 and 22 in view.\n\nIt was urged on behalf of the petitioner that section 3(l)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act is not reasonably related to the purpose of the Act, namely,\n\nj \"preventive detention\".\n\nI~ was argued that preventive detention can only be for the purpose of prevent-\n\nHans Muller of Nurenburg\n\nVI Superintendent, Ptesideru, y Jail, Calcutta and otlr4r1\n\nBose J.\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNurenburg\n\ny, Superintendent, Presidency Jail, CalcUtta and others\n\nBose J.\n\n', J -'\"' ' 1 ; r • \" l ' ! • ing something and when you seek to make arrangements for a man's expulsiorr from the country you are not preventing anything, or trying to,· but are facilitating the performance of a positive act . by the State, namely the act of expulsion.\n\nWe do not agree and will first examine the pos1t10n where an order of expulsion is made before any steps to enforce it are taken. The right to expel is conferred by section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 on the Central Government and the right to enforce an order of expulsion and also to prevent any breach of it, and the right to use such force as may be reasonably necessary \"for the effective exercise of such power\" is conferred by 'section 11 ( 1), also on the Central Government.\n\nThere is, therefore, implicit in the right of expulsion a number of ancillary rights, among them, the right to prevent any breach of the orders and the right to use force and to take effective measures to carry out those purposes.\n\nNow the most effective method of preventing a breach of the order and ensuring that it is duly obeyed is by arresting and detaining the person ordered to be expelled until proper arrangements for the explusion can be made. Therefore, the right to make arrangements for an expulsion includes the right to make arrangements for preventing any evasion or breach of the order, and the Preventive Detention Act confers the power to use the_ means of preventive deten . tion as one of the methOds of achieving this end.\n\nHow far it is necessary to take this step in a given case is a matter that must be left to the discretion of the Government concerned, but, in any event, when criminal charges for offences said to have been committed in this country and abroad are levelled against a person, an apprehension that he is likely to disappear and evade an order of expulsion cannot be called either unfounded or urrreasonable.\n\nDetention rn such circumstances is rightly termed preventive and falls within the ambit of the Preventive Detention Act and is reasonably related to the purpose of the Act.\n\nThe next question is whether any steps can be\n\n.. .._\n\n' . ..\n\n,,.~\n\n, . •' I i\n\n' f' ><\n\ntaken under the law in anticipation of an order that is about to be made, or which may be made, by the competent authority on the recommendation of another authority seized with certain powers of. Government and yet not competent to make an order of this kind.\n\nThe Foreigners Act confers the right of expulsion on the Central Government.\n\nTherefore, a State Government has no right either to make an order of expulsion or to expel. It was argued that if a State\n\nGovernment cannot expel or rriake an order of expulsion, then it cannot be' permitted to detain \"with a view to making arrangements for the expulsion\".\n\nIt was contended that the only authority that can make such arrangements, or direct that they should\n\nb~ made, is the Central Government. It was also argued that until an order of expulsion is made by the proper authority, no one can start making arrangements for its due execution; the arrangements contemplated by section 3(1) (b) must follow and not precede the order, especially as they involve curtailment of a man's personal liberty, for the order may never be made and it would be wrong to permit an authority not authorised to decide the question to , detain a man of its own motion till somebody else has time and leisure to consider the matter. That would be inconsistent with the fundamental right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution to citizen and foreigner alike.\n\nAgain, we do not agree. The Preventive Detention Act expressly confers the right to detain \"with a view to making arrangements\" for the expulsion upon both the State and the Central Government and the \"satisfaction\" required by section 3 ( 1) (b) can be of either Government.\n\nThe right to satisfy itself that , the drastic method of preventive detention is necessary to enable suitable arrangements for expulsion to be made is therefore expressly conferred on the State Government and as a State Government cannot expel, the conferral of the right can only mean that the State\" Government is given the power to decide and to\n\n- satisfy itself whether expulsion is desirable or neces- 8- 90 S. C. India/59\n\n. 1955\n\nHans Muller of Nurenburg v.\n\nSuperintendent Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\nHans Muller of\n\n.Nurenburg\n\nSuperintendent Presi, dency .\"'fail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\nsary, and if it thinks it is, then to detain until proper arrangements for the expulsion are made, one of them, and an essential one, being reference to the Central Government for final orders. It is evident that the authorities must be vested with wide discretion in the present field where international complications might easily .follow in a given case. U nles. a State Government has authority to act in anticipation of orders from rhe Centre, it might be too late to act at all.\n\nWe now turn to the argument that section 3(1) (b) is ultra vires because it offends article 14 of the Constitution. Actually, the attack here is .on section 3 {2)(c) of the Foreigners Act but as section (3)(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act is .consequential on that it is also involved. Section 3(1)(b) permits detention of a \"foreigner\" within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946. The definition of \"foreigner\" is given in section 2( a) of that Act and is as follows :\n\n\" 'foreigner' means a person who-- ( i) is not a natural-born British subject as defined in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section (1) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, or\n\n(ii) has not been granted .a certificate of naturalization as a British subject under any law for the .time being in force in India\" ..\n\nThe rest of the definition is not material. The argument is that tills differentiates between foreigner and foreigner.\n\nIt takes two classes of British subjects who are now as much foreigners as anyone else not an Indian citizen, out of the clas. of foreigners for the purposes of preventive detention and for the purposes of expulsion under the Foreigners Act. Tills, it was contended, offen_ds article 14 which provides that\n\n\"The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory .of India\".\n\nThis argument is easily :answered by the classification rule which has been repeatedly applied in this Court. The dassification of foreigners into those who are British subjects of the kind set out in the defirii- .tion, and others, so as to make the former not\n\n. f\n\nl ,\n\nforeigners for the purposes of the Foreigners Act and the Preventive Detention Act, :is a reasonable and rational classification and so does not, on the authority of our previous. decisions, offend article 14. There is no individual discrimination and it is easily understandable that reasons of State may make it desirable to classify foreigners into different groups. We repel this argument.\n\nIt was then said that at any rate there is differentiation in the same group because the definition discriminates between classes of British subjects inter se.\n\nIt was pointed out that the British Nationality and Statuts of Aliens Act, 1914 was repealed in 1948 and re-enacted in another form but as our Act has retained the 1914 definition that is the one we must consider.\n\nWe do not intend to examine this contention because, even if it be true that there is the discrimination alleged, namely between one class of British subject and another, that will not give the petitioner a right of challenge on this ground. He is not a British subject and so is not a member of the only class that could claim to be aggrieved on this score. This Court has decided in earlier cases that the only persons who can impugn any given piece of legislation under article 32 are those who are aggrieved thereby.\n\nAs the petitioner is not a person aggrieved, so far as this point is concerned, he not being a British subject, he cannot be attack the section on this gruund.\n\nWe hold that the impugned portions of section 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act and section 3(2)(c) of the Foreginers Act, 1946 are intra vires. '\n\nWe now turn to a wider question that brings us to the fringe of International law. It arises in this way.\n\nThe good faith of the Government of the State of West Bengal in making the order of detention was r challenged on the following, among other, grounds.\n\nIt was argued that the real object of Government in continuing the detention was to keep the petitioner in custody so that it would be in a position to hand > , him over to the West German authorities as soon as a suitable German boat arrived. It will be remembered\n\nl9.'Ji5\n\nHans Muller of Nurenhurg v.\n\nSuperintendent Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose j.\n\nHtins Mul/E'i of Nurenburg . v.\n\nSuperintendent . Presidency Jail, Calculta and others\n\nBose J~\n\nthat the West German Government_ wants the . getitioner fot offences which he is alleged to have committed in West Germany and that. the .West German Consul at Calcutta wrote. to the West Bengal Government on 9-10-1954 asking that Government to issue a provisional warrant of arrest against the, petitioner and to keep him in custody until the West,, German Government could initiate extradition· proceedings against him, and added. that the West , Genp.an. Consulate at Calcutta had already arrat; iged ,.f<w. his re patriation on a. Ger!llan boat that was to arrive on the 19th of October 1954. On receipt , of this letter, the Secretary of the West . Bengal Government recorded :a note saying that he supposed there would be no. objection to the West Bengal Government keeping the petitioner in detention . till the .19th. It was said that the connection between the letter, the expected arrival of the boat on the 19th and the Secretary's. proposal to keep the petitioner till that date, was obvious. . · The attack on the good faith of the West Benga.I Government at this p0int was two-fold. First, it was said that whatever the original intention of the West Bengal Government may have been, when the. West German Consul's letter was recei\".ed, the object of the detention was no longer for the .purpose. of . mking .arrangements for the petitioner's expulsion bm for keeping him in custpdy till. the West German Government was in a position to commence .extradition prnceedings; that, it was said, was an abuse of the Preventive Detention Act and was not justified by any of its prov1s1.ons ..\n\nThe second ground of attack was that, if that was not the object, then, very clearly, the idea was to hand the petitioner over to the Germari authorities on a German boat without the. formality of extradition proceedings and without givirig . the petitioner ·. a chance to defend himself and show that he. could not be extradited. That, . it was said, made the. matter worse than ever. It was denied that the petitione.r had committed any offence in West Germany or anywhere else. He claimed to be a communist and said that the real object of the West German Government\n\n. f\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME.COURT , REPORTS. 1297\n\nwas 'to 'subject him to political persecution the moment they could lay hands on him. The contention was that once an order of extradition is asked . for, a foreigner cannot be handed over to: the Government seeking, his .extradition except under the Extradition Act. .\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended very strongly that this question was academic and should not be onsidered because no order . of expulsion had yet been servd on the petitioner and no orie knows the terms of the order. We do not think it is in view of what 'the )earned Attorney~GeneraL told us, namely that all order of expulsion . has actually been made and , signed bt is. kept in abeyance pending our decision. · · We see no orce in th~ first part of the petitioner's argument. We.' are at. bottom considering the question of the_ West Bengal Government's gOod faith. The order of detention was made before the West German Consul . rote his. letter, so there was no connection between' that letter and the order. After that there is no material to indicate that the West Bengal Government changed its mind and continued the detention for another purpose. The note referred to is the note . of. a Secretarv to Government and embodies his suggestion about what should be done. It cannot be used either . as an order of Government itself or as an indication of its mind.\n\nThe second point raises a question of wider import touching the status and rights of foreigners in India, and the question we have to determine is whether there is anylaw in India vesting the executive government with power to expel a foreigner from this land as opposed to extraditing him.\n\nArticle 19 of the Constitution confers certain fundamental rights of freedom on the citizens of India, among them, the right \"to move freely throughout the territory of India\" and \"to reside and settle in any part of India\", subject only to laws that impose rea~ sonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights in the interests of the general publiC' or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. No cor-\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNurenburg\n\nSuperihtendenl Presidency Jail, Calcutta and othtrs\n\n•.955\n\nHans Mulltt •f\n\nNurenburg\n\nSuptTinletidbttt' Presidency ]aif,.\n\nCalcutta and othtrs\n\nBose j.\n\nresponding rights are given to foreigners. All that is guaranteed to, them is protection to life and liberty i1t accordance with the laws of the land. This is con\n\nferred by article 21 which is in the following terms :\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his lite or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law\".\n\n_ Entries 9, 101 17, 18 and 19 in the Union List confer\n\nwid~. powers on the_ Centre to make laws about, among. , other things, admission into and expulsion from India, about, . extradition arid aliens and about preventive . deention onnectecf with foreign affairs.\n\nTherefore, the right to make laws about the extradition of aliens and about their expulsion from the land is. express, ly , conferred; al.so, it is to, be observed that extradition . and expulsion are contained in separate entries indicating that_ though they may. 9vlap 'in certain. aspects, they are different . and. distinct . subjects. And that brings us to the Foreigners Act which deais, among ' other . t:lllngs, with, expulsi9n, and the\n\nExtradion _Act which. regulates .extradition. ·\n\nThe Foreigpers Act confers the power to expel foreighers from India.\n\nIt vests the Central Government\" With 'absolute\"\"artd unfettered discretion and,- as there is no provision fettering this discretion in the\n\nConstirutioii, an unrestricted right to expel remains.\n\nThe law of extradition is quite different. Because of tteaty obli'gati0ns it . confers a right on certain countries (not all) to ask that personS' who 'are alleged to havl: committed certain specified offences in their territories; or who . have already been convicted of those bffences by their courts, be handed over to them in custody for prosecution 'Or punishment. But des pite that -the Government . of -India is not . bound to comply•., with the .. request, , and has. an.- abso.lute and unfettered --discretion to refuse . .-\n\nThere are important' differences between the two Acts. ., Irr the first'\"place, the Extradition Act \"applies to ev&¥ybody;\" citizen and :foreigner alike,.-and to every class \"•of.\"foreignet, rhat·.is ''W say, everi• to•·foreigners who ·re n6t' nationak ··of .. the coiµltrY' asking for\n\nextradition.\n\nBut, as has, been seen, because , of article 19 no citizen can be expelled (as opposed to extradition) in the absence of a specific law to that effect; and there is none; also, the kind of law touching ex\" pulsion (as opposed to extradition) that could be made in the case of a citizen would have to be restricted in scope. Thatis not the case where a foreigner -is .concerned because article . 19 does not appJy. . ut a citizen who has committed certain kinds .. of offences abroad can be extradited if the formalities,. prescribed by the Extradition Act are observed. A foreigner has no such right and he can be expelled withoµt. , any formality beyond the making of . an order by the\n\nCentral Government.\n\nBut if he is extradited. instead of being expelled, .then. the formalities ·.of the Extraqition Act must be complied with. The importance of the distinction will be realised from what follows; and that applies , to citizen and foreigner alike'. . . .\n\nThe Extradition . Act is really a special branch of the law of. Criminal Procedure. It .. deals , with criminals and those accused of certain crimes. ·.The Foreigners Act is not directly concerned with criminals or crime though the fact that a foreigner . has committed offences, or is suspected of that, may be a good ground for regarding him . as undesirable. Therefore,. under the Extradition Act warrants or a summons .must be issued; there must be a magisterial enquiry. and. when there is an arrest it is penal in character; and-,-and this is . the most important distinction of all-when the person to be . extradited leaves .India he does not leave the country a fn; e man.· The police in India hand him• over to the police of the requisitioning\n\nState and. he remains in custody thFOughout.\n\nIn the case of expulsion, no idea of• punishmeht is involved, at any rate, ·in theory, and if a man is prepared to leave voluntarily he can ordinarily go as and when he pleases.·· But the• right is not' his. Under the Indian law, 'the niattef -is I left to the unfettered discretioh'-t>f the Union Government an:d -.tha:t-'Government can1 prescribe the route and the port-ior 'place of departure: and' can place ; him •on -a particular, ship 1'0r\n\nplane.: ·(See sectfons. 3(2):(h) :and•6 of'•'thedForeigtu:rs\n\nr955\n\nHans Muller ef\n\nNurenburg v.\n\nSuperintendent Presidency Jai, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNutenburg\n\nSuperintendtnt Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose :J.\n\nAct). Whether. the Captain of a foreign ship or .. Plane can be compelled to take a .. passenger he does not want or to follow a particular route is a matter .that does not arise and we express no opinion on it. j3ut assuming that he is willing to do so, the righ.t of the Government to make the order vis-a-vis the man expelled is absolute.\n\nThis may not be the law in all countries. ·· Oppenheim, for example, says that in England, until Decem ber 1919, the British Government had\n\n\"no power to expel even. the most dangerous .alien without the recommendation of a court, or without an Act of Parliament making provision for' , such expulsion, except during war on an . occasion ·of imminent .. national . danger : or great .. emergency\". (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I, 7th edition, page 631). ·\"' But that is immaterial, for the law m\"'each country is different and we are concerned . with the law as it obtains in our land. Here the matter of. expulsion has to be viewed . from three points of view : ( 1) does the Constitution permit the making of such a law? (2) does it place any limits on such laws? and (3) is there in fact any law on this. topic. in India and if .so, what does it enact? We have already examined the lawmaking power in this behalf and its scope, and as to the third question the law on this matter in India is embodied in the Foreigners Act which . gives an unfettered right to the Union Government to .expel.\n\nBut there is this distinction.\n\nIf the order is one of expulsion, as opposed to extradition;· 'then the person expelled leaves India a free man. It is true he may• be apprehended the moment he ·leaves; by some other power and consequently, in some . cases, this would be small consolation to him, but in most cases the distinction is substantial, for the right of a . foreign power to arrest except in its .own territory nd on -its own . boats is not unlimited. But however thii, t may be, so:far as India is concerned; there must be .. an order of release if he is in preventive. custody and though he may Ii<; conducted to the frontier .. under detention .he . must be permitted to.· leave a free man\n\n- f\n\n...\n\n:Land cannot be handed over under arrest.\n\nIn a case of extradition, he does not leave a free man. He remams under arrest throughout and 1s merely handed over by one set of police to the next.\n\nBut m that event, the formalities of the Extradition Act must be complied with. There must be a magisterial enqmry with a regular hearing and the person sought to be extradited must be afforded the right to submit a written statement to . the Central Government and to ask, if he so chooses, for political asyium; also he has the right to defend himself and the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. (Article 22(1) ). Of course, he can also make a representation against an order of expulsion and ask for political asylum apart from any Act but those are not matters of right as under the Extradition Act.\n\nOur conclusion is that the Foreigners Act is not governed by the prov1s10ns of the Extradition Act.\n\nThe two are distinct and neither impinges . on the other. Even if there is a requisition and a good case for extradition, Government 1s riot bound to accede to the request. It 1s given an unfettered right to refuse. Section 3(1) of the Extradition Act says..,-\n\n\"the Ceritral Government may, if it thinks fit\".\n\nTherefore, if it chooses not to comply with the request, the person against whom the request is made cannot insist that it should. The right 1s not his; and the fact that a request has been made does not fetter the discretion of Government to choose the less cumbrous procedure of the Foreigners Act when a foreigner is concerned, provided always, that in that event the person concerned leaves India a free man.\n\nIf no choice had been left to the Government, the position would have been different but as Government is given the right to choose, no question of want of good faith can arise merely because it exercises the right of choice which the law confers. This line of attack on the good faith of Government falls to. the ground.\n\nThe remaining grounds about want of good faith\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNurenburg\n\nVi Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\n•955\n\nHans MUlltr of\n\nNurenburg ,,.\n\nSuptrinten<knt) Presidency Jail, .\n\nCalcutta. and otherS'\n\nBose J~\n\nFebruary 28\n\nthat were raised in the petition were not seriously piessed and as. they are of no substance we need not discuss them. . The petition fails and is dismissed.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nl\\MRIK SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF PEPSU.\n\n[S. K. 'DAS, BHAGWATI arid VENKATAAAMA AYYAJ!. JJ.)\n\n\" ' Criminal Procedure Code (Aci Vof 1898), s.-197(1)-Charge of ,.Jc criminal isappropriation against a public servant-Sanction for prosecution under s. 197(1) of the Code of Criminal .Procedure- W hen necessary-Whether every offence committed by a public servant or every act done. b~ -him while .performing .official duties requires sanction for prpsecution.\n\nIt -is not every offence •committed by a public servant that retjui-res sanction for prpsecu\\i.t; n. under s . .197(1} of the Code of Criminal Proct; dure . nor. eveµ every act done by him while he is actually engaged in µie performanCe of his official duties; but if the act compla.ined. of : is direCtly concerned \\vith his official duties so that, if queStionea, it c'ould b'e claimed to 'have been done by virtue ofthe office, then. san<; tion. would .be necessanr; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it \\Vas, iri fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that ,.Would re:illy be a ·matter Of defence on the merits, which would have to be investiga'.ted at the trial, and could not arise at the stage -of the grant ofsanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution.\n\nWhether sanction is necessary to Proseeute a .public servant on a charge of criminal .misappropriation, will depend qn whether the ..>- acts complained of hinge on }:iis duties as a public servant.\n\nIf they do, then sanction i_s requiste. But if they are uncoqnected with such duties, then nb. sanctin \"is necessary._.. ' ·\n\nHori Ram Singh Y •. Emperor ([1939] F.C.R. 159), H. H. B, Gill\n\nv. The King ([1948] L.R. 75 LA. 41), Albert. West Meads v. The King '([1948] 'L.R. 75 I.A. 185), Phaniniira Chandra v. The King (['I949J L.R::76 LA>lO); 'R. W:· Math'ams v. \"State°<jf WestB.engal ([.1955]. .l S.C:R. 2'16~:artd Shreekttntiah Ramayya Munipalil v. The State of Bombay ([1955-].:J .s.C.R:- 117.7),. referr<; d to.'\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1smcTmN: Criri:iirial Appeal• No:48 of \"195'11.\"'\"' ... · \"·· ··•\"\"'\"· ...", "total_entities": 164, "entities": [{"text": "HANS MULLER OF NURENBURG", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 465, "end_char": 489, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": ".HANS MULLER OF NURENBURG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,\n\nCALCUTTA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 498, "end_char": 551, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,\n\nCALCUTTA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 555, "end_char": 569, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 571, "end_char": 580, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. 'DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 582, "end_char": 593, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 598, "end_char": 606, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 631, "end_char": 652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 654, "end_char": 673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union list of Seventh Schedule to Constitution-Preventive Detention Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 698, "end_char": 774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 792, "end_char": 802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Union list of Seventh Schedule to Constitution-Preventive Detention Act 1950", "statute": "Union list of Seventh Schedule to Constitution-Preventive Detention Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Whether ultra vires Constitution-Foreigners Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 803, "end_char": 855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 876, "end_char": 886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether ultra vires Constitution-Foreigners Act 1946", "statute": "Whether ultra vires Constitution-Foreigners Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Constitution-Extradition Act 1870", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 910, "end_char": 943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 948, "end_char": 968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "West Bengal Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1091, "end_char": 1113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, a West German subject, was placed un<; Ier preventive detention by an order of the West Bengal Government under ' 3( 1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 on the ground that he was a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 and that it had becoine necessary to make arrangements for his expulsion from India ahd tht; refore he was required to be detained until the issue of an appropriate order from the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1139, "end_char": 1168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1233, "end_char": 1252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1331, "end_char": 1336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, a West German subject, was placed un<; Ier preventive detention by an order of the West Bengal Government under ' 3( 1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 on the ground that he was a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 and that it had becoine necessary to make arrangements for his expulsion from India ahd tht; refore he was required to be detained until the issue of an appropriate order from the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1433, "end_char": 1451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, a West German subject, was placed un<; Ier preventive detention by an order of the West Bengal Government under ' 3( 1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 on the ground that he was a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 and that it had becoine necessary to make arrangements for his expulsion from India ahd tht; refore he was required to be detained until the issue of an appropriate order from the Central Government."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1519, "end_char": 1529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1622, "end_char": 1641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1720, "end_char": 1730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and whether it w:is beyond the legislative\n\ncompetence of Parliament to enact such a law; '\n\n(ii) whether, in any event, the detention was invalid as .it was made in bad faith."}}, {"text": "Held that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1840, "end_char": 1902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1925, "end_char": 1939, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2075, "end_char": 2091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Held that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Held that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2317, "end_char": 2327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Held that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Held that the Impugned portion of the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "tion Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2353, "end_char": 2395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Arts. 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2758, "end_char": 2773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Deten\n\ntion Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Preventive Deten\n\ntion Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2783, "end_char": 2798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Deten\n\ntion Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Preventive Deten\n\ntion Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2884, "end_char": 2891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Deten\n\ntion Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Preventive Deten\n\ntion Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2899, "end_char": 2913, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 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"gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hans Muller", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5171, "end_char": 5182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hans Muller of\n\nNurenburg v: Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nHans Muller:of Nurenburg\n\nSperinUndent, Presidency Jail, .C1lcutta and others\n\nORIGINAL :JurusmcrrnN : Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Hans .Muller"}}, {"text": "Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hans Muller of\n\nNurenburg v: Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nHans Muller:of Nurenburg\n\nSperinUndent, Presidency Jail, .C1lcutta and others\n\nORIGINAL :JurusmcrrnN : Petition No.", "canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,\n\nCALCUTTA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5390, "end_char": 5400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the 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C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5544, "end_char": 5558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General .of India (B. Sen, and /. N. Shroff, fot P. X. Bose, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5588, "end_char": 5594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General .of India (B. Sen, and /. N. Shroff, fot P. X. Bose, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5603, "end_char": 5612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General .of India (B. Sen, and /. N. Shroff, fot P. X. Bose, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "P. X. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5618, "end_char": 5628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General .of India (B. Sen, and /. N. Shroff, fot P. X. Bose, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Hans .Muller", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5752, "end_char": 5764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the , Court was delivered by -BosE J.-The .petitioner, Hans .Muller, who is not a citizen of India, and who is said to be a West German subject, was arreste.d by the 'Calcutta Police oh the 18th September, 1954 and was placed under preventive detention.", "canonical_name": "Hans .Muller"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5864, "end_char": 5879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the , Court was delivered by -BosE J.-The .petitioner, Hans .Muller, who is not a citizen of India, and who is said to be a West German subject, was arreste.d by the 'Calcutta Police oh the 18th September, 1954 and was placed under preventive detention."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6006, "end_char": 6015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "That you are a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6285, "end_char": 6356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6529, "end_char": 6541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "That you are a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "That you are a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6553, "end_char": 6583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central ). Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6646, "end_char": 6667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it has become  necessary to make <l!\"rangements for your expulsion from India and for this purpose , you are required to be detained under -section 3(1) (b} of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 until the issue of an appropriate order of expulsion from the Central )."}}, {"text": "19th .September, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6715, "end_char": 6736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the day after his arrest, namely on -the 19th .September, 1954 he wrote to .the Consul\"General of West Germany at •.Calcutta saying that he had been arrested and asking for .·-an early interview."}}, {"text": "9th of October 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7210, "end_char": 7229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th of October 1954 the Calcutta Police handed .the petitioner's ."}}, {"text": "Nurenburg", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7420, "end_char": 7429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This passport was issued to the petitioner by the West German Government at Nurenburg."}}, {"text": "West Germany", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7434, "end_char": 7446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in West Germany on the 27th of November\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "27th of November\n\n1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7454, "end_char": 7476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in West Germany on the 27th of November\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "Federal Republic of Germanyuntil", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7792, "end_char": 7824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consul got the passport he made the following entry on it :\n\n\"Valid only for the return' voyage to the Federal Republic of Germanyuntil the 8th January 1955\"."}}, {"text": "8th of January 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8001, "end_char": 8020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this fresh entry, the passport ceased to be valid after the 8th of January 1955, he now has no passport. . . . . ."}}, {"text": "of October 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8083, "end_char": 8098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day, the .9th of October 1954, the West German Government wrote to ."}}, {"text": "West German Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day, the .9th of October 1954, the West German Government wrote to ."}}, {"text": "Lebanon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8490, "end_char": 8497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the petitioner in Lebanon and in Egypt and he concluded-\n\n\"The Government 'of the Federal Republic of Germany ."}}, {"text": "Egypt", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8505, "end_char": 8510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the petitioner in Lebanon and in Egypt and he concluded-\n\n\"The Government 'of the Federal Republic of Germany ."}}, {"text": "Government 'of the Federal Republic of Germany", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8535, "end_char": 8581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the petitioner in Lebanon and in Egypt and he concluded-\n\n\"The Government 'of the Federal Republic of Germany ."}}, {"text": "Muller", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8601, "end_char": 8607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "apply for Muller's extradition through diplomatic channels whilst at the same time submitting the 'supporting documents."}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8849, "end_char": 8874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereby <.request the Government of West Bengal to issue a provisional warrantof arrest which ensures Muller's ."}}, {"text": "Germany", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8988, "end_char": 8995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".detention up to the date of his extradition to Germany. '"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9282, "end_char": 9286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and otherS;\n\nBose J.\n\nIQ55\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNurttoburg\n\nv. _ Superintendent, Presidnicy Jail, Calcutta arul others\n\nBose J.\n\nexpenses in connection with Muller's repatriation will be borne by the Government of , the Federal Republic of Germany\". , ."}}, {"text": "Hans Muller", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9297, "end_char": 9308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and otherS;\n\nBose J.\n\nIQ55\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNurttoburg\n\nv. _ Superintendent, Presidnicy Jail, Calcutta arul others\n\nBose J.\n\nexpenses in connection with Muller's repatriation will be borne by the Government of , the Federal Republic of Germany\". , .", "canonical_name": "Hans .Muller"}}, {"text": "Superintendent, Presidnicy Jail, Calcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9330, "end_char": 9371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and otherS;\n\nBose J.\n\nIQ55\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNurttoburg\n\nv. _ Superintendent, Presidnicy Jail, Calcutta arul others\n\nBose J.\n\nexpenses in connection with Muller's repatriation will be borne by the Government of , the Federal Republic of Germany\". , .", "canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,\n\nCALCUTTA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "20th of October", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9932, "end_char": 9947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only the Central Government could do that, and up till the 20th of October the Central Government had not passed any orders."}}, {"text": "High , Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10041, "end_char": 10065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that date the petitioner applied to the High , Court of Calcutta .for a writ in the nature of ."}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10121, "end_char": 10132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10585, "end_char": 10598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10760, "end_char": 10771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10808, "end_char": 10818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)(1;>)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10929, "end_char": 10946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11009, "end_char": 11022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of 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{"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "articles 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15832, "end_char": 15843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act but also the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16101, "end_char": 16119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16141, "end_char": 16151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16338, "end_char": 16348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16972, "end_char": 16984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16992, "end_char": 17012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17136, "end_char": 17154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "section 3(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17230, "end_char": 17245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17443, "end_char": 17457, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17592, "end_char": 17610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "section 3(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17667, "end_char": 17682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "section 3(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18510, "end_char": 18525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18533, "end_char": 18553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18788, "end_char": 18798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20522, "end_char": 20536, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21189, "end_char": 21201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21885, "end_char": 21894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hans Muller of\n\n.Nurenburg\n\nSuperintendent Presi, dency .\"'fail, Calcutta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22463, "end_char": 22536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955\n\nHans Muller of Nurenburg v.\n\nSuperintendent Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\nHans Muller of\n\n.Nurenburg\n\nSuperintendent Presi, dency .\"'fail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\nsary, and if it thinks it is, then to detain until proper arrangements for the expulsion are made, one of them, and an essential one, being reference to the Central Government for final orders."}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23077, "end_char": 23089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23128, "end_char": 23138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23193, "end_char": 23202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23217, "end_char": 23231, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23336, "end_char": 23351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23413, "end_char": 23433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2( a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23477, "end_char": 23490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23663, "end_char": 23713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24202, "end_char": 24216, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24252, "end_char": 24262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914", "statute": "the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24726, "end_char": 24740, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24889, "end_char": 24899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "was pointed out that the British Nationality and Statuts of Aliens Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25250, "end_char": 25326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25935, "end_char": 25945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was pointed out that the British Nationality and Statuts of Aliens Act, 1914", "statute": "It was pointed out that the British Nationality and Statuts of Aliens Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26183, "end_char": 26198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was pointed out that the British Nationality and Statuts of Aliens Act, 1914", "statute": "It was pointed out that the British Nationality and Statuts of Aliens Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "section 3(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26235, "end_char": 26250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was pointed out that the British Nationality and Statuts of Aliens Act, 1914", "statute": "It was pointed out that the British Nationality and Statuts of Aliens Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Foreginers Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26258, "end_char": 26278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of the State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26428, "end_char": 26466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The good faith of the Government of the State of West Bengal in making the order of detention was r challenged on the following, among other, grounds."}}, {"text": "West German authorities", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26735, "end_char": 26758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued that the real object of Government in continuing the detention was to keep the petitioner in custody so that it would be in a position to hand > , him over to the West German authorities as soon as a suitable German boat arrived."}}, {"text": "Superintendent . Presidency Jail, Calculta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26958, "end_char": 27000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nSuperintendent .", "canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,\n\nCALCUTTA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27182, "end_char": 27190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the .West German Consul at Calcutta wrote."}}, {"text": "9-10-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27231, "end_char": 27240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the West Bengal Government on 9-10-1954 asking that Government to issue a provisional warrant of arrest against the, petitioner and to keep him in custody until the West,, German Government could initiate extradition· proceedings against him, and added."}}, {"text": "19th of October 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27597, "end_char": 27617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consulate at Calcutta had already arrat; iged ,.f<w. his re patriation on a. Ger!llan boat that was to arrive on the 19th of October 1954."}}, {"text": "West . Bengal Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27669, "end_char": 27693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt , of this letter, the Secretary of the West ."}}, {"text": "West Benga.I Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28067, "end_char": 28090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The attack on the good faith of the West Benga."}}, {"text": "Germari authorities", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28758, "end_char": 28777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the West German Government was in a position to commence .extradition prnceedings; that, it was said, was an abuse of the Preventive Detention Act and was not justified by any of its prov1s1.ons ..\n\nThe second ground of attack was that, if that was not the object, then, very clearly, the idea was to hand the petitioner over to the Germari authorities on a German boat without the."}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29490, "end_char": 29505, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30880, "end_char": 30890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31663, "end_char": 31673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "And that brings us to the Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32429, "end_char": 32469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government . of -India is", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33244, "end_char": 33269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But des pite that -the Government ."}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33470, "end_char": 33485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33724, "end_char": 33734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34227, "end_char": 34242, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34804, "end_char": 34818, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35032, "end_char": 35047, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hans Muller", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35964, "end_char": 35975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3(2):(h) :and•6 of'•'thedForeigtu:rs\n\nr955\n\nHans Muller ef\n\nNurenburg v.\n\nSuperintendent Presidency Jai, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNutenburg\n\nSuperintendtnt Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose :J.\n\nAct).", "canonical_name": "Hans .Muller"}}, {"text": "Superintendent Presidency Jai, Calcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35994, "end_char": 36033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3(2):(h) :and•6 of'•'thedForeigtu:rs\n\nr955\n\nHans Muller ef\n\nNurenburg v.\n\nSuperintendent Presidency Jai, Calcutta and others\n\nBose J.\n\nHans Muller of\n\nNutenburg\n\nSuperintendtnt Presidency Jail, Calcutta and others\n\nBose :J.\n\nAct).", "canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT, PRESIDENCY JAIL,\n\nCALCUTTA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Oppenheim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36533, "end_char": 36542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oppenheim, for example, says that in England, until Decem ber 1919, the British Government had\n\n\"no power to expel even."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36570, "end_char": 36577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oppenheim, for example, says that in England, until Decem ber 1919, the British Government had\n\n\"no power to expel even."}}, {"text": "Decem ber 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36585, "end_char": 36599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oppenheim, for example, says that in England, until Decem ber 1919, the British Government had\n\n\"no power to expel even."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36605, "end_char": 36623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oppenheim, for example, says that in England, until Decem ber 1919, the British Government had\n\n\"no power to expel even."}}, {"text": "India is embodied in the Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37482, "end_char": 37521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38541, "end_char": 38556, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38940, "end_char": 38953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Act but those are not matters of right as under the Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39076, "end_char": 39143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Our conclusion is that the Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39146, "end_char": 39187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39229, "end_char": 39244, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39463, "end_char": 39475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Our conclusion is that the Foreigners Act", "statute": "Our conclusion is that the Foreigners Act"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39483, "end_char": 39498, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government to choose the less cumbrous procedure of the Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39788, "end_char": 39858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. K. 'DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40774, "end_char": 40784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. K. 'DAS, BHAGWATI arid VENKATAAAMA AYYAJ!.", "canonical_name": "S. K. 'DAS"}}, {"text": "VENKATAAAMA AYYAJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40800, "end_char": 40817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. K. 'DAS, BHAGWATI arid VENKATAAAMA AYYAJ!."}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40830, "end_char": 40853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 197(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40976, "end_char": 40985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Hori Ram Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42317, "end_char": 42331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sanctin \"is necessary... ' ·\n\nHori Ram Singh Y •. Emperor ([1939] F.C.R. 159), H. H. B, Gill\n\nv. The King ([1948] L.R. 75 LA."}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42346, "end_char": 42363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I.A. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42459, "end_char": 42475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1302_1310_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "•955\n\nHans MUlltr of\n\nNurenburg ,,.\n\nSuptrinten<knt) Presidency Jail, .\n\nCalcutta. and otherS'\n\nBose J~\n\nFebruary 28\n\n1302:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1955]\n\nthat were raised in the petition were not seriously piessed and as. they are of no substance we need not discuss them. . The petition fails and is dismissed.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nl\\MRIK SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF PEPSU.\n\n[S. K. 'DAS, BHAGWATI arid VENKATAAAMA AYYAJ!. JJ.)\n\n\" ' Criminal Procedure Code (Aci Vof 1898), s.-197(1)-Charge of ,.Jc criminal isappropriation against a public servant-Sanction for prosecution under s. 197(1) of the Code of Criminal .Procedure- W hen necessary-Whether every offence committed by a public servant or every act done. b~ -him while .performing .official duties requires sanction for prpsecution.\n\nIt -is not every offence •committed by a public servant that retjui-res sanction for prpsecu\\i.t; n. under s . .197(1} of the Code of Criminal Proct; dure . nor. eveµ every act done by him while he is actually engaged in µie performanCe of his official duties; but if the act compla.ined. of : is direCtly concerned \\vith his official duties so that, if queStionea, it c'ould b'e claimed to 'have been done by virtue ofthe office, then. san<; tion. would .be necessanr; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it \\Vas, iri fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that ,.Would re:illy be a ·matter Of defence on the merits, which would have to be investiga'.ted at the trial, and could not arise at the stage -of the grant ofsanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution.\n\nWhether sanction is necessary to Proseeute a .public servant on a charge of criminal .misappropriation, will depend qn whether the ..>- acts complained of hinge on }:iis duties as a public servant.\n\nIf they do, then sanction i_s requiste. But if they are uncoqnected with such duties, then nb. sanctin \"is necessary._.. ' ·\n\nHori Ram Singh Y •. Emperor ([1939] F.C.R. 159), H. H. B, Gill\n\nv. The King ([1948] L.R. 75 LA. 41), Albert. West Meads v. The King '([1948] 'L.R. 75 I.A. 185), Phaniniira Chandra v. The King (['I949J L.R::76 LA>lO); 'R. W:· Math'ams v. \"State°<jf WestB.engal ([.1955]. .l S.C:R. 2'16~:artd Shreekttntiah Ramayya Munipalil v. The State of Bombay ([1955-].:J .s.C.R:- 117.7),. referr<; d to.'\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1smcTmN: Criri:iirial Appeal• No:48 of \"195'11.\"'\"' ... · \"·· ··•\"\"'\"· ...\n\n,:L.f\n\nAppeal by Special Leave granted by the Supreme Court by its Order dated the 31st July 1953 from the Judgment and Order dated the 15th May 1953 of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Pepsu at Patiala in Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 1952 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 31st March 1952 of the Court of Magistrate 1st Class, Patiala in Challan Case No. 160/102 of 1951. fai Gopal Sethi, (Naunit Lal, with him) for the appellant.\n\nN. S. Bindra, (Porus A .. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent. 1955.\n\nFebruary 28. The Judgment. of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-The appellant was a Sub-Divisional Officer in the . Public Works , Department, Pepsu, and was, at the material dates, in charge of certain 'works at a place called Karhali. It was part of his duties .to disburse the wages to the work~ men employed in the works, and the procedure usualc ly followed was that he drew the amount required from the treasury, and paid. the same to the employees against their signatures or thumb-impressions in the monthly acquittance roll.\n\nIn the roll for April 1951, one Parma was mentioned as a . khalasi (menial servant), and a sum o~ Rs. 51 shown as paid to him for: .his wages, the payment being vouched. by thumbimpression.\n\nThe case .. of the prosecution was. that there was, in fact, no person of the name of. Parma, that the .. thumb-impression found in the , acquittance roll was. that of, the appellant himself, that he had included a fictitious name;· in tl; ie acquittance roll, with intent o himself draw the_ .amount, and that. by this expedient he had received,!~· -; S,~ , ap.d JJ?.isappropriated the same. . ·. .. '\" , ........ ·. : , ,. , . . ..\n\nThe First-Class Magistrate \"of Patiala; before whom the appellant was put up for trial;:. framed charges against him under section 465 of 'the ''Indian Penal\n\nCode for forging the thumb-itnpressiori of Parma, and under' \"sectidn t409 of tlie ln<c'!in Penal 'Co<le for trimina'f misappropi'i'ation • of\"'Rs. 51, and' after' a 'full \"trial,\n\nAmrik Singh v.\n\nTM State of PepsU:\n\n.A.mrik Singli\n\nv. ' TM State of P1ps1l\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya> J.\n\n1304 SUPREME1 CO, URT. REPO:(lTS~ [!955];\n\nacquitted him. . He held on .. the eviqence • that,• ;'there w:is a khalasi Parma by name in the . service ·-0f . the accused at Kehtauli\", and that. though .the. , t\\11,1m, bimpression in the acquittance roll ,. was .that, .of .~_the appellant, the prosecution had. not established .. 1.that the amount drawn by him did. not .reach the hands. of Parma. Against this judgment, there wa5 . an .,, appeal. by the State to the High Court of Pepsu; whic; h held that proof that the. thumb; impresion., .in , the,, ac.quittance roll was that of the appellant was sufficient,. when taken along with .other circumstances, t6' e5fablish his gtiilt, and 'accordinglf convi'Ctecl . him 'both under section 465 ;µid section 409 . of the 'Indiirr''Periar Code. This appeal by special' leave is directed 'against this judgment. ' · · ':· ' In support of. the appeal it is argued by Mr.' Jai Gopal Sethi that theconviction of the appellant is illegal, as sanction had not been obtained under sec-· ti on 197 ( 1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure rfor\"his prosec11tiorl, that the ev'idence on record. ·, is insllfficient to establish an.· offence either under section .465-ror section 409 of. the Indian Penal Code arrd that there 'having . been . an acquittal of the . appellant by the trial Magistrate, the materials on record did not justify a reversal of. that verdict by the appellate Couit. • ·· :·\n\nThe question of sanction under section 197 ( 1} of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be taken up fiii for consideration, as it goes to the root of the riitter.\n\nThe facts beaiing on this question are that there 'was an application . by the Department for . s.anction ' . to prosecute the . 'appellant for arr . offence . linaer sectiOn 409, and that, the Chief .. Secretary; Home Depaitfuent, sent . the ' communication; Exhibit PX, statirig thai: he had been \"dire'cted ic>\" convey sanction. ''of the .Goveriurient to his prosecution\": In view of this, no question was raised before the trial Magistrate' 'or the High. Court that the prosecution was .bad for want of sanction. But after thtl : disposal . of the appl by th.e High Court, it was discovered that,. in. fact,, .there was np order of .the Government sanctioning the pre>- secution, and . that the . Chief Secretary had :committed\n\na mistake in sending the communica, tion,. Exhibit; PX.\n\n' . ...\n\nThe position,· therefore; is that the prosecution . which has resulted in the conviction of the appellant. was initiated without ariysanction under section 197 ( 1) of the Code of· Criminal Procedure and if sanction under that section is necessary, as contended for by Mr, Sethi,. then the entire proceedings including the conviction must be quashed. According to the respondent, ·. however, the main charge against the appellant is under section 409, and no sanction is required . for a· prosecution under that section. The point for' decision is whether sanction under section ··197(1)' of the' Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary for prosecuting the appelLlllt under section 409.\n\nTliere has been considerable divergence of judicial opinion on the scope of section 197 ( 1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe question . has latterly been the subject of consideration by the highest Courts in this country, and. by the Privy Council, and the position may now be taken to be fairly well-settled. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor( ) is a decision of the Federal Court on the necessity for sanction under section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935, whicli is similar in terms to section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts in that case were that a Sub- Assistant. Surgeon was charged under section 409 with having dishonestly , removed certain medicines from a hospital which was under his charge, to his own residence, and under section 477-A, with having failed . to enter them in the stock book. The sanction of the Government had not been obtained for the . prosecution under section 270 . of the Government of India Act, - and the point for decision was whether it was necessary. It was held that the charge under section 477-A required sanction,. as \"the official capacity . is involved in the very act . complained of as . amounting to a crime\"; but that no sanction was required for .a charge under section 409, because \"the official capacity is material only in .connection with the 'entrustment' and .does. not necessarily enter into the later act of misappropriation or conversion, which is the act complained of\".\n\n(l) [1939] F.C.R. 159.\n\n,1955\n\nAmrik Singh\n\nv. .\n\nThi State of Ptf.'u\n\nVenkataraina\n\n4Jiyar J.\n\nAmr.ik_Sigh\n\nThe State of P-.epsu\n\n, v enkatarama\n\nAyyar .J.\n\n fo the course of his judgment, Varadachariar, J. discussed , the sc0:pe of section 197 (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedur.e and after observing that the deci- sions on that section were not uniform, proceeded to group them under three categories-those which had .held that sanction w.as necessary when the act complained of attached to the official character of the person doing it, those which had held that it was necessary in all cases in which .the official character of the person gave him an opportunity for the .commission of the crime, and those which had held it necessary when the offence was committed while the - accused was actual! y engaged in the performance of official duties.\n\nThe learned Judge expressed his \"\\greement with the first of the three views.\n\nIn H. H.B. Gill v. The King(1),.the question arose directly with reference to section 197 ( 1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There, the accused was charged under section 161 with taking bribes, and under section 120-B with .conspiracy. On the question whether sanction was necessary under section 197 ( l) it was held 'by the Privy Council that there was no difference in scope between that section and section 270 of .the Government of India Act, 1935, and approving the statement of the law by V:aradachariar, J. in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor.('), Lord Simonds observed: ·\n\n\"A public servant can Gnly be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within .the scope of his official duty ........ The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office\".\n\nIt was accordingly held that as the acts with which the accused was charged could not be justified as done by virtue of his office, no sanction was necessary.\n\nThe view taken in H. H. B. Gill v. The King( ) was followed by the Privy Council in Albert West Meads v.\n\nThe King('), and reaffirmed in Phanindra Chandra v.\n\n(I) [1948] L.R. ·;5 I.A. 41.\n\n(2) [1939] F.C.R. 159.\n\n(3) [1948] L.R. 75 I. A. 185. \"\n\n\"--\":\n\nThe King( 1), and adopted by this . Court m R. W.\n\nMathams v. State of West Bengal( 2).\n\nThe result of the authorities may thus be summed up : It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is. directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution.\n\nIt is conceded for the respondent that on the principle above enunciated, sanction would be required for prosecuting the appellant under section 465, as the charge was in respect of his duty of obtaining signatures or thumb-impressions of the employees before wages were paid to them. But he contends that misappropriation of funds could, under no circumstances, be said to .be within the scope of the duties of a public servant, that he could not,. when charged with it, claim justification for it by virtue of his office, that therefore no sanction under section 197 ( 1) was necessary, and that the question was concluded by the decisions in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor( 3 ) and Albert\n\nWe; t Meads v. The King( 4 ), in both of which the charges were of criminal misappropriation.\n\nWe are of opinion that this is too broad a statement of the legal position, and that the two decisions cited lend no support to it. In our judgment, even when the charge is one of misappropriation by a public servant, whether sanction is required under secti@n 197{1) will depend upon the facts of each case. If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attach-\n\n(!) [1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 10.\n\n(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R 216.\n\n(3) [1939] F.C.R. 159.\n\n(4) {1948] L.R. 75 I. A. 185.\n\nAmrik Singh\n\nThe State of Pepsu\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n. 1955\n\nAmrik Singh . v.\n\nThe State of Pepsu\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\ning to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under section 197(1) would be necessary; but if there Was no necessarv connection beween them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required.\n\nQuite recently, this Court had to consider in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay(') the necessity for sanction under section 197 ( 1), when the charge was one of misappropriation under section\n\n409. There, the law was laid down in the following terms:\n\n\"The section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says i5-\"\n\n'when any public servant. , ...... is accused of any . offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty .......... ' We have therefore first to concentrate on the word\n\noffence'.\n\nNow an offence seldom consists of a single act.\n\nIt ls usually composed of several elements and, as a 'rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established.\n\nIn the present case, the elements alleged against the second accused are, first, that there was an 'entrusttnent' . and/or 'dominion'; second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was 'in his capacity as a public servant'; third, that there was a 'disp0sal'; and fourth, . that the disposal was 'dishonest'. Now it is evident that the entrusttnent and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity\".\n\nOn the facts, it was held in that case that the several acts which were complained of, were official acts, and that the prosecution was bad for want of sanction.\n\nThe decisions in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor('), and Albert West Meads v. The King( ) when properly examined, do not support the extreme contention\n\n(1) [1955] l s.c.R. 1177.\n\n(2) [1939] F.C.R. 159. ·\n\n (3) [1948] L.R. 75 I.A. 185.\n\n., .\n\n' ( y\n\nurged on behalf of the respondent. In Hori Ram Singh\n\nv. Emperor(1), the medicines had not been entered in the stock book, and were removed by the accused to his . residence, and the charge against him was that in so removing them he had committed misapproprfation. It was no part of the duty of the _accused to remove medicines to his house,, and he could not claim that he did so by virtue. of his office.\n\nHe could have made such a claim if he had, let us suppose, entered the medicines in the stock books and shown them as expended in the hospital. But, on the facts, no official act was involved, and that was why Varadachariar, J .. observed that,\n\n\" .... so far as the charge under section 409 was concerned; the acts in respect of which he was intended to be prosecuted could not be regarded as acts done or purported to be done in execution of his duty\".\n\nReference may also be made to the following observations of Sulaiman, J. in the same case :\n\n\"The question whether a criminal breach of trust can be committed while purporting to act in execution of his duty is not capable of being answered hypothetically in the abstract, without any reference to the actual facts of the case. An attempt to answer the question in a generalized way has been responsible for loose language used in some of the cases cited before us. . . . . . . . The question whether the act purported to have been done in execution of duty or not must depend on the special circumstances of each case\".\n\nIn Albert West Meads v. The King (2), an Army Officer had received two sums of money, and was subsequently unable to produce them. He was charged with criminal misappropriation, and convicted.\n\nHe contended that the conviction was iilegal for want of sanction, but the Privy Council, following H. H. B.\n\nGill v. The King( 3 ), rejected this contention. It is essential to note that the accused did not claim to have spent the amount in the course of his official duties, but stated. that the moneys had been consumed by fire~ It is with reference to these facts that the Privy Council observed :\n\n(1) [1939] F.C.R. 159.\n\n(2) [1948] L.R. 75 I, A. 185.\n\n(3) [1948] L.R. 75 I.A. 41. 9-90 S. C, India/59\n\nAmrik Singh v.\n\nThi State of Pepsu\n\nV 1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nAmrik Singh . ' v.\n\nThe Stfl!~ !![ Pepsu\n\nVenka_tarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n\" .. :.the appellant 'could not justify the .acts in respect of which he was charged', i.e. acts. of frauduleritly misapplying money entrusted to his .care as a public servant, 'as acts done by him by virtue of the office that he held\"'.\n\nThe result then is that whether sanction is necessary to prosecute a public servant on a charge of criminal misappropriation, will depend on whether the acts complained of hinge on his duties as a public servant.\n\nIf they do, then sanction is requisite. But if they are unconnected with such duties, then no sanction is necessary: In this view, we have to examine whether the acts with which the appellant is charged directly bear on the duties which he has got to discharge as a public servant. The appellant received the sum of Rs. 51 alleged to have been misappropriated, as Sub- Divisional Officer, and he admits receipt of the same.\n\nThen it was his duty to pay that amount to the khalasi Parma, and take his signature or thumb-impression in acknowle<lgment thereof.\n\nThe accused does claim to have paid the amount to Parma, and the acquittance roll records the payment, and there is in acknowledgment thereof a thumb-impression as against. his name. If what appears on the face of the roll is true-and whether it is true or not is not a matter relevant at the stage of sanction-then the acts with which the appellant is charged fall within the scope of his duties, and can be justified by him as done by virtue of his office.\n\nClearly, therefore, sanction was required under section 197 ( 1) of 'the Code of Criminal Procedure before the appellant could be prosecuted under section 409, and the absence of such .sanction is fatal to the maintainability of the prosecution.\n\nThe conviction should, therefore, be quashed.\n\nIn this view, there is no need to consider whether on the evidence, : the offence of criminal misappropriation or forgery has been brought home to the· appellant or not.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed; and the' c'c; mvictions and sentences passed on the appellant are set aside. 'Fine,.' if paid, will be refunded. · ' · ' : 'Appeal allowed. ' !\n\n\\ .\n\n......", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "l\\MRIK SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 336, "end_char": 348, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "l\\MRIK SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF PEPSU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 353, "end_char": 371, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PEPSU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. 'DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 375, "end_char": 385, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 387, "end_char": 395, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 431, "end_char": 454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 197(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 577, "end_char": 586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Hori Ram Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1918, "end_char": 1932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sanctin \"is necessary... ' ·\n\nHori Ram Singh Y •. Emperor ([1939] F.C.R. 159), H. H. B, Gill\n\nv. The King ([1948] L.R. 75 LA."}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1947, "end_char": 1964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I.A. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2060, "end_char": 2076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2826, "end_char": 2836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fai Gopal Sethi, (Naunit Lal, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2868, "end_char": 2880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra, (Porus A .. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Porus A .. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2883, "end_char": 2899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra, (Porus A .. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2904, "end_char": 2917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra, (Porus A .. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-The appellant was a Sub-Divisional Officer in the ."}}, {"text": "Parma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3539, "end_char": 3544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the roll for April 1951, one Parma was mentioned as a ."}}, {"text": "First-Class Magistrate \"of Patiala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4137, "end_char": 4171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The First-Class Magistrate \"of Patiala; before whom the appellant was put up for trial;:."}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4256, "end_char": 4267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4292, "end_char": 4296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".A.mrik Singli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4509, "end_char": 4523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51, and' after' a 'full \"trial,\n\nAmrik Singh v.\n\nTM State of PepsU:\n\n.A.mrik Singli\n\nv. ' TM State of P1ps1l\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya> J.\n\n1304 SUPREME1 CO, URT."}}, {"text": "State of P1ps1l\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya> J.\n\n1304 SUPREME1 CO, URT. REPO:(lTS~ [!955]", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4533, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51, and' after' a 'full \"trial,\n\nAmrik Singh v.\n\nTM State of PepsU:\n\n.A.mrik Singli\n\nv. ' TM State of P1ps1l\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya> J.\n\n1304 SUPREME1 CO, URT."}}, {"text": "Parma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4963, "end_char": 4968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Parma."}}, {"text": "High Court of Pepsu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5040, "end_char": 5059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the State to the High Court of Pepsu; whic; h held that proof that the."}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5304, "end_char": 5315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5321, "end_char": 5332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jai Gopal Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5490, "end_char": 5505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appeal it is argued by Mr.' Jai Gopal Sethi that theconviction of the appellant is illegal, as sanction had not been obtained under sec-· ti on 197 ( 1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure rfor\"his prosec11tiorl, that the ev'idence on record. ·,"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5622, "end_char": 5648, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5779, "end_char": 5790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5816, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6039, "end_char": 6050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6063, "end_char": 6089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7117, "end_char": 7128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7242, "end_char": 7247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was initiated without ariysanction under section 197 ( 1) of the Code of· Criminal Procedure and if sanction under that section is necessary, as contended for by Mr, Sethi,."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7408, "end_char": 7419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7566, "end_char": 7592, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7643, "end_char": 7654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7733, "end_char": 7744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7757, "end_char": 7783, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 270", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8075, "end_char": 8086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8094, "end_char": 8123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 197(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8155, "end_char": 8169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8177, "end_char": 8203, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8282, "end_char": 8293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8422, "end_char": 8433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 270", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8572, "end_char": 8583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8711, "end_char": 8722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8899, "end_char": 8910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9123, "end_char": 9140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amrik Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9150, "end_char": 9161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",1955\n\nAmrik Singh\n\nv. .", "canonical_name": "l\\MRIK SINGH"}}, {"text": "State of Ptf.'u\n\nVenkataraina", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9173, "end_char": 9202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi State of Ptf."}}, {"text": "4Jiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9204, "end_char": 9210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'u\n\nVenkataraina\n\n4Jiyar J.\n\nAmr.ik_Sigh\n\nThe State of P-.epsu\n\n, v enkatarama\n\nAyyar .J.\n\n fo the course of his judgment, Varadachariar, J. discussed , the sc0:pe of section 197 (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedur.e and after observing that the deci- sions on that section were not uniform, proceeded to group them under three categories-those which had .held that sanction w.as necessary when the act complained of attached to the official character of the person doing it, those which had held that it was necessary in all cases in which .the official character of the person gave him an opportunity for the .commission of the crime, and those which had held it necessary when the offence was committed while the - accused was actual!"}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9309, "end_char": 9322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'u\n\nVenkataraina\n\n4Jiyar J.\n\nAmr.ik_Sigh\n\nThe State of P-.epsu\n\n, v enkatarama\n\nAyyar .J.\n\n fo the course of his judgment, Varadachariar, J. discussed , the sc0:pe of section 197 (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedur.e and after observing that the deci- sions on that section were not uniform, proceeded to group them under three categories-those which had .held that sanction w.as necessary when the act complained of attached to the official character of the person doing it, those which had held that it was necessary in all cases in which .the official character of the person gave him an opportunity for the .commission of the crime, and those which had held it necessary when the offence was committed while the - accused was actual!", "canonical_name": "Varadachariar"}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9353, "end_char": 9364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10132, "end_char": 10143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10156, "end_char": 10182, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10263, "end_char": 10274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10348, "end_char": 10359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 270", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10462, "end_char": 10473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10482, "end_char": 10511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "aradachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10557, "end_char": 10569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question whether sanction was necessary under section 197 ( l) it was held 'by the Privy Council that there was no difference in scope between that section and section 270 of .the Government of India Act, 1935, and approving the statement of the law by V:aradachariar, J. in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor.('),", "canonical_name": "Varadachariar"}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10613, "end_char": 10620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Simonds observed: ·\n\n\"A public servant can Gnly be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within .the scope of his official duty ........ The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office\"."}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11306, "end_char": 11323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I. A. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11337, "end_char": 11354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 197(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11608, "end_char": 11622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11630, "end_char": 11656, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12422, "end_char": 12433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12842, "end_char": 12853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 76 I.A. 10", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13467, "end_char": 13482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R 216", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13489, "end_char": 13507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13514, "end_char": 13531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I. A. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13545, "end_char": 13562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Pepsu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13582, "end_char": 13596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amrik Singh\n\nThe State of Pepsu\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n."}}, {"text": "section 197(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13760, "end_char": 13774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14136, "end_char": 14147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14204, "end_char": 14216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15688, "end_char": 15705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I.A. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15722, "end_char": 15738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16443, "end_char": 16454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sulaiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16679, "end_char": 16687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may also be made to the following observations of Sulaiman, J. in the same case :\n\n\"The question whether a criminal breach of trust can be committed while purporting to act in execution of his duty is not capable of being answered hypothetically in the abstract, without any reference to the actual facts of the case."}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17842, "end_char": 17859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I.A. 41", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17904, "end_char": 17919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1nkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17980, "end_char": 17990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9-90 S. C, India/59\n\nAmrik Singh v.\n\nThi State of Pepsu\n\nV 1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nAmrik Singh . '"}}, {"text": "khalasi Parma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18993, "end_char": 19006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then it was his duty to pay that amount to the khalasi Parma, and take his signature or thumb-impression in acknowle<lgment thereof."}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19588, "end_char": 19599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19613, "end_char": 19639, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19687, "end_char": 19698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1311_1332_EN", "year": 1955, "text": ". (\n\nv .\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1311\n\n THE COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY ... ) . . . ,, . .. . .\n\n. \"·\n\nNUSSERWANJLRATTANJI MISTRI & OTHERS .. . '\n\n(VIVIAN BosE,\n\n}AGANNADHADAS,\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and SINHA JJ.] ·\n\nLand revenue-Assessment-Right of Government to levy-Foras tenure-Incidents-Foras Land Act (Bombay Act VI of 1851), s. 2- Land Acquisition, effect of-Land Acquisition Act (VI of 1857), s. 8 -Crown Grants Act (XV of 1857), s. 3-Scope of-Bombay City Land Revenue Act (Bombay Act II of 1876).\n\nIn the island of Bombay certain lands were held on a tenure known as \"Foras\".\n\nUnder s. 2 of Bombay Act VI of 1851 the occupants were entitled to hold the lands subject only to the payment of revenue .then payable. Between 1864 and 1867 the Government of India acquired these lands under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (VI of 1857). On 22-11-1938 the Governor-General sold them to certain persons under whom the present respondents claimed. In April 1942 the appellant acting under the Bombay City Land Revenue Act (Bombay Act II of 1876) issued notices to the respondents proposing to levy assessment on the lands at the rates mentioned therein.\n\nThe respondents thereupon instituted two suits disputing the right of the appellant to assess the lands to revenue.\n\nThey contended that under the Foras Land Act the occupants had acquired the right to hold the lands on payment of revenue not exceeding what was then payable, that the right to. levy even that asseessment was extinguished when the Government acquired the !_ands under the Land Acquisition Act, that the Governor-General having conveyed the lands absolutely under the sale deed dated 22-11-1938 the respondents were entitled to hold them revenue-free and that even if revenue was payable it could not exceed what was payable under the Foras Land Act.\n\nHeld, (i) that under the Foras Land Act (VI of 1851) the occupants of Foras lands acquired a specific right to. hold th.em on payment of assessment not exceeding what was then payable.\n\n(ii) that the right of the Government to levy assessment was not the. subject-matter of the land acquisition proceedings and that the effect of those proceedings was only to extinguish the rights of the occupants in the lands and to vest them absolutely in the Government. · ·\n\n(iii) that where there is an absoiute sale by the Crow1.1 it does not necessarily import that the fand' Js conveyed revenuefree: ·\n\nThe question 1s one of construction of the grant. The rule is that a grantee from the Crown gets only what is granted by the\n\nFebruary 28\n\n1?:55: The cOl; e-clOr.of\n\n'Bombaj, ·\n\nNusserwanji Rattanj1° Mistri and others\n\ndeed and nothing. passes by_ implication.\n\nWhen the grant is em bodied in a deed the question Ultimately reduces itself to a detern1i nation of what was granted therronder.\n\nSection 3 of the Cro\\vn Grants Act (XV of 1895) that \"all provisions,. restrictions,- conditions and limitations over shall' take effect according to their tenor\" does not app}y when the question is as to the liability to pay revenue.\n\n(i~) that the Foras tenure became extinguished when the lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition proceedings and it was incapable of coming back to life \\vhen the lands were sold on 22·11-1938 and_ the respondents cannot claim a right tO pay assess~ ment only at the rate at Which it was payable under the Foras Land Act.\n\nGoswamini Shri Kamala Vahooji v. Collector of Bombay ([1937] L.R. 64 I.A. 334), Shapurji fivanji v. The Collector of Bombay {[1885] l.L.R.- 9 Bom. 483, 488), Naoroji Beramji v. Rogers (4 Born.\n\nH.C.R. l), Deputy Collector, Calicut Division v. Aiyavu Pillay {[1911] 9 I.C. 341), Dadoba v. Collector of Bombay {[!901] I.L.R. 25 Bom. 714), Thakur fagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces\n\n{[1946] F.L.J. 88) and Collector of Bombay v.' Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay and others ([1952] S.C.R. 43), referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAP PELLA TE No. 74 of 1952.\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeal\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 10th November 1948 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal from Original Decree No. 274 of 1945 arising out of the decree dated the 17th March 1945 of the Court of Revenue Judge, Bombay in Suits Nos. 7 and 23 of 1943.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta, with him), for the appellant.\n\nM. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India and farnshedji Kanga, (R. J. Kolah and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the respondents.\n\n1955. Febary 28.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deli.vered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The point for decision in this appeal is as to the liability of certain lands situated within the City of Bombay to be assessed to revenue under the Bombay City Land Revenue Act No. II of 1876. These lands were originally known as Foras lands, and the rights. of the occupants of\n\n' . ...,\n\n$.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQRTS 1313\n\nthose lands were settled by . Bombay Act No .. VI of 1851, called the Foras Act.' What these rights are, is a matter in controversy between the parties, and will be presently considered. Between 1864 and 1867 the Government acquired the_se lands for the purpose of the B.B.C.I. Railway, under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act No. VI of 1857. On 22-11-1938 these lands, being no longer required for the purpose of the Railway, were sold by the GovernorcGeneral to Lady Pochk.hanawalla and others as joint tenants under a deed, Exhibit A. On 28-3-1939 the survivor of the purchasers under Exhibit A conveyed the lands in trust under Exhibit B, and the respondents are the\n\ntrustees appointed under that deed.\n\nIn April 1942 the appellant acting under the provisions of Bombay Act No. II of 1876, issued notices to the respondents proposing to ievy assessment on the lands at the rates mentioned . therein, and calling for their representation.\n\nIn their reply, the respondents denied the right 9f the appellant to assess . the lands to revenue, and followed it up by instituting two suits before the Revenue Judge for establishing their rights.· In their plaints, they alleged that under the provisions of the Foras Act the maximum assessment leviable on the lands was 9 reas per burga, and that the Government had no right to enhance it; that the effect of the land acquisition proceedings between 1864 and 1867 was to extinguish the right of the State to levy even this assesssment, and that further, having purchased the properties absolutely from the Governor-General under Exhibit A, they were entitle to hold them without any liability to pay revenue thereon, They accordingly prayed for a declaration that the Government had no right to levy any assessment on these lands, or, in . the alternative, that such assessmerit should not exceed what was payable under Bombay Act No. VI of 1851.\n\nThe .. appellant contested the suit. The Revenue: Judge held that as a result . of the land acquisition proceedings between 1864 and 1867, the Jands vested .in the. Government freed froni any 1iabi4ty to pay assessment, .and that\"\n\nwhen the Governor-General transferred them under\n\n19s:r\n\nTht Collector of Bombay v.\n\nN usserwanji Rattaryi Mistri\n\nana others\n\nV1nkatarama\n\nA.J:7DT J.\n\n1955. -·-·.\n\nThe .Collector ef\n\nBombay v.\n\nNusstrl.QtJ11ji RattanJi Mistri\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nExhibit A withount reserving the . right to assess them, the purchasers . had the right to hold them without any liability to pay revenue. He accordingly. granted a declaration . that the appellant. had no right to levy assessment, and that. the notices issued . by him under Act No. II of 1876 were . illegal. On appeal by the defendants to the High Court of Bombay, it was h.eld by Chagla, C.J., Bhagwati, J. concurring, that Act No.\n\nVI of 1851 imposed a specific limit on the right_ of the Governm.ent to 'levy assessments on the lands. il). question, th<1t, . further, by reason of the land acquisition proceedings the right of , the Provincial Government to levy assessment even within the limits prescribed by Act No. VI of 1851 was extinguished,. and that when the lands were transferred by the Central Government to Lady Pochklianaw; illa and dthers, they got them as revenue-free lands.\" In the result, the appeal was dismissed.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against this decision. . · · The .statutory authority under which th~ appellant seeks to 'Jevy assessme11t on_. th, e lands. is .. ction .. 8 of\n\nBombayA, t :N~; II of 1876, and it is as follows:. ...\n\n\"It .. s~'!ll . be .. the. duty. of the. Collector, subject to the orders of Government, . to fix a11d .. to kvv. the. as-. sessmeni for. land. revemie ..\n\n. When there is no right on the part of •the 'superior holder . in limitation of . the right of : Government\"' to assess;' the assessment shall be fixed . at \" the discretion of the Collectorsubject to the.• control of,:Government.\n\nWhen 'there is a right on the:· 'part of fhe' siiprfor holder itt • limitation of the right of Government, in consequence of a . specific . %nit .. fo as\"sessmeni' 'having been established and preserved, the assessment\" shall not exceed such specific lirrii.t\"~ \". ' .. It \"Ya~ n .. ie' J0>ting'. ~t h~ '.; espp)lden~~ ,'.,\\Yer' 'sup<; t'tor holders as 'defined .m the , Act, th:il. the appellaf'; is_s'ff~.1'ntie~ to. the.¥:, in;: April )942: ID, iejr\n\nreply Iibt1ces ·.and in the plamts, the . respondents ,,.did not atS]S'ute:'ihaf-1xisiti1; m; _Bii(ortly s\\inten4eci in teqgs of s'ectib'n' 's' that tney' had a :sp~ifi'~', rigP, C in,\" mita ti1irt\" of\"'fhe; 'Tight''' of the' I Goverr, iilient to'' ~;;~ ; the .\n\n. '.i,1 1 ,~ ~!!_\";,_fr~ i;-:-;·;7•,-111 ?-: 11.-~:1\"\"'l.~ •. -,, r, ~-:, I•\".' '\":·!'\n\n' r ,,\n\nland; and the entire controversy in the Courts below was whether - they had istablished that right; No contention was raised that they were not superior holders as defined in the Act, and that, in_ consequence, no assessment could be imposed on the lands under section 8 of the Act.\n\nIn the argument before us, the contention was sought to be raised -for the first time by the learned Attorney-General that the proceedings taken by the Collector under section 8 were incompetent, as that section would apply only to lands held by superior holders, that the definition of 'superior holder' in section 3( 4) as meaning \"the person having the_ highest title under the Provincial Government to any land in the City of Bombay\" would take in only per.Sons who held on a derivative tenure from the Government, that persons who acquired lands from the Government under an outright sale could no_t be described as 'superior holders' within section 3( 4), and that the lands held by the respondents were therefore outside the operation of section ~8. -\n\nOn behalf _of the appellant, the learned Solicitor- General objected to this question being allowed to_ be raised at this stage of the proceedings, as. that would involve investigation of questions of fact and -of lw, such as whether under the tenures in the City ·-_ of Bombay, .owners held the lands_ as superior hold_ers, whether pnCler Indian jurisprudence what was paid by the occupier of land _w.as rent or .revenue, whether the prerogative. right of the Crown to assess lands subsisted in the Presidency Towns of Calcutta,_ Bombay .- and Madras and several other questions, for the decision -of which there - were not sufficient - materials.\n\nThis objectionmust be upheld. In view of the fact that the. respondents have, at all stages~ claimed immunity from assessment on the basis of section 8,. _we do not, consider that. it would be proper to -allow them now to, change their front, and, take up a snd wh91ly inconsistel).t with , what they _had taken, when., that)nvolves an ~Q._vs_tigaion, into factS - which _h~~--nt. ben made._ We_. must, •. therefore, _ proceed __ on . the footing that the respondents are 'superior holders; -as ~Clfiiied ·-·- _-·- .1 ... ·;1_..:.··; j•\n\n-1955\n\nThe Col/ctor oj\n\n._Bombay _v. -Jv usserwanji Rattanji Mi.rt.ri and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\n.Ayyar J.\n\nThe Collector Of\n\nBombay\n\nV.\n\nNusierwatlji Ratta'!ii Mistri\n\nand others\n\nVenkalarama\n\nA.yyar j.\n\nin section 3( 4) of Act No. II of 1876, and that their rights are to be determined in accordance with section 8 of the Act.\n\nConstruing that section, the Privy Council laid down in Goswamini Shri Kamala Vahooji v. Collector of 'Bombay( 1 ) two propositions : that though the language of the section would more appropriately apply when the -, dispute was as to the quantum of assessment, the right to levy it not being itself controverted, it was open to the superior holder under this section to plead and prove that the State had no right to levy any assessment; and that the burden was .on the person who pleaded a limitation on the right of the State to assess, to clearly and unequivocally establish it.\n\nIt is, therefore, open to . the respondents to plead that the lands are wholly exempt from revenue; bur the onus of making it out lies heavily on them.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has . sought to estab. lish a right in the respondents in limitation of the right of the appellant to :issess .the lands on three grounds: (l) the Foras Act No. VI of 1851, (2) the land acquistion proceedings under Act No. VI of 1857, and (3) the; sale deed, Exhibit A. Taking first \"-' the Foras Act: For a correct appreCiation of its prc>- visions, it is necessary to refer to the 'history of the lands, which are dealt with therein. The Island of Bombay once formed part of the Portuguese Dominions in India. In 1661 when Princess Infante Catherine was married to King Charles II of England, it was ceded by the King of Portugal. to the British Crown as dowry, and by a Royal Charter dated 27th March 1668 King Charles II granted it >- to the East India Company. At that time the Island consisted only of the Fort and the . town, and \"outside the walls of the town it was scarcely more than rock and marsh which becarrie a group. of islands every day ' on high tidt\" .. Vide Shapurji Jivimji v.\n\nThe .Collector of. Bombay('). It appears 'from War- . den's Report 011 the Landed Tenure• . In. Bombay and\n\n1..e. Mesuri~'s Report on the Fo~:is lando, that dur'- ing . the Hlth ntury .the East India . Company starte, d \" \"'\n\n(I) [1937) L.R. 64 I.A. 334.\n\n(2) [1885) I.L.R. 9 Bom. 483,488.\n\n' I\n\nreclaiming these lands, and invited the inhabitants to cultivate , them, at first without payment of any assessment and subsequently on favourable rates.\n\nThese payments were called \"Foras\". The meaning of this word is thus explained by Westropp, J. in his note at page 40 in Naoroji Beramji v. Rogers(1) :-\n\n\" 'Foras' is derived from the Portuguese word 'fora', (Latine foras, from foris a door), signifying outside.\n\nIt here indicates the rent or revenue derived from outlying lands.\n\nThe whole island of Bombay fell under that denomination when under Portuguese rule, being then a mere outlying dependency of Bassein. Subsequently the term foras was, for the most part, though perhaps not quite exclusively, limited to the new salt batty ground reclaimed from the sea, or other waste ground lying outside the Fort, Native Town, and other the more ancient settled and cultivated grounds in the island, or to the quitrent arising. from that new salt battjr ground and .outlying ground\".\n\nThus, the salt batty lands reclaimed from the sea came to be known as Foras lands by association with the assessments payable thereon called \"Foras\": The nature .of the interest which the occupants had in the Foras lands was the subject of considerable. debate in the beginning of the 19th Century. In 1804, the Company resumed some of the Foras lands for settling persons displaced in the Town area, and that resulted in a suit by one Sheik Abdul Ambly, wherein the right of the Company to resume the lands was challenged. The action failed, the Court upholding the claim .of the Company to resume them, but at the same time, it observed that its action in dispossessing the occupants would \"appear and be fdt as a grievous hardship, if not an open and downright injury\". Vide Warden's Report on the Landed Tenures of Bombay, pages 60 and 61. Thereafter, the Company had the matter further investigated, and there were reports on the subject by Warden in 1814 and Le Mesurier in 1843.\n\nAnd finally the Company decided to reeognise\n\n'i955\n\nThe Collector of Bombay\n\nv; . Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand others\n\nVe'n:katCiramcln\n\nAyjar J.\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay ,,, Nusserwa, Yi Rattanji Mistri and others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAY.Y\"r ],\n\n1318 SUPREME coURT REPORTS\n\n[1955.J\n\nthe rights Of the occupants, and. that resulted in. the enactment of. Act SI of. 1851. . _ The 'relevant provisions of the. Act may now be noticed. The preamble to the Act states that,\n\n\"Whereas the East India Company are legally entitled to the freehold reversion of the several lands heretofore paying a render called foras, the outline whereof is delineated in a plan ........ and numbered 1,. subject to certain tenancies therein at will, or from year to year; whereas it is considered expedient as of grace and favour that the rights of the said East India Company in all of the lands included in the said plan,. .. .... should be extinguished, save . as. hereinafter mentioned. It iL enacted as follows :\" Section 2 enacts tha.t : .\n\n\"From and -after -the said 1st day of July, the rights of the. said Company in all of the said lands mentioned in the said plan No. 1, except those men\" tioned. in the said plan No. 2, shall be extinguished in favour of the persons who shall then hold the same respectively-. as the immediate rent-payers to the said.\n\nCompany,. -saving the. rents now severally payable .in respect of .. such lands, which shall continue. payable and recoverable by distress, or by any means by which land .revenue in Bombay is or shall be recoverable, under any .Act or Regtilation .... -'.- .. \" ....\n\nSection 4 provides-: . · ·· . \"Nothing . herein contained shall exempt such lands from , being . liable to any further general taxes on land in' Bombay ....... \"·\"\n\nAccording to the appellant, the effect of these provisions was to grant. the lands to the occupants.· on a permanent ... tenure, . heritable and alienable, • .but not further, to • grant - them on. a permanent assessment.\n\nReliance was also placed on the decision in Shapurjt /ivanji.•v. The. Collector of Bombay('), where it was held genem!ly that., the Government had the• .right. under section 8.·. of the -Act to enhance the assessments: \"on Foras lands. - There is some -support for .. :this contention, .juthe provisions. ·of : the Act., The •• preamble\n\n--.-~}-; ·,,,.,---.- -.,,,, . ' ·-\n\nexpressly recites that th-e occupants were tenants at will or from year to year, and that the reversion was with the East India Company. One consequence of that was that the Company had the right to eject the occupants.- -Now, what the Company did under the Act was to give up that right as a matter of grace, because, as already mentioned, it would appear to have invited them to settle on the lands and cultivate them, and it did that.by extinguishing its reversion as landlord .. In other words, it agreed to confer on the tenants the status of owners oflands. If that was all the scope of Act No. VI of 1851, it could not be doubted that the rights of the State to_ enhance. the assessments would not be affected, because ownership of land does not per se carry _with it an immunity from enhancement of assessment in exercise of sovereign rights, apd occupants ofForas lands cannot claim to be in a better position by reason of the Act than owners of lands in ryotwari tracts, the assess- - men ts on which are liable to periodic revision. But what is against the appellant is that section 2 does not stop with merely extinguishing the reversionary rights of the Company. It goes further, and saves expressly \"the rents now severally payable in respect of such lands\", rent being used here in the sense of assessment, and adds \"which shall :continue to be payable\". Now, the contention of the respondents is that those .words conferred on the Government a right to recover only the assessment which was then payable, and that there was thus a limitation on its right to enhance it. It is common ground that the assessment payable on these lands at that time was 9 reas per burga, and Exhibit N shows that it was at that rate that the assessment was collected from 1858 until the lands were acquired by the Government in land acquisition proceedings. It is accordingly contended for the respondents that under the Act, the Government could not claim anything more. than 9 reas per burga as assessment on the lands. It is urged for the appellant that the words \"now severally payable\" could not be construed as impos- . lW\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay\n\nv. l•tusseruanji Rattanji Aiistri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Collector oj\n\nBo111ay\n\nVo NU!strwanji Rattilnji Mistri and others -··-· Venkatartima Ayya' J.\n\ning a limitation on the right of the Government to enhance the assessment, as they occur in ' a ' saving clause, the scope of which was to reserve . the' rights of the Company and not to corifer on the occupants rights in addition . to what the body of the section had granted to them. It is true that the S<:tting in which these words occur is more appropriate for reserving rights in favour of the Company than for declaring any in favour of the occupants. But to adopt the construction 'contended '' for by 'the' appellant ' would be to render the words ''now' severally 'payable\"' and \"which shall co'ntinue to be payable;\" wholly meaningless.\n\nNotwithstanding that the drafting is inartistic, the true import of the clause unmistakably is that while, on the one hand, the right of the Government to recover the assessment is saved, it 'is, on the other hand, limited to the amount then · payable by the occupants; The contention of the respondents that under the Foras Act they acquired a specific right to hol, d the lands on ' payment of assessment not exceedin'g what was then payab.le, must, 'therefore, be accepted~ ··· ·\" , . .\n\nWe have next to decide what effect the proceedings taken by the Government under. the. Land Acquisition Act No. VI of 1857 during the years 1864 to 1867 have 'on the rights of the parties. Section VIII of the Act is as follows : ·\n\n\"Whe~ the Ccillector or other officr has , made an award or . directed a reference to . arbitration,. he may take immediate. possessiqn. of the. land. which shall thenceforward be vested absolutely . 'in , the Government, , free from all other ' estates, rights, titles. and interests\". The' <:Ontention of' the respondents \"which\" has found favour with the Courts. below is that under that section the effect of the vesting of the 'lands in the Government was to extinguih whatever' interests:· were previously held over them, that the. right\"'of ·the Government t<i levy assessment was such an interest, and that it was also extinguished .. It is ar'1\\led that when. lands. are acquired un.der. the, Act,. the valuation that is made is of all the interests subsisting thereon, including the\n\nrights of the Crown. to assess the lands, as well as the interests of the claimants therein, that what is paid to the owners . is not the full value of the lands but the value . of.their interests therein, deduction being made of . the value of the right of the Government to assess from out of the full value, and .that, in effect, there was an ; iward of compensation for the right to assess, and that, therefore, that right equally with the rights of the claimants. over the lands would be extinguished. One pf the awards has been marked as Exhibit J>, and the respondents rely on the recitals therein that the compensation to the claimants was \"for their interest in the said lands\". The award, it must be mentioned, directs the Government to pay the claimants the amounts specified therein, but contains no provision for payment of any sum as compensation to the Government for its right to assess the lands; nor does it even value that right. But the respondents contended that the Government being the authority to pay must be deemed to have paid itself, and that, in any event, if they were entitled to\n\ncompensation, their failure to claim it could not affect the result, which was that the right to levy assessment would be extinguished.\n\nWe are unable to accept this contention. When the Government acquires lands under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, it must be for a public purpose, and with a view to put them to that purpose, the Government acquires the sum total of all private interests subsisting in them. If the Govern ment has itself an interest in the land, it has only to acquire the other interests outstanding therein, so that it might be in a position to pass it on absolutely for public user.\n\nIn In the Matter of the Land Acquisition Act: The Government of Bombay. v. Esupali Salebhai(1) Batchelor, J. observed :\n\n\"In other words Government, as it seems to me, -are not debarred from acquiring and paying for the only outstanding interests merely because the Act, which primarily contemplates all interests as held outside Government, directs that the entire compen-\n\n.i.9s_~\n\nTht Collector ef\n\nBombay v .. . Nusserwanj'i\n\nRattanji Mistri and others v enkataraman\n\nAyyer J.\n\nThe Collector of Bombay\n\nNussrrwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand other'\n\nVenkatarama\n\n, dyyar J. ·\n\n1322 STiJP.RiEME CG>GRT REPORTS [1955]\n\nsation based upon the market value of the whole land, .must be distributed •among. the dainiants\". ,_,,;: • - There,. 'the <;:overnment 'c!ainied ownership 'ofthe'land on whith there - stciod buildings '-belonging' to the claimants,' and it was lleld that the Government was boilnd to acquire -and pay only for the superstructure, as it was already• the owner of the site:· Similarly in Deputy Collector, Calicut' Division v. Aiyai1u Pi/lay('), Wallis, J. (as he - then was) observed :\n\n\"It is, in my opinion, -clear that the Acf does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest which already belongs -to Government in land which is being acquired under the Act,' but only for the acquisition of such interests in the land as 'do not already belong to the' Government\".\n\nWith these observations, we are in entire agreement.\n\nWhen Government possesses an interest in land which is the subject of -acquisition under the Act, that interest is itself outside such acquisition, because there can be no question of Government acquiring what is its own. An investigation into the nature and value of that interest will no doubt be necessary for determining the compensation payable for the interest outstanding in the claimants, but that would not make it the subject of acquisition.\n\nThe language of section VIII of Act No. VI of 1857 also _ supports this _construction. Under that section, the lands _vest in the Government \"free from all other estates, rights, titles and interests\", which must -clearly mean other than those possessed by the Government.\n\nIt ' is on this understanding of the section that the award, Exhibit P, is framed. The scheme of it is that the interests of the occupants are ascertained and valued, and the Gov.ernment isdirected to pay the compensation fixed for them. There is no valuation of the right of the Government to levy assessment on the lands, and there is no award of compensation therefor.\n\nWe have so far assumed with the re.spondents' that the right of the Government to levy assessment is an interest . in land within the -meaning of sec(ion VIII\n\n(1) [1911] 9 I. C. 341.\n\n' I-\n\n-.,\n\n. , ...\n\nSUPREME COUKf REPORTS 1323\n\nof Act VI of 1857. But is thi~ ·.assumption well~ founded? We think not. In its normal acceptation, \"interest\" means one or more of those rights ·. which go to make up \"ownership\". It will include for example, mortgage, lease, charge, easement . and the like, but the right to impose a tax on land is a prerogative right of the Crown, paramount to the ownership over the land and outside it. Under the scheme of ·the Land Acquisition Act, what is acquired is only the ownership over the lands, or the inferior rights comprised therein. Section 3 (b) of the Land Acquisition Act No. I of 1894 defines a \"person interested\"\n\nas including \"all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act, and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land\". Section 9 requires that notices should be given to all persons who are interested in the land.\n\nUnder section 11, the Collector has to value the land, and apportion the compensation among the claimants according to their interest in the land. Under section 16, when the Collector make an award \"he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrance\". The word \"encumbrance\" in this section can only mean interests in respect of which a compensation was made . under section 11, or could have been claimed. It cannot include the right of the Government to levy assessment on the lands. The Government is not a \"person interested\" within the definition in section 3(b), and, as already stated, the Act does not contemplate its interest being valued or compensation being awarded therefor.\n\nIt is true that there is in Act No. VI of 1957 nothing corresponding to section 3(b) of Act No. I of 1894, but an examination of the provisions Act No. VI of 1857 clearly shows that the subject-matter of acquisition under that Act was only ownership over the lands or its constituept rights and not the right of the Government to levy assessmeflt.\n\nThe provisions relating to the issue of notices to, pei;-sons . interested\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v.\n\nNusstrwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nana others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n•955\n\nT ht Coll.tctor of\n\n Bombay\n\nNasserwanji.\n\nRattanJi Minri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatatamli\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand. the apportionment of compensation among them are substantially the same. Moreover, under .section VIII the Government is to take the lands free . from - all other \"estates, rights, title and interest\", and \"interest'; must, in the context, be construed eiusdem generis with \"estates\" etc., as meaning right over lands, of the character of, but not amounting to an estate, and cannot include the prerogative right to assess the lands. It must accordingly be held that the effect of the land acquisition proceedings was only to extinguish the rights of the occupants in the lands and to vest them absolutely in the Government, that the right of the latter to levy assessment was not -the subject-matter of those proceedings; and that if after the award the lands were not assessed to revenue, it was because there could be no question of the Government levying assessment on its own lands.\n\nThen there remains the question whether the sale deed, :£xhibit A, imposes any limitation on the right of the Crown to assess the lands. The deed conveys the lands to the puchasers absolutely \"with all rights, easements and appurtenances whatsoever\" to be held \"for ever';. It does not, however recite that they are to be held revenue-free. But it is argued for the respondents that where there is an absolute sale by the Crown as here, that necessarily imports that the land is conveyed revenue-free; and section 3 of the Crown Grants Act No. XV of 1895 and certain observations in Dadoba v. Collector of Bombay(') were relied on as supporting this contention. Section 3 of Act No. XV of 1895 is as follows:\n\n' . --,,\n\n\"All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limi- >- tations over contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take affect according to their tenor any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislarure to the contrary notwithstanding\".\n\nThe contention is that as the grant is of a freehold estate without any reservation it must, to take effect according to its tenor, be construed as granting exemption from assessment to revenue. But that will be extending the bounds of section 3 beyond its con- •\n\n' ,\n\n) .\n\ntents. The object of the Act as declared m the preamble is to remove certain doubts \"as to the extent and operation of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and, as to the power of the Crown to impose limitations and restrictions upon grants and other transfers. of land made by it or under its authority\".\n\nSection 2 enacts that the provisions of the Transfer of Property. Act do not apply to Crown grants. Then follows section 3 with a positive declaration that \"all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over\" shall take effect according to their tenor. Reading the enactment as a whole, the scope of section 3 is that it saves \"provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over\" which would be bad under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, such as conditions in restraint of alienations or enjoyi; nent repugnant to the nature of the estate, limitations offending the rule against perpetuities and the like.\n\nBut no question arises here as to th.e validity of any provision, restriction, condition, or limitation over, contained in Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and there is accordingly nothing on which section 3 could take effect.\n\nIt is argued by the learned Attorney-General that this limitation on the scope of the Act applies in terms only to section 2, and that section 3 goes much further, and is general and unqualified in its operation. The scope of section 3 came up for consideration before the Privy Council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces (1). After setting out that section, Lord Wright observed: ·\n\n\"These general words cannot be read in their apparent generality. The whole Act was intended to settle doubts which had arisen as to the effect of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and must be read with reference to the general context ........ \"\n\nIn this view, section 3 must also be construed in the light of the preamble, and so construed, it cannot, for the reasons already given, have any bearing on\n\n(I) 1946 F. L. J. 88. 10-90 S. C. India/59\n\nThe Collector of\n\n(~'.S!:, Bombay v.\n\nNusserwanj Rattanji Mis ri and others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v • . NUsserwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand olhers\n\nJI enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nthe rights of the parties. Moreover, that section only enacts that \"all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over\" shall take effect according to their tenor, and what is relied on is not any provision, restnct1on, condition or limitation over, in Exhibit A which according to its tenor entitles the respondents to hold the lands rent-free, but the absolute character of the interest conveyed under Exhibit A. Therefore, section 3 does not in terms apply.\n\nThe respondents also relied on certain observations in Dadoba v. Collector of Bombay (1) as supporting their contention. There, the facts were that the Government had granted one parcel of land to the Free\n\nChurch Mission of Scotland revenue-free under a deed dated 1-10-1884. By another deed dated 20-12-1887 they released their right of reversion on two other parcels of land held by the Mission as tenants but \"subject to the payment of taxes, rates, charges, assessments leviable or chargeable in respect of the said premises or anything for the time being thereon\".\n\nOn 16-1-1888 the Mission sold all the three parcels to one Janardan Gopal, and the Secretary of State joined in the conveyance for effectually releasing the reversion of the Government. Before Tanardan Gopal purchased the lands, there had been correspondence between his solicitors and the Government as to the assessment payable on the lands, and the Government had intimated that it would be 9 pies per square yard per annum. Subsequent to the purchase, the Collector raised the . assessment payable on the lands, and the point for decision was whether he could lawfully do. so.\n\nIn deciding that he could not, Sir Lawrence Jenkins stated that the purchaser had paid full value for the lands in the belief induced by the Government that the assessment of 9 pies per sq. yard would be permanent, and that on the facts, the case fell within section 115 of the Evidence Act, and that the Government was estopped from enhancing the assessment.\n\nHe was also prepared to hold that t\\le correspondence between the purchaser and the Government prior to\n\n. .'-\n\n' .\n\n• ::f'\n\n' /\n\n;;:·\n\nthe sale amounted to a collateral contract not to raise the assessment.\n\nChandavarkar,\n\nJ., concurred in the decision, and in the course of his judgment observed:\n\n\" .... when we have regard to the 'nature of the transaction, viz., that Government was selling the property out-and-out as any private proprietor-when we look to the whole of the language used .... the intention of the parties must be taken to have been that the purchaser was to be liable to pay the amount of 9 pies per square yard per annum then levied as assessment and no more\".\n\nThese observations have been relied on as supporting the contention that when ther.e is an absolute sale by the Government, it amounts to an agreement not to levy more assessment than was payable at that time.\n\nBut the remarks of the learned Judge have reference to the recitals in the deed dated 20-12-1887 and the negotiations between the purchaser and the Government which are referred to in the passage, and not to the .character of the transfer as an absolute sale; and the decision is based on a finding of estoppel or collateral contract deducible from the correspondence between the purchaser and the Government.\n\nNeither section 3 of the Crown Grants Act, nor the observations in Dadoba v. Collector of Bombay(1) lend any support to the contention that an absolute sale of lands by the Government ipso .facto confers on the purchasers a right to hold the lands free of revenue.\n\nThe question then is whether on the terms of Exhibit A such a right could be held to have been granted. There was some discussion at the Bar as to the correct rule of construction applicable to the deed, Exhibit A.\n\nIt was argued by the learned Solicitor- General for the appellant that being a Crown grant, Exhibit A should be construed in favour of the Crown and against the grantee. On the other hand, it was argued by the learned Attorney-General that it should make no difference in the construction of the grant, whether the grantor was the Crown or a subject, as\n\nr. ,.--·\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v.\n\nN usserwanji Rattanji Mmri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\n.1955\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombqy\n\nNusserwanji Rattanji Mist; i\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nthe question in either case was what had been granted; and that must be determined on the language of the deed. When closely examined, it will be seen that there is no real conflict between the two propositions.\n\nThe former is in the nature of a rule of substantive law; and its scope is that whereas the transferee from a subject acquires, unless . the contrary appears, all the rights which the transferor has in the property as enacted in section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, as grantee from the Crown gets only what is granted by the deed, and nothing passes by implication. But when the grant is embodied in a deed, the question ultimately reduces itself to a determination of what was granted thereunder. What the Court has to do is to ascertain the intention of the grantor from the words of the document, and as the same words cannot be susceptible of two different meanings, it makes no difference whether they occur in a grant by the Crown or by the subject. If the words used in a grant by a subject would be effective to pass an interest, then those words must equally be effective to pass the same interest when they occur in a Crown grant. Dealing with this question, Sir John Coleridge observed in Lord v. Sydney ( 1) :\n\n\"But it is unnecessary for their Lordships to say more on this point, because they are clearly of opinion, that upon the true construction of this grant, the creek where it bounds the land is ad medium filum, included within it. In so holding they do not intend to differ from old authorities in respect to Crown grants; but upon a question of the meaning of the words, the same rules of common sense and justice must apply, whether the subject-matter of construction be a grant from the Crown, or from a subject; it is always a question of intention, to be coller ted from the language used with reference to the surrounding circumstances\".\n\nExhibit A has to be construed in the lignt of these principles.\n\nAs already stated, there is no recital in the deed that the purchasers are entitled to hold the lands free of assessment On the other hand, it\n\n(1) [1859] 12 Moore P.C. 473, 496, 497; 14 E.R. 991, 1000.\n\n' '\n\n...\n\nexpressly provides that the properties will be subject \"to the payment of all cesses, taxes, rates, assessments, dues and duties whatsoever now or hereafter to become payable in re.pect thereof\", which .words would in their natural and ordinary sense cover the present assessment. In Dadoba v. Collector of Bombay (1), the Court had to consider a clause similar to the above contained in a deed executed by the Government in favour of the Mission on 20-12-1887. Discussing the effect of this clause on the rights of the plaintiff to hold the property permanently on an assessment of 9 pies per sq. yard, Chandavarkar, J. observed:\n\n\"When that deed says that the property was sold 'subject to the payment of all taxes, rates, charges, assessments leviable or chargeable', it leaves the question open as to what the taxes etc., are which are 'leviable or chargeable'. Extrinsic evidence of that is admissible, for it neither contradicts nor varies the terms of the deed, but explains the sense in which the parties understood the words of the deed, which; taken by themselves, are capable of explanation : see Bank of New Zealand v. Simpson(2)''.\n\nIn that case, the dispute was not as to the liability to pay any assessment but to the quantum of assessment payable, and it was a possible view to take that the clause in question was not decisive on that question, and that it was left open. But here, the question is whether a right was granted to the purchaser to hold the lands free from liability to be assessed, and the clause in Exhibit A clearly negatives such a right.\n\nEven if we are to regard the question as left open, as observed in Dadoba v. Collector of Bombay(!) , it will not assist the respondents, as they have not established aliunde any right to hold the lands free from assessment. It must, therefore, be held that far from exempting the lands from liability to be assessed to revenue, Exhibit A expressly subjects them to it.\n\nIt was finally contended that even if the land acquisition proceedings between 1864 and 1867 had not the\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v.\n\nNttsserwanji Rattanji Mistri and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar :J,\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v.\n\nNusserwanji Rattatifi Mistri and Others\n\nV enkatarama ··\n\nAyyar ].\n\neffect of extinguishing the right of the Government to levy assessment, and that even if Exhibit A conferred on the purchasers no right to hold the land revenue-free, the assessment which the Government was entitled to levy under section 8 of Act No. II of 1876 was limited to what was payable under the Foras Act No. VI of 1851, and that the appellant had no right . to levy assessment at a rate exceeding the same. The argument in support of the contention was that it was an incident of the Foras tenure under which the lands were held, that the occupants\n\nwere bound to pay only a fixed assessment, that the incident was annexed to the lands, and was inseparable therefrom, that between the dates when the lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act No. VI of 1857 and 22-11-1938 when they were sold under Exhibit A they continued to retain their character as F oras lands, that if no assessment was paid on the lands during that period, it was because the hand to pay and the hand to receive were the same, that when they came to the respondents under Exhibit A, they became impressed with the Foras tenure, and that, in consequence, they were liable to be assessed only at the rate payable under Act No. VI of 1851.\n\nThis contention is, in our judgment, wholly untenable. When the lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act No. VI of 1857, the entire \"estate. right, title and interest\" subsisting thereon became extinguished, and the lands vested in the Government absolutely freed from Foras tenure, arid when they were sold by the Government under Exhibit A the purchasers obtained them as freehold and not as Foras lands. As the tenure under which the lands were originally held had become extinguished as a result of the land acquisition proceedings, it was incapable of coming back to life, when the lands were sold under Exhibit A.\n\nIn support of the contention that the incidents of the Foras tenure continued to attach to the lands in the hands of the respondents, the learned Attornev- General relied on the following .observations of\n\n\"' .\n\n' .\n\n. /\n\n+· -\n\nDas, J. in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the .City of Bombay and others (1) :-\n\n\"The immunity from the liability to pay rent .is just as much an integral part or an inseverable incident of the title so acquired as is the obligation to hold the land for the purposes of a market and for no other purpose\".\n\nBut the point for decision there was whether the Municipal Corporation of Bombay could acquire by prescription a right to hold the lands rent-free, they having entered into possession under a resolution of the Government that no rent would be charged.\n\nAnd the passage quoted above merely laid down that when title to the land was acquired by the Municipal Corporation by prescription, one of the rights acquired as part of, the prescriptive title was the right t.o hold the lands revenue-free. But the question here is whether the right to hold the lands under a fixed assess- . ment survived after the acquisition by the Government under the land acquisition proceedings, and that depends on the effect of section VUI of Act .VI of 1857.\n\nIf, as observed in the . above passage, the liability to pay assessment was \"an integral part or an inseverable incident of the title\", then surely it was also extinguished along with the title of the occupants under section VIII of Act No. VI of 1857.\n\nThere is another difficulty in the way of accepting the contention of the respondents. The Foras Act was repealed in 1870 by Act No. XIV of 1870 long prior to the date of Exhibit A, and therefore, even if we hold that the Foras tenure revived in the hands of the purchasers under Exhibit A, the rights under the Foras Act were no longer available in respect of the lands. Section 1 of Act No. XIV of 1870 saves rights \"already acquired or accrued'', and it is argued that the rights now claimed are within the saving clause. But as the lands had all been acquired under Act No. VI of 1857 between 1864 and 1867 there were no rights in respect of the lands which could subsist at the date of the repeal, and the rights now claimed\n\n(I}\n\n1952 S.C.R. 43, 52.\n\n,-.,\n\nI •\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v.\n\nNusserwanji Ratlanji Mistri and others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].\n\n'955\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay\n\nNusserwanji Rattanji Mislri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nMarch I\n\nby the respondents are not within the saving clause.\n\nIn the result, it must be held that the right of the appellant to levy assessment under section 8 of Act No. II of 1876 is not limited by any right in the respondents.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Courts below, and dismiss both the suits instituted by the respondents with costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nSURAJ PAL\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 302, 307-Charges and conviction by trial court under s. 302 read with s. 149 and under s. 307 read with s. 149 of the Code-Conviction by the appellate couri under ss. 302 and 307 of the Code-Legality-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 236, 237-Applicability-Retrlal.\n\nWhere a person has been charged along with others under ss. 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code each, only as read with section 149 of the Code, his convictions and sentences for the sub stantial offences under ss. 302 and 307 of the Code are erroneous.\n\nThe absence of specific charges in this. behalf is a serious lacuna in the proceedings, inasmuch as the framing of a specific and distinct charge in respect of every distinct head of criminal liability consti\n\ntuting an offence is the foundation for a conviction and sentence cherefor. The conviction in these circumstances under ss. 302 and 307 of the Code and sentences of death and transportation for life -cannot be maintained unless the Court is satisfied, on the facts of the case, that the accused has not been prejudiced in his trial. Whe ther or not in such a situation the questioning of the accused during the course of his examination under s. 342 of the. Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the offences under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code can be relied upon as obviating the likelihood of prejudice has to be determined \\Vith reference to the facts and ircumstances of each case.\n\nAll the circumstances of the case and the evidence and materials on the record should be looked into on the question arising in such a situation as to whether a retrial should be ordered or not ..\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 139 of 1954.", "total_entities": 154, "entities": [{"text": "THE COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NUSSERWANJLRATTANJI MISTRI & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NUSSERWANJLRATTANJI MISTRI & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 208, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land revenue-Assessment-Right of Government to levy-Foras tenure-Incidents-Foras Land Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213, "end_char": 302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VI of 1851", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 304, "end_char": 325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 328, "end_char": 332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act VI of 1851", "statute": "Bombay Act VI of 1851"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 362, "end_char": 382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 397, "end_char": 401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Crown Grants Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434, "end_char": 438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Crown Grants Act", "statute": "Crown Grants Act"}}, {"text": "Scope of-Bombay City Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 439, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act II of 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 478, "end_char": 499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 520, "end_char": 526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the island of Bombay certain lands were held on a tenure known as \"Foras\"."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 588, "end_char": 592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act II of 1876", "statute": "Bombay Act II of 1876"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VI of 1851", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 596, "end_char": 617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 1864 and 1867 the Government of India acquired these lands under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (VI of 1857)."}}, {"text": "22-11-1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 851, "end_char": 861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22-11-1938 the Governor-General sold them to certain persons under whom the present respondents claimed."}}, {"text": "Bombay Act II of 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1031, "end_char": 1052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "They contended that under the Foras Land Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nusserwanji Rattanj1° Mistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2605, "end_char": 2633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule is that a grantee from the Crown gets only what is granted by the\n\nFebruary 28\n\n1?:55: The cOl; e-clOr.of\n\n'Bombaj, ·\n\nNusserwanji Rattanj1° Mistri and others\n\ndeed and nothing.", "canonical_name": "Nusserwanji Rattanj1° Mistri"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2820, "end_char": 2829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22·11-1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3244, "end_char": 3254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(i~) that the Foras tenure became extinguished when the lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition proceedings and it was incapable of coming back to life \\vhen the lands were sold on 22·11-1938 and_ the respondents cannot claim a right tO pay assess~ ment only at the rate at Which it was payable under the Foras Land Act."}}, {"text": "Which it was payable under the Foras Land Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3337, "end_char": 3382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 64 I.A. 334", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4271, "end_char": 4285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4316, "end_char": 4330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India and farnshedji Kanga, (R. J. Kolah and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4430, "end_char": 4441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India and farnshedji Kanga, (R. J. Kolah and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4446, "end_char": 4461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India and farnshedji Kanga, (R. J. Kolah and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B.B.C.I. Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5177, "end_char": 5193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 1864 and 1867 the Government acquired the_se lands for the purpose of the B.B.C.I. Railway, under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act No."}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5219, "end_char": 5239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pochk.hanawalla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5382, "end_char": 5397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22-11-1938 these lands, being no longer required for the purpose of the Railway, were sold by the GovernorcGeneral to Lady Pochk.hanawalla and others as joint tenants under a deed, Exhibit A. On 28-3-1939 the survivor of the purchasers under Exhibit A conveyed the lands in trust under Exhibit B, and the respondents are the\n\ntrustees appointed under that deed."}}, {"text": "28-3-1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5454, "end_char": 5463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22-11-1938 these lands, being no longer required for the purpose of the Railway, were sold by the GovernorcGeneral to Lady Pochk.hanawalla and others as joint tenants under a deed, Exhibit A. On 28-3-1939 the survivor of the purchasers under Exhibit A conveyed the lands in trust under Exhibit B, and the respondents are the\n\ntrustees appointed under that deed."}}, {"text": "N usserwanji Rattaryi Mistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7126, "end_char": 7154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government freed froni any 1iabi4ty to pay assessment, .and that\"\n\nwhen the Governor-General transferred them under\n\n19s:r\n\nTht Collector of Bombay v.\n\nN usserwanji Rattaryi Mistri\n\nana others\n\nV1nkatarama\n\nA.J:7DT J.\n\n1955. -·-·."}}, {"text": "QtJ11ji RattanJi Mistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7244, "end_char": 7267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "QtJ11ji RattanJi Mistri\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nExhibit A withount reserving the ."}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7295, "end_char": 7300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "QtJ11ji RattanJi Mistri\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nExhibit A withount reserving the .", "canonical_name": "Ayyar"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7651, "end_char": 7671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the defendants to the High Court of Bombay, it was h.eld by Chagla, C.J., Bhagwati, J. concurring, that Act No."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7689, "end_char": 7695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the defendants to the High Court of Bombay, it was h.eld by Chagla, C.J., Bhagwati, J. concurring, that Act No."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7703, "end_char": 7711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the defendants to the High Court of Bombay, it was h.eld by Chagla, C.J., Bhagwati, J. concurring, that Act No."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8108, "end_char": 8126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that when the lands were transferred by the Central Government to Lady Pochklianaw; illa and dthers, they got them as revenue-free lands.\""}}, {"text": "Pochklianaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8135, "end_char": 8146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that when the lands were transferred by the Central Government to Lady Pochklianaw; illa and dthers, they got them as revenue-free lands.\""}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9951, "end_char": 9960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10142, "end_char": 10151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10282, "end_char": 10295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10621, "end_char": 10634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11254, "end_char": 11262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "right of the Crown to assess lands subsisted in the Presidency Towns of Calcutta,_ Bombay .- and Madras and several other questions, for the decision -of which there - were not sufficient - materials."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11279, "end_char": 11285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "right of the Crown to assess lands subsisted in the Presidency Towns of Calcutta,_ Bombay .- and Madras and several other questions, for the decision -of which there - were not sufficient - materials."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama\n\n.Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12004, "end_char": 12023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j•\n1955\n\nThe Col/ctor oj\n\n.Bombay v. -Jv usserwanji Rattanji Mi.rt.ri and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\n.Ayyar J.\n\nThe Collector Of\n\nBombay\n\nV.\n\nNusierwatlji Ratta'!ii Mistri\n\nand others\n\nVenkalarama\n\nA.yyar j.\n\nin section 3( 4) of Act No.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\n.Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Venkalarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12101, "end_char": 12112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j•\n1955\n\nThe Col/ctor oj\n\n.Bombay v. -Jv usserwanji Rattanji Mi.rt.ri and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\n.Ayyar J.\n\nThe Collector Of\n\nBombay\n\nV.\n\nNusierwatlji Ratta'!ii Mistri\n\nand others\n\nVenkalarama\n\nA.yyar j.\n\nin section 3( 4) of Act No."}}, {"text": "section 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12128, "end_char": 12141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12227, "end_char": 12236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13521, "end_char": 13526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Island of Bombay once formed part of the Portuguese Dominions in India."}}, {"text": "Infante Catherine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13550, "end_char": 13567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1661 when Princess Infante Catherine was married to King Charles II of England, it was ceded by the King of Portugal."}}, {"text": "Charles II", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13588, "end_char": 13598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1661 when Princess Infante Catherine was married to King Charles II of England, it was ceded by the King of Portugal."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13602, "end_char": 13609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1661 when Princess Infante Catherine was married to King Charles II of England, it was ceded by the King of Portugal."}}, {"text": "Portugal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13639, "end_char": 13647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1661 when Princess Infante Catherine was married to King Charles II of England, it was ceded by the King of Portugal."}}, {"text": "27th March 1668", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13709, "end_char": 13724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the British Crown as dowry, and by a Royal Charter dated 27th March 1668 King Charles II granted it >- to the East India Company."}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13762, "end_char": 13780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the British Crown as dowry, and by a Royal Charter dated 27th March 1668 King Charles II granted it >- to the East India Company."}}, {"text": "Mesuri~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14129, "end_char": 14136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay and\n\n1..e. Mesuri~'s Report on the Fo~:is lando, that dur'- ing ."}}, {"text": "L.R. 64 I.A. 334", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14252, "end_char": 14268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Westropp", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14548, "end_char": 14556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The meaning of this word is thus explained by Westropp, J. in his note at page 40 in Naoroji Beramji v. Rogers(1) :-\n\n\" 'Foras' is derived from the Portuguese word 'fora', (Latine foras, from foris a door), signifying outside."}}, {"text": "Sheik Abdul Ambly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15736, "end_char": 15753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1804, the Company resumed some of the Foras lands for settling persons displaced in the Town area, and that resulted in a suit by one Sheik Abdul Ambly, wherein the right of the Company to resume the lands was challenged."}}, {"text": "Collector of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16344, "end_char": 16363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And finally the Company decided to reeognise\n\n'i955\n\nThe Collector of Bombay\n\nv; .", "canonical_name": "Collector of\n\nBombay"}}, {"text": "Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16370, "end_char": 16397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand others\n\nVe'n:katCiramcln\n\nAyjar J.\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay ,,, Nusserwa, Yi Rattanji Mistri and others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAY.Y\"r ],\n\n1318 SUPREME coURT REPORTS\n\n[1955.J\n\nthe rights Of the occupants, and.", "canonical_name": "Nusserwanji Rattanj1° Mistri"}}, {"text": "Ayjar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16429, "end_char": 16434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand others\n\nVe'n:katCiramcln\n\nAyjar J.\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay ,,, Nusserwa, Yi Rattanji Mistri and others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAY.Y\"r ],\n\n1318 SUPREME coURT REPORTS\n\n[1955.J\n\nthe rights Of the occupants, and."}}, {"text": "Collector of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16443, "end_char": 16463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand others\n\nVe'n:katCiramcln\n\nAyjar J.\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay ,,, Nusserwa, Yi Rattanji Mistri and others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAY.Y\"r ],\n\n1318 SUPREME coURT REPORTS\n\n[1955.J\n\nthe rights Of the occupants, and.", "canonical_name": "Collector of\n\nBombay"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17283, "end_char": 17292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17898, "end_char": 17907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18452, "end_char": 18461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19746, "end_char": 19755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Collector of\n\nBombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20790, "end_char": 20810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lW\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay\n\nv. l•tusseruanji Rattanji Aiistri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Collector oj\n\nBo111ay\n\nVo NU!strwanji Rattilnji Mistri and others -··-· Venkatartima Ayya' J.\n\ning a limitation on the right of the Government to enhance the assessment, as they occur in ' a ' saving clause, the scope of which was to reserve .", "canonical_name": "Collector of\n\nBombay"}}, {"text": "l•tusseruanji Rattanji Aiistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20815, "end_char": 20845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lW\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay\n\nv. l•tusseruanji Rattanji Aiistri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Collector oj\n\nBo111ay\n\nVo NU!strwanji Rattilnji Mistri and others -··-· Venkatartima Ayya' J.\n\ning a limitation on the right of the Government to enhance the assessment, as they occur in ' a ' saving clause, the scope of which was to reserve ."}}, {"text": "NU!strwanji Rattilnji Mistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20912, "end_char": 20940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lW\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay\n\nv. l•tusseruanji Rattanji Aiistri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Collector oj\n\nBo111ay\n\nVo NU!strwanji Rattilnji Mistri and others -··-· Venkatartima Ayya' J.\n\ning a limitation on the right of the Government to enhance the assessment, as they occur in ' a ' saving clause, the scope of which was to reserve ."}}, {"text": "Venkatartima Ayya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20958, "end_char": 20975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lW\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay\n\nv. l•tusseruanji Rattanji Aiistri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Collector oj\n\nBo111ay\n\nVo NU!strwanji Rattilnji Mistri and others -··-· Venkatartima Ayya' J.\n\ning a limitation on the right of the Government to enhance the assessment, as they occur in ' a ' saving clause, the scope of which was to reserve .", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\n.Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22208, "end_char": 22228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section VIII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22310, "end_char": 22333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25281, "end_char": 25287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Esupali Salebhai(1) Batchelor, J. observed :\n\n\"In other words Government, as it seems to me, -are not debarred from acquiring and paying for the only outstanding interests merely because the Act, which primarily contemplates all interests as held outside Government, directs that the entire compen-\n\n.i.9s_~\n\nTht Collector ef\n\nBombay v .. ."}}, {"text": "Rattanji Mistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25309, "end_char": 25324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nusserwanj'i\n\nRattanji Mistri and others v enkataraman\n\nAyyer J.\n\nThe Collector of Bombay\n\nNussrrwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand other'\n\nVenkatarama\n\n, dyyar J. ·\n\n1322 STiJP.RiEME CG>GRT REPORTS [1955]\n\nsation based upon the market value of the whole land, .must be distributed •among.", "canonical_name": "Rattanji Mistri"}}, {"text": "enkataraman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25338, "end_char": 25349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nusserwanj'i\n\nRattanji Mistri and others v enkataraman\n\nAyyer J.\n\nThe Collector of Bombay\n\nNussrrwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand other'\n\nVenkatarama\n\n, dyyar J. ·\n\n1322 STiJP.RiEME CG>GRT REPORTS [1955]\n\nsation based upon the market value of the whole land, .must be distributed •among."}}, {"text": "Ayyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25351, "end_char": 25356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nusserwanj'i\n\nRattanji Mistri and others v enkataraman\n\nAyyer J.\n\nThe Collector of Bombay\n\nNussrrwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand other'\n\nVenkatarama\n\n, dyyar J. ·\n\n1322 STiJP.RiEME CG>GRT REPORTS [1955]\n\nsation based upon the market value of the whole land, .must be distributed •among.", "canonical_name": "Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Wallis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25939, "end_char": 25945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the <;:overnment 'c!ainied ownership 'ofthe'land on whith there - stciod buildings '-belonging' to the claimants,' and it was lleld that the Government was boilnd to acquire -and pay only for the superstructure, as it was already• the owner of the site:· Similarly in Deputy Collector, Calicut' Division v. Aiyai1u Pi/lay('), Wallis, J. (as he - then was) observed :\n\n\"It is, in my opinion, -clear that the Acf does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest which already belongs -to Government in land which is being acquired under the Act,' but only for the acquisition of such interests in the land as 'do not already belong to the' Government\"."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28207, "end_char": 28216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28532, "end_char": 28541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28634, "end_char": 28644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28781, "end_char": 28791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29061, "end_char": 29071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29249, "end_char": 29261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29455, "end_char": 29467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Collector of Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29812, "end_char": 29831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interested\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v.\n\nNusstrwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nana others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n•955\n\nT ht Coll.tctor of\n\n Bombay\n\nNasserwanji.", "canonical_name": "Collector of\n\nBombay"}}, {"text": "Nusstrwanji Rattanji Mistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29836, "end_char": 29863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interested\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v.\n\nNusstrwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nana others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n•955\n\nT ht Coll.tctor of\n\n Bombay\n\nNasserwanji.", "canonical_name": "Nusserwanji Rattanj1° Mistri"}}, {"text": "RattanJi Minri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29949, "end_char": 29963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RattanJi Minri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatatamli\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand.", "canonical_name": "Rattanji Mistri"}}, {"text": "Venkatatamli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29977, "end_char": 29989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RattanJi Minri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatatamli\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31401, "end_char": 31410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31557, "end_char": 31566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32120, "end_char": 32129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32282, "end_char": 32312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32465, "end_char": 32474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32578, "end_char": 32587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32776, "end_char": 32785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32910, "end_char": 32934, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33312, "end_char": 33336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33380, "end_char": 33389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33525, "end_char": 33534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33545, "end_char": 33554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33636, "end_char": 33645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33795, "end_char": 33801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After setting out that section, Lord Wright observed: ·\n\n\"These general words cannot be read in their apparent generality."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33966, "end_char": 33996, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34079, "end_char": 34088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The whole Act was intended to settle doubts which had arisen as to the effect of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "The whole Act was intended to settle doubts which had arisen as to the effect of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34344, "end_char": 34361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay v.\n\nNusserwanj Rattanji Mis ri and others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v • .", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\n.Ayyar"}}, {"text": "NUsserwanji Rattanji Mistri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34396, "end_char": 34423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NUsserwanji Rattanji Mistri\n\nand olhers\n\nJI enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nthe rights of the parties.", "canonical_name": "Nusserwanji Rattanj1° Mistri"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34899, "end_char": 34908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The whole Act was intended to settle doubts which had arisen as to the effect of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "The whole Act was intended to settle doubts which had arisen as to the effect of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "1-10-1884", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35201, "end_char": 35210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the facts were that the Government had granted one parcel of land to the Free\n\nChurch Mission of Scotland revenue-free under a deed dated 1-10-1884."}}, {"text": "20-12-1887", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35234, "end_char": 35244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By another deed dated 20-12-1887 they released their right of reversion on two other parcels of land held by the Mission as tenants but \"subject to the payment of taxes, rates, charges, assessments leviable or chargeable in respect of the said premises or anything for the time being thereon\"."}}, {"text": "16-1-1888", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35510, "end_char": 35519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16-1-1888 the Mission sold all the three parcels to one Janardan Gopal, and the Secretary of State joined in the conveyance for effectually releasing the reversion of the Government."}}, {"text": "Janardan Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35566, "end_char": 35580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16-1-1888 the Mission sold all the three parcels to one Janardan Gopal, and the Secretary of State joined in the conveyance for effectually releasing the reversion of the Government.", "canonical_name": "Janardan Gopal"}}, {"text": "Tanardan Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35700, "end_char": 35714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before Tanardan Gopal purchased the lands, there had been correspondence between his solicitors and the Government as to the assessment payable on the lands, and the Government had intimated that it would be 9 pies per square yard per annum.", "canonical_name": "Janardan Gopal"}}, {"text": "Lawrence Jenkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36124, "end_char": 36140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In deciding that he could not, Sir Lawrence Jenkins stated that the purchaser had paid full value for the lands in the belief induced by the Government that the assessment of 9 pies per sq."}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36348, "end_char": 36359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandavarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36659, "end_char": 36671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandavarkar,\n\nJ., concurred in the decision, and in the course of his judgment observed:\n\n\" .... when we have regard to the 'nature of the transaction, viz.,"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37766, "end_char": 37775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Collector of\n\nBombqy\n\nNusserwanji Rattanji Mist", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38706, "end_char": 38753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, it was argued by the learned Attorney-General that it should make no difference in the construction of the grant, whether the grantor was the Crown or a subject, as\n\nr. ,.--·\n\nThe Collector of Bombay v.\n\nN usserwanji Rattanji Mmri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\n.1955\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombqy\n\nNusserwanji Rattanji Mist; i\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nthe question in either case was what had been granted; and that must be determined on the language of the deed."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39234, "end_char": 39243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39251, "end_char": 39275, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "John Coleridge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39984, "end_char": 39998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with this question, Sir John Coleridge observed in Lord v. Sydney ( 1) :\n\n\"But it is unnecessary for their Lordships to say more on this point, because they are clearly of opinion, that upon the true construction of this grant, the creek where it bounds the land is ad medium filum, included within it."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43427, "end_char": 43436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45286, "end_char": 45289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "+· -\n\nDas, J. in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the .City of Bombay and others (1) :-\n\n\"The immunity from the liability to pay rent .is just as much an integral part or an inseverable incident of the title so acquired as is the obligation to hold the land for the purposes of a market and for no other purpose\"."}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45659, "end_char": 45690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the point for decision there was whether the Municipal Corporation of Bombay could acquire by prescription a right to hold the lands rent-free, they having entered into possession under a resolution of the Government that no rent would be charged."}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46977, "end_char": 46986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47536, "end_char": 47553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'955\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay\n\nNusserwanji Rattanji Mislri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nMarch I\n\nby the respondents are not within the saving clause.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\n.Ayyar"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47709, "end_char": 47718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SURAJ PAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47966, "end_char": 47975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SURAJ PAL\n\nti."}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47986, "end_char": 48008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48025, "end_char": 48038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss."}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48043, "end_char": 48054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48061, "end_char": 48078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 302, 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48098, "end_char": 48110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48155, "end_char": 48161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48172, "end_char": 48178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48189, "end_char": 48195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48206, "end_char": 48212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48265, "end_char": 48280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48302, "end_char": 48328, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 236, 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48346, "end_char": 48358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48439, "end_char": 48454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48462, "end_char": 48479, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48504, "end_char": 48515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48595, "end_char": 48610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48969, "end_char": 48984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49292, "end_char": 49298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49307, "end_char": 49333, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49368, "end_char": 49388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49396, "end_char": 49413, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1332_1345_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "'955\n\nThe Collector of\n\nBombay\n\nNusserwanji Rattanji Mislri\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nMarch I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nby the respondents are not within the saving clause.\n\nIn the result, it must be held that the right of the appellant to levy assessment under section 8 of Act No. II of 1876 is not limited by any right in the respondents.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Courts below, and dismiss both the suits instituted by the respondents with costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nSURAJ PAL\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 302, 307-Charges and conviction by trial court under s. 302 read with s. 149 and under s. 307 read with s. 149 of the Code-Conviction by the appellate couri under ss. 302 and 307 of the Code-Legality-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 236, 237-Applicability-Retrlal.\n\nWhere a person has been charged along with others under ss. 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code each, only as read with section 149 of the Code, his convictions and sentences for the sub stantial offences under ss. 302 and 307 of the Code are erroneous.\n\nThe absence of specific charges in this. behalf is a serious lacuna in the proceedings, inasmuch as the framing of a specific and distinct charge in respect of every distinct head of criminal liability consti\n\ntuting an offence is the foundation for a conviction and sentence cherefor. The conviction in these circumstances under ss. 302 and 307 of the Code and sentences of death and transportation for life -cannot be maintained unless the Court is satisfied, on the facts of the case, that the accused has not been prejudiced in his trial. Whe ther or not in such a situation the questioning of the accused during the course of his examination under s. 342 of the. Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the offences under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code can be relied upon as obviating the likelihood of prejudice has to be determined \\Vith reference to the facts and ircumstances of each case.\n\nAll the circumstances of the case and the evidence and materials on the record should be looked into on the question arising in such a situation as to whether a retrial should be ordered or not ..\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 139 of 1954.\n\ns.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1333 , Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and •Order dated the 29th April 1954 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1101 of 1953 and Referred No. 111 of 1953 arising out of the Judgment . and Order dated the 3rd September 1953 of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Fatehpur in Sessions Trial / No. 50 of 1953.\n\n+ .\n\nSadhan Chandra Gupta and Janardhan Sharma, : for the appellant.\n\nK. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.\n\n1955.\n\nMarch\n\n1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court at Allaha- . bad. The sole appellant before us has been convicted by the Sessions Court under sections 148, 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to rigorous . imprisonment for two and a half years under section 148, to transportation for life under section 307, and to death under section 302.\n\nThese convictions and sentences have been confirmed by the High Court. . At the trial there were 19 other accused along with this appellant. All of them were convicted and sen- . tenced by the trial court under various sections. of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal ten out of them were acquitted by the High Court. In respect of the remaining nine besides this appellant, the convictions and sentences were partially modified.\n\nBut this appeal is not concerned with them. The incident in -the course of which these offences are said to have been committed took place in the evening of the 4th January, 1953, shortly before sun set in a village called Sonari in the district Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh. During that incident two persons, Bisheshwar and Surajdin, are alleged to have received gun-shot wounds.\n\nBisheshwar survived but Surajdin died on the spot. The back-ground for this incident was as follows : In the village of Sonari there were two factions between whom there was prior history of enmity resulting ' in criminal prosecutions by each against the other. It\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Prader/,\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe Statt of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nmay be broadly stated that the accused persons m the present case belong to one party and the prosecution witnesses as well as the deceased person belong to the other party. In the year 1946 there was rioting: between them in which two of the present prosecution witnesses were assaulted. This led to a criminal case against some of the present accused and other,. in which they were convicted and sentenced, the members of the other party figuring therein as prosecution witnesses. Again, just five months prior to the present incident, there was another rioting in the village bet-. ween these two group>. In that, one Ram Bharosey a.\n\nmember of the party of the present accused was killed ..\n\nAs a result 15 persons of the opposite-party (i.e. the party of the present prosecution witnesses) were prosecuted.\n\nBy the date of this incident that case had been committed to the sessions but the sessions trial had not started, According to the .prosecution case, the occasion for the incident, which concerns' us, was that some of the present accused wanted to. persuade or prevent a member of the opposite-party by name, Bisheshwar-P.W. 2 in this case-from do-- ing what is called pairavi on behalf of the accused in that case. (Pairavi is said to be the active assistance in relation to Court proceedings which a friend or agent renders to a litigant). While, Bisheshwar, P. W .. 2; and two others Bhurey Lal, P.W. 1, and Ram Saran, P.W. 3, were sitting in front of the house of Ram Saran on the evening of the 4th January, 1953,. the present appellant and the other accused are said . to have turned up before them, lathies in hand. The appellant is said to have asked Bisheshwar to give up doing pairavis in the then pending case on behalf of the accused therein.\n\nBisheshwar having declined to do so, the appellant is said have pulled out a pistol from bis inner pocket and fired at him, as a result of which he fell down on the ground. P.Ws. 2 and 3: are said to have dragged him inside the house and chained the door from inside, run up the roof and raised an alarm, whereupon a number of persons of the other party are said to have come running up.\n\nOne of the persons who so came running up was;\n\n' /\n\n~- .\n\nSurajdin who was cutting fodder at the house of Bhurey Lal, P.W. 1. The appellant is said to have fired at him with the pistol. He fell down and died on the spot.· Another person named Gaya Prasad is said to have received some minor lathi injuries .. Accused party thereafter is said to have run away. First information of the report was lodged by Bhurey Lal, P.W. 1, near about 12 that very night at the police station which was about nine miles from the scene of the occurrence. The police came on the . scene the next · morning and the. usual investigation followed.\n\nThe police filed on the 22nd February, 1953, a charge-sheet for offences under sections 147, 148; 323/149 and 307/149. The charge-sheet in so . far as it was under section 323/149 related presumably to some minor injuries said to have been received by Ga ya . Prasad, and in so far as it was under section 307 /149 related presumably to the gun-shot wounds received by Bisheshwar, P.W. 2.\n\nIt may be noticed that the charge-sheet did not concern itself with any offence or offences alleged to have been committed, in bringing about the death of Surajdin by the firing of a pistol at him. It is on this charge-sheet that cognizance of the case was taken by the Magistrate and committal proceedings were started. It appears, however, that the complainant-party finding that the police challan . did not relate to the offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code filed; on the 2nd May, 1953, a private complaint, before the very Magistrate in whose court the commital proceedings were by then pending. That complaint was filed by the same Bisheshwar, P.W. 1, who lodged the first information in this case on the 5th January, 1953.\n\nIt sets out substantially the same facts. This complaint also was taken on the file of the Magistrate. The enquiry thereon was merged into the enquiry relating to the police challan case.\n\nThe Magistrate eventually committed all the 20 accused to take their trial before the sessions Judge by framing charges, under sections 147, 323/149, 307 /149 and 302/149. There was a specific charge under section 148, Indian Penal. Code against Suraj Pal and\n\n,..\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State oj Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas ,7•\n\nbharm Raj, the former for being armed with a pistol and the latter for being armed with a pharsa, at the time of the commission of the rioting. It is in respect of charges so framed by the committing Magistrate without any amendment or alteration that the accused were tried in the Sessions Court. It may be mentioned at this .stage that the defence of the accused, apart from the general denial of their having anything to do with the incident and denials as to their having been present at the occurrence, was to the effect that it was the complainant's party including the deceased Surajdin who formed the unlawful assembly, with the common object of beating one Ram Pal of the village. This Ram Pal had appeared as a prosecution Witness at the committal stage in the criminal proceedings by then pending against the present prosecution witnesses as accused. It was also their defence that it was one Ram Bhawan of that party who, in the course of the incident, fired pistol shots in the air and also shot, later, Surajdin and brought about his death.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge found all the accused guilty of the various offences as charged and sentenced them. On appeal the High Court considered the prosecution evidence with reference to three aspects. ( 1) How far the manner in which the prosecution alleged the incident to have taken place can be accepted; (2) How far the prosecution case regarding the presence and participation of the various persons can be accepted; and (3) What offence can be said to have been made out as against each of them.\n\nOn the first question the High Court accepted the view that the incident took place as alleged by the prosecution. With reference to the second, the High Court set out elaborately various reasons why the prosecution evidence in so far as it implicates particular individuals, could not be accepted at its face value and required to be carefully scrutinised. .With reference to certain criteria which it was considered necessary and right to adopt for purposes of scrutiny, the High Court held that the convictions of ten out of the 20 persons before it should be set aside and that\n\n...\n\nthe other ten persons including the present appellant were participants in the rioting.\n\nAccordingly, the Court confirmed the conviction as against these ten under section 147, Indian Penal Code. As regards the charge under section 148, Indian Penal Code, Dharm Raj was acquitted but the conviction of Suraj Pal was maintained on the ground of his having a pistol in his hand at the time of the rioting. There remained the three charges against the ten persons under sections 323/149 for injuries on Gaya Prasad, 307 /149 in respect of the gun-shot wounds received by Bisheshwar, and 302/149 in respect of the murder of Surajdin.\n\nIt was held that the assault on Gaya Prasad was not proved beyond doubt and hence all the accused were acquitted in respect of this charge.\n\nAs regards the other two charges, i.e., under sections 307/149 and 302/149, the High Court came to the conclusion that neither the attempt on the life of Bisheshwar by pistol fire nor the actual death of Surajdin by pistol fire can be said to have been in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly nor to have been within the knowledge of the accused as being so likely. It was, therefore, held that none of the accused could be found guilty under section 149, with reference to, the attempt on the life of Bisheshwar, or the death of Surajdin. All the same, in view of the fact that the evidence showed that the person who inflicted the pistol fire as against both was the appellant Suraj Pal, it was held that he was guilty of the offences under sections 307 and 302, Indian Penal Code. On this ground, therefore, the High Court, while it set aside the convictions and sentences of all the accused under sections 307 /149 and 302/149, maintained the convictions of the appellant under these two sections and maintained the sentences of transportation for life under section 307 and of death under section 302, Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe High Court convicted the other nine persons under section 323/149 in respect of the injuries received by P.W. 2 and sentenced them therefor.\n\n'!' On the above statement of the course of these proceedings, one important fact which emerges is that\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\n]agannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State ef Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nthere have been no direct and individual charges against the appellant for the specific offences under sections 3W and 302, Indian Penal Code. The question that arises is whether, without such direct charges the convictions and sentences for those offences can be maintained. It appears to us quite clear that a charge against a person as a member of an unlawful assembly in respect of an offence committed by one or other of the members of that assembly in prosecution of its common object is a substantially different one from a charge against any individual for an offence directly committed by him while being a member of such assembly. The liability of a person in respect of the latter is only for acts directly committed by him, while in respect of the former, the liability is for acts which may have been done by any one of the other members of the unlawful assembly, provided that it was in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or was such as the members knew to be likely to be so committed. A charge under section 149, Indian Penal Code puts the person on notice only of two alleged facts, viz., (1). that the offence was committed bv one or other of the members of the unlawful assembly. of which he is one, and (2) t.hat t.he offence was committed in prosecution of the common object or is such that was known to be likely to be so committed. Whether or not section 149, Indian Penal Code creates a distinct offence (as r_egarrls which there has been conflict of views in the High Courts), there can be no doubt that it creates a distinct head of criminal liabilitv which has come to be known as \"constructive liabilitv\" -a convenient phrase not used in the Indian Penal° Code. There can, therefore. be no doubt that the direct individual liabilitv of a person can only be fixed upon him with reierence to a specific charge in respect of the particular offence. Such a case is not covered by sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The framing of a specific and distinct charge in respect of every distinct head of criminal liability constituting an offence. is the foundation for a conviction and sentence therefor. The absence, therefore, of specific\n\n.-L\n\ncharges against the appellant under sections 307 and 302, Indian Penal Code in respect of which he has been sentenced to transportation for life and to death respectively, is a very serious lacuna in the proceedings in so far as it concerns him. The question then which arises for consideration is whether or not this lacuna has prejudiced him in his trial.\n\nIt is perfectly true that the initial accusation as disclosed by the first information lodged by the complainant, P.W. 1, on the 5th January, 1953, specifically, was to the effect that it was this appellant who with a pistol fired both as against Bisheshwar, P.W. 2, as also against the deceased, Surajdin. It is also true that this allegation was repeated m the private wmplaint filed by this same P.W. 1 in May, 1953, directly before the Magistrate. It is also undeniable that the evidence in court, both in the committal pro- -ceedings as well as at the sessions trial, given by the prosecution witnesses was m support of that allegation. But curiously enough, apart from the absence of any individual charges against the appellant for these specific offences, even the charges against him and others relating to the injuries inflicted on P.W. 2\n\nand the deceased Surajdin are somewhat vague as to the authorship thereof. The relevant charges run as follows (after specifying the members alleged to constitute the unlawful assembly) :\n\n\"Firstly :-That you, on the 4th day of January 1953 at about half an hour before sunset in village Sonari, formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murders of Bisheshwar and Suraj Din and committed rioting.\n\nAnd thereby committed an offence punishable under section 147 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSecondly :-That you on the same date, time and place, in prosecution of the common object of the said unlawful assembly of which you were members at that time committed the murder of Suraj Din who was shot dead by a pistol fire.\n\nAnd thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe Stale of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhada, J.\n\nThirdly :-That you on the same date, time and place, in prosecution of the common object of the said unlawful assembly of which you were members at that time attempted to commit the murder of Bishe-- shwar Singh by means of a pistol fire.\n\nAnd thereby committed an offence punishable under section 307 /149 of the Indian Penal Code\".\n\nThe portions underlined (for the purposes of this judgment) in the charge under heads 2 . and 3 above are curiously vague. They appear to indicate a definite non-committal attitude on the part of the. Public Prosecutor and the Court, which has the ultimate responsibility for the framing of the charge, ( vide section 226, Code of Criminal Procedure) as to who is the active author of the pistol fire referred to under these two heads of charge. When the charge was so pointedly vague, no accused was bound to direct his attention in his defence to the question as to whether he or somebody else was the person who fired the pistol which brought about the gun-shot wounds. It has been brought to our notice that the appellant has been specifically questioned in the Court of Sessions. under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure on the footing that he was the person who fired at P.W .. 2 and the deceased, Surajdin, and that the accused. denied it. But this cannot be said to remove anv prejudice that would arise bv virtue of the vaguenes~·. in the charge at the sessions trial, as to who was the author of the pistol fire. Normally in a sessions . trial the accused has no right of cross-examination after the questioning under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been suggested that sincesuch a question was put also in the questioning .by the committing Magistrate under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure.. the accused had ample notice of this specific case before the commencement of the sessions trial But it does not follow that there could be no prejudice. On the other hand, the very fact that in spite of such questioning the charges framed in the Magistrate's Court, with their vagueness, in sc:> far as this feature therein is concerned, has been\n\n..;..\n\n. '\n\n\\ .\n\n·,..i.\n\n• f\n\nmaintained, before the Sessions Court without .any amendment, is likely to have been misleading. The appellant might well have relied on the absence of any such amendment as being an indication that he was not called upon to defend himself on the footing of his being the author of the pistol fire. In a case so serious as that which involves the sentences of transportation for life, and of death, and particularly in a case like the present one, where the death sentence has been awarded in the trial court by distinguishing this appellant from all the other accused in respect of his individual act by way of pistol fire, it is difficult to say that the accused has not been prejudiced by the absence of specific charges under sections 307 and 302, Indian Penal Code.\n\nFurther, the medical evidence indicates that P.W. 2 as well as the deceased Surajdin had gun-shot wpunds on their person. The evidence of the Doctor is to the effect that these wounds mav have been caused by a country pistol which, it is alleged, the appellant had in his hand. It has been suggested on behalf of the defence that the Medical Officer was not competent to speak about it and that if the prosecution wanted to rely thereupon, they should have called an arms expert to speak to the same. Whether or not this comment is legitimate, it is clear. that if the appellant is to be found directly responsible for inflicting the wounds, noted as gun-shot wounds by the Medical Officer, he might well have ·:\\vailed himself of the opportunity to elucidate, by cross-examination or positive defence, the nature of the fire-arm which would have caused the actual injuries found on the bodies of P.W. 2 and of deceased Surajdin. In all the circumstances above noticed, we are satisfied that the absence of specific charges against the appellant under sections 307 and 302, Indian Penal Code has materially prejudiced him. We must accordingly set aside the convictions and sentences of the appellant under sections 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe further . question that arises is whether or not we are to direct a retrial of the appellant in respect of these offences. We have given our best considera-\n\n11-90 S. C. India/59.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe Stale of Utter Pradesh\n\n• Jagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\n.Jaganniulhadas 1•\n\n1342 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nti on to all\" the circumstances of this case and have 'for this purpose -looked into the evidence and the material on the record. The case discloses certain outstanding features. At the very outset and simultaneously with >the first information filed by P.W. 1 in this case, there was another report filed by one Ram Pal at the same police station, almost exactly at the same time, relating to the same incident. This is Ex. P-16 on the record. This report is said to have been lodged at the\n\npolice station at 12-15 in the night, while the other report is said to have been lodged at 12-10 that night.\n\nThe report, Ex. P-16 alleged the present prosecution party to be the aggressors and put forward, as the occasion for the incident, an attempt on the part of the prosecution party to beat Ram Pal, the complainant of that complaint, for having given evidence in support of the prosecution in the committal proceedings of the rioting case then pending against the present prosecution witnesses (as accused therein)- obviously with a view to prevent him from giving evidence in the Sessions Court against them. That complaint specifically refers to one Ram Bhawan who is P.W. 4 in the present case as the person who had a pistol in hand and fired with it. That report makes no mention of any injuries having been by then received from pistol fire, in the course of that incident.\n\nOf course, there is no proof, in this case, of any of the allegations in that report.\n\nBut it appears from the order of commitment in this case (which forms part of the present printed record) that with reference to that report there was pending, at the date of th.e committal, a cross-case against some of the prosecution witnesses in the present case for the same incident. The police constable moharrir of the police station where the counter complaint, Ex. P-16 was lodged and who accepted both the complaints (1) from Bhurey Lal, and (2) from Ram Pal, has stated in his eviilence that when the complaint, Ex. Pc16, was filed by Ram Pal the present appellant Suraj Pal had also accompanied Ram Pal, the complainant therein.\n\nThis may well be claimed to be the eonduct of an innocent person. It is also not without some significance\n\n....\n\n' .\n\n• -\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP0RTS 1343\n\nthat admittedly an_d -as a mat_ter of fact, the _ police . did not file any _charge-sheet in the present case\n\n~ against any one for the actual offence of murder under section 302, Indian Penal Code and that even in the charge-sheet which they did file they confined the case to section 307, Inaian Penal Code but did not commit themselves as to who out of the members of the unlawful assembly was the author of the pistol fire. , So far as it appears from the police charge-sheet dated T the 22nd February, 1953, as printed in the record before us, there is a statement therein to the effect \"Sura: Pal Singh and Ram Manohar were armed with -\n\npistols\".\n\nRam Manohar is also one of the accused who was put up for trial.\n\nThe statements of some of the prosecution witnesses furnish indication of more than one fire-arm _having been used at the incident. Thus, for instance, Bisheshwar, P.W. 2, said \"I heard 3 or 4 guns being fired outside and also heard a noise\".\n\nP.W. 4, Ra_m Bhawan, said \"We four persons threw lumps of earth from the well at the accused persons, the accused retired and fired their gun twice ......... . . . . . . . . . The accused had fired a gun from the door -of Mahadeo when going away, then had fired two or three guns from his door\". P.W.- 5, Gaya Prasad, said \"Two or three guns afterwards had been fired from the door of Mahadeo Pandit. Those guns had been fired from the lane. The guns had been fired at the door of Ram Saran and had hit it\". All these witnesses no doubt assert that so far as the particular injuries with which this case is concerned the firing was by the appellant Suraj Pal. But the above statements by these witnesses in the cross-examination may well indicate that there may have been bther persons in the unlawful assembly at that time \\vith\n\narms in their -hands, who made use of them by firing.\n\nApart from the use of pistols in the course of that incident, by one party or the other, there are clear indications that there was a mutual fight between both the parties. Two of the persons on the side of the accused, viz. Lal Pratap and Chedi Lal have received some iniuries .and their injury . certificates have\n\nns.s\n\nSurj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhada J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\n1344 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nbeen marked as Exs. D-1 and' D-2. The prbsecution witnesses themselves admit that there was 'mutual fighting to this extent, viz. that there was also thrmving of brickbats by the complainant's party against the rioters.\n\nAs already stated there is in fact'it counter case against some of the present prosecution witnesseS in respect of the same incident. In such a situation any further trial is likely to result only in very · doubdul and unreliable evidence being adduced after a considerable lapse of tinie. Even as it is, the' evidence recorded 'in the present case has been found by the High Court in its judgment as not acceptable at its face value.. The learned Judges have dealt with this :tspect at length and· they wound up their consideration of this patt cif the case as follows : · \"For the above reasons, I am of opinion that there is a good deal of substance in this part of the arguments of the appellants' counsel.\n\nThe question that would arise is as . to which of the particular accused is guilty and what should be the criterion for deciding this matter. In view of the biassed and interested nature of the prosecution evidence, I am of opinion that the presence of on! y those accused should be held to have been proved who have been .assigned any definite part by the prosecution witnesses or whose presence is corroborated by some other circumstantial evidence. In view of the 'highly interested nature of the prosecution evidence, dealing with the first aspect of the case also, viz. the question as to how far the prosecution have succeeded in proving the manner in which the incident occurred, I have not accepted the prosecution case unless it found corroboration from some other factor of a circumstantial nature or from probabilities of the case\".\n\nIt is by reference to these standards that they have rejected the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in so far as they implicated ten other accused whom the High Court acquitted. But it appears to us, that judged by the very same standards there is no adequate reason for accepting the evidence as being reliable in respect of this appellant also. In fact there is good reason to feel that on the same standards this a pp el- . ~\n\n. +\n\n.,,.\n\n~ . S.C.R .. 1345\n\nSUPREME.COUR~ REPORTS\n\n~ ' . . . .. ~\n\n- . .\n\n. ;\n\nlant also should have got the benefit of the doubt.· At this stage, it is not out of place to mention: one fact. It appears from the evidence of the Investigating Officer, P.W. 14, that in the course of th~ irivesti-. gation the prosecuting authorities were of the opinion that the murder in this case was to be attributed.• to the prosecution witness, Ram Bhawan, P.W. 4, and not to the appellant, and that in their view even the evidence as against Ram Bhawan was not sufficient to put him on trial for the murder. Doubtless such an opinion of the prosecuting authorities has no relevancy in the case and should not have .been placed on the record in this case. But when we have. to consider the desirability or otherwise of retrial, we need not shut our eyes to these features of .the case. which have been brought on the record. In the cir~ cumstances mentioned above we do not consider that the interests of justice require that any retrial should be ordered. We accordingly .direct that there shall be no retrial. . : . . . . . In the result, the convictions of the appellant .under sections 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentences therefore are hereby set aside. But his conviction under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code is maintained as also the sentence of two. year~. and a half in respect thereof. This appeal is accordingly allowed partially to the extent indicated above. Appeal partially allowed.' '\n\nTHE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, G.LP. RAILWAY\n\nv. ' .\n\nMAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER;· .\n\n[VJYIAI:\" .. BosE, JAGANNADHADAs,\n\nVEJ>T:\\(ATARAMA.\n\nA:YYAR. and B.. P. SINHA JJ.] , ,. , .. ,\n\nPayment of Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936), s.\"2(; i}-Wages-\n\nHouf~ rent allowance.,.-'rJlhether falls•r, vithin. the <irfinition .ofwages under the Act-Rule 3(i) of the statutor.y R_ules framed.by the Government-Legal effect thereof. ,. \" .... ' ' '\" \"\"' ·\n\nThe Railwa{ Board under the 'Ministry of Railw~s of fhd Government of India introduced a scheme with effect 1frori:l<tb:e'. 1st\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar fradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nMarch 2", "total_entities": 146, "entities": [{"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 276, "end_char": 285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SURAJ PAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 533, "end_char": 542, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURAJ PAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 549, "end_char": 575, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 579, "end_char": 590, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 592, "end_char": 605, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. 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B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2823, "end_char": 2836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2841, "end_char": 2850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "sections 148, 307 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3116, "end_char": 3141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3149, "end_char": 3166, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3240, "end_char": 3251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3286, "end_char": 3297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3318, "end_char": 3329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3568, "end_char": 3585, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "4th January, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3921, "end_char": 3938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident in -the course of which these offences are said to have been committed took place in the evening of the 4th January, 1953, shortly before sun set in a village called Sonari in the district Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Sonari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 3989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident in -the course of which these offences are said to have been committed took place in the evening of the 4th January, 1953, shortly before sun set in a village called Sonari in the district Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Fatehpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4006, "end_char": 4014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident in -the course of which these offences are said to have been committed took place in the evening of the 4th January, 1953, shortly before sun set in a village called Sonari in the district Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4016, "end_char": 4029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident in -the course of which these offences are said to have been committed took place in the evening of the 4th January, 1953, shortly before sun set in a village called Sonari in the district Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Bisheshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During that incident two persons, Bisheshwar and Surajdin, are alleged to have received gun-shot wounds.", "canonical_name": "Bishe-- shwar Singh"}}, {"text": "Surajdin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4080, "end_char": 4088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During that incident two persons, Bisheshwar and Surajdin, are alleged to have received gun-shot wounds.", "canonical_name": "Suraj Din"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Prader/,\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe Statt of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nmay be broadly stated that the accused persons m the present case belong to one party and the prosecution witnesses as well as the deceased person belong to the other party.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Ram Bharosey", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5127, "end_char": 5139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that, one Ram Bharosey a.\n\nmember of the party of the present accused was killed ..\n\nAs a result 15 persons of the opposite-party (i.e. the party of the present prosecution witnesses) were prosecuted."}}, {"text": "Bisheshwar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5628, "end_char": 5638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "persuade or prevent a member of the opposite-party by name, Bisheshwar-P.W. 2 in this case-from do-- ing what is called pairavi on behalf of the accused in that case. ("}}, {"text": "Pairavi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pairavi is said to be the active assistance in relation to Court proceedings which a friend or agent renders to a litigant)."}}, {"text": "Bhurey Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5906, "end_char": 5916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While, Bisheshwar, P. W .. 2; and two others Bhurey Lal, P.W. 1, and Ram Saran, P.W. 3, were sitting in front of the house of Ram Saran on the evening of the 4th January, 1953,."}}, {"text": "Ram Saran", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While, Bisheshwar, P. W .. 2; and two others Bhurey Lal, P.W. 1, and Ram Saran, P.W. 3, were sitting in front of the house of Ram Saran on the evening of the 4th January, 1953,."}}, {"text": "Surajdin", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6723, "end_char": 6731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surajdin who was cutting fodder at the house of Bhurey Lal, P.W. 1."}}, {"text": "Gaya Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6908, "end_char": 6919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another person named Gaya Prasad is said to have received some minor lathi injuries .. Accused party thereafter is said to have run away."}}, {"text": "22nd February, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7318, "end_char": 7337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police filed on the 22nd February, 1953, a charge-sheet for offences under sections 147, 148; 323/149 and 307/149."}}, {"text": "sections 147, 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7373, "end_char": 7390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7458, "end_char": 7469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ga ya . Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7546, "end_char": 7560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "far as it was under section 323/149 related presumably to some minor injuries said to have been received by Ga ya .", "canonical_name": "Ga ya . Prasad"}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7592, "end_char": 7603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8123, "end_char": 8134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8136, "end_char": 8153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "2nd May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8168, "end_char": 8181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "did not relate to the offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code filed; on the 2nd May, 1953, a private complaint, before the very Magistrate in whose court the commital proceedings were by then pending."}}, {"text": "5th January, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8403, "end_char": 8420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That complaint was filed by the same Bisheshwar, P.W. 1, who lodged the first information in this case on the 5th January, 1953."}}, {"text": "sections 147, 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8739, "end_char": 8756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8818, "end_char": 8829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Suraj Pal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8858, "end_char": 8867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Code against Suraj Pal and\n\n,..\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State oj Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas ,7•\n\nbharm Raj, the former for being armed with a pistol and the latter for being armed with a pharsa, at the time of the commission of the rioting.", "canonical_name": "SURAJ PAL"}}, {"text": "State oj Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8896, "end_char": 8918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Code against Suraj Pal and\n\n,..\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State oj Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas ,7•\n\nbharm Raj, the former for being armed with a pistol and the latter for being armed with a pharsa, at the time of the commission of the rioting.", "canonical_name": "State oj Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8953, "end_char": 8975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Code against Suraj Pal and\n\n,..\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State oj Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas ,7•\n\nbharm Raj, the former for being armed with a pistol and the latter for being armed with a pharsa, at the time of the commission of the rioting.", "canonical_name": "State oj Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "bharm Raj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8996, "end_char": 9005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Code against Suraj Pal and\n\n,..\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State oj Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas ,7•\n\nbharm Raj, the former for being armed with a pistol and the latter for being armed with a pharsa, at the time of the commission of the rioting.", "canonical_name": "bharm Raj"}}, {"text": "Ram Pal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9662, "end_char": 9669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned at this .stage that the defence of the accused, apart from the general denial of their having anything to do with the incident and denials as to their having been present at the occurrence, was to the effect that it was the complainant's party including the deceased Surajdin who formed the unlawful assembly, with the common object of beating one Ram Pal of the village.", "canonical_name": "Ram Pal"}}, {"text": "Ram Pal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9691, "end_char": 9698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Ram Pal had appeared as a prosecution Witness at the committal stage in the criminal proceedings by then pending against the present prosecution witnesses as accused."}}, {"text": "Ram Bhawan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9900, "end_char": 9910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also their defence that it was one Ram Bhawan of that party who, in the course of the incident, fired pistol shots in the air and also shot, later, Surajdin and brought about his death."}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11311, "end_char": 11322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11324, "end_char": 11341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11371, "end_char": 11382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11384, "end_char": 11401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Dharm Raj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11403, "end_char": 11412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the charge under section 148, Indian Penal Code, Dharm Raj was acquitted but the conviction of Suraj Pal was maintained on the ground of his having a pistol in his hand at the time of the rioting.", "canonical_name": "bharm Raj"}}, {"text": "Suraj Pal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11449, "end_char": 11458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the charge under section 148, Indian Penal Code, Dharm Raj was acquitted but the conviction of Suraj Pal was maintained on the ground of his having a pistol in his hand at the time of the rioting.", "canonical_name": "SURAJ PAL"}}, {"text": "sections 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11614, "end_char": 11626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Gaya Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11810, "end_char": 11821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that the assault on Gaya Prasad was not proved beyond doubt and hence all the accused were acquitted in respect of this charge.", "canonical_name": "Ga ya . Prasad"}}, {"text": "sections 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11965, "end_char": 11977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12383, "end_char": 12394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sections 307 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12683, "end_char": 12703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12705, "end_char": 12722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12841, "end_char": 12853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13003, "end_char": 13014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13034, "end_char": 13045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13047, "end_char": 13064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13121, "end_char": 13132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "agannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13361, "end_char": 13373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the above statement of the course of these proceedings, one important fact which emerges is that\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\n]agannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State ef Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nthere have been no direct and individual charges against the appellant for the specific offences under sections 3W and 302, Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "State ef Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13396, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the above statement of the course of these proceedings, one important fact which emerges is that\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\n]agannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State ef Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nthere have been no direct and individual charges against the appellant for the specific offences under sections 3W and 302, Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "State oj Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "sections 3W and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13541, "end_char": 13560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13562, "end_char": 13579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14468, "end_char": 14479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14481, "end_char": 14498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14822, "end_char": 14833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 236 and 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15356, "end_char": 15376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15384, "end_char": 15410, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 307 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15675, "end_char": 15695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15697, "end_char": 15714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "4th day of January 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17065, "end_char": 17088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant charges run as follows (after specifying the members alleged to constitute the unlawful assembly) :\n\n\"Firstly :-That you, on the 4th day of January 1953 at about half an hour before sunset in village Sonari, formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murders of Bisheshwar and Suraj Din and committed rioting."}}, {"text": "Suraj Din", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17239, "end_char": 17248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant charges run as follows (after specifying the members alleged to constitute the unlawful assembly) :\n\n\"Firstly :-That you, on the 4th day of January 1953 at about half an hour before sunset in village Sonari, formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murders of Bisheshwar and Suraj Din and committed rioting.", "canonical_name": "Suraj Din"}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17323, "end_char": 17334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17342, "end_char": 17359, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17642, "end_char": 17653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17665, "end_char": 17682, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jagannadhada", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17727, "end_char": 17739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe Stale of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhada, J.\n\nThirdly :-That you on the same date, time and place, in prosecution of the common object of the said unlawful assembly of which you were members at that time attempted to commit the murder of Bishe-- shwar Singh by means of a pistol fire.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Stale of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17763, "end_char": 17785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe Stale of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhada, J.\n\nThirdly :-That you on the same date, time and place, in prosecution of the common object of the said unlawful assembly of which you were members at that time attempted to commit the murder of Bishe-- shwar Singh by means of a pistol fire.", "canonical_name": "State oj Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Bishe-- shwar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17997, "end_char": 18016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe Stale of Uttar Pradesh\n\nJagannadhada, J.\n\nThirdly :-That you on the same date, time and place, in prosecution of the common object of the said unlawful assembly of which you were members at that time attempted to commit the murder of Bishe-- shwar Singh by means of a pistol fire.", "canonical_name": "Bishe-- shwar Singh"}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18095, "end_char": 18106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18119, "end_char": 18136, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18450, "end_char": 18461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18463, "end_char": 18489, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18931, "end_char": 18942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18944, "end_char": 18970, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19373, "end_char": 19384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19386, "end_char": 19412, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19530, "end_char": 19541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19543, "end_char": 19569, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 307 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20681, "end_char": 20701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20703, "end_char": 20720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 307 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21775, "end_char": 21795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21797, "end_char": 21814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 307 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21929, "end_char": 21949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21957, "end_char": 21974, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": ".Jaganniulhadas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22266, "end_char": 22281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Pal v.\n\nThe Stale of Utter Pradesh\n\n• Jagannadhadas J.\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\n.Jaganniulhadas 1•\n\n1342 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nti on to all\" the circumstances of this case and have 'for this purpose -looked into the evidence and the material on the record."}}, {"text": "Ram Pal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23114, "end_char": 23121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-16 alleged the present prosecution party to be the aggressors and put forward, as the occasion for the incident, an attempt on the part of the prosecution party to beat Ram Pal, the complainant of that complaint, for having given evidence in support of the prosecution in the committal proceedings of the rioting case then pending against the present prosecution witnesses (as accused therein)- obviously with a view to prevent him from giving evidence in the Sessions Court against them.", "canonical_name": "Ram Pal"}}, {"text": "Bhurey Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24227, "end_char": 24237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-16 was lodged and who accepted both the complaints (1) from Bhurey Lal, and (2) from Ram Pal, has stated in his eviilence that when the complaint, Ex."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24761, "end_char": 24772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24774, "end_char": 24791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24872, "end_char": 24883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Inaian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24885, "end_char": 24902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25193, "end_char": 25202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as it appears from the police charge-sheet dated T the 22nd February, 1953, as printed in the record before us, there is a statement therein to the effect \"Sura: Pal Singh and Ram Manohar were armed with -\n\npistols\"."}}, {"text": "Ram Manohar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25207, "end_char": 25218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as it appears from the police charge-sheet dated T the 22nd February, 1953, as printed in the record before us, there is a statement therein to the effect \"Sura: Pal Singh and Ram Manohar were armed with -\n\npistols\"."}}, {"text": "Ram Manohar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25249, "end_char": 25260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Manohar is also one of the accused who was put up for trial."}}, {"text": "Ra_m Bhawan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25567, "end_char": 25578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 4, Ra_m Bhawan, said \"We four persons threw lumps of earth from the well at the accused persons, the accused retired and fired their gun twice ......... . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Mahadeo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25781, "end_char": 25788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused had fired a gun from the door -of Mahadeo when going away, then had fired two or three guns from his door\".", "canonical_name": "Mahadeo Pandit"}}, {"text": "Mahadeo Pandit", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25944, "end_char": 25958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W.- 5, Gaya Prasad, said \"Two or three guns afterwards had been fired from the door of Mahadeo Pandit.", "canonical_name": "Mahadeo Pandit"}}, {"text": "Ram Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26040, "end_char": 26049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The guns had been fired at the door of Ram Saran and had hit it\"."}}, {"text": "Lal Pratap", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26670, "end_char": 26680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Pratap and Chedi Lal have received some iniuries .and their injury ."}}, {"text": "Chedi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26685, "end_char": 26694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Pratap and Chedi Lal have received some iniuries .and their injury ."}}, {"text": "sections 307 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30303, "end_char": 30323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30331, "end_char": 30348, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30424, "end_char": 30435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30443, "end_char": 30460, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, G.LP. RAILWAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30652, "end_char": 30686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, G.LP."}}, {"text": "MAHADEO RAGHOO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30696, "end_char": 30710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER;· .", "canonical_name": "Mahadeo Pandit"}}, {"text": "B.. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30793, "end_char": 30805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and B.. P. SINHA JJ.] , ,. , .. ,"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30824, "end_char": 30850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Railwa{ Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31084, "end_char": 31097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Railwa{ Board under the 'Ministry of Railw~s of fhd Government of India introduced a scheme with effect 1frori:l<tb:e'."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar fradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31227, "end_char": 31249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1st\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar fradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nMarch 2", "canonical_name": "State oj Uttar Pradesh"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1345_1353_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "~ . S.C.R .. 1345\n\nSUPREME.COUR~ REPORTS\n\n~ ' . . . .. ~\n\n- . .\n\n. ;\n\nlant also should have got the benefit of the doubt.· At this stage, it is not out of place to mention: one fact. It appears from the evidence of the Investigating Officer, P.W. 14, that in the course of th~ irivesti-. gation the prosecuting authorities were of the opinion that the murder in this case was to be attributed.• to the prosecution witness, Ram Bhawan, P.W. 4, and not to the appellant, and that in their view even the evidence as against Ram Bhawan was not sufficient to put him on trial for the murder. Doubtless such an opinion of the prosecuting authorities has no relevancy in the case and should not have .been placed on the record in this case. But when we have. to consider the desirability or otherwise of retrial, we need not shut our eyes to these features of .the case. which have been brought on the record. In the cir~ cumstances mentioned above we do not consider that the interests of justice require that any retrial should be ordered. We accordingly .direct that there shall be no retrial. . : . . . . . In the result, the convictions of the appellant .under sections 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentences therefore are hereby set aside. But his conviction under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code is maintained as also the sentence of two. year~. and a half in respect thereof. This appeal is accordingly allowed partially to the extent indicated above. Appeal partially allowed.' '\n\nTHE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, G.LP. RAILWAY\n\nv. ' .\n\nMAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER;· .\n\n[VJYIAI:\" .. BosE, JAGANNADHADAs,\n\nVEJ>T:\\(ATARAMA.\n\nA:YYAR. and B.. P. SINHA JJ.] , ,. , .. ,\n\nPayment of Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936), s.\"2(; i}-Wages-\n\nHouf~ rent allowance.,.-'rJlhether falls•r, vithin. the <irfinition .ofwages under the Act-Rule 3(i) of the statutor.y R_ules framed.by the Government-Legal effect thereof. ,. \" .... ' ' '\" \"\"' ·\n\nThe Railwa{ Board under the 'Ministry of Railw~s of fhd Government of India introduced a scheme with effect 1frori:l<tb:e'. 1st\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar fradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nMarch 2\n\nig55 - The bivisional\n\nEnginer;. G./._P.\n\nRail]IJay v; ..\n\nMahadeo Raghoo\n\nand another\n\nNovemer .1947 granting compensatory (city) allowance ar:.d house\n\nren~. allowances at certain rates to certain Railway employees (in~ eluding the 1st respondent who wa_s, rajlway einployee since 1945) stationed at specified headquarters. The first respondent. drew this allov.; ance along with his salary up io the 18th August 1948, when he was offered by the Government, quarters .<:uitable to his post, but he refused to occupy the same and the house rent allowance was stopped from the date of his refusal to occupy the quarter offered to him. Rule,}(i). of the., Statutory Rules framed by the Government arid Pllt ihto effect On 1st November 1947 runs as follows : . \"Th.e ho'use rent alloace in not be admissible to those who occupy a'.ccommodation pto'.vided by Government or those to whom acCommodation has been offered by Governine'nt. but Who. have refused\" . . Held,\" tllat the house ient alloWance is adn1issible only so long as an employee is stationed <it one of the specified places and has not been offered Government qllarters.\n\nT.he rules distitictly provide that the allowance will not be admissible to those who occupy Government .quar.ters or. _those to whom such quarters have been offred but who have refused to take advantage of the offer. Once an employee Of the descl-iption given above has beeri offered stlitale hoUse\n\naccommodation and he has refused it, he ceases t9 be eniitled to the house rent allowance and that allowance ceaSes to be \"wages\" within the meaning bf the. definition in s. 2(vi) of the Act because it is no more payable under the terms of the contract.\n\nThe grant Of house rent .allowance does not create an indefeasible. right in. the employee at .all places wherever he may be posted and in all, ircumstances, irrespective of whether or not he has Peen\n\noffered Coverllmet qu<irters. ·\n\nCIVIL . APPEL!, ATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 208 of 1952.\n\n' .\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and + Order dated the 28th day of September 1951 of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Bombay in Application No. 500 of 1951.\n\nM: C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n( G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and' P. G. Go'k, hale, with him), for the appellant.\n\n/. B. Dadachanji, M. V. /ayakar and Rajinder , Narain; for respondent No. l;\n\n. 1755.. March ~- The Judgi; nent of,. the;. C!>urt was .leliverec!-hy - ·\n\n• J ',.-\n\nSINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the orders dated the 28th September 1951 passed by the 2nd respondent, the Authority appointed under section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936), (which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act) allowing the 1st respondent's claim for house rent allowance as part of his wages.\n\nIn this case the facts are not in dispute and may shortly be stated as follows : The 1st respondent . is a gangman in the employ of the Central Railway (which previously used to be known as the G.I.P. Rly.), since April 1945. At that time his wages were Rs. 18 per month plus dearness allowance.\n\nWith effect from the 1st November 1947 the Railway Board under the Ministry of Railways of the Government of India introduced a scheme of grant of compensatory (city) allowance and house rent allowance at rates specified in their memorandum No. E47 CPC/14. This scheme was modified by the Railway Board's letter No. E47 CPC/14 dated 1st December 1947. As a result of this scheme certain railway employees stationed at specified headquarters were , eligible for the allowance aforesaid at certain specified rates. The 1st respondent thus became entitled to the allowance of Rs. 10 per month. This allowance the 1st respondent drew along with his salary until the 18th August 1948 when he was offered by the Government, quarters suitable to his post, but he refused to occupy the same. On his refusal to occupy the quarters offered by the Government, the house rent allowance was stopped with effect from the 19th August 1948.\n\nOn the 8th June 1951 the 1st respondent put in his claim before the Authority for Rs. 290 on the ground that the appellant,· the Divisional Engineer, G.l.P. Rly., who was the authority responsible under section 4 of the Act for payment of wages, had stopped payment of house rent allowance to him from the 19th Augu:>t 1948.\n\nThe claim covered the period the 19th August 1948 to the 18th January 1951 at the rate of Rs. 10 per month. The appellant appeared before the Authority ; ind by his written statement\" contested the claim on tl1e ground that the house rent allowance 'which was\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G.I.P •\n\nRailway v.\n\nM ahadeo Raghoo and anothd\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G./.P ' Railway v.\n\nMaadeo Raghoo and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nthe .. subject matter . of the claim was- -not \"wages\" within the meaning of -section- Z(vi) of the- Act. It was, therefore, submitted by the appellant who wa; the opposite party before the authority that .it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim which should be dismissed in limine. It was further pleaded that the claim was inadmissible on the ground that there had been no illegal deduction •from the respondent's wages inasmuch as the respondent had been allotted railway quarters of a suitable type and as he had refused to occupy those quarters, he was not entitled under the rules to any house rent allowance. Alternatively, it was further - pleaded by the appellant that so much of the claim ' as related to a period precedirig six months immediately before the date of the application was time-barred under the first proviso to section 15 (2) of the Act. The Authority. condoned the delay and that parf of the order condoning the delay is not in controversy before us.\n\nOn the issues thus joined between the parties the Authority came to the conclusion that the house rent allowance was \"wages\" as defined .in the Act, that as a matter of fact, accommodation was -offered to the 1st respondent and he refused. it; but that even so, the appellant was not entitled to withhold - the -. house rent allowance. - Accordingly the claim for Rs. 290 was allowed by. the Authority.\n\nThe short point to be decided in .this case is whether the house rent allowance claimed by . the 1st· respondent came within the purview of the definition -of \"wages\" contained in the Act There being no difference on-· questions of fact between the parties, the answer -to the question raised must depend upon the construction -to be placed - upon: the following 1ii:aterial portion of-the definition of. '.'wages\" in ectiori •2(vi)\n\nof the Act :~ . , . . - .- . . . . \" -\n\n\"'Wages~ means all emunerition, capable-'of -be. ing' •expressed, in terms :of money,; which--would; if the terms of .the -contract ofemployment;•express'.-ot implied,- ·, Were .Julfilled;• be payable,• .Whether . conditionally. upon . the, regular , attendance,_ good-w, ork .or conduct or -, othc; r;: behayour. rof the person employed or .-othrc\n\n' .\n\n-.,·\n\n. ; 'y\n\nwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include- ( a) the v:1J:µe of any house-accommodation, supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity, or of any service excluded by general or special order of the State Government .......... ·\n\n\" Shorn of all verbiage, \"wages\" are remuneration payable by an employer to his employee for services rendered according to the terms of the contract between them. The question then arises, what are the terms of the contract between the parties. When the 1st respondent's employment under the railway administration represented by the appellant began, admittedly he was not entitled to any such house rent allowance. As already indicated, the scheme for payment of house rent allowance was introduced with effect from the 1st November 1947 when the rules were framed, admittedly under sub-section (2) of section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor-General. Those rules were amended subsequently. We are here concerned with the amendment made by the Railway Board by its letter No. E47CPC/ 14 dated the 1st December 1947, particularly rule 3(i) whiCh'is in these terms :-\n\n\"The house rent allowance will not be admissible to those .. who occupy accommodation provided by Government. m those to whom -accommodation has been offered by Government but who have refused it\".\n\n- It has. been argued .on behalf of the appellant that the terms -of the contract between the parties -include the rule quoted above and -that therefore the position in law is that there is no absolute right in the 1st respondent to claim the house -rent allowance; in other wor.ds, it .is -contended. that _there is a .cndition precede.nt, to th~, claim for .house re11t allowmce being admissible,. nawely, hat th~ employee~ should. , e posted at on<: oL ~()se. places,,_(' like .. Boi; nbay,, .Calcutta,\n\nThe -Divisional Engineer, G.J.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghoo\n\nand another\n\n, Sinha J.\n\nThe .Divisional Engineer, G.J.P.\n\nRililway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghao\n\nand another\n\nSinha J.\n\nMadras, etc., before the claim for house rent, allowance could arise and. that there is a condition subsequent, namely, that. the employee posted at any one of those places will cease to be entitled to the allowance if either the Government provides accommodation to the employee in question or the employee refuses to occupy the accommodation so offered to him. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf' of the 1st respondent that the employee's right to the allowance accrues as soon as he has fulfilled the terms of the contract of employment including regular attendance, good work. or conduct and his other behaviour in terms of the definition of \"wages\" as contained . in the. Act. It was also argued on. beha)f of the 1st res~ pondent that the terms of the definition have to be construed consistently. with the provisions of sections 7 and 11 of the Act; that rule 3(i) quoted above is inconsistent with some of tl1e terms of the definition of \"wages\" and the provisions of sections 7 and 11 and that in any event, if rule 3(i) aforesaid .were to be considered as a part of the terms of the contract between the. parties, section 23 of the Act prohibits an employee from entering into . such a .contract. , as has the effect of. depriving him of his vested rights. ·\n\n . It should be noted at the outset that the learned Attorney-General appearing on behalf of the appellant has not pressed the argument which appears to have been raised in the written statement of the ap:- pellant and also before the -Authority as would appear from the orders passed by him, that clause (a) excluding \"the value of any house accommodation\" clearly showed that house rent allowance was . not included in \"wages\"· as defined in section 2(vi) of the Act. As will presently appear, this . argument proceeds on the unwarranted assumption that house . rent allowance is synonymous with the value of any .house.accommoda• tion. referred . to in the definition of. \"wages\" and in section 7 (2) (b) and section 11 of the Act.\n\nThe answer to the question whether house rent\n\n' .\n\nallowance is \"wages\" may be 'in the affirmative if the \"' rules .framed by the department relating . to the grant of. house rent allowance make it compulsory for the\n\nemployer to grant house rent allowance without anything more : in other words, if the house rent allowance had been granted without any conditions or with\n\nconditions~ if any, which were unenforceable in law.\n\nBut the statutory rules framed by the Government governing the . grant of house rent allowance do not make it unconditional and absolute in terms. The house rent allowance in the first instance is not admissible to all the employees of a particular dass. It is admissible only to such railway employees . as are posted at specified places in order \"to compensate railway servants in certain costlier cities for excessive rents paid by them over and above what they might normally be expected to pay\"; nor is such an allowance \"intended to be a source of profit\" or to be \"an allowance in lieu of free quarters\", as specifically stated in the preamble to the letter No. E47CPC/14, dated 1st December 1947, issued by the Railway Board.\n\nThe argument on behalf of the 1st respondent would have been valid if the rules in terms contemplated the grant of house rent allowance to every employee of a particular category but the rules do not make the grant in such absolute terms. The house rent allowance is admissible only so long as an employee is stationed at one of the specified places and has not been offered Government quarters.\n\nThe rules . distinctly provide that the allowance will not be ad\"\n\nmissible to those who occupy Government quarters or to those to whom such quarters have been offered but who have refused to take advantage of the offer. Once an employee of the description given above has been offered suitable house accommodation and he has refused it, he ceases to . be entitled to the house rent allowance and ' that allowance thus ceases to be \"wages\" within the meaning of the definition in the Act, because it is no more payable under the terms of the contract.\n\nIii 'our opinion, it is clear beyond all reasonable doubt that the rule5 which must be included in the terms Of contract btween the employer and the employ_ee contemplate that an ,. employee posted at one\n\nThe. Divisional Engineer, G.I.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Ragho1>\n\nand another\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe D'iuisir:mal Engineer, G.J.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghoo and anotMr\n\nBinha J.\n\n1352 SUPREME COURT REl1QRTS [1955]\n\nof the. specmed places would be entitled to horu; e rent allowance; but that as , soon as he. is <>ffered.. Government quarters .for. his .accommodation, .he .. ceases.. to be so entitled, whether he ·, actually, occupies ., or dqes not occupy the quarters offered to him. . Hence the grant of house rent allowance .does not .create an indefeasible right in the . employee at all , places wherever he may be posted. and in all circumstances, irrespectivs:\n\nof whether or not he . has . been .. offered Government quarters.. . . . .\n\nBut it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the provisions of sections 7 and 11 of .the Act.. .We . do not\" see any such inconsistency. Section 7 of the Act deals with such:· deductions. as may be made from the wages . as defined in the Act, of .an employee .. Subsection. (2) of section 7 . categorically specifies the heads under which deductions may lawfully be made from wages. Clause ( d) of this sub-section. has reference to \"deductions for . house accommodation supplied by the employer\", and section .. 11 provides that stich a :deduction shall not be made unless .. the. house accommodation has . been accepted by the. employee and shall not exceed the amount equivalent to the value of such . accommodation. The definition of \"wages\" in the Act also excludes . from -.its. operation the value of house accommodation referred. to, in. sections ·\"! and 11. as aforesaid.· The legislarnre,, has , used the expression \"value of any . house. accommodation\" in .the definition of '.'wages\"-. •as denoting something which can .be: deducted from. ,'.'wages''., The •. c9ne ex, dudes the. other. .It .is ... thus clear-. that: the.,, definition of \"wages\" under the:Act cannot .include :the\"value of any house accommodation •:supplied: by . the employer tothe employee;. otherwise .jc ... would.· not.be a\".legally permissible' deduction' .from wages. , . It: isc equally! clea:r that house rent allowance which may . •in:::certain\n\ncir'.umstances .. as \"aforesaic\\ be includd., , in, \"w.ge,~' is m,>t ,)\"he, .. ;~\\l; J; I}~; thing. i'S the;; .valu~;, of apy .Ji~¥s~.-.ac, coinm<;>Patipn. refw; d to , in th~ J\\qt., Th.at,., h!; ing,,, s9,\n\nthere i~ n, q : . rcaiidify., .ii),, , tjie .a, rgup; ient , ftd, vancer.l . on.,.h~-. half of the 1st respondent that rule 3(i) aforesaid is\n\n....\n\ninconsistent . witli . the provisions of sections . 7. and 11 of the Act. '. .. . . . . . . . . . \" .. ,, It remains to consider the last argument advanced on behalf of the lst respondent that section. 23 of the.\n\nAct prohibits an employee from relinquishing such a right as is the subject matter of rule 3(i) quoted above. This argument proceeds on the . assumpti9n that house rent allowance which is a right. conferred on the employee is an absolute right. It has already been held above that the Act read along with the rules which constitute the terms of the contract between the employer and the employee does not create any absolute right in the employee to the house rent allowance. That being so, there is no question of the employee relinquishing any such right as is contemplated by section 23.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid, the appeal succeeds.\n\nThe orders passed by the Authority are set aside. Jn the special circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed: .\n\nA. V. D'COSTA\n\nB. C. PATEL AND ANOTHER.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, ]AGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and SINHA JJ.]\n\nPayment of Wages Act, 1936, (IV of 1936), Ss. 5, 7, 15(1)(2)- Claim for wages due on account of the introduction of upgrading of persons-Claimant's right to be placed on monthly wages ignored- No delay in payment of wages or deduction of wages alleged-Authority under the Act-Whether had jurisdiction to decide the complaint of the applicant.\n\nThe second respondent had been an employee of the Central Railway as a daily rated casual labourer on specified daily wages since 1941. He continued to receive his wages at the specified rate until October 1949. In October 1949 he made an application through an official of the Registered Trade Union-a person permitted by the authority under sub-section (2) of s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936-claiming his wages due in respect of six months from May to October 1949. The respondent did not allege delay in the\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G./.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghoo and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nMarch 4", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "Ram Bhawan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 423, "end_char": 433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "gation the prosecuting authorities were of the opinion that the murder in this case was to be attributed.• to the prosecution witness, Ram Bhawan, P.W. 4, and not to the appellant, and that in their view even the evidence as against Ram Bhawan was not sufficient to put him on trial for the murder."}}, {"text": "sections 307 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1159, "end_char": 1179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1187, "end_char": 1204, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1299, "end_char": 1316, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, G.LP. RAILWAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1508, "end_char": 1542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, G.LP.", "canonical_name": "Divisional Engineer, G./.P ' Railway v.\n\nMaadeo"}}, {"text": "MAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1552, "end_char": 1578, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "B.. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1649, "end_char": 1661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and B.. P. SINHA JJ.] , ,. , .. ,"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1680, "end_char": 1706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Railwa{ Board", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1940, "end_char": 1953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Railwa{ Board under the 'Ministry of Railw~s of fhd Government of India introduced a scheme with effect 1frori:l<tb:e'."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1st\n\nSuraj Pal v.\n\nThe State of Uttar fradesh\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nMarch 2\n\nig55 - The bivisional\n\nEnginer;.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "Mahadeo Raghoo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2193, "end_char": 2207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G./._P.\n\nRail]IJay v; ..\n\nMahadeo Raghoo\n\nand another\n\nNovemer .1947 granting compensatory (city) allowance ar:.d house\n\nren~. allowances at certain rates to certain Railway employees (in~ eluding the 1st respondent who wa_s, rajlway einployee since 1945) stationed at specified headquarters.", "canonical_name": "MAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "1st November 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2855, "end_char": 2872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statutory Rules framed by the Government arid Pllt ihto effect On 1st November 1947 runs as follows : . \""}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3739, "end_char": 3747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4247, "end_char": 4267, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4312, "end_char": 4323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M: C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n( G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and' P. G. Go'k, hale, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4355, "end_char": 4367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M: C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n( G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and' P. G. Go'k, hale, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M: C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n( G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and' P. G. Go'k, hale, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. G. Go'k", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M: C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n( G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and' P. G. Go'k, hale, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4441, "end_char": 4454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/. B. Dadachanji, M. V. /ayakar and Rajinder , Narain; for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. V. /ayakar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4456, "end_char": 4469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/. B. Dadachanji, M. V. /ayakar and Rajinder , Narain; for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rajinder , Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/. B. Dadachanji, M. V. /ayakar and Rajinder , Narain; for respondent No."}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C!>urt was .leliverec!-hy - ·\n\n• J ',.-\n\nSINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the orders dated the 28th September 1951 passed by the 2nd respondent, the Authority appointed under section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936), (which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act) allowing the 1st respondent's claim for house rent allowance as part of his wages.", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4752, "end_char": 4765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4773, "end_char": 4793, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ministry of Railways of the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5307, "end_char": 5354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With effect from the 1st November 1947 the Railway Board under the Ministry of Railways of the Government of India introduced a scheme of grant of compensatory (city) allowance and house rent allowance at rates specified in their memorandum No."}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5489, "end_char": 5492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1st December 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5573, "end_char": 5590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E47 CPC/14 dated 1st December 1947."}}, {"text": "18th August 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5902, "end_char": 5918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This allowance the 1st respondent drew along with his salary until the 18th August 1948 when he was offered by the Government, quarters suitable to his post, but he refused to occupy the same."}}, {"text": "8th June 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6173, "end_char": 6186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th June 1951 the 1st respondent put in his claim before the Authority for Rs."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6369, "end_char": 6378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "19th Augu:>t 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6472, "end_char": 6489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who was the authority responsible under section 4 of the Act for payment of wages, had stopped payment of house rent allowance to him from the 19th Augu:>t 1948."}}, {"text": "M ahadeo Raghoo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6799, "end_char": 6814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant appeared before the Authority ; ind by his written statement\" contested the claim on tl1e ground that the house rent allowance 'which was\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G.I.P •\n\nRailway v.\n\nM ahadeo Raghoo and anothd\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G./.P ' Railway v.\n\nMaadeo Raghoo and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nthe .. subject matter .", "canonical_name": "MAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6827, "end_char": 6832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant appeared before the Authority ; ind by his written statement\" contested the claim on tl1e ground that the house rent allowance 'which was\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G.I.P •\n\nRailway v.\n\nM ahadeo Raghoo and anothd\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G./.P ' Railway v.\n\nMaadeo Raghoo and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nthe .. subject matter .", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "Divisional Engineer, G./.P ' Railway v.\n\nMaadeo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6841, "end_char": 6888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant appeared before the Authority ; ind by his written statement\" contested the claim on tl1e ground that the house rent allowance 'which was\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G.I.P •\n\nRailway v.\n\nM ahadeo Raghoo and anothd\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G./.P ' Railway v.\n\nMaadeo Raghoo and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nthe .. subject matter .", "canonical_name": "Divisional Engineer, G./.P ' Railway v.\n\nMaadeo"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7761, "end_char": 7771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10256, "end_char": 10267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10275, "end_char": 10304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahadeo Raghao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11386, "end_char": 11400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "places,,(' like .. Boi; nbay,, .Calcutta,\n\nThe -Divisional Engineer, G.J.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghoo\n\nand another\n\n, Sinha J.\n\nThe .Divisional Engineer, G.J.P.\n\nRililway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghao\n\nand another\n\nSinha J.\n\nMadras, etc.,", "canonical_name": "MAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12265, "end_char": 12282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12414, "end_char": 12431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12562, "end_char": 12572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13152, "end_char": 13165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13398, "end_char": 13407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13420, "end_char": 13430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahadeo Ragho1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15810, "end_char": 15824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Divisional Engineer, G.I.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Ragho1>\n\nand another\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe D'iuisir:mal Engineer, G.J.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghoo and anotMr\n\nBinha J.\n\n1352 SUPREME COURT REl1QRTS [1955]\n\nof the.", "canonical_name": "MAHADEO RAGHOO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Binha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15924, "end_char": 15929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Divisional Engineer, G.I.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Ragho1>\n\nand another\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe D'iuisir:mal Engineer, G.J.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghoo and anotMr\n\nBinha J.\n\n1352 SUPREME COURT REl1QRTS [1955]\n\nof the."}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16622, "end_char": 16639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16696, "end_char": 16705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16840, "end_char": 16849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18198, "end_char": 18200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19145, "end_char": 19155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. V. D'COSTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19355, "end_char": 19368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. D'COSTA\n\nB. C. PATEL AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "B. C. PATEL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19370, "end_char": 19381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. D'COSTA\n\nB. C. PATEL AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19397, "end_char": 19408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, ]AGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and SINHA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*"}}, {"text": "AGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19411, "end_char": 19423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, ]AGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and SINHA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19425, "end_char": 19442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, ]AGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19459, "end_char": 19485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 5, 7, 15(1)(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19501, "end_char": 19519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20165, "end_char": 20170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20178, "end_char": 20204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1353_1368_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "....\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1353\n\ninconsistent . witli . the provisions of sections . 7. and 11 of the Act. '. .. . . . . . . . . . \" .. ,, It remains to consider the last argument advanced on behalf of the lst respondent that section. 23 of the.\n\nAct prohibits an employee from relinquishing such a right as is the subject matter of rule 3(i) quoted above. This argument proceeds on the . assumpti9n that house rent allowance which is a right. conferred on the employee is an absolute right. It has already been held above that the Act read along with the rules which constitute the terms of the contract between the employer and the employee does not create any absolute right in the employee to the house rent allowance. That being so, there is no question of the employee relinquishing any such right as is contemplated by section 23.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid, the appeal succeeds.\n\nThe orders passed by the Authority are set aside. Jn the special circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed: .\n\nA. V. D'COSTA\n\nB. C. PATEL AND ANOTHER.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, ]AGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and SINHA JJ.]\n\nPayment of Wages Act, 1936, (IV of 1936), Ss. 5, 7, 15(1)(2)- Claim for wages due on account of the introduction of upgrading of persons-Claimant's right to be placed on monthly wages ignored- No delay in payment of wages or deduction of wages alleged-Authority under the Act-Whether had jurisdiction to decide the complaint of the applicant.\n\nThe second respondent had been an employee of the Central Railway as a daily rated casual labourer on specified daily wages since 1941. He continued to receive his wages at the specified rate until October 1949. In October 1949 he made an application through an official of the Registered Trade Union-a person permitted by the authority under sub-section (2) of s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936-claiming his wages due in respect of six months from May to October 1949. The respondent did not allege delay in the\n\nThe Divisional Engineer, G./.P.\n\nRailway v.\n\nMahadeo Raghoo and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nMarch 4\n\nA. V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C. 'Patel and another\n\nSUPREME COURT R.E?ORTS [1955]\n\npayment of his wages or deduction _of , his wages n contravent; ion of the provisions of s. 5 or s. 7 of Act IV of 1936 respectively. The respondeot alleged that he had been paid his actual wageS' as fixed by the railv.ray adn1inistration but that after the introduction of the scheme of upgrading of persons employed under the daily wages scheme, others who were junior to him had been _placed on the monthly wages scheme whereas his claim to be so placed, had been ignored and that he had not been paid wages oi:i the .cale to which he would have been entitled .if he had been placed on the monthly wages scheme.\n\nHeld, per SINHA J. (V1v1AN BosE and VENKATAMM~ AYYAR JJ. corzcurring, JAGAN_NADHADAs J. dissenting), that the respondent's complaint feJl under the category of potential wages and the authority appointed under the Act had no jurisdiction .to decide the question of potential wages.\n\nIt had the jurisdiction to decide what actually the t_erms of the contract between the parties. were, that is to say, to determine the c.tual wages. ·\n\nOn the case as made on behalf of the respondent, orders of the superior officers were. necessary to upgrade him from a daily wage~\n\nearner to a higher cadre. rhe authority under the Act has not\n\nbee~ empow.ered -nder s. :is to make such .direction to the superior officers. ·\n\nPer }AGANNADHADAS J.-Undoubtedly a claim to a higher potential wage cannot ·!be brought in under the category of \"claim arising out of deduction from the wages or delay in payment of the wages\" if that wage depended on the \"determination by a. superior departmental or other authority as to whether or not a particular em ployee is entitled to the higher wage-a determination which in volves the exercise of administrative judgment or discretion or certi fication, and which would, in such a situation, be a condition of the payability of the wage. But where the higher wage does not depend upon such determination hut depends on the application of and giving effect to certain rules and orders which, for this purpose, must be deemed to be incorporated in the contract of employment, such a wage is not a prospective wage merely because the paying -authority concerned makes defaut or commits error in working out the application .of the rules. The wage .under the Act .i.s not nces sarily the .immediately preexisting wage but the presently payable wage. _Whetheror' not an employee was entitled to wages of a higher category than what he was till then drawing would depend entirely on the sc<?pe of the rules with reference to which he is entitled to become one in te higher category and it cannot be .assumed a priori that such a claim is a claim -to \"prospective wages1\".\n\nOn the facts of the case as found the. dispute as to the wage was one that fell within the jurisdiction of the '.'authority\". concerned.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE No. 147 of J95~.\n\nJ URJSDJCTION : Appeal Civil\n\nAppeal by Special -Leave from the Judgment and\n\n..... - Order dated the 24th day of August 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 50 of 1951 arising out of the Order dated the 19th day of June 1951 of the said Court exercising Original Juris-- diction in Misc. No. 143 of 1951.\n\n. '\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for the appellant.\n\nJ. B.\n\nDadachanji, M. V. f ayakar and Rajinder Narain, for respondent No. 2. 1955.\n\nMarch 4. The Judgment of Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha JJ. was delivered by Sinha J.\n\nJagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nSINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated the 24th August 1951 upholding that of a single Judge of that court sitting on the Original Side, dis--\n\nmissing the appellant's petition under art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated the 23rd January 1951 passed by the 1st respondent, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).\n\nThe facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated as follows: The 2nd respondent is and has been at all material times an employee of the Central Railway (formerly called the G.I.P. Rly.) represented by the appellant who has been nominated by the Railway Administration as responsible for payment of wages under section 3 of the Act.\n\nEver since 1941, the 2nd respondent has been employed by the Railway Administration as a carpenter on daily wages, and has been treated as a daily rated casual labourer and has been paid his wages at the rate of Rs. 3-4-0 per day.\n\nHe continued receiving his wages at that rate until\n\nOctober, 1949 without any demur, and granting receipts for the wages thus received. On the 2nd December, 1949, an application was made by one K. N. Pitkar \"an official of Registered Trade Union, a person\n\nA. V. D'Costa\n\nV• B •. C. Patel and another\n\nA~ V. D'Cost~ ·\n\n. v.\n\nB. C. Patel 4nd another\n\nSinha J.\n\npermitted by 'the Authority\" under _sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, against the G.I.P. Rly. administration through its Divisional Engineer, Pare!, Bombay. It was alleged on behalf of the 2nd respondent that his wages due in respect of six months from May to October 1949 amounting to Rs .. 245 had not been paid or had been subjected to illegal deductions as shown in the schedule. The schedule will be set out hereinafter. A claim for Rs. 245 ph.1s Rs. 15 by way of compensation was made.\n\nThe appellant, as the opposite party before the Authority, resisted the claim, inter alia, on the grounds---:\n\n( 1) that Rs. 245 had not been illegally deducted from the wages of the 2nd resp0ndent; and\n\n(2) that the claim of the 2nd respondent who was employed as a daily rated casual labourer on specified daily wages, to be placed on a permanent cadre on the scale of monthly rates of pay was unfounded. it was further alleged that the 2nd respondent did not come within the purview of the Railway Services (Revision of Pay) Rules as he was a daily rated casual labourer charged to works and that no rules had been laid down governing the rates of pay and the conditions of service of daily rated casual labourers like the 2nd respondent. Hence his terms of service were the daily wages paid to him all along. It was thus contended that there had been no deduction from his wages. In this connection reference was made to the award of the Railway Workers Classification Tribunal, dated the 28th May 1948.\n\nThe Authority by its orders dated the 23rd January 1951 decided that the position of the 2nd respondent was not that of a casual labourer but that of a \"temporary employee\" and that therefore he was entitled to be on the scale of Rs. 55-150 plus the allowances admissible. In coming to this conclusion the Authority observed that the work done by the 2nd respondent is of the same nature as that of a member of the permanent staff. Hence the 2nd respondent could not be called a casual labourer. It also made reference to\n\narticle 39( d) of the Constitution containing the direction that there should be equal pay . for equal work.\n\nThe Authority also negatived the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the question of classification of an employee was outside its jurisdiction. In pursuance of the said order the Authority allowed the 2nd respondent's application by its further orders dated the 2nd March 1951. .\n\nAgainst the said orders of the Authority the appellant moved the High Court of Judicature at Bombay by an application under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the aforesaid orders. The matter was heard in the first instance by a learned single Judge of that court who by his orders. dated the 19th June 1951 dismissed the application. The appellant preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent which was heard by a Division Bench of that court.\n\nThe Division Bench by its order dated the 24th August 1951 dismissed the appeal and agreed with the conclusions of the Judge on the Original Side that the Authority had not acted without jurisdiction or had not exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the 2nd respondent's application.\n\nOn the appellant's application for leave to appeal to this court being rejected by the High Court, the appellant moved this court and obtained special leave to appeal on the 2nd February 1953.\n\nThe main controversy between the parties in this court is whether, having regard to the relevant provisions of the Act, the 1st respondent was competent to pass the orders it did, which orders had been upheld by the High Court of Bombay.\n\nThe Authority set up under section 15 of the statute in question is undisputably a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Its power to hear and determine disputes must necessarily be found in the provisions of the Act. Such a tribunal, it is undoubted, cannot determine any controversy which is not within the ambit of those provisions.\n\nOn examining the relevant provisions of the Act it will be noticed that it aims at regulating the payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in industry.\n\nIt applies\n\n12 90-S. C. India/59\n\n.. 1955\n\nA. V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C. Patel and another\n\n. Sinha J.\n\n•955\n\n. A. v. ncosta\n\nv. - B. C. Parel end another -· Sinha J.\n\nin the first. instance to the:· payment of.wages to persons employed fo any .factory or. employed by a rail- way administration; but. the State Government has the power after: giving three months' notice to extend the provisions of the Act or any of .them. to the •payment of' wages to any . cla.ss of persons employed .in any class or group of industrial .establishments. \"Wages\" means-\n\n\"all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if . the terms of •the contract of employment, express or implied, •were ful- filled, be: ; payabl~: .... :to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment .... \" (omitting words not necessary for our present purpose). · · · Section 3 lays down that every employer or his <epresentative or nominee shall be responsible for the payment to persons employed by him of all wages.\n\nSection 3 provides for fixati(>n of \"wage-periods\" which shall not exceed one month in any case. Section 5 indicates the last date within which, with reference to the particular wage-period, wages shall be paid, Section 7 lays down that the wages of an employed person shall be paid to him without deductions of any kind except those authorized by or under die Act. Section 7(2) in clauses (a) to (k) specifies the heads under which deductions from wages may be made, namely, fines; deductions for absence from duty; deductions for damage to or loss of goods of the employer; deductions for house accommodation supplied by the employer; deductions for amenities and services supplied by the employer; deductions for recovery of advances or for adjustment of overpayments of wages; deductions of income-tax payable by the employee; deductions to be made under orders of a court or other competent authority; deductions for subscriptions to, and for repayment of advances from any provident. fund; deductions for payments to cooperative societies, etc.; and finally, deductions made with the concurr.ence of the employed person in 'furtherance .of . cenain schemes approved by Government.\n\nNo .other deductions are permissible. It is also laid\n\nSWPRBME COUR'f REPORTS\n\ndown that every>payment. :m;:tde by .. .the employ.ed. peri\n\nson to the employer or his agent shall be d.eerrw~ to be deduction from wages. Each of, the several, hds of deductions aforesaid is dealt with in detail , in sections 8 to 13. Section 8 lays down the, c<,)llditio~~ an\\!\n\nlimits subject to which fines may be imposed. and, the procedure for imposing such .fines .. , hi ;; i.lso requil;\"e$ a register of such fines to be. maintained. by. the ; per.son responsible for .. the payment of wages.\n\nSection 9\n\ndeas with deductions on account of absence from .duty and prescribes . the. limits and the proportion therepf to wages.. Section IO similarly deals with deductions for damage or' loss to the employer and the procedure for determining the same.' Like sec; tion . 8, this section also requires a register of such deductions and . realiza- .tions to be maintained by the person fesponsible , for the payment . of wages. Section 11 lays down the limits of deductions for house accommodation and other amenities or services . which , may have been accepted by the employee, subject to such cqnditions as the State Government may .impose. Section 12 lays down the conditions subject to which deductions for recovery of advances may be made from wages .. Finally section 13 provides that the deductions for payment !O co-operative societies and insurance schemes. shall be subject to such conditions as the State. Government may prescribe. Section 14 makes provision for the appointment of Inspectors for carrying out the purpose of the Act, with power to enter on any premises and to examine any registers or documents re\" lating to the calculation or payment of wages and to take evidence on the spot. His function is to s~ that the registers or documents prescribed by the Act , containing the necessary entries as regards deductions and other matters have been properly kept by. the employers or their agents in order to be able to ascertain whether any deductions from wages in excess of the provisions of sections 7 to 13 aforesaid have been made. We then come to section 15 which makes pro- . vision. for the appointment of the . Authority \"to . hear and decide for .any specified area all claims arising out 'of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of\n\n.l/)55\n\nA •. V, P'Costa\n\nv. 13, C. Patel imiJ. !UIOl/zer\n\nSinha J.\n\nA. V. D'Costa ' v.\n\nB. C. Pai.I iznd anothir\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nthe wages of persons employed or• paid .in that area\".\n\nWhere the Authority finds that any deduction. has been made from the wages of an employed, person or the payment of any wages had been; delayed; he may at the instance of the wage-earner himself or any legal practitioner ot any official of a registered . trade union . authorized in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under the Act or any other person. acting with the permission of the Authority, after. making s1Kh enquiry as he thinks fit and 'after <giving an opportunity to the person resp0nsible for the pay, ment of. wages urider section 3 tO ,; how cause; . direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted or the payment of delayed wages\" together with such compensation as he may determine. The section als0 lays down the limits and conditions of his power to direct payment oL compensation to the employed person . or of penalty to the employer, if. he is satisfied that the application made on behalf of an employee was either malicious or vexations. His determination is .final. subject to a very limited right of appeal under section 17.\n\nSection 18 vests the Authority with all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of taking evidence, of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the production qf documents. Sec: tion 22 lays down that no court shall entertain any suit in respect of wages or of deduction from wages in so far as the claim forms the subject matter of a pending proceeding under the Act or has formed the subject of a direction in favour of or against the plaintiff under section 15, or which could have been recovered by the application under that section.\n\nSection 26 empowers the State Government to make rules to regulate the procedure to be followed by the authorities and courts referred to in sections 15 and 17 and provides that rules may be made inter alia, requiring the maintenance of records, registers, returns and notices necessary under the Act and the display 'in a conspicuous place of notices specifying the rates of wages payable to persons employed on such premises; and prescribing the authority for making a list of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR17 REPORTS 1361\n\nimposed and the procedure for imposing such fines. acts and omissions in respect of which fines ma:y be We have set. out above in some detail the relevant provisions of the Act in order to point out that those provisions are not applicable to the complaint' made in the present case. In this connection it is necessary to set out in extenso the \"particulars of claim\" in the schedule appended to his application which are as follows:\n\n\"The applicant is working as a carpenter-mason with the opposite party under\n\nI.O.W., Byculla.\n\nAccordiilg to the orders on introduction of the prescribed scales, the Railway Administration has to make the staff working under I.O.W. on permanent monthly wages scheme under the rules of the prescribed scales.\n\nThe applicant along with others was up till now under daily wages scheme. About 20 posts under I.O.W. where the applicant is working were to be made permanent. The opposite party in supersession of claim of the applicant has confirmed his juniors on the permanent scales as a skilled workman in the scale of 55-3-85-4-125-5-130, whereas the opposite party continued to pay the applicant on daily wages scheme thus depriving him of his legitimate wages under the prescribed scale, which resulted in the monetary loss to the applicant of Rs. 40-13-4 per month. Notice on behalf of the applicant was served on this count on the opposite party but of no avail and hence this application. The juniors have been paid under the prescribed scales from April, 1949, from which date the applicant was also entitled to the prescribed 'scale 55-130 (scale for skilled workman)\".\n\nThere is no allegation of delay in payment of wages inasmuch as it is not the respondent's case that his wages were not paid within the time limit laid down iii section 5; nor are there allegations to show that any payments have been made by the employed person to the employer or his agent which could be deemed to be a deduction from his wages within the\n\nmeaning of section 7. None of the categories of deductions as laid 'down in section 7 have been referred to. In\" other words, it is not alleged that his wages\n\n{I V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C. Patel and atUJthe1\"\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955 were so much a\"nd that so' much had been deducted\n\nA. V.D'Costa ·.under any of the heads set out under section 7(2). v. . ·. The allegations made by the respondent only amount B. c. Patel to saying tha_t he had been paid his actual wages andanotherc__as fixed by the railway administration but that after\n\n' the introduction of the scheme of upgrading of per- Sinha J. sons employed under the daily wages scheme, others .-- who were junior to him had been placed on the monthly wages scheme whereas his claim to be so placed had been ignored.'. The respondent's main grievance, therefore, appears to be that he had not been paid wages on the scale to which he would have been entitled if he had been placed on the monthly wages scheme. ··· In our opinion, the scheme of the Act as set forth above shows that if an employee were. to. state that his wages were, say Rs.100 per month, and that Rs.10 had been wrongly deducted by the authority responsible for the paynient of wages, that is to say, that the deductions could not come under any one of the categories laid down in section 7(2), that would be a straight case within the pur:view of the Act and the authority appointed under section 15 could entertain the dispute.\n\nBut it is said on behalf of the respondent that the authority has the jurisdiction not only to make directions contemplated by sub-section (3) of section 15 to refund to the employed person any amount unlawfully deducted but also to find out what the terms of the contract were so as to determine what the wages of the employed person were.\n\nThere is no difficulty in accepting that proposition. If the parties entered into the contract of service, say by correspondence and the contract is to be determined with reference to the letters that passed between them, it may be open to the authority to decide the controversy and find out what the terms of the contract with reference to those letters were.\n\nBut if an employee were to say that his wages were Rs. 100 per month which he actually received as and when they fell due but that he would be entitled to higher wages if his claims to be placed on the higher wges scheme had been recognized andgiven_ effect to,\n\n. ' i\\\n\nthat would not, in our opinion, be a matter within the ambit of his jurisdiction. The authority has the jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of the contract between the parties were,.that is to say, to determine the actual wages; but the authority has no jurisdiction to determine the question of potential wages. The respondent's complaint in the present case comes within the latter illustration.\n\nIf the respon-. dent's claim to be placed on the scheme of higher wages had been unduly passed over by the appellant, if indeed he had the power to do so, the obvious remedy of the respondent. was to approach the higher authorities of the railway administration by 0 way __ of\n\n. I' departmental appeal or revision; but instead of doing\n\n .I ' that, he has sought his redress by making. his claim :_ , before the authority under the Act. The question is, has the authority the power to direct the appellant or his superior officers who may have been responsible for the classification, to revise the classification so as to upgrade him from the category of a daily wageearner to that of an employee on the monthly wages scheme. If the respondent had been on the cadre of monthly wages and if the appellant had withheld his rise in wages to which he was automatically entitled, without any orders of his superior officers, he might justly have claimed the redress of his grievance from the authority under the Act, as it would have amounted to an underpayment. But in the present case, on the case as made on behalf of the respondent, orders of the superior officers were necessary to. upgrade him from a daily wage-earner to a higher cadre.\n\nThe authority under the Act has not been empowered under section 15 to make any such direction to those superior officers. The appellant is responsible to pay the respondent only such wages as are shown in the relevant register of wages presumably maintained by the department under the provisions of the.· Act, but he cannot be directed to pay the respondent higher wages on the determination by the authority that he be should have been placed on the monthly wages scheme. · In that view of the matter it is not necessary to go\n\nA~ V. D' Costa v.\n\nB. C. Patel and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nA. V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C. Patti and another\n\nSinha ].\n\ninto the merits of the. controversy . as to , what .classification as adumbrated by · the Railway Workers' Classification Tribunal, .and adopted by. the Railway administration, the second respondent should have been brought under. ·.If that question were . open to determination by the Authority, .we would have had to remit the case to the Authority ·to give . a fresh opportunity to the parties to adduce. all the relevant evidence and then to come to its final conclusiohs, . as it appeared to us during the hearing of the case . that all relevant information had not been placed before the Authority. But, as, in our opinion; that is not a matter within' its limited jurisdiction, that contingency does not arise.\n\nFor the reasons given above we allow this appeal, quash the orde'rs of the Authority and of the High Court, but in the special circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs.\n\n]AGANNADHADAS J.-I regret that I find myself unable to agree.\n\nThe second respondent before us, employed as a carpenter in the Railway since 1941, has' beeri working as daily-rated casual labourer. He claimed that he should have been absorbed as a monthly-rated permanent employee and that he has been wrongly superseded. His claim to be treated as a permanent employee was apparently not accepted bf the Tribunal (the Authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for Bombay). But it was held that the position of the applicant is not that of a daiJy; rated casual labourer but that of a monthly\"rated temporary employee. His claim: was treated and upheld' by the Tribunal as one substantially based on. the gioun.d that . the Award of the Railway Workers' Classification Tribunal in relation to the recominendaticiils of the Central Pay Commission was approved by the Railway Board and directed to be implemented, and that by virtue thereof he was: no longer a mere castial labourer but was entitled to higher wages on the' footing of a monthly-rated labourer, No question , arises that the order of the Tribu:na:l \"is bad owirig to the\n\n\"\\.-\n\n, S.C.R; SUPREME 'coURT REPORTS 1365\n\nvariation between the cl:iim ·-made and the relief _granted.\n\nAs hdd by the High Court, pleadings in these cases have tobe liberally construed. That his claim was understood as having been based on the Award of Railway Workers' Classification Tribunal, ''by the Railway Authorities themselves, is clear from the statement filed on their behalf in answer to the -employee's claim. Apart from the question of jurisdiction, the defence was two.fold.\n\n(1) The applicant being a daily-rated casual labourer, charged to works, the directive of the Railway Board did not apply to him. (2) Even if it applied to a person in the situation of the applicant, he was not entitled to be brought •On to the monthly-rates of pay in the skilled grade, without his previously passing a trade test to establish himself as skilled in his trade and he did not pass the test. The Tribunal, on the material referred to by it in its order. came to the conclusion (1) that the applicant did Iiot fall within the category of workcharged staff, (2) that under the Award of the Rail- way Workers' Classification Tribunal,· no trade test was necessary for the applicant who was a carpenter, and (3) that as per certain instructions of the con- . ccrned authority, the period of casual labour was to -be limited to six months, and that since this applicant was admittedly a Casual labourer under the Railway for a much larger period, i.e. since 1941, he became entitled to be treated as a temporary employee and not as a casu'1,.l labourer and to receive wages as such. whether these conclusions are right or wrong is not the question before us. The only question is whether or not the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to find that the applicant was entitled to the emoluments of a monthly-rated temporary employee and not to that of a daily-rated casual labourer, as the result of the order of the Railwa7 Board directing implementation of the Award of the Classification Tribunal.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the Tribunal arises under sec- tion 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Act IV -of 1936) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The 'Tribunal is set up to decide \"all claims arising out of deductions from he_ wages or delay . in payment . of\n\n A. V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C, Patel and another\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n1955 wages\".\n\nTh~ relief which it is authorised to award is -to direct \"the refund of the amount deducted, or the A. v. eosia payment of the wages delayed\". Such a direction B. c. Patel \\ made by the Tribunal is final, under section 17 of the and another ' Act, subject to the right of appeal provided therein.\n\nUnder section 22, no suit lies in any court for the re- JagannadhadasJ. covery of wages or of any deduction therefrom which\n\ncould have been recovered by an application under section 15. However limited this jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and however elaborate. the provisions in the Act for the preparation and display by the employer of the table of wages payable to the employees, and for the inspection thereof by the Factory Inspectors, it cannot be supposed that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is only to enforce the wages so displayed or otherwise admitted: Such a narrow construction would rob the machinery of the Act of a great deal of its utility and would confine its application to cases whiCh are not likely to arise often, in a wellordered administration like the Railways. Indeed, I do not gather that such a construction was pressed for, before us, in the arguments. Even a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, like the one under consideration, must necessarily have ·.the jurisdiction to decide, for itself, the preliminary facts on which the claim or dispute before it depends. In the instant case, it must have jurisdiction to decide what the wages pay- able are and, for that purpose, 'what the contract of employment and the terms thereof a:re. The judgment of my learned brothers in this case apparently recognises the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as above stated, when it said that the Tribunal has the power •\"to find out what the ternis of the contract were to determine what the wages of the employed person. were\". 'Vhether the Tribunal's decision in this behalf is conclusive or not is a matter that does not arise for decision in this case.\n\nBut, it is said that the Tribunal bas no authority to determine the question of \"potential wages''.\n\nUndoubtedly a claim to a higher potential wage cannot be brought in under the category of \"claim arising out of deduction from the wages or delay in pay-\n\nS.C.R. \\' . '\n\n\\ . 1367\n\n1955. . ,_ ment of the wages\"iif that wage depended . on the determination by a' superior. departmental or ether authority as to whether or not a particular employee A. v. costa is entitled to the higher wage-.:a determination which B. c. Pat.i involves the exercise of administrative judgment or a•a another discretion or certification, and which would, in such - a situation, be a condition of the payability of the JagannaahadasJ. wage.· But where the higher wage does not depend upon such determination but depends on the application of,· and giving effect to, certain rules and orders which, for this purpose, must be deemed to be incorporated in the contract of employment, such a wage is, in my view, not a prospective wage, merely because the paying authority concerned makes default or commits error in working out the application of the rules. In this context it is relevant to notice that the definition of \"wages\" in the Act is \"all remuneration which would if the terms of the contract, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable\". The word \"were\" in this definition which I have underlined; Reems to indicate that even a \"prospective wage\" which would be payable on the proper application of the rules in the sense which I ha:ve explained above may well fall within its scope. The. wage under the Act is not, necessarily, the immediately pre-existing wage but the presently-payable wage. . · · In the case before us, the order of the Tribunal proceeded on the view that the applicant was present~ ly entitled to be treated as a monthly-rated tempo- . rary employee and not as a daily-rated casual labourer, by virtue of the directions of the Railway Board for\n\nthe implementation of the scheme of classification and that therefore he was entitled to the appropriate higher wage. We have not been shown any material to indicate that this higher classification of the appli- cant depended not on the mere application, of the classification scheme and the rules thereunder, to him but upon any determinll; tioii by a departmental higher authority. If it was the latter, undoubtedly the Tribunal cannot claim to sit in judgment over that determination, whether it was ight or wrong. Such\n\nA. V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C. Patti and another\n\njagannadhadas J.\n\ndetermination, ·if. wrong, could , be -, corrected only • by a further departmental appeal; if :any; available_, But the Tribunal had, to my mind,, the . authority. to find whether the applicant's .case falls within the : scope of determination bythe departmental. authority -or is oneof mere application of the. rules to the facts .. of this case. If the decision of the Tribunal in this behalf was wrong, the appropriate remedy for. the Railway Authority was by way of an appeal under section 17 of the Act. Since . the finding _of the Tribunal in this case involved the case of as many as six persons and the net additional amount ordered was a sum of Rs. 1,341, its finding was appealable. under section 17 of the Act. Whether or not an employee, was entitled to wages of a highercategory than what he was till then drawing would depend entirdy on the scope of the rules with reference tci which he is entitled to become one in the higher category and it . cannot be assumed a priori that such a claim is a claim to \"prospective wages\".\n\nIn my view, therefore, there is no sufficient reason to reverse the judgment of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court and this appeal should be dismissed with .costs.\n\nBY THE CouRT. In accordance with the decision of the majority, the appeal is allowed and the orders of the Authority and of the.High Court are quashed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs throughout.\n\n Appeal allowed. '\n\n...", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 835, "end_char": 845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. V. D'COSTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1045, "end_char": 1058, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. V. D'COSTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. C. PATEL AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1060, "end_char": 1083, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. C. 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V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C. 'Patel and another\n\nSUPREME COURT R.E?ORTS [1955]\n\npayment of his wages or deduction of , his wages n contravent; ion of the provisions of s. 5 or s. 7 of Act IV of 1936 respectively.", "canonical_name": "SINHA JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2269, "end_char": 2273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2277, "end_char": 2281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "V1v1AN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2816, "end_char": 2827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per SINHA J. 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Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5439, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5458, "end_char": 5471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. B.\n\nDadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5504, "end_char": 5521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B.\n\nDadachanji, M. V. f ayakar and Rajinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. V. f ayakar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5523, "end_char": 5537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B.\n\nDadachanji, M. V. f ayakar and Rajinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5542, "end_char": 5557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B.\n\nDadachanji, M. V. f ayakar and Rajinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5613, "end_char": 5624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha JJ.", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5626, "end_char": 5643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Vivian Bose, Venkatarama Ayyar and Sinha JJ.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5685, "end_char": 5698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Sinha J.\n\nJagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 5993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6140, "end_char": 6160, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6346, "end_char": 6361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated as follows: The 2nd respondent is and has been at all material times an employee of the Central Railway (formerly called the G.I.P. Rly.)"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2nd December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6919, "end_char": 6937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2nd December, 1949, an application was made by one K. N. Pitkar \"an official of Registered Trade Union, a person\n\nA. V. D'Costa\n\nV• B •. C. Patel and another\n\nA~ V. D'Cost~ ·\n\n."}}, {"text": "K. N. Pitkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6970, "end_char": 6982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2nd December, 1949, an application was made by one K. N. Pitkar \"an official of Registered Trade Union, a person\n\nA. V. D'Costa\n\nV• B •. C. Patel and another\n\nA~ V. D'Cost~ ·\n\n."}}, {"text": "A. V. D'Costa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7033, "end_char": 7046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2nd December, 1949, an application was made by one K. N. Pitkar \"an official of Registered Trade Union, a person\n\nA. V. D'Costa\n\nV• B •. C. Patel and another\n\nA~ V. D'Cost~ ·\n\n.", "canonical_name": "A. V. D'COSTA"}}, {"text": "C. Patel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7056, "end_char": 7064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2nd December, 1949, an application was made by one K. N. Pitkar \"an official of Registered Trade Union, a person\n\nA. V. D'Costa\n\nV• B •. C. Patel and another\n\nA~ V. D'Cost~ ·\n\n."}}, {"text": "B. C. Patel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7101, "end_char": 7112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nB. C. Patel 4nd another\n\nSinha J.\n\npermitted by 'the Authority\" under _sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, against the G.I.P. Rly."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7191, "end_char": 7201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7209, "end_char": 7235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "G.I.P. Rly. administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7249, "end_char": 7275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nB. C. Patel 4nd another\n\nSinha J.\n\npermitted by 'the Authority\" under _sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, against the G.I.P. Rly."}}, {"text": "Railway Workers Classification Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8602, "end_char": 8641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection reference was made to the award of the Railway Workers Classification Tribunal, dated the 28th May 1948."}}, {"text": "28th May 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8653, "end_char": 8666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection reference was made to the award of the Railway Workers Classification Tribunal, dated the 28th May 1948."}}, {"text": "23rd January 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8707, "end_char": 8724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Authority by its orders dated the 23rd January 1951 decided that the position of the 2nd respondent was not that of a casual labourer but that of a \"temporary employee\" and that therefore he was entitled to be on the scale of Rs."}}, {"text": "article 39( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9192, "end_char": 9206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2nd March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9579, "end_char": 9593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the said order the Authority allowed the 2nd respondent's application by its further orders dated the 2nd March 1951. ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9663, "end_char": 9697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the said orders of the Authority the appellant moved the High Court of Judicature at Bombay by an application under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the aforesaid orders."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9722, "end_char": 9733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th August 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10096, "end_char": 10112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench by its order dated the 24th August 1951 dismissed the appeal and agreed with the conclusions of the Judge on the Original Side that the Authority had not acted without jurisdiction or had not exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the 2nd respondent's application."}}, {"text": "2nd February 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10516, "end_char": 10533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the appellant's application for leave to appeal to this court being rejected by the High Court, the appellant moved this court and obtained special leave to appeal on the 2nd February 1953."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10752, "end_char": 10772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main controversy between the parties in this court is whether, having regard to the relevant provisions of the Act, the 1st respondent was competent to pass the orders it did, which orders had been upheld by the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10802, "end_char": 10812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12166, "end_char": 12175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12318, "end_char": 12327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12415, "end_char": 12424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12530, "end_char": 12539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12684, "end_char": 12696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 8 to 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13804, "end_char": 13820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13822, "end_char": 13831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14089, "end_char": 14098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14517, "end_char": 14527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14733, "end_char": 14743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14856, "end_char": 14866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15033, "end_char": 15043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 7 to 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15604, "end_char": 15620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15663, "end_char": 15673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16488, "end_char": 16491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17131, "end_char": 17141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17144, "end_char": 17154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17218, "end_char": 17245, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17651, "end_char": 17661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17738, "end_char": 17748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17879, "end_char": 17897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20029, "end_char": 20038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20237, "end_char": 20246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20302, "end_char": 20311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. V.D'Costa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20497, "end_char": 20509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\" other words, it is not alleged that his wages\n\n{I V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C. Patel and atUJthe1\"\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955 were so much a\"nd that so' much had been deducted\n\nA. V.D'Costa ·.under any of the heads set out under section 7(2).", "canonical_name": "A. V. D'COSTA"}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20549, "end_char": 20561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21521, "end_char": 21533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21630, "end_char": 21640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21817, "end_char": 21827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24356, "end_char": 24366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26276, "end_char": 26286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26294, "end_char": 26314, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Pay Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26677, "end_char": 26699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Award of the Railway Workers' Classification Tribunal in relation to the recominendaticiils of the Central Pay Commission was approved by the Railway Board and directed to be implemented, and that by virtue thereof he was: no longer a mere castial labourer but was entitled to higher wages on the' footing of a monthly-rated labourer, No question , arises that the order of the Tribu:na:l \"is bad owirig to the\n\n\"\\.-\n\n, S.C.R; SUPREME 'coURT REPORTS 1365\n\nvariation between the cl:iim ·-made and the relief _granted."}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29052, "end_char": 29078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29537, "end_char": 29547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29630, "end_char": 29640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29799, "end_char": 29809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "the Payment of Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33821, "end_char": 33834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such\n\nA. V. D'Costa v.\n\nB. C. Patti and another\n\njagannadhadas J.\n\ndetermination, ·if.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34326, "end_char": 34336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34539, "end_char": 34549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34987, "end_char": 35004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my view, therefore, there is no sufficient reason to reverse the judgment of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court and this appeal should be dismissed with .costs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1369_1427_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1369\n\nJUGALKISHORE SARAF\n\n1. ,.! ' v:\n\nRAW COTTON CO. LTD.\n\n[S. R.' DAs,' BHAGW4TI and IMAM JJ.]\n\nCode 'of Civil Pr6cedure (Act' V f 1908), s. 146; Order XXI, rule 16-Debt transferred pending suit thereon-Decree not mentioned in deed-Execution of decree-Application by transferee-Applicability .of, Or_det: XX!, rule .16 . and s. 146-Equitable principles-:- Transfer of Property, Act (IV , of 1882), ss. 3, 5, 8. and 1~0.\n\nH si. S filed a suit against th~ appellant for recovery of money and during the. pendency of the .suit a document was executed on the 7th f'.ebruary, 1949,. wher~.by. H & S transferred to the respondents all book and othe, r debts . due to them together with all. securities for the debts and all other property to which they were entitled in connection with their ,.b:usiness. in. Bombay. One of the book debts was the subject matter of .the suit, but there was no mention in that\n\ndocuent of the , sirit pr . th~ decree to. be passed in the suit.. The respondents did. not .take. any .steps under Order XXII, rule 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure. to get themselves substituted as plaintiffs in the place of H. & S, but allowed the 'suit to be continued in the name of .the original plaintiffs, and on the 15th December, 1949, a decree was passed, in favoµr of H & S against the appellant. On the 25th April, 1951, the rcospondents filed 1n. the City Civil Court, Bombay, an application for execution of the decree under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code, and a notice under Order XXII, rule 16 was issued by the Court calling. upon H & S and the appellant to' show cause why the decree' hould not be executed by the transferees, the respondents. The appellant contended inter . alia that as the respondents were only the assignees of the debt which was the subjectmatter of .the suit .and not of the decree itself they were not entitled to execute the decree. ·\n\n Held, that the respondents as the transferees of the debt which was the subject-matter of the suit were entitled to make an application for execution of .the decree under section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure as persons claiming under the decree-holder.\n\nThe effect of the expression \"save as otherwise provided In th'is Code\" contained in section 146 is that a person cannot make an application under section 146 if other provisions of the Code are applicable to it.\n\nPer DAs and IMAM\n\nJ).,\n\nBHAGWATI J. dissenting.-Order XXI, rule 16, by the first alternative, contemplates the actual trans- \"fer by an assignment in writing of a decree after it is passed and while a transfer of or an agreement to transfer a decree that may be passed in future may, in equity, entitle the transferee to claim the beneficial interest in the decree after it is passed, such\n\n1955\n\n111arch 7\n\n]ugalkisho; e saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\n1370 SUll!YEMii: C0URT REPORTS\n\n[J1)55]\n\nequitable transfer does ; q.o~1 ren.4er I he: ,1'a.ns.ree 1 a transferee of the decree by assignment in writing within the ffieaning of Order XXI, rule 16. ·, '.· , ,,. .· .. 1 ··~ ., 1 f. , , Per DAs J.-The transfer in writing of I a property which is the subject-matter of a su.it wiot. in terms transferring the decree passed or to be passed in the 'sUit does ndt entitle the' transferee to apply £@r irxecution of the .decre~ .uqder Order._ ~XI,, ule . .l~, as a tr; insferee. o~ the decree._Py .; in assignment in, Vfriting. ·\n\nIf :by reason of any provision of law, st<tu, tory or other\\visc!, interest in property passes from one person . to another, ·. tliere is a transfer of the property by oper.ition of law; There is no warrant for confining transfers \"by operation of law',' to the three cases of de;:i.th, devolution or sutcession or' to transfers bY opera!ioh of statutory lJ.ws only. If the dOcurrient i_n question'; could be\" ConStrued to be .f transfer of or an .agfeement to transfer the deCree to' be passed iri future~ then on the decree beiD; g passed, by opetation Of.equity, the fespondellts would .become the 'trarisferees of the' dCcree by operation of law within the mfaning of Order XXI, rule i6. ' Per BHAGWAT! ).-Section 5 Of the Transfer of Property Act defines a \"transfer of property\" as an act by which the t'.t; insferor\n\nconveys property in present or in future to the transferee or' transferees. The Words \"in preserit or in future\" qualify the word \"conveys\" and not the word ' 1pr'operty\" in the. section. A' transfer o'f property that is not in existence qperates as a coiltract to be performed in the future v.~, hich may be Specifically' enforced as soon as the property 'comes into existence. It is only by the operation oi this equitable principle that as soOn as \"the property comes int'o exst ence and is capable of being identified, equity taking as done that which 'ought to be done, fasteris upon: the property and the contract to assign becomes a compete equitable assignment. There is Iloihing in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other law Which prevents the operation of ths equitable principle, and an assignment in Writing of a decree to be passed in future would bCcome a complete equitable assignment on the decree being passed and would fall within the \"assignment in writing\" cc>qtemplated by : Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code.\n\nA mere transfer of property as such does not by itself spCU out a transfer of a decree which has been passed or may be passed in respect -of that property and it would require an assignm, ent of such decree .in order. to effectuate the transfer. But where the prorty is an actionable claim within the meaning of the definition in section 3 Of the Transfer of Propert}r Act and is transferred by lneans of an instrument in writing, the transferee could by virtue Of section\n\n130 of the .Transfer of Property Act step. into the shoes. of the transferor .and claim to be th~ transferee of the decree and apply for execution of. the decree under Order XXI, rule 16 .of the Code of. Civil\n\nProcedure.\n\nPer IMAM;. J.~There ~Ust be a decree 'irl .xistence hic:h is transfCrred before the tran'sferee\" can benefit from 'the Provisions\n\n...\n\ns:c.R.\n\nSl'.!PR'EME C<DURT. REP~RTS :1371\n\n<>f rule :16. The 01:dinary .. and natural meaning i>'f the words.of. •rule\n\n16 can oarry np other, interpretation and, the question of.a strict. and narrow ip.erprtation of .its pr<!Ysion, s qoes. 1wt rise.. ' . ,\n\nCase-law rev.lewed. ·\n\nCrviL · AP~ELLA'i'E.\n\nNo. 212 <?f 1$4,\n\n1uRISDICoqON :\n\n. '\n\n'Civil' .A. ' eal\n\n. ,.PP\n\nAppeal ftom the Judgment and Decree dated the 10th day of November 1953 of the High' Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 8 of 1953 under the Letters Patent, against the decree dated tlte 23rd day of September 1952 of the said High . Court in Appeal No. 67 of 1952 from Original Decree arising out of Order dated the 20th November 195~ of the City Civil Court, Bombay, in Summary Suit No. 233 of 1948.\n\nR. Subramania Iyer and K. R. Choudhry, for the :appellant.\n\nH. /. Umrigar, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the respondent.\n\n1955. March 7. The following Judgments were delivered. ·\n\nDAs J.-The facts leading up to this appeal are few and simple. Two persons named Mahomedali Habib and Sakerkanoo Mahomedali Habib used to carry on business as merchants and pucca adatias in bullion and cotton at Bombay under the name. and style of Habib & Sons. In .1948 that firm instituted a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court, being Summary Suit No. 233 of 1948, against the present appellant Jugalkishore Saraf, a Hindu inhabitant carrying on business at Bombay, for. the recovery of Rs. 7,113-7-0 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum said to be due by him to the firm in respect of certain transactions in gold and silver effected by the firm as pucca adatias. On the 7th Febmary, 1949 when that summary suit was stiU pendii; ig a document was\n\nexeuted whereby it. was agreed that the two partners would transfer and Messrs Raw Cotton Company, Limited, (hereinafter called the, respondent company)\n\nJugalkishore Saraf .,, Raw Cotlmt\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nJugalkishore Saref\n\nRaw Cotwn\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDas\n\n1372 SUPREME q!)URT REPORTS [1955}\n\nwould accept the transfer of, inter alia, all. book and, other debts due to them in connection with their business in Bombay and full benefit of all securities for the debts and all other property to which they were . entitled in connection with the said business. The respondent company did not take steps under, 0. XXII, r. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to get themselves substituted as plaintiffs in the place and stead of Habib & Sons, the plaintiffs on record, but allow.ed the suit to be continued in the name of the original plaintiffs.\n\nEvidently, the two partners migrated f, rom India to Pakistan. and their properties vested in the. Custodian 0£ Evacuee Property. On the 15th December 1949 a decree . was passed in the summary suit for the sum of Rs. 8,018-7-0 for the debt and interest and the sum of Rs. 410 for costs of the suit, aggregating to Rs. 8,428-7-0, and for further interest . at 4 per cent. per annum from the date of the decree until paymertt.\n\nHabib & Sons being the plaintiffs on record the decree\n\nwas passed in their favour. On the 11th December 1950 the Custodian of Evacuee Property, _Bombay, informed the respondent mmpany that by an order made on the 2nd AugustH50\n\nthe Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property had confirmed \"the transaction of transfer\" of the business of Habib & Sons to the respondent company.\n\nOn or about the 25th April, 1951 the respondent company presented before the Bombay City Civil Court a tabular statement purporting to be an application for execution under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the last column of the tabular statement, under the heading \"Th~ mode in which the assistance of the Court is required\", the respondent company prayed that the Court ''be pleased tc,> declare the Applicants the assignees of the decree as the decretal debt alc,>ng with c,>ther debts hatl been transferred by the plaintiffs to the Applicants by a deed of assignment dated the 7th February 1949 which was confirmed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bombay, and order them to be substituted for the plaintiffs\". There was, in that column,. no (\n\nspecifiction of any of the modes in which the assist-\"\" -\\\n\n• -\n\n.-< •\n\n•..\n\nance of the Court might be required as indicated in clause (j) of Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code. On the 10th\n\nMay 1951 the Bombay City Civil Court issued a notice under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code to Habib & Sons, who were the decree-holders on record, and Jugalkishore Saraf, who was the defendant judgment-debtor, requiring them to show cause why the decree passed in the suit on the 15th December 1949 in favour of the plaintiffs and by them transferred to the respondent company, should not be executed by the said transferees against the said defendant judgment-debtor.\n\nThe defendant judgment debtor showed cause by filing an affidavit affirmed by him on the 15th June\n\n1951. Amongst other things, he denied that the document in question had been executed or that the document transferred the decree to the respondent company.\n\nThe matter was tried on evidence and the execution of the document was proved by the evidence of an attesting witness which has been accepted by the executing Court. The executing Court, however, rejected the second contention and made the notice absolute with costs and gave leave to the respondent company to execute the decree against the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor filed an appeal before the High Court.\n\nThe appeal was heard by Dixit, J. Before him the execution of the document was not challenged and nothing further need be said about that.\n\nThe only substantial question raised was whether the respondent company were the transferees of the decree within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16. The learned Judge answered the question in the affirmative on the authority of the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Purmananddas f ivandas v. V allabdas W allji (1 ) and in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Ghulamnabi(2) and affirming the order of the executing Court dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe judgment-debtor preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court which was dismissed by Chagla, C.J., and Shah, J., following the two earlier decisions mentioned above. They, however, (1) [1877] I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506. '(2) I.L.R.[19°46]Bom. 2;6. 13-90 S. C. India/59\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd .\n\nDasJ.\n\n'Jugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\n•granteil, under article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution, a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court. The prillcipal .question mged before us is as to' whether the respondent company .can .claim to be 'the 'transferees CJf the decree within .the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16 of .the .Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nOrder XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, .omitting the local amendments which are not material\n\nfor our .present purpose, provides :-\n\n\"16. Where a ilecree or, if a 'decree has been passed jointly in favour .CJf two or more persons, the interest of any .decree-holiler in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution .of the decree to the Court which passed it ; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to .the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder.\n\nProvided that, where the decree or .such interest as aforesaid, has .been transferred by assignment, notice <Of , such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections {if any) to its execution : Provided also that, where a decree for the payment •of money against two or more persons has 'been ttansforred to . one of them, it shall not be executed against the others\".\n\nThe first thing that strikes the reader is the sequence of events contemplated by this rule. It postulates, first, that a decree has 'been passed and, secondly, that that decree has been transferred (i) by assignment in writing 0r (ii) by operation of law. The cardinal rule of construction of statutes . is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used rby the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the .same. But'if no such alternative construction is possible, 'the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of liera1 interpretation.\n\nIn the present case a literal construction of the rule\n\n,_J\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT R~PQ; RTS 1375\n\nleads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction. It is quite plain that if Order XXI, rule 16 is thus construed the respondent company canot possibly contend that ¢e the decree now sought to be executed by them wa$, after ,.its passing, transferred to them by. an assignment ir:t writing within the meaning of that rule, for the document in question was' executed .on the 7th February 1949 but the decree was passed subsequently on die 15th December 1949. Whether they can claim to have become the transferees of the decree after it was passed by operation of Jaw within the meaning of this rule or to have otherwise become entitled to the benefit of it is a different matter which will be considered later on.\n\nFor the moment it is enough to say that there .had been no transfer of the decree to the respondent company by any assignment in writing executed after the decree was passed, as contemplated and required by Order XXI, rule .16. Indeed, Dixit, J. conceded-\n\n\"If the language of Order XXI, rule 16 is striCtly construed, it seems to me that the Respondents have no case\".\n\nAnd so did Chagla, C.J., when he said-\n\n\" .... and it is perfectly clear that if one were to construe rule 16 strictly there is no assignment of the decree in favour of the first respondent\".\n\nThe learned Chief Justice, like Dixit, J., however, departed from the rule of strict or literal construction as they felt pressed by the fact that the Bombay High Court had consistently taken the view that there might be an equitable assignment of a decree which would constitute the assignee an assignee for the purpose of rule 16 and that what the Court must consider is not merely a legal assignment but also an assignment which operates in equity. The equitable principle relied upon by the Bombay High Court is what had been enunciated by Lord Westbury in Holroyd v.\n\nMarshall(1) in the following words:\n\n(1) [1862] 10 H.L.C. 191, 2rn, 211.\n\nJu, galkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nGo. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\nJugalkishore SaraJ v.\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo.Ud.\n\nDas].\n\n1376 SUPREME cou1tr REPORTS [1955]\n\n\"It is quite true that a deed which professes to convey property which is not in existence at the time is as a conveyance void at law, simply because there is nothiiig to convey. So in equity a contract which engages to transfer property, which is not in existence, cannot operate as an immediate alienation merely because there is nothing to transfer.\n\nBut if a vendor or mortgagor agrees to sell or mortgage property, real or personal, of which he is not possessed at the time, and he receives the consideration for the contract,. and afterwards becomes possessed of property answering the description in the contract, there is no doubt that a Court of Equity would compel him to perform the contract, and that the contract would, in equity, transfer the beneficial interest to the mortgagee or purchaser immediately on .the property being acquired. This, of course, assumes that the supposed contract is one of that class of which a Court of Equity would decree the specific performance\".\n\nThe same principle was thus reaffirmed by Jessel, M.R., in Collyer v. Isaacs('):\n\n\"A man can contract to assign property which is to come into existence in the future, and when it has come into existence, equity, treating as done that which ought to be done, fastens upon that property, and the contract to assign thus be.comes a complete assignment\".\n\nApplying the above principles to the facts of the instant case the High Court came to the conclusion that the document of the 7th February, 1949, on a proper reading of it, constimted an assignment of the decree.\n\nThe reasoning, shortly put, is : that on a true construction the document in question amounted to a transfer of the decree that was expected to be passed in the pending suit, that as the decree . was not in existence at the date of the document it operated as an agreement to transfer the decree when it would be passed, that such an agreement could be enforced by\n\n.~ suit for specific performance as indicated by the\n\n(1) L. R. 19 Ch. D. 342, 351.\n\n• 4\n\n. \"· - . • .'1 1377\n\nPrivy Council in Raja Sahib Perhlad v. Budhoo(1),\n\nthat as . soon 'as a decree was passed equity, treating as done what ought to be done, fastened upon the decree and the agreement for transfer became .. the transfer of the decree and the transferee became a transferee of the decree within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16. It is to be noted that to attract the application of this equitable principle there must be an agreement to transfer the decree to be passed in future. As soon as the decree is passed equity fastens upon it and, by treating as done what ought to be done, that is by assuming that the transferor has executed a deed transferring the decree to the transferee as in all conscience he should do equity regards. the transferee as the beneficial owner of the after-acquired decree.\n\nThe equitable principle we are considei:ing only implements or effectuates the agreement of the parties. This equity does not, however, take upon itself the task of making any new agreement for the parties either by filling up the lacuna or gap in their agreement or otherwise.\n\nIf, therefore, there is no agreement between the parties to transfer the future decree the equitable principle referred to above cannot come into play at all. In order, therefore, to test the propriety of the application of this equitable principle to the facts of the present case we have to enquire whether there was here any agreement between the parties to transfer the decree to be passed in the then pending suit. This necessarily leads us to scrutinise the terms of the document in question and ascertain its true meaning and import.\n\nNo point has been taken before us that the document of the 7th February 1949 is only an executory agreement and not a deed of transfer. Indeed, the argument has proceeded before us, as before the Court below, that the document in question 1s a completed . deed of transfer.\n\nThis relieves us of the task of closely examining the. form of. the document.\n\nFor our present purpose we have, therefore, only to consider what properties were covered by the document. The High . Court has. held that the decree to be\n\n(1) [1869) 12 )\\,{. I. A. 275; 2 B.L.R. 111.\n\n:Jugalkishbre Sarqf\n\nv • . Raw Cotton co. Ltd.\n\nDas :J.\n\n~:;:;\n\nJugDJ!cisho;:e sara.f\n\nRaw CottOn\n\nCo. £td,\n\nDas];\n\npased was also indutlecl 'in this document. The reasonmg appears to be' this. : Clause f of the 'document comprised six several items of proprieties. Each of these items referred to' '.'the•' said'. Iridian business\".\n\nThe Fourth .item was \"All' the book and other debts due\"to the vendors in cciri'n'edion' with' the' said Indian business and the foll'. benefits of all' securities for the debts\". and the'last ap.d. residuary' item was' \"All other property', to w)iich the vendors are' entitled iri connection with' thesliid' Indian business\". One' of the book debts was the siibject:matter' . of the pending suit.\n\nThe decree that the pliritiff · woiild obtain in that suit \\Yould, therefore, .be propertf or 'right ''.in connection with the! said Indian b'usiness\". Therefore, as they were transferring all property' in 'connection with their :business they .must have intended to transfer the foture decree als'o. Therefore, it must Ile regarded as cove'red by the dod1mem: I am unable to accept this lirie of reasonirig. 'It cannot' be\" overlooked that there was' ho mention. in that . docilmenf of any suit or decree: to be' passed in that suit as one would have\n\nexpected if . te parties . really . intended to transfer the foture decre.e also. Ih this connection it is significant\" that the· esiduary item covered \"All properties to wl\\.ich the' vendor{ dre' erititled\"' arid not all pri>- perties' to which they might iri' foture become entitled.\n\nReference. may :ilso be'. niade to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act: Under' section 8 of that Act tlie trarisfe:r of property' passes to the transferee all the int:'eresr which the transferor . is then capable of passing in the propert'y :ind in the · 1egal incidents thereof; and if d1e property transferred is a debt or actionable • • clafoi, also the securities therefor.\n\nIt• is• urged\" that as ·.•the respondent company thus becanie entitled, by' VirtUe• of this document read in the \"light• of section 8; to all the rights and remedies iricluding the right·· to prosecute the pehdihg suit' and to• obtain' a-' decree the•.: decree that was eventually passed>\" autortiatie:i.lly add immediately upori .. .its passing 'mut be taken as having been •transferred by this very. dotumemi.: This' I 1arguthent ilppear~~ tci . me\" to really amount to a beg'gihg of the quesrioh. The\n\n• ..\n\n...\n\n. \" ..\n\ntransfer of the debt passed' all the interest which the transferors were then capable of passing in the . debt and in the legal incidents thereof. There was then no decree in existence and, therefore, the transferors could not then pass. any interest in the non-existing decree. Therefore, section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act does not assist the respondent .company Upon the assignment of the debt the respondent company undoubtedly became entitled to get themselves substitutedunder Order. XXII,, rule 10 as plaiiltiffs in the pending suit but they. did not choose to do so and allowed the transferors. to continue the. _suit and a decree to be passed in their favour. The true . position, therefore, is that at the date of the transfer of the debt to the. respondent company the transferors could not transfer the decree, because. the decree did not exist. On a true construction of the document the transferors' agreed only to transfer,. besides .. the five items. of spectified properties, ·\"All other properties to which the .vendors .are entitled\", that is to• sav, all'\n\nproperties to which at the date of the docoment: they were en'titled.\n\nAt the date of the document they had the right to proceed with the suit and to get such relief as the . Court by its decree. might award but no. decree had yet been passed in that suit and, therefore, property to which they- -were then entitled could.· not include any decree that might in• future be passed. It is significant that there was, in the document, no provision purporting in terms to transfer any ·. future decree.\n\nSection 8 of the Transfer of Property Act does not operate to pass any future property; .. for that section .passes all interest which the transferor can then, i.e., at the date of the transfer, pass. There was thus no agreement for .transfer and much less a transfer of a future decree oy this. document. All that W{lS\n\ndone by the transferors by . that document was to transfer only the properties . mentioned in clause 1 together •With all .legaL incidents and remedies. 'The properties. so\". transferred .. included book debts. A book debt which was· made: the. subject-matter 0f: the. pend\" ing suit did not, for that reason, c:ease to. be a. book debt and, therefore, it was also transfei:'red '. bur no\n\n:fogalkishore Saraf\n\nv •.\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDas]:\n\nJugalkishor1 Saraf\n\nRaw CotW'fl\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDa, J.\n\ndecree to. be passed in respect of that book debt was in terms transferred. In such a situation. there was no room or scope for the application of the equitable principle at all. The transfer in writing of a property which is the subject-mater of a suit without in terms transferring the decree passed or to be passed in the suit in relation to that property does not entitle . the transferee to apply for execution of the decree as a transferee of the decree by an assignment in writing\n\nwithin the meaning of Order XXI, or 16 See Hansrai Pal v. Mukhrai Kunwar( 1 ) and Vithal v. Mahadeva (').\n\nIn my judgment the decree was not transferred or agreed to be transferred to the respondent company by the document under consideration and the latter cannot claim to be transferees of the decree by an assignment in writing as contemplated by Order XXI, rule 16.\n\n• The matter, however, has been argued before us at length on the footing that the decree had been transferred or . agreed to be transferred by this document and therefore, the equitable principle came into play and that as . soon as the decree was passed the respondent company became the transferees of the decree by assignment in writing within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16., As considerable legal learning has been brought to bear on the question of the application of the equitable principle and its effect on the prior written agreement and as the different decisions of the High Court are not easily reconcilable, I consider i: ; i;·.ht to record my views on that question.\n\nI shall, then, assume, for the purposes of this part of the argument, that the document of the 7th February 1949 was a completed deed of transfer covering the decree. to be passed in future in the then pending suit.\n\nUnder the Transfer of Property Act there can be no transfer of property which is not in existence at the date of the transfer. Therefore, the purported transfer of the decree that might .. be passed in future could only operate. as a contract to transfer the decree to be performed in future;, i.e., . after the. passing of the\n\n(1) [1908] I. L. R: 30 All. 28.\n\n(2) [1924] 26 Bo\"1 L.R. 333. . '-Ir\n\ndecree. The question then arises : What is the effect 1955 of the operation of the equitable principle on the Juga/kishore Saraf decree as and when it is passed? Where there is a ' Raw vCotton contract for the transfer of property which is not in Co. Ltd. existence at the date of the contract, the intending transferee may, when the property comes into existence, enforce the contract by specific performance, provided the contract is of the kind which is specifically enforceable in equity. It is only when the transferor voluntarily executes a deed of transfer as in all conscience he should do or is compelled to do so by a decree for specific performance that the legal title of the transferor in that property passes from him to the transferee. This transfer of title is brought about not by the prior agreement for transfer but by the subsequent deed of transfer.\n\nThis process obviously involves delay, trouble and expenses.\n\nTo obviate these difficulties equity steps in again to short circuit the process. Treating as done what . ought to be done, that is to say, assuming that the intending transferor has executed a deed of transfer in favour of the intending transferee immediately after the property came into existence, equity fastens upon the after-acquired property and treats the beneficial interest therein as transferred to the intending transferee.\n\nThe question for consideration is : Is this transfer brought about by the earlier document whereby the property to be acquired in future was transferred or agreed to be transferred ? In other words, can it be said, in such a situation, that the after-acquired property had been transferred, proprio vigore, by the earlier document? Does that document operate as an assignment in writing within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16?\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent company contends that the answer to these questions must be in the affirmative. He relies on several cases to which reference may now be made . . In Purmananddas Jivandas v.\n\nVallabdas Wallji\n\n(supra) the facts were these.\n\nIn May 1859 one R died leaving his properties to executors in trust for the appellant. In August 1868 the execl, ltors filed , a\n\nsuit in the Original Side of the Bombay High Court\n\nDasJ.\n\n1382 SUFREME COURTi REPORTS [1.955]:\n\n•955 against Luckmidas Khimji• for recovery of mtmey lent ; JUgal/dshore Sara:. to him as manager of Mahajan Wadi.\n\nDuring the v. • pendency of. the: suit,. the. executors on the 11th May Raw Cottiln 1870 assigned in very wide and general terms all the Co. Ltd. properties of the: testator to the appellant including Das]i 'all movable. property,. debts claims and things. in action whatsoever vested in them as such. executors\" ..\n\nThe. appellant was not . .brought on the record bµt the suit proceeded. in the name of.. the executors; On the 23rd January 1873 a decree was passed for the. plaintiffs on• the ,, record; i.e .. the . executors; for Rs. 31,272-13-5 which .:was made a. first charge on: . the Wadi properties. The appellant. thernupon• applied for execution. \"0£ the:· decree -under -.seGtion 232 of the Code of 1882 (con-esponding .t-0 our Order. XXl, rule. 16), as' transferee of the. decree. The Chamber Judge dismissed the application .. Qn appeal Sargent,. C.J .. ,. and Bayley;. J., . held that the appellant was competent. to. maintain the application. After pointing:- 011.t that . the assignment . was in the. most general .terms, Sargent,.\n\nC.J.,·. observed.:~: ·\n\n\" .... : .. . •: .- .. , .. •.:· .... and the effect of this assignment. was, in .. equity,,.•to vest in Purmananddas the whole\n\ninterest in . the• decree -which . was afterwards ·, obtained.\n\nBut it has been suggested that Purmananddas .. is not a transferee of.· thedecree .under section. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code,. because the decree has. nat. been transferred to him \"by assignment in writing or by\n\noperatian of law\", ·and: that, therefore, he is not entitled to apply for execution .. There. is no doubt that, in:· a Court. of equity, -in .England -the decree . would be regarded-. as assigned to' Purmanartddas, and. he would be .-allowed to proceed in exerntion in .. the -name of the assignors. Here there is no distinction between \"law\" and .. .'equity\";· and by the expression .1by ... operatiou of law'. tnust. be, understood .the , operation: of law as administered in these Coufts. We think : under , the circumstances .that we must hold that this ... decree has been. transferred .. to , Furmananddas .. 'by operation- . of law''\\ ... --· ,,. ·· ,,1 \"' q..\n\n•, P• ,, .,'\n\nTh~\" -'last , sentence i:n the abo'Ve 'qu6tati6n;\" ·.standing by•· ·.\"ihdf;' i 'quitei ·\"'dearly indic'aii!s • \"tfo1r• 'the learned\n\nChief')ustice was of the view that as the benefit of the decree became available to tlic:; appellant by operation of the equitable principle it had to be held that the decree had been transferred to the appellant \"by operation of law\" rather than by ' an assignment in writing and that is how it was understood by the_ reporter who framed' the head-note. The learned ' Chief Justice, however, immediately after that last sentence added:- ·· \"In the present 'case 'the decree has been transferred by an assignment in . writing as construed in\n\nthee Courts\".\n\nThis senteace . prima f acie appears to be somewhat inconsistent with the sentence immediately preceding and it 1has. given rise t<,> a good. deal of comerits . in later , cases .. The learned. Chi.ef Justice has no.t referred to any case . in which . the Bombay . High Court had adopted ' such a constructfon. ' ' ' , '\n\nTh~. case' 0£ A~nd~ .Af.ohon Roy v. Prooiha . Nath Ganguli-( 1 ) . follows . µie decision of the Bombay High Court in . Purmanan; ddas Tivandas v. Vallabdas W allji (supra). It sliould be : noted, . however, that, in.· this Calcutt.a \\,'.ase the decree was . obtained and . the transfer was , tµade on the' same day and it' was held that though there was . no :J, Ssignment of the decree in so many, words the property with all ; irrears of rent having . been , assigned to the mortgagee simultaneously with the passing. of the <decree . th, e assignment p\"ssed the decree also.\n\nThe case• of Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Ghulamnabi {supra)· has been strongly relied upon. In that case a shop was held by A and B as •tenants-inc common. In May 1936 A agreed to sell his half. share to C. As per arrangement A filed a partition suit on the 16th January 1937 to recover his share.- The -disputes' in the suit were referred to arbitration by order of Court and eventually the umpire made hiS award on the 16th January 1939 declaring that A was• entitled1 to; a half share. .A then; on -the 7th March, 1939; stild'-ali his riglits ; under the award (which1 was\n\n f1) [ig2b] 25 c.W.'N.'a63; A.1.R. '19~1 ea1. 14~· ' ' •' ·\" ' ·\n\n19,55\n\nJugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co.Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\n'955\n\n.\"J?Jgo/Jcishor~ Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co. LJd. -.\n\nDas\n\ncalled a decree) to C by a registered deed. C did not apply for substitution of his name on the recoid of the suit. The Court passed a decree upon the. award on the 1st September, 1939. On the 24th November\n\n1939 C applied for execution of the decree. Ii: was held that C was entitled to execute the decree under Order XXI, rule 16, for what had been transferred to him was not merely A's half share in the property but all his rights under the award including the right to .take a decree. In this case, having regard to the terms of the previous agreement and the fact that the parties were treating the award as a decree the intention was quite clear that by the subsequent deed of sale both the award and the decree upon it had been transferred. It was quite clearly recognised by the Full Bench that if the sale deed transferred only A's half share in the property or only his right to take a decree C could not apply under Order XXI, rule 16.\n\nReading the three cases relied on by learned counsel. for the respondent company it seems to me that they proceeded on the footing that the equitable title related back to the earlier agreement in writing and converted the agreement to transfer the future decree into art assignment in writing of that decree as soon as it was passed. Some support is sought to be derived bv learned counsel for this doctrine of relation back from the above quoted observations of Lord Westbury in Holroyd v.\n\nMarshall (supra) \"that the contract would, in equity, transfer the beneficial interest\" and of Jessel, M.R., in Collyer v. Isaacs (supra) that \"the\n\ncontract to assign thus becomes a complete assignment\". I find consider.able. difficulty in . accepting this argument as sound. In the first place the Lord Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls were not concerned with the question of relation qack in the form in which it has arisen before us.\n\nIn the next place it must not be . overlooked that the equitable principle herein alluded , to is not a rule of .. construction of documents but is a substantive rule which confers the benefit of the after-acquired property on the person to w horn the transferor . had, by his agreement, promised to transfer the same, Thus, by .treating as done that\n\n.... '\n\nwhich ought to be done, equity fastens upon the afteracquired property and brings about a transfer of it.\n\nThe implication of this principle, to my mind, is clearly that the agreement, by itself and proprio vigore, does not transfer the property when it is subsequently acquired but that instead of putting the intending transferee to the trouble and expense of going to Court for getting a decree for specific performance directing the promisor to execute a deed of transfer which when executed will transfer the afteraquired property, equity intervenes and places the parties in a position relative to each other in which by the prior agreement they were intended to be placed as if a deed of transfer had been made. As I apprehend the position, it is by the operation of equity on the subsequent event, namely, the actual acquisition of the property on its coming into existence that the beneficial interest therein is transferred to the promisee. This transfer, to my mind, is brought about by operation of equity which is something dehors the prior agreement. It is true that that agreement makes the application of the equitable principle possible or I may even say that it sets the equity in motion but, nevertheless, it is equity alone which denudes the transferor of his interest in the after-acquired property and passes it to the intending transferee.· That being the true position, as I think it is, the afteracquired property cannot, logically and on principle, be said to have been transferred to the intending transferee oy the agreement in writing. I do not see on what principle this transfer can be said to relate back to the previous agreement. I am fortified in my view by the observations of Lord Cave in the case of Performing Right Society v. London Theatre of Varieties (1). In that case, in 1916 a firm of music publishers, being members of the plaintiff society, assigned by an indenture of assignment to the society the performing right of every song, the right of performance of which they then possessed or should thereafter acquire, to be held by the society for the period of the assignor's membership. Subsequently, a certain\n\n(1)\n\nL. R. [1924] A. C. 1.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nv; Raw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\n.1955\n\nJugalkishore Saref\n\nVo Raw Cotton\n\nCu •. L/d.\n\n~ Das].\n\n1.386\n\n..S-UPREME:COURT REPORTS\n\nU955J\n\nsong was written; and fhe copyright in .it, . together with the right of performance, was assigned . by . the author to the said firm, but there was no fresJi. assignment .in writing by the firm to the plaintiff society such as .was required by section 5 (2) of the Copyright Act, 1911. The defendants, who were music hall. proprietors, permitted this song to be publicly . sung in their music hall without •the consent of the plaintiff society.\n\nThe plaintiff society then sued the defendants for infringement of their performing rights and claimed a .perpetual injunction. The defence was that as there was no assignment .in writing of the copyril\\\"ht subsequently acquired by the firm to the plaintiff society the latter was not the legal owner and, therefore, was not entitled to a perpetual injunction.\n\nDiscussing the nature of the right acquired by the plaintiff .society under the indenture of 1916 and its claim to the after-acquired copyright secured by the firm and referring to section 5, sub-section (2) of •the Copyright Act, 1911, Viscount Cave, L.C., observed at p. 13 :~\n\n\"There was on the respective dates of the instruments under which the appellants claim no existing copyright in the songs in question, and therefore no owner of any such right; and this being sb, neither of those instruments can be held to have been an assignment \"signed hy the owner of the right within the meaning of the section. No doubt when a person executes a document .purporting to assign property to be afterwards acquired •by .him, that property on its acquisition passes in equity to the assignee : Holroyd\n\nv. Marshall, 10 H.L.C. 191; Tailby v. Official Receiver, 13 A:C. 523; but how such a subsequent acquisition can be held to relate back, so as to cause an instrument which on its date was not an assignment under the Act to become. such an assignment, I am unable to understand. The appellants have a right in equity to have the .performing rights assigned to them and in that sense are equitable owners .. of those rights; but they are not assignees of the rights within the meaning of the . statute. This contention, .-therefore, fails\".\n\n~ -\n\nThe above observations, to my mind, completely -cover the .present case. On a parity of reasoning, the respondent company may have, by operation of equity, become entitled to the benefit of the decree as soon as it was passed but to say that is not to say that there has been a transfer of the decree by the document of the 7th February 1949. And so it has been held in several cases to which reference may now be made.\n\nIn Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi( 1) 'the plaintiff assigned the decree to be passed in the pending suit. The assignee was not brought on the record under section 372 of the 1882 Code corresponding to Order XXII, rule 10 of the present Code but the suit proceeded in the name of the original plaintiff .and a decree was passed in his favour. The assignee\n\n, icn applied for execution of diat decree claiming to be a transferee decree-holder under section 232 of the 1882 Code. That application was .dismissed. White, 'C.J., observed:-\n\n\"We are asked to hold that in the event which happened in this case die appellant is entitled to be -rreated as the transferee of a decree from a decree- Jiolder for the purpose~ of section 332, notwithstand- .ing that at the time of the assignment there was nv\n\n.decree and no decreeoholder. It seems to us that we should not be warranted in applying the doctrine of equity on which die appellant relies, which is stated in Palaniappa v.\n\nLakshmanan, I.LR. 16 Mad. 429, for the pµrpose of construing section 232 of the Code.\n\nWe think the words \"decree-holder\" must be con- :strued as meaning decree-holder in fact and not as including a party who in equity may afterwards be- come entitled to the rights of the actual decree-holder, .and that the words of the section relating to a transfer of a decree cannot be construed so as to apply to a case where there was no decree in existence at the .time of the agreement\".\n\nlt is true that the case of Purmananddas Jivandas v.\n\nVallabdas Wallji (supra) was not cited in that case ,. but die case of Palaniappa v. Lakshmanan(2 ) which\n\n(1) [1907] 17 M.L.J. 39i.\n\n(2) [1893) I.L. R.t6 Mad. 429.\n\nJug4lk#hore $araf\n\nv. , Raw. Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\n]ugalkishort Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\nadopted the equitable principle enunciated by Jessel, M.R., in Collyer v: Isaacs (supra) on which that Bombay case had been founded was brought to the notice of the Court.\n\nIn Dost Muhammad v. Altaf Husain Khan(') one M instituted a suit for recovery of some immovable property. During the pend ency of the suit M transferred his interest in the property to the respondent.\n\nThe respondent did not apply to bring himself on the record and the suit went on in the name of M as the plaintiff. By a compromise decree M was awarded a portion of the property. After the decree was passed the respondent applied to execute the decree_ as the tr:µ15feree of the decree. The Munsiff rejected the application but the District Judge reversed his order.\n\nOn second appeal Chamier, J., found it impossible to tr.eat the respondent as the transferee of the decree, for the document on which he relied was executed before the decree was passed.\n\nPeer Mahomed Rowthen v. Raruthan Ambalam(2) may also be referred to. In that case the Madras High Court followed its earlier decision in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi (supra).\n\nThe case of Thakuri Cope v. Mokhtar Ahmad(') does not carry the matter any further, for it only follows• the three earlier cases hereinbefore mentioned. Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram Manda!(' ) represents the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. In that case Hennessey and his brothers, who were Zamindars, instituted rent suits against their tenants.\n\nPending those suits Hennessey and his brothers transferred the Zamindari to the appellant company. The appellant company did not get themselves substituted as plaintiff but allowed the suits to proceed in the names of the original plaintiffs who were the transferors. Eventually, decrees were passed in favour of Hennessey and his brothers. The appellant company then applied for execution. The executing Court and the lower appellate Court held that\n\n(1) [1912] 17 l.C. 512.\n\n(2) [19151 30.r. a. 831.\n\n(3) 1922 C.W.N. (Patna) 256; A. I. R. 1922 Pat. 563.\n\n(4) [1924] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 703.\n\n)11\n\n. .. .,, - •\n\n.the appellant company was not a transferee of the decree.\n\nThe appellant company thereupon preferredthis second appeal to the High Court; It was held that the appellant company could not apply under Order XXI, rule 16, for that rule could not properly cover a case where there was no decree at the date of the assignment of the property and the term \"decreehoJder\" could not cover a party who, in equity, might afterwards have become entitled to the rights of the actual decree holder.\n\nThe case of Ananda Mohan Roy v. Promotha Nath Ganguli (supra) was explained as being based really on the construction that was put upon the convey.ance, namely, that it covered a decree which had been passed \"simultaneously with, if not before, the execution of the conveyance\".\n\nAfter pointing out that in Purmananddas f ivandas\n\nV.\n\nV allabdas W allji (supra) the transferor and transferee stood in the position of trustee and cestui quetrust and that that .circumstance might hav.e attracted the application of the equitable principle the Court could not assent tc' the broad proposition supposed to have been laid down in that case that the transferee in equity became a transferee of the decree by the prior agreement so as to come under Order XXI, rule 16 and preferred to follow the decision of the Madra~ High Court in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi (supra) and the other decisions to which reference has been already made.\n\nIn Pandu foti Kadam v. Savla Piraji Kate(1) one Tuljaram obtained a decree on a mortgage against the appellant Pandu Joti. Later on, the respondent Savla brought a suit against the appellant Pandu and Tuljaram. In that suit a decree was passed directing Tuljaram to transfer the mortgage decree to Savla.\n\nThe respondent Savla thereupon without having obtained, amicably or by execution of his decree, an actual assignment of the mortgage decree sought to execute that decree, It was held that although Savla had a legal right, by executing his own decree, to compel his judgment-debtor Tuljaram to assign to him the mortgage decree obtained by Tuljaram, such\n\n(1) [1925] 27 Born. L. R. uo9.\n\n14-90 S. C. India/59\n\nJugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nDasJ.\n\nright alone, without an assignment in writing, did not make him a transferee of the mortgaged decree so as to be entitled to execute that decree.\n\nEven the Bombay High Court (Fawcett and Madgavkar, JJ.) in Genaram Kapurchand Marwadi v.\n\nHanmantram Surajmal (' ) followed the decision of the Madras High Court in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi (supra). The question came up for consideration in connection with a plea of limitation.\n\nThere in February 1914 the appellant obtained an assignment of the rights of the plaintiff in a pending suit which was thereafter continued by the original plaintiff.\n\nIn November 1914 a decree was passed in favour of the original plaintiff. The appellant made several applications for execution of the decree in 1916, 1917, 1920 and 1921 all of which were dismissed.\n\nIn November 1923 the appellant obtained a fresh assignment in writing from the plaintiff and made a fresh application for execution. The judgment-debtor pleaded that the earlier applications were not in accordance with law and did not keep the decree alive.\n\nIt was held that although the appellant was entitled, in equity, to the benefit of the decree he did not, before he actually obtained an assignment of the decree in 1923, become a transferee of the decree by an assignment in writing within Order XX!, rule 16 and, therefore, the applications made by him prior to 1923 were not made in accordance with law and, therefore, the last application was barred by limitation. This decision clearly proceeded on the ground that Order XX!, rule 16 contemplated only the transfer of a decree after it had been passed.\n\nThe case of Abdul Kader v. Daw Yin(•) does not assist the respondent company, for in that case the\n\nCourt took the view that, on its true construction, the deed under consideration in that case actually transferred the decree that had already been passed.\n\nIn Prabashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji('), Rankin, C. J., considered the previous cases and preferred to\n\n(x) A..!.R. 1926 Born. 406; 28 Born. L.R. 776.\n\n(2) A.I.R.1920 Rang. 308.\n\n;~) [1931) .l.L.R .. 19 Cal. 297.\n\n• ..,\n\nfollow the case of Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v.\n\nBhasaram Manda! (supra).\n\nThe case of Purna Chandra Bhowmik v. Barna Kumari Debi(1) does not, when properly understood, afford any support to the contention of the respondent company. There the defendant No. 1 had exe• cuted a mortgage bond in favour of the plaintiff assigning by way of security the decree that would be passed in a pending suit which he, the defendant No. 1, had instituted against a third party for recovery of money due on unpaid bills for work done. After this mortgage a decree was passed in that suit in favour of the defendant No. 1 who had continued that suit as the plaintiff.\n\nThe plaintiff daiming to be the assignee by way of mortgage of that decree instituted this suit against two defendants.\n\nThe defendant No. 1 was the plaintiff in the earlier suit who had mortgaged to the plaintiff the decree to be passed in that suit and the defendant No. 2 was a person who claimed to be a transferee of the same decree under a conveyance subsequently executed in his favour by the first defendant. The judgment-debtor under the decree in the first suit was not made a party defendant in this suit. The first c::lefendant did not contest this suit and it was only contested by the second defendant. One of the points raised by the contesting defendant was that this subsequent suit which was one for a pure declaration of title was bad under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act inasmuch as the plaintiff did not pray for consequential relief in the shape of a permanent injunction restraining him, the contesting defendant, from executing the decree.\n\nIn repelling that argument as manifestly untenable Mukherjea, J., as he then was, said :-\n\n\"All that the plaintiff could want possibly at the present stage was a declaration that she was an assignee of the decree and if she gets a declaration it would be open to her to apply for execution of the decree under Order XXI, rule 16, of the Code of Civil Procedure. No other consequential relief by way of\n\n(1) I.L.R. [1939] 2 Cal. 341.\n\nJugalkishore Stlt'af\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDasJ.\n\n1955\n\n7¥galkishore_ Saaf.\n\nRaw Colton~\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDa ].\n\n'\" ~,\n\n1392 SUPREME COURT REiPORT, S [1955]\n\nmiunction or otherwise could or. should have been prayed for by the plaintiff in, . tpe present suit\".\n\nIt will be noticed that the •construction of Order XXI, rule 16; was not in issue at all. The question was. not between the person claiming to be the transferee of the decree and the judgment-debtor. Indeed, the judgmentcdebtor was not a party to this suit at all.\n\nThe simple question was whether the suit was maintainable under section. 42 by reason. of the absence of. a prayer for consequential relief.\n\nIn view of the facts of that case · the observation . quoted above appears to me to be a passing• one not necessary for the decision of the question then before the Court and not an expression of considered opinion on the meaning, scope and effect of Order XXI, rule 16.\n\nAl!. the cases, except the three cases relied on by learned counsel for the respondent company, quite clearly lay down-and I think correctly-that Order XXI, rule 16, by the. first alternative, contemplates the actual transfer of the decree by. an assignment in writing executed after the decree is passed and that while a transfer of or an agreement to. transfer a decree that may be passed in future may, in. equity,. entitle the. intending transferee to claim the beneficial interest in the decree after it. is passed, such equitable transfer .does not relate back to the priqr . agreement and does not_ render the transferee a transferee of the decree by an assignment in writing within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent company then contends that even if the respondent company did not, by force of the prior agreement in writing read in . the light of the equitable principle alluded to above or of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, become the transferees of the decree by an assignment in writing, they, nevertheless, became the· transferees of the decree \"by operation of' law\" within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16. That phrase has been considered by the different High Courts in numerous cases but the interpretations put upon It are. not at all uniform and it is difficult to reconcile all of them.\n\nS; C.R.\n\n'SUPREME GOURT , REPORTS 1393\n\nIn this judgment in the present case the executing\n\nCourt exprnssed the view that the ·.phrase could only mean that •the Tights had been transferred \"on account of devolution of interest on death, etc\" .. In delivering the judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal, Chagla, C.J.., said :~\n\n\"The operation of law contemplated by Order XXI, rule 16 is not any equitable principle but operation by devolution as in the case of death or insol-\n\n\" vency ..\n\nThe learned . Chief Justice does not give any mason for the view expressed by him but assumes the law to be so. The genesis for such assumption is . probably traceable to the observations of Sir Robert P. Collier who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in Abedoonissa Khatoon v. Ameeroonissa Khatoon(1). The question arose in that case in this way. One Wahed sued his father Abdool for possession of certain properties. The trial Court dismissed the suit and Wahed appealed to the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal Wahed died and his widow Abedoonissa was substituted in the place of W ahed for prosecuting the appeal. The High Court allowed the appeal and by its decree declared that W ahed was in his lifetime and those who became his heirs were entitled to recover the properties in suit. Abedoonissa applied for execution of the decree for herself and for one W ajed who was said to be the posthumous son of Wahed born of her womb. Objection was taken, inter alia, that Wajed was not the legitimate son of Wahed.\n\nThis . objection was overruled and it was held that Abedoonissa was entitled to execute the decree for herself and as the guardian of Wajed. Then the judgment-debtor .Abdool died.\n\nAbdool's widow .. Ameeroonissa filed a suit for a declaration that Wajed was not the legitimate son of Wahed and for: setting aside the last mentioned order. Abedoonissa took the point .that the matter was concluded by principles • of res judicata. To that Ameeroonissa's reply was that . the proceeding in which the the question of the legitimacv of\n\nWajed was decided was wholly incompetent .so far as\n\n(1) [1876] L. R. 4 I. A. 66, l.L.R. 2 Cal. 327. ' 1\n\n\"1955\n\nJugalkishore Samf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nDas J\n\n•955\n\nJugalkishOf'e Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\nWajed was concerned because, the decree being in favour of Abedoonissa, Wajed was not a transferee of the decree within the meaning of section 208 of Act VIII of 1859 corresponding to Order XXI, . rule 16 of the present Code and could not apply for execution and that being so any adjudication on his status in such proceeding was not binding at all. The question for decision in the suit was whether Wajed was a transferee of the decree within the meaning of section 208 of the Code of 1859. It was in that connection . that Sir Robert P. Collier in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, after quoting that section, observed :- ·\n\n\"It appears to their Lordships, in the first place, that, assuming Wajed to have the interest asserted, the decree was not, in terms of this section, transferred to him, either by assignment, which is not pretended, or by operation of law, from the original decree-holder.\n\nNo incident had occurred, on which the law could operate, to transfer any estate from his mother to him. There had been no death ; there had been no devolution ; there had been no succession.\n\nHis mother retained what right she had ; that right was not transferred to him ; if he had a right, it was derived from his father ; it appears to their Lordships, therefore, that he is not a transferee of a decree within the terms of this section\".\n\nThe above observations seem to put upon the phrase \"by operation of law\" an interpretation which, in the language of Chakravartti, J., in his judgment in Sailendra Kumar v. Bank of Calcutta(! ) \"suggests that it would apply only in cases where certain events, not connected with any act on the part of anybody towards' making a transfer, happen and the law, operating on those events, brings about a transfer\".\n\nSome of the decisions of certain High Courts to be presentlv cited seem to assume that their Lordships of the Privy Council . were out to give an exhaustive enumeration of the cases of transfer of property by operation of law but I find myself in agreement with Chakravartti, L that there is no reason for making\n\n(•) I. L. R. [1948] I Cal. 472.\n\n...\n\nsuch an assumption and treating these observations as the text of a statute.\n\nIn Dinendranath Sannyal v. Ramcoomar Ghose( 1 ) Sir Barnes Peacock pointed out the great distinction between a private sale in satisfaction of a decree and a sale in execution of a decree. One of the principal distinctions so pointed out was :-\n\n\"Under the former the purchaser derives title through the vendor, and cannot acquire a better title than that of the vendor. Under the latter the purchaser notwithstanding he acquires merely the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor,, acquires that title by operation of law adversely to the judgment-debtor. and freed from all alienations or incumbrances effected by him subsequently to the attachment of the property sold in execution\".\n\nHere the act of the decree-holder in seeking execution by attachment and sale and the act of the Court in directing attachment and sale cannot possibly be said to be the happening of an event unconnected with the act of making a transfer such as death or devolution or succession referred to in Abedoonissa' s case (supra) could be said to be.\n\nBy the act of applying for execution the decree-holder quite dearly desires that the judgment-debtor should be stripped of all his right, title and interest in the property attached and sold and the order of the Court has the effect of so denuding the judgment-debtor and of passing his right. title and interest to the purchaser of the property at the Court sale. This transfer of property is not by any assignment in writing executed by the transferor in favour of the transferee but is brought about by the operation of the statutory provisions relating to and governing execution of decrees. Thus this Privy Council decision itself shows that transfers \"by operation of law\" were not intended bv it to be confined to the three cases of death, devlution or succession ..\n\nMore often than not transfers \"by operation of law\" will be found to be brought obout by the opera-\n\n( x) [1889] L. R. 8 I.A. 65,75.\n\n}ugalkis/, ore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\n. 1955\n\n Ju'galkishore .faref v Raw Co!ton\n\nC1. Ltd.\n\n'/Jas J.\n\ntion .of cstatutor.y law. '.fhus when .a :person .dies testate there is a devolution , of :his ; Properties to his legal representatives by operation of the law of . testamentary succession which is now. mainly statu-\n\n.tory .in .this country.\n\nWhen a person Is adju_dged insolvent his properties vest in the official assignee and that transfer is brought about by the operation of the insolvency laws which have been codified.\n\nCourt sle of property in execution of a decree vests the right; title and interest cif the judgment-debtor In that property in the auction-purchaser thereby effecting a trarisfer by operation of the hw embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. Likewise, statutes m some cases provide for the forfeiture of property, e.g. property in -relation to which an offence has been committed, namely, illicit liquor or opium, etc., and thereby effect a transfer of such property from the delinquent owner to the State. It is neither necessary nor profitable to try and enumerate exhaustively the 'instances of transfer 'by operation of law. Suffice it to say that there in no warrant for confining transfers '\"by operation of law\" to transfers by operation of statutory laws. When a Hindu or a Mohammaden dies intestate and 'his heirs succeed to his estate there is a transfer not by anv statute but by the operation of their respective personal law. In order to consti- :tute a transfer of property \"by operation of law\" all that is necessary 'is that there must be a passing of one person's rights in property to another person by the force df some law, statutory or otherwise.\n\nReference has already been made to the case of Purmananddas /ivandas v. Vallabdas Wallji (supra) where, by applying the equitable principle, Sargent, C.J., upheld the appellant's right to maintain the application 'for execution. In the beginning the 'learned 'Chief Justice founded his decision on the ground that the appellant had become the transferee of the decree \"'by operation of law\". 'This view appears to me to be logical, for 'it was by the operation of the equitable principle that the right~ title and -interest 1of the . transferor in the after-acquired decree became the property of the appellant. , Jn .other iwords,\n\nit was equity which operated on the decree as soon as it was passed and passed the interest -0f the decreeholder to the appellant. The result of this transmission was to transfer the property from the decreeholder to the appellant and this transfer was brought about by the operation of the equitable principle dis- .c; ussed above which is as good as any rule of law. The actual decision in Purmananddas Jivandas v. VaUabdas Wallji (supra) may well be supported as ari instance of transfer by operation of law and indeed Sargent, C.J., himself first described the transfer in that case as being one by operation of law. The same remarks apply to the other two cases of Ananda Mahon Roy v. Promotha Nath Ganguli (supra) and Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Ghulamnabi\n\n(supra) relied On by learned counsel for the respondent company.\n\nIn Abdul Kader v. Daw Yin (supra) in July 1928 the plaintiff obtained a decree that a certain sale deed be set aside on payment of a certain sum and for possession of the properties and mesne profits. In August 1928, i.e., after the passing of the decree the plaintiff executed a deed for the sale of the properties to the appellant who by the terms of the deed was to . obtain possession of the properties through Court on payment of the amount mentioned therein. The plaintiff deposited the necessary amount and applied for execution of the decree but she died shortly there- :after. Thereupon the appellant applied for execution of the decree. On a construction of the terms of the sale deed the Court came to the conclusion that the sale deed covered the decree and, therefore, the appellant was. a transferee of the decree by assignment i.n writing. This was sufficient to dispose of the case but the learned Judges tried to reconcile some of the earlier cases by deducing two propositio.11.s :\n\n(1) that the words \"by operation of law\" cannot be invoked so as to make an assignment operative to transfer the decree and the right under it which would upon the true construction of its terms; otherwise, be inoperative in that regard; and\n\n(2) that although in certain cases principles . of equi1y may be relied on, e.g., in the case of .a transfer\n\ntg,55\n\n]ilgalkishore Saraf\n\nv • . Raw Cotton\n\n.co.lid.\n\n.fJasJ.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\nby trustees and a beneficiary, such principles cannot be considered as rendering a transfer valid \"by operation of law\".\n\nIt is difficult to appreciate the implication of the first proposition. When on a true construction of the deed it actually operates to transfer a decree then in existence, no equitable principle need be invoked, for m that case the transfer is by the deed itself and as such is by an assignment in writing. It is only when the deed does not effectively transfer the decree because, for instance, the decree 1s not then in existence, but constitutes only an agreement to transfer the decree after it is passed that the invocation of the equitable principle becomes necessary and it is in those circumstances that equity fastens and operates upon the decree when it is passed and effects a transfer of it- If, however, the learned Judges meant to say that if on a true construction of the deed it did not cover the decree then the equitable principle would not come into play at all and in that case the principle of transfer by operation of law could not be invoked, no exception need then be taken. As regards the second proposition which appears to be founded on the observations of Mukherji, J., in Mathurapore Zamindary\n\nCo.'s case (supra) I do not see why the equitable principle may be relied on only in the case of a transfer by trustees to cestui que trust. Indeed, it was applied in the two earlier English cases as between mortgagor and mortgagee and m Performing Right Society v. London Theatre of Varieties (supra) to an indenture of assignment of copyright to be acquired' in future made between persons who did not stand m the relationship of trustee and beneficiary. Nor do I see why, in cases where the equitable principle applies, the transfer should not be regarded as one by operation of law.\n\nIn Mahadeo Baburao Halbe v. Anandrao Shankarrao Deshmukh(') .the judgment confined transfers by operation of law to cases of death, devolution or succession. for which, as already stated, I see no warrant.\n\n(1) [1933] I. L. R. 57 Bom. 513.\n\nThe decision in Periakatha Nadar v. Mahalingam() 1s somewhat obscure.\n\nThere a receiver appointed in a partnership action filed a suit against a debtor of the firm and obtained a decree. Thereafter the assets of the firm mcluding the decree were directed to be sold by auction amongst the partners.\n\nThis order was made in spite of the objection of the partners.\n\nThe decree was purchased by one of the partners who was defendant No. 2. The purchaser then applied for execution of the decree.\n\nPandrang Rao, J. said, at p. 544 :-\n\n\"It appears to us that the words 'operation of law' cannot apply to a case where a person ha~ become the owner of a decree by some transaction inter vivas. It applies to cases where the decree has been transferred from one to another by way of succession or where there is a bankruptcy or any similar event which has the effect in law of bringing about such a transfer\".\n\nIf the purchaser of a property in execution sale becomes the transferee of the property by operation of law I, for one, cannot see why the purchaser of a property at an auction sale held in a partnership action under the order of the Court made in invitum will not be a transferee by operation of law. If an involuntary execution sale is not a transaction inter vivas why should an auction sale held in a partnership action in the teeth of opposition of the parties be a transaction inter vivas? The learned Judges concluded that as no particular form of assignment was prescribed for transfer, the order of the Court might be treated as an assignment in writing of the decree. I find it much easier to hold that there was in that case a transfer by operation of law than that the Court acted as the agent of the partners and the order of the Court was the assignment in writing. The law authorised the Court in a partnership action to order the sale of the partnership assets and consequently the sale passed the interest of all the partners other than the purchasing partner in the decree solely to\n\n1 (1: A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 543.\n\nJugalkishore Sara v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\n:fugalkishom'Sari!f.\n\n.v •.\n\nRaw Cottan .c •. Lt~.\n\nDas(].\n\nthe latte>. •l do not see why .a transfer .thus brought .about -Should not, like a transfer effected by a Court sale in execution, be regarded .as a transfer by operation of . <law. Further, as I have already said, there is no valid reason for confining •transfer by operation of -law to succession and bankruptcy or the like.\n\nIn G. N. Asundi v. Virappa Andaneppa Manvi('.) a , father sHed his sons for a declaration of his sole tide to a clecree previously .obtained by the sons against a third party on •promissory notes. The parties came to a cgmpromise and a joint petition signed by the father and the sons was filed in Court in which it was Stated that the sons, had no objection to surrender -all their rights in the decree to the father. The Court passed a •decree in accordance with the compromise. On an application for execution by the father of the decree on -the promissory notes it was held that on its true construction the .compromise petition amounted. to an assignment of the decree within the meaning -of Order\n\nXXI, rule 16. So far there -can be no difficulty; but .the learned Judges went. on -to .say, without, I think • . any good reason, that transfer by operation of law was obviously intended to be confined to testamentary .and intestate .succession, forfeiture, insolvency and the like. This was only because •the Court felt bound to hold that the decision in Abedoonissa's case had so limited it. .It was als0 pointed out-I .think correctly -th-at a decree declaring the title .of the decree- holder to another decree previously passed in .another suit did not effect a transfer of the earlier .decree by operation of. law and the decree-holder under the latter decree did not become the transferee of the earlier <lecree by operation .of law within the meaning of Order X~I, rule 16.\n\nThis was aiso held in a number -,)f .c:ises .including Mahadeo 'Baburao Halbe's case (.<upra) and .Finn Kusha!das 'Leklzraj v. Firm -Jhamandas Maherchandani{' ). This must follow frotn the very nature of a declaratory _decree. . A declaratory detree. does not create .or confer any .new . right but <leclares a pre-existing -t<ight.\n\nTherefore, when a\n\n(!) I.L. R. [19391 Born. 271, (•) A.l.R, 1944 Sind 230\n\n' -\n\n_ _,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME 80URT REPORTS 1:401\n\ndeclaratory decree declares the right of the decreeholder to another decree passed in an earlier suit; there is no divesting of interest of one person and vesting of it in another. There is no transfer at all and, therefore, the person in whose favour the declaratory decree is passed does not fall within Order XXI, rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe last case to which reference need be made is that of Maya Debi v. Rajlakshmi Debi( 1 ). There a Darpatnidar deposited under section 13 ( 4) of the Bengal Patni Taluqa Regulation (VIII of 1819) the arrears of revenue to avoid a putni sale and entered into possession of the putni as he was entitled to do under the above section. He then filed a suit and obtained a decree for arrears of rent due to the Patnidar from another Darpatnidar.\n\nSubsequently he relinquished possession in favour of the Patnidar by giving a notice to the Patnidar. The question was whether the Patnidar, after he got back the possession of the putni, could be regarded as the assignee of the decree which had been obtained by the Darpatnidar against another Darpatnidar. It was held that in view of the provisions of section 13( 4) the Patnidar on getting back possession of the putni became the transferee of the decree by operation of law. It was also held that the notice given by the Darpatnidar to the Patnidar could also be construed as an assignment in writing.\n\nThe result of the authorities appears to me to be that if by reason of any provision of law, statutory or otherwise; interest in property passe.~ from one\n\n>- person to another there is a transfer of the property by operation of law. There is no reason that I can see why transfers by operation of law should be regarded as confined to the three cases referred to by the Privy. Council in Abedoonissa's case. If, therefore; I were able to construe the document of the 7th February 1949 to be a transfer or an agreement to transfer the decree to be passed in future then I would have had no difficulty in holding that by ope- ,. ration of equity the beneficial interest in the decree\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 1.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. lid.\n\nDas].\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCod, td.\n\nDas).\n\nwas immediately after its passing taken out of the '' , transferors and passed to the respondent company and that the latter had become the transferees of the decree now sought to be executed by operation of law.\n\nAs, however, I have held that that document did not cover the decree, there was no room for the application of the equitable principle and the respondent company - cannot, therefore, claim to come under ~' Order XXI, rule 16 as transferees by operation of law and cannot maintain the application for execution.\n\nThere is another ground on which the right of the respondent company to maintain the application for execution has been sought to be sustained.\n\nThis point was not apparently taken before the High Court and we have not had the advantage and benefit of the opinion of the learned Judges of that Court. Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure on which this new point is founded provides as follows :\n\n\"146. Proceedings by or against representatives.- Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him\".\n\nThere are two questions to be considered before the section may be applied, namely, (1) whether the Code otherwise provides and (2) whether the respondent • company can be said to be persons claiming under the decree-holder. As regards (1) it is said that Order XX!, rule 16 specifically provides for application for execution by a transferee of decree and, therefore, a trans- --1 feree of decree cannot apply under section 146 and must bring himself within Order XX!, rule 16. This is really begging the question. Either the respondent company are transferees of the decree by an assignment in writing or by operation of law, in which case they fall within Order XX!, rule 16, or they are not such transferees, in which event they may avail themselves of the provisions of section 146 if the other condition is fulfilled. There is nothing in Order XX!, rule 16 which, expressly or by necessary implication\n\n...\n\n...\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1403 -.f' precludes a person, who claims to be entitled to the benefit of a decree under the decree-holder but does not answer the description of being the transferee of that decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law, from making an application which the person from whom he claims could have made. It is said: what, then, is meant by the words \"save as otherwise provided by this Code\" ? The answer is that those words are not meaningless but have effect in some cases.\n\nTake, by way of an illustration, the second proviso to Order XXI, rule 16 which provides that where a decree for payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them it shall not be executed against the others. This is a provision which forbids one of the judgment-debtors to whom alone the decree for payment of money has been transferred from making an application for execution and, therefore, he cannot apply under section 146 as a person claiming under the decree-holder. As the respondent company do not fall within Order XXI, rule 16 because the document did not cover the decree to be passed in future in the then pending suit that rule cannot be a bar to the respondent company making an application for execution under section 146 if they satisfy the other requirement of that section, namely, that they can be said to be claiming under the decree-holder.\n\nA person may conceivably become entitled to the benefits of a decree without being a transferee of the decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law. In that situation the person so . becoming the owner of the decree may well be regarded as a person claiming under the decree-holder and so it has been held in Sitaramaswami v.\n\nLakshmi Narasimha( 1 ), although in the earlier case of Dost Muhammad v.\n\nAltaf Husain (supra) it was held otherwise. The case of KanKati Mahanandi Reddi v. Panikalapati Venkatappa( 2 ) also held that the provisions of Order XXI, rule 16 did not prevent execution of the decree under section 146. In that case it was held that the appli-\n\n(1) [1918] J.L.R. 41 Mad. 510.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1942 Mad. 21.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\n1955•\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRlWJ Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd:\n\nDas].\n\ncant could not execute the decree under Order XXI, rule 16 but he could execute the same under section\n\n146. The main thing to ascertain is as to whether the respondent company had any right, title or interest in the decree and whether they can be said. to be persons. claiming under the decree-holder.\n\nI. have already held that the document under consideration did not transfer the future decree and; therefore, the equitable principle did not apply and, therefore, the respondent company did not become a transferee of the decree within the meaning of Order\n\nXXI, rule 16. What, then, was the legal position of the respondent company? They had undoubtedly, by the document of the 7th February 1949, obtained a transfer of the debt which was the subject matter of the then pending suit.\n\nThis. transfer, under the Transfer of Property Act; carried all the legal incidents and the remedies in relation to that debt. The transferors no longer had any right, title or interest in the subject matter of the suit. After the transfer it was the respondent company which had the right to continue the suit and obtain a decree if the debt was really outstanding. They, however, did not bring themselves on the record as the plaintiffs in the place and stead of the transferors but allowed the latter to proceed with the suit. The transferors, therefore, proceeded with the suit although they had no longer any interest in the debt whichwas the subject matter of the suit and which had been transferred by them to the respondent Company. In the premises, in the eye of the law, the position of the transferors, vis-a-vis the respondent company, was nothing more than that of benamidars for the respondent company and when the. decree was-· passed for the recovery of that debt it was. the respondent company who were the real owners of the decree. As between the respondent company and the transferors the former may well claim a. declaration of their title; Here there is no question of transfer. of the decree by the transferors to the respondent company by assignment of the decree in writing or by operation of law and. the respondent company cannot apply for execution of the\n\n...\n\n...\n\n, i.\n\ndecree under Order XXI, rule 16. But the respondent company are, nontheless, the real owners of the decree because it is passed in relation to and for the recovery of the debt which undoubtedly they acquired by transfer by the document under consideration.\n\nThe respondent company were, after the transfer, the owners of the debt which was the subject matter of the suit and the legal incidents thereof and consequently were the real owners of the decree. The respondent company derived their title to the debt by transfer from the transferors and claimed the same under the latter. When the respondent company became the owner of the decree immediately on its passing they must, in relation to the decree, be also regarded as persons claiming under the transferors.\n\nThe respondent company would not have become the owner of the decree unless they were the owners of the debt and if they claimed the debt under the transferors they must also claim the relative decree under the transferors as accretions, as it were, to their original right as transferees of the debt. . In my opinion, the respondent company are entitled under section 146 to make the application for execution which the original detree-holders could do.\n\nIn Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram Manda! (supra) Mukherji, J., felt unable to assent to the broad proposition that Courts of execution have to look to equity in considering whether there has been an assignment by operation of law. I see no cogent reason for taking this view. If the executing Court can and, after the amendment of Order XXI, rule 16 by the deletion of the words \"if that Court thinks fit'', must deal with complicated questions relating to transfer of decree by operation of statutory provisions which may be quite abstruse, I do not see why the executing Court may not apply its mind to the simple equitable principle which op, erates to transfer the beneficial interest in the after-acquired decree or to questions arising under section 146.\n\nSection 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure does require that the executing Court alone must determine all questions arising between the 15-90 S.C. India/59\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ud.\n\nDas].\n\nJugalkishore Sara}\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo .. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\nparties or their representatives and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of , the decree and. authorises it even to treat the proceedings as a suit. As the assignees from the plaintiff of the debt which was the entire subject matter of the suit the respondent company were . entitled to be brought on the record under Order XXII, rule 10 and must; therefore, be also regarded as a representative of. the plaintiff within the meaning of section 47 of the Code; Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the application for execution was defective in that although it purported to be an application for exe'cution under Order XXI, rule 11, it did not comply with the requirements of that rule in that it did not specify any of the several modes in which the assistance of the Court was required. The application was imdoubtedly defective as the decision in the case of Radha Nath Das v. Produmna Kumar Sarkar(' ) 'and Krishna Govind Pati v.\n\nMoolchand Keshavchand Gujar( 2 ) will show but this objection was not taken before the executing Court which could then have returned the application, nor was any objection taken by the appellant at any later stage of the proceedings.\n\nFurther, it appears that the respondent company actually presented another tabular statement for. execution specifying the mode in which the assistance of the Court was required. In these circumstances, it is not open to the appellant to contend that the application is not maintainable.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.\n\nBHAGWATI J.-I agree that the appeal be dismissed with costs. I would however' like to record my own reasons for doing so; Habib & Sons, a partnership firm which carried on business as merchants and Pukka Adatias in bullion and cotton iii Bombay filed a .suit against the Ap'pellant in the City Civil Court, Bombay being Summary\n\n(1) I. L. R. (1939) 2 Cal. 325\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1941 Born. 302.\n\n/ ..\n\nSuit No. 233 of 1948, to recover a sum of Rs. 7,113-7-0 with interest and costs. During the penden:cy of the suit an agreement was arrived at between Habib & Sons and the Respondents on the 7th February, i949 under which Habib & Sons transferred to the Respondents inter alia .... ''Fourthy :-All the book and other debts due to. the Vendors in connection with the said Indian business and the full benefit of all securities for the debts .. , ......... Sixthly :-All other property to which the Vendors are entitled in connection with the said Indian business\". As consideration for the said transfer the Respondents undertook to pay satisfy, discharge and fulfil all the debts, liabilities contracts and engagements of the vendors in relation to the said Indian business and to indemnify them against all proceedings, claims and demands in respect thereof. The Respondents did not take any steps under Order XXII, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to bring themselves on the record of the suit as plaintiffs in place and stead of Habib & Sons and a decree was passed in favour of Habib & Sons against the Appellant on the 15th December, 1949 for Rs. 8,428/7 /- inclusive of interest and costs with interest on judgment at 4 per cent. per annum till payment.\n\nBoth the partners of Habib & Sons were declared evacuees and by his order dated the 2nd August, 1950 the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bombay confirmed the transaction of transfer of the business of Habib & Sons to the Respondents as evidenced by the agreement dated the 7th February, 1949.\n\nA communication to that effect was addressed by the Custodian to a Director of the Respondents on the 11th December, 1950.\n\nOn the 25th April, 1951 the Respondents filed in the City Civil Court, Bombay an application for execution under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Pro\n\ncedure to execute the decree obtained by Habib & Sons against the Appellant. That application was by the Respondents as assignees of the decree and the mode in which the assistance of the Court was required was that the Court should declare the Respon-\n\n1955 - Jugalkishore Saraf\n\n1(.\n\nRaw Cotton ca. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati],\n\n~ 195_5\n\n:Jugalki'shore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati],\n\ndents the assignees of the decree as the decretal debt along with other debts were transferred by Habib &\n\nSons to them by a deed of assignment dated the 7th February, 1949 which was confirmed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bombay and should order them to be substituted for the plaintiffs. A notice under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure was issued by the Court on the 10th May, 1951, calling upon Habib & Sons and the Appellant to show cause why the decree passed in favour of Habib & Sons and by them transferred to the Respondents, the assignees of the decree should not be executed by the said transferees against the Appellant. The Appellant showed cause and contended ( 1) that the deed of assignment in favour of the Respondents was not executed by Habib & Sons and (2) that the assignee of the subject-matter of the suit and not of the decree itself was not entitled to apply for leave under Order XX!, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Chamber Summons was adjourned to Court in order to take evidence whether the document in question was executed by Habib & Sons or not. Evidence was led at the hearing and the Court held the document duly executed by the two partners of Habib & Sons and as such duly proved. On the question of law the Court followed the decisions in Purmananddas Jiwandas v. Vallabdas Wallii(') and Chimanalal Hargovinddas\n\nv. Gulamnabi(') and held that the Respondents were entitled to execute the decree under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nAn appeal was taken by the Appellant to the High Court against this decision of the City Civil -' Court. The appeal came for hearing before Dixit, J.\n\nThe finding that the deed of assignment was duly proved was not challenged. But the contention that inasmuch as there was no transfer of the decree itself but only of the property the Respondents were not entitled to apply to execute the decree was pressed and was negatived by the learned Judge. The learned\n\nJudge observed that if the language of Order XXI, 1\n\n(1) [1877] l.L.R. l l Bom. 5o6.\n\n(2) I.L.R. [1946] Born. 276.\n\nrule 16 was strictly construed it seemed to hini that the Respodents had no case. But he followed the decisions m Purmananddas Jiwandas v.\n\nV allabdas Wallji( 1 ) and Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Gulamnabi ( 2 ) and dismissed the appeal.\n\nA Letters Patent Appeal was filed against this decision of Dixit, J. and it came on for hearing and final disposal before a Division Bench of the High Court constituted by Chagla, C.J. and Shah, J.\n\nThe Division Bench also were of the opinion that if one were to construe Order XXI, rule 16 strictly there was no assignment of the decree in favour of the respondents.\n\nThey however were of the opinion that the High Court had consistently taken the view that there could be an equitable assignment of a decree, which would constitute the assignee an assignee for the purpose of Order XXI, rule 16 and that what the Court must consider was not merely a legal assignment but also an assignment which operated in equity. They then considered the two Bombay decisions which had been relied upon by the City Civil Court as well as by Dixit, J. and came to the conclusion that the deed of assignment fell within the principle of those two decisions, that it constituted an eqliitable assignment of the decree which was ultimately passed in favour of Habib & Sons, that the application for execution was maintainable under Order XXL rule 16 and dismissed the appeal. The Appellant. applied for and obtained the necessary certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution.\n\nOrder XXI, rule 16 provides for an application for execution by transferee of a decree and runs as under:-\n\n\"Where a decree: ................... is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such rlecree-hloder:\n\n(1) [1877] I.L.R. II Bom. 506. ('l) I.L.R. [1946] Bom. 276.\n\n. 1955\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\n.v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton 'Co. Ltd.\n\n Bhagwati J.\n\nProvided that, where .the decree ................. . has been transferred by assignment, n.otice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to . . ,, its execuaon ......................... .\n\nThe transfer contemplated under this rule is either by assignment in writing or by operation of law. It '.-\n\nwas not contended by the Appellant at any stage of the proceedings that there was in this case a transfer by operation of law or that the agreement dated the 7th February 1949 was not an assignment of all -the rights which Habib & Sons had in connection with the Indian business. The question therefore that falls to be considered is whether the deed of assignment dated the 7th February 1949 operates as a transfer of. the decree by assignment in writing within the meanirig of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nA strict and narrow construction has been put upon. the. worc\\s \"where a decree.· ... is transferred by assignment in writing\" by the High Court of Madras in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi(\") and .the , decisions following. it, paticular)y Kangati Maa nandi Reddi v. Panikalap. ati Venkatappa .& Another ( 2 ) and by the High :c0urt of. Calcutta in Mathurapore Zamindary .Co. Ltd, v. Bhasaram Manda! (\") which is followed . in Prabashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji (').\n\nThey have held that 'the words \"decree-holder\" rhust be construed as meaning decree-holder 'in fa2t and\n\nnot as including a .Party . who in equity rriay. afterwards become entitled to the rights of the actual decree-holder and that the language of Order XXI, rule 16 (old section 232) cannot be construed so as to apply to a case where there was no decree in existence at the time of . the ·:assignment and this position was in effect conGeded by Dixit, J. and by the Division -Berich when -they observed that on •a strict construe-\n\n ( ;) (;907) i7 Madra~ L'aw .Journal\"391.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1942 Madras 21.\n\n(3) (1924) I.L.R. 51 Calcutta 703.\n\n(4) (1931) I.L.R. 59 Calcutta 297.\n\ntion of Order XXI, rule 16 there was no assign_ment of the decree in favour of the Respondents.\n\nA contrary view has however been taken by the High Court of Bombay in Purmananddas Jiwandas v.\n\nVallabdas Wallji(1) and Chimanlal Hargovinddas v.\n\nGulamnabi (2). These two decisions have applied the equitable principle enunciated 'by Sir George Jessel, M. R. in Collyer v. !Jaacs( 3 ) as under:-\n\n\"The creditor had a mortgage security on existing chattels and also the benefit of what in form was an assignment of non-existing chattels which might be afterwards brought on to the premises.\n\nThat assignment, in fact, constit:Uted only a contract .to give him the after-acquired chattels.\n\nA mar.i cannot in equity, any more than at law, assign what has no existence. A man can contract to assigri property which is to come into existence in the future, and when it has come irito existence, equity, treating as done that which ought to be done, fastens. upon that property, and the contract to assign 'thus becomes a complete assignment\". · The High Court of Calcutta also applied the same principle in Purna Chandra Bhowmik v. Barna Kumari Debi(') and the High Court of' Madras . in Kangati Mahanandi Reddi v.\n\nPanikalapati Venkatappa and another(\") observed that if the matter were res integra much might perhaps be said for the contention that the assignee under simi_lar circumstances . . could execute the' decree under Order XXI, rule 16.\n\nThe decision in Purmananddas Jivandas v. V allabdas Wallji( 1)' and the equitable principle enunciate_d therein was brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided the case of Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram Mandal( 6 ) but was negatived by them and they relied upon the observations of the Privy Council in dealing with a somewhat similar provision contained in Section 208 of Act . VIII of 1859 in the, case of Abedo.onissa Khatoon v. Ameeroonissa Khatoon (7): •\n\n:(1) (1877) l.L.R: 11 Born. 506.\n\n(2) l.L.R. 1946 Born. 276.\n\n(3) L, R. 19 Ch. D. 342. .\n\n(4) I. L. R. [1939] 2 Calcutta 341. (:i) A.; I.R. 1942 Madras 21:\n\n(6) [1924] I.L.R. 51 Calcutta 703.\n\n(7) (1876) L..R.,4 L.A. 66. ·' . ;\n\nJugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nJugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\n' BhagwatiJ.\n\n\"Their Lordships have further to observe, that they agree with the Chief Just; ce in the view which he expressed,-that this was not a section intended to apply to case~ where a serious contest arose with respect to the rights of persons to an equitable interest in a decree\".\n\nRankin, C.J. laid stress upon this aspect of the question and delivered a similar opinion in Prabhashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji(' ) at page 299 :-\n\n\"There seem to be two possible views of the rule.\n\nOne view would be to say that there must be a decree in existence and a . transfer in writing of that decree.\n\nThat is the strict view-a view which the courts in India have taken. The. only other possible view would be to say that, while other cases are within the rule-such as cases where a person claims to be entitled 'in equity under an agreement to the benefit of the decree-it is optional with the courts to give effect to the rule according as the case is a clear one or one which requires investigation of complicated facts or difficult questions of law unsuited for discuss10n on a mere execution application.\n\nIn that view, if it were understood that the court had a complete discretion to apply the rule or not, it might be that the rule would be workable; but I do not think that any such discretion as that is !ntended to be given by the rule\" and he fortified himself in his conclusion by relying upon the deletion of the words \"if that Court thinks fit the de.cree may be executed\" when the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 was enacted.\n\nOrder XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a statutory provision for execution by the transferee of a decree and unless and until a person applying for execution establishes his title . as the transferee of a decree he cannot claim the. benefit of that provision. He may establish his title by proving that he is a transferee of a decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a \"transfer of pro-\n\n(1) [1931] I. L. R. 59 Calcutta 297.\n\n..1,\n\nperty\" as an act by which the transferor conveys property in present or in future to the transferee or transferns. A transfer of a decree by assignment in writing may be effected by conveying the decree in present or in future to the transferee. But even for the transfer to operate in future the decree which is the subject matter of the transfer must be in existence at the date of the transfer.\n\nThe words \"in present or in future\" qualify the word \"conveys\" and not the\n\nword \"property\" in the section and it has been held that a transfer of property that is not in existence operates as a contract to be performed in the future which may be specifically enforced as soon as the property comes into existence. As was observed by the Privy Council in Rajah Sahib Perhlad v. Budhoo(1) :-\n\n\"But how can there be any transfer, actual or constructive, upon a contract under which the vendor\n\nsells that of which he has not possession, and to which he may never establish a title? The bill of sale in such a case can only be evidence of a contract to be performed in future, and upon the happening of a contingency, of which the purchaser may claim a specific performance, if he comes into Court shewing that he has himself done all that he was bound to do\".\n\nIt is only by the operation of the equitable principle that as soon as the property comes into existence and is capable of being identified, equity taking as done that which ought to be done fastens upon the property and the contract to assign thus becomes a complete equitable assignment. In the case of a decree to be passed in the future therefore there could be no assignment of the decree unless and until the decree was passed and the agreement to assign fastened on the decree and thus became a complete equitable assignment. The decree not being in existence at the date of the transfer cannot be said to have been transferred by the assignment in writing and the matter resting merely in a contract to be performed in the future which may be specifically enforced as soon as the decree was passed there would . be no transfer\n\n( 1) [1869] 12 M. I. A. 275.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati].\n\nJugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nGo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati ).\n\n1414 SUf']lEME QOURT REPORTS\n\n[1955J\n\nautomatically in. favour of the \"transferee\" of the decree when passed. It would .require a further act on the part of the \"transferor\" to completely effectuate the transfer and if he did not do so the only remedy of the \"transferee\" would be, to sue for specific performance of the contract to transfer. There would therefore be no legal transfer or assignment of the decree to be passed in future. by virtue of the assignment in writing executed before the. decree came into existence and the only way in which the transferee could claim that the decree was transferred to him by assignment in writing would be by the operation of the equitable principle above enunciated and .the contract to assign having become a complete equitable\n\nassignment of :the deree.\n\nIs there any warrant for importing tllis equitable principle while construing the statutory provision enacted in Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure? The Code of Civil Procedure does not prescribe ahy mode in which. an assignment in writing has got to be executed 'in order to effectuate a transfer of a decree. The only other statutory provision i;, regard to assignments . in writing is to be found in Cha pt er VIII of the Transfer, of Property Act which relates to transfers' of actionable Claims and an actionable claim has been defined in section 3 of the Act as \"a claim to . any debt. ........... or to any beneficial : interest in moveable property not in the possession, . either . actual or constructive; of the claimartt, which the Civi-1 Courts recognize as affording 'grounds for relief ...... : ... \". A judgment debt or decree is not an actionable claim for no action is necessary to tealise it. It has already been the subject : of . an action and is secured by the decree.·· A decree to be ·passed in future also does not tome as such' within rhe definition of an actionable claim -and an assignment or -transfer thereof need 'not be effected in the manne~ prescribed hy sectidn 130 of the Transfer of Property -Act. If therefore the assignment or transfer of a decree to- ' be ' passed in the -future does hcit\" require to be effectuated in the manner prescribed in the stan1te there would be no objection to the\n\n...\n\n...\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REJ?ORT, S 1415\n\noperation of the equitable principle above enunciated and the contract to assign evidenced by the assignment in writing becoming a complete equitable assignment of the decree when passed. The assignment in writing of the decree to be passed would thus result in a contract to assign which contract to assign would become a complete equitable assignment on the decree being . passed and would fulfil the requirements of Order XXI, rule 16 in so far as the assignment or the transfer of the decree would in that. event be cfiectuated by an assignment in writing which became a complete equitable assignment of the decree when passed. There is nothing in the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or any other law which prevents the operation of this equitable principle and in working out the rights and liabilities of the transferee of a decree oh the one hand and the decreeholder and the judgment debtor on the other, there is no warrant for r.eading the words \"where a decree\n\n.............. is transferred by assignment in writing\" in the strict and narrow sense in which they . have been read by the High Court of Madras in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi(1) and the High Court of Calcutta in Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd.\n\nv. Bhasaram Mani:lal(2) and Prabashinee Debi v.\n\nR.asiklal Banerji( 3 ). It is significant to observe that the High Court of Calcutta in Purna Chandra Bhowmik v.\n\nBarna 'Kumari Debi( 4 ) applied this equitable principle\n\nand held that the plaintiff in whose favour the defendant had executed a mortgage bond assigning bv way of sec:unty the decree tha.t would be passed ' in a suit . instituted by him against a third party for recovery of money . due on unpaid bills for work done wa.s entitled to: a .declaration that he was the assignee of 'the decree passed ·. in favour of the defendants and was as such entitled to realise the decretal debt either amicably or by execution. If the ·plaintiff was thus declared to be the assighee of the •decree< subsequently passed in favour of the defendant and entitled to realise the :decteta:l amount by. execution he could\n\n(1) [1907] 17 M.L.J. 391.\n\n(3) [1931] l.L.R. 59 Cal. 297. (2). [1924] I.L.R.51 Cal. 703.\n\n(4) I.L.R. [1939] .2 Cal. 341.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton Go. Ltd. ·- BhagwatiJ.\n\napply for execution of the decree and avail himself of the provisions of Order XXI, rule 16 as . the assignee of the decree which was passed subsequent to the date of the assignment in writing in his favour.\n\nThere could be no objection to decide questions involving investigation of complicated facts or difficult questions of law in execution proceedings, as section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorises the Court executing the decree to decide all questions arising therein and relating to execution of the decree and subsection (2) further authorises the executing Coiirt to treat a proceeding under the section as a suit thus obviating the necessity of filing a separate suit for the determination of the same. The line of decisions of the High Court of Bombay beginning with Purmana11ddas /ivandas v. Vallabdas 'Wallji(') and ending with Chimanlal Hargovinddas v.\n\nGulamnabi(') importing the equitable principle above enunciated therefore appears to me to be more in consohance with law and equity than the strict and narrow interpretation put on the words \"where a decree ............ is transferred by assignment in writing\" by the High . Courts of Madras and Calcutta in the decisions above noted.\n\nEven if an equitable assignment be thus construed as falling within an \"assignment in writing\" contemplated by Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would in terms. require an assignment of the decree which was to be passed in the future in favour of the assignor. In the present case, it is impossible to read the deed of assignment dated the 7th February, 1949 as expressiy or by necessary implication assigning in favour of the Respondent the decree which was going to be passed by the City Civil Court in favour of Habib & Sons. There is however another aspect of the matter which was not urged before the Courts below in the present case nor does it appear to have been considered in most of the judgments above referred . to.\n\nThere is no .doubt on the authorities that a mere transfer of property as such does not by itself spell out\n\n(1) [1877] I.L.R: 11 Born. 506,\n\n(2) I.L.R. 1946 Born. 276.\n\n...\n\n...\n\na transfer of a decree which has been passed or may be passed in respect of that property/ and it would require an assignment of such decree in order to effectuate the transfer (vide Hansraj Pal v. Mukhraji Kunwar & others(1), Mathurapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v.\n\nBhasaram Mandal(2), and Kangati Mahanandi Reddi v.\n\nPanikalapati Venkatappa & another( 3 ).\n\nWhere however the property which is transferred is an actionable claim within the meaning of its definition in section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act the consequences of such transfer would be different. An actionable claim means a claim to any debt, or to any beneficial interest in moveable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognize as affording grounds for relief, and a transfer of an actionable claim when effected by an instrument in writing signed by the transferor is under section 130 of the Act complete and effectual upon the execution of such instrument, and thereupon all the rights and remedies of the transferor, whether by way of damages or otherwise, vest in the transferee, whether such notice of the transfer as is therein provided be given to the debtor or not. If the book debt or the property which is an actionable claim is thus transferred by an assignment in writing all the rights and remedies of the transferor in respect thereof including the right to prosecute the claim to judgment in a Court of law either in a pending litigation or by institution of a suit for recovery of the same vest in the transferee immediately upon the execution of the assignment as a necessary corollary thereof.\n\nNot only is the actionable claim thus transferred but all the necessary adjuncts or appurtenances thereto are transferred along with the same to the transferee.\n\nSection 8 of the Act provides that unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. These incidents include where the property is\n\n(1) [1908] I. L.R. 30 AU. 28.\n\n(2) [1924] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 703.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1942 Mao. 21.\n\n1955 ...,...,,,.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati].\n\n1955 - Jugalkiihore Saraf v.\n\nROwCotton\n\nC•. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati].\n\n1418 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1955)\n\na debt or other actionable claiin, the securities!·: therefor. ............... but not arrears of interest accrued before the transfer. In cases of transfer of book debts or property coming within the definition. of ': a<:tionable claim there is therefore necessarily involved also a transfer of the transferor's right in a decree which may be passed in his favour in a pending litigation and the moment a decree is passed in his favour by the court of law, that decree is also automatitall y transferred . '1 favour of the transferee by virtue of the assignment in writing already executed by the transferor. The debt which is the subject-matter of the' claim is merged in the decree and the transferee of the actionable claim becomes entitled by virtue of the assignment in writing in his favour not only to the book debt but :also to the decree in which it has merged. The book debt does not lose its character of a debt by its being merged in the decree and the transferee is without anything more entitled to the benefit of the decree passed by the court of law in favour of the transferor.\n\nIt would have been open to the transferee after the execution of the deed of assignment in his favour to take steps under Order XXII, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have himself substituted in the pending litigation as plaintiff in place and stead of the transferor and prosecute the claim to judgment; but even if he did not do so he is not deprived of the benefit of the decree ultimately passed by the court of law in favour of the transferor, the only disability attaching to his position being that under section 132 of the Act he would take the actionable claim subject to all the liabilities and equities to which the transferor was subject in respect thereof at the date of the transfer. The transferee of the actionable claim thus could step into the shoes of the transferor and claim to be the transferee of the decree. by virtue of the assignment 'in writing executed by the transferor in his. favour and could therefore claim to execute the decree as transferee under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThis aspect could not be considered by the High\n\n...\n\nCourt of Bombay in Purmananddas- /ivandas v: Vallabdas Wallji(1) because the assignment there was executed on the 11th May, 1870, i.e. before the enactment of the Transfer of Property Act in 1882. The Court therefore applied the equitable principles and came to the conclusion that the equitable assignment which. was completed on the passing of the decree was covered bv the old section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure. lt was also not considered by the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Gulamnabi(2) nor by Dixit, J. or by the Division Bench in the present case. The High Court of Patna in Thakuri Cope and Others v. Mokhtar Ahmad & An- -0ther( 3) , went very near it when it observed that all that was transferred was an actionable claim, but did not work out the consequences thereof and its reasoning was deflected by the consideration of the equitable principles and the applicability thereof while construing the provisions of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of C!vil Procedure. The High Court of Calcutta in Purna Chandra Bhowmik v. Barna Kumari Debi (4)\n\ndefinitely adopted this position and observed at p. 344:- . \"In my opinion, what was transferred was the daim to a debt and as such would come within the definition of actionable claim as given in section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. The mere fact that the claim was reduced by the Court did not make; in my opinion, any difference\".\n\nIt no doubt applied the equitable principle also and held that the mortgage must be deemed tu have attached itself to the decree which was for a definite amount as soon as the decree was passed, but further observed that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that she was an assignee of the decree and if she got that declaration it would be open to her to apply for execution of the decree under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am sure that if this aspect of the question had been properly presented to Dixit, J. or the Division Bench in the\n\n(1) [1877] I.L.R. 11 Born. 506.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1922 Patna 563.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 1946 Born. 276.\n\n(4) I. L. R. [1939] 2 Cal. 341.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ;\n\n:055 present case they also would have come to the same\n\nJugalkis!Wie Saraf conclusion. v.\n\nRaw.Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwahJ.\n\nMr. Umrigar, learned counsel for the Respondents; further urged that even if the Respondents were not entitled to the benefit of Order XX!, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure they were the true owners of the debt and the decree which was ultimately passed by the City Civil Court in favour of Habib and Sons by virtue of the deed of assignment dated the 7th February 1949 and that under section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure execution proceedings could be taken and application for execution could be made by them as persons claiming under Habib & Sons. The deed of assignment transferred the debt which was the subject matter of the pending litigation in the City Civil Court between Habib & Sons and the Appellant. Habib & Sons could have taken proceedings in execution and made the application for execution of the decree against the Appellant and the Respondents claiming under Habib & Sons by virtue of the deed of assignment were therefore entitled to take the execution proceedings and make the application for execution under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Coc!e of Civil Procedure. He also urged that Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not prohibit such execution proceedings at the instance of the Respondents and for this purpose relied upon the observations of the learned Judges of the High Court of Madras in Kangati Mahanandi Reddi v. Panikalapati\n\nVenkatappa & another (') at page 23 :-\n\n-.'\n\n...\n\n\"We are unable to hold that merely because rule 16 has been interpreted as applying only to decrees m existence at the time of the transfer, it prohibits an application by a transferee who obtained the transfer of a decree, a transfer which is legally valid and is embodied in a written deed (as rule 16 requires) before the necree was actually passed. To permit execution by mch a transferee, in our opinion, in no way violates the principles which are embodied in rule 16 or in Order XXI generally. The appellant here is the\n\n(1) A.LR. 1942 Mad. 21\n\n•• -\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME'COURT REPORTS 1421\n\ntrue owner of the decree,· and he has his written title -deed, and that is all that the law requires'' ..\n\nIt was however urged on behalf of the Appellant that section 146 did not apply because Order XXI, rule 16 was a specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure which applied when a person other than a decreeholder wanted to execute the decree and if the Respondents could not avail themselves of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure they could not avail themselves of section 146 also.\n\nReliance was placed in support of this contention on a decision of the High Court of Patna in Thakuri Gope and others v. Mokhtar Ahmad and another( 1 ) and another decision of the High\n\nCourt of Allahabad in Shib Charan Das v.\n\nRam Chander & Others(2). This contention of the Appellant is obviously unsound. Order XXI, rule 16 provides for execution of a decree at the instance of a transferee by assignment in writing or by operation of law and enables such transferee to apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it. If a transferee of a decree can avail himself of that provision by establishing that he is such a transferee he must only avail himself of that provision. But if he fails to establish his title as a transferee by assignment in writing or by operation of law within the meaning of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure there is nothing in the provisions of Order XXI, rule 16 which prohibits him from availing himself of section 146 if the provisions of that section can be availed of by him. That is the only meaning of the expression \"save as otherwise provided by this Code\". If a person does not fall within the four corners of the provision of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure that provision certainly does not apply to him and the words \"save as otherwise provided in this Code\" contained in section 146 would not come in . the way of his availing himself of section . 146 because Order XXI, rule 16 cannot then be construed as an \"otherwise provision\" contai11ed in the\n\nCode. I am therefore of the opinion that if the Respondents could not avail themselves of Order XXI,\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1922 Patna 563. 16-9) s. C. India/59\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1922 All. 98.\n\n195:,\n\nJugalkishore S•, a.f\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ\n\n•955\n\nJugdlkislzore Saraf\n\nRaw Catton Co. Ltd.\n\nBagwatiJ.\n\n11122 [1!955]\n\nrule .Hi' of, the• C0de ; of 1Ci, vil , ProGedµre they p; iµJd .certainly under ; the. , circumstan\\:es •@f the, prqent ... case\n\nake the ··:execJ.ition. :pr.©ceedUi; gs .and .make ,):he. :1ppli- cation for execution of .the decree pa5ied , by: .. the City Civil Court in fa\"our of Habib & Sons under section .146 •©f the Civil P.i; ocedure Code. ' , . A.n objection was however. taken •on behalf of the :Appellant during the .course : 1of. the argu!'l}nts before :us though'. ll'to such objection was taken ip the Couns\n\nbelow, .ihat :the application :for execution , made by the Respondents was u; ldeative inasmuch as it was not an application 'in proper form . under Order XXI; 'rule 11 .of the Code. nf. Civil .Procedure. Qrder XXI, rule 11.(2)\n\n('j) prescribes that :particulars in r.egard to the. mode in whicli. the :assistance of the Court was required should be set out therein. The .respondents had . in their application for execution filed. before .the City Civil , Court not mentioned .any of these particulars but had only stated that the Court should declare them the assignees of .the decree as the , decretal debt :alon:g with other debts were transferred , by Habib ,&\n\nSorrs to , .tihem by :the deed caf assignment dated the .7th February 1949 which was con'firmed by, the Custoaia:n :of Evacuee Property, Bombay and should order :them to be substituted for Habib & .Sons.· This was mo compliance with the provisions , of -Order XXI, '.rule 11'(2) (j) . and therefore there was no .proper. application for execution before the Court and n:he same was\n\nliable to be dismissed. Reliance was place.cl in support :of this contention , on .a decision, of the High Court of\n\nCalcutta n J$.adha Nath ]}as v. Produmna .Kumar Sar- 1'\\ar('), ; where >it was held dissenting from a decision of the High Court of Bombay . in Baijnath . Ramchander \"\" Binjraj foowarmal Batia.& Co:(') that under Order XXI, mle 16 •of the Code of Ci.vii Procedure. the .assignee .. : of. a decree cannot . make two. :applications, :one for- 'teG©rding . the :assignment and another for\n\nexecutling . .'the \"lecree. 'The as.siguee df . a decree, could .only ma'ke,.one•'application for :execution •under •Order\n\nXXI, .. r; uk 11. .of the Code :of.Civil Prncedure specifying ; fuerein,; the. mode .in which ; the assistance .. of the.•Court\n\n(') I. L. R. [rg39) 2' Clcutta 325.\n\n. ' ' • ' - .1 l. {' .\n\n(2) I.L.R.i93,7 Bombay 09>. .\n\n- ' '' ' . ' '\n\n.... was . !!~.quired and it was :only ·; after. 1such applimtiqn\n\nhad been made to the C0urt. which . passed the. .decree tha, t the Court woµld issue notice under, Order , XXI, rule 16 . to the . transferor aqd . the judgment debtor and\n\nthe. decree would not •be .executed until the Court had heard . their obfeccions if any to :its 'execution.\n\nSen~ J. in that case observed at page 327 :-- \"It seems to me to be o, bvious from the wording of t11e rule that there. can be no notice to the transfewr or ' judgment-debtor and' no he;µ-ing of any ' objection unless and until there is an application for execution.\n\nThe notice and the entire proceedings under Order\n\nXXI, rule 16, orjginate from an application for .execution. If .there -is no sµch application .the proceedings are. without . any foundation.\n\nOrder XXl, rule 16, of the Code nowhere provides for an application to :record an assignment .or for an application for leave .to execute a decree y .an assignee or for an application for substitution\". , This in my opinion correctly sets out the position in law .and in so . far as the two decisions of the High\n\nCourt <Gf Bombay in Baijnath Ramchander v.. Binjnzj Joowarmal Batia & Co.(1) and Krishna Govind Patil v.\n\nMoolchand Keshavchand Gujar( 2) .decide anything to the .contrary they are not .correct. The .position was\n\nclarified by a later decision of the High Court of Bombay in Bhagwant Balajirao and -Others v .. Rajaram Sajnaji & Others(3) where Rajadhyaksha and Macklin, JJ. held, following Radha Nath !Jas v,. Pmdumna Kumar $arkar( 4 ) .that an application made by -an assignee of a .decree must under O.r.der X:XI, rule 16 be for the executioa of the decree and not merely for the recognition of the assignment and for leave to execute the decree. Lt was .urged before . the . learned Judges that .the practice in the High Courl of , Boµibay was to. entertain :applications of _this kirid, but; they observed that the , practice if such a practice prevfii)ed v, vas: opposed . to :the, pi:oyisions .of the Order. X~, . rule 16. of the Co.de of. Civil Pr9cedu, t:e. The ont(1Iltion\n\nterapi::e :i, i, rged on.· be, half ro.f . the. AppeJ, lnt ,,.;1:µ<1r.1, the\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1937 Born. 691.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1947 Born. 157\n\n(2) A.I .. R. 194i , B<>1r\" 302 ,(l'.B.).\n\n(4) I. L ... R. '[193g.); z 'C:a\\;. 325. . ' -, .. -·· - \"\n\n:jt; galkiskore . .Sartif\n\nv.; :Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\n'B, hagwatiJ.\n\n:JugalkishMC sartfJ\n\nv.: Raw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati ],\n\napplication for execution :in the present case ·.was defective appears to have some foundation.: • _ . . ' This defect however was not such as lo preclude the Respondents from obtaining the necessary \" rdie[ The application which was filed by' them 'in -the\" Cicy Civil Court was headed \"application for execution under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil _Pi:oce' dure\" and the only defect was in the specification _of the mode in which 'the assistance of the Court was re' quired: The particulars which were required to be filled in column l were not in accordance with the requirements of Order XXI, rule ll(Z)(j) and sh:oiild have specified one of the modes therein prescribed and certainly 'a declaration that the respondents •were the assignees of the decree and the order for their substitution af the pliintiffs was certainly . not one of the prescribed modes which were required to be specified in that column. The. 'practice 'which prevailed in the\n\nBigh Court of J3ombay as recognised in Baijnath Ramchander v. Binjraj foowarmat Batia & Cb.C1) and also in Bhagwant Balajirao :and. others v .. Rajaram Sajnaji & others(') appears to have been the only justification for making the application: iri the manner which the respondents did.\n\nThat defect however according to the very same decision in Bhagwant Ealajirdo and others v. Rajaram Sajnaji & others(') was purely technical and might be allowed to l:le cured by amendment of the application.\n\nAs a matter of fact Order XXt, rule 17 lays down the procedure on .receiv-- ing applications for execution of a decree and enjoim upon the Court the duty 'to ascertain whether such\n\nof -the requirements of rules 11 to 14 as may be arplicable to the case have been complied with and if\n\nthey have not been complied with the Court has to reject the application or allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it.\n\nWhen the application for execution in the present case was received by the City Civil Court, the Court should have scrutinised the application as required by\n\nOrder XXI, rule 17(1) and if it was found that the\n\n(1) I.LR. 1937 Born. 691.\n\n(21 A.I~R. 1947 Born. 157.\n\n..,.\n\nrequirements of rules U to 14. as may be applicable were not complied with as .is . contended for by the Appellant; the. Court should have rejected. the application or allowed the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by the Court. Nothing of the kind was ever .done by the City Civil Court nor was any objection in that behalf .taken on behalf of the Appellant at -, any time until the mat£er - came before this Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n\nOn. the . 27th March, 1952 however a further application for . execution was filed . by the . Respondents. in the City Civil Court specifying in column 'J' .the mode in which .the assistance of the Court . was required and it was by ordering attachment.and sa.le .. of the moveable property of. the Appellant therein specified.\n\nThis further applicatio.µ for execution was a sufficient compliance with the provisiqns of Order XXI, rule 11\n\n(2) (j) and was sufficient under the . circumstances to cure the defect, if any, in the . original application. for execution made by the Respondents to the City Civil Court on . the 25th April, 1951. This objection of the Appellant therefore is devoid of any substance . and does not avail him.\n\nThe appeal accordingly fails and 1s dismissed with costs.\n\nIMAM J.-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments of my learned brethren. I agree .that the appeal must be dismissed with costs and in the view expressed by them that the respondent should be permitted under the provisions of section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure to execute the decree passed in favour of Habib & Sons, as one claiming under the latter.\n\nThe document under which the respondent claimed to exernte the decree was treated as a deed of transfer in the .courts below and not merely as an agreement to\n\ntransfer, By. this document there was a transfer of all the book and. other debts due to Habib & Sons in connection wich the Indian business and the full benefit of all securities . for the debts. The document, however, neither in terms, nor by any reasonable inter-\n\n1955\n\nJugalkishore Sarqf\n\ny., Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n142U:\n\n, ' SUPREl\\IE .COURT REPORTS [1955]'\n\n., .'. ' . . . ' . . \\ . . . . . rgss . pretation of its contents :purported to transfer any ;. alkishores~,;1 _decree which Ha.bib & Sons may obtain in the fu.ture. g ..-.· It seems. to me, therefore, that the respondent. cankaw Cotton • not claim to be a transferee of the decree; which was Co.Lta.' \\ subsequently 'obtained by Habib & Sons, by.an assign- . ment in writirig within the meaning of Order XXI,\n\nrule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. . . . ·, Order XXI of the Code of Civil' Procedure' relates to execution of decrees and orders. . Rule 1 of that Order relaies to payments under a decree which has been passed:· Rules 4 to 9. relate to the transfer of an existing decree for execution.· The normal rule is that a decree can be executed only by the person in whose nanie it stands and rule IO enables him to do so, :while l'ule 16 of Order XXI; enables the transferee of the decree 'to execute it in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as an' application for execution made by the decree-holder. It seems to ·.me, therefore, that there must be a decree iii' existence which is transferred before the transferee• can benefit from the provisions of rule 16.' ·. The . ordinary : and natural meaning of tlie words' of rule' 16 can carry: no .. other interpretation and the question' of a strict and narrow interpretation of its provisions .does not arise.\n\nThe position of an assignee, before a decree is passed, is amply safeguarded by the provisions of Order XXII, rule 10, which enables him' to obtain. the leave of the\n\nCourtto coritinue:the suit. Thereafter the decree, if any, would be in his name which he'could execute. I agree with my learned brother Das, J., that the pro• visions of Order XXI, rule 16 contemplate the actual transfer by an assignment in writing of a decree after it' is passed and that while a transfer of or an agreement to transfer a decree that may be passed in future may; in equity, entitle the intending transferee to claim. the beneficial interest in the decree after it is passed; such equitable transfer does not : render the transferee a transferee of the decree by assignment in writing •within tire .meaning of Order XXI, rule 16. In this respect the decisions of:the Madras High Court in . Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi(')\n\n(1) (1907) 17 M.L.J. 391_, .. ,\n\n...\n\n. '\n\n! 't\n\nS.C~R ..\n\nSUPREllIE COURT REPORTS 1427\n\nand of the Calcutta High Court in. 11Iathurapore 19;5 Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram lllandal(') and lk\"-h- 5 ·\n\n/ Prabashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji(') are correct. Juga '' v\":'. ara As at present advised, I would like to express no RawC-Otton opinion as to whether the expression \"by operation Co. Ud. of law\" can be given the interpretation suggested by my learned brother Das, J., as it is uiinecessary to do so in the present appeal. . · · · · · ·. Appeal di;\"inissed.\n\nSHIVNANDAN SHARl\\IA\n\n. v.\n\nTHE PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD.· ·\n\n- -- . [ViviA:N Bos~, JAG~NNADHADAS and SINIIA JJ.]. -. ' . - Master and servant-Banker-Agreement .. between Bank and -\n\nTreasUrers~Treasurers, wheth'e:Y sirvantS or independent - contractors -Cashier appointed by Treasitrer-Whether servant of the Bank.\n\n. ..\n\nI . • ' • • l _ . . , {. • l . The appellant was appoiµted head. cashier in one of the branches of the .respondent Ballk by,'tbe Tfeasurers who .wer_e ~D. charge Qfh6 Cash Department of the Bank by virtue of an agreeffient between them .. The question arose as to whetner the appellant' was' an•: em p!oyee of the Bank. •. ' · . 1 Held, (i) that the tes oi the greeent ciearly showecl that the Treasurers were servants ofthe Bank and not fodependent con~ tractors; and tha~ 1 • 1 t :-\" ... ,\n\n(ii) as the direction and control of the appellant ancl of the ministerial staff in charge of tlie Cash Departl!lent of the Bank was ·entirely vested.in:the Bank, the appellanwas an.employee of the Bank. ... . , , . .... . t · , .\n\nIf a ma.\"sier employ\"s a srvant and autho.rizes hiin-to eploya number of persons to do a. particular job and -to guarantee_the_ii fide~ lity and efficiency for a cash consideration, the employe8s thUS appointed by the servant would be, equally with the employer, servants\n\nof the master. ... i . ! · ;\n\nTh.e question a3 to whose employe0 a parlicUlar : person'; hi h~~ to be determined with reference to tb6 facts and( circUmstarices 'of each individual case, and among the many sts by which to asr tain who is the employer, the most satisfactory one is to ask who fa entitled to tell the employee the way in which ha is to .do the work upon which he is enga:; ed. · . :\n\n. (1) [192!] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 703.\n\n(2) [1931] I.L.R. 59 Cal. 297.\n\nImamJ.\n\nMarch 15", "total_entities": 232, "entities": [{"text": "JUGALKISHORE SARAF", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAW COTTON CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R.' DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IMAM JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 5, 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 430, "end_char": 441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1076, "end_char": 1103, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "15th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1263, "end_char": 1282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to get themselves substituted as plaintiffs in the place of H. & S, but allowed the 'suit to be continued in the name of .the original plaintiffs, and on the 15th December, 1949, a decree was passed, in favoµr of H & S against the appellant."}}, {"text": "25th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1354, "end_char": 1370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th April, 1951, the rcospondents filed 1n."}}, {"text": "City Civil Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1403, "end_char": 1427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the City Civil Court, Bombay, an application for execution of the decree under Order XXI, rule 11 of the Code, and a notice under Order XXII, rule 16 was issued by the Court calling."}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2105, "end_char": 2132, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2264, "end_char": 2275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2326, "end_char": 2337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2417, "end_char": 2425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI J. dissenting.-Order XXI, rule 16, by the first alternative, contemplates the actual trans- \"fer by an assignment in writing of a decree after it is passed and while a transfer of or an agreement to transfer a decree that may be passed in future may, in equity, entitle the transferee to claim the beneficial interest in the decree after it is passed, such\n\n1955\n\n111arch 7\n\n]ugalkisho; e saraf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\n1370 SUll!YEMii: C0URT REPORTS\n\n[J1)55]\n\nequitable transfer does ; q.o~1 ren.4er I he: ,1'a.ns.ree 1 a transferee of the decree by assignment in writing within the ffieaning of Order XXI, rule 16. ·, '.· , ,,. .· ..", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4127, "end_char": 4136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4144, "end_char": 4168, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "is Iloihing in the provisions of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4917, "end_char": 4958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5620, "end_char": 5629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is Iloihing in the provisions of the Code", "statute": "There is Iloihing in the provisions of the Code"}}, {"text": "section\n\n130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is Iloihing in the provisions of the Code", "statute": "There is Iloihing in the provisions of the Code"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5776, "end_char": 5800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "R. Subramania Iyer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Subramania Iyer and K. R. Choudhry, for the :appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Choudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6926, "end_char": 6940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Subramania Iyer and K. R. Choudhry, for the :appellant."}}, {"text": "H. /. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. /. Umrigar, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6981, "end_char": 6994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. /. Umrigar, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6999, "end_char": 7014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. /. Umrigar, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mahomedali Habib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two persons named Mahomedali Habib and Sakerkanoo Mahomedali Habib used to carry on business as merchants and pucca adatias in bullion and cotton at Bombay under the name."}}, {"text": "Sakerkanoo Mahomedali Habib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7197, "end_char": 7224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two persons named Mahomedali Habib and Sakerkanoo Mahomedali Habib used to carry on business as merchants and pucca adatias in bullion and cotton at Bombay under the name."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7307, "end_char": 7313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two persons named Mahomedali Habib and Sakerkanoo Mahomedali Habib used to carry on business as merchants and pucca adatias in bullion and cotton at Bombay under the name."}}, {"text": "Habib & Sons", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and style of Habib & Sons."}}, {"text": "Bombay City Civil Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7401, "end_char": 7424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In .1948 that firm instituted a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court, being Summary Suit No."}}, {"text": "Jugalkishore Saraf", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7492, "end_char": 7510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "233 of 1948, against the present appellant Jugalkishore Saraf, a Hindu inhabitant carrying on business at Bombay, for.", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "7th Febmary, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7771, "end_char": 7788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th Febmary, 1949 when that summary suit was stiU pendii; ig a document was\n\nexeuted whereby it."}}, {"text": "Raw Cotton Company, Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7927, "end_char": 7954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was agreed that the two partners would transfer and Messrs Raw Cotton Company, Limited, (hereinafter called the, respondent company)\n\nJugalkishore Saraf .,,"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8461, "end_char": 8488, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8722, "end_char": 8727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Evidently, the two partners migrated f, rom India to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8731, "end_char": 8739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Evidently, the two partners migrated f, rom India to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "15th December 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8815, "end_char": 8833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 15th December 1949 a decree ."}}, {"text": "Habib & Sons", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9104, "end_char": 9116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Habib & Sons being the plaintiffs on record the decree\n\nwas passed in their favour."}}, {"text": "Habib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9441, "end_char": 9446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th December 1950 the Custodian of Evacuee Property, _Bombay, informed the respondent mmpany that by an order made on the 2nd AugustH50\n\nthe Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property had confirmed \"the transaction of transfer\" of the business of Habib & Sons to the respondent company."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9677, "end_char": 9704, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "10th\n\nMay 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10438, "end_char": 10452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th\n\nMay 1951 the Bombay City Civil Court issued a notice under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code to Habib & Sons, who were the decree-holders on record, and Jugalkishore Saraf, who was the defendant judgment-debtor, requiring them to show cause why the decree passed in the suit on the 15th December 1949 in favour of the plaintiffs and by them transferred to the respondent company, should not be executed by the said transferees against the said defendant judgment-debtor."}}, {"text": "Jugalkishore Saraf", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10594, "end_char": 10612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th\n\nMay 1951 the Bombay City Civil Court issued a notice under Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code to Habib & Sons, who were the decree-holders on record, and Jugalkishore Saraf, who was the defendant judgment-debtor, requiring them to show cause why the decree passed in the suit on the 15th December 1949 in favour of the plaintiffs and by them transferred to the respondent company, should not be executed by the said transferees against the said defendant judgment-debtor.", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "15th June\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11002, "end_char": 11017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant judgment debtor showed cause by filing an affidavit affirmed by him on the 15th June\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11614, "end_char": 11619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by Dixit, J. Before him the execution of the document was not challenged and nothing further need be said about that.", "canonical_name": "Dixit"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11979, "end_char": 11996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge answered the question in the affirmative on the authority of the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Purmananddas f ivandas v. V allabdas W allji (1 ) and in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Ghulamnabi(2) and affirming the order of the executing Court dismissed the appeal."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12266, "end_char": 12272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment-debtor preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court which was dismissed by Chagla, C.J., and Shah, J., following the two earlier decisions mentioned above."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12284, "end_char": 12288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment-debtor preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court which was dismissed by Chagla, C.J., and Shah, J., following the two earlier decisions mentioned above."}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12556, "end_char": 12570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12830, "end_char": 12853, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12878, "end_char": 12905, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT R~PQ; RTS 1375", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14673, "end_char": 14701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case a literal construction of the rule\n\n,_J\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT R~PQ; RTS 1375\n\nleads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction."}}, {"text": "7th February 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15160, "end_char": 15177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an assignment ir:t writing within the meaning of that rule, for the document in question was' executed .on the 7th February 1949 but the decree was passed subsequently on die 15th December 1949."}}, {"text": "Westbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The equitable principle relied upon by the Bombay High Court is what had been enunciated by Lord Westbury in Holroyd v.\n\nMarshall(1) in the following words:\n\n(1) [1862] 10 H.L.C. 191, 2rn, 211."}}, {"text": "Ju, galkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nGo. Ltd.\n\nDas].\n\nJugalkishore SaraJ v.\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo.Ud.\n\nDas].\n\n1376 SUPREME cou1tr REPORTS [1955]", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16711, "end_char": 16846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ju, galkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nGo."}}, {"text": "Jessel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17883, "end_char": 17889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same principle was thus reaffirmed by Jessel, M.R., in Collyer v. Isaacs('):\n\n\"A man can contract to assign property which is to come into existence in the future, and when it has come into existence, equity, treating as done that which ought to be done, fastens upon that property, and the contract to assign thus be.comes a complete assignment\"."}}, {"text": "7th February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18320, "end_char": 18338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Applying the above principles to the facts of the instant case the High Court came to the conclusion that the document of the 7th February, 1949, on a proper reading of it, constimted an assignment of the decree."}}, {"text": "Jugalkishbre Sarqf", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21067, "end_char": 21085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":Jugalkishbre Sarqf\n\nv • .", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "Raw Cotton co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21093, "end_char": 21112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raw Cotton co. Ltd.\n\nDas :J.\n\n~:;:;\n\nJugDJ!cisho;:e sara.f\n\nRaw CottOn\n\nCo. £td,\n\nDas];\n\npased was also indutlecl 'in this document.", "canonical_name": "Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22697, "end_char": 22721, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22730, "end_char": 22739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23154, "end_char": 23163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23844, "end_char": 23853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23861, "end_char": 23885, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25137, "end_char": 25146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25154, "end_char": 25178, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25552, "end_char": 25560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27729, "end_char": 27753, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Luckmidas Khimji•", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30418, "end_char": 30435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In August 1868 the execl, ltors filed , a\n\nsuit in the Original Side of the Bombay High Court\n\nDasJ.\n\n1382 SUFREME COURTi REPORTS [1.955]:\n\n•955 against Luckmidas Khimji• for recovery of mtmey lent ; JUgal/dshore Sara:."}}, {"text": "23rd January 1873", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30949, "end_char": 30966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the name of.. the executors; On the 23rd January 1873 a decree was passed for the."}}, {"text": "Sargent", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31372, "end_char": 31379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chamber Judge dismissed the application .. Qn appeal Sargent,."}}, {"text": "Bayley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31396, "end_char": 31402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Bayley;."}}, {"text": "Purmananddas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31819, "end_char": 31831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it has been suggested that Purmananddas .. is not a transferee of.·"}}, {"text": "Bombay . High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33636, "end_char": 33655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Bombay ."}}, {"text": "Cave", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39007, "end_char": 39011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am fortified in my view by the observations of Lord Cave in the case of Performing Right Society v. London Theatre of Varieties (1)."}}, {"text": "Jugalkishore Saref", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39535, "end_char": 39553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".1955\n\nJugalkishore Saref\n\nVo Raw Cotton\n\nCu •. L/d.\n\n~ Das].", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39876, "end_char": 39885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Copyright Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39897, "end_char": 39916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40621, "end_char": 40630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Copyright Act, 1911", "statute": "the Copyright Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Copyright Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40656, "end_char": 40675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42373, "end_char": 42384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42665, "end_char": 42676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "White", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42728, "end_char": 42733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "White, 'C.J., observed:-\n\n\"We are asked to hold that in the event which happened in this case die appellant is entitled to be -rreated as the transferee of a decree from a decree- Jiolder for the purpose~ of section 332, notwithstand- .ing that at the time of the assignment there was nv\n\n.decree and no decreeoholder."}}, {"text": "section 332", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42936, "end_char": 42947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43255, "end_char": 43266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chamier", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44759, "end_char": 44766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On second appeal Chamier, J., found it impossible to tr.eat the respondent as the transferee of the decree, for the document on which he relied was executed before the decree was passed."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45016, "end_char": 45033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the Madras High Court followed its earlier decision in Basroovittil Bhandari v. Ramchandra Kamthi (supra)."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45360, "end_char": 45379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "represents the view taken by the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Hennessey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45394, "end_char": 45403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Hennessey and his brothers, who were Zamindars, instituted rent suits against their tenants.", "canonical_name": "Hennessey"}}, {"text": "Hennessey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45508, "end_char": 45517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending those suits Hennessey and his brothers transferred the Zamindari to the appellant company.", "canonical_name": "Hennessey"}}, {"text": "Tuljaram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47577, "end_char": 47585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pandu foti Kadam v. Savla Piraji Kate(1) one Tuljaram obtained a decree on a mortgage against the appellant Pandu Joti.", "canonical_name": "Tuljaram"}}, {"text": "Pandu Joti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47640, "end_char": 47650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pandu foti Kadam v. 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Rasiklal Banerji('), Rankin, C. 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Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52521, "end_char": 52563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jugalkishore Stlt'af\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDasJ.\n\n1955\n\n7¥galkishore_ Saaf.", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "7¥galkishore_ Saaf", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52578, "end_char": 52596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jugalkishore Stlt'af\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDasJ.\n\n1955\n\n7¥galkishore_ Saaf."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54421, "end_char": 54445, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Robert P. Collier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55506, "end_char": 55523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "probably traceable to the observations of Sir Robert P. Collier who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in Abedoonissa Khatoon v. 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Ameeroonissa filed a suit for a declaration that Wajed was not the legitimate son of Wahed and for: setting aside the last mentioned order."}}, {"text": "L. R. 4 I. A. 66", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 56946, "end_char": 56962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jugalkishore Samf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 56995, "end_char": 57033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\n\"1955\n\nJugalkishore Samf\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nDas J\n\n•955\n\nJugalkishOf'e Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. 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R. 8 I.A. 65", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 61228, "end_char": 61243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62006, "end_char": 62033, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mukherji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67098, "end_char": 67106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second proposition which appears to be founded on the observations of Mukherji, J., in Mathurapore Zamindary\n\nCo.'s case (supra) I do not see why the equitable principle may be relied on only in the case of a transfer by trustees to cestui que trust.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea"}}, {"text": "Mathurapore Zamindary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67115, "end_char": 67136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second proposition which appears to be founded on the observations of Mukherji, J., in Mathurapore Zamindary\n\nCo.'s case (supra) I do not see why the equitable principle may be relied on only in the case of a transfer by trustees to cestui que trust."}}, {"text": "Pandrang Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68461, "end_char": 68473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pandrang Rao, J. said, at p. 544 :-\n\n\"It appears to us that the words 'operation of law' cannot apply to a case where a person ha~ become the owner of a decree by some transaction inter vivas."}}, {"text": "Jugalkishore Sara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 70001, "end_char": 70018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jugalkishore Sara v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "Mahadeo 'Baburao Halbe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71982, "end_char": 72004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was aiso held in a number -,)f .c:ises .including Mahadeo 'Baburao Halbe's case (.<upra) and .Finn Kusha!das 'Leklzraj v. Firm -Jhamandas Maherchandani{' )."}}, {"text": ".Finn Kusha!das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72025, "end_char": 72040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was aiso held in a number -,)f .c:ises .including Mahadeo 'Baburao Halbe's case (.<upra) and .Finn Kusha!das 'Leklzraj v. 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Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "Section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75419, "end_char": 75430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75434, "end_char": 75461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76261, "end_char": 76272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76619, "end_char": 76630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77725, "end_char": 77736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78035, "end_char": 78046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78794, "end_char": 78805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79106, "end_char": 79118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79827, "end_char": 79851, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82331, "end_char": 82342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83186, "end_char": 83197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83200, "end_char": 83210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83214, "end_char": 83241, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83907, "end_char": 83917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86340, "end_char": 86367, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "2nd August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86763, "end_char": 86779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the partners of Habib & Sons were declared evacuees and by his order dated the 2nd August, 1950 the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bombay confirmed the transaction of transfer of the business of Habib & Sons to the Respondents as evidenced by the agreement dated the 7th February, 1949."}}, {"text": "11th December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87074, "end_char": 87093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A communication to that effect was addressed by the Custodian to a Director of the Respondents on the 11th December, 1950."}}, {"text": "Raw Cotton ca. 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Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 91785, "end_char": 91804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton 'Co. Ltd.\n\n Bhagwati J.\n\nProvided that, where .the decree ................. .", "canonical_name": "Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91806, "end_char": 91814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nJugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton 'Co. 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Barna Kumari Debi(') and the High Court of' Madras ."}}, {"text": "High Court of' Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 95142, "end_char": 95163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Calcutta also applied the same principle in Purna Chandra Bhowmik v. 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Courts of Madras and Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 106330, "end_char": 106366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The line of decisions of the High Court of Bombay beginning with Purmana11ddas /ivandas v. Vallabdas 'Wallji(') and ending with Chimanlal Hargovinddas v.\n\nGulamnabi(') importing the equitable principle above enunciated therefore appears to me to be more in consohance with law and equity than the strict and narrow interpretation put on the words \"where a decree ............ is transferred by assignment in writing\" by the High ."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106531, "end_char": 106558, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107792, "end_char": 107801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 107809, "end_char": 107833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108237, "end_char": 108248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109138, "end_char": 109147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110960, "end_char": 110987, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111336, "end_char": 111347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111828, "end_char": 111855, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "11th May, 1870", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 112026, "end_char": 112040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This aspect could not be considered by the High\n\n...\n\nCourt of Bombay in Purmananddas- /ivandas v: Vallabdas Wallji(1) because the assignment there was executed on the 11th May, 1870, i.e. before the enactment of the Transfer of Property Act in 1882."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112075, "end_char": 112099, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112292, "end_char": 112303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112307, "end_char": 112334, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112458, "end_char": 112463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt was also not considered by the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Gulamnabi(2) nor by Dixit, J. or by the Division Bench in the present case.", "canonical_name": "Dixit"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 112518, "end_char": 112537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Patna in Thakuri Cope and Others v. Mokhtar Ahmad & An- -0ther( 3) , went very near it when it observed that all that was transferred was an actionable claim, but did not work out the consequences thereof and its reasoning was deflected by the consideration of the equitable principles and the applicability thereof while construing the provisions of Order XXI, rule 16 of the Code of C!vil Procedure."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113209, "end_char": 113218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113226, "end_char": 113250, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113778, "end_char": 113805, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114231, "end_char": 114238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwahJ.\n\nMr. Umrigar, learned counsel for the Respondents; further urged that even if the Respondents were not entitled to the benefit of Order XX!,"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114378, "end_char": 114405, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114618, "end_char": 114629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114633, "end_char": 114660, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115363, "end_char": 115390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116418, "end_char": 116429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116499, "end_char": 116526, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116685, "end_char": 116712, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116748, "end_char": 116759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High\n\nCourt of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 116947, "end_char": 116971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed in support of this contention on a decision of the High Court of Patna in Thakuri Gope and others v. Mokhtar Ahmad and another( 1 ) and another decision of the High\n\nCourt of Allahabad in Shib Charan Das v.\n\nRam Chander & Others(2)."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117606, "end_char": 117633, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117736, "end_char": 117747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117986, "end_char": 118013, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118130, "end_char": 118141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jugalkishore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 118494, "end_char": 118506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195:,\n\nJugalkishore S•, a.f\n\nRaw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ\n\n•955\n\nJugdlkislzore Saraf\n\nRaw Catton Co. Ltd.\n\nBagwatiJ.\n\n11122 [1!955]\n\nrule .Hi' of, the• C0de ; of 1Ci, vil , ProGedµre they p; iµJd .certainly under ; the. ,", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "Baijnath . Ramchander \"\" Binjraj foowarmal Batia.& Co", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 120455, "end_char": 120508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Baijnath ."}}, {"text": "High\n\nCourt <Gf Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 122178, "end_char": 122200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "far as the two decisions of the High\n\nCourt <Gf Bombay in Baijnath Ramchander v.. Binjnzj Joowarmal Batia & Co.(1) and Krishna Govind Patil v.\n\nMoolchand Keshavchand Gujar( 2) .decide anything to the .contrary they are not .correct."}}, {"text": "Rajadhyaksha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122529, "end_char": 122541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .position was\n\nclarified by a later decision of the High Court of Bombay in Bhagwant Balajirao and -Others v .. Rajaram Sajnaji & Others(3) where Rajadhyaksha and Macklin, JJ."}}, {"text": "Macklin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122546, "end_char": 122553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .position was\n\nclarified by a later decision of the High Court of Bombay in Bhagwant Balajirao and -Others v .. Rajaram Sajnaji & Others(3) where Rajadhyaksha and Macklin, JJ."}}, {"text": "Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 123435, "end_char": 123455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Sartif\n\nv.; :Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\n'B, hagwatiJ.\n\n:JugalkishMC sartfJ\n\nv.: Raw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati ],\n\napplication for execution :in the present case ·.was defective appears to have some foundation.: •", "canonical_name": "Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd."}}, {"text": "JugalkishMC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 123473, "end_char": 123484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Sartif\n\nv.; :Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\n'B, hagwatiJ.\n\n:JugalkishMC sartfJ\n\nv.: Raw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati ],\n\napplication for execution :in the present case ·.was defective appears to have some foundation.: •", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "Raw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 123497, "end_char": 123517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Sartif\n\nv.; :Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\n'B, hagwatiJ.\n\n:JugalkishMC sartfJ\n\nv.: Raw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati ],\n\napplication for execution :in the present case ·.was defective appears to have some foundation.: •", "canonical_name": "Raw Catton\n\nCo. Ltd."}}, {"text": "27th March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 126196, "end_char": 126212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27th March, 1952 however a further application for ."}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126982, "end_char": 126986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IMAM J.-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments of my learned brethren.", "canonical_name": "IMAM JJ."}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127217, "end_char": 127228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127232, "end_char": 127259, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jugalkishore Sarqf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127785, "end_char": 127803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document, however, neither in terms, nor by any reasonable inter-\n\n1955\n\nJugalkishore Sarqf\n\ny., Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n142U:\n\n, ' SUPREl\\IE .COURT REPORTS [1955]'\n\n., .'. ' . . . ' . . \\ . . . . .", "canonical_name": "Jugalkishore Saraf\n\nRaw Cotton\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nBhagwati]"}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127830, "end_char": 127840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document, however, neither in terms, nor by any reasonable inter-\n\n1955\n\nJugalkishore Sarqf\n\ny., Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n142U:\n\n, ' SUPREl\\IE .COURT REPORTS [1955]'\n\n., .'. ' . . . ' . . \\ . . . . .", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Ha.bib & Sons", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 128012, "end_char": 128025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "alkishores~,;1 _decree which Ha.bib & Sons may obtain in the fu.ture."}}, {"text": "cankaw Cotton", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 128110, "end_char": 128123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cankaw Cotton • not claim to be a transferee of the decree; which was Co.Lta.' \\"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128309, "end_char": 128336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order XXI of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128347, "end_char": 128368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129575, "end_char": 129578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree with my learned brother Das, J., that the pro• visions of Order XXI, rule 16 contemplate the actual transfer by an assignment in writing of a decree after it' is passed and that while a transfer of or an agreement to transfer a decree that may be passed in future may; in equity, entitle the intending transferee to claim."}}, {"text": "SHIVNANDAN SHARl\\IA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 130759, "end_char": 130778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIVNANDAN SHARl\\IA\n\n."}}, {"text": "PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 130790, "end_char": 130814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD.· ·"}}, {"text": "JAG~NNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130842, "end_char": 130855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ViviA:N Bos~, JAG~NNADHADAS and SINIIA JJ.]. -. ' . -"}}, {"text": "SINIIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130860, "end_char": 130866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ViviA:N Bos~, JAG~NNADHADAS and SINIIA JJ.]. -. ' . -"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1427_1444_EN", "year": 1955, "text": ". '\n\n! 't\n\nS.C~R ..\n\nSUPREllIE COURT REPORTS 1427\n\nand of the Calcutta High Court in. 11Iathurapore 19;5 Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Bhasaram lllandal(') and lk\"-h- 5 ·\n\n/ Prabashinee Debi v. Rasiklal Banerji(') are correct. Juga '' v\":'. ara As at present advised, I would like to express no RawC-Otton opinion as to whether the expression \"by operation Co. Ud. of law\" can be given the interpretation suggested by my learned brother Das, J., as it is uiinecessary to do so in the present appeal. . · · · · · ·. Appeal di;\"inissed.\n\nSHIVNANDAN SHARl\\IA\n\n. v.\n\nTHE PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD.· ·\n\n- -- . [ViviA:N Bos~, JAG~NNADHADAS and SINIIA JJ.]. -. ' . - Master and servant-Banker-Agreement .. between Bank and -\n\nTreasUrers~Treasurers, wheth'e:Y sirvantS or independent - contractors -Cashier appointed by Treasitrer-Whether servant of the Bank.\n\n. ..\n\nI . • ' • • l _ . . , {. • l . The appellant was appoiµted head. cashier in one of the branches of the .respondent Ballk by,'tbe Tfeasurers who .wer_e ~D. charge Qfh6 Cash Department of the Bank by virtue of an agreeffient between them .. The question arose as to whetner the appellant' was' an•: em p!oyee of the Bank. •. ' · . 1 Held, (i) that the tes oi the greeent ciearly showecl that the Treasurers were servants ofthe Bank and not fodependent con~ tractors; and tha~ 1 • 1 t :-\" ... ,\n\n(ii) as the direction and control of the appellant ancl of the ministerial staff in charge of tlie Cash Departl!lent of the Bank was ·entirely vested.in:the Bank, the appellanwas an.employee of the Bank. ... . , , . .... . t · , .\n\nIf a ma.\"sier employ\"s a srvant and autho.rizes hiin-to eploya number of persons to do a. particular job and -to guarantee_the_ii fide~ lity and efficiency for a cash consideration, the employe8s thUS appointed by the servant would be, equally with the employer, servants\n\nof the master. ... i . ! · ;\n\nTh.e question a3 to whose employe0 a parlicUlar : person'; hi h~~ to be determined with reference to tb6 facts and( circUmstarices 'of each individual case, and among the many sts by which to asr tain who is the employer, the most satisfactory one is to ask who fa entitled to tell the employee the way in which ha is to .do the work upon which he is enga:; ed. · . :\n\n. (1) [192!] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 703.\n\n(2) [1931] I.L.R. 59 Cal. 297.\n\nImamJ.\n\nMarch 15\n\n195L\n\nShicnandan\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe .P-unjab National Barik Ltd.\n\n1428 SUPREME :coURT:REPORTS ,. [1955] ·\n\n' Don6van -V. lAing, Wharton'&·· Down,.COnitruction Syndicate ([1893] 1 Q.B.D. 629) and Mersey.Pocks & Harbour }3oard v . . r; ogginr & Griffit~ (Liverpool) Ltd. (l1947] A.C.I.), referred to. ·\n\n C1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1cnoN : Civil .. Appeal No. 207 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment ' and Order dated the 31st day of August 1953 of the La' bour Appellate Tribunal of India; Lucknow, rn Appeal No. III-57 ot 1953.\n\nA. S. R. Chari (Ba\";;; a-Shzv Charan Singh and M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him), for the appellant.\n\nAchhru Ram (Naunit Lal, with him), for the re'- ~~= . . 1955.\n\nMarch 15.\n\nThe Judgment . of the Court was delivered by\n\nS1NHA.\n\nJ.'-This is an appeal. by special leave against the orders of · the Lucknow Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India (hereinafter ·.to be referred to as \"The Appellate Tribunal\") dated the . 31st August 1953, setting aside the award dated the 13th October 1952 made by . the Chairman, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta (herein after to be referred to as \"The Tribunal\") reinstating 'ihe appellant as the head cashier. with , back salarv under the Punjab National Bank (hereinafter called ... The Bank\"). .. .\n\nThe facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated. The appellant started his service as the head cashier in the Una Branch of the Bank on the 18th June 1949. The Cash Department of the Bank is in charge of Treasurers. The relation between the Bank and the Treasurers . is evidenced by ail agreement d3ted\n\nthe 1st May 1944 (Ex. 1) which will be noticed in detail hereinafter~ That was an agreertrent between the Bank ·'and \"Messrs Rai Bahadur Karam ' Chand Puri & Bros\". That firm was appointed the Tr.casurers at the head office .of the Bank -and other places iri and outside the Punjah. On the 28th Septemhcr-1951 the District Manager of the Northern Circle of the Bank wrote a letter (Ex. 4) to the Treasurers bforming\n\n.• v'\n\n- '\n\n...\n\nthem that it had been decided to close the Una office of the B, mk with effect from the dose ot business on the 3rd November 1951.\n\nIn pursuance of that letter the Treasurers intimated by a letter . dated 2nd October 1951 enclosing a copy of Ex. 4 to the . appellant that the l.Tna Branch of the Bank will .ceae to function .from the close of business on the 3rd November 1951 and that . his services will not be required after that date.\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Employees' Union (P_unjab) took .. up .the cause of the appellant . as .also that of .other employees . and made representations to the Government of India. . The Government of India by a notification No. SR0-432\n\ndated the 8th March 1952 published in the Gazette of India, Part II-Sec .. 3, in exercise of !ts .powers _under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) referred . the . industrial dispute between . the Bank and its workmen named in . schedule : 2. (concerning . workers dismissed) and schedule 3 (relating to workers transferred) for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta con_. stituted under section 7 of the Act. Schedule 1 in so far as it is necessary for purposes of this .case contains the following points of disp1Jte between the employer and the workmen :.....::. . . . . \"L . Wrongful dismissal of the .workmen mentioned iii. schedule II and their reinstatement.\n\n\"2.\n\nIn .the event of any order for reinstatement payment of wages and other allowances from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement\" .. l The appellant is No. 5 in schedule 2 aforesaid. The Tribunal gave its award on the 13th October 1952 in respect of a number of employees whose . cases were actually .in controversy before it. It is only necessary to refer to the award in so far as it concerned the appellant. After overruling the preliminary objec• tion of the Bank .that the Union had no locus standi to represent the appellant the Tribunal' formulated the following point for its decision :- .\n\n\"On merits themain point . involved . is . as . to whether the services of an cmployey of ... the Cash\n\nShirml ur!rm\n\nShmmn\n\n'\\(· The Punjab\n\national B. nk Ltd ..\n\nSinhr .:I\n\n1430 : SUPREl\\IE.COUR'f REPORTS [1955]\n\nf9ss Departnien t can be terinliia ted on a change made in .the services oftheContractor Cashier\".\n\nShi'flnandais ' - Sharma 'It answered this point in these words:-\n\nv. •: .: \"This point has been agitated in more than one The Punjab - case and I have also held in Reference No. 3 of 1951 Nati<mazBankI.td •. Ch . . f I d t . 1 T \"b I (P N B . k d\" _ _ as _ airman o n us na n una . . . an is-\n\nSinha J; pute) relating to 5 cashiers that the employees of the .--- Cash Department are the employees of the Bank and not the. nominees of the Contractor Cashiers so far service conditions are concerned, and I think it will serve no useful purpose to discuss all the legal prece- dents cited, more especially when the point has been .set at rest by their Lordships of. the Supreme Court\n\nin Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1952 in tlie matter of United .Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Secretary, U. P. Bank Employees' Union and Others. I am of the opinion that the dismissal of Shi-i Sharma was wrongful and liable to be set aside.·· Now the normal remedy is reinstatement and I have no hesitation in allowing the same: He will also be paid his back salary and allO\\\".ance from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstate- 'ment\". •-. \\Vhatever may be the merits of the answer given • to the question propounded by the Tribunal, there is no doubt that the question posed had been wrongly framed. The discharge' or dismissal of the appellant had nothing to do with the change in the personnel ofthe Treasurers. The appellant's services were dispensed with on the ground that the Una Branch where he was employed as head cashier being an un- .ecc; momic unit had to be closed and that therefore the\n\n, appellant's services_were no more required.. TJ.ic rcs- .pondent's case appears to have been. that the firm known as l\\Iessrs R. B. Karam Chand Puri & Bros . . have been contractors for the Cash Department of the _Bank at the head office and some of the other offices in the Punjab and beyond; that from time to tim.e agreements were executed between the Bank and the aforesaid firm; that the last agreement was executed on the 1st l\\Iay 1954 (Ex. I); that . the appellant .according to the respondent-Bank was the nominee of the said firm, and that his services had been dispensed\n\n1955\n\ns ivnandan\n\nSharma\n\nv. 1\"he Punjab\n\n~Y tional Ba_nk Ltdi\n\ns_inha J.\n\nSUP-REME CQUR'F REPORTS [1.955]\n\naward: hy the .Tribunal was,. in the. result, set:::aside , and the .Bank?s appeal ._allowed.,• , . , , ; The appellant in \"this: Courtthrough his • counsel Shri 'Chari,- argued that' the Appellate Tribunal had\n\nmisinter-preted the provisions of the. Industtial Disputes -Act in coming, to the conclusion that the Tribunal had nojurisdiction to entertain the-dispute simply, on the . ground that one of the parties to the: dispute had successfully denied .. the relationship; of : employer and employee; \"that the Appellate Tribunal misconceived its functions- -by basing its ; findings: .on the interpretation of the: :written agreement . between the Bank and its Treasurers ; when - it :should. have gone inro all the relevant .facts to -determine the substance oi. the matter; -and finally; :rhat: the Appellate Tribunal mlsdiretted. itself on<the question of the interpretation of the agreement for coming : to the conclusion that the appellant was not :an employee of the Bank but was a nom'inee' of' the \"Treasurers\"; It' was further argued on behalf· of -the 'appellant tliat •the :Tribunal having based • its dicisicin on its ' previous award dated the 16th September . 1952 in Reference No ... 3 of 1951 between' •persons 'IIlOre or less -in the same .. position as the•• appellant•· and the respondent-Bank, . 'in the background of the decision• of the previous Tribunals,· e.g., the award' ' of the Conciliation Board preside-cl over by Mr. Justice ' Bind Basni Prasad of the Allahabad High Court,· the awardby the Tribunal presided over by Mr. K, C. Sen. and the award of the All India Ii:tdustrial Tribunal . (Bank Disputes);• presided over by Sri\n\nS. Panchapagesa Sastri and the award dated the 24th March 1951 in Reference No: 20, the award of the Tribuna} was really final: The -argument was that the award of the Tribunal was . based: on considerations :of facts ' and · c'ircurnstarices disclosed in those earlier awards· to: which the Bank and': its cashiers and other employees : employed in the Cash Department were parties:· It was thus a •final finding of fact which was not open 'to appeal.:before the Appellate Tribunal.\n\nIt. was therefore contended' that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to etitertain the appeal . and . to reverse the award of the Tribunal. \"'\n\nI ;\n\nOn behalf of the respondent-Bank it was contended that no specific grounds had been taken either before the Appellate Tribunal or in the memorandum of appeal to this Court that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction on the ground now taken by the appellant in this Court, nor was that ground taken in the statement of case. On merits it was .contended by the respondent's counsel that the Tribunal is as much bound by the rules of evidence and procedure as any other Tribunal and as the Tribunal had not addressed itself to the question whether the cashier-appellant was an employee of the Bank, the question was open before the Appellate Tribunal which was competent to pronounce -on that basic question. Finally it was argued that on a true construction of the provisions of the agreement (Ex. I) this Court should accept the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the appellant was not an employee of the Bank and that on that account the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant ahy relief to the . appellant. . ·\n\nOn behalf of the respondent the case was practically rested on the construction of the agreement (Ex. 1).\n\nWith reference to the terms of the agreement . the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the Treasurers . were not servants or employees of the Bank but were \"independent contractors\" and that the appellant and other employees in the Cash Department having been nominees . of the \"independent contractors\", there could not be any relation of employer and employee between the Bank and the appellant.\n\nIt is therefore necessary to examine in some detail the terms of the agreement aforesaid. We set out below, underlining important words, the terms of the agreement in so far as they are relevant for the determination of the true relation between the Bank and the Treasurers. Though this agreement is dated the 1st May 1944, cl. (1) provides that it will be deemed to have commenced and come into force from the 15th March 1942, the date of the death of R. B. Karam Chand Puri and will take the place of the previous agreement dated the 26th July 1941, thus maintain. ing the .continuity of the relationship between the\n\nShivnandarr\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab National Bank [, t,/\n\nSinha J.\n\n1434 SUPREl\\IE.COURT REPORTS [1955)\n\n' - t9ss Bank and the Tr!lasurers'. Theagreement provides that the Tceasurers.sbal.l diligently and 'aith'ully serve Shivnandan J' \"J Sharma the Bank at the Head Office and its various offices\n\nT. mentioned in schedule A attached to and forming part The Punjab of the agreement and at 9ther offices where they may NationalBankUa. hereafter be appointed treasurers and shall in all res-\n\nSi,.haJ. _ pects diligently and faithfully obey and observe all lawful orders and instructions of_tbe Bank or the person placed by the Bank in authority over them in rela~ tion to the due discharge of their duties as Treasurers.\n\nThe Treasurers in addition to the duties, liabilities and responsibilities devolving upon them by virtue of the provisions oftbe agreement shall also be liable to perform such duties and discharge such responsibili~ ties as by custom usually devolve on treasurers in the employ of a bank._ The Treasurers shall be -paid_ for their services a remuneration as µientioned in schedule A aforesaid or such remuneration as the General Board of Directors of the Bank may de'termine from time to time. Out of the remuneration paid to tbeni by the Bank the Treasurers shall pay salaries to their nominees employed by them for performing the duties of. a cashier in the Bank on their behalf or other functionaries of a similar nature. The salaries of such nominees employed by them will be fixed by the Treasurers themselves but the same will be subjeet to the approval of the Bank. The remuneration of the Treasurers will-.. be tbenet amount which will-be left to them after paying salaries to their nominees employed by them for working as cashiers, etc. The Treasurers themselves will not be entitled to any kind of allowances besides the net remuneration as aforesaid but their nominees or working cashiers will be entitled to allowances which the authorities of the Bank may sanction for members of . the staff from (ime to time. The Treasurers -shall employ the number of men at each office as mentioned iri schedule A.aforesaid. The Board of Directors shall have the power to increase or decrease the number of their nominees for any particular office and the amount of rem unera ti on fixed for that office. The Trea- . surers.' shall be responsible for the due safety, both within and outside the premises of the B:mk at any\n\ns:c.R. :SUPREME •COURTiREP, OR'fS . 1435\n\n:Office pfacoo 1:t!llde; r their charge, of' all mOfley, , •specie,\n\nornaments, .. bullion, •cash, etc. :and \"; cif other aluable documents received by them for :arid . on behalf. of the Bank .or from the 'Bank and shall be answerable to the Bank for all fosses occurring either inadvertently or :by or through the .negligence .or misconduct of the Treasurers . or :any of their nominees .. The Treasurers shall be entitled to resign the services of the Bank by •giving three calendar months' notice to the Bank.\n\nThe Bank shall also be entitled to dispense with the Treasurers' .services on giving three . months' notice.\n\nIn case of gross :negligence or misconduct or of any fraud, .misappropriation or embezzlement by the Treasurers or any of the nominees in the discharge of .their duties as such Treasurers, no notice shall be\n\nnecessary and the Bank shall have the right to dispense with their services forthwith. The Bank shall have the right to take the Treasurers into the servioe of the Bank after settlement of remuneration with :the Treasurers at any other office or offices of the Bank. The Treasurers and their nominees shall obey all the orders, rules and .regulations prescribed by the Ban•k with regard to the discharge of their duties by the cashiers :as well as with regard to the amount of balance they are allowed to keep with .them. It shall be the duty .of the cashiers to inform the manager of the Bank as soon as .the balance in hand exceeds the prescribed limit .and to ask for orders on the point. 'The Treasurers shall not engage any person as their assistant or peon about whose character, conduct or reliability the manager of the Board of Directors of the Bank may . have any objection. The Treasurers shall also arrange that no person under employment absents himself from duty withol.lt the written permission of .the manager . for the time being. If any such employee is absent without leave, or , he is turned out on the objection of. the , Board or the . Managr, the Treasurers shall. forth'Yith . app9int a substitute in his place.\n\nThe Treasurers shall be responsible for.:. the .1 acts and defaµlts .of all . their . n0mi1,1ees.\n\nThe .. Treasurers and , thefr nominees .. shall be.·:entitled to travelling allotJ!ancf] .according to . .rates. s~<; tioned ., py the , Board\n\n~9li5\n\n.. Shivnandan\n\n.ShlJTfllfl\n\nV.\n\nT:he Pu, Yab .Jlofltional Bank J. td,\n\nSinha J.\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma\n\n\"· The Pury'iih National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha ].\n\nof Directors of' the Bank. The Treasurers_ have de- . posited security of the value of Rs. 15,000/- on which they shall be entitled to receive interest at the rate of 3! per cent. per annum. As a further security for the due performance of the terms and .conditions of the agreement as -a cover for loss that may be caused to the Bank by. any act or omission of themselves or any one of their nominees, the Treasurers hypothecated properties as per . schedule C attached . to and forming part of the agreement. Schedule A aforesaid contains the names of the offices, the monthly remuneration of the Treasurers in respect of each one of those offices separately, net savings of the Treasurers after paying the salaries of the total number of men . including cashiers, etc., as stated against each one of the offices.\n\nApart from the terms set out above bearing on the relation between the Bank and the Treasurers, some of which apply equally to their nominees, the following terms of the agreement bear directly on the relation between the nominees of the Treasurers, like the appellant, and the Bank. In this connection the agreement provides that the Board of Directors shall have the power to increase or decrease the number of the Treasurers' nominees for any particular office and the amount of remuneration fixed for that office.\n\nSuch nominees shall be entitled as servants of the Bank to any bonus which may from time to time be declared for the members of the staff. The bonus of the Treasurers shall be limited to the amount of their own net remuneration and no further. They shall not be entitled to any bonus to which their cashiers are not eligible under the rules of the Bank. The nominees of the Treasurers shall be entitled to participate as ordinary members of the staff in the provident fund constituted by the Bank. Such nominees shall also be entitled to travelling allowance according to rates sanctioned by the Board of Directors of the Bank whenever they are required to go to out-stations on bank business.\n\nFrom the terms of the agreement. aforesaid set out above almost verbatim omitting such clauses and words as 'are not relevant to this case, it will appear\n\n\\ ·•\n\n-1,\n\nthat the Treasurers are under the employment of the Bank on a monthly basis for an indefinite term, that is to say, until such time as either party to the agreement terminated it in accordance with the terms quoted above. They are under the complete control and direction of the Bank through its manager or other functionaries. The Treasurers have to take their orders from day to day as regards the cash balance or other cognate matters relating to the safe custody of cash, valuable documents, etc. belonging to the Bank or its constituents. The Treasurers receive in respect of each office under their charge a certain named sum out of which they have to pay the salary of a stated number of their assistants who may be head cashiers or cashiers or assistant cashiers and other such functionaries. They are entitled to receive bonus on the net amount secured to them as their remuneration, being the lump sum fixed in respect of each office, minus the salary of the assistants. It is true that these Treasurrs are not and cannot be expected to be personally present to discharge their onerous duties at each one of the large number of offices spread over the Punjab and outside. Naturally they had to be authorized to engage head cashiers, cashiers, or assistant cashiers in respect of each of the offices placed in their charge. They had to guarantee the fidelity of the persons so employed as their assistants. Those assistants had to be persons in whose reliability, honesty and efficiency both the Bank and the Treasurers had confidence. The Treasurers have the right to nominate those assistants but the Bank had the final words in the choice. The Bank Manager has complete control over such nominees in the matter of leave of absence, discipline and conduct in the discharge of their duties as assistants managing the cash and other valuables in the custody of the Bank. From the very nature of things it had to be a dual control in the sense that the Treasurers had to nominate the assistants who are to discharge those responsible functions in connection with cash and other valuables of the Bank and the Bank could not abdicate its powers of full control over the day to day working ot\n\n17-90 S. C. India/59\n\n195.S\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nShiunandatt\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab Jfational Bank Ltd.\n\nI Sinh~ ].\n\nthe Cash Department. The nominees of the Treasurers are treated on the same footing as the other servants of the Bank in the matter of bonus, travelling allowanc.e and provident fund, etc. It is true those nominees are. to be paid by the Treasurers but it is out of the. money provided by the Bank.\n\nIt is not always. easy to determine.whether the relation between two parties, in the present case of the Treasurers vis-a-vis the Bank, is that ' of servants to a master or of independent contractors who have undertaken to do a particular job for their employer.\n\nThe question has generally arisen in connection with the determination of vicarious liability of an employer in respect of .acts done by his agent (using a neutral word which includes an independent contractor as also a servant). The distinction between a servant and an independent contractor has been the subject matter of a large volume of case-law from which the text-book writers on torts have attempted to lay down some general tests. For example, in Pollock's Law. of Torts,*. the distinction has thus been brought out:\n\n\"A master is one who not only prescribes to the workman the end of his work, but directs or at any\n\nmoip.ent may direct the means also, or, as it has been put, 'retains the power of controlling the work', a servant is a person subject to the command of his master as to the manner in which he shall do his work .... An independent contractor is one who undertakes to produce a given result but so that in the actual execution of the work he :is not under the order or control of the person for whom he does it, and may use his own discretion in things not specified beforehand ................ \".\n\nClerk & Lindsell on Torts (11th Edn.) at p. 135 have adopted the description of an independent contractor given by Pollock as quoted above.\n\nIn the 11th Edn. of Salmond's Treatise on the Law of Torts, the same distinction has been clearly indicated in the following passage a~ p. 98:-\n\n- *Pages 62 & 63 of Pollock on Torts, 15th Edn.\n\n.._,\n\n\"What then, . is the test of . this distinction between a . servant and an independent . contractor? The test IS the existence of a right of control .over the agent m respect of the manner in which his work is to be .done. A . servant is an agent who works under the supervision and direction of his employer; an independent contractor IS one who IS his own master.\n\nA servant IS a person engaged to obey his employer's 9rders from time to time; an independent contractor is a person engaged to do certain work, but to exercise his own discretion as to the mode and\n\ntime of doing it-he IS bound by his contract, but not by his employer's orders\".\n\nThose learned authors have discussed m great detail cases illustrative of those distinctions, indicating the circumstances in which the general rule has been applied to individual cases with such modifications as the facts and circumstances of a particular case required. We are here not concerned with those mce distinctions which have been drawn m connection with the rule of vicanous liability in torts. We are here concerned only with the question how far the test laid down by the standard authors as' quoted above can be applied to determine the present controversy whether the Treasurers of the Bank were its servants as contended on behalf of the appellant or independent contractors as claimed on behalf of the respondent-Bank. The agreement between the parties, as summarised above, IS a composite transaction constituting the Treasurers agents of the Bank, the former agreemg to indemnify the latter against any los occasioned to the Bank due to the lack of fidelity and efficiency of the ministerial staff entrusted with the charge of the Bank's cash and valuable documents.\n\nThe Treasurers have been charged with the duty of nominating their assistants who are to be responsible m their day to day work to the Bank which all the time has full control over them in the matter of their leave of absence, as to how they shall keep the cash and other valuables and as to how they shall be under the general direcion of the Bank's manager or some\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha ].\n\nShiv1Uf1J.{/O.n\n\nSha,.ma\n\nThe Punjab.\n\nNational Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nother functionary who may be nominated by the Bank to supervise the work of the Cash Department.\n\nThe Bank makes itself answerable to the employees thus appointed by the Treasurers with the concurnonce of the Bank for their bonus, provident fund and travelling allowance. For those purposes these assistants are to be on the same footing as the other employees of the Bank.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the respondent Bank that its agreement with the Treasurers shows that the latter had the fullest responsibility for the appointment and dismissal and payment of salary of the employees in charge of the Cash Department of the Bank and that therefore the Treasurers could not but be independent contractors.\n\nIt has already been noticed that the appointment of such assistants as are entrusted with the work of the Cash Department is not under the absolute power of the Treasurers.\n\nThe appointment has to be approved by the Bank and the Treasurers cannot continue to employ those workmen in whose fidelity and efficiency the Bank has no confidence.\n\nHence both in the matter of appointment and dismissal of the employees the Bank reserves to itself the power to give direction to the Treasurers. Similarly in the matter of the payment of salary the money comes out o.f the coffers of the Bank, though it may be paid by the hand of the Treasurers. In this connection it was contended on behal£ of the appellant that payment of salary of the employees in the Cash Department is made through the Bank itself but we have no tangible evidence in this case beyond the bare assl!rtiOn at the Bar. But, in our opinion, the situation in respect of the appointment, dismissal and payment of salary of the employees of the Cash Department is analogous to that of the employees of a particular department of Government, in which appointment and dismissal of ministerial staff may rest with an authority so empowered by the head of the department. Payment of salary may also be made by the appointing authority but the money comes out of the Government treasury. In those Circumstances, can it be rightly asserted that\n\n' ·-\n\nthose employees are not the servants of Government?\n\nThe analogy may not be perfect, because, in the present case, the appointment and dismissal of the employees of the Cash Department IS the joint responsibility of the Bank and its Treasurers. It has got to be so because the Treasurers are the guarantors of the fidelity and efficiency of the employees and the Bank has to exercise complete control over the day to day discharge of their functions because it Is the Bank which is vitally and immediately concerned with the efficient and honest discharge of the duties of the assistants in the Cash Department, the efficient running of which is the most important of a bank's functions.\n\nIt will further be noticed with reference to the terms of the agreement set out above that whereas the Treasurers and their nominees have to take their orders from the Bank Manager or other such functionary, there Is no specific provision that those nommees shall discharge their day to day functions under the direct control of the Treasurers or that they will be subject to the immediate control of the Treasurers m the discharge of their daily duties and in the matter of the grant of leave of absence. There\n\nrnuld not be such a provision, as a dual control of that kind in the daily work of the employees would lead to a great deal of confusion and lack of discipline amongst the ministerial staff.\n\nThe employees of the Cash Departmen~ have of necessity to be under the direct control of the Bank Manager or of some ::>ther functionary appointed by the Bank. It is the Bank which has undertaken the responsibility m the matter of their pay and prospects m the service and naturally therefore, such employees, even as other employees of the Bank, have -to take their orders from the Bank. It must therefore be held that the Treasurers are the servants of the Bank and that their nominees must equally be so.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal held that on a reading as\n\n~ whole of the clauses of the agreement aforesaid the appellant was an employee of the Treasurers and not of the Bank. It did not address itself pointedly\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma\n\nThe !'u, Yab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nShivnandtu1\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha -J.\n\ni:o the question as to what was the exact relation between the Bank and the •Treasurers.\n\nIt did not also consider the question as tO what would be the position of ' the employees of the Cash· Department\n\nvis-a-vis the Bank if it were held that the Treasurers themselves were the servants : of the Bank and . not independent contractors.\n\nBefore the Appellate Tribunal 'both parties appear to have. concentrated their attention on the question as to whether the employees of the Cash· 'Department were . servants . of\" the Bank or of the Treasurers. In our opinion,. that was not a correct approach to. the determination of the controversy between the parties. ·. If the Treasurers' relation to the Bank was that of servants to a master, simply because the servants were authorized to appoint and dismiss the ministerial staff of the Cash Department would not make the employees in the Cash Department independent of the Bank. In that sittiation the ultimate employer would be the Bank through the agency of 'the Treasurers. jt was argued on' behalf of 'the respondent that even if it were held that ·the Treasurers were the servants of: the. Bank and . not independent contractcirs; the. legal position of the employees of the Cash Department vis-a-vis the Bank would be the same;· namely, that they will be in· law the :servants of the Treasurers. In our opinion, there is no substance 'in that contention. .If . a master employs' a servant and authorizes him to employa number of persons to do a particular job and to guarantee their fidelity and efficiency for a Tash consideration, the employees thus appointed by .the .. servant 'Wou!O'beequal!y•with the employer;: servants of the master. 'It is not -always correct to say that persons appointed and liable to be dismissed: by : an in dependent contractor can -in no circumstances •be . the employees of the third party. This would be ·· clear from the following observations of Lord Esher, M.R., in the case of Donovan v. Laing,' Wharton & -Down Construction Syndicate(1) :~ , . . . . . ,. \"It -is . true that .the defendants,. selected the man and paidhis.wages; and these are .circumstances which, if .nothing •else intervened;• wouldbe.strong'to. show (1) [18~3] t n. B. D629 at 632.\n\nthat he. was the servant of the defendants. So; indeed, he was as to a great many things; but as to the working of the crane he was no longer their servant, but bound to work under the orders of Jones & Co., and, if they saw the man misconducting. himself in working the crane or disobeying thei.r orders, they would . have a right to discharge him from that employment?'.\n\nThose observations have 'been approved in the latest decision of the House of Lords in the case of Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Goggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd.(1).\n\nThe House of Lords distingllished that ruling on facts but did not depart from the general rule laid down in the earlier decision that the determinative factor is as to which party had control . over the workers· as to how they would do their job from day to day. Lord Macmillan in his speech at p. 14 has observed as follows :- \"Many reported cases were cited to your Lordships but where, as all agree, the question in each case turns on its own circumstances, decisions in other cases are rather illustrative than determinative.\n\nSo far as attempts have been made to formulate a criterio:1 of general application, it cannot be said that these attempts have been very successful\".\n\nIt would thus appear that the question 4s to whose employee a particular person was has to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. . Lord Porter in the course of his speech in the reported case (supra) at p. 17 has observed as follows :-\n\n\"Many factors have a bearing on the result. . Who is paymaster, who can dismiss, how long the alternative service lasts, what machinery is employed, have all to be kepf in mind. The expressions used in any individual case must always be considered in regard to the subject matter under discussion but amongst the many· tests suggested I . -think that . the most satisfactory,· by which to ascertain who is the employer at any particular time, is to ask who is entitled to tell the _employee th.e way in which he is to do the work upon which he is engaged\" ..\n\n(1) [1947] A.C. I,\n\nShivnatrdan\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha :J.\n\n1955 Shivnandan\n\nS!iafrrid\n\nTi,, Punjqb National Bahk l.Jd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nMarch 15\n\nAs indicated above, in the present case the direction and control of the appellant and of the ministerial staif in charge of the Cash Department of the Bank was entirely vested in the Bank through its manager or other superior officer. We have therefore no hesitation in differing from the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal and in holding that the appellant was an employee of the Bank. That being so, the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to make the directions it did in respect of the appellant. The respondent did not at any stage of the proceedings challenge the orders of the Tribunal on its merits.\n\nThat conclusion being reached, there is no difficulty in upholding the orders of the Tribunal in respect of the appellant, It is therefore not necessary to pronounce upon the other points raised by the parties.\n\nThe appeal 1s accordingly allowed with costs throughout.\n\nBHIM SEN\n\nti.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nTHE STATE OF U.P.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAs and SINHA JJ. J\n\nU. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (U. P. Act XXVI of 1947), ss. 49 (1)(2)(4), 52, 55-Rule 84 framed by Stat< Government-Thef' of the value of Rs. J..().0_ committed by three accused-One of the accused belonging to Madhya Pradesh State-Panchayat Ada/at constituted under the provisions of s. 49 of the Act and Rule 84 framed there\n\nunder to try the present case-Whether could be properly constituted -Rule 84-W hether Intra vires-/urisdiction of ordinary courts-\n\nJJ/hether excluded-Bar under s. 55---Scope of.\n\nThree accused were c.onvicted by a Magistrate under s. 379 of the Indian Penal Code of the offence of theft of the value of Rs. 3 and sentenced to a fine 0£ . Rs. 25 /- each. The question for determination was whether te case should have been tried by a Panchayat Ada:lat cortstituted under the U. P. PanchaYat Raj Act,\n\n1947 and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try it. Two of the accused belonged to U.P. State and the third belonged to Madhya Pradesh State.\n\nSection 52( I) of the Act provides that certain specified offences (including the offence of theft when the value of stolen property does", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 81, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t\n\nS.C~R ..\n\nSUPREllIE COURT REPORTS 1427\n\nand of the Calcutta High Court in."}}, {"text": "SHIVNANDAN SHARl\\IA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 528, "end_char": 547, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIVNANDAN SHARl\\IA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 555, "end_char": 583, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": ".P-unjab National Barik Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2364, "end_char": 2392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ImamJ.\n\nMarch 15\n\n195L\n\nShicnandan\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe .P-unjab National Barik Ltd.\n\n1428 SUPREME :coURT:REPORTS ,. [", "canonical_name": ".P-unjab National Barik Ltd."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2869, "end_char": 2883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari (Ba\";;; a-Shzv Charan Singh and M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shzv Charan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2894, "end_char": 2911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari (Ba\";;; a-Shzv Charan Singh and M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. R. Krishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2916, "end_char": 2936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari (Ba\";;; a-Shzv Charan Singh and M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2969, "end_char": 2979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram (Naunit Lal, with him), for the re'- ~~= . ."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram (Naunit Lal, with him), for the re'- ~~= . ."}}, {"text": "S1N", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3089, "end_char": 3092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3389, "end_char": 3437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Chairman, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta (herein after to be referred to as \"The Tribunal\") reinstating 'ihe appellant as the head cashier."}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3566, "end_char": 3586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with , back salarv under the Punjab National Bank (hereinafter called ... The Bank\"). .. ."}}, {"text": "1st May 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3947, "end_char": 3959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is evidenced by ail agreement d3ted\n\nthe 1st May 1944 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Rai Bahadur Karam ' Chand Puri & Bros", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4068, "end_char": 4105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) which will be noticed in detail hereinafter~ That was an agreertrent between the Bank ·'and \"Messrs Rai Bahadur Karam ' Chand Puri & Bros\"."}}, {"text": "Punjah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4218, "end_char": 4224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That firm was appointed the Tr.casurers at the head office .of the Bank -and other places iri and outside the Punjah."}}, {"text": "28th Septemhcr-1951 the", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th Septemhcr-1951 the District Manager of the Northern Circle of the Bank wrote a letter (Ex."}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank Employees' Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4821, "end_char": 4858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab National Bank Employees' Union (P_unjab) took .. up .the cause of the appellant ."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4978, "end_char": 4997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and made representations to the Government of India. ."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5168, "end_char": 5178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5197, "end_char": 5221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "workers dismissed) and schedule 3 (relating to workers transferred) for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta con."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5506, "end_char": 5515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Schedule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "13th October 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6018, "end_char": 6035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal gave its award on the 13th October 1952 in respect of a number of employees whose ."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7009, "end_char": 7014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an is-\n\nSinha J; pute) relating to 5 cashiers that the employees of the .--- Cash Department are the employees of the Bank and not the.", "canonical_name": "Sinha"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7383, "end_char": 7396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Supreme Court\n\nin Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Shi-i Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7572, "end_char": 7584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am of the opinion that the dismissal of Shi-i Sharma was wrongful and liable to be set aside.··"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8572, "end_char": 8578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "have been contractors for the Cash Department of the Bank at the head office and some of the other offices in the Punjab and beyond; that from time to tim.e agreements were executed between the Bank and the aforesaid firm; that the last agreement was executed on the 1st l\\Iay 1954 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appellant .according to the respondent-Bank was the nominee of the said firm, and that his services had been dispensed\n\n1955\n\ns ivnandan\n\nSharma\n\nv. 1\"he Punjab\n\n~Y tional Ba_nk Ltdi\n\ns_inha J.\n\nSUP-REME CQUR'F REPORTS [1.955]\n\naward: hy the .Tribunal was,."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8914, "end_char": 8920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appellant .according to the respondent-Bank was the nominee of the said firm, and that his services had been dispensed\n\n1955\n\ns ivnandan\n\nSharma\n\nv. 1\"he Punjab\n\n~Y tional Ba_nk Ltdi\n\ns_inha J.\n\nSUP-REME CQUR'F REPORTS [1.955]\n\naward: hy the .Tribunal was,."}}, {"text": "Bind Basni Prasad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10450, "end_char": 10467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the background of the decision• of the previous Tribunals,· e.g., the award' ' of the Conciliation Board preside-cl over by Mr. Justice ' Bind Basni Prasad of the Allahabad High Court,· the awardby the Tribunal presided over by Mr. K, C. Sen. and the award of the All India Ii:tdustrial Tribunal . ("}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the background of the decision• of the previous Tribunals,· e.g., the award' ' of the Conciliation Board preside-cl over by Mr. Justice ' Bind Basni Prasad of the Allahabad High Court,· the awardby the Tribunal presided over by Mr. K, C. Sen. and the award of the All India Ii:tdustrial Tribunal . ("}}, {"text": "K, C. Sen.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10544, "end_char": 10554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the background of the decision• of the previous Tribunals,· e.g., the award' ' of the Conciliation Board preside-cl over by Mr. Justice ' Bind Basni Prasad of the Allahabad High Court,· the awardby the Tribunal presided over by Mr. K, C. Sen. and the award of the All India Ii:tdustrial Tribunal . ("}}, {"text": "S. Panchapagesa Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10650, "end_char": 10672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bank Disputes);• presided over by Sri\n\nS. Panchapagesa Sastri and the award dated the 24th March 1951 in Reference No: 20, the award of the Tribuna} was really final: The -argument was that the award of the Tribunal was ."}}, {"text": "R. B. Karam Chand Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13282, "end_char": 13304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) provides that it will be deemed to have commenced and come into force from the 15th March 1942, the date of the death of R. B. Karam Chand Puri and will take the place of the previous agreement dated the 26th July 1941, thus maintain."}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13474, "end_char": 13494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ing the .continuity of the relationship between the\n\nShivnandarr\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab National Bank [, t,/\n\nSinha J.\n\n1434 SUPREl\\IE.COURT REPORTS [1955)\n\n' - t9ss Bank and the Tr!lasurers'.", "canonical_name": ".P-unjab National Barik Ltd."}}, {"text": "Pu, Yab .Jlofltional Bank", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18291, "end_char": 18316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "py the , Board\n\n~9li5\n\n.. Shivnandan\n\n.ShlJTfllfl\n\nV.\n\nT:he Pu, Yab .Jlofltional Bank J. td,\n\nSinha J.\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma\n\n\"· The Pury'iih National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha ]."}}, {"text": "Sinha J.\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18325, "end_char": 18353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "py the , Board\n\n~9li5\n\n.. Shivnandan\n\n.ShlJTfllfl\n\nV.\n\nT:he Pu, Yab .Jlofltional Bank J. td,\n\nSinha J.\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma\n\n\"· The Pury'iih National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha ].", "canonical_name": "Sinha J.\n\nShiunandatt\n\nSharma"}}, {"text": "Shivnandan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22827, "end_char": 22837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the very nature of things it had to be a dual control in the sense that the Treasurers had to nominate the assistants who are to discharge those responsible functions in connection with cash and other valuables of the Bank and the Bank could not abdicate its powers of full control over the day to day working ot\n\n17-90 S. C. India/59\n\n195.S\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nShiunandatt\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab Jfational Bank Ltd.\n\nI Sinh~ ].", "canonical_name": "SHIVNANDAN SHARl\\IA"}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22854, "end_char": 22879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the very nature of things it had to be a dual control in the sense that the Treasurers had to nominate the assistants who are to discharge those responsible functions in connection with cash and other valuables of the Bank and the Bank could not abdicate its powers of full control over the day to day working ot\n\n17-90 S. C. India/59\n\n195.S\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nShiunandatt\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab Jfational Bank Ltd.\n\nI Sinh~ ].", "canonical_name": ".P-unjab National Barik Ltd."}}, {"text": "Sinha J.\n\nShiunandatt\n\nSharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22881, "end_char": 22910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the very nature of things it had to be a dual control in the sense that the Treasurers had to nominate the assistants who are to discharge those responsible functions in connection with cash and other valuables of the Bank and the Bank could not abdicate its powers of full control over the day to day working ot\n\n17-90 S. C. India/59\n\n195.S\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nShiunandatt\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab Jfational Bank Ltd.\n\nI Sinh~ ].", "canonical_name": "Sinha J.\n\nShiunandatt\n\nSharma"}}, {"text": "Punjab Jfational Bank Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22916, "end_char": 22942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the very nature of things it had to be a dual control in the sense that the Treasurers had to nominate the assistants who are to discharge those responsible functions in connection with cash and other valuables of the Bank and the Bank could not abdicate its powers of full control over the day to day working ot\n\n17-90 S. C. India/59\n\n195.S\n\nShivnandan\n\nSharma v.\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nShiunandatt\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab Jfational Bank Ltd.\n\nI Sinh~ ].", "canonical_name": ".P-unjab National Barik Ltd."}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23977, "end_char": 23984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For example, in Pollock's Law."}}, {"text": "Clerk", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24646, "end_char": 24651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (11th Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Lindsell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24654, "end_char": 24662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (11th Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24807, "end_char": 24814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Salmond's Treatise on the Law of Torts, the same distinction has been clearly indicated in the following passage a~ p. 98:-\n*Pages 62 & 63 of Pollock on Torts, 15th Edn."}}, {"text": "s 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25405, "end_char": 25408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab.\n\nNational Bank Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27186, "end_char": 27213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv1Uf1J.{/O.n\n\nSha,.ma\n\nThe Punjab.", "canonical_name": ".P-unjab National Barik Ltd."}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33521, "end_char": 33526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This would be ·· clear from the following observations of Lord Esher, M.R., in the case of Donovan v. Laing,' Wharton & -Down Construction Syndicate(1) :~ , . . . . . ,. \""}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34641, "end_char": 34650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Macmillan in his speech at p. 14 has observed as follows :- \"Many reported cases were cited to your Lordships but where, as all agree, the question in each case turns on its own circumstances, decisions in other cases are rather illustrative than determinative."}}, {"text": "Porter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35238, "end_char": 35244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Porter in the course of his speech in the reported case (supra) at p. 17 has observed as follows :-\n\n\"Many factors have a bearing on the result. ."}}, {"text": "S!iafrrid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35999, "end_char": 36008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the most satisfactory,· by which to ascertain who is the employer at any particular time, is to ask who is entitled to tell the _employee th.e way in which he is to do the work upon which he is engaged\" ..\n\n(1) [1947] A.C. I,\n\nShivnatrdan\n\nSharma\n\nThe Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\nSinha :J.\n\n1955 Shivnandan\n\nS!iafrrid\n\nTi,, Punjqb National Bahk l.Jd."}}, {"text": "BHIM SEN", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36950, "end_char": 36958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHIM SEN\n\nti."}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36986, "end_char": 36999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF U.P.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAs and SINHA JJ."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37002, "end_char": 37013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF U.P.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAs and SINHA JJ.", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37015, "end_char": 37028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF U.P.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAs and SINHA JJ."}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37033, "end_char": 37038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF U.P.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAs and SINHA JJ.", "canonical_name": "Sinha"}}, {"text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37052, "end_char": 37075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37102, "end_char": 37108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37330, "end_char": 37335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37534, "end_char": 37539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37605, "end_char": 37611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37619, "end_char": 37636, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "PanchaYat Raj Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37854, "end_char": 37871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U.P. State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37960, "end_char": 37970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two of the accused belonged to U.P. State and the third belonged to Madhya Pradesh State."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37997, "end_char": 38017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two of the accused belonged to U.P. State and the third belonged to Madhya Pradesh State."}}, {"text": "Section 52( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38020, "end_char": 38034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "PanchaYat Raj Act,\n\n1947", "statute": "PanchaYat Raj Act,\n\n1947"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_1_1444_1452_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "1955 Shivnandan\n\nS!iafrrid\n\nTi,, Punjqb National Bahk l.Jd.\n\nSinha J.\n\nMarch 15\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1955f\n\nAs indicated above, in the present case the direction and control of the appellant and of the ministerial staif in charge of the Cash Department of the Bank was entirely vested in the Bank through its manager or other superior officer. We have therefore no hesitation in differing from the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal and in holding that the appellant was an employee of the Bank. That being so, the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to make the directions it did in respect of the appellant. The respondent did not at any stage of the proceedings challenge the orders of the Tribunal on its merits.\n\nThat conclusion being reached, there is no difficulty in upholding the orders of the Tribunal in respect of the appellant, It is therefore not necessary to pronounce upon the other points raised by the parties.\n\nThe appeal 1s accordingly allowed with costs throughout.\n\nBHIM SEN\n\nti.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nTHE STATE OF U.P.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAs and SINHA JJ. J\n\nU. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (U. P. Act XXVI of 1947), ss. 49 (1)(2)(4), 52, 55-Rule 84 framed by Stat< Government-Thef' of the value of Rs. J..().0_ committed by three accused-One of the accused belonging to Madhya Pradesh State-Panchayat Ada/at constituted under the provisions of s. 49 of the Act and Rule 84 framed there\n\nunder to try the present case-Whether could be properly constituted -Rule 84-W hether Intra vires-/urisdiction of ordinary courts-\n\nJJ/hether excluded-Bar under s. 55---Scope of.\n\nThree accused were c.onvicted by a Magistrate under s. 379 of the Indian Penal Code of the offence of theft of the value of Rs. 3 and sentenced to a fine 0£ . Rs. 25 /- each. The question for determination was whether te case should have been tried by a Panchayat Ada:lat cortstituted under the U. P. PanchaYat Raj Act,\n\n1947 and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try it. Two of the accused belonged to U.P. State and the third belonged to Madhya Pradesh State.\n\nSection 52( I) of the Act provides that certain specified offences (including the offence of theft when the value of stolen property does\n\n.~·\n\nnot exceed Rs. 50 /') shall be cognizable by a Panchayat Adalat.\n\nSection 55 provides that no court shall take cognizance of any case which is cognizable under the Act by the Panchayat Adalat.\n\nSection 49 provides: \"49(1) The Sarpanch shall, for the trial of every case, form a bench of five Panches from the panel referred to in s. 43.\n\n(2) Every such bench shall include one Panch who resides in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which the complainant of a case resides and likewise one Panch in the area in which the accused resides and three Panches residing in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which neither party resides, provided that in police cases one Panch shall be such as may be residing in the Gaon Sabha in which the offence was committed, one Panch residing in the area of Gaon Sabha in which the accused resides and three Panches residing in the areas other than those mentioned above\".\n\nRule 84 framed by the State Government under s. 49(4) of the Act reads as follows :-\n\n\"For the purposes of trial or decision of any case or proceeding parties of which are residents of different circles or different districts or any one of the parties iJ a resident of a place not governed by the Act, the prescribed authority having jurisdiction over the Panchayati Adalat in which a case or proceeding is instituted or transferred for disposal shall constitute a special bench consisting of Panches of the said Panchayati Adalat and if convenient and possible may include a Panch of the other circle and shall appoint one of them as Chairman of the bench unless the Sarpanch is a member of it\".\n\nHeld that inasmuch as in the present case one out of the accused belonged to Madhya Pradesh it was not possible to constitute a bench in strict compliance with s. 49(2) of the Act to try his case. Section 84 in so far as it relates to the constitution of a special bench where one of the parties belongs to a place outside the State Qf U. P. is ultra vires.\n\nHence no competent bench could be constituted under s. 49. of the Act for the trial of the presnt case in which there were three accused one of whom was a person belonging to a different State.\n\nUnder the circumstances the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts was not excluded.\n\nExclusion of jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction, can be brought about by the setting up of a court of limited jurisdiction, in respect of the limited field, only if the vesting and the exercise of that limited jurisdiction is clear and operative.\n\nThe bar under s. 55 of the Act relates to the case as a whole arid has reference to the entire proceeding in respect of all the accused together.\n\nCruMtNAL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDIGTION: Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 1954.\n\nBhim Sen . v.\n\nThe State of U. P.\n\n\"955\n\nBhim.Sen\n\n\"· The State of U. P;\n\nAppeal under Article 134(1) (c) of the Constiruc tion from the Judgment and - Order -dated the. .-27th October 1953 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Reference No. 121 of 1953. - _ _\n\nK. P. Gupta.and A.D. Mathur,' for the appellant.\n\n-K. B. Astliana ai).d c . .P. Lal, for the resp0ndertt. 1 . ' . . . . . . , ' . ' . ' ' ~\n\n1955. 'March' 15. The - Judgment -of the -Court wasdelived by ·\n\njAGANNADHADAS' J.'-'This is an appeal ' by -leave granted . by the -High Court 'of Allahabad presumably under artide 134( 1) ( c) of the Constitution. The facts are simple.\n\nThree persons including, the appellant were, at the -material time, pared porters af the railway station Manikpur in the district Bartda of Uttar Pradesh. Qn the night 'of the 18th June, 1952, they we; e fotinCl by two waichi'nen of the Watch 'and Ward staff -attached to the railw_ay stati@, .cominitti1).g' theft of certain packets of biscuits. by breaking open a rail- W?Y parcel containing those packets, which as parcel porters, - they had occasion to handle. First information of the same w:is lodged,_ before the u!J-Ispector, Railway Police, by one Ra!Il Prasad, Head Watchman_, The Raiiway Police. _filed the charge~; heet . under section- 379 of the . Indian Penal Code on the 20th June, 1952, - The case was taken -cognizance of by the Railway Magistrate, Manikpur. All the three accused\n\nplead~.d guilty: They _ were convieted by the Magistrate on the; 15th' July, 1952, .and' sentencea to\n\n7 a fine_ of Rs. 25 each. Against this convicti0n the .. present appellant, filed a revision_. to the Sessions . , Judge of Banda.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to meRtion . .that . under the . U. P .. P.anchayat Raj . Act, .1947, . the . Panchayati Adalats in\" U.P.. have, criminal- .jurisdiction \" in certain matters'; The point taken •before the Ses- - sions T udge was that' by virtue of the said Act, the\n\npresnt '. case should _ have - been tried -•by -the' 'Panchayati Adil.lat' and that the Railway Magistrate had - no jurisdiction. This contention was _ accepted by the learned Sessions JuClgc: 'He accorqirigly made a reference to the High Court for quashing - the conviction\n\nand sentence. It came before a Single Judge of the High Court who did not feel quite satisfied that the Railway Magistrate had jurisdiction.· But without deciding the question ' ohe way or the other, he declined to accept the reference on the ground that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was discretionary.\n\nSomewhat curiously however, the learned Judge granted a certificate against his - own judgment that the case is a fit one forappeal to .the Supreme Court. If the learned 'Judge thought fit to grani: leave to appeal, he might well have himself decided the question involved so that we should have had the benefit of his consideration of the same.·\n\n-To dcide the question of jurisdiction ths raised it is necessary to, , notice the scheme of the U.P. Panchayat, Raj At, 1917 (U.]J. A, ct XXVI of 1947) (hereinafter referred to_ as the. Act) and a few relevant sections. 9f the. sall1e. \"It. -may be mentiOned' that the Act appears. to have , undergone some _ amendments in the ypr 1952 and . recently .in\n\n1955. _ These .amendments have .no _application to the present case. Under the Act, . as it stood at the time of i:he commission of the o#ence _ and . the conviction therefor, the scheme thereunder is as follows : Under 'section 3, the ·. State Government shall; . by : . notification . in the official Gazette, establish . a Gaon Sabha for . every village or group of _villages. Under section 42, the State Government . or . the . prescribed aµthority shall divide a disti; ict . in_to 'circles, each circle comprising as . many\n\narea~ sµbject to. the . jµrisdiction of _ Gaon Sabha as -t mav .. be e; icpedient .. Th~ .State Goverrµnent shall . also establish ... Panchayati . Adalats for each such . circle, provided-that the areas. of Gaon Sabhas within each\n\ncirck , shall,. as. fai: .a~- posible~. be (ontigous.' \\Jndr section, 43,, eyery . paon Sabha. in . a ci_rcle . shall elect five ... aqults of. prescribed qualificatipn permanently residing within its jurisdiction to act as. Pariches in the Pan.chayati Adalat of that circle. The Panches so elected.· by all _the Gaori Sabhas fil a circle shall form a pariel. Under section 44 all the Panches ·· elected unde{ sestion: 43 .. shall dei: 'fom ·ong themselves • a person who is able to record proceedings and to act,\n\n-1955\n\nBhim Sen\n\nThe State of U. P.\n\nJagannadhadas .7-\n\n•955\n\nBhim Srn\n\nv. .\n\nThi State of U. P.\n\nJagaaaadhaaas j.\n\n1448 StJJIREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nas Sarpanch of the Partehayati Adalat. As will be seen from the subsequent sections the Panchayati Adalat has jurisdiction to deal with all disputes and cases, both civil and criminal, arising within its area but it is enough for the present case to notice only those portions which relate to criminal jurisdiction.\n\nSectfon 52(1) provides that certain specified offences, if committed within the jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat (which in this context must be taken to tefer to local jurisdiction) shall be cognizable by such Panchayati Adalat. The clauses of sub-section ( 1) of section 52 specify the various classes of offences under the Indian Penal Code and under some other special and local Acts which are within the cognizance of the Panchayati Adalat.\n\nSection 379, Indian Penal Code, is one of the sections so enumerated and it is specifically provided that the jurisdiction of the Adalat in respect of this offence is only where the theft of the stolen property does not exceed Rs. 50.\n\nSection 51(1) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, every case instituted under the Act shall be instituted before the Sarpanch of the Panchayati Adalat of the circle in which the offence is committed.\n\nIt is also provided under section 55 that no court shall take cognizance of any case which is cognizable under the Act by the Panchayati Adalat unless an order has been passed by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate under section 85.\n\nSection 85 authorises a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, on an application of a party or on his own moti9n, to cancel the jurisdiction of the Panchayati Adalat with regard to any pending case if there is an apprehension of miscarriage of justice. Section 49 provides the machinery for the trial of cases by the formation of benches to dea.J with the same. It is necessary to set out the whole of that section in so far as it relates to criminal cases and it is as follows :\n\n\"49.\n\n(1) The Sarpanch shall, for the trial of every case, form a bench of five Panches from the panel (the panel referred to in section 43 above noticed) , provided that at least one of the Panches in the bench\n\n...\n\nshall be a person who . is able to record evidence and proceedings.\n\n(2) Every such bench shall include one Panch who resides in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which the complainant of a case resides and likewise one Panch in the area m which the. accused resides and three Panches residing in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which neither party resides, provided that in police cases one Panch shall be such as may be residing in the Gaon Sabha in which the offence was committed, one Panch residing in the area of Gaon Sabha in which the accused resides and three Panches residing in the areas other than those mentioned above.\n\n(3) ............................................... . ( 4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this ection, the State Government may, by rules, prescribe the constitution of special benches for determin.ing any dispute arising between any parties or Gaon Sabhas or different circles or for any other purpose''.\n\nOne of the rules framed with reference to this subsection which 1s relevant for the present purpose 1s rule 84 and is as follows :\n\n\"For the purposes of trial or decision of any case or proceeding parties of which are residents of different circles or different districts or any one of the parties is a resident of a place not governed by the Act, the\n\npreribed authority having jurisdiction over the Panchayati Adalat in which a case or proceeding is instituted or transferred for disoosal shall constitute a special bench consisting of Panches of the said Panchayati Adalat and if convenient and possible may include a Panch of the other circle and shall appoint one of them as Chairman of the bench unless the Sarpanch is a member of it\".\n\nThe question of jurisdiction arises with reference to the above provisions of the Act. The charge-sheet filed by the police shows that the theft of the property involved in the case is Rs. 3. There can also be no doubt that the offence has been. committed within the limits of Manikpur. It would appear, therefore, prima\n\nBhim Sen\n\nThe State of U. F.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nBhim'Stn\n\nv. 717' \"State of U. P.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSUPREME COURT E.EPORTS [ 1;955]\n\nfacie that .by virtue of sections 51 arid 52, the }?anchayati Adalat of Manikpur had jurisdicticm .o try the case... If so, the jurisdiction . of the regular Magistrate would . appear .to qe barred urider section _55 .of the Act, since it is not . suggested that there \\:tali been any ord.er. under section 85.\n\nBut there is. a sc\\rious difficulty in the way of the e'fercie , of this . jurisdi, ction by the Adalat.. . . , , , , ,.' The jurisdiction of the Adalat to try any criminal case has to be exercised by a bench of the Panches to be formed by the Sarpanch under section 49 of the Act. The 'bench has to consist of five Panches of whom one is to be of the Gaon Sabha of Manikpur (since the offence was committed in that place and this is . a police case) and another belonging to the Gaon Sabha of the accused and the other three from Gaon Sabhas . outside the above two. Where there is only one accused and that accused belongs to an .. area within Uttar Pradesh for which a Gaon Sabha has been formed under the Act or where there are more\n\nthan one accused all belonging to the area of the same Gaon Sabha, the constitution of a bench of the Panchayati Adalat for the trial of such a case presents no difficulty. But in the present case it is oh the record that one out of the three accused by name Tulsi belongs to Jubbalpore in Madhya Pradesh. It was, therefore, not possible to constitute a bench in strict compliance with section 49(2) of the Act to try his case.\n\nRecourse had, therefore, to be had to section 49(4) and the rules framed thereunder. The relevant rule 84 (which has been quoted above) no doubt provides for the constitution of special benches to try cases where there are more than one accused who are residents of different areas. Now this rule in so far as it provides for cases wherein all the parties concerned are residents of Uttar Pradesh may be unexceptionable. But whether it is valid in so far as it provides for the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of a resident outside the State , may be open to argument on more grounds than one. In the present case, it is sufficient to consider whether this portion of the rule is valid, withreference to section 49(4) under which it is\n\nframed. Section 49( 4) authorises the . Government to frame rules for , the constitution of special benches \"for determining disputes between parties of different circles or Gaon Sabhas or for any other purpose\". \"Circles or Gaon Sabhas\" mentioned herein has reference only to circles and Gaon . Sabhas constituted under the Act. This does not .authorie the framing of a rule in so far as it relates to a person belonging to a place outside the State. Nor tan the phrase \"for any other purpose\" in sub-section ( 4) of section 49 whatever that may mean-be construed so widely as to authorise a rule affecting such. an. outsider, assuming without deciding, that a statutory provision by a State Legislature can, directly or by delegation and in terms, validly provide for the exercise of .such jurisdiction by a Panchayati Adalat. We are clearly of the opinion that rule 84 in so far as it relates to the constitution of a special bench where one of the .parties belongs to a place outside . the State is ultra vires.\n\nHence no competent bench could be constituted under section 49 of the. Act for the trial of the present case in which there are three accused of whom one is a person belonging to a different State.\n\nNow, in these circumstances, it has to be considered whether the trial of this case by the ordinary criminal Court is barred. The bar of the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal Court is brought about by section 55 of the Act.\n\nBut it requires to be noticed that the bar which is brought about by the section, is a bar which relates to the case as a whole. Because, in terms, what it says is \"no court shall take cognizance of any case which is cognizable under the Act by a Panchayati Adalat\".\n\nUnder section 2(a) of the Act a \"case\" is defined as meaning \"criminal proceeding in respect of an offence triable by a Panchayati Adalat\" and \"Panchayati Adalat\" is defined as \"including a bench thereof\". It is clear, therefore, that this bar has reference to the entire proceeding, i.e., as involving all the accused together. Such a bar in respect of the entire case can be operative only where there is a valid machinery for the trial thereof. In the present case in which at least one of the accused\n\nBhim Sm\n\nTM State of U. P.\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\n__ ,\n\nBhiT!I Sen\n\nThi Stale of u. P.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSl)PREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\n(though nor this very appellwt) is a person coming from an area outside the local extent of the Act, any bench of the Ada1at that can be valid! y formed thereunder 'Cannot try the three accused together a11d hence can have no jurisdiction over the whole case. The jurisdiction of the regular criminal court in respect of such a case cannot be taken away by the operation of section 55 of the Act. It is to be remembered that the jurisdiction of the criminal courts under section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is comprehensive.\n\nThat section enjoins that all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, enquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with \"according to the provisions hereinafter contained\". To the extent that no valid machinery is set up under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act for the trial of any particular case, the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal court under section 5, Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be held to have been excluded. Exclusion of jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction, can be brought about by the setting up of a court of limited jurisdiction, in respect of the limited field, only if the vesting and the exercise of that limited jurisdiction is clear and operative.\n\nWhere, as in this case, there is no adequate machinery for the exercise of this jurisdiction in a specific case, we cannot hold that the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of such a case by the Court of general jurisdic tion is illegal.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that the Railway Magistrate had the jurisdiction to try the case.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "Sinha J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHIM SEN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 998, "end_char": 1006, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BhiT!I Sen", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "allowed.\n\nTHE STATE OF U", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1020, "end_char": 1044, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1050, "end_char": 1061, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1063, "end_char": 1076, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1100, "end_char": 1123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1150, "end_char": 1156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1378, "end_char": 1383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1582, "end_char": 1587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1653, "end_char": 1659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1667, "end_char": 1684, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "PanchaYat Raj Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1902, "end_char": 1919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U.P. 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Astliana ai).d c ."}}, {"text": "jAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5390, "end_char": 5403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The - Judgment -of the -Court wasdelived by ·\n\njAGANNADHADAS' J.'-'This is an appeal ' by -leave granted .", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAs"}}, {"text": "Bartda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5694, "end_char": 5700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three persons including, the appellant were, at the -material time, pared porters af the railway station Manikpur in the district Bartda of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5704, "end_char": 5717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three persons including, the appellant were, at the -material time, pared porters af the railway station Manikpur in the district Bartda of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Ra!Il Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6121, "end_char": 6133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First information of the same w:is lodged, before the u!J-Ispector, Railway Police, by one Ra!Il Prasad, Head Watchman, The Raiiway Police."}}, {"text": "Raiiway Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First information of the same w:is lodged, before the u!J-Ispector, Railway Police, by one Ra!Il Prasad, Head Watchman, The Raiiway Police."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6226, "end_char": 6243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7616, "end_char": 7629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somewhat curiously however, the learned Judge granted a certificate against his - own judgment that the case is a fit one forappeal to .the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "U.P. 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F.\n\nJagannadhadas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13804, "end_char": 13833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would appear, therefore, prima\n\nBhim Sen\n\nThe State of U. F.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nBhim'Stn\n\nv. 717' \"State of U. P.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSUPREME COURT E.EPORTS [ 1;955]\n\nfacie that .by virtue of sections 51 arid 52, the }?", "canonical_name": "State of U. P.\n\nJagannadhadas J."}}, {"text": "State of U. P.\n\nJagannadhadas J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13857, "end_char": 13889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would appear, therefore, prima\n\nBhim Sen\n\nThe State of U. F.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nBhim'Stn\n\nv. 717' \"State of U. P.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSUPREME COURT E.EPORTS [ 1;955]\n\nfacie that .by virtue of sections 51 arid 52, the }?", "canonical_name": "State of U. P.\n\nJagannadhadas J."}}, {"text": "sections 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13949, "end_char": 13960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14223, "end_char": 14233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14495, "end_char": 14505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh for which a Gaon Sabha has been formed under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14882, "end_char": 14948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tulsi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15233, "end_char": 15238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in the present case it is oh the record that one out of the three accused by name Tulsi belongs to Jubbalpore in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Jubbalpore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15250, "end_char": 15260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in the present case it is oh the record that one out of the three accused by name Tulsi belongs to Jubbalpore in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "section 49(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15360, "end_char": 15373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Pradesh for which a Gaon Sabha has been formed under the Act", "statute": "Uttar Pradesh for which a Gaon Sabha has been formed under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 49(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15441, "end_char": 15454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uttar Pradesh for which a Gaon Sabha has been formed under the Act", "statute": "Uttar Pradesh for which a Gaon Sabha has been formed under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 49(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16111, "end_char": 16124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16152, "end_char": 16166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17213, "end_char": 17223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17565, "end_char": 17575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17863, "end_char": 17875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhim Sm\n\nTM State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18363, "end_char": 18380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case in which at least one of the accused\n\nBhim Sm\n\nTM State of U. 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{"document_id": "1955_2_1006_1012_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "CorPcration of\n\nCalcutta\n\nMule hand Agarwal/a\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nNovember 23.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nwere it not that the appellant desired that the decision of this Court should be obtained on certain questions of importance, and that purpose has been achieved. On a consideration of all the circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case in which we should pass an order for demolition. We should, however, add that we find no justification for the strictures passed on the appellant by the court below.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nIN THE MATTER OF\n\nD AN ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT. •\n\n[B. K. MuKHERJEA, C. J., S. R. DAs and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.)\n\nBar Councils Act-Misconduct in capacity other than professional -Jurisdiction of Court-Bar Councils Act (XXXVIII of 1926), s. JO-Supreme Court Rules, Order IV, Rule 30.\n\nSection 10 of the Bar Councils Act confers on the Court juris~ diction to take disciplinary_ action against an Advocate not merely for professional misconduct but any other misconduct committed in any other capacity as well and leaves it to the Court's discretion to t2ke such action as it thinks fit in any suitable case.\n\n< The Advocate-General of Bombay v. Three Advocates ([1934] I.LR. 59 Born. 57), In the matter of an Advocate ([1936] I.L.R. 63 Cal. 867) and In re a Pleader (I.L.R. [1943] Mad. 595), referred to.\n\nIn re Thomas fames Wallace ([1866] L.R. I P.C. 283), and In re an Advocate of Benares (A.LR. [1932] All. 492), held inapplicable.\n\nConsequently, in a case where an Advocate figuring as an accused in a case under the Bombay Prohibiti9n Act was persistently rud!! to and contemptuous of the trial Magistrate and did all in his po\\ver to hold up the trial and bring the administration of justice into contempt, he ~'<ls guilty of misconduct and as such was liable to be suspended from practice.\n\nD in person\n\nC. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, as amicus curiae.\n\n1955.\n\nNovember 23.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs J.-This Rule was issued by this Court under Order IV, rule 30 of the Rules of this Court after receipt of a report from the Bombay High Court that that High Court had, by its order made on the 13th October 1955 in Civil Application No. 1506 of 1955, suspended the respondent from practice as an Advocate of that High Court for a period of one year from\n\nth~ date of the said order. By the rule the respondent has been required to show cause why, in view of the matter specified in the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court referred to above, appropriate action, disciplinary or otherwise, should not be taken against him by this Court.\n\nThe respondent is an Advocate of some standing in the Bombay High Court and as such was also enrolled as an Advocate of this Court. It appears that in the earlier part of the year 1953 the Advocate was prosecuted before Mr. Sonavane, one of the Presidency Magistrates at Bombay, on a charge of having committed an offence under the Bombay Prohibition Act. The trial lasted from July 1953 to November\n\n1953. On the 18th November 1953 the Magistrate convicted the Advocate of the offence with which he was charged and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one month and to a fine of Rs. 201 and to rigorous imprisonment of four weeks in default of payment of the fine. The Advocate went up on appeal to the High Court. The High Court on the 24th February 1954 upheld the conviction but altered the sentence to one of fine of Rs. 1,000 only.\n\nIn the meantime, on the 25th November 1953, the trial Magistt:ate, Mr. Sonavane, made a report to the Registrar (Appellate Side) of the Bombay High Court as to the conduct of the Advocate who appeared in person as the accused before him. On a perusal of that report the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court constituted a Tribunal consisting of three members of the Bar Council to enquire into the conduct of . the Advocate. The Tribunal issued a summons\n\nIn the mslur of D an Atlvocau of\n\nthe Supreme Courl\n\nIn th~ mattl of D an Advocate of tM Suprem1 Court\n\nDas].\n\nagainst the Advocate intimating that it would enquire into his conduct as disclosed in :-\n\n(a) the report dated the 25th November 1953 of Shri T.\n\nSonavane,\n\nB.A.,\n\nLL.B., Presidency Magistrate, 18th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, to the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay, 'egarding Case No. 593/P of 1953 tried by him, and\n\n(b) the judgment recorded by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 1532 of 1953 (with Criminal Appeal No. 1564 of 1953) upholding the judgment and order of conviction passed against him by the aforesaid learned Magistrate in the aforesaid case.\n\nThe proceedings appear to have been somewhat protracted by reason of frequent objections made and petitions filed by the respondent but eventually on or about the 16th March 1955 the respondent forwarded to the Secretary to the Bar Council Tribunal a copy of a letter addressed by him to the Registrar, High Court, Bombay, and requested the Tribunal to send a report to the High Court in terms of his pleading guilty to the charges levelled against him. He concluded the letter by expressing regret for having wasted the time of the Tribunal. In his letter to the Registrar, the respondent enclosed a separate written apology unconditionally withdrawing his contention that the proceedings bfore the Tribunal were misconceived in law and admitting that the High Court had full authority in law to refer the matter to the Bar Council Tribunal and further that the statements made by Mr.\n\nSona vane in his report were true except in two respects therein specified. On the 28th March 1955 the respondent submitted an additional statemnt clarifying and supplementing his previous. apology. Thereupon the Tribunal made a report to the High Court. By this report the Tribunal held, on the respondent's own admission, the alfegations in the report of Mr. Sonavane to be proved and recommended that a very serious notice should be taken of the respondent's conduct. As regards the .second item in the summons the Tribunal held that the mere conviction of the resvondent under the Prohibition Act did not amount\n\nto professional or other misconduct under section 10 of the Indian Bar Councils Act and, therefore, found him not guilty of that charge.\n\n0'1 a perusal of that report the High Court issued notice to the respondent for final hearing of the matter. The matter came up for final disposal before a Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Tendolkar, J. on the 13th October 1955. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent offered an unconditional and unqualified apology on behalf of the respondent' and pleaded that the ends of justice would be met if the Court only administered a warning to the respondent.\n\nAfter considering the report of the Tribunal the High Comt took the view that the misconduct of the respondent was so serious and so grave that a deterrent punishment must be imposed on him.\n\nAccordingly, taking everything into consideration, the High Court suspenaed the respondent from practice for a period of one year from the date of that order. The respondent's application for a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court having been refused, the respondent filed a petition for special leave to appeal before u';. That petition has, however, been dismissed by us. The rule for disciplinary action now remains to he dealt with.\n\nIn answer to the rule the respondent has filed a petition by way of showing cause.\n\nParagraph 7 of that petition runs as follows :-\n\n\"7. That the report of the learned Presidency Magistrate, 18th Court, is a highly exaggerated, garbled and manifestly incorrect version of the incidents that occurred during the trial of the case. And looking to the circumstances under which the petitioner was more or less compelled to tender a humiliating apology, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct that a proper inquiry be held in the matter by or under the directions of this Hon'ble Court\".\n\nAppearing in person before us the respondent has contended with a certain amount of vehemence that he had not had any fair deal before the Tribunal, that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to enter upon the enquiry inasmuch as the misconduct complained of\n\n111 lht matl1r of D an Advocate of th1 Suprem1 Court\n\nDas].\n\nIn the mr.tte, ~, r D an Advocate of lht Suprvnt r:ourl\n\nDas].\n\n\\;; as not committed by him in his .capacity as an Advocate, for he appeared in person as the accused in the Prohibition case, that the Tribunal had at one stage held that it had no jurisdiction but had without giY; ng him a hearing gone back on that decision and <kclineJ to decide that question in his presence, that the Tribunal failed to formulate any formal charge, that he made an application to the High Court under article 227 for quashing the proceedings for want of jurisdiction but the High Court had rejected that application and dccllned to give him a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court and pointed nut various other matters which he characterised a' . :wwing prejudice and bias on the part of the Tribun ::.\n\nIt was pointed out to the respondent that iiis application for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court having been dismissed we were not, in this Rule, concerned with the proceed•ngs iJi the Bombay High Court or before the Tribunal of the Bar Council as observed by this Court in In the matter of Mr. G, a Senior Advocate Qf the Supr.:me Court( 1 ). The respondent then fell back upon parograph 7 of his petition quoted above and asked this Court to hold a fresh enquiry into the matter. From the judgment of the Bombay High Court which is referred to in the Rule issued herein it appears that the respondent had admitted the truth of everything contained in Mr. Sonavane's report except two matters only.\n\nIn his present petition showing cause he does not, apart from a vague allegation that the report is an exaggerated, garbled and manifestly incorrect version of the incidents that occurred during the trial of the case, refer to any particular statement therein which is exaggerated, garbled or incorect.\n\nIn view of his unconditional admission of the truth of the statements in the report of Mr. Sonavane we are not prepared to permit him to go back on the same on such vague allegations as are to be found in paragraph 7 of his petition. It is needless for us to emphasise that a person holding the responsible position of an Advocate of a High Court\n\n(1) [1955] l $.C.R. 490, 495.\n\nand of this Court cannot be permitted to play with the Court in the way this Advocate has done. He admitted the correctness of the report, confessed his guilt and tendered an unconditional apology evidently in the hope that he would get away with it by merely tendering an apology.\n\nFinding that the tactics did not work with the High Court as he expected the same to do, he now wants to change his tactics by asking for an enquiry which he had himself avoided by means of his admission and apology. This we are not prepared to permit him to do. We have carefully gone through the report of Mr. Sonavane and we find ourselves in entire agreement with the High Court when it says that that report makes an extremely sad reading. The conduct of the respondent in the criminal trial was, as pointed out by the High Court, entirely indefensible by any standard.\n\nIt discloses a continuous and . persistent attempt on the part of the respondent to be rude to and contemptuous of the Magistrate, to hold up the trial and to do everything in his power to bring the administration of justice into contempt. Such a conduct, in our opinion, merits severe condemnation.\n\nThe respondent has drawn our attention to the case of In re Thomas fames Wallace(1 ) which was followed in In re An Advocate of Benares( 2). We do not conceive that the Privy Council intended to lay down any fixed and rigid rule of law or did anything more than indicate the course which, in the circumstances of that case, it considered to be reasonable, satisfactory and convenient a1id the Allahabad case simply followed the same. As has been held by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in The Advocate-General of Bombay v. Three Advocates(3), the Indian Legislature by using the words \"professional or other misconduct\" in section 10 of the Indian Bar Councils Act intended to confer on the Court disciplinary jurisdiction to take action in all cases of misconduct whether in a professional or other capacity .leaving it to the discretion of Court to take action only in suitable\n\n(l) [1866] L.R. l.P.C. 283.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1932 All. 492.\n\n(3) [1934] I.L.R. 59 Bom. 57.\n\n19~5\n\nIn 1111 ina111r •f D an Adoocal1 of .1h1 Supreme Court\n\nDas].\n\nIn the matter nf D an Advoeate of\n\nthe Supreme Court\n\nDas].\n\ncases. To the like effect is the decision of a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in In the matter of an Advocate('). The pleader concerned in the case of In re a Pleader( 2) was certainly not, by shouting slogans in Court, functioning as an Advocate, nevertheless he was dealt with under section 13(f) of the Legal Practitioners Act.\n\nW a/lace's case (supra) was not a decision on any statutory provision such as we have in the Legal Practitioners Act or the Bar Councils Act.\n\nFor the reasons stated above and in view of the conduct of the Advocate seen in the light of the surrounding circumstances we are clearly of opinion that the Advocate should, by reason of his having indulged in conduct unworthy of a member of the honourable profession to which he belongs, be suspended from practice for some time. He is an Advocate of this Court and according to a majority decision of this Court he is entitled, under the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, to exercise his profession in all Courts throughout the Union of India.\n\nAny suspension for a period less than the period fixed by the Bombay High Court will obviously lead to serious anomaly and inconvenience.\n\nWe accordingly direct that the Advocate concerned be suspended from practice for a period co-terminous with the period of s.uspension fixed by the Bombay High Court, namely, up to the 13th October, 1956.\n\n(l) [1936] I.L.R. 63 Cal. 867.\n\n(2) I.L.R. [1943] Mad. 459.", "total_entities": 36, "entities": [{"text": "IN THE MATTER OF\n\nD AN ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 569, "end_char": 621, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IN THE MATTER OF AN ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT. •", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. K. MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 627, "end_char": 642, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 651, "end_char": 660, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JO-Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 816, "end_char": 838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 860, "end_char": 870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JO-Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "JO-Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Benares", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1459, "end_char": 1466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In re Thomas fames Wallace ([1866] L.R. I P.C. 283), and In re an Advocate of Benares (A.LR. ["}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D in person\n\nC. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, as amicus curiae."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2527, "end_char": 2544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the rule the respondent has been required to show cause why, in view of the matter specified in the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court referred to above, appropriate action, disciplinary or otherwise, should not be taken against him by this Court."}}, {"text": "Sonavane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2883, "end_char": 2891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in the earlier part of the year 1953 the Advocate was prosecuted before Mr. Sonavane, one of the Presidency Magistrates at Bombay, on a charge of having committed an offence under the Bombay Prohibition Act.", "canonical_name": "Sona vane"}}, {"text": "18th November 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3073, "end_char": 3091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th November 1953 the Magistrate convicted the Advocate of the offence with which he was charged and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one month and to a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "24th February 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court on the 24th February 1954 upheld the conviction but altered the sentence to one of fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "25th November 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3528, "end_char": 3546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, on the 25th November 1953, the trial Magistt:ate, Mr. Sonavane, made a report to the Registrar (Appellate Side) of the Bombay High Court as to the conduct of the Advocate who appeared in person as the accused before him."}}, {"text": "T.\n\nSonavane", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4227, "end_char": 4239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "against the Advocate intimating that it would enquire into his conduct as disclosed in :-\n\n(a) the report dated the 25th November 1953 of Shri T.\n\nSonavane,\n\nB.A.,\n\nLL.B., Presidency Magistrate, 18th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, to the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay, 'egarding Case No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4447, "end_char": 4481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "593/P of 1953 tried by him, and\n\n(b) the judgment recorded by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "16th March 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4847, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings appear to have been somewhat protracted by reason of frequent objections made and petitions filed by the respondent but eventually on or about the 16th March 1955 the respondent forwarded to the Secretary to the Bar Council Tribunal a copy of a letter addressed by him to the Registrar, High Court, Bombay, and requested the Tribunal to send a report to the High Court in terms of his pleading guilty to the charges levelled against him."}}, {"text": "High Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4987, "end_char": 5005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings appear to have been somewhat protracted by reason of frequent objections made and petitions filed by the respondent but eventually on or about the 16th March 1955 the respondent forwarded to the Secretary to the Bar Council Tribunal a copy of a letter addressed by him to the Registrar, High Court, Bombay, and requested the Tribunal to send a report to the High Court in terms of his pleading guilty to the charges levelled against him."}}, {"text": "Sona vane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5571, "end_char": 5580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his letter to the Registrar, the respondent enclosed a separate written apology unconditionally withdrawing his contention that the proceedings bfore the Tribunal were misconceived in law and admitting that the High Court had full authority in law to refer the matter to the Bar Council Tribunal and further that the statements made by Mr.\n\nSona vane in his report were true except in two respects therein specified.", "canonical_name": "Sona vane"}}, {"text": "28th March 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th March 1955 the respondent submitted an additional statemnt clarifying and supplementing his previous."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6230, "end_char": 6240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6248, "end_char": 6271, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6524, "end_char": 6533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter came up for final disposal before a Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Tendolkar, J. on the 13th October 1955."}}, {"text": "13th October 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6545, "end_char": 6562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter came up for final disposal before a Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Tendolkar, J. on the 13th October 1955."}}, {"text": "article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8828, "end_char": 8839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "From the judgment of the Bombay High Court which is referred to in the Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9659, "end_char": 9734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thomas fames Wallace(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11781, "end_char": 11803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent has drawn our attention to the case of In re Thomas fames Wallace(1 ) which was followed in In re An Advocate of Benares( 2)."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12114, "end_char": 12123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not conceive that the Privy Council intended to lay down any fixed and rigid rule of law or did anything more than indicate the course which, in the circumstances of that case, it considered to be reasonable, satisfactory and convenient a1id the Allahabad case simply followed the same."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12350, "end_char": 12360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12368, "end_char": 12391, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12803, "end_char": 12816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the matter nf D an Advoeate of\n\nthe Supreme Court\n\nDas]."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12893, "end_char": 12912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the like effect is the decision of a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in In the matter of an Advocate(')."}}, {"text": "section 13(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13120, "end_char": 13133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Legal Practitioners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13141, "end_char": 13164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Legal Practitioners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13260, "end_char": 13283, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13751, "end_char": 13804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is an Advocate of this Court and according to a majority decision of this Court he is entitled, under the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, to exercise his profession in all Courts throughout the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13862, "end_char": 13876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is an Advocate of this Court and according to a majority decision of this Court he is entitled, under the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, to exercise his profession in all Courts throughout the Union of India."}}, {"text": "13th October, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14202, "end_char": 14220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly direct that the Advocate concerned be suspended from practice for a period co-terminous with the period of s.uspension fixed by the Bombay High Court, namely, up to the 13th October, 1956."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1013_1021_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1013\n\nSHRI VIRINDAR KUMAR SATYAWADI v.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB. f B. K. MnT<:HERJEA, C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nJAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, (XLlll of 1951), ss. 33, 36- Ciiminai Procedu1e Code (V of 1898), ss. 195(1)(b), 476, 476B- Retuming Officer--Deciding on the validity or otherwise of nomination paper tmde1 ss. 33, 36 of the Act-Whether a court within the\n\nmeaning of ss. 195(1)(b), 476 and 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nHeld that a Returning Officer acting under ss. 33 and 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and deciding on the validity or otherwise of a nomination paper is not a court within the meaning of ss. 195(1)(b), 476 and 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nShell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation ((1931] A.C. 275 at 296), R. v. London County Council ([1931] 2 K.B. 215), Cooper v. Wilson (rl937J 2 K.B. 309), Huddart Parker and Co.\n\nv. Moorehead ((1908] 8 C.L.R. 330), Rola Co. v. The Commonwealth ((19Hj 69 C.L.R. 185), Bliarat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. ( [1950] S.C.R. 459), Mehar Singh v. Emperor, (A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 884), Empernr v. Nanak Chand (A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 208), Har Prasad v. Empero1, (A.I.R. 1947 All. 139) and Channu Lal v.\n\nRex ([1950] 51 Cr. l f. JQ9), reforred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION ; Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by special leave from thr. Judgment and Order dated the 10th June 1953 of the Punjab High Court at Simla in Criminal Revision No. 86 of 1953 ari, ing out of the Judgment and Order dated the 7th January 1953 of the Court of Sessions Judge, Kamal in Criminal Appeal No. 355 of 1952.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the appellant.\n\nCopa! Singh and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent.\n\nN•v mher 24\n\n195~ .\n\nShri Virindar Kt4mar Salyawadi\n\nThe Staid of\n\nPuniab\n\n1955.\n\nNovember 24.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-Thc appellant was a candidate for election to the House of the People from the Kamal Reserved Constituency during the Ja, t General Electio; is.\n\nThe proviso to section 33(3) of the Representation of the People Act (XL!II of 1951), omitting what is not material, enacts \"that in a constituencv where anv seat is reserved for the Scheduled Cstes, no cndiate shall be deemed to be qualified to be chosen to fill that seat unless his nomination paper is accompanied by a declaration verified in the prescribed manner that the candidate is a member of the Scheduled Castes for which the seat has been so reserved and the declaration specifies the particular caste of which the candidate is a member and aiso the area in relation to which such caste is one of the Schedule Castes\"_ Rule 6 of the Election Rules provides that t:1e declaration referred to in the above proviso shall be verified by the candidate on oath or solemn affirmation before a Magistrate. Schedule II co; itains t11c frmn of nomination paper to he usd, with the terms in which the declaration is to he made by the candidate and verified by the Magistrate: On 5-11-1951 the appelhnt signed two nomination papers, each containing the following declaration:\n\n\"I hereby declare that I am a member of tbc Balmiki Caste which has been declared to be a Scheduled Caste in the State of Punjab\".\n\nThe Balmiki Caste is one of the castes declared to he\n\n.1 Scheduled Caste under the \"Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950\". The above declaration was made on solemn affirmation before the First Class\n\nMagistrate, Kamal, and the nomination papers with the above declaration were filed before the District Magistrate, Kamal, who was the returning officer. One Jai Ram Sarup, a member of the Chamar caste, which is one of the Scheduled Castes, was also a candid•tc for the seat, and he raised the objection that the appellant was not a Balmiki by caste, and that he was therefore not oualified to stand for election to the resened Constitu, ency.\n\nActing on the declaration aforesaid, the returning officer overruled the objection, and accepted the nomination paper of the appellant as valid. At the polling, the appellant got the majority of votes, and on 6-3-1952 he was declared duly elected.\n\nOn 27-8-1952 Jai Ram Sarup filed the application out of which the present appeal arises, under sections 476 and 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the District Magistrate, who functioned as the returning officer. He therein alleged that the declaration made by the appellant that he belonged to the Balmiki caste was false, that, in fact, he was born a Muslim and had been converted to Hinduism, and that therefore \"in the interests of justice\" and \"for c;1feguarding the interests of the Scheduled Castes'', proceedings hould be taken for his prosecution. In his counter-affidavit the appellant stated :\n\n\"l am not a Muhammadan by birth.\n\nOn the other hand, I was born in Balmiki Hindu familv.\n\nI am a Hindu\".\n\nThe District Magistrate held an enquiry in which one Prith Singh Azad, President of the Depressed Classes, Delhi, gave evidence that the appellant was a Muslim of the 1ame of Khaliq. Sadiq, that in 1938 he applied to the Suddhi Sabha to be converted to Hinduism. that he was so converted, and that thereafter he came to be known as Virindar Kumar.\n\nIn cross-examination, he stated that the appellant had admitted before him that he was a Muslim by birth. He added that he had two Muslim wives living at the time of the conversion.\n\nThe applicant, Jai Ram Sarup, also produced ten letters stated to be in the handwriting of the appellant in proof of the above facts. On 17-9-1952 the Magistrate passed an order that there wa> a prima f acie case for taking action, and on 29-9-1952 he filed a complaint before the First Class Magistrate, Kamal, charging the appelbnt with offences under sections 181, 182 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nAgainst this order, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Kamal, who dismissed the same on the ground th:it the returning officer was not a Court, that the proceedings before\n\nShri Virilldar Kumar Saty awadi\n\nTiu Stat• of\n\nPunjab\n\nV1nkalarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nShri Vfrindar Kumar S(Jlyawadi\n\nThi State of\n\nPunjab\n\nV1nkalarama\n\n,(ryar ].\n\nhim did not fall under section 476, and that therefore no appeal lay under section 476-B.\n\nThe appellant took the matter in revision before the High Court, Punjab, and that was heard by Harnam Singh, J., who held, differing from the Sessions Judge, that the returning officer was a Court, and that his order was therefore appcalable. He, however, held that on the merits there was no case for interference, and accordingly dismissed the revJSJon.\n\nIt is against this order that the present appeal by special leave is directed.\n\nOn behalf of the appella:it Mr. N. C. Chatterjee argues that having held that the order of the returnmg officer was appealable, the learned Judge ought to have remanded the case for hearing by the Sessions\n\nJudge on the merits, and that his own disposal of the matter was summary and perfunctory. The contention of Mr. Gopal Singh for the respondent is that the view of the Sessions Judge th!lt the returning officer was not a court and that his order was not, therefore, appealable was correct, and that further the order of the High Court in revision declining to interfere on the merits was not liable to be questioned in special appeal in this Court.\n\nThe first question that arises for our decision is whether the order of the District Magistrate passed on 17-9-1952 as returning officer is open to appeal.\n\nThe statutory provisions bearing on this point a1\" sections 195, 476 and 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 195 ( 1) (a) provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the public officer concerned or of his superior. Section 195(1) (b) enacts that no Court shall take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein, where such offence is committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court. except on the complaint in writing of such Court or a Court to which it is subordinate. The offence under section 193 is one of those mentioned in section 195(1) (b). Section 476 prescribes the procedure to be followed where a Court is moved to lay . a complaint, and that applies\n\nonly to offences mentioned in sections 195 ( 1) (b) and 195(1) (c) and not to those mentioned in section 195(1) (a). Section 476-B provides for an appeal from an order passed under section 476 to the appropriate Court.\n\nThe result then is that if the complaint relates to offences mentioned in sections 195 ( 1) (b) and 195 ( 1) ( c), an appeal would be competent, but not if it relates to offences mentioned in section 195(1)(a).\n\nNow, the order of the Magistrate dated 17-9-1952 directs that the appellant should be prosecuted for offences under sections 181, 182 and 193. There is no dispute that the order in so far as it relates to offences under sections 181 and 182 is not appealable, as they fall directly under section 195(1) (a). The controversy is only as regards the charge under section 193.\n\nSection 193 makes it an offence to give false evidence whether it be in a judicial proceeding or not, and it likewise makes it an offence to fabricate false evidence for use in a judicial proceeding or elsewhere.\n\nIf the offence is not committed in a judicial proceeding, then it will fall outside section 195 (1) (b) ,- which applies only when it is committed in or in relation to a proceeding in Court, and there is in consequence no bar to a complaint l:ieing made in respect thereof unaffected by the restrictions contained in section 195(1)(b ). But if the offence under section 193 is committed in or in relation to a proceeding in Court, then it will fall under section 195 ( 1 )(b), and the order directing prosecution under section 476 will be appealable under section\n\n476-B.\n\nThe point for decision therefore is whether the returning officer in deciding on the validity of a nomination paper under ection 36 of the Act can be held to act as a Court. The question thus raised does not appear to be covered by authority, and ln:; to be decided on the true character of the functions of the returning officer and the nature and the extent of his powers.\n\n\"There has been much difference of opinion as to the precise character of the office of a returning officer, viz., as to whether he is a judicial or ministerial officer\", says Parker on Election Agent and Returning Officer, Fifth Edition, page 30.\n\nThe true\n\nShri Virint!ar Kumm Sat; Jawadi\n\nThi Stale of Punjab\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nShri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi\n\nThe Slat1 of\n\nPunjab\n\nV1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nview, according to him, is that he partakes of both characters, and that 'in determining objections to nomination papers, he is a judicial officer. That is also the view taken in Indian decisions.\n\nBut before we can hold that the proceedings before a returning office! resulting in the acceptance or rejection of a nomination paper fall wiJhin section J95(l)(b) of the Code of Crirn:nal Procedure, it must be shown not merely that they are judicial in character but that fur the! he is acting as a Court in respect thereof. It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies and tribunals, and entrust to them work of a judicial character, but they are not Courts in the accepted sense of that term, though they may possess, as observed by Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Company of Austral/a v. Federal Conl1n/ssio11er of Taxation( 1 ), some of the trappings of a Court. The distinction between Courts and Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions is well established, though whether an authority constituted by a particular enactment falls within one category o;· tl1e other may, on the provisions of that emctment, be open to argument.\n\nThere has been considerable discussion in the Courts in England and Australia as to what are the essential characteristics of a Court as distinguished from a tribuna! e;.rcrmmg quasi-judicial functions.\n\nVide Shell Company of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation('), R. v.\n\nLondon County Council('), Cooper v.\n\nWilson(.'), Hurl dart Parker and Co. v.\n\nMoorehead('), and Rola Co. v. The Cmmonwealth (').\n\nIn this Court, the question was considered in some fuln(:\" in Tiharat Bank Ltd. v.\n\nEmployees of Bharat Bani: Ltd.( ).\n\nIt is unnecessary to traverse the same ground once again. It may be stated broadlv that what distinguishes a Court fro1n a quasi-judicial tribu. rrai is thot it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and decbre the .rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as\n\n(IH19.1!1 A.C:. 275. 296.\n\n(3) [: 937] 2 I<..D. 309.\n\n(5) [19H] 69 C.L.R. 185.\n\n(2., [ 911] 2 K.B. 2\\5.\n\n(11 [ 908] 3 C.LR. '.130.\n\n(6) [ 950] S.C.R. 459.\n\na matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court.\n\nWe have now to decide whether in view of the principles above stated and the functions and powers entrusted to the returning officer under the Act, he is a court. The statutory provision bearing on this matter is section 36. Under section 36(2), the returning officer has to examine the nomination paper and decide all obiections which mav be made thereto.\n\nThis power is undoubtedly judicial in character. But in exercising this power, he is authorised to come to a decision \"after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary\". That means that the parties have no right to insist on producing evidence which they mav desire to .adduce in support of their case. There is no machinery provided for summoning of witnesses, or of compelling production of documents in an enqmry under section 36.\n\nThe returning officer is entitled to act suo motu in the matter. When one compares this procedure with that prescribed for trial of election petitions by the Election Tribunal under sections 90 and 92 of the Act, the difference between the two becomes marked. While the proceedings before the Election Tribunal approximate in all essential matters to proceedings in civil courts, the proceedings under section 36 present a different picture. There is no !is, in which persons with opposing claims are entitled to have their rights adjuoicated in a judicial manner, but an enquiry such as is usually conducted by an ad hoc tribunal entrusted with a quasi-judicial power. In other words, the function of the returning officer acting under section 36 is judicial in character, but he is not to act judicially in discharging it. We are of opinion that the returning officer deciding on\n\nM-85 S. C. India/59\n\nShri V rindar K •mar Satyawadi\n\nThe State of\n\nPonjab\n\nV enkatarama Ayyar J.\n\n19;5\n\nSltri Viriru/ar K11ntar S1dyarotJtli\n\nT/r4 Stale of\n\nPW!ia6\n\nV1nkatarbma\n\nAyyar].\n\nthe validity of a nomination paper is not a Court foe the purpose of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the result is that even as regards the charge under section 193, the order of the Magistrate was not appealable, as the offence was not committed in or in relation to any proceeding in a Court. In this view, the learned Sessions Judge was right in dismissing the appeal as incompetent, and the question argued by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that the learned Judge of the High Court ought to have remanded the case for hearing by the Sessions Judge on the merits does not arise.\n\nIt was next argued for the appellant that as the application for initiating prosecution under section 193 was made under section 476 on the assumption that the returning officer was a court, the order passed thereon must, in the view that he was not a Court, be quashed as without jurisdiction. But then, it should be noted that the application was presented under section 195 also, and it was necessary to move the returning officer under section 195 ( 1 )(a) with reference . to the offences under sections 181 and 182, and there could be no question of quashing the order as without jurisdiction. Even as regards section 193, the position is this : It has no doubt been held that section 476 must be taken to be exhaustive of all the powers of a' Court as such to lay a complaint, and that a complaint filed by it otherwise than under that section should not be entertained.\n\nBut there is abundant authority that section 476 does not preclude the officer presiding over a Court from himself preferring a complaint, and that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate before whom the complaint is laid to try it like any other complaint is not taken away by that section. Vide Meher Singh v. Emperor( ), Emperor\n\nv. Nanak Chand('), Har Prasad v. Emperor(') and Channu Lal v. Rex('). There is thus no legal impediment to a returning officer filing a . complaint under sections 181 and 182 as provided in section 195(1)(a) and charging the accused therein with also an offence\n\n(I) A.LR. 1933 Lah. 884.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1943 Lah.208.\n\n(3) A.l.R!947 A. 11. 139.\n\n(4) [1950] 51 Cr. LJ. 199.\n\nunder section 193, In this connection, it should be mentioned that the appellant himself took the objection before the Magistrate that qua returning officer he was not a Court and that the proceedings under section 476 were incompetent, and that that was overruled on the ground that it was an enabling section. There is, therefore, no ground for holding that the order dated 17-9-1952 was without jurisdiction.\n\nIt was finally contended that the Magistrate was under a misapprehension in stating that the appellant had declared that he was born a Balmiki, whereas, in fact, he only declared that he was a Balmiki by caste.\n\nBut it was the appellant himself who pleaded in his counter-affidavit that he was not a Muslim by birth, and was born in a Balmiki Hindu family, and the observation of the Magistrate has obvious reference to what was pleaded and argued by the appellant. And it should also be noted that no objection was taken either in the grounds of appeal to the Sessions Court or in revision to the High Court with reference to the above remark. Moreover, the charge as laid in the complaint is that the declaration of the appellant in the nomination paper that he \"was a member of the Balmiki caste\" was false. There is accordingly no substance in this contention.\n\nIt must be emphasised that in the view that the order of the Magistrate dated 17-9-1952 was final, this appeal being really directed against that order there must be exceptional grounds before we can interfere with it in special appeal, and none such has been established.\n\nOn the other hand, whether action should be taken under section 195 is a matter primarily for the Court which hears the application, and its discretion is not to be lightly interfered with in appeal, even when that is competent.\n\nBut where, as here, the legislature does not provide for an appeal, it is preposterous on the part of the appellant to invite this Court to interfere in special appeal.\n\nThis appeal is accordingly dismissed.\n\nS/lri 'VirilfliM JC' umar SalJawadi\n\nTl11Stal1of\n\nPunjab\n\nV 1nkalarar114\n\nAyyar J.", "total_entities": 113, "entities": [{"text": "VIRINDAR KUMAR SATYAWADI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Virindar Kt4mar Salyawadi", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 33, 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 210, "end_char": 220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 195(1)(b), 476, 476B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 259, "end_char": 283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 33, 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 195(1)(b), 476 and 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 428, "end_char": 454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 464, "end_char": 490, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 33 and 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 557, "end_char": 595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 195(1)(b), 476 and 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 697, "end_char": 723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 733, "end_char": 759, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1681, "end_char": 1697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Vir Sen Sawhney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1720, "end_char": 1735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Copa! Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Copa!"}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1783, "end_char": 1796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh and P. G. 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Sadiq", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate held an enquiry in which one Prith Singh Azad, President of the Depressed Classes, Delhi, gave evidence that the appellant was a Muslim of the 1ame of Khaliq."}}, {"text": "Virindar Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5291, "end_char": 5305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that he was so converted, and that thereafter he came to be known as Virindar Kumar.", "canonical_name": "Virindar Kt4mar Salyawadi"}}, {"text": "17-9-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5628, "end_char": 5637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17-9-1952 the Magistrate passed an order that there wa> a prima f acie case for taking action, and on 29-9-1952 he filed a complaint before the First Class Magistrate, Kamal, charging the appelbnt with offences under sections 181, 182 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "29-9-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5730, "end_char": 5739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17-9-1952 the Magistrate passed an order that there wa> a prima f acie case for taking action, and on 29-9-1952 he filed a complaint before the First Class Magistrate, Kamal, charging the appelbnt with offences under sections 181, 182 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "First Class Magistrate, Kamal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5772, "end_char": 5801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17-9-1952 the Magistrate passed an order that there wa> a prima f acie case for taking action, and on 29-9-1952 he filed a complaint before the First Class Magistrate, Kamal, charging the appelbnt with offences under sections 181, 182 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "sections 181, 182 and 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5878, "end_char": 5895, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court of the Sessions Judge, Kamal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Kamal, who dismissed the same on the ground th:it the returning officer was not a Court, that the proceedings before\n\nShri Virilldar Kumar Saty awadi\n\nTiu Stat• of\n\nPunjab\n\nV1nkalarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nShri Vfrindar Kumar S(Jlyawadi\n\nThi State of\n\nPunjab\n\nV1nkalarama\n\n,(ryar ]."}}, {"text": "Virilldar Kumar Saty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6111, "end_char": 6131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Kamal, who dismissed the same on the ground th:it the returning officer was not a Court, that the proceedings 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was therefore appcalable."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6447, "end_char": 6459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "him did not fall under section 476, and that therefore no appeal lay under section 476-B.\n\nThe appellant took the matter in revision before the High Court, Punjab, and that was heard by Harnam Singh, J., who held, differing from the Sessions Judge, that the returning officer was a Court, and that his order was therefore appcalable."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6821, "end_char": 6837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appella:it Mr. N. C. Chatterjee argues that having held that the order of the returnmg officer was appealable, the learned Judge ought to have remanded the case for hearing by the Sessions\n\nJudge on the merits, and that his own disposal of the matter was summary and perfunctory.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7108, "end_char": 7119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of Mr. Gopal Singh for the respondent is that the view of the Sessions Judge th!lt the returning officer was not a court and that his order was not, therefore, appealable was correct, and that further the order of the High Court in revision declining to interfere on the merits was not liable to be questioned in special appeal in this Court."}}, {"text": "sections 195, 476 and 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7688, "end_char": 7714, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7716, "end_char": 7727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 172 to 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7814, "end_char": 7833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7841, "end_char": 7858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7946, "end_char": 7960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8233, "end_char": 8244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8274, "end_char": 8288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8294, "end_char": 8305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8439, "end_char": 8451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8506, "end_char": 8520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8526, "end_char": 8537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8590, "end_char": 8601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8703, "end_char": 8715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8821, "end_char": 8838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 181, 182 and 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8957, "end_char": 8982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 181 and 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9061, "end_char": 9081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9129, "end_char": 9143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9215, "end_char": 9226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9513, "end_char": 9524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195(1)(b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9746, "end_char": 9764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9791, "end_char": 9802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9884, "end_char": 9895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9948, "end_char": 9959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9985, "end_char": 9997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10554, "end_char": 10560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as to whether he is a judicial or ministerial officer\", says Parker on Election Agent and Returning Officer, Fifth Edition, page 30."}}, {"text": "Virint!ar Kumm Sat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10642, "end_char": 10660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The true\n\nShri Virint!ar Kumm Sat; Jawadi\n\nThi Stale of Punjab\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "Virindar Kt4mar Salyawadi"}}, {"text": "Virindar Kumar Satyawadi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10720, "end_char": 10744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi\n\nThe Slat1 of\n\nPunjab\n\nV1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nview, according to him, is that he partakes of both characters, and that 'in determining objections to nomination papers, he is a judicial officer.", "canonical_name": "Virindar Kt4mar Salyawadi"}}, {"text": "Sankey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11549, "end_char": 11555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies and tribunals, and entrust to them work of a judicial character, but they are not Courts in the accepted sense of that term, though they may possess, as observed by Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Company of Austral/a v. Federal Conl1n/ssio11er of Taxation( 1 ), some of the trappings of a Court."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11999, "end_char": 12006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There has been considerable discussion in the Courts in England and Australia as to what are the essential characteristics of a Court as distinguished from a tribuna!"}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12011, "end_char": 12020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There has been considerable discussion in the Courts in England and Australia as to what are the essential characteristics of a Court as distinguished from a tribuna!"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13713, "end_char": 13723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13731, "end_char": 13744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14290, "end_char": 14300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 90 and 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14485, "end_char": 14503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14705, "end_char": 14715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15040, "end_char": 15050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V rindar K •mar Satyawadi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15212, "end_char": 15237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of opinion that the returning officer deciding on\n\nM-85 S. 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{"document_id": "1955_2_1022_1029_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Dec1mh1r 1.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nTHAIVALAPPIL KUNJUVARU VAREED\n\nfl.\n\nTHE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.\n\nl S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 72, 161 and 238-Prerogative right of pardon vested in the Mahara7a of Cochin and affirmed by Art. XX! of Covenant dated 29th May 1949 entered into between the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin~Whet!1er superseded and abrogated in view of thr: acccJsion and integration of United State of Travancore Cochin with Dominion of India and the Union of India-Whether itJ r:ontinuence consistent U'ith ~4rts. 62, 161 and 238 of the Constitutioa.\n\nA sentence of death passed on the appellant by the Sessions Judge of Trichur (now siturrted in the United State of Travancore- Cochin and previously in the former State of Cochin) was confirmed by the High Court. Mercy petitions presented to the Raj Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin and to the President of India were rejected.\n\nThe question for determination was v; hether the appellant could rely on the pre-existing power of the Maharaja of Cochin to exercise the po, ver of pardon in respect of a sentence of death passed by the courts in his State, the prerogative right having been affirmed by Art. XX! of the Covenant dated the 29th May 1949, entered into between the Rulers of T ra vancore and Cochin.\n\nHeld that the pre-existing prerogative right of pardon vested in the Maharaja of Cochin must be taken to have been superseded and abrogated having regard to the event.s which culminated in the accession and integration of the State of Travancore+Cochin with the Dominion of India and thereafter its absorption into the Union of India when the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January 1950, the continuance of such prerogative being inconsistent \\Vith Arts. 72, 161 and 238 of the Constitution.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1955.\n\nOn appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 17th June 1955 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court at Ernakulam in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 113 of 1955 (R.T. No. 4 of 1954 and Criminal Appeal No. 136 of 1954).\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar, for the appellant.\n\nSardar Bahadur, for the respondent.\n\n1955. December 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave and arises under somewhat unusual circumstances. The appellant was convicted of murder in\n\nSessions Case No. lO of 1954 by the Sessions Judge of Trichur now in the State of Travancore-Cochin and sentenced to death. The sentence was in due course confirmed by the High Court and an application for leave to appeal against it to this Court was rejected.\n\nThe appellant filed mercy petitions to the Raj- Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin and to the President of India and both of them were rejected.\n\nAfter all these attempts had failed, the Sessions Judge issued a warrant on the 29th March, 1955, fixing 6th April, 1955, for the execution of the prisoner.\n\nMeanwhile, the Superintendent, Central Jail, Viyyur, where the condemned prisoner was lodged, informed the Sessions' Judge by his letter dated the 1st April, 1955, that the prisoner had sent a mercy petition to the Maharaja of Cochin and requested for directions, since no orders had been received in respect of that petition.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the Sessions Division of Trichur is admittedly in the former State of Cochin.\n\nIt does not appear from the record whether this mercy petition to the Maharaja of Cochin was sent before or after the mercy petitions to the Raj-Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin and to the President were disposed of. On receipt of the letter dated the 1st April, 1955, from the Superintendent, Central Jail, the Sessions Judge passed an order that the circumstances of the case demanded that the execution of the sentence should not take place on the date already fixed.\n\nHe accordingly issued an order staying execution of the sentence, previously ordered by his warrant dated the 29th March, 1955.\n\nAt this stage, the Public Prosecutor filed an application to the Sessions Judge on the 30th May, 1955, praying that the stay may be vacated and that fresh directions to execute the warrant may be issued.\n\nOn that application, the Public Prosecutor raised the question that a mercy\n\nTliaivalappil Irunjuvaru Var11d\n\nThe Stall of T ravancor1-Cochin\n\nTloaioalaHil KwijutJMU fl' amd\n\nTiu S1a11 of T rauancor4-Cochin\n\n]agartnadhadas ].\n\npet1t1on to the Maharaja of Cochin, who as such, has lost sovereignty over the territory forming part of the previous Cochin State, and hence also lost his prerogative of pardon, was incompetent and could not stand in the way of the warrant being executed.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge dealt with this question and agreed with the contention of: the Public Prosecutor. Accordingly, he vacated the stay and issued a fresh warrant for execution of the prisoner giving a week's time to the prisoner to take the matter on appeal to the High Court, if so advised.\n\nThe prisoner filed an appeal to the High Court and the learned Judges of the High Court after consideration of the arguments on both sides agreed with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge, and dismissed the appeal by its judgment dated the 17th June, 1955.\n\nThe present appeal is against this order of the High Court.\n\nFor the hearing of this appeal counsel was assigned to the appellant amicus curiae and all the relevant constitutional provisions have been fully and fairly placed before us. Learned counsel appearing for the State has also been heard.\n\nWe are satisfied that the question that has been raised does not admit of substantial argument and that the view taken by both the Courts below is correct.\n\nThe entire basis for any argument on behalf of the appellant is the pre-existing undoubted power of the Maharaja of Cochin to exercise the prerogative of pardon in respect of a sentence of death passed by the courts within his State. That prerogative right has been affirmed in Article XXI of the Covenant dated the 29th May, 1949, entered into between the Rulers of Travancorc and Cochin for the formation of the United State of Travancore and Cochin. The article is in the following terms : \"Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding provisions of this Covenant, the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin shall continue to have, and exercise, their present powers of suspension, remission or commutation of death sentences in respect of any person who may have been, or is hereafter, sentenced\n\nI f '\n\n2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COTJRT REPORTS 1025\n\nto death for capital offence committed within the territories of Travancore or Cochin as the case may be\".\n\nIt is only on the assumption that the power thus recognised in this article of the Covenant still survives in the Maharaja of Cochin, notwithstanding that he had lost his sovereignty over the territories which constituted the State of Cochin that the appellant has any statable case. -But this assumption is clearly unfounded having regard to the events which culminated in the accession and integration of the State of Travancore-Cochin with the Dominion of India and thereafter its absorption into the Union of India, when the Constitution of India came into operation on the 26th January, 1950. The relevant historical events may briefly be stated.\n\nIn August, 1947, the Rulers of the States of Travancore and Cochin executed separate instruments of accession to the Dominion of India on the same lines as most other Indian States did, at the time. In May, 1949, the two States formed into a United State\n\nunder a Covenant signed by each of the Maharajas, the provisions of which were guaranteed by the Government of India. It is Article XXI of this Covenant which has already been referred to and which provides for the continuance of the prerogative of the Maharaja of Cochin for commutation of death sentences within his State. Under this Covenant it was also . provided that the then Ruler of Travancore should be\n\nthe first Raj Pramukh of the United State of Travancore-Cochin.\n\nIt was specifically provided by Article IX thereof as follows :\n\n\"The Raj Pramukh shall, within a fortnight of the appointed day, execute on behalf of the United State an Instrument of Accession in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and in place of the Instruments of Accession of the Covenanting States\".\n\nBy Article X(4) of the Covenant it was provided that\n\n\"The Legislature of the United State shall, subject to the provisions of this Covenant, have full power\n\n191)1)\n\nThaivalappil KUl!furaru Yatud\n\nTm Stat, of T ra111111COr,..Co&/iitt\n\nJag1JMadliar/a1 J.\n\nT haivalappil Kunjuvaru V arttd\n\nThe State of Travantore-Cochin\n\n:Jagannadhadas].\n\nto make laws for the United State, including provisions as to the Constitution of the United State, within the framework of this Covenant and the Constitution of India\".\n\nIn pursuance of article\n\nIX, the Raj Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin executed an Instrument of Acce<- >ion dated the 14th July, 1949, which was accepted bv the Governor-General of India on the 15th August,\n\n1949. By article I of this Instrument it was declared that the United State acceded to the Dominion of India. In pursuance of Article X(4) the legislative assembly of the State of Travancore-Cochin resol\"ed that the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly be adopted by the State. In cons•:quence thereof the Raj Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin issued a proclamation dated the 24th November, 1949, which runs as follows :\n\n\"Whereas with the inauguration of the new Constitution for the whole of India now being framed by the Constituent Assembly of India, the Government of India Act, 1935, which now governs the constitutional relationship between this State and the Dominion of India. will stand repealed ; ! and whereas, in the best interests of the United State of Travancore and Cochin, which is closely linked with the rest of India by a community of interests in the economic, political and other fields, it is desirable that the constitutional relationship established between this State and the Dominion of India, should not only be continued as between this State and the contemplated Union of India further strengthened, and the Constitution of India as drafted by the Constituent Assembly of India, which includes duly appointed representatives of this State, provides a suitable basis for doing so ; And whereas by virtue of the power vesting in it under the Covenant establishing this State, the Legislative Assembly of the State has resolved that the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by this State ; I now hereby declare and direct-\n\nThat the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shal.l be the Constitution for the United State of Travancore and Cochin as for the other parts of India and shall be enforced as such in accordance with the tenor of its provisions : That the provisions of the said Constitution shall as from the date of its commencement, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which are at present in force in this State\".\n\nFor our present purposes, the last paragraph in this Proclamation is important. On the coming into force of the Constitution of India on the 26th January, 1950, the State of Travancore-Cochin became a part of the Union of India and was one of the Part B States as provided under article 1 clause\n\n(2) taken with Part B of the First Schedule. The Constitution specifically provided for the prerogative of mercy in respect of sentences of death in articles 72, 161 and\n\n238. Article 72 provides for the power of the President, article 161 for the power of the Governor in a Part A State, and article 238(1) taken with article 161 for the power of the Raj Pramukh of a Part B State. In the light of these provisions the continuance of the prerogative of the Maharaja of Cochin relating to the execution of the death sentences with reference to the ex-State of Cochin would be inconsistent with the new Constitution. Such power, therefore, must be taken to have 'been superseded and abrogated as stated in the last para of the Proclamation above mentioned.\n\nIt would follow that article XXI of the Covenant of May, 1949, no longer survives.\n\nArticle 372 ( 1) of the Constitution has also been relied upon on behalf of the appellant. This runs as follows: \"Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or re-\n\nThaioalappil K utifuoaru Varud\n\nTiu State of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nJagannadhadat ].\n\nTbai\"llaHiJ ,. .. ,;..- v.,...i\n\nTile Slllt• qf T fDDont; orf.Cochin\n\npealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority\".\n\nThe argument based on this article is that the criminal law of the ex-Cochin State continued to be in force in spite of the new Constitution having come into force and that the exercise of the prerogative by the Maharaja of Cochin in respect of the ex-State of Cochin was an integral part of that law. Apart from the question whether such prerogative which was incidental to his sovereignty, could survive after he lost his sovereignty over the territory, the difficulty in the way of this argument is two-fold. (1) The continuance is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution ; and (2) The continuance is only until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature.\n\nAs already pointed out, the continuance of the prerogative of the Maharaja of Cochin would be inconsistent with articles 72, 161 and 238 of the Constitution. Further it is to he noticed that by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951, (Central Act I of 1951), passed by the Union Legislature, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, has been made applicable to the whole of India by amending section 1 of the Code and by substitution therein for the words \"whole of India except Part B States'', the words \"whole of India except the States of Jari:tmu and Kashmir and Manipur\". The Code of Criminal Procedure and along with it sections 401, 402, and 402-A thereof, relating to commutation of sentences having thus been made specifically applicable to all Part B States by Central Act I of 1951, the . prerogative under the old Cochin law must in any case be deemed to have been repealed or abrogated by competent legislative authority after the coming into force of the Constitution. It was suggested in the Courts below that in so far as the Maharaja's prerogative was concerned the Legislature was incompetent to abrogate . it in view of article 362 of the Constitution. But that article has no bearing. It refers only to personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Rulers of Indian States. It is obvious even from the Covenant, in which article XXI appears, that the\n\n...\n\npower of pardon thereunder is different from \"personal rights, privileges and dignities\" which have been dealt with under articles XVI and XVII in the following terms.\n\n\"XVI. The Ruler of each Covenanting State, as also the members of his family, shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them, whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947.\n\nXVII. ( 1) The succession, according to law and custom to the gaddi of each Covenanting State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler thereof is hereby guaranteed\".\n\nThere is thus no substance in any of the arguments on which the ca~ for the appellant can possibly be presented.\n\nThis appeal is accordingly dismissed.\n\nTHAKUR PRAT AP SINGH\n\nf).\n\nSHRI KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J., V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI, fAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nJilt!ction Dispute-Rule requiring candidate to state occupati-:m in nomination paper-If mandatory in character-Duty of Court- Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act (II) of 1952, ss. 9(1)\n\n(iii) (c), 23.\n\nThe appellant was a candidate for the office of President of the Municipal Committee, Damoh. The nomination was made in an o\\d form under the old rules which required a candidate to enter his caste.\n\nUnder the new rules this was changed and occupation had to be stated instead, which none except the respondent No. I had done. Objection to the validity of the appellant's nomination paper was overruled by the Supervising Officer. The appellant secured the highest number of votes and was declared elected. The respondent No. 1, thereupon, filed the election petition. He failed in the Election Tribunal which held that the defect was not substantial and was curable. The High Court, however, reversed this decision in revision, holding that failure to comply with any of the provisions set out in the rules was fatal and in such cases the nomination papct should be rejected.\n\nThaiaalaOllU EwfirwotM V amd\n\nTh• SIDie of T rav1111&0t1-Cochin\n\n]opullldhad1J1 J.\n\nDecem6'r 2.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "THAIVALAPPIL KUNJUVARU VAREED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAIVALAPPIL KUNJUVARU VAREED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "l S. R. 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SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 195, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 198, "end_char": 219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 72, 161 and 238", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raj Pramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 910, "end_char": 921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mercy petitions presented to the Raj Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin and to the President of India were rejected.", "canonical_name": "Raj Pramukh"}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 925, "end_char": 942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mercy petitions presented to the Raj Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin and to the President of India were rejected."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1104, "end_char": 1110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question for determination was v; hether the appellant could rely on the pre-existing power of the Maharaja of Cochin to exercise the po, ver of pardon in respect of a sentence of death passed by the courts in his State, the prerogative right having been affirmed by Art."}}, {"text": "State of Travancore+Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1597, "end_char": 1623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held that the pre-existing prerogative right of pardon vested in the Maharaja of Cochin must be taken to have been superseded and abrogated having regard to the event.s which culminated in the accession and integration of the State of Travancore+Cochin with the Dominion of India and thereafter its absorption into the Union of India when the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January 1950, the continuance of such prerogative being inconsistent \\Vith Arts."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1714, "end_char": 1735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1759, "end_char": 1776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held that the pre-existing prerogative right of pardon vested in the Maharaja of Cochin must be taken to have been superseded and abrogated having regard to the event.s which culminated in the accession and integration of the State of Travancore+Cochin with the Dominion of India and thereafter its absorption into the Union of India when the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January 1950, the continuance of such prerogative being inconsistent \\Vith Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 72, 161 and 238", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1839, "end_char": 1860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2191, "end_char": 2207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2229, "end_char": 2243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Bahadur, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Raj- Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2776, "end_char": 2809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed mercy petitions to the Raj- Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin and to the President of India and both of them were rejected."}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2821, "end_char": 2839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed mercy petitions to the Raj- Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin and to the President of India and both of them were rejected."}}, {"text": "29th March, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all these attempts had failed, the Sessions Judge issued a warrant on the 29th March, 1955, fixing 6th April, 1955, for the execution of the prisoner."}}, {"text": "6th April, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2978, "end_char": 2993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all these attempts had failed, the Sessions Judge issued a warrant on the 29th March, 1955, fixing 6th April, 1955, for the execution of the prisoner."}}, {"text": "Superintendent, Central Jail, Viyyur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3046, "end_char": 3082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the Superintendent, Central Jail, Viyyur, where the condemned prisoner was lodged, informed the Sessions' Judge by his letter dated the 1st April, 1955, that the prisoner had sent a mercy petition to the Maharaja of Cochin and requested for directions, since no orders had been received in respect of that petition."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the Superintendent, Central Jail, Viyyur, where the condemned prisoner was lodged, informed the Sessions' Judge by his letter dated the 1st April, 1955, that the prisoner had sent a mercy petition to the Maharaja of Cochin and requested for directions, since no orders had been received in respect of that petition."}}, {"text": "Maharaja of Cochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3246, "end_char": 3264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the Superintendent, Central Jail, Viyyur, where the condemned prisoner was lodged, informed the Sessions' Judge by his letter dated the 1st April, 1955, that the prisoner had sent a mercy petition to the Maharaja of Cochin and requested for directions, since no orders had been received in respect of that petition."}}, {"text": "Raj-Pramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3604, "end_char": 3615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It does not appear from the record whether this mercy petition to the Maharaja of Cochin was sent before or after the mercy petitions to the Raj-Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin and to the President were disposed of.", "canonical_name": "Raj Pramukh"}}, {"text": "30th May, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4147, "end_char": 4161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At this stage, the Public Prosecutor filed an application to the Sessions Judge on the 30th May, 1955, praying that the stay may be vacated and that fresh directions to execute the warrant may be issued."}}, {"text": "Tliaivalappil Irunjuvaru Var11d", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4342, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that application, the Public Prosecutor raised the question that a mercy\n\nTliaivalappil Irunjuvaru Var11d\n\nThe Stall of T ravancor1-Cochin\n\nTloaioalaHil KwijutJMU fl' amd\n\nTiu S1a11 of T rauancor4-Cochin\n\n]agartnadhadas ]."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4444, "end_char": 4446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th June, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5299, "end_char": 5314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prisoner filed an appeal to the High Court and the learned Judges of the High Court after consideration of the arguments on both sides agreed with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge, and dismissed the appeal by its judgment dated the 17th June, 1955."}}, {"text": "29th May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6088, "end_char": 6102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That prerogative right has been affirmed in Article XXI of the Covenant dated the 29th May, 1949, entered into between the Rulers of Travancorc and Cochin for the formation of the United State of Travancore and Cochin."}}, {"text": "Travancorc", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That prerogative right has been affirmed in Article XXI of the Covenant dated the 29th May, 1949, entered into between the Rulers of Travancorc and Cochin for the formation of the United State of Travancore and Cochin."}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That prerogative right has been affirmed in Article XXI of the Covenant dated the 29th May, 1949, entered into between the Rulers of Travancorc and Cochin for the formation of the United State of Travancore and Cochin."}}, {"text": "State of Travancore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7137, "end_char": 7156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-But this assumption is clearly unfounded having regard to the events which culminated in the accession and integration of the State of Travancore-Cochin with the Dominion of India and thereafter its absorption into the Union of India, when the Constitution of India came into operation on the 26th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7173, "end_char": 7190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-But this assumption is clearly unfounded having regard to the events which culminated in the accession and integration of the State of Travancore-Cochin with the Dominion of India and thereafter its absorption into the Union of India, when the Constitution of India came into operation on the 26th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7230, "end_char": 7244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-But this assumption is clearly unfounded having regard to the events which culminated in the accession and integration of the State of Travancore-Cochin with the Dominion of India and thereafter its absorption into the Union of India, when the Constitution of India came into operation on the 26th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7255, "end_char": 7276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7304, "end_char": 7322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-But this assumption is clearly unfounded having regard to the events which culminated in the accession and integration of the State of Travancore-Cochin with the Dominion of India and thereafter its absorption into the Union of India, when the Constitution of India came into operation on the 26th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7732, "end_char": 7751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In May, 1949, the two States formed into a United State\n\nunder a Covenant signed by each of the Maharajas, the provisions of which were guaranteed by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8345, "end_char": 8354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8362, "end_char": 8391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thaivalappil KUl!furaru Yatud", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8634, "end_char": 8663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Article X(4) of the Covenant it was provided that\n\n\"The Legislature of the United State shall, subject to the provisions of this Covenant, have full power\n\n191)1)\n\nThaivalappil KUl!furaru Yatud\n\nTm Stat, of T ra111111COr,..Co&/iitt\n\nJag1JMadliar/a1 J.\n\nT haivalappil Kunjuvaru V arttd\n\nThe State of Travantore-Cochin\n\n:Jagannadhadas]."}}, {"text": "State of Travantore-Cochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8760, "end_char": 8786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Article X(4) of the Covenant it was provided that\n\n\"The Legislature of the United State shall, subject to the provisions of this Covenant, have full power\n\n191)1)\n\nThaivalappil KUl!furaru Yatud\n\nTm Stat, of T ra111111COr,..Co&/iitt\n\nJag1JMadliar/a1 J.\n\nT haivalappil Kunjuvaru V arttd\n\nThe State of Travantore-Cochin\n\n:Jagannadhadas]."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8952, "end_char": 8973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9154, "end_char": 9159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of article\n\nIX, the Raj Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin executed an Instrument of Acce<- >ion dated the 14th July, 1949, which was accepted bv the Governor-General of India on the 15th August,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "15th August,\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9167, "end_char": 9185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of article\n\nIX, the Raj Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin executed an Instrument of Acce<- >ion dated the 14th July, 1949, which was accepted bv the Governor-General of India on the 15th August,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "24th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9563, "end_char": 9582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cons•:quence thereof the Raj Pramukh of Travancore-Cochin issued a proclamation dated the 24th November, 1949, which runs as follows :\n\n\"Whereas with the inauguration of the new Constitution for the whole of India now being framed by the Constituent Assembly of India, the Government of India Act, 1935, which now governs the constitutional relationship between this State and the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9746, "end_char": 9775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United State of Travancore and Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9939, "end_char": 9976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and whereas, in the best interests of the United State of Travancore and Cochin, which is closely linked with the rest of India by a community of interests in the economic, political and other fields, it is desirable that the constitutional relationship established between this State and the Dominion of India, should not only be continued as between this State and the contemplated Union of India further strengthened, and the Constitution of India as drafted by the Constituent Assembly of India, which includes duly appointed representatives of this State, provides a suitable basis for doing so ; And whereas by virtue of the power vesting in it under the Covenant establishing this State, the Legislative Assembly of the State has resolved that the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by this State ; I now hereby declare and direct-\n\nThat the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shal.l be the Constitution for the United State of Travancore and Cochin as for the other parts of India and shall be enforced as such in accordance with the tenor of its provisions : That the provisions of the said Constitution shall as from the date of its commencement, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which are at present in force in this State\"."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10326, "end_char": 10347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constituent Assembly of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10366, "end_char": 10395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and whereas, in the best interests of the United State of Travancore and Cochin, which is closely linked with the rest of India by a community of interests in the economic, political and other fields, it is desirable that the constitutional relationship established between this State and the Dominion of India, should not only be continued as between this State and the contemplated Union of India further strengthened, and the Constitution of India as drafted by the Constituent Assembly of India, which includes duly appointed representatives of this State, provides a suitable basis for doing so ; And whereas by virtue of the power vesting in it under the Covenant establishing this State, the Legislative Assembly of the State has resolved that the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly of India be adopted by this State ; I now hereby declare and direct-\n\nThat the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shal.l be the Constitution for the United State of Travancore and Cochin as for the other parts of India and shall be enforced as such in accordance with the tenor of its provisions : That the provisions of the said Constitution shall as from the date of its commencement, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which are at present in force in this State\"."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10779, "end_char": 10800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11374, "end_char": 11395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11427, "end_char": 11453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the coming into force of the Constitution of India on the 26th January, 1950, the State of Travancore-Cochin became a part of the Union of India and was one of the Part B States as provided under article 1 clause\n\n(2) taken with Part B of the First Schedule."}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11541, "end_char": 11550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11588, "end_char": 11602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 72, 161 and\n\n238", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11708, "end_char": 11733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11735, "end_char": 11745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11787, "end_char": 11798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 238(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11852, "end_char": 11866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11878, "end_char": 11889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12400, "end_char": 12411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12595, "end_char": 12606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 72, 161 and 238", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13852, "end_char": 13876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13938, "end_char": 13980, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Act I of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13989, "end_char": 14010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14050, "end_char": 14082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14143, "end_char": 14152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14333, "end_char": 14359, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 401, 402", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14378, "end_char": 14395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Part B States by Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14506, "end_char": 14534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14891, "end_char": 14902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part B States by Central Act", "statute": "Part B States by Central Act"}}, {"text": "15th day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15546, "end_char": 15570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ruler of each Covenanting State, as also the members of his family, shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them, whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947."}}, {"text": "THAKUR PRAT AP SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15926, "end_char": 15946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THAKUR PRAT AP SINGH\n\nf)."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15986, "end_char": 15995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J., V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI, fAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16011, "end_char": 16032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J., V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI, fAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "fAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16034, "end_char": 16047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J., V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI, fAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "ss. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16257, "end_char": 16265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ThaiaalaOllU EwfirwotM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17161, "end_char": 17183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ThaiaalaOllU EwfirwotM V amd\n\nTh• SIDie of T rav1111&0t1-Cochin\n\n]opullldhad1J1 J.\n\nDecem6'r 2."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1029_1034_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1029\n\npower of pardon thereunder is different from \"personal rights, privileges and dignities\" which have been dealt with under articles XVI and XVII in the following terms.\n\n\"XVI. The Ruler of each Covenanting State, as also the members of his family, shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them, whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947.\n\nXVII. ( 1) The succession, according to law and custom to the gaddi of each Covenanting State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler thereof is hereby guaranteed\".\n\nThere is thus no substance in any of the arguments on which the ca~ for the appellant can possibly be presented.\n\nThis appeal is accordingly dismissed.\n\nTHAKUR PRAT AP SINGH\n\nf).\n\nSHRI KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J., V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI, fAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nJilt!ction Dispute-Rule requiring candidate to state occupati-:m in nomination paper-If mandatory in character-Duty of Court- Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act (II) of 1952, ss. 9(1)\n\n(iii) (c), 23.\n\nThe appellant was a candidate for the office of President of the Municipal Committee, Damoh. The nomination was made in an o\\d form under the old rules which required a candidate to enter his caste.\n\nUnder the new rules this was changed and occupation had to be stated instead, which none except the respondent No. I had done. Objection to the validity of the appellant's nomination paper was overruled by the Supervising Officer. The appellant secured the highest number of votes and was declared elected. The respondent No. 1, thereupon, filed the election petition. He failed in the Election Tribunal which held that the defect was not substantial and was curable. The High Court, however, reversed this decision in revision, holding that failure to comply with any of the provisions set out in the rules was fatal and in such cases the nomination papct should be rejected.\n\nThaiaalaOllU EwfirwotM V amd\n\nTh• SIDie of T rav1111&0t1-Cochin\n\n]opullldhad1J1 J.\n\nDecem6'r 2.\n\n1955 '\n\nT\"4Tcur PraJap\n\nSingh\n\nShri Krishna Gupta\n\nond otkrs\n\nHeld, that the rule requiring the occupation of the candidate to be st.ated in the nomination form was directory an<l not mandatory in character and as the failure to comply with it did not affect the merits of the case as laid down in s. 23 of the Act, the election could not be set <iside on that ground.\n\nRattan Anmol Singh v. Atma Ram ([1955] I S.C.R. 481 ), dis tinguished.\n\nCourts should not go by mere technicalities but look to the ub stance.\n\nSome rules may be vital, while others are merely directory, and a breach of thtle may be overlooked, provided there is substantial compliance \\Vith the rules read as a whole and no prejudice ensues.\n\nWhen the Act does not n1ake a clear distinction, it is the duty of the court to sort out one class from the other along broad based commonsense lines.\n\nPunjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar '\" lnconle-Tax Officer, Lahore ([1940] L.R. 67 I.A. 464), referred to.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE No. 294 of 1955.\n\njuRISDICTION :.\n\nCivil Appeal\n\nAppeal by special leave from the f udgment and Order dated the 7th September, f955, of the Nagpur High Court, in Civil Revision No. 833 of 1954.\n\nB. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta, with him) for the appellant.\n\nR. S. Dabir and R. A. Govind, for respondent No. 1.\n\n1955.\n\nDecember 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The appellant was a candidate for the office of President of the Municipal Committee of Dam oh. The respondents (seven of them) were also candidates. The nominations were made on forms supplied by the Municipal Committee but it turned out that the forms were old ones that had not been brought up to date. Under the old rules candidates were required to give their caste, but on 23-7-1949 this was changed and instead of caste their occupation had to be entered. The only person who kept himself abreast of the law was the first . respondent.\n\nHe struck out the word \"caste\" in the printed form and wrote in \"occupation\" instead and then gave his occupation, as th\" new rule required, and not his\n\ncaste. All the other candidates, including the appellant, filled in their forms as they stood and entered their caste and not their occupation. The first respondent raised an objection before the Supervising Officer and contended that all the other nomi11ations were invalid and claimed that he should be elected as his was the only valid nomination paper. The objection was overruled and the election proceeded.\n\nThe appellant secured the highest number of votes and was declared to be elected. The first respondent thereupon filed the election petition uut of which this appeal arises. He failed in the trial Court. The learned Judge held that the defect was not substantial and so held that it was curable. This was reversed by the High Court on revision. The learned High Court Judges referred to a decision of this Court in Rattan Anmol Singh v. Atma Ram(') and held that any failure to comply with any of the provisions set out in the various rules is fatal and that in such cases the nomination paper must be rejected.\n\nWe do not think that is right and we deprecate this tendency towards technicality ; it is the substance that counts and must take precedence over mere form.\n\nSome rules are vital and go to the root of the matter : they cannot be broken ; others are only directory and a breach of them can be overlooked provided there is substantial compliance with the rules read as whole and provided no prejudice ensues ; and when the legislature does not itself state which is which judges must determine the matter and, exercising a nice discrimination, sort out one class from the other along broad based, commonsense lines. This principle was enunciated by Vicount Maugham in Puniab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. lncometax Officer, Lahore(\") and was quoted by the learned High Court Judges:\n\n\"It is a well settled general rule that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially\".\n\n(1) [ 955) I S.C.R.481.\n\n(2) [ 940) L. R. 67 I. A. 464, 476.\n\nThakur Pratap\n\nSingh\n\nv, Shri Krishna Guptt1\n\nand othtrs\n\nBose J.\n\n1955 T\"\"\"\"' l'Ntap SiqA\n\nS/wl If\"'\"\"\" Gupt4\n\n\"\"' 0\"'61\n\nS-J.\n\nBut apart from that, 'this is to be found in the Act itself.\n\nThe learned High Court Judges were of opinion that the directions here about the occupation were mandatory. That, we think, is wrong.\n\nThe present matter is governed by section 18 of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act\n\n(II) of 1922. Among other things,, the section empowers the State Government to\n\n\"make rules under this Act regulating the mode ........ of election of presidents ........ \" and section 175 (1) directs that\n\n\"all rules for which provision is made in this Act shall be made by the State Government and shall be consistent with this Act\".\n\nNow one of the provisions of the Act, the one that directly concerns us, is set out in section 23 :\n\n\"Anything done or any proceeding taken under this Act shall not be questioned ...... on account of any defect or irregularity not affecting the merits of the case\".\n\nThe rules have therefore to be construed in the light of that provision.\n\nRule 9(1)(i) states that- \" ........ each candidate shall .......... deliver to the Supervising Officer a nomination paper completed in the f'prm appended and subscribed by the candidate himself as assenting to the nomination and by two duly qualified electors as proposer and seconder\".\n\nThe amended form requires the candidate to give, among other things, his name, father's name, age, address an<l occupation ; and rule 9(1) (iii) directs that the Supervising Officer.\n\n\"shall examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may either on such objection or on his own motion, after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, refuse any nomination on any of the following grounds :\n\n• • • •\n\n(c) that there has been any failure to comply with any of the provisions of clause (i) ...... \".\n\nIt was contended that the word \"may\" which we have underlined above has the force of \"shall\" in that context because clause (a) of the rule reads-\n\n\" (a) that the candidate is ineligible for election under section 14 or section 15 of the Act\".\n\nIt was argued that , if the candidate's ineligibility under those sections is established, then the Supervising Officer has no option but to refuse the nomination and it was said that if that is the force of the word \"may\" in a case under clause\n\n(a) it cannot be given a different meaning when clause ( c) is attracted.\n\nWe need not stop to consider whether this argument would be valid if section 23 had not been there because the rules cannot travel beyond the Act and must be read subject to its provisions. Reading rule 9(1) (iii) (c) in the light of section 23, all that we have to see is whether an. omission to set out a candidate's occupation can be said to affect \"the merits of the case\".\n\nWe are clear it does not. Take the case of a man who has no occupation. What difference would it make whether he entered the word \"nil\" there, or struck out the W'>rd \"occupation\" or placed a line against it, or just left it blanks ? How is the case any different, so far as the merits are concerned, when a man who has a occupation does not disclose it or misnames it, especially as a man's occupation is not one of the qualifications for the office of President. We are clear that this part of the form is only directory and is part of the description of the candidate ; it does not go to the root of the matter so long as there is enough material in the paper to enable him to be identified beyond doubt.\n\nIt was also argued that there was a reason for requiring the occupation to be stated, namely, because section 15(k) of the Act disqualified any person who \"holds any office of profit\" under the Committee.\n\nBut disclosure of a candidate's occupation would not necessarily reveal this because the occupation need only be stated in general terms such as \"service\" or\n\nT\"\"\"\"1 Pralap\n\nSingli\n\nS/irl Krisluta GuJi.\n\nand olbers\n\nBos1 J.\n\nThakur ITatap\n\nSingh\n\nShri Krishna Gupta\n\nand othns\n\nBose J.\n\n\"agriculture\" and need not be particularised ; also, in any event, section 15 sets out other grounds of disqualification which are not required to be shown in the form.\n\nAs regards our earlier decision. That was a case in which the law required the satisfaction oI a particular official at a particular time about the identity of an illiterate candidate. That, we held, was the substance and said in effect that if the law states that A must be satisfied about a particular matter, A's satisfaction cannot be replaced by that of B ; still less can it be dispensed with altogether. The law we were dealing with there also required that the satisfaction should be endorsed on the nomination paper.\n\nThat we indicated was mere form and said at page 488-\n\n\"If the Returning Officer had omitted the attestation because of some slip on his part and it could be proved that he was satisfied at the proper time, the matter might be different because the element of his satisfaction at the proper time, which is of the substance, would be there, and the omission formally to record the satisfaction could probably, in a case like that, be regarded as an unsubstantial technicality\".\n\nA number of English cases were cited before us but it will be idle to examine them because we are concerned with the terms of section 23 of our Act and we can derive no assistance from decisions that deal with other laws made in other countries to deal with situations that do not necessarily arise in India.\n\nThe appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs here and in the High Court. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Civil Judge restored.", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "15th day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 451, "end_char": 475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ruler of each Covenanting State, as also the members of his family, shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them, whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947."}}, {"text": "THAKUR PRAT AP SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 831, "end_char": 851, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKUR PRATAP SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 863, "end_char": 887, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 891, "end_char": 900, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 916, "end_char": 937, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 957, "end_char": 972, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1162, "end_char": 1170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2199, "end_char": 2212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 '\n\nT\"4Tcur PraJap\n\nSingh\n\nShri Krishna Gupta\n\nond otkrs\n\nHeld, that the rule requiring the occupation of the candidate to be st.ated in the nomination form was directory an<l not mandatory in character and as the failure to comply with it did not affect the merits of the case as laid down in s. 23 of the Act, the election could not be set <iside on that ground.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2461, "end_char": 2466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3029, "end_char": 3058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar '\" lnconle-Tax Officer, Lahore ([1940] L.R. 67 I.A. 464), referred to."}}, {"text": "L.R. 67 I.A. 464", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3108, "end_char": 3124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. B. Tawakley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3353, "end_char": 3367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. S. Dabir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3413, "end_char": 3424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Dabir and R. A. Govind, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. A. Govind", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3429, "end_char": 3441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Dabir and R. A. Govind, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "23-7-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3917, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the old rules candidates were required to give their caste, but on 23-7-1949 this was changed and instead of caste their occupation had to be entered."}}, {"text": "Vicount Maugham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5910, "end_char": 5925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle was enunciated by Vicount Maugham in Puniab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. lncometax Officer, Lahore(\") and was quoted by the learned High Court Judges:\n\n\"It is a well settled general rule that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially\"."}}, {"text": "L. R. 67 I. A. 464", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Krishna Guptt1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Pratap\n\nSingh\n\nv, Shri Krishna Guptt1\n\nand othtrs\n\nBose J.\n\n1955 T\"\"\"\"' l'Ntap SiqA\n\nS/wl If\"'\"\"\" Gupt4\n\n\"\"' 0\"'61\n\nS-J.\n\nBut apart from that, 'this is to be found in the Act itself.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6356, "end_char": 6360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Pratap\n\nSingh\n\nv, Shri Krishna Guptt1\n\nand othtrs\n\nBose J.\n\n1955 T\"\"\"\"' l'Ntap SiqA\n\nS/wl If\"'\"\"\" Gupt4\n\n\"\"' 0\"'61\n\nS-J.\n\nBut apart from that, 'this is to be found in the Act itself."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6658, "end_char": 6668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6902, "end_char": 6913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act shall be made by the State Government and shall be consistent with this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6979, "end_char": 7058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7149, "end_char": 7159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shall be made by the State Government and shall be consistent with this Act", "statute": "Act shall be made by the State Government and shall be consistent with this Act"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8466, "end_char": 8476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8480, "end_char": 8490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8896, "end_char": 8906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9061, "end_char": 9071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10017, "end_char": 10030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thakur ITatap\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10346, "end_char": 10366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and olbers\n\nBos1 J.\n\nThakur ITatap\n\nSingh\n\nShri Krishna Gupta\n\nand othns\n\nBose J.\n\n\"agriculture\" and need not be particularised ; also, in any event, section 15 sets out other grounds of disqualification which are not required to be shown in the form."}}, {"text": "Krishna Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10373, "end_char": 10386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and olbers\n\nBos1 J.\n\nThakur ITatap\n\nSingh\n\nShri Krishna Gupta\n\nand othns\n\nBose J.\n\n\"agriculture\" and need not be particularised ; also, in any event, section 15 sets out other grounds of disqualification which are not required to be shown in the form.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10399, "end_char": 10403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and olbers\n\nBos1 J.\n\nThakur ITatap\n\nSingh\n\nShri Krishna Gupta\n\nand othns\n\nBose J.\n\n\"agriculture\" and need not be particularised ; also, in any event, section 15 sets out other grounds of disqualification which are not required to be shown in the form."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11709, "end_char": 11719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11885, "end_char": 11890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of English cases were cited before us but it will be idle to examine them because we are concerned with the terms of section 23 of our Act and we can derive no assistance from decisions that deal with other laws made in other countries to deal with situations that do not necessarily arise in India."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1035_1042_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1035\n\nCHAND! PRASAD SINGH\n\nTHE ST ATE OF UTT AR PRADESH.\n\n[VIVIAN Bos£ and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]\n\nTrial before Sessions Tudge for an offence under s. 409, l.P.l. with the aid of asses; ors for misappropriating certain sums of money from three different persons-Received by appellant as Secretary of a Company-And for an offence under s. 477-A, l.P.C. for falsifyi11t a minute book-With the aid of Turv-Same persons acting as assessors and iurors-V rdict of not guilty in respect of both charges-Disagreement with verdict of jury under s. 477-A and reference to the High Court under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-Dis- 11greement with the opinion of assessors under s. 409 and conviction of accused-Appeal to the High Court-Appeal and reference both heard together and disposed of by one judgment by High Court-Sessions Tudge whether contravened any provision of law or committed illegality in acttnf!; as he did-Appellant's status-Whether that of a servant 01 tnat of an age11t--S::.'11ant and agent-Distinction between- Appellant charged with three offences under s. 409, l.P.C. and one offence under s. 477-A; l.P.C.-Whether contravention of s. 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedurc-S. 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-Applicability of.\n\nThe appellant was tried bv the Sessions Judge with the aid of assessors tor an offence under s. 409, I.P.C. for misappropriating certain sums of money recei; ed as promoter of a Company from three different persons for the purpose of allotment of shares and omitted to be brought into the Company after it was formed, and also for an oflence under s. 477-A, I.P.C. by the same Sessions Judge with the aid of a jury for the offence of falsifying a minute hook, the same persons acting both as assessors and jurors. They rcurned a ve1 Jict of not guilty in respect of both the charges. The Sessions Judge, disagreeing with the verdict of the jury under s. 477-A, referred the matter to the High Court under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. .Disagreeing also with the opinion of the assessors in respect of the charge under s. 409, I.P.C. he held the appellant guilty and sentenced him to 4 years' regorous imprisonment. Against this conviction the appellant appealed to the High Court. Both the reference under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the appeal were heard togethef by the High Court. which confirmed the appellant's conviction under s. 409 and the sePtence passed by the Sessions Judge and disagreeing with the veidict of the jury it held him guilty under s. 477-A and sentenced him to two years' rigorous imprisonment. Oil appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court :- -\n\nHeld (i) that the contention that when the Sessions Judge disagreed with the verdict of the jury and the opinion ot the assessors, l l-3'i S. C. Ind a/59\n\nDee1mber7.\n\nCi1a:1di PrastSd\n\nSingh\n\nTi1t State of Uttar Prad•sh\n\nhe shoul<l have referred the \\Vhole case under s. 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the High Co!1rt and not merely that part ot\n\nit \\\\'hich related to the charge under s. 477-A, l.P.C. was without force because the Sessions judge had contravened no provision of law and committed no illegality in deciding the case which related to the charge under s. 409, l.P.C. That s. 307, Code of Criminal Pmcedure appiies in terms only to trials by a jury and the Sessions Judge had no po\\ver under that section to refer cases tried with the aid of a:; sessors for the decision ot the High Court. In the present case there \\VJS the further fact that both the appeal against the conviction under s. 409, LP.C. and the r:.:ference under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in n::spect of the charge under s. 477-A WC'I? disposed of by the same judgment ;\n\n(ii) that the contention that the appellant's true status was that of a serv;.i.nt and not that of= an agent and that he should have been tried not under s. 409, l.P.C. but under s. 408, I.P.C. was also without force inasmuch as his status \\Vas that of an agent and not that of a servant in view of his duties as Secretary of the Society.\n\nThe distinction betv:een the t\\VO is this a srvant acts under the direct control and supervision of the master, and is bound to conform to all reasonable orders given to him in the course of his work .. An agent though bound to exenise his authority in accordance with all lawful instruction~ \\.Vhich may be given to him from time to time by his princip:ii, is not subject in its exercise to the direct control or supervision of the principal ;\n\n(iii) that the contention that there h1-::. been violation of s. 234 of the Cod.: of c:riminal Procedure ir. that the appellant had been charged with three offcn..:es under s. 409i l.P.C. and one under s. 477-A was also \\vithout force as the case was governed by s. 235 ot the Co<lc 0£ Criminal Pru;:edure as the several offences under s. 409, I.P.C. and s. 477-A, 1.P.C. <irose out of th~ same acts and formed part of the san1e transaction.\n\nEmpEror v. Haria Dhobi, (A.LR. \\937 Patna 662), Pachaimuthu In 1e, ([1932] l.L.R. 55 Ma<l. 715), Emperor v. Lachrnan Gangota, (A.LR. 1934 Patna 424), Emperor v. Kalidas ([1898] 8 Born. L.R. 599), Emperor v. Vyankat Sing {fl907] 9 Born. L.R. 1057) and Emperor v. Chanbasappa (A.LR. 1932 Born. 61), referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 143 of 1954.\n\nOn appeal by leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd March 1954 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 1953 connected with Criminal Reference Register No. 15 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 24th February 1953 in Sessions Trial No. 5 of 1952 of the Sessions Court at Lucknow.\n\nB. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta and A. D. Mathur with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. P. Sinha (K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal with him) for the respondent.\n\n1955. December 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad affirming the conviction of the appel- 1:1.nt by the Sessions Judge, Lucknow under sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn 12-2-1949 a Society known as the Model Town Co-operative Housing Society, Ltd., was register.d under the provisions of the Co-operatiYe S'J<.:ieties Act (II of 1912), its object being to acquire vacant sites in the town of Lucknow and to al\\ot them to its members so as to enable them to build houses of their own. The appellant. was the chief promoter thereof, and collected monies from prospective shareholders by way of share money. The first general body meeting of the :Society was held on 1-3-1949. At that meeting, the appellant was elected Honorary Secretary and one Sri Munna Lal Tewari as Treasurer. The latter having resigned, one S. C. Varma was appointed Treasurer in his stead. On 22-4-1949, there was a meeting of the Managing Committee, at which the appellant was directed to hand over the accounts of the Society and its funds to its Treasurer. The appellant gave a list of 38 persons as members of the Society, delivery cheques issued by 13 of them as their share money, and paid a sum of Rs. 3,500 being the amount stated to have been received by him from the other 25 members as share money. The Society did not function thereafter.\n\nOn 16-7-1949 some of the members wrote a letter to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies pointing out that the Society had not functioned ever since its incorporation, and asking that steps might be taken for examination of its accounts and, if necessary, for its being wound up. On this, there was an investigation of the affairs of the Society by two Assistant\n\nChandi Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nThe Stat. of U tlar Pradtsli\n\nChandi Pra5od\n\nSi1ish\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nV rnkatarama Ayyar ].\n\nRegistrars, and on the basis of their reports dated 22-2-1950 and 18-5-1950 the present prosecution was started against the appellant charging him under sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code. The charge under section 409 was that he had received a sum of Rs. 500 from one Sri Chaturvedi, a sum of Rs. 100 from Dr. 0. P. Bhanti and another sum of Rs. 100 from Dr. R. S. Seth, all as share money in December 1948, and that he had misappropriated the same. The charge under section 477-A was that on 22-4-1949 the appellant acting as the Secretary of the Society falsified the minute book, Exhibit P-18, by omitting to show therein the share money received from the three persons above mentioned. The defence of the appellant: was that the three amounts aforesaid were paid to him not as prospective Secretary for the purpose of allotment of shares, but were deposited with him in his individual capacity for purchasing shares, in case the Society worked well.\n\nThe trial of the offence under section 409 was held with the aid of assessors and that under section\n\n477-A with the aid of a jury, the same persons acting both as assessors and jurors, and they returned a verdict of not guilty with reference to the charges under both the sections. The Sessions Judge, disagreeing with the verdict of the jury under section\n\n477-A, referred the matter to the High Court under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He also disagreed with the opinion of the assessors with reference to the charge under section 409, and held that the appellant: was guilty and sentenced him to four years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000. Against this conviction, the appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court. Both the reference under section 307 and the appeal were heard together by the High Court, which agreed with the Sessions Judge that the appellant had received the three amounts as share money and in his capacity as Secretary, and accordingly confirmed his conviction under section 409 ahd the sentence passed by the Sessions Judge.\n\nDisagreeing with the verdict of the jury, it also held him guilty under section 477-A and sentenced him to\n\ntwo years' rigorous imprisonment. The present appeal by special leave is directed av, ainst this judgment.\n\nMr. Taw2, kley firstly contended that the finding of the courts below that the amounts paid by Sri Chaturvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth were paid :is share money was erroneous, and in support of this contention relied on a letter written by one of them, Dr.\n\nSeth, to 'the appellant on 3rd May 1951 (Ex. D-5) in which it was stated that the amount was paid on the express understanding that if the Society ran, a share\n\nwould be allotted to him and otherwise the monev would be returned.\n\nThis letter was written long afte~· proctedings had been taken by the Registrar, and the courts below did not attach much importance to it. On the ot!1er hand, Dr. Seth himself gave evidence in these proceedings which deprives Exhibit D-5 of very much of its value.\n\nExhibit P-10 is the receipt gra; iL l to Sri Chaturvedi. It expressly recites that Rs. 500 was received as share monev fm five shares in the Society. Notices were also isued to both Sri\n\nChaturvedi and Dr. Bhanti to lttend the general body meeting of the Society to be held on 1st March 1949 for electing the President and members of the Managing Committee of the Society, and Dr. Seth and Dr. Bhanti actually attended it.\n\nSri Chaturvedi and Dr. Bhanti have also given evidence that they paid the amounts only as share capital. The courts below accepted the above evidence, and held that the moneys were not paid to the appellant in his individual capacity. There are no grounds for disturbing that finding in special appeal.\n\nIt is now necessary to deal with the several contentions of law urged by Mr. Tawakley in support of this appeal. His first contention was that when the Sessions Judge disagreed with the verdict of the jury and with the opinion of the assessors, he should have referred the whole case under section 307 for the decision of the High Court and not merely that part or it which related to the charge under section 477-A, and that his failure to do so vitiated the conviction.\n\nHe argued that when the same facts constitute two\n\nSingh\n\nThe State ef Uttar .frad; sh\n\nVeatarama\n\n4, yyar J.\n\nChandi Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nTh£ St, te of Uttar Pracb.sh\n\nY enkatarama\n\nApar J.\n\ndistinct offences one of which is triable with the aid of jurors and the other with assessors, and the accused is charged with both, the reference under section 307 must relate to both thecharges, if inconsistent findings by different courts with reference to the ·; ame matter is to be avoided. What would happen, he asked, if, in the present case, the appellant did not file an appeal against his conviction U<lder section 409, but the High Court came to the conclusio!\\ in the reference under section 307 that Sri Chaturvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth did not pay the amounts to the appellant as share money, and tlldt no offence had been committed by him under section 477-A ? The conviction of the appellant under section 409 based on the finding of the Sessions Judge that those amounts were paid as share money would stand, notwithstanding that it would be against the decision of the High Court. This anomaly could be avoided, it is argued, by holding that the reference under section 307 must be of the whole case.\n\nReliance is placed in support of this contention on the observations in Emperor v. Haria Dhobi('). We are unable to agree , with this contention. If the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge is to be held to be illegal, it can only be on the ground that he contravened some provision of law which requires him to refer the whole case to the High Court. It is conceded that the only provision of law dealing with this matter is section 307.\n\nBut that section applies in terms only to trials with the aid of a jury. There is therefore no power in the Sessions Court to refer cases tried with the aid of assessors for decision of the High Court under that section. That was the view taken in Pachaimuthu In re('), where it was held that the Assistant Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to refer under section 307 the whole case to the High Court, that he should himself dispose of the charges which were triable with the aid of assessors, and that the reference in respect of those charges was bad, This decision was followed in Emperor v. Lachman\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1937 Patna 662.\n\n(2) [1932] l. L. R, 55 Mad. 715.\n\nGangota(1}. The same view has also been taken by the High Court of Bombay in a number of cases : Vide Emperor v. Kalidas( 2 ), Emperor v. Vyankat Singh( 3) and Emperor v. Chanbasappa( 4 ). We are accordingly of opinion that the Sessions Judge had contravened no provision of law, and had committed no illegality in deciding the case, in so far as it related to the charge under section 409, himself. In this case there is the further fact that the appellant preferred an appeal against his conviction under section 409 by the Sessions Judge, and that appeal was heard along with the reference under section 307 in respect of the charge under section 477-A, and that they were both of them disposed of by the same judgment.\n\nIt was next contended that the true status of the appeilant was that of a servant and not of an agent, and that he should have been charged not under section 409 but under section 408. The substance of the charge against the appellant is that as the promotor of a Society he lawfully received the amounts paid by Sri Ch:nurvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth, but that after its incorporation, when he failed on 22-4-1949 to hand over those amounts to the Treasurer aad to include their names as shareholders in the minutes book, he committed offences under sections 409 and- 477-A.\n\nNow, what is the status of the appellant as Secretary of the Society in which capacity he cQmmitted the offences, servant or agent ? The distinction between the two is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 22, page 113, para 192:\n\n\"A servant acts under the direct control and supervision of the master, and is bound to conform to all reaonable orders given _him in the course of his work ...... An agent though bound to exercise his authority in accordance with all lawful instructions which may be given to him from time to time by his principal, is not subject in its exercise to the direct control or supervision of the principal\".\n\nHaving regard to the nature of the duties of the appellant as the Secretary of the Society, we are clearly\n\n(3) A. I. R. 1934 Patna 424.\n\n(2) [1898] 8 Born. L. R. 599.\n\n(l) [1907] 9 Bom. L. R. 1057.\n\n(4) A. I. R. 1922 Bom. 61.\n\nSingh\n\nThe State of Uttar Prades!t\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nC/1a1rli Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nT, 11t State of Uttar Prades:1\n\nVcnkatarama\n\nAy; ar J.\n\nof opinion that his status was that of an agent and not a servant.\n\nMoreover, whether the appellant shouid be charged under section 408 or section 409 is of no importance in the present case, as the sentence imposed on him under section 409, viz., our years' rigorous imprisonment could be mairna:Pe<I even under section 403.\n\nIt was argued by the appellant that an offence under section 408 was triable with the aid of a iury, whereas that under section 409 was triable with the aid of assessors, and that he had been prejudiced in that he had lost the benefit of a tria I by jury. But this objection was not taken in the trial court, and is not now open. Vide section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIt is next contended that there has been a violation of section 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in that the appellant had been charged with three offencesunder section 409 and one under section 477-A.\n\nBut the case is Governed by section 235, as the several offences under sections 409 and 477-A arise out of the same acts and form part of the same transaction.\n\nMoreover, the appel.lant has failed to show any prejudice as required by section 537. This objection must accordingly be overruled.\n\nIt was finally contended that there had been_no proper examination of the appellant under section 342, and that therefore the conviction was illegal. Thio objection was not raised in the Courts below, and is sought to be raised in this Court by a supplemental proceeding. We find no substance in this obiection.\n\nIn the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed.", "total_entities": 132, "entities": [{"text": "1035\n\nCHAND! PRASAD SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDI PRASAD SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ST ATE OF UTT AR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ST ATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 615, "end_char": 621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 629, "end_char": 655, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 708, "end_char": 714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1108, "end_char": 1114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1145, "end_char": 1151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1187, "end_char": 1193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 255", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1228, "end_char": 1234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1242, "end_char": 1268, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1381, "end_char": 1387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1389, "end_char": 1394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1636, "end_char": 1642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1646, "end_char": 1651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1939, "end_char": 1945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1993, "end_char": 1999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2007, "end_char": 2033, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2118, "end_char": 2124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2126, "end_char": 2131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2306, "end_char": 2312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2320, "end_char": 2346, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2450, "end_char": 2456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2573, "end_char": 2579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2672, "end_char": 2685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oil appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court :- -\n\nHeld (i) that the contention that when the Sessions Judge disagreed with the verdict of the jury and the opinion ot the assessors, l l-3'i S. C. Ind a/59\n\nDee1mber7."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Prad•sh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2889, "end_char": 2911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ci1a:1di PrastSd\n\nSingh\n\nTi1t State of Uttar Prad•sh\n\nhe shoul<l have referred the \\Vhole case under s. 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the High Co!1rt and not merely that part ot\n\nit \\\\'hich related to the charge under s. 477-A, l.P.C. was without force because the Sessions judge had contravened no provision of law and committed no illegality in deciding the case which related to the charge under s. 409, l.P.C. That s. 307, Code of Criminal Pmcedure appiies in terms only to trials by a jury and the Sessions Judge had no po\\ver under that section to refer cases tried with the aid of a:; sessors for the decision ot the High Court.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Prades!t"}}, {"text": "s. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2960, "end_char": 2966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 3000, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3088, "end_char": 3094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3269, "end_char": 3275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3604, "end_char": 3610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3644, "end_char": 3650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3658, "end_char": 3684, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3717, "end_char": 3723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3922, "end_char": 3928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3947, "end_char": 3953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3955, "end_char": 3960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4616, "end_char": 4622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4890, "end_char": 4896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4898, "end_char": 4903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4909, "end_char": 4915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Pachaimuthu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\937 Patna 662), Pachaimuthu In 1e, ([1932] l.L.R. 55 Ma<l. 715), Emperor v. Lachrnan Gangota, (A.LR.", "canonical_name": "Pachaimuthu"}}, {"text": "B. B. Tawakley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta and A. D. Mathur with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5739, "end_char": 5750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta and A. D. Mathur with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. D. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta and A. D. Mathur with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5798, "end_char": 5809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5811, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5829, "end_char": 5838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6016, "end_char": 6039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad affirming the conviction of the appel- 1:1.nt by the Sessions Judge, Lucknow under sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6123, "end_char": 6143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6153, "end_char": 6170, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "12-2-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6176, "end_char": 6185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12-2-1949 a Society known as the Model Town Co-operative Housing Society, Ltd., was register.d under the provisions of the Co-operatiYe S'J<.:ieties Act (II of 1912), its object being to acquire vacant sites in the town of Lucknow and to al\\ot them to its members so as to enable them to build houses of their own."}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6399, "end_char": 6406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12-2-1949 a Society known as the Model Town Co-operative Housing Society, Ltd., was register.d under the provisions of the Co-operatiYe S'J<.:ieties Act (II of 1912), its object being to acquire vacant sites in the town of Lucknow and to al\\ot them to its members so as to enable them to build houses of their own."}}, {"text": "1-3-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6671, "end_char": 6679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first general body meeting of the :Society was held on 1-3-1949."}}, {"text": "Munna Lal Tewari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6755, "end_char": 6771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that meeting, the appellant was elected Honorary Secretary and one Sri Munna Lal Tewari as Treasurer."}}, {"text": "S. C. Varma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6818, "end_char": 6829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter having resigned, one S. C. Varma was appointed Treasurer in his stead."}}, {"text": "22-4-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6871, "end_char": 6880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22-4-1949, there was a meeting of the Managing Committee, at which the appellant was directed to hand over the accounts of the Society and its funds to its Treasurer."}}, {"text": "16-7-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7333, "end_char": 7342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16-7-1949 some of the members wrote a letter to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies pointing out that the Society had not functioned ever since its incorporation, and asking that steps might be taken for examination of its accounts and, if necessary, for its being wound up."}}, {"text": "Chandi Prasad\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7696, "end_char": 7716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this, there was an investigation of the affairs of the Society by two Assistant\n\nChandi Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nThe Stat."}}, {"text": "Stat. of U tlar Pradtsli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this, there was an investigation of the affairs of the Society by two Assistant\n\nChandi Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nThe Stat."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7775, "end_char": 7797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of U tlar Pradtsli\n\nChandi Pra5od\n\nSi1ish\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nV rnkatarama Ayyar ].", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Prades!t"}}, {"text": "22-2-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7874, "end_char": 7883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Registrars, and on the basis of their reports dated 22-2-1950 and 18-5-1950 the present prosecution was started against the appellant charging him under sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "18-5-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7888, "end_char": 7897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Registrars, and on the basis of their reports dated 22-2-1950 and 18-5-1950 the present prosecution was started against the appellant charging him under sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7975, "end_char": 7995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8005, "end_char": 8022, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8041, "end_char": 8052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chaturvedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8108, "end_char": 8118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 from one Sri Chaturvedi, a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "0. P. Bhanti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8146, "end_char": 8158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "100 from Dr. 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8195, "end_char": 8205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "100 from Dr. R. S. Seth, all as share money in December 1948, and that he had misappropriated the same."}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8303, "end_char": 8314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8822, "end_char": 8833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8884, "end_char": 8896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9141, "end_char": 9153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9220, "end_char": 9246, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9335, "end_char": 9346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9571, "end_char": 9582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9820, "end_char": 9831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9952, "end_char": 9963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Taw2", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10100, "end_char": 10104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Taw2, kley firstly contended that the finding of the courts below that the amounts paid by Sri Chaturvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth were paid :is share money was erroneous, and in support of this contention relied on a letter written by one of them, Dr.\n\nSeth, to 'the appellant on 3rd May 1951 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Bhanti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Taw2, kley firstly contended that the finding of the courts below that the amounts paid by Sri Chaturvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth were paid :is share money was erroneous, and in support of this contention relied on a letter written by one of them, Dr.\n\nSeth, to 'the appellant on 3rd May 1951 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10226, "end_char": 10230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Taw2, kley firstly contended that the finding of the courts below that the amounts paid by Sri Chaturvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth were paid :is share money was erroneous, and in support of this contention relied on a letter written by one of them, Dr.\n\nSeth, to 'the appellant on 3rd May 1951 (Ex."}}, {"text": "3rd May 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10381, "end_char": 10393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Taw2, kley firstly contended that the finding of the courts below that the amounts paid by Sri Chaturvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth were paid :is share money was erroneous, and in support of this contention relied on a letter written by one of them, Dr.\n\nSeth, to 'the appellant on 3rd May 1951 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Tawakley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11656, "end_char": 11664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is now necessary to deal with the several contentions of law urged by Mr. Tawakley in support of this appeal."}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11869, "end_char": 11880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11981, "end_char": 11992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State ef Uttar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12114, "end_char": 12128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He argued that when the same facts constitute two\n\nSingh\n\nThe State ef Uttar .frad; sh\n\nVeatarama\n\n4, yyar J.\n\nChandi Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nTh£ St, te of Uttar Pracb.sh\n\nY enkatarama\n\nApar J.\n\ndistinct offences one of which is triable with the aid of jurors and the other with assessors, and the accused is charged with both, the reference under section 307 must relate to both thecharges, if inconsistent findings by different courts with reference to the ·; ame matter is to be avoided.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Prades!t"}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12391, "end_char": 12402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12655, "end_char": 12666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12734, "end_char": 12745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12901, "end_char": 12912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12955, "end_char": 12966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13221, "end_char": 13232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13690, "end_char": 13701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pachaimuthu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13952, "end_char": 13963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was the view taken in Pachaimuthu In re('), where it was held that the Assistant Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to refer under section 307 the whole case to the High Court, that he should himself dispose of the charges which were triable with the aid of assessors, and that the reference in respect of those charges was bad, This decision was followed in Emperor v. Lachman\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1937 Patna 662.", "canonical_name": "Pachaimuthu"}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14061, "end_char": 14072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14426, "end_char": 14446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view has also been taken by the High Court of Bombay in a number of cases : Vide Emperor v. Kalidas( 2 ), Emperor v. Vyankat Singh( 3) and Emperor v. Chanbasappa( 4 )."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14751, "end_char": 14762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14880, "end_char": 14891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14972, "end_char": 14983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15015, "end_char": 15026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15247, "end_char": 15258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15269, "end_char": 15280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15414, "end_char": 15416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substance of the charge against the appellant is that as the promotor of a Society he lawfully received the amounts paid by Sri Ch:nurvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth, but that after its incorporation, when he failed on 22-4-1949 to hand over those amounts to the Treasurer aad to include their names as shareholders in the minutes book, he committed offences under sections 409 and- 477-A.\n\nNow, what is the status of the appellant as Secretary of the Society in which capacity he cQmmitted the offences, servant or agent ?"}}, {"text": "nurvedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15417, "end_char": 15424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substance of the charge against the appellant is that as the promotor of a Society he lawfully received the amounts paid by Sri Ch:nurvedi, Dr. Bhanti and Dr. Seth, but that after its incorporation, when he failed on 22-4-1949 to hand over those amounts to the Treasurer aad to include their names as shareholders in the minutes book, he committed offences under sections 409 and- 477-A.\n\nNow, what is the status of the appellant as Secretary of the Society in which capacity he cQmmitted the offences, servant or agent ?"}}, {"text": "sections 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15649, "end_char": 15661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Prades!t", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16562, "end_char": 16585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Prades!t\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nC/1a1rli Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nT, 11t State of Uttar Prades:1\n\nVcnkatarama\n\nAy; ar J.\n\nof opinion that his status was that of an agent and not a servant.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Prades!t"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16587, "end_char": 16604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Prades!t\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nC/1a1rli Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nT, 11t State of Uttar Prades:1\n\nVcnkatarama\n\nAy; ar J.\n\nof opinion that his status was that of an agent and not a servant."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Prades:1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16640, "end_char": 16663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Prades!t\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nC/1a1rli Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nT, 11t State of Uttar Prades:1\n\nVcnkatarama\n\nAy; ar J.\n\nof opinion that his status was that of an agent and not a servant.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Prades!t"}}, {"text": "Vcnkatarama", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16665, "end_char": 16676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Prades!t\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nC/1a1rli Prasad\n\nSingh\n\nT, 11t State of Uttar Prades:1\n\nVcnkatarama\n\nAy; ar J.\n\nof opinion that his status was that of an agent and not a servant."}}, {"text": "section 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16813, "end_char": 16824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16828, "end_char": 16839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16918, "end_char": 16929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17002, "end_char": 17013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17069, "end_char": 17080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17136, "end_char": 17147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 536", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17351, "end_char": 17362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17370, "end_char": 17396, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17455, "end_char": 17466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17474, "end_char": 17500, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17565, "end_char": 17576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17591, "end_char": 17602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17635, "end_char": 17646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17678, "end_char": 17698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17841, "end_char": 17852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17991, "end_char": 18002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1043_1049_EN", "year": 1955, "text": ".2s.C.R.\n\nSUPREJviE COURT REPORTS 1043\n\nTILKESHW AR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR.\n\n:BtiSE, VnrKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIY AR JJ.]\n\nl:vidence-foi11t recording of statements made by witnesses during investigation--Legaiity-Testimony of such witnesses in court- Admissibility-Sttbstitution of a charge under s. 149, I.P.C. for one r'1lder s. 34, l.P.C.-Validity-Accused filing statement instead of being examined in court-Legality-Prejudice--Cud.· of Criminal Procedure, (Act V of 1898), ss. 161(3), 342-lndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 34. 149. ·\n\nAlthough the joint recording of statements made by witnesses during an investigation is a contravention of s. 161(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and must be disapprove<:!, that by itself docs not render the testimony given by such witnesses in court inadmissible. lt is, however, for the court to decide whether it will rely on such testimony or attah any weight to it.\n\n/, ahirnddin v. Emperor, (A.LR. 1947 P.C. 75), applied.\n\nRaliram Tik_aram v. Emperor, (A.LR. 1945 Nag. 1) and Maganlai Ra.f!:r.k_is!u>n v. Emp,·:or (A.LR. 1946 Nag. 173), disappro\\cd.\n\nHejoy C/zand Pr.tra v. The State, (A.LR. 1950 Cal. '163), approved.\n\nThe coui-1has power to substitute a charge under s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code for a charge under s. 34.\n\nJ(amaii Singh and others v. The State of Punjab, ([1954] S.C.R.\n\n904) and Willie Slaney's case, (Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1955), referred to.\n\nAlthough s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates oral examination of the accused in court and though the practice of filing written statements is to be deprecated, the fact that the accused filed a statement instead of being examined is no ground for interference unless he is shown to have been prejudiced thereby.\n\nConsequently, in a case where the accused were put up for ::rial under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and the Additional Sessions Judge relying on the evidence of three of the prosecution witnesses whose statements during the investigation were recorded jointly in contravention of s. 161(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, convicted and sentenced them to transportation for life and the High Court in appeal agreed with the findings of fact, but altered the conviction to one under s. 326 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code, as also the sentence, their conviction was not liable to be set aside.\n\nDtc1mber 8.\n\nTilktshwar Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe Stal# of Bihar\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1954.\n\nOn appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th August 1953 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 345 of 1952 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 20th August 1952 of the Court of Additional Session Judge, Darbhanga in Session Case No. 12 of 19'.>2.\n\nH. /. Umrigar and R. C. Prasad, for the appellant.\n\nB. K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, for the respondent. 1955.\n\nDecember 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-The appellants were charged before the Additional Sessions Judge, Darbhanga under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Balbhadra Narain Singh. They were also chargerl, some under section 147 and the others under section 148, for being members of an unlawful assembly and for rioting.\n\nThe case of the prosectuion was as follows : The deceased and the appellants were pattidars in the village of Mahe, and there was ill-feeling between them on account of the village pattidari. On 5-3-1951, at about 10 A.M. the deceased was returning from the river to his baithka. On the way, the appellants who were armed with bhalas, sword and lathi, and some others surrounded him at the courtyard of the village school and attacked him. One Harischandra Singh who is still absconding, plunged his bhala into the abdomen of the deceased, and the appellants joined in the attack on him. The deceased ran to his baithka. and from there, he was taken to the police station at Singhia.\n\nThere, he made a complaint which has been filed as the first information report, and therein he set out the incidents mentioned above, and implicated the appellants as concerned in the attack.\n\nThe deceased was then taken to the hospital, and in view of his precarious condition the doctor recorded his dying declaration.\n\nThe deceased was then sent\n\nfor treatment to the hospital at Samastipur, but on the way he died. On the basis of the first 1 nformation report and on the enquiries made by . them, the police charged the appellants under section 302 read with section 34 for murder and under sections 147 and 148 for rioting.\n\nThe defence of the appellant was that the deceased was attacked by some unknown assailants 1n his baithka in the early hours of 5-3-1951, and that they were not concerned in the offence.\n\nThe Additional Sessions Judge, Darbhanga accepted the evidence of the prosecution, and convicted the appellants under section 302 read with section 34, and sentenced them to transportation for life.\n\nHe also convicted them, some under section 147 and the others under section 148, but imposed no separate sentence under those sections. The appellants took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Patna. The learned Judges agreed with the Sessions Judge in his conclusions of fact, but altered the conviction from one under section 302 read with section 34 to one under section 326 read with section 149, and the sentence from transportation for life to various terms of imprisonment.\n\nThe learned Judges also maintained the conviction of the appellants on the charge of rioting, but awarded no separate sentence therefor.\n\nIt is against this judgment that the present appeal 1s directed.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants, it was firstly contended by Mr. Umrigar that the finding of the courts below that the incident took place at the school courtyard and not at the baithka of the deceased was bad, because it wa.s based on inadmissible evidence, viz., Exhibit P-7 and the testimony of P.Ws. 4, 7 and 12.\n\nExhibit P-7 is a statement of the deceased taken by the police officer subsequent to the lodging of the first information and after the investigation had begun, and its reception would be barred by section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the learned Judges thought that it would be admissible under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, and the correctness of this view is disputed by the appellants.\n\nIJut even if Exhibit P-7 is inadmissible in evidence,\n\n9!l!l\n\nr;/l:IJhwar Sinflt\n\nand others\n\nTiu Stal• of Biliar\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAy_var J.\n\nTilkeshwar Singh\n\nand ot!ur\n\nTM State of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAY., var J,\n\nthat would not assist the appellants, as the learned Judges observed that apart from that document, they would have, on the other evidence, held that the decea,; ed was attac'.,_ed at the school courtyard.\n\nThen, we come to the evidence of P., Vs. 4, 7 c•.nd 12 on which the courts below have relied in accepting the version of the incident as given by the prosecution.\n\nMr. U mrigar contended that their evidence was inadmissible, because they were examined by the police at the stage of investigation, and their statements were not recorded separately as required by section 161(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is what the investigating officer,\n\nP.W. 18, deposed with reference to this matter.\n\n\"The Daffadar produced Sita! Singh\n\n(P.W. 12), Ram Karan Singh (P.'vV. 7) and Ramkinker (P.\\V. 4).\n\nFirst of all, I examined them separately but recorded their joint statement in respect of common things.\n\nI made a separate record about the idc!ltificatio:-i and the wcapo;15\", The recording of a joint statement of the exam11oation of P.vVs. •!, 7 and 12 is clearly in contrQvention of sect:on 161(3), and must be disapproved. But the questio'.1 is whether that renders the testimony of P.'vV s. 4, 7 nd 12 in court inadmi\"ible.\n\nSection 16i(3) does not say so, and indeed, seeing that the police are not bound to make a record of the statements o[ witnesses in which case there is admittedly no bar to the reception of their testimony, it would be anomalous if we were to hold that their evidence is inadmissible, because the statements were also reduced to writing but not in the manner provided in the section.\n\nThe Indian Evidence Act contains elaborate provisions as to who are competent witnesses and on 'Nhat matters their evidence is inadmissible.\n\nAnd on these prov1s10ns, P.Ws. 4, 7 and 12 are neither incomnetent \\Vitnesses, nor is their evidence as to the incidents to which they deposed, inadmissible.\n\nIn Zahiruddin v.\n\nEmperor( 1 ) it was held by the Privy Council that the failure to comply with the provisions of section 162(1) might greatly (I\n\nA.I.R. 1947 P.C. 75. \"'\n\nimpair the value of the evidence of the witness, but that would not affect its admissibility. On the same reasoning, it will follow that the evidence of P.Ws. 4, 7 and 12 is not inadmissible for the reason that their statements had been recorded by P.W. 18 jointly and not separately as required by section 161(3).\n\nIn support of his contention that their evidence is inadmissible, Mr. Umrigar relied on the decisions in Baliram Tikaram v. Emperor (' ) and Maganlal Radhak_ishan v. Emperor(). In Baliram Tikaram\n\nv. Emperor( ), which was a decision under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the accused had not been furnished with copies of the statements recorded by the police officers under section 161, and it was held that that deprived the accused of a valuable right, and must have caused prejudice to them. That was the view taken in Viwanath v. Emperor( 3), and no exception can be taken to it. But the learned Judges went on to obse.rve that the evidence of the witnesses who gave statements at the investigation would itself be inadmissible.\n\nThe reason for this opinion was thus stated by them :\n\n\"How can the evidence be admissible and proper for consideration when the accused is robbed of hrs statutory means or cross-examination and thereby denied the opportunity of effectively cross-examining his adverse witnesses ? No evidence recorded by the Court, unless it satisfies the requirement of section 138, Evidence Act, can become admissible and proper for consideration. It would indeed be bold to sav that the evidence of a witne'ss is legally admissibl~ against a party even though he at the time it was given had not the full opportunity to cross-examine him\".\n\nThis view was reiterated by the same learned Judges in M aganltd Radhakishan v. Emperor( 2 ), but, for the reasons already given, we are unable to accept this as a correct statement of the law. \\Ve are of the opinion that while the failure to comply with the requirements , of section 161(3) might affect the weight to be\n\n(I) A.I.R. I 945 Nag. I.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1946 Nag. 173.\n\n(3) I.LR. [1937] Nag. 178.\n\nTilke hwar Singh\n\nand others\n\nThtSta!e of Bihm\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].\n\nTilkeshwar Singh\n\nand others\n\n\" Tiu State of Bihar\n\nV1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nattached to the evidwce of the witnes!es, it does not render it inadmissible.\n\nThat was so held by Harries, C.J. and Bachawat, J. in Bejoy Chand Patra v. The State('), where this question arose directly for decision, and we are in agreement with this view. In the present case, the attention of the learned Judges was drawn to the infirmity in the evidence of P.W s. 4, 7 and 12, arising by reason of the failure to observe section 161(3), but they . were, nevertheless, prepared to accept it as reliable. We must accordingly hold that the findings of the courts . below are not open to attack on the ground that they were based on inadmissible evidence.\n\nIt was next contended that the charge on which the appellants were tried was one under section 302 read with section 34, and that the learned Judges of the High Court erred in convicting them under section 326 read with section 149. Before the learned Judges the contention that was pressed was that there was no power in the court to substitute section 149 for sectior> 34, but they declined to accept it. The question has since been considered by this Court in Kamai! Singh and others v. The State of Punjab(') and Willie Slaney's case( ). It is conceded by Mr. Umrigar that in view of these decisions, the question is no longer open. It must be answered adversely to the appellants .•\n\nIt was finally contended that there had been no proper examination of the appellants under section 342, and that the conv1ct1on should accordingly be quashed.\n\nWhat happened was that when the court commenced its examination under section 342, the appellants stated that they would file written statements.\n\nTbose statemerts \\Vere very elaborate and furnished the answer of the appellants to all the points raised in the prosecution evidence.\n\nMr. Umrigar was unable to suggest any question which could have been put, with reference to which the statements did not contain an answer.\n\nClearly, the appellants have not been prejudiced.\n\nIt is no doubt true that (I) A.LR. 1950 CaL 363.\n\n(2) [1954] S.C.R. 904.\n\n(3) Crin1inal Appeal No. 6 of 1955.\n\nsection 342 contemplates an examination in court, and the practice of filing statements is to be deprecated. But thar_ is not a ground for interference, unless prejudice is established.\n\nAnd it is nothing unusual for the accused to prefer filing statements mstead of answering questions under section 342, lest they should suffer by inadvertent admissions or by damaging statements.\n\nAs no prejudice has been shown, this contention also must be rejected.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nJAYARAM VITHOBA AND ANOTHER\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY.\n\n[V1v1AN BosF.. VENKATARAMA AYYAR and CttANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.l\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 423(1)(b) and (J), s. 439-Powers of Appellate Court-High Court's powers of revision-Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 11)87), ss. 4(a), 5.\n\nThe first appellant was prosecut.\"-1 under s. 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887) for being present in a gaming house for the purposes of gaming and was, in addition, charged under s. 4( a) of the Act for keeping a gaming house.\n\nThe Presidency Magistrate, ':\"ho tried the case, found him guilty under s. 4(a) and sentenced him to three months' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nHe also tound him guilty under s. 5 but awarded no separate sentence under that section.\n\nIn revision, the High Court set aside the conviction under s. 4(a), but confirmed that under s. 5 and awarded a sentence of th.-ee months' rigorous imprisonment under that section. It was contended for the first appellant that the High\n\nCourt had no power under s. 423( I) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to impose any sentence under s. 5 of the Act when no such sentence had been awarded by the Magistrate and that, in any event, the award of such a sentence amounted to an enhancement and was, in conequence, ille,; al, as no notice had been issued therefor, a< rrquired by law.\n\nHeld, that though s. 423(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure w:is not applicable to the case, the High Court had power to pass he sentence under s. 423(I)(d).\n\nThe law does not envhage a person being convicted for an\n\nT ilkeshwar Sin:h\n\nand others\n\nTh• Stale of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nDec em/Hr 13,", "total_entities": 116, "entities": [{"text": "TILKESHW AR SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TILKESHWAR SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 333, "end_char": 338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356, "end_char": 361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 161(3), 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505, "end_char": 520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 528, "end_char": 538, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 558, "end_char": 564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 161(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 681, "end_char": 690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 698, "end_char": 724, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1268, "end_char": 1285, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1305, "end_char": 1310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1465, "end_char": 1471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1479, "end_char": 1505, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1858, "end_char": 1864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1875, "end_char": 1880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1888, "end_char": 1905, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 161(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2104, "end_char": 2130, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2291, "end_char": 2297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2308, "end_char": 2314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2322, "end_char": 2339, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tilktshwar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2426, "end_char": 2442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tilktshwar Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe Stalof Bihar\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Tilktshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2845, "end_char": 2852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. /. Umrigar and R. C. Prasad, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "U mrigar"}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2857, "end_char": 2869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. /. Umrigar and R. C. Prasad, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. K. Saran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2891, "end_char": 2902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. M. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2907, "end_char": 2918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3003, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-The appellants were charged before the Additional Sessions Judge, Darbhanga under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Balbhadra Narain Singh.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Darbhanga", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-The appellants were charged before the Additional Sessions Judge, Darbhanga under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Balbhadra Narain Singh."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3129, "end_char": 3139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Balbhadra Narain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3187, "end_char": 3209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-The appellants were charged before the Additional Sessions Judge, Darbhanga under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Balbhadra Narain Singh."}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3247, "end_char": 3258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3280, "end_char": 3291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3463, "end_char": 3467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosectuion was as follows : The deceased and the appellants were pattidars in the village of Mahe, and there was ill-feeling between them on account of the village pattidari."}}, {"text": "5-3-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3548, "end_char": 3556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5-3-1951, at about 10 A.M. the deceased was returning from the river to his baithka."}}, {"text": "Harischandra Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3797, "end_char": 3815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Harischandra Singh who is still absconding, plunged his bhala into the abdomen of the deceased, and the appellants joined in the attack on him."}}, {"text": "Singhia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4028, "end_char": 4035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and from there, he was taken to the police station at Singhia."}}, {"text": "Samastipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4422, "end_char": 4432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased was then sent\n\nfor treatment to the hospital at Samastipur, but on the way he died."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4581, "end_char": 4592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4603, "end_char": 4613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 147 and 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4635, "end_char": 4655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4998, "end_char": 5008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5093, "end_char": 5104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5126, "end_char": 5137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5242, "end_char": 5261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Patna."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5383, "end_char": 5394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5405, "end_char": 5415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5451, "end_char": 5462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6261, "end_char": 6272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6280, "end_char": 6306, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 32(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6373, "end_char": 6386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6413, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "IJhwar Sinflt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6547, "end_char": 6560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJut even if Exhibit P-7 is inadmissible in evidence,\n\n9!l!l\n\nr;/l:IJhwar Sinflt\n\nand others\n\nTiu Stal• of Biliar\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAy_var J.\n\nTilkeshwar Singh\n\nand ot!ur\n\nTM State of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAY.,"}}, {"text": "Tilkeshwar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6618, "end_char": 6634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJut even if Exhibit P-7 is inadmissible in evidence,\n\n9!l!l\n\nr;/l:IJhwar Sinflt\n\nand others\n\nTiu Stal• of Biliar\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAy_var J.\n\nTilkeshwar Singh\n\nand ot!ur\n\nTM State of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAY.,", "canonical_name": "Tilktshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6650, "end_char": 6664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJut even if Exhibit P-7 is inadmissible in evidence,\n\n9!l!l\n\nr;/l:IJhwar Sinflt\n\nand others\n\nTiu Stal• of Biliar\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAy_var J.\n\nTilkeshwar Singh\n\nand ot!ur\n\nTM State of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAY.,", "canonical_name": "STATE OF BOMBAY"}}, {"text": "U mrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7067, "end_char": 7075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. U mrigar contended that their evidence was inadmissible, because they were examined by the police at the stage of investigation, and their statements were not recorded separately as required by section 161(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.", "canonical_name": "U mrigar"}}, {"text": "section 161(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7261, "end_char": 7275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7283, "end_char": 7309, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Daffadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7406, "end_char": 7414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The Daffadar produced Sita!"}}, {"text": "Sita! Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7424, "end_char": 7435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The Daffadar produced Sita!"}}, {"text": "Ram Karan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7448, "end_char": 7463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh\n\n(P.W. 12), Ram Karan Singh (P.'vV. 7) and Ramkinker (P.\\V. 4)."}}, {"text": "Ramkinker", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7479, "end_char": 7488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh\n\n(P.W. 12), Ram Karan Singh (P.'vV. 7) and Ramkinker (P.\\V. 4)."}}, {"text": "s. 4, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7895, "end_char": 7902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7932, "end_char": 7942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8321, "end_char": 8340, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 162(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8732, "end_char": 8746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9089, "end_char": 9103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9345, "end_char": 9356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9364, "end_char": 9390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9494, "end_char": 9505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 138", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10209, "end_char": 10220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10759, "end_char": 10773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tilke hwar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10885, "end_char": 10901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tilke hwar Singh\n\nand others\n\nThtSta!e of Bihm\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].", "canonical_name": "Tilktshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10933, "end_char": 10950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tilke hwar Singh\n\nand others\n\nThtSta!e of Bihm\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11020, "end_char": 11025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tilkeshwar Singh\n\nand others\n\n\" Tiu State of Bihar\n\nV1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nattached to the evidwce of the witnes!es, it does not render it inadmissible."}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11129, "end_char": 11136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was so held by Harries, C.J. and Bachawat, J. in Bejoy Chand Patra v. The State('), where this question arose directly for decision, and we are in agreement with this view."}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11147, "end_char": 11155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was so held by Harries, C.J. and Bachawat, J. in Bejoy Chand Patra v. The State('), where this question arose directly for decision, and we are in agreement with this view."}}, {"text": "s. 4, 7 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11394, "end_char": 11408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11454, "end_char": 11468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11773, "end_char": 11784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11795, "end_char": 11805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11884, "end_char": 11895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11906, "end_char": 11917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12032, "end_char": 12043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Willie Slaney", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12203, "end_char": 12216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh and others v. The State of Punjab(') and Willie Slaney's case( )."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12466, "end_char": 12477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12605, "end_char": 12616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13121, "end_char": 13132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13414, "end_char": 13425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAYARAM VITHOBA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13618, "end_char": 13633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAYARAM VITHOBA AND ANOTHER\n\nti."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13656, "end_char": 13671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF BOMBAY"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13689, "end_char": 13706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[V1v1AN BosF.. VENKATARAMA AYYAR and CttANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.l\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 423(1)(b) and (J), s. 439-Powers of Appellate Court-High Court's powers of revision-Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 11)87), ss.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR"}}, {"text": "SEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13722, "end_char": 13735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[V1v1AN BosF.. VENKATARAMA AYYAR and CttANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.l\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 423(1)(b) and (J), s. 439-Powers of Appellate Court-High Court's powers of revision-Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 11)87), ss."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13742, "end_char": 13768, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 423(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13786, "end_char": 13798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13808, "end_char": 13814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4(a), 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14042, "end_char": 14053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act", "statute": "Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14099, "end_char": 14103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act", "statute": "Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14146, "end_char": 14167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4( a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14268, "end_char": 14276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14389, "end_char": 14396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14487, "end_char": 14491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14605, "end_char": 14612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14639, "end_char": 14643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 423( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14808, "end_char": 14818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14830, "end_char": 14856, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14886, "end_char": 14890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 423(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15152, "end_char": 15164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15172, "end_char": 15198, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 423(I)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15283, "end_char": 15295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15407, "end_char": 15425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law does not envhage a person being convicted for an\n\nT ilkeshwar Sin:h\n\nand others\n\nTh• Stale of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nDec em/Hr 13,", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1049_1056_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R. ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1049\n\nsection 342 contemplates an examination in court, and the practice of filing statements is to be deprecated. But thar_ is not a ground for interference, unless prejudice is established.\n\nAnd it is nothing unusual for the accused to prefer filing statements mstead of answering questions under section 342, lest they should suffer by inadvertent admissions or by damaging statements.\n\nAs no prejudice has been shown, this contention also must be rejected.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nJAYARAM VITHOBA AND ANOTHER\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY.\n\n[V1v1AN BosF.. VENKATARAMA AYYAR and CttANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.l\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 423(1)(b) and (J), s. 439-Powers of Appellate Court-High Court's powers of revision-Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 11)87), ss. 4(a), 5.\n\nThe first appellant was prosecut.\"-1 under s. 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887) for being present in a gaming house for the purposes of gaming and was, in addition, charged under s. 4( a) of the Act for keeping a gaming house.\n\nThe Presidency Magistrate, ':\"ho tried the case, found him guilty under s. 4(a) and sentenced him to three months' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nHe also tound him guilty under s. 5 but awarded no separate sentence under that section.\n\nIn revision, the High Court set aside the conviction under s. 4(a), but confirmed that under s. 5 and awarded a sentence of th.-ee months' rigorous imprisonment under that section. It was contended for the first appellant that the High\n\nCourt had no power under s. 423( I) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to impose any sentence under s. 5 of the Act when no such sentence had been awarded by the Magistrate and that, in any event, the award of such a sentence amounted to an enhancement and was, in conequence, ille,; al, as no notice had been issued therefor, a< rrquired by law.\n\nHeld, that though s. 423(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure w:is not applicable to the case, the High Court had power to pass he sentence under s. 423(I)(d).\n\nThe law does not envhage a person being convicted for an\n\nT ilkeshwar Sin:h\n\nand others\n\nTh• Stale of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nDec em/Hr 13,\n\nJ•yar11m Vilhoba\n\nand anoth1r\n\nThe Slate •f\n\nBrJmbay\n\noffence without a sentence being imposed therefor, and the award of\n\n:ii. sentence by the High Court was only consequentia) on and inci~ dental to the affirmancc of the conviction, and it was a just and proper order to be passed under the law, within the meaning of s. 423(l)(d) of the.Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nSuch a sentence cannot amount to an enhancement as it was awarded only for the first time in appeal.\n\nEven if it were to be regarded as an enhancement, the order of the High Court could not be held to be bad for want of notice under s. 439(2), as the fim appellant had an opportunity of showing cause against the conviction and enhancement, and, in any event, no prejudice had resulted to him by reason of the abence of a formal notice under the section~\n\nIbrahim v. Emperor (A.LR. 1940 Born. 129), Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Hossein Ali (A.LR. 1938 Cal. 439} and Pradip Chaudhry v. Emperor\n\n(A.LR. 1946 Pat. 235), d~ approved.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 24th July 1953 of the Bombay High Court i'n Criminal Revision Application No. 669 of 1953 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 29th June 1953 of the Court of Presidency Magistrate, 9th Court at Bandra, Bombay 111 Case No. 11872/73/P of 1952.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee, for the appellants.\n\nN. S . .J3indra, (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1955. December 13.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAI<. J.-The first appellant was at the relevant date, in possession of room No. 10 in House No. 334, Bazar Road, Bandra, Bombay.\n\nOn information that this room was being used as a gaming house, Mr.\n\nBhatt, Sub-Inspector of Police, raided it on 19-9-1952, and fc11nd the two appellants and four others in possession of gaming instruments.\n\nAll of them were prosecuted under section 5 of the Bombay P, evention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887), hereinafter referred to as the Act, for being present in a gaming house for the purposes of\n\ngaming, and the first appellant was, in addition, charged under section 4(a) of the Act for keeping a gaming house.\n\nThe presidency Magistrate who tried the case, found the first appellant guilty under section 4(a) of the Act, and sentenced him to three months' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nHe also found him guilty under section 5 of the Act, but awarded no separate sentence under that section.\n\nThe second appellant was found guilty under section 5, and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe appellants took the matter in revision to the High Court, which set aside the conviction of the first appellant under section 4(a) but confirmed that under section 5, and awarded a sentence of three months' rigorous imprisonment under that section.\n\nAs regards the second appellant, both the conviction and sentence were confirmed.\n\nAgainst this order, the present appeal by special leave has been preferred.\n\nBoth the courts below have concurrently found that the appellants were present in a gaming house for the purpose of gaming, and have thereby committed an offence punishable undcr section 5 of the Act, and that finding is not under challenge before us. The only contention that has been raised before us-and it arises only as regards the first appellantis that as the High Court had set aside his conviction under section 4(a) of the Act, it should have set aside the sentence passed on him under that section, and that it had no power under the Code of Criminal Procedure, to impose a sentence under section 5, when none such had been passed by the Magistrate.\n\nThis contention is based on the terms of section 423.\n\nUnder that section, when there is an appeal against a conviction, the court has the power under subclause ( 1) (b) either ( 1) to reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit or discharge the accused, or order his retrial, or (2) to alter the finding but maintain the sentence, or (3) to reduce the sentence with or without altering the finding, or ( 4) to alter the sentence with or without either reducing the sentence or altering the finding, but, subject to section 106(3), not so as to enhance the same. It is urged that the 12--85 s. c. India/59.\n\nJayaram Vitliob~\n\nand another v.\n\nThe State q(\n\nBomb't•\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n]aJ•aram Vitholta\n\nnnd anolher\n\nT!it State of\n\nBomba7\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAy.Jar ].\n\npresent case does not 'fall within any of the four categories mentioned above as the conviction under section 5 has been affirmed, and no question of reduction or alteration of sentence arises, as none had been impo; cd under that section by the Magistrate, and that accordingly the order of the High Court could not be justified under any of the p'rovisions of the Code. It is further contended that the award of sen tence under section 5 amounted in the above circumstances to an enl1ance1nent, and was, in consequence, illegal, as no notice had been issued therefor, as required by law.\n\nIn support of this contention, the decision 111 Ibrahim v. Em perm (1 ) is relied on. In that case, as in the present, the accused was convicted both under section 4(a) and section 5 of the Act, but a sentence was passed under section 4(a) and none under section 5.\n\nOn appeal, the learned Judges set aside the conviction under section 4 (a), and on the question of sentence, observed that the Magistrate was wrong in not having imposed a separate sentence under section 5, and continued :\n\n\"He ought to have imposed a sentence under each section ; but as he has not imposed a sentence under section 5, we cannot impose one ourselves, for that would be enhancing the sentence\".\n\nThese observations undoubtedly support the first appellant.\n\nA different view, however, was taken in two other decisions, which may now be noticed. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Hossein Ali( 2 ), the accused had been convicted by the Magistrate both under section 363 and section 498 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to imprisonment under section 363, no separate sentence having been awarded under section 498. On appeal, the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction under section 363, but held the accused guilty under section 498. On a reference as to whether the Sessions Judge could pass any sentence under section 498, it was held by the High Court that he could, under section 423(1)(b) of\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1940 Born. 129.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 439\n\nthe Code of Criminal Procedure, as there was an alteration of the conv1ct1on under sections 363 and 498 to one under section 498. This view proceeds, in our opinion, on a misconception of the true meaning of the words \"alter the finding\" in section 423(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nWhen a statute enacts provisions creating specific offences, in law these offences constitute distinct matters with distinct incidents. Under section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they have to be separately charged, and under section 367, the judgment has to specify the offence of which and the law under which the accused is convicted.\n\nWhen there is a conviction for more offenc'es than one, there are distinct findings in respect of each of them, and when section 423 ( 1 )(b) speaks of a finding being reversed or altered by the court of appeal, it has reference to the finding in respect of each of the offences. When, therefore, the High Court set aside the conviction under section 4\n\n(a) and affirmed that under section 5, there are two distinct findings, one of reversal and another of affirmance, and there is no question of alteration.\n\nThe decision in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. H ossein Ali (1) was followed in Pradip\n\nChaudhry v. Emperor( 2). There, the Sessions Judge convicted the accused under sections 324 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to imprisonment under section 324, but no sentence was imposed on them under section 148.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court set aside the conviction under section 324, and confirmed that under section\n\n148. Dealing with the contention of the accused that the Court had no power under section 423(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to award a sentence under section 148, the learned Judges observed that they had \"ample power tp transpose the sentence, so long as the transposition does not amount to enhancement\".\n\nWe are unable to support the reasoning in this decision either. There is nothing about transposition of sentence under section 423(1)(b). , It only provides for altering the finding and maintaining the sentence, (I) A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 439.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1946 Patna 235.\n\nJayaram Vithoba\n\ntllld another\n\nThe Stall of\n\nBombay\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nja; v aram ViJ/1oba\n\nand a11other\n\nThi Stat~ of\n\nBomba~\"\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya< ].\n\nand that can apply only to cases where the finding of guilt under one section is altered to a finding of guilt under another. The section makes a clear distinction between a reversal of a finding and its alteration, and provides that when there is a reversal, the order to be passed is one of acquittal, discharge or retrial, whereas when there is an alteration, the order to be passed is one of maintaining, reducing or altering the sentence.\n\nBut here, the order passed by the High Court is not one of alteration of any finding. It is, as already stated, a reversal of the finding under 5'Ction 4(a) and a confirmation of the conviction under section 5. VI e are therefore of opinion that on the language of the section, the imposition of a sentence under section 5 by the High Court cannot be justified.\n\nThe question still remains whether apart from section 423(1)(b), the High Court lras the power to impose the sentence which it has. When a person is tried for an offence and convicted, it is the duty of the court to impose on him such sentence, as is prescribed therefor. The law does not envisage a person being convicted for an offence without a sentence being imposed therefor.\n\nWhen the trial Magistrate convicted the first appellant under section 5, it was plainly his duty to have imposed a sentence. Having imposed a sentence under section 4(a), he obviously considered that there was. no need to impose a like sentence under section 5 and to direct that both the sentences should run concurrently.\n\nBut, in strictness, such an order was the proper one to be passed. The appellants then took the matterin revisions to the High Court, and contended that their conviction under section 5 was bad. The High Court went into the question on the merits, and found them guilty under that section. It was the duty of the High Court to impose a sentence under section 5, and that is precisely what it has done. The power to pass a sentence under those circumstances is derived from the law which enacts that on conv1ct1on a sentence shall be imposed . on the accused, and that is a power which can and ought to be exercised by all the courts which, having jurisdiction to decide whether the\n\naccused is guilty or not, find that he is. We are of op1mon that this power is preserved to the appellate court expressly by section 423(1)(d), which enacts that it can \"make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or pmper\".\n\nWhen a conviction is affirmed in appeal but no sentence had been awarded by the trial Magistrate, the award of a sentence is consequential on and incidental to the affirmance of the conviction, and it is a just and proper order to be passed under the law.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the view expressed in Ibrahim v. Emperor(1) that such an order would be an enhancement of the sentence.\n\nBefore a sentence can be said to be enhanced, there must be one which could be enhanced and when no sentence was imposed on a conviction by the trial Magistrate and one is fot the first time awarded in appeal, it cannot correctly be said to be an enhancement. We are accordingly of opinion that it was within the competence of the High Court to have passed the sentence which it had.\n\nThere is another ground on which the order of the lower court can be sustained. Against the conviction of the appellants by the Presidency Magistrate, no appeal lay, and accordingly the appellants preferred a revision to the High Court. Under section 439 ( 1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court in hearing a revision can ex.er.cise the powers of a court of appeal under section 423, and may enhance the sentc:nce.\n\nUnder section 439(2), an order of enhancement could not be passed, unless the accused had an opportunity of being heard in his defence, and under section 439(6), the accused is also entitled, when proceedings are taken under section 439(2), to show cause against his conviction. The substance of the matter is that when proceedings are taken against the accused for enhancement of sentence under section 439 (2), he has a right to be heard both on the question of the propriety of the conviction and of the sentertce to be imposed on him if he is convicted. In the present case, the first appellant had an opportunity of pre- (!) A.I.R. 1940 Born. 129.\n\nJayaram Vithoba and another\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nV er1katararna\n\nAyyar J.\n\n\\955\n\nvaram Vithoba nnd a1101h1r\n\nThi State of\n\nBombay\n\nVenkatorama\n\nA)!l'ar ].\n\nseating his case in respect of both these matters, and, in fact, he availed himself of the same. He himself raised in his revision the question of his guilt under section 5, and the High Court on a consideration of all the evidence affirmed his conviction. On the question of sentence, section 5 enacts that when a person is fonnd guilty under that section, the punishment shall not be less than three months' imprisonment and Rs. 200 fine, if he had been convicted for the same offence previously. The first appellant had a previous conviction, and the sentence of imprisonment is the minimum which could be passed against him under section 5. With reference to this aspect of the matter, the High Court observes :\n\n\"In view of the fact that the first accused admits one previous conviction under section 5 of the Act, the sentence of three months' rigorous imprisonment passed upon him by the learned Presidency Magistrate is justified\".\n\nNow, the question is whether, in the circumstances, the order of the High Court could be held to be bad for want of notice under section 439(2). The law does not prescribe that any particular formalities should be complied with, before action is taken under that section.\n\nIt only provides that the accused should have an opportunity or showing cause against the conviction and enhancement, and as the first appellant was heard on both these questions, the requirements of the section were satisfied. The order of the High Court could accordingly be _maintained under section 439, even if it were to be regarded as an enhancement of the sentence. In any event, no prejudice has resulted to the first appellant by reason of the absence of a formal notice under section 439(2).\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed.", "total_entities": 119, "entities": [{"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 50, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 332, "end_char": 343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAYARAM VITHOBA AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 563, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAYARAM VITHOBA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 570, "end_char": 589, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 640, "end_char": 656, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. 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1017, "end_char": 1021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act", "statute": "Conviction by the trial Court but no sentence-High Court CMftrming conviction and awarding sentence-Legality-Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1064, "end_char": 1085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4( a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1239, "end_char": 1260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Presidency Magistrate, ':\"ho tried the case, found him guilty under s. 4(a) and sentenced him to three months' rigorous imprisonment."}}, {"text": 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{"in_sentence": "The law does not envhage a person being convicted for an\n\nT ilkeshwar Sin:h\n\nand others\n\nTh• Stale of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nDec em/Hr 13,\n\nJ•yar11m Vilhoba\n\nand anoth1r\n\nThe Slate •f\n\nBrJmbay\n\noffence without a sentence being imposed therefor, and the award of\n\n:ii.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAI"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2338, "end_char": 2343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law does not envhage a person being convicted for an\n\nT ilkeshwar Sin:h\n\nand others\n\nTh• Stale of Bihar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nDec em/Hr 13,\n\nJ•yar11m Vilhoba\n\nand anoth1r\n\nThe Slate •f\n\nBrJmbay\n\noffence without a sentence being imposed therefor, and the award of\n\n:ii."}}, {"text": "s. 423(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2683, "end_char": 2695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2703, 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 4326, "end_char": 4335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4379, "end_char": 4400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4698, "end_char": 4710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4813, "end_char": 4822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4933, "end_char": 4942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5121, "end_char": 5133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5159, "end_char": 5168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1887", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1887"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5592, "end_char": 5601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5826, "end_char": 5838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5958, "end_char": 5984, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6013, "end_char": 6022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6116, "end_char": 6127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6592, "end_char": 6606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jayaram Vitliob~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6684, "end_char": 6700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayaram Vitliob~\n\nand another v.\n\nThe State q(\n\nBomb't•\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n]aJ•aram Vitholta\n\nnnd anolher\n\nT!it State of\n\nBomba7\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAy.", "canonical_name": "JAYARAM VITHOBA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6722, "end_char": 6727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayaram Vitliob~\n\nand another v.\n\nThe State q(\n\nBomb't•\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n]aJ•aram Vitholta\n\nnnd anolher\n\nT!it State of\n\nBomba7\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAy."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6741, "end_char": 6752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayaram Vitliob~\n\nand another v.\n\nThe State q(\n\nBomb't•\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n]aJ•aram Vitholta\n\nnnd anolher\n\nT!it State of\n\nBomba7\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAy.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAI"}}, {"text": "aJ•aram Vitholta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6765, "end_char": 6781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayaram Vitliob~\n\nand another v.\n\nThe State q(\n\nBomb't•\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n]aJ•aram Vitholta\n\nnnd anolher\n\nT!it State of\n\nBomba7\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAy."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6946, "end_char": 6955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7274, "end_char": 7283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7591, "end_char": 7603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7608, "end_char": 7617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7662, "end_char": 7674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7763, "end_char": 7772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7898, "end_char": 7907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8027, "end_char": 8036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8395, "end_char": 8406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8411, "end_char": 8422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8430, "end_char": 8447, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8545, "end_char": 8556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8619, "end_char": 8630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8666, "end_char": 8677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8757, "end_char": 8768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8821, "end_char": 8838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8901, "end_char": 8927, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 363 and 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8980, "end_char": 9000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9014, "end_char": 9025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9138, "end_char": 9152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9164, "end_char": 9190, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9335, "end_char": 9346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9354, "end_char": 9380, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9428, "end_char": 9439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9662, "end_char": 9673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9884, "end_char": 9893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9923, "end_char": 9932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 324 and 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10239, "end_char": 10259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10267, "end_char": 10284, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10326, "end_char": 10337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10381, "end_char": 10392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10452, "end_char": 10463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10490, "end_char": 10502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10581, "end_char": 10598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10606, "end_char": 10632, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10659, "end_char": 10670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10936, "end_char": 10953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jayaram Vithoba", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11084, "end_char": 11099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayaram Vithoba\n\ntllld another\n\nThe Stall of\n\nBombay\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "JAYARAM VITHOBA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11887, "end_char": 11896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12000, "end_char": 12009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12096, "end_char": 12113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12494, "end_char": 12503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12589, "end_char": 12601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12683, "end_char": 12692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12933, "end_char": 12942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13108, "end_char": 13117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13565, "end_char": 13582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ibrahim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14006, "end_char": 14013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to agree with the view expressed in Ibrahim v. Emperor(1) that such an order would be an enhancement of the sentence."}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14717, "end_char": 14728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14741, "end_char": 14767, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14859, "end_char": 14870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14910, "end_char": 14924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15050, "end_char": 15064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15129, "end_char": 15143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15300, "end_char": 15311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15591, "end_char": 15606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayaram Vithoba and another\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nV er1katararna\n\nAyyar J.\n\n\\955\n\nvaram Vithoba nnd a1101h1r\n\nThi State of\n\nBombay\n\nVenkatorama\n\nA)!l'ar ]."}}, {"text": "varam Vithoba", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15640, "end_char": 15653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayaram Vithoba and another\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nV er1katararna\n\nAyyar J.\n\n\\955\n\nvaram Vithoba nnd a1101h1r\n\nThi State of\n\nBombay\n\nVenkatorama\n\nA)!l'ar ]."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay\n\nVenkatorama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15672, "end_char": 15701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayaram Vithoba and another\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nV er1katararna\n\nAyyar J.\n\n\\955\n\nvaram Vithoba nnd a1101h1r\n\nThi State of\n\nBombay\n\nVenkatorama\n\nA)!l'ar ]."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15878, "end_char": 15887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16001, "end_char": 16010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16349, "end_char": 16358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16513, "end_char": 16522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16785, "end_char": 16799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17224, "end_char": 17235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17416, "end_char": 17430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1057_1066_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nK. C. MATHEW AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.\n\n(V1v1AN BosE, VENKATARAMA -AYYAR and\n\nCHANDRA SEKHARA AIY AR JJ.]\n\nSessions Trial-Charge--Diff erent offences against different accused lumped together-Legality-Examination of the accused neither full nor clear-Failure to raise objection at earlier stages-Withholding by the accused of facts within their special knowledge-Inference-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 225, 342, 537 -Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), ss. 302, 149.\n\nThe appellants were put up for trial along with others before the Court of Sessions. The charge against them set out the fact that they formed an unlawful assembly, stated the common object specifying in detail the part each accused had played and then gave a list of to;, sections of the Travancore Penal Code including sections which correspond to s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 149.\n\nThe Sessions Judge acquitted them under s. 302 read with s. 149 but convicted them on the lesser charges. They appealed to the High Court against their convictions and the State appealed against their acquittals under s. 302 read with s. 149. The High Court dismissed their appeals and allowed the appeals against their acquittals and sentenced each of them to transportation for life. It was contended on their behalf that the charge was not in accordance with law c, ad their examinations under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal\n\nProodure were defective and prejudiced them.\n\nHeid, that the charge framed was a legal one and was expressly covered by s. 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Each of the accused was apprised of the facts alleged against him and he could easily pick out the relevant sections under which he was charged.\n\nThere could, therefore, be no prejudice to any one of them.\n\nHeld, further, that as no objection was taken to the defective cxamVi.ation under s. 34 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at an earlier stage although the accused wre represented by counsel, and as the petition of appeal did not ; et out the questions the court should have put to them and the answers they would have given and as they thereby withheld from the court facts which were within their special knowledge, the court was entitled to draw an adverse conclusion against them and hold that no prejudice had been caused to them.\n\nThat when an accused person is not properly questioned under s. 34 2 so as to enable him to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him he is entitled to ask the appellate Court, which is the ultimate court of fact, to place him in the same position\n\nDeumber 15\n\nJt.C.Afathtw\n\nand othtrs v. • rhe State of T ravancore-C-Ochin\n\nhe would have been in if he had been properly questioned and to take the explanation he would have given, if he had been asked, into c0nsideration when \\Veighing the evidence in just the same way as \"the court would have done if the explanation had been there all along.\n\nBut he cannot ask to be placed in a better position than he would have been in if the court had done its duty from the start.\n\nTh~.:r.for.::, when complainin, g of prejudice he 1nust set out the questions he should have been asked and indicate the answers he would have given.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 97 of 1953.\n\nAppeal under Article 134 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution from the judgment and order dated the 15th June 1953 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 54, 55, 56, 58 and 79 of !J52.\n\nS. Mohan Kumaramangalam and S. Subramaniam, for the appellants.\n\nSardar Balzadur, for the respondent.\n\n1955. December 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-This is a case of rioting in which two police constables were killed. Thirty one persons were put up for trial. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted twenty one of them on all the charges and acquitted the remaining ten of the most serious charge of all, namely the offence falling under the sections of the Travancore. Penal Code which correspond to section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 149.\n\nBut she convicted them on several of the lesser charges and imposed sentences ranging from two to five years O:l each count and directed that the sentences should run consecutively except in the cases of accused 5 to 8 and 18. She sentenced each of them on only one count and so there was only one sentence.\n\nThe convicts appealed to the High Court and the State of Travancore-Cochin also appealed against the acquittals on tlw murder-cum-rioting count.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the appeals made by the ten accused and allowed the appeals against the acquittals and imposed the lesser sentence\n\nof transportation m each case.\n\nThese ten accused now appeal here.\n\nThe accused are said to be communists. Two of them, namely numbers 30 and 31, were arrested on 27-2-1950 at about 1 P.M. and were confined in the Edappilly police lock up. The prosecution case is that the other 29 accused entered into a conspiracy to release their comrades and in pursuance of that conspiracy attacked the police station at about 2 A.M. on the 28th armed with deadly weapons such as choppers, knives, bamboo and other sticks and a dagger. Two police constables, Mathew and Velayudhan, were killed in the course of the raid.\n\nThe first point taken before us is that the charge is not according to law and has prejudiced the appellants in their defence. The complaint on this score is that each accused has not been told separately what offences he is being tried for. They have all been lumped together as follows :\n\n\"The aforesaid offences having been proved by the evidence adduced by the prosecution, you the accused 1-29 have committed offences punishable under .................... \" and then follow a string of ten sections of the Travancore Penal Code.\n\nWe are. satisfied that the charge neither caused, nor could have caused, prejudice. The body of the charge set out the fact that the accused 1-29 formed an unlawful assembly and stated the common object ; and then the charge specified in detail the part that each accused had played.\n\nIn the circumstances, each accused was in a position to know just what was charged against him because once the facts are enumerated the law that applies to them can easily be ascertained ; and in this particular case it was just a matter of picking out the relevant sections from among the ten mentioned. There is nothing in this objection ; section 225 of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly covers this kind of case.\n\nThe next argument was that the examination of each accused under section 342 of the Criminal Prcr cedure Code was defective and that that caused pre-\n\nK.C.Mathew\n\nl1Ni others\n\nThe State of T raoancore-Cochi11\n\nBose J.\n\n195!>\n\nICC.Ma1'11w\n\nand ollrm\n\nTllA Stott of Traoaneon-Coehin\n\nBo11 ].\n\njudice. We agree that the examination was not as full or as clear as it should have been but we are not satisfied that there was any prejudice.\n\nIt i' to be noted that the question of prejudice was not raised in either of the Courts below nor was it raised in the grounds of appeal to this Court. The point wa> taken for the first time in the arguments before us and even there counsel was unable to say that his clients had in fact been prejudiced ; all he could urge was that there was a possibility of prejudice.\n\nWe agree that the omission to take the objection in the grounds of appeal is not necessarily fatal ; everything must depend on the facts of the case ; but the fact that the objection was not taken at an earlier stage, if it could and should have been taken, is a material circumstance that will necessarily weigh heavily against the accused particularly when he has been represented by counsel throughout. The Explanation to section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly requires the Court to\n\n\"have regar<l to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings\".\n\nAnother strong circumstance is this : the petition for appeal does not set out the questions that, according to the appellants, they should have been asked nor does it indicate the answers that they would have given if they had been asked. Again, though that is not necessarily fatal ordinarily it will be very difficult to sustain a plea of prejudice unless the Court is told . just where the shoe pinches. It is true that in certain exceptional cases prejudice, or a reasonable likelihood of prejudice, may be so patent on the face of the facts that nothing more is needed ; but that class of case must be exceptional.\n\nAfter all, the only person who can really tell us whether he was in fact prejudiced is the accused ; and if there is real prejudice he can at once state the facts and leave the Court to judge their worth. But if the attitude of the accused, whether in person or through the mouth of his counsel, is : \"I don't know what I would have said. I still have\n\nto think that up. But I might have said this, that or the other\", then there will ordinarily be little difficulty in concluding that there neither was, nor could have been, prejudice.\n\nHere, as elsewhere, the Court is entitled to conclude that a person who deliberately withholds facts within his special knowledge and refuses to give the Court that assistance which is its right and due, has nothing of value which he can disclose and that if he did disclose anything that would at once expose the hollowness of his cause.\n\nThe purpose of section 342 is set out in its opening words-\n\n\" for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him\".\n\nIf the accused is not afforded that opportunity, he is entitled to ask the appellate COurt to place him in the same position as he would have been in had he been asked. In other words, he is entitled to ask the appellate Court, which is the ultimate Court of fact, to take the explanation that he would have given in the first Court into consideration when weighing the evidence in just the same way as it would have done if it had been there all along. But if he does not ask this in the last Court of fact he is in little better position when the case comes here than he would be in had he, say, omitted to call, in his defence, a witness who he says, would have deposed in his favour. In very exceptional cases he might be allowed to call such a witness even at such a stage, but if he does not ask for that when his case is under appeal he would normally have but slender hope of succeediug here. It is true he is in a stronger position when section 342 is in question because the section places a solemn and serious duty on the Court, and the accused can very rightly and properly complain if the Court fails to do its duty ; but when all is said and done, he cannot claim to be placed in a better position than he would have been in had the Court discharged its duty at the outset. Therefore, all he is entitled to say on appeal is, \"I was not asked to explain this matter. Here is my explanation ; this is\n\nK.C.Matht11J\n\nand others\n\nThi Sate of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nBose].\n\nK.C.},, fathew\n\nand others\n\nThe State of T ravancoreCochin\n\nBos1 ].\n\nwhat I would have said : please consider it\". But if he does not take up that position at the appellate stage and complains of prejudice for the first time here, the inference is strong that the plea is an afterthought and that there was no real prejudice.\n\nHowever, as the true meaning of \"prejudice\" m section 537 and other sections of the Code is not Ytt properly appreciated, probably for want of an authoritative decision by this Court, we invited counsel to tell us what questions his clients should have been asked and at any rate to indicate what, according to him, they might reasonably have said. His main grievance on this score is that none of the appellants has been asked about the common object and he said it is obvious that most pf them could very reasonably have said that they had no idea that it was murder and that they did not even know that any of the members of the assembly carried lethal weapons.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to explain that both courts find that there was an unlawful assembly and that the police station at Edappilly was raided and that arms and ammunition and some of the station records were carried away by the raiders ; also that two of the police constables who were on sentry duty were murdered.\n\nThe only point on which they differ is about the common object.\n\nThe charge set out that the common object was to rescue the 30th and 31st accused by force and to murder the policemen on duty as well as to loot the records, arms and ammunition of the police station. The learned Sessions Judge found, mainly because of a concession made by the Public Prosecutor, that the common object could not be placed higher than that of rescue despite the fact that some of the members were armed with deadly weapons ; accordingly she (for the learned Sessions Judge was a lady) acquitted all the accused of the charge under setion 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 149, or rather under the corresponding provisions of the Travancore Penal Code.\n\nThe State appealed against these acquittals and\n\nthe High Court thereupon convicted on the murdercum-rioting charge and imposed the lesser sentence.\n\nThe convicts also appealed but their appeals were dismissed.\n\nIn view of the admission made by the learned Public Prosecutor we do not think the High Court was justified in holding that the assembly had the common object to murder but we do not think that that makes any difference to the result.\n\nEven if it be assumed that the common object was only to res.cue the two accused who were in the lock up, it is obvious that the use of violence was implicit in that . object. People do not gather together at the dead of night armed with crackers and choppers and sticks to rescue persons who are guarded by armed police without intending to use violence in order to overcome the resistance of the guards ; and a person would have to be very naive and simpleminded if he did not realise that the sentries posted to guard prisoners at night are fully armed and are expected to use their arms should be need arise ; and he would have to be a moron in intelligence if he did not know that murder of the armed guards would be a likely consequence in such a raid ; and what holds good for murder also holds good for looting in general. Now section 14? applies not only to offences actually committed in pursuance of the common object but also to offences that members of the assembly know are likely to be committed. It would be impossible on the facts of this case to hold that the members of the assembly did not know that murder was likely to be committed in pursuance of a common object of that kind by an assembly as large as the one we have here. Accordingly, even if the common object be not placed as high as murder the conviction on the murder-cum-rioting charge was fully justified. This answers the main ground of appeal.\n\nBut to go back to the argument about section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. What we have to assess here is the explanation which counsel says each appellant could reasonably have given in the trial Court if he had been asked for one, namely that\n\nK.C.Mathew and others y.\n\nThe State of Travancore-Cochin\n\nBose].\n\nK.C.Matll1w\n\nmuJ olhlfs\n\nv ..\n\nTht Stott of Tt avancort~Cochin\n\nBos1 J.\n\nhe did not know that any member of the assembly carried lethal weapons and that murder was likely to result. The answer to that is plain. There is nothing to indicate that the appellants are deficient in intelligence and understanding, and if they are judged by the standard of men of reasonable intelligence, as they must be, then an explanation of this kind cannot be believed. Men who band themselves together to rescue persons locked behind prison bars and guarded by armed police do not set out with bare hands and doves of peace ; of course, they arm themselves with implements that are strong enough to break open locks and break down doors and iron bars and it is obvious that implements of this kind can be used with deadly effect should the need and the desire to use them in that way arise. It hardly matters whether each member knew the exact nature of the implements, namely that some had choppers and some sticks.\n\nIt is enough that they knew that instruments that could be used as deadly weapons would necessarily have to be carried if the purpose underlying the common object was to be achieved. Therefore, even if the answer now suggested to us had been given in the trial Court it would have made no difference to the -result.\n\nTurning next to the first accused, counsel said that he was not asked about identification in his examination under section 342.\n\nBut that is not correct.\n\nThe question put was-\n\n\"P.Ws. 1 and 4 say that they had seen you, beating constables Mathew and V elayudhan, etc.\" The point about identification is implicit in this question and we are satisfied that this appellant understood what the question imported because the crossexamination of these witnesses discloses that the question of identity was present to the mind of the cross-examiner; he specifically questioned each witness about the matter.\n\nNext, it was said that no question was put to the first accused about any robbery, but we need not examine this any further because the matter becomes academic once the murder-cum-riot conviction is upheld and once we make the sentences concurrent instead of consecutive as we intend to do.\n\nThe argum, nts on this point about the rest of the appellants except the seventh accused, followed the same rattern and we need not examine them separately.\n\nAs regards the seventh accused, the only point of substance in his case is that he was not asked to expiain his presence at K:idiparambu where .the agreement to rescue and the planning are said to have taken shape.\n\nCounsel said that this accused lives there, so the mere fact that he was seen among a crowd that had gathered there in the day time could . not be regarded as a circumstance of suspicion. That would have had force had it not been for the fact that he was again seen at the police station at 2 A.M. and was identified as one of the rioters who took an active part in the raid. \\V c have gone into the question of possible prejudice under section 342 in the way we have because, as we have said, appellants do not appear to appreciate what is necessary when this kind of plea is raised. We do not intend to lay down any hard and fast rule but we do wish to emphasise that what we have done in this case is not to be regarded as a precedent and that in future it will be increasingly difficult to induce this Court to look into questions of prejudice if the requisite material is not placed before it and if appellants deliberately withhold from the Court assistance which it is in their power to render ; an inference adverse to them must be expected if that attitude is adopted.\n\nCounsel then tried to attack the credibility of the witnesses and the correctness of the findings generally but, following our usual practice, we decline to interfere with concurrent findings of fact where there is ample evidence which, if believed, can be used in support of the findings. That is the position here.\n\nThe only ground on which interference is called for is where the sentences were dire<:'.ted to run consecutively.\n\nThe High Court confirmed the convictions and sentences passed by the learned Sessions Judge\n\nK.C. Mathtta\n\nll1lll othtrs\n\nTlt.4Staieof T ravancor11-Co&hin\n\nBost].\n\nK.C.MaJ/itw\n\nand oth.trs\n\nThe State of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nBolt J.\n\nDecembtr 16.\n\nbut when it allowed the appeal by the State and passed the lesser sentence it said that \"the sentences passed on each accused will run conrrently\". We are not sure whether the learned Judges meant that the sentences imposed by ihem should run concurrently with the others or whether they meant to allow the appeal to that extent. In order to remove all doubts, we allow the appeal to the extent of directing that the sentences imposed on each accused shall run concurrently and not consecutively.\n\nExcept for that, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nRAJAHMUNDRY ELECTRIC SUPPLY\n\nCORPORATION LTD.\n\nti.\n\nA. NAGESWARA RAO AND OTHERS.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]\n\nIndian Companies Act, 1913 (Vil of 1913), s. 153-C sub-clause (J)(a)(i) and s. 162(v) and (vi)-Application for an order under s. 153-C-Validity t!tereof to be judged Oil the facts at the time of presentation thereof-Subsequent events-Effects thereof-Order under s. 153-C-Whether competent before facts proved make out a case for u1inding up under s. 162-Wordsi \"just and equitable\" in s. 162(vi) -Whether ejusdem generis with the matters mentionned in clauses (i) to (v) of the section--Mere misconduct of Directors in misappropriat. ing funds of a Company-Apart from other circumstances-Whether\n\nwarrants an order for the winding up of a Company-CircumstanceJ under which an order for winding up can be passed by the court.\n\nAn application was filed by the first respondent under s. 162 clauses (v) and (vi) of the Indian Companies Act for the winding up of the Company on the grounds, inter-alia, that the affairs of the Con1pany were being mismanaged and that the directors had misappropriated the funds of the Company.\n\nIn the alternative it was prayed that action might be taken under s. 153-C and appropriate orders be passed to protect the interests of the shareholders.\n\nThe High Court held (i) that the charges set out in the application had been substantially prove~ and that it was a fit case for an order for winding up being made under s. 162 (vi) and (ii) that under the circumstances action could be taken under s. 153-C and accordingly it appointed two administrators with all the powers of directors to look after the affairs of the Company. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court by the Company it was contended that the", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "C. 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Mohan Kumaramangalam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3538, "end_char": 3561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mohan Kumaramangalam and S. Subramaniam, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. Subramaniam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3566, "end_char": 3580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mohan Kumaramangalam and S. Subramaniam, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sardar Balzadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3603, "end_char": 3618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Balzadur, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4040, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4061, "end_char": 4072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4080, "end_char": 4097, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The convicts appealed to the High Court and the State of Travancore-Cochin also appealed against the acquittals on tlw murder-cum-rioting count."}}, {"text": "27-2-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two of them, namely numbers 30 and 31, were arrested on 27-2-1950 at about 1 P.M. and were confined in the Edappilly police lock up."}}, {"text": "Edappilly police lock up", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4932, "end_char": 4956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two of them, namely numbers 30 and 31, were arrested on 27-2-1950 at about 1 P.M. and were confined in the Edappilly police lock up."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5265, "end_char": 5271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two police constables, Mathew and Velayudhan, were killed in the course of the raid."}}, {"text": "Velayudhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5276, "end_char": 5286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two police constables, Mathew and Velayudhan, were killed in the course of the raid."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5850, "end_char": 5860, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6491, "end_char": 6502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6636, "end_char": 6647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of T", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next argument was that the examination of each accused under section 342 of the Criminal Prcr cedure Code was defective and that that caused pre-\n\nK.C.Mathew\n\nl1Ni others\n\nThe State of T raoancore-Cochi11\n\nBose J.\n\n195!"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6781, "end_char": 6785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next argument was that the examination of each accused under section 342 of the Criminal Prcr cedure Code was defective and that that caused pre-\n\nK.C.Mathew\n\nl1Ni others\n\nThe State of T raoancore-Cochi11\n\nBose J.\n\n195!"}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7804, "end_char": 7815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9519, "end_char": 9530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10623, "end_char": 10634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of T ravancoreCochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11189, "end_char": 11215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C.},, fathew\n\nand others\n\nThe State of T ravancoreCochin\n\nBos1 ].", "canonical_name": "State of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nBolt"}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11530, "end_char": 11541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Edappilly", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12280, "end_char": 12289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is necessary at this stage to explain that both courts find that there was an unlawful assembly and that the police station at Edappilly was raided and that arms and ammunition and some of the station records were carried away by the raiders ; also that two of the police constables who were on sentry duty were murdered."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13108, "end_char": 13125, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13136, "end_char": 13147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13212, "end_char": 13222, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14508, "end_char": 14518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15139, "end_char": 15150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.C.Mathew", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15354, "end_char": 15364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What we have to assess here is the explanation which counsel says each appellant could reasonably have given in the trial Court if he had been asked for one, namely that\n\nK.C.Mathew and others y.\n\nThe State of Travancore-Cochin\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "K. C. MATHEW"}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15384, "end_char": 15410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What we have to assess here is the explanation which counsel says each appellant could reasonably have given in the trial Court if he had been asked for one, namely that\n\nK.C.Mathew and others y.\n\nThe State of Travancore-Cochin\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "State of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nBolt"}}, {"text": "K.C.Matll1w", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15420, "end_char": 15431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C.Matll1w\n\nmuJ olhlfs\n\nv ..\n\nTht Stott of Tt avancort~Cochin\n\nBos1 J.\n\nhe did not know that any member of the assembly carried lethal weapons and that murder was likely to result.", "canonical_name": "K. C. MATHEW"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16855, "end_char": 16866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16980, "end_char": 16986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 4 say that they had seen you, beating constables Mathew and V elayudhan, etc.\""}}, {"text": "V elayudhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16991, "end_char": 17002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 4 say that they had seen you, beating constables Mathew and V elayudhan, etc.\""}}, {"text": "idiparambu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17919, "end_char": 17929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the seventh accused, the only point of substance in his case is that he was not asked to expiain his presence at K:idiparambu where .the agreement to rescue and the planning are said to have taken shape."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18446, "end_char": 18457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.C. Mathtta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19614, "end_char": 19626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court confirmed the convictions and sentences passed by the learned Sessions Judge\n\nK.C. Mathtta\n\nll1lll othtrs\n\nTlt.4Staieof T ravancor11-Co&hin\n\nBost]."}}, {"text": "K.C.MaJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19685, "end_char": 19692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C.MaJ/itw\n\nand oth.trs\n\nThe State of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nBolt J.\n\nDecembtr 16."}}, {"text": "State of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nBolt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19715, "end_char": 19748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C.MaJ/itw\n\nand oth.trs\n\nThe State of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nBolt J.\n\nDecembtr 16.", "canonical_name": "State of T ravancore-Cochin\n\nBolt"}}, {"text": "RAJAHMUNDRY ELECTRIC SUPPLY\n\nCORPORATION LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20308, "end_char": 20352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJAHMUNDRY ELECTRIC SUPPLY\n\nCORPORATION LTD."}}, {"text": "A. NAGESWARA RAO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20360, "end_char": 20376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. NAGESWARA RAO AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20407, "end_char": 20424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20431, "end_char": 20457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20473, "end_char": 20479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 162(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20507, "end_char": 20516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20557, "end_char": 20563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20693, "end_char": 20699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20778, "end_char": 20784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 162(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20816, "end_char": 20826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21212, "end_char": 21218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21254, "end_char": 21267, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21521, "end_char": 21527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21780, "end_char": 21786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21858, "end_char": 21864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22024, "end_char": 22037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court by the Company it was contended that the"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1076_1101_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Rajalzmundry Eketric Supp/;!\n\nCorporation Ltd. v.\n\nA Nageswara Rao\n\nand others\n\nD1tnnbt' 19.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nappointed to manage its affairs, when action under section 153-C.\n\nThis contention must ingly be rejected.\n\n[1955]\n\nis taken\n\naccord-\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, of the first respondent. The costs of the administrator will come out of the estate.\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA v.\n\nTHE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, WEST\n\nBENGAL AND OTHERS\n\n(WITH CONNECTED APPEAL)\n\n[S, R. DAs, ACTING C. J., VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nSales Tax-Sale of hessian to the Ministry of Industry and Supplies of the Government of India-If exempt from payment of sales tax-Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act VI of 1941), s. 5(2)(•)(iii). . -Per S. R. DAs, AcTING\n\nC.J., V1v1AN BosE,\n\nBHAGWATI\n\nAND\n\nJAGANNADHADAS JJ., SINHA J. dissenting.-The exemption created by the provisions of s. 5(2)(a)(iii) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act of 1941 must be construed strictly and cannot be extended to sales to Government departments other than those mentioned therein.\n\nThe Department of Industries and Supplies, which was subsequently rcdesignated as the Ministry of Industries and Supplies, was not the same as the Indian Stores Department or the Supply Dc-- partmcnt of the Government. of India and~ consequently, sales _made to the Ministry of Industries and. Supplies are not exempt from pay~ ment of sales tax under that section.\n\nIn a welfare State with ever expanding activities in different fields including trade and commerce, Government departments arc often entrusted with the performance of welldefined activities and are authorised to deal with the outside world and enter into transactions in the .same way as an ordinary person or a Company may do and may well\n\n0be. regarded as distinct units or quasi-legal entities for µie purpose for which they are created.\n\nConsequently, the. sales _of hessian made to the Ministry of Industries and Supplies of the Government of India by the appellant Mills were hot exempt from payment of sales tax under the Act and the State of West Bengal was entitled to levy the same.\n\nPer S1NHA J.-The language of a statute has sometimes to be construed in a modified form in order to give effect to the real intentions of the legislature where, as in the present case, the language is only of a descriptive nature and not a definitive one.\n\nMiller v. Salomons ([1852] 7 Exchequer 475), referred to.\n\nCommissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forest ( [1890] 15 A. C. 334 ), held inapplicable.\n\nThe terms of s. 5(2)(a)(iii) indicate that the exemption created attaches to a particular function of the Government of India described by a certain name.\n\nThe change of nomenclature was, therefore, of no consequence so long as a particular department continued to discharge that func tion, namely, that of purchasing articles including hessian for the Government of India.\n\nHistory of the department shows that the Ministry of Industry and Supply is a lineal descendant of the Tndian Stores Department and was at the time of the contract discharging its function on behalf of the Government of India and, consequently, the sales made to it must held to be exempt from payment of sales tax.\n\nA department of the Government is neither a natural nor a legal person but is one of the many functions of a Government placed in charge of a hierarchy of officials with the head of the department at the apex.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 9 and 10 of 1954.\n\nOn appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th day of June 1952 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 26 of 1952 arising out of the Order dated the 6th day of December 1951 of the said High Court exercising its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in Matter No. 110 of 1950.\n\nC . . K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No. 9 of 1954 and respondent No. 3 in No. lOof 1954.\n\nS. Chowdhury, (S. N. Mukherji, B. N. Ghosh and A. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No. 10 of 1954.\n\nS. M. Bose, Advocate-Genera/. of West Bengal, (B.\n\nSen and P. K. Bose, with him) for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in both appeals.\n\nThi Union of India\n\nThe Commneial T tJJt Ojfim, Wut B1ngal and otlwrs\n\n19!>5\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nT!w Commercial T 4\" Officer, West Bengal and others\n\n1955. December 19.\n\nDAs AcTING C. J.-The only question canvassed before us in the above appeals, which have been heard together, is whether certain sales of goods made by Shri Ganesh Jute Mills, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Mills) to the Government of India, Ministry of Industry and Supplies are to be deducted from the taxable turnover of the Mills so as to be exempt from sales tax dernanded by the Commercial Tax Officer of the State of West Bengal. The relevant facts are stated beki.w.\n\nOn the first of September 1948 the Government of India, Ministry of Industry and Supplies, in Calcutta, placed with the Mills a confirmatory order in writing bearing No. Cal/J-1/2001/103 for the supply to the Government of India of a large quantity of hessian cloth of different descriptions at different prices therein mentioned.\n\nIt was stipulated that the contract would be governed by the conditions of contract specified in Form WSB 133 as amended up-to-date.\n\nIt was specifically mentioned that the goods ordered were required to meet an international obligation of the Government of India and as such the execution of the contract in accordance with the programme of deliveries as given in the schedule attached thereto was essential. The agreed prices were stated to be exclusive of the Bengal Sales Tax and it was stipulated that the Government of India would arrange direct payment of sales tax to the Government of West Bengal if it was ultimately found that Sales Tax was payable in respect of that contract. Pursuant to the aforesaid contract, the Mills supplied goods to the Government of India of the aggregate value of Rs. 2,10,040 calculated at the prices agreed upon.\n\nThe Commercial Tax Officer, Beadon Street, District II Charge, claimed that the aforesaid sales should be included in the taxable turnover of the Mills and assessed to sales tax. The Mills, on the other hand, claimed exemption under section 5 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act VI of 194.1).\n\nThe relevant portion of section 5 ran as follows:-\n\n\"5. (1) The tax payable by a dealer under this Act shall be kYie,\\ at the rate of one quarter of an anna in the rupee on his u:uble turnover ;\n\n(2) In thi.; Act the expression \"taxable turno\\'cr\" means tlut part of a dealer's gross turno\\'cr during any period \\\\\"hich renums, after deducting r hcrdrom-\n\n( a) his tunwYer during th:1t period 011-\n\n(i) .................. ..\n\n(ii) .................. ..\n\n(iii) sales to the Indian Stores Department: the Sul'Ph Department tli. the CoYcrnment of India, :md any r;1ilway or water transport ::, lministration ;\n\n(iY) ................... .\n\n(Y) ........ .° .......... . (Yi) ................... .\n\n1.__\\,) .•.•••.••••••••••••• \" The J-.[ills further rnntended tlut if anv sales tax was\n\nat all payable the same was payable l1\\; the Government of Jn,\\ia and not bv them. The Commercial Tax Officer o\\'erruk, I both these obiections an,\\ on the 8th November 1950 he assessed the Mills to sales tax in respect of the supplies made by the Mills to the Government of India under the aforesaid contract an,\\ demanded a sum of Rs. 9,401-10-6.\n\nOn the 6th December 1950 the Mills filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court at Calcutta. In the petition the Mills impkadeJ as n:spondents the Commercial Tax Officer, the State of West Bengal and the Union of India.\n\nThe Mills praved for a writ of m1111dam11.r on the respon, knts to cancel an, l/or reca II :md/or forbear from acting or giving effect to the demand date,! the 8th\n\nNm-ember 1950 and from realising tht sum of Rs. 9,401-10-6 an,\\ for a writ of cer!ion1ri for production of the records and proceedings before the Commercial Tax Officer an,! for quashing the same and for other incident:il reliefs. On the same day a rule was issued on the respondents to show cause why the orders prayed for should not be made.\n\nThe Commercial Tax Officer filed an affidavit m opposition disputing the contentions put forward by\n\nTht l,\"nim1 ~( ln.Jia\n\n\\\".\n\nT ht ctmmztrcial Tax OJfim, Wes!\n\nBen~:al and othtrs\n\nDru Actg. C.].\n\nTiu Union of India\n\nTh1 Comm\"cial T 6't Officer, Wtsl Bengal and others\n\nD., Actg. C.J.\n\nthe Mills in support of their claim for exemption and maintaining that sales tax was due and had been legitimately assessed and demanded. On behalf of the Union of India was filed an affidavit affirmed by one\n\nM. P.\n\nPai, the then Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Works, Production & Supply. It was therein stated that a department of the Government of India named the Department of Supply came into existence in the month of September 1939 immediately on the commencement of World War II and before the enactment of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act VI of 1941). It was averred that before the 7th January 1946 the said Department of Supply was charged with the procurement of Stores from all places In India including Bengal and that it also directed the work of Indian Stores Department in the United Kindom and of the India Supply Mission in the United States of America.\n\nIt was added that by Resolution No. 227/45-Pub(c) dated the 31st December 1945 the Governor-General in Council announced the creation with effect from the 7th January 1946 of the Department of Industries & Supply in place of the existing Department of Supply and of Industries and Civil Supplies. It was claimed that the powers and functions of the Department of Industries and Supplies were the same as those of the Department of Supply and that there was no variation in the nature of the said functions whatsoever.\n\nThe rule came up for hearing before Bose, J., who took the view that the newly created Department of Industries & Supplies was charged with the same work of procurement of stores for Government as had been entrusted to the Department of Supply and certain additional works and that later on the name was again changed to Ministry of Industry and Supply. The learned Judge pointed out that although there was a change in the designation of the Indian Stores Department and the Supply Department of the Government of India, section. 5(2) (a)(iii) was not amended in any way until 1949 when by an amending Act (West Bengal Act X of 1949) the exemption\n\ngranted under section 5(2)(a)(iii) was withdrawn.\n\nThe learned Judge appears to have regarded this continuance of section 5(2)(a) (iii) in the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as indicative of the fact that in view of the State of West Bengal the Ministry of Industry & Supply was the same as the Indian Stores Department and the Supply Department of the Government of India referred to in the section.\n\nThe learned Judge accordingly held that the Mills were entitled to the benefit of the exemption and were not liable to pay sales tax in respect of the supplies in question. He accordingly, on the 3rd January 1952, made the rule absolute.\n\nThe Commercial Tax Officer and the State of West Bengal went up on appeal from the said judgment and order of Bose, J. The appeal came up fot hearing before a Bench consisting of K. C. Das Gupta, J. and P. N. Mookerjee, J. In separate but concurring judgments both the learned Judges rejected the preliminary objection taken by the Mills and the Union of India as to the maintainability of the appeal. On the merits both of them held that the Department of Industries & Supplies was not the same as the Indian Stores Department or the Supply Department of the Government of India.\n\nThe old departments ceased to exist and a new department combining some of the functions of these departments and some new functions was created and that, therefore, sales to the newly created department could not be deducted from the taxable turnover under section 5(2)(a)(iii).\n\nIn the result, the Appeal Court allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the order of Bose, J. and dismissed the application of the Mills under Article 226.\n\nThe Mills as well as the Union of India have now come up on appeal before us with a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court.\n\nIn view of the• decision of this Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. fames Chadwick & Bros.\n\nLtd.( ), the question of maintainability of the appeal before the High Court has not been raised before us.\n\nThe appeals have been fought out on the merits only.\n\n(I) [1953] S. C.R. 1028.\n\nT!.. Union of lrulia\n\nThi Commercial Tax Ojjicer, W tsl\n\nBengal and ot/urs\n\nD1J1 Aclg. C. J.\n\n'. \\. \" lOSi\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1955]\n\n1955 The appeals came: up before this. Court for hearing\n\nTh• Union , j India on the 22nd and -_ 23rd September 1955: After going The c~ _ . through the rcords ·.it-was • felt that the materials on Tax Off~\"• w,,1 record were not sufficient to enable the Court to de- Bmgal. mu! ot\"4rs c_ termine . tlie .real •point -of controversy ' between the\n\nDas A-;;:C.-j • . \\parties.-· The appeals were accordingly adjourned and directions were -given for the filing of sup_plementary affidavits ·, setting . out the facts relied on by the parties respectively •. -Fresh affidavits have since been filed. It . appears from the affidavit of one - A. R. Iyer, Deputy . Director, Directorate ' General of Supplies and Disposals, under the Ministry of Works, Housing & Supply, that in 1918 a department called the Contracts Directorate had been - constituted as _ a purchasing organisation for the needs of the Army. : With effect from - the -lst January 1922 the Indian stores Department . .was constituted . as - a result of .the recommendations of the Stores Purchase Committee. The functions of this department were to\" act as a purchasing and inspection agency . in. respect of -. certain commodities including textile goods for ll Central departments and minor Local Governments and such other authorities as might desire to avail themselves of the services of this department. Annexure III to the davi.t _of Iyer indicates that it was not obligatory - on the other departments to inake purchases through • the Indian s; ores Department. Originally this department . was constituted for a period of two years but by Resolution No. S. 217 of the Government of India, dated the 6th May 1924, -it was placed on a permanent basis and continued to discharge the -same functions. Rules 5 and 6 -attached to this Resolution -. show that purchases could - also be made ' locally. by other departments in case of emergency or for convenience. - _ . -\n\n- In 1939 when the outbreak of World War II was . -. - -- - imminent the necessity forcreating -a new department was keenly felt and the Governor-General in Council _ by a. Resolution:· of the-- Home Department dated the 26th August 1939 (Annexure V to Iycr's affidavit) announced the creation from that date of a department of Supply \"to deal directly with questions concerning supplies of all kinds required for the prosecution of war\".\n\nAnnexure VIII to Iyer's affidavit shows that the control of the Indian Stores Department and all other matters relating to the purchase of stores in India which were being then dealt with in the Department of Commerce were to be dealt with in the department Supply as a temporary measure for the duration of the war.\n\nThat the Indian Stores Department and the Contracts Directorate did not lose their identity, is shown by the Office Memorandum dated the 3rd August 1940\n\n(Annexure X, Clause 4) and Office Memorandum dated the 2nd December 1941 (Annexure XI, Clause 1(a) and Clause 4). It is thus clear that up to the end of the year 1940 purchases used to be made for and on account of the Government of India by the Contracts Directorate, the Indian Stores Department and the Department of Supply and that purchases were also made locally by other departments.\n\nIt was then that on the 1st July 1941 the Bengal Legislature passed the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 which by section 5(2) (a)(iii) exempted sales to the Indian Stores Department, the Supply Department of the Government of India and any railway or water transport administration from sales tax.\n\nSales to other departments of the Government of India were not so exempted.\n\nBy a Press Note dated the 2nd September 1941 issued by the Government of India in the Supply Department (Annexure\n\nXIII to Iyer's affidavit) a purchase branch of the Supply Department for the duration of the war was created with effect from the 1st August 1941 and it shows that the Contracts Directorate and the Indian Stores Department had then \"ceased to exist as separate entities\" for the duration of the war and a new branch was being organised in their place.\n\nThen came the Office Memorandum dated the 23rd December 1941 issued by the Government of India in the Department of Supply (Annexure XIV) which superseded the previous office memorandum dated the 13th December 1940 (Annexure XII). The 14-85 s. C. lndia/59\n\nThe Union of India\n\nThe Commercial Tax Officer, West Bengal and others\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\n195.'l\n\nTiu Union o.( Indict\n\nThe Comm<\"r..ial T°'\" Offeer, Jl'e.rt Bengal and ffthl'rs\n\nDas At_i;. (.'. J.\n\nauthorities under the Central Governmellt concerned with the production, manufacture and p_urchase of supplies were shown in Statement I annexed thereto.\n\nIt is clearly mentioned therein that departments other than the ones referred to therein were and, in the absence of orders to the contrary, would remain independent of the department though working in close touch with it (Clause 3). Powers of local purchase were also not disturbed in any way (Clause 4).\n\nStatement I indicates that purchases of various supplies, e.g., medical and veterinary supplies, coal and coke for Railway and other civil and military authont1es in India, etc., and Printing and Stationery stores, were independent of the Supply Department.\n\nIt is thus clear that the Indian Stores Department and the Supply Department of the Government of India were not the only departments which had authority to make purchases for and on behalf of the Government of India in its various departments.\n\nOn the 21st April 1943 came Notification No. 2rB- No. 107/43-Pub(c) whereby the Governor-Gcnrral in Council announced the creation, from the 22nd April 1943, of a Department of Industries and Civil Supplies to deal with (i) Statistics and Research, (ii) Development and (iii) Controls.\n\nShortly thereafter Office Memorandum No. E4(179) dated the 14th May 1943 issued by the Department of Supply intimated that the Governor-General in Council had decided that the Department of Industries and Civil Supplies would, with effect from the 15th May 1943, take over responsibility for the procurement of cotton textiles and cotton textile stores (Annexure XVI to Iyer's affidavit).\n\nSo this Department of Industries and Civil Supplies became another purchasing organisation of the Government of India apart from the Department of Supply.\n\nThe Government of India Resolution dated the 31st December 1945 announced the creation, with effect from the 7th January 1946, of the Department of Industries and Supplies in place of the existing Department of Supply and the Department of Industries and Civil Supplies.\n\nBy this Resolution the Indian\n\nStores Department and the Contracts Directorate which during the war had been brought under the Supply Department, were incorporated in the newly created department. It will be noticed that this newly <:reated department had assigned to it the work of the procurement of stores for the Government of India which was formerly assigned to the Department of Supply and the Department of Industries and Civil Supplies. In addition to these duties this department was authorised also to deal with other things, namely, development of industries, administration of Government factories not allocated to specialised departments, Disposals of Surplus and Civil Supplies. The nature and volume of the purchases made by this newly created department became obviously different from and larger than those of the two departments it replaced.\n\nIt is also noteworthy that the Department of Supply which was created for the prosecution of war was abolished as soon as the war was over (Annexure XVII to the affidavit of Iyer).\n\nThe Resolution of the Government of India dated the 2nd September 1947 published in the Gazette of India dated the 6th September 1947 (Annexure XVIII) announced, amongst other things, that with effect from the 29th August 1947 the Department of Industries and Supplies would be re-designated as .the Ministry of Industries and Supply.\n\nFrom the summary of the annexures to the affidavit of Iyer filed in these proceedings it is quite clear that while the Ministry of Industries and Supply was a new designation of the Department of Industries and Supplies, the Department of Industries and Supplies cannot be regarded merely as a new designation of the Department of Supply and the Department of Industries and Civil Supplies.\n\nIndeed, the Resolution announced the \"creation\" of the Department of Industries and Supplies in place of the two existing departments mentioned above.\n\nThis newly created department had wider powers and was a new department altogether. The exemption granted by the Bengal Finance (Sales-Tax) Act, 1941 was given to two departments by name. It was not given to the\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nThe Commercial Tax Oificer, West\n\nBengal and others\n\nDar Aclg. C. ].\n\n1955 sales to ilie. Government 'of India in alh itS' depart- .-· - Th4 U•ionofl•dia ments. It is true that the Indian Stores Department TM c:· . 1 . and the Supply Department of the Govetnment of Tax o.ou:':'\"W,,, . India were not corporate bodies but. they evidently\n\nBengal and •thtrs - were . sufficiently well defined organisations to be Das Jct&· C.J \\ . referred to as. \"entities\" in some of the Press Notes and Resolutions mentioned above and even in the affidavits filed .. in these. proceedings.\n\nFurther, the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 . by section 5 (2)(a)(iii) certainly dealt with these two departments as if they were distinct entities. The Act, in a manner, conferred ' on these . two departments the status, as it were, of well defined and distinct entities at least for the purposes of that Act, namely for making sales to them exempt from the tax .. If it were the object of the Bengal Legislature to give exemption to all sales to all departments of the Government of India it would have been quite easy for it to frame\n\nsub-clause\n\n(iii) in a general way as sub-clause (iv) had been framed. Further,· if sales to these two departments were to be regarded as covering sales to all departments of the Government of India then the sales to the Railways which at that time mostly, if not wholly, belonged to the Government of India need not have been separately mentioned in _ the way it has been in sub-clause (iii). As - already stated, there were, at the date when the Act was passed, various other departments of the Government of India which were concerned with purchase of stores but quite dearly t)le exemption conferred by the section was not intended to extend to the sales to those departments. Therefore, the reference to these two . particular departments in the section cannot possibly be read as a reference to the Government of India generally. It has been urged that the real object of section 5(2)(a)(iii) was to give exemption not to the parti- cu1ar departments but to the sales of such goods as, . at the date of the Act, used to -be made to those de,\n\npartments and, therefore, sales of those goods made to any department of the Government of India which came to be charged with the duty of purchasing those\n\ngoods should also come within the purview of the section and be entitled to the benefit of the exemption conferred by it. We are unable to accept this line of reasoning.\n\nThis interpretation will unduly narrow the scope and ambit of the exemption by limiting it to sales of only those goods as, at the date of the Act, used to be sold to those two departments and sales of other goods even to those two department',, however necessary for the prosecution of the war, would not get the benefit of the exemption. Such could not possibly be the intention of the legislature as fxpressed by the language med by it in framing the section.\n\nAccording to the section the exemption is given to all sales made to those two deparunents, no matter whether the sales were only of the kind of goods which used to be sold to them at the date of the Act or of other kinds of goods. The suggested interpretation involves the addition of qualifying words to the section which ordinarily it is not permissible for the court to do. Further, the press notes and the resolutions of the Government of India summarised above clearly indicate that there were other purchasing departments which were independent of the Indian Stores Department or the Supply Department of the Government of India and that the authority of other departments of making local purchases was not interfered with by te creation of these two departments.\n\nTherefore it may well have been that, at the date of the passing of the Act, same or similar kinds of goods used to be sold to these two departments as well as to other departments but surely it cannot be contended, in view of the language of the section, that the exemption was intended to extend to the sales of the same or similar kinds of goods to those other departments also.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to pronounce any opinion as to the validity or soundness of the extreme position taken up by the learned Advocate-General of West Bengal namely _that as the exemption is given by a statute to sales made to two departments eo nomine it will not extend to sales made to the same department redesignated by a new name. It is enough for our present\n\nThe Union of lndi•\n\nThe CommtrciaJ Ta, Ojf1ur, w,.i &ngal and olhm\n\nDa< A<tg. C.J.\n\nTht Union of India v.\n\nThe Commtrcial Tax Olficer, We.\\'t\n\nBengal and others\n\nDas Artg. C.J.\n\npurpose to say that the Department of Industries and Supplies which was subsequently re-designated as the Ministry of Industries and Supply was not the same as the Indian Stores Department or the Supply Department of the Government of India under a different name. The scope and volume of the work entrusted to the Department of Industries and Supplies was much wider and larger than that with which the two departments which it replaced had been charged.\n\nUnlike those of the two departments, its purchases were not confined to goods necessary for the prq_secution of the war. To extend the benefit of the statutory exemption to the sales made to the newly created department of Industries and Supplies, of goods not required for war purposes but, say, for meeting international obligations as in the present case, will necessarily widen the scope of the exemption and impose greater loss of revenue on the State of West Bengal than what the Act by its language intends to do. In view of the ever expanding activities of the modern welfare State in different fields including that of trade and commerce, the Government departments are often entrusted with the performance of well defined activities and are authorised to deal with the outside world and to enter into contracts of sale and purchase and other transactions in the same way as an ordinary person or company may do. Such Government departments, therefore, may well be regarded as distinct units or quasi legal entities, at least for the particular purposes for which they are created.\n\nAt any rate, the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 by providing for the deduction of the sales to the two named departments from the taxable turnover certainly treated those two departments as distinct entities. This exemption is the creation of the statute and must be construed strictly and cannot be extended to sales to other departments. The fact that the section was not amended until 1949 does not at all indicate that the Bengal Legislature intended to extend the benefit of the section to any but the departments specifically mentioned in the section. In our opinion the conclusion arrived at by the Appeal\n\nCourt, namely that the sales tax is payable on the sale in question is correct and these appeals must be dismissed with costs.\n\nS1NHA J.-I regret to have to differ from my learned brethren in the determination of the only question involved in these appeals, namely, . whether the sales by the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1954 (Messrs Shrcc Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd.) to the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1954, the Union of India (the Government of India at the time of the transactions in question) were liable to payment of <, a]es tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act VI of 1941), to be referred to hereinafter as \" The Act\".\n\nThe farn leading up to these appeals may shortly be stated as follows : The Government of India in the Ministry of Industry and Supply (which for the sake of brevity may be called \"The Government\" entered into a contract on the 1st September 1948 with Messrs Shree Gane<, h Jute Mills Ltd., which may be designated \"The Mills\", for the supply of hessian at certain rates and of certain description appearing in Exhibit A to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Mills.\n\nWith reference to the question of sales tax the contract contains the following stipulation :-\n\n\"The prices shown above are exclusive of the Bengal Sales Tax. The Government of India will arrange direct payment of sales tax to the Government of Wt'>t Bengal if it is ultimately found that sales tax is payable in respect of this contract\".\n\nIt is also provided that \"This contract will be governc:.d by the conditions of contract specified in Form\n\nWSB. 133 as amended up to date\". This contract was entered into and '>igned by \"A Huq, Deputy Director of Supplies, for and on behalf of the Governor-General of India\".\n\nIn pursuance of the aforesaid contract the Mills rnpplied hessian goods to the Government of India of a certain valuation on which the\n\n:ommercial Tax Officer of Bengal, the main contesting respondent, made a demand of Rs. 9,401-10-6 as .sales tax from the Mills.\n\nThe Mills demurred to the\n\nTht~Union of India \\'. 'f ht Commtrcial Tax Ojfuu, Wt>I\n\nBl!ngal ari.rl othtrJ\n\nDo• Actg. C.J.\n\nThe U11io11 of India\n\nv The CfJmmercial Tax O.fficer, H'est\n\nIJengal and others\n\nSinha].\n\npayment and contended that the sales in questjon were exempt from payment of the sales tax demanded in view of the provisions of section 5(2)(a)(iii) of the Act. Eventually the Mills moved the High Court of Calcutta for an appropriate writ under article 226 of the Constitution against the contesting respondents.\n\nThe matter was heard by a Single Judge of that Court who by his judgment dated the 6th December 1951 held that the Mills were not liable to pay the sales tax demanded and cancelled the notice of demand and directed the respondents 1 and 2 to forbear from enforcing the demand. Respondents 1 and 2 went up in appeal under the Letters Patent. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench which came to the contrary conclusion. The major portion of the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench was devoted to the discussion of the question whether the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the writ matter was amenable to the appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent. That question has not been pressed during the arguments and is therefore no more in controversy. The only question that was canvassed before us was the applicability of section 5(2) (a) (iii) of the Act which contains the exemption, the benefit of which is being sought by the appellants in each case. The exemption is in these terms :-\n\n\"Sales to the Indian Stores Department, the Supply Di'partment of the Government of India, and any railway or water transport administration\".\n\nIt has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the sale of hessian by the Mills to the Government of India in the Ministry of Industry and Supply is within the terms of the exemption quoted above.\n\nOn the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the Sales Tax Department of the Government of \\Vest\n\nBengal that the sales in question were not covered by the aforesaid exemption clause.\n\nIt is therefore necessary to go into some detail of the formation and development of the Department in question.\n\nThe supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the Government and sworn to by Shri A. R. Iyer, Deputy Director of Directorate General of Supplies &\n\nDisposals, discloses the following facts.\n\nThe Indian Stores Department was constituted with effect from the 1st January 1922 as a result of the recommendations of the Stores Purchase Committee which had been constituted by the Government of India to examine the whole question of the constitution of an expert agency to carry out on a large scale purchase of supplies required for the public services, as recommended by the Indian Industrial Commission, with the object of encouraging the purchase of articles made in India for Government requirements.\n\nThe scope and functions of the Department, inter alia, were to act as a purchasing and inspection agency, and in an advisory capacity in all matters connected with the purchase of stores fqr the public services, on behalf of all Central Departments of the Government and of the minor local Governme11ts and also on behalf of such major local Governments, Companyworked Railways, Corporations, Port Trusts, Municipalities and quasi public bodies and Indian States as might desire to avail themselves of the Department's assistance.\n\nThe activities of the Department consisted in the purchase and inspection in India of a large variety of goods and articles including \"textile goods\", so that the purchase of hessian which is the particular commodity involved in this case, would be included in the activities of the Department. The Department had been constituted in the first instance for a period of two years. But by a Resolution of the Government of India dated the 6th May 1924 it was placed on a permanent basis.\n\nIt continued to discharge the same functions as before.\n\nIt made purchases not only for the needs of the civilian departments of the Government of India but also of all the requirements of the Army.\n\nHessian which had been purchased from the Mills in this case was one of the products which the Government of India used to purchase only through the Indian Stores Department whenever needed for Government purposes.\n\nA Department called the \"Contracts Directorate\" had been constituted in 1918 as a purchasing organization for the needs of the Army.\n\nBut after the constitution of the Indian\n\nThe Uni.on of India v.\n\nThi Commercial Tax Officer, Wtst Bengal and others\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe (/nifJn qf India\n\nv; TM Commtrcial 1ax O.fficer, WtJl\n\nIJngal and r1lhtn\n\nSinha J.\n\nStores Department in 1922 the Army authorities alsr> began to utilize the services of the Indian Stores Department for procurement of several categories of stores required by them.\n\nBy a Resolution of the Home Department dated the 26th August 1939, apparently to meet the demands of the imminent second world war, the Contracts Directorate and the Indian Stores Department were in 1940. amalgamated with the Department of Supply so that in 1941, when the Act was passed, the position was that the Department of Supply as reorganized on the 3rd August 1940 included amongst its activities and functions the purchase of stores for the needs of the Government.\n\nThis branch of its activity was administered by the Directorate General, Supply Branch, located at New Delhi.\n\nJute products and textiles including hessian had to be purchased only by placing. indents by the department concerned with the Directorate General of Supply, New Delhi. Thus this Department absorbed for the duration of the war the purchasing sections of the Indian Store's Department and the Contracts Directorate which were placed under completely self-contained organizations empowered to procure all supplies, whether for war purposes or otherwise.\n\nAll authorities requmng supplies to be procured in India had to place their indents or demands on the Directorate General concerned. With effect from the 1st August 1941 the Contracts Directorate and the Indian Stores Department ceased to exist as separate entities in the Supply Department and became one purchasing organization in the said Department.\n\nThis organisation arranged for supply of all .classes of stores for purposes of Government, such as textiles, leather goods, etc. Thus hessian which came under the head of \"textiles\" which was being purchased in the first instance only by the Indian Stores Department continued to be purchased by the Supply Department when the Indian Stores Department came under the control of the Supply Department.\n\nBy a notification dated the 21st April 1943 issued by the Government of India in the Home Department, another Department called the Industries and\n\nCivil Supplies Department was created. This Department was primarily concerned with statistics and research and development of industries, as also controls on civil supplies (other than foodstuffs). \\Vhen this Department was first created, it had no purchasing activity.\n\nBut with effect from the 15th May 1943 the Government directed that the new department should take over responsibility for the procurement of cotton textiles and cotton textile stores which till then were being dealt with by the Indian Stores Department which later came under the Supply Department as aforesaid.\n\nPurchase of jute and woollen textiles continued to be the responsibility of the Supply Department.\n\nBy a Resolution of the Government of India dated the 31st December 1945 the Department of Industries and Supplies in place of the existing Departments of Supply and of Industries and Civil Supplies was created with effect from the 7th January 1946.\n\nFrom that date the Department of Industries and Supplies became responsible for the procurement of stores from all places in India in the same manner as the Department of Supply had been doing previously to its amalgamation with the new Department. The powers and functions of the Department of Industries and Supplies in the matter of procurement of stores continued as before.\n\nThe Department continued to procure and purchase only the same kinds of articles as the Department of Supply had been doing before the coming into existence of the Department of Industries and Supplies so that the creation of the Department of Industries and Supplies did not make any difference in its activities relating to purchase of stores. There was no addition to or subtraction from its functions in the matter of purchase of stores.\n\nFrom what has been stated above, it is clear that the purchasing functions of the Government of India with special reference to the procurement of textiles including hessian with which we are immediately concerned were discharged by the Indian Stores Department from 1st January 1922.\n\nThose functions were taken over by the Department of . Supply m 1940.\n\nThe L'11ion of lndi, o\n\n'' T ht Commercial Tax Offim, Wr.<i Bmgnl and othrn\n\nSi11ha].\n\nTht Union Qf India v.\n\nThe Cornrntrcial Tax Officer, J.Vest Btngal and others\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe Department of Supply itself merged m the Department of Industries and Supplies with effect from the 7th January 1941\\.\n\nBy a notification of the 2nd September 1947 the Department of Industries and Supplies was redesignate<l as the Ministry of Industry and Supply with effect from the 29th August 1947 as a result of the emergence of India as an Independent State.\n\nThus the Ministry of Industry and Supply is a lineal descendant of the Indian Stores Department, of course, with an added volume of work and functions, but the original activity of purchase of stores remaining the same in bulk and in character.\n\nIt has already been noticed that the Indian Stores Department was concerned with the function, amongst others, of purchasing stores of a large variety of articles and goods on behalf of all Central Departments of the Government of India and Local Governments, Railway Companies, Corporations, Port Trusts, Municipalities and other quasi public bodies, as also Indian States if they availed of the services of the department.\n\nThus the infant Indian Stores Department has grown in stature and volume in the course of the last about 25 years. The same sapling has grown into a shady tree but its function as the sole purchasing agency of the Government of India and other Governments for a large variety of goods and commodities has contiilued.\n\nThe nomenclature has undergone successive changes, but the function of purchasing agency on behalf of the Central and other Governments and public bodies as aforesaid has remained the same.\n\nFurthermore, the purchase of hessian, which is the subject-matter of the demand in question has continued in the same organization, though under a different name.\n\nIt is well settled that the provisions of a statute have to be construed with reference to the state of affairs as they existed at the time the statute was passed. In the year 1941 there was in existence the Supply Department of the Government of India which had incorporated the Indian Stores Department.\n\nAccording to the affidavit referred to above, the main activities of purchase of goods and commodities\n\nrequired by the Government of India and other Governments, local bodies, etc., except for purchases of small values, that is to say, not exceeding Rs. 100 in each case and of certain specified commodities, like foodstuffs, forage, lethal stores, etc. referred to !n para. 7 of the affidavit (at p. 18 of the supplementary paper book) were carried on by the Supply Department. That is the reason why the exemption to the Government of India was worded as it stands in section 5(2)(a)(iii). As stated above, the Supply Department existed as a separate department up to the 6th January 1946. With effect from the 7th January the Department of Industries & Supplies came into existence which later was re-designated as the Ministry of Industry & Supply.\n\nThe judgment under appeal is based chiefly on the consideration that the exemption clause in question does not in terms refer to the newly created department which now goes by the name of the Ministry of Industry & Supply.\n\nBut this di:partment in so far as it deals with industry, is not concerned with the main purchasing activities of the Government of India.\n\nThe exemption was granted in respect of the purchasing activity of the Government of India and that function continues to be assigned to the Supply Department which has now become a wing of the newly created department of the Government.\n\nThe question therefore arises whether in those circumstances the Government of India could claim the benefit of the exe.mption. The High Court in answering that question in the negative ha, s gone upon mere nomenclature. It has emphasize1l the change in the name and overlooked the sub1; tance of the matter.\n\nAfter all, what is a Department of a Government ?\n\nIt is not a mere name, whatever else it may be. It is not a person, either natural or artificial. A Department of Government is a particular function.\n\nThe Government has so many functions and each of its functious or a group of functions is placed in charge of a particular Department which may be made up of a number of clerks organized in a group, whose work Is supervised by a hierarchy of officials with\n\nThe ( .. /nion of /ndit;\n\nT ht Commercial Tax Officer, lf'\"est Bengal and others\n\nSi,, hn ].\n\n'!ht Union of India v.\n\nT ht Commercial Ta.-r Offutr, ~Vest\n\nBrngal and others\n\nSinha].\n\nthe head of the department at the apex.\n\nA department may therefore consist of a single function out of the many functions of the Government, or it may .comprise several functions placed in charge of a single departmental head.\n\nThe Indian Stores Department which came to be incorporated in the Supply Department of the Government of India and later merged in the larger Department of the Ministry of Industry & Supply, could have continued its separate existence as it did until 1939 or could have become part of a larger department as it did after the 3rd August 1940, or the 7th January 1946, or the 29th August 1947 ; and conversely, its activities could be split up into a number of sub-departments under different heads classified according to the nature of the commodities to be purchased.\n\nBut, in my opinion, the change in the nomenclature in either direction should not matter so long as the function, namely, of purchasing articles and commodities required by the Government of India and other Governments continued to be the same.\n\nIt is a matter of substance and not of form.\n\nThe Department concerned cannot be' equated with a natural person. Nor can it be raised to the level of a legal person. I am not aware of any principle of jurisprudence which would justify placing a department of Government on the pedestal of a legal person.\n\nThere is no tertium quid between the two positions.\n\nThough tbe High Court has not said so in so many words, it has treated the department either as a legal person or as something in between a legal person and a natural person. That, in my opinion, is not sound logic.\n\nNor is there any legal basis for treating a department of Government either as a legal person or as a natural person. In my view, the terms of s. 5(2) (a) (iii) show that it was an exemption granted to a particular function of the Government of India described by a certain name.\n\nAnd one might feel inclined to exclaim with the great poet Shakespeare \"What is in a name !\" It is but a description of the main purchasing activity of the Government of India, as the history of the department above set out shows.\n\nSometimes the language of a statute has to be construed in a modified form in order to give effect to the real intentions of the legislature where, as in the present case, the language is only of a descriptive nature and not a definitive one. An instance of this is furnished by the case of Miller v. Salomons( 1 )· In that case the question arose whether a person of Jewish persuasion who was returned to Parliament as a Member of the House of Commons was entitled to sit without taking the prescribed oath. The form of the oath as given by 6 Geo. 3, c. 53, mentioned the name of \"King George\" only. It was argued on behalf of that member that the oath was confined to .the name of a sovereign who bore that name. But it was held by the Court that it was a mere description and that the intention of the statute was to include all sovereigns who came after King George III. The relevant portion of the observations of the Court are in these terms :\n\n\"The second question arising on the construction of the Act is, whether, as the form of the oath given by the 6 Geo. 3, c. 53, mentions the name of King George only, the obligation to administer it ceased with the reign of that Sovereign, because it was applicable to no other than to him. I think this argument cannot prevail. It is clear that the legislature meant the both to be taken always thereafter, for the enactment is general-that it shall be taken without limit of time-and the oath is not confined to the existing monarch, but mentions 'the successors' ; and as it could not be taken in those words during the reign of a Sovereign not of the name of George, it follows that the name George is merely used by way of designating the existing Sovereign ; and the oath must be altered from time to time in the name of the Sovereign, iq the manner it was when actually administered in this case, in order to carry the obvious meaning of the enactment into effect. This is an instance in which the language of the legislature must be modified, in order to avoid absurdity and inconsistency with its manifest intentions\".\n\n(]) [1852] 7 Exchquer 475: 155 E.R. 1036, 1068.\n\nThe C.:nion of India\n\n'\" The Commercial Tax Officer, West Bengal and others\n\nSinha .J.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nTht Commercial Tax Offiar, VVtJt\n\nBengal and others\n\nSinh11}.\n\nThe High Court referred to the observation of Lord Halsbury in the case of Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forrest(!) to the effect that exemptions from taxation should be strictly construed because otherwise the burden of taxation will fall on other members of the community. Those observations, in my opinion, have no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the present controversy, because we know that the exemption was granted to the Government of India in the department dealing with purchase of certain commodities and articles without reference to quantity.\n\nAs already pointed out, the Indian Stores Department was concerned with purchase of stores for public services on behalf of all Central Departments of Government and local Governments, etc., and the Government of Bengal as then constituted was one of the Provinces of India which have been receiving subsidies and subventions to make up the deficit in their budget~. As a matter of fact, as stated on behalf of the Bengal Government the concesswn was granted in order to enable business communities within the Province of Bengal to compete on favourable terms with others outside Bengal in the matter of supplying the needs of the Government. Hence there is no question of liberal construction of the exemption resulting in throwing a greater burden on other citizens.\n\nOn the other hand, the larger the sales in the Province of Bengal 2s it used to be, the greater the benefit to the bminess community doing business within that Province.\n\nIt -was therefore stated at the Bar that though the present case involved taxes amounting to less than Rs. 10,000, the question arising for determination in this case affected much larger amounts because such sales within the Province amounted to several crores. I should have thought that the business community in the Province of Bengal having had the advantage of the transactions of sale, the Government of Bengal in all fairness should have allowed the purchasing agency of the Government of India the benefit of the exemption until that benefit was in\n\n(I) (1890] 15 A.C. 334.\n\nterms withdrawn some time in the beginning of 1949.\n\nThe matter can be looked at from another point of view also. We are concerned here with the sale of hcssian.\n\nAs , pointed out in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government of India, the purchase of hessian has all along been the concern of the Supply Department, now incorporated in the Ministry of lndustry & Supply. Sab tax is a tax on sale of goods and tax on hessians falls :within the contemplation of the law granting the exemption if the sales were effecteJ through the purchasing agency of the Government of India. The beneficiary certainly was not an amorphous body like a department but the Goveniment of India, because it is the Government of hdia which could be a unit for purposes of the Act.\n\nIn this connection our attention was invited to the last clause of the exemption covered by the words \"and any Railway or water transport administration\". The argument was that if the Government of India as such was to be the beneficiary, then there was no necessity for the words just quoted. But this' argument overlooks the fact that a railway or a water transport administration need not necessarily be a department of Government because there were, and still are, raiway systems or water transport systems which are owned and administered by corporate bodies other than the Government of India.\n\nSales even to those public or semi-public bodies were within the terms of the exemption.\n\nThose words therefore are not words of limitation but words which widen the scope of the exemption in so far as the same may be available to railways and water transport administrations not owned and carried on by the Government of India.\n\nAnother reason which may be adduced m answer to the contention that there was nothing to prevent the Legislature from stating that the exemption was granted in respect of all purchases by the Government of India is that the Indian Stores Department and its later substitutes had to make purchases not only for the Government of India but also for local governments and other public bodies. Hence the exemption 15-85 S. C. India/59.\n\nThe Union o,( bu!ia\n\n\\' The Commercial Ta., Officer, We-11\n\nBen, al and othen\n\nSin:.a J.\n\nTht Union ef India\n\nT Ju Commtrdal Ta:it Officer, Wesl Btngal and olhtrs\n\nSinha ].\n\nSUPREME COURJ' REPORTS [1955!\n\nin the terms in which it occurs in section 5(2) (a) (iii) was not an exemption in favour of the Government of India only but also to other Governments and public bodies which could avail themselves of the facilitv of purchase through that department. Another argument was urged to meet the appellant's case that really the exemption was meant for the Government of India in its function of purchase of stores and commodities, discharged through the Indian Stores Department and later through the Supply Department. It was argued that if the legislature meant to grant the exemption to the Government of India, then the easiest thing to do would have been to say that sales to the Government of India were exempt from the tax. But it has not been the contention of the appellant that all sales to the Government of India are within the terms of the exemption.\n\nOnly the sales transacted through the purchasing department 9f the Government of India were so exempt. In para. 7 of the affidavit referred to above it has been stated on behalf of the Government that the different departments were entitled to make local purchases of small values, .that is to say, not exceeding Rs. 100 and of certain specified commodities like foodstuffs which were not within the purchasing activity of the departments aforesaid of the Government of India. Hence, in my opinion, there is no validity in this argument either.\n\nIt was also suggested during the argument that if the exemption were to be related to only such commodities and articles as were within the purview of the Stores Department and later of the Supply Department, then such an interpretation would involve addition of qualifying words to the section which is not ordinarily within the function of the courts. But, in my opinion, this argument also suffers from the infirmity that it equates the departments mentioned in the exemption clause quoted above with a legal person,-an argument which has already been dealt with. 'In my opinion, there is no escape from the conclusion that those are mere words of description and are not words with defined connotation, because\n\nneither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder define those departments.\n\nIf the nomenclature only matt- ered, then there is no escape from the conclusion that whatever articles and commodities were purchased by the Indian Stores Department or its later substitutes, of whatever magnitude and value, would be within the mischief of the exemption clause in question. But that, in my opinion, was not the intention of the framers of the Act. They knew what the activities of the Government through those departments were and the exemption was granted only in respect of those functions of the Government, as already indicated.\n\nFor the aforesaid reasons I would allow these appeals, set aside the orders of the Letters Patent Bench and restore the orders passed by the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, with costs throughout.\n\nBY THE COURT.\n\nin accordance with the Judgment of the majority the appeals are dismissed with costs.\n\nP. L. LAKHANPAL v.\n\nTHE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR. ls. R. DAS, ACTING C.J.,\n\nBHAGWATI, }AGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nConstitution of .India, Arts. 13, 21, 22 and 35(c)-/ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011 (Act VI of 2011), s. 3(1) (a )(i) and s. 8(1) Proviscr-Constitution (Application to /am mu and Kashmi,.) 01der, 1954-Detention order under the provisions of ss. 3 (J)(a)(i) and 8(1) Proviso of the Act-Whether violates fundamental .-ights guaranteed under Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution-Nonsupply of grounds of detention to Detenu-Whether violates his fundamental right-Addition of clause (c) to Art. 35 of the Constitution- Effect of.\n\nThe petitioner was detained in Kothibagh sub-jail in Srinagar by the order of Jammu and Kashmir Government under the provisions of s. 3(1)(a) (i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011. ·\n\nThe UniMi of l•dia\n\nTiu CatRmucia Tax Ojfiar, Wis B•ngal and othtTJ\n\nSinha J\n\nD1ctmher 20.", "total_entities": 147, "entities": [{"text": "section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 417, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, WEST\n\nBENGAL AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 422, "end_char": 473, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 504, "end_char": 510, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 526, "end_char": 537, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 547, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 550, "end_char": 563, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 583, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bengal Act VI of 1941", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 754, "end_char": 775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)(•)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 778, "end_char": 793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Act VI of 1941", "statute": "Bengal Act VI of 1941"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 939, "end_char": 954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Act VI of 1941", "statute": "Bengal Act VI of 1941"}}, {"text": "Indian Stores Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Department of Industries and Supplies, which was subsequently rcdesignated as the Ministry of Industries and Supplies, was not the same as the Indian Stores Department or the Supply Dc-- partmcnt of the Government."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1389, "end_char": 1411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India and~ consequently, sales _made to the Ministry of Industries and."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Industries and Supplies of the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1981, "end_char": 2043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sales _of hessian made to the Ministry of Industries and Supplies of the Government of India by the appellant Mills were hot exempt from payment of sales tax under the Act and the State of West Bengal was entitled to levy the same."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2131, "end_char": 2151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sales _of hessian made to the Ministry of Industries and Supplies of the Government of India by the appellant Mills were hot exempt from payment of sales tax under the Act and the State of West Bengal was entitled to levy the same."}}, {"text": "S1N", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2188, "end_char": 2191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2600, "end_char": 2615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2940, "end_char": 2959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The change of nomenclature was, therefore, of no consequence so long as a particular department continued to discharge that func tion, namely, that of purchasing articles including hessian for the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Industry and Supply", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3003, "end_char": 3034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "History of the department shows that the Ministry of Industry and Supply is a lineal descendant of the Tndian Stores Department and was at the time of the contract discharging its function on behalf of the Government of India and, consequently, the sales made to it must held to be exempt from payment of sales tax."}}, {"text": "Tndian Stores Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "History of the department shows that the Ministry of Industry and Supply is a lineal descendant of the Tndian Stores Department and was at the time of the contract discharging its function on behalf of the Government of India and, consequently, the sales made to it must held to be exempt from payment of sales tax."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th day of June 1952 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3849, "end_char": 3860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3891, "end_char": 3909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3914, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "S. Chowdhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4019, "end_char": 4031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chowdhury, (S. N. Mukherji, B. N. Ghosh and A. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4034, "end_char": 4048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chowdhury, (S. N. Mukherji, B. N. Ghosh and A. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "B. N. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4050, "end_char": 4061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chowdhury, (S. N. Mukherji, B. N. Ghosh and A. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4066, "end_char": 4076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chowdhury, (S. N. Mukherji, B. N. Ghosh and A. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant in C. A. No.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Bose"}}, {"text": "S. M. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4132, "end_char": 4142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Bose, Advocate-Genera/. of West Bengal, (B.\n\nSen and P. K. Bose, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nSen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4179, "end_char": 4186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Bose, Advocate-Genera/. of West Bengal, (B.\n\nSen and P. K. Bose, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4191, "end_char": 4201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Bose, Advocate-Genera/. of West Bengal, (B.\n\nSen and P. K. Bose, with him) for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Bose"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4264, "end_char": 4278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi Union of India\n\nThe Commneial T tJJt Ojfim, Wut B1ngal and otlwrs\n\n19!>5\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nT!w Commercial T 4\" Officer, West Bengal and others\n\n1955.", "canonical_name": "C.:nion of India"}}, {"text": "Ganesh Jute Mills, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4590, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAs AcTING C. J.-The only question canvassed before us in the above appeals, which have been heard together, is whether certain sales of goods made by Shri Ganesh Jute Mills, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Mills) to the Government of India, Ministry of Industry and Supplies are to be deducted from the taxable turnover of the Mills so as to be exempt from sales tax dernanded by the Commercial Tax Officer of the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4863, "end_char": 4874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAs AcTING C. J.-The only question canvassed before us in the above appeals, which have been heard together, is whether certain sales of goods made by Shri Ganesh Jute Mills, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Mills) to the Government of India, Ministry of Industry and Supplies are to be deducted from the taxable turnover of the Mills so as to be exempt from sales tax dernanded by the Commercial Tax Officer of the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "first of September 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4922, "end_char": 4945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the first of September 1948 the Government of India, Ministry of Industry and Supplies, in Calcutta, placed with the Mills a confirmatory order in writing bearing No."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the first of September 1948 the Government of India, Ministry of Industry and Supplies, in Calcutta, placed with the Mills a confirmatory order in writing bearing No."}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5827, "end_char": 5852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreed prices were stated to be exclusive of the Bengal Sales Tax and it was stipulated that the Government of India would arrange direct payment of sales tax to the Government of West Bengal if it was ultimately found that Sales Tax was payable in respect of that contract."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6335, "end_char": 6344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6440, "end_char": 6449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th December 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7555, "end_char": 7572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th December 1950 the Mills filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7606, "end_char": 7617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7625, "end_char": 7646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7658, "end_char": 7680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th December 1950 the Mills filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "M. P.\n\nPai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8818, "end_char": 8828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the Union of India was filed an affidavit affirmed by one\n\nM. P.\n\nPai, the then Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Works, Production & Supply."}}, {"text": "Bengal Act VI of 1941", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9169, "end_char": 9190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "7th January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9224, "end_char": 9240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was averred that before the 7th January 1946 the said Department of Supply was charged with the procurement of Stores from all places In India including Bengal and that it also directed the work of Indian Stores Department in the United Kindom and of the India Supply Mission in the United States of America."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9333, "end_char": 9338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was averred that before the 7th January 1946 the said Department of Supply was charged with the procurement of Stores from all places In India including Bengal and that it also directed the work of Indian Stores Department in the United Kindom and of the India Supply Mission in the United States of America."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9349, "end_char": 9355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was averred that before the 7th January 1946 the said Department of Supply was charged with the procurement of Stores from all places In India including Bengal and that it also directed the work of Indian Stores Department in the United Kindom and of the India Supply Mission in the United States of America."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9479, "end_char": 9503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was averred that before the 7th January 1946 the said Department of Supply was charged with the procurement of Stores from all places In India including Bengal and that it also directed the work of Indian Stores Department in the United Kindom and of the India Supply Mission in the United States of America."}}, {"text": "31st December 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9566, "end_char": 9584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227/45-Pub(c) dated the 31st December 1945 the Governor-General in Council announced the creation with effect from the 7th January 1946 of the Department of Industries & Supply in place of the existing Department of Supply and of Industries and Civil Supplies."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10061, "end_char": 10065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule came up for hearing before Bose, J., who took the view that the newly created Department of Industries & Supplies was charged with the same work of procurement of stores for Government as had been entrusted to the Department of Supply and certain additional works and that later on the name was again changed to Ministry of Industry and Supply."}}, {"text": "West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10633, "end_char": 10648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(2)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10689, "end_char": 10709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Act", "statute": "West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "section 5(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10789, "end_char": 10804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Act", "statute": "West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10901, "end_char": 10921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge appears to have regarded this continuance of section 5(2)(a) (iii) in the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as indicative of the fact that in view of the State of West Bengal the Ministry of Industry & Supply was the same as the Indian Stores Department and the Supply Department of the Government of India referred to in the section."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Industry & Supply", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10926, "end_char": 10955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge appears to have regarded this continuance of section 5(2)(a) (iii) in the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as indicative of the fact that in view of the State of West Bengal the Ministry of Industry & Supply was the same as the Indian Stores Department and the Supply Department of the Government of India referred to in the section."}}, {"text": "3rd January 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11279, "end_char": 11295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He accordingly, on the 3rd January 1952, made the rule absolute."}}, {"text": "K. C. Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11501, "end_char": 11516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commercial Tax Officer and the State of West Bengal went up on appeal from the said judgment and order of Bose, J. The appeal came up fot hearing before a Bench consisting of K. C. Das Gupta, J. and P. N. Mookerjee, J. In separate but concurring judgments both the learned Judges rejected the preliminary objection taken by the Mills and the Union of India as to the maintainability of the appeal."}}, {"text": "P. N. Mookerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11525, "end_char": 11540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commercial Tax Officer and the State of West Bengal went up on appeal from the said judgment and order of Bose, J. The appeal came up fot hearing before a Bench consisting of K. C. Das Gupta, J. and P. N. Mookerjee, J. In separate but concurring judgments both the learned Judges rejected the preliminary objection taken by the Mills and the Union of India as to the maintainability of the appeal."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11668, "end_char": 11682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commercial Tax Officer and the State of West Bengal went up on appeal from the said judgment and order of Bose, J. The appeal came up fot hearing before a Bench consisting of K. C. Das Gupta, J. and P. N. Mookerjee, J. In separate but concurring judgments both the learned Judges rejected the preliminary objection taken by the Mills and the Union of India as to the maintainability of the appeal."}}, {"text": "Department of Industries & Supplies", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11765, "end_char": 11800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merits both of them held that the Department of Industries & Supplies was not the same as the Indian Stores Department or the Supply Department of the Government of India."}}, {"text": "section 5(2)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12162, "end_char": 12182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12329, "end_char": 12340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of lrulia\n\nThi Commercial Tax Ojjicer, W tsl\n\nBengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12773, "end_char": 12831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Union of lrulia\n\nThi Commercial Tax Ojjicer, W tsl\n\nBengal and ot/urs\n\nD1J1 Aclg."}}, {"text": "A. R. Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13548, "end_char": 13558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appears from the affidavit of one - A. R. Iyer, Deputy ."}}, {"text": "Indian stores Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13862, "end_char": 13886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With effect from - the -lst January 1922 the Indian stores Department ."}}, {"text": "S. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14535, "end_char": 14541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th May 1924", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14580, "end_char": 14592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. 217 of the Government of India, dated the 6th May 1924, -it was placed on a permanent basis and continued to discharge the -same functions."}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15304, "end_char": 15308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Annexure VIII to Iyer's affidavit shows that the control of the Indian Stores Department and all other matters relating to the purchase of stores in India which were being then dealt with in the Department of Commerce were to be dealt with in the department Supply as a temporary measure for the duration of the war."}}, {"text": "3rd August 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15742, "end_char": 15757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the Indian Stores Department and the Contracts Directorate did not lose their identity, is shown by the Office Memorandum dated the 3rd August 1940\n\n(Annexure X, Clause 4) and Office Memorandum dated the 2nd December 1941 (Annexure XI, Clause 1(a) and Clause 4)."}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15772, "end_char": 15780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2nd December 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15814, "end_char": 15831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the Indian Stores Department and the Contracts Directorate did not lose their identity, is shown by the Office Memorandum dated the 3rd August 1940\n\n(Annexure X, Clause 4) and Office Memorandum dated the 2nd December 1941 (Annexure XI, Clause 1(a) and Clause 4)."}}, {"text": "Clause 1(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15846, "end_char": 15857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15862, "end_char": 15870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st July 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16175, "end_char": 16188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then that on the 1st July 1941 the Bengal Legislature passed the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 which by section 5(2) (a)(iii) exempted sales to the Indian Stores Department, the Supply Department of the Government of India and any railway or water transport administration from sales tax."}}, {"text": "Bengal Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16193, "end_char": 16211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then that on the 1st July 1941 the Bengal Legislature passed the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 which by section 5(2) (a)(iii) exempted sales to the Indian Stores Department, the Supply Department of the Government of India and any railway or water transport administration from sales tax."}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16269, "end_char": 16281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supply Department of the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16343, "end_char": 16387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then that on the 1st July 1941 the Bengal Legislature passed the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 which by section 5(2) (a)(iii) exempted sales to the Indian Stores Department, the Supply Department of the Government of India and any railway or water transport administration from sales tax."}}, {"text": "2nd September 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16558, "end_char": 16576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Press Note dated the 2nd September 1941 issued by the Government of India in the Supply Department (Annexure\n\nXIII to Iyer's affidavit) a purchase branch of the Supply Department for the duration of the war was created with effect from the 1st August 1941 and it shows that the Contracts Directorate and the Indian Stores Department had then \"ceased to exist as separate entities\" for the duration of the war and a new branch was being organised in their place."}}, {"text": "1st August 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16777, "end_char": 16792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Press Note dated the 2nd September 1941 issued by the Government of India in the Supply Department (Annexure\n\nXIII to Iyer's affidavit) a purchase branch of the Supply Department for the duration of the war was created with effect from the 1st August 1941 and it shows that the Contracts Directorate and the Indian Stores Department had then \"ceased to exist as separate entities\" for the duration of the war and a new branch was being organised in their place."}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17329, "end_char": 17336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17833, "end_char": 17841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal and others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "West Bengal and others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17905, "end_char": 17913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal and others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "West Bengal and others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "21st April 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18429, "end_char": 18444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st April 1943 came Notification No."}}, {"text": "22nd April 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18563, "end_char": 18578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "107/43-Pub(c) whereby the Governor-Gcnrral in Council announced the creation, from the 22nd April 1943, of a Department of Industries and Civil Supplies to deal with (i) Statistics and Research, (ii) Development and (iii) Controls."}}, {"text": "15th May 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18957, "end_char": 18970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E4(179) dated the 14th May 1943 issued by the Department of Supply intimated that the Governor-General in Council had decided that the Department of Industries and Civil Supplies would, with effect from the 15th May 1943, take over responsibility for the procurement of cotton textiles and cotton textile stores (Annexure XVI to Iyer's affidavit)."}}, {"text": "Department of Supply", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19232, "end_char": 19252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So this Department of Industries and Civil Supplies became another purchasing organisation of the Government of India apart from the Department of Supply."}}, {"text": "2nd September 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20623, "end_char": 20641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Resolution of the Government of India dated the 2nd September 1947 published in the Gazette of India dated the 6th September 1947 (Annexure XVIII) announced, amongst other things, that with effect from the 29th August 1947 the Department of Industries and Supplies would be re-designated as .the Ministry of Industries and Supply."}}, {"text": "6th September 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20686, "end_char": 20704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Resolution of the Government of India dated the 2nd September 1947 published in the Gazette of India dated the 6th September 1947 (Annexure XVIII) announced, amongst other things, that with effect from the 29th August 1947 the Department of Industries and Supplies would be re-designated as .the Ministry of Industries and Supply."}}, {"text": "29th August 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20781, "end_char": 20797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Resolution of the Government of India dated the 2nd September 1947 published in the Gazette of India dated the 6th September 1947 (Annexure XVIII) announced, amongst other things, that with effect from the 29th August 1947 the Department of Industries and Supplies would be re-designated as .the Ministry of Industries and Supply."}}, {"text": "Department of Industries and Supplies", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20802, "end_char": 20839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Resolution of the Government of India dated the 2nd September 1947 published in the Gazette of India dated the 6th September 1947 (Annexure XVIII) announced, amongst other things, that with effect from the 29th August 1947 the Department of Industries and Supplies would be re-designated as .the Ministry of Industries and Supply."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Industries and Supply", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20871, "end_char": 20904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Resolution of the Government of India dated the 2nd September 1947 published in the Gazette of India dated the 6th September 1947 (Annexure XVIII) announced, amongst other things, that with effect from the 29th August 1947 the Department of Industries and Supplies would be re-designated as .the Ministry of Industries and Supply."}}, {"text": "Government 'of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21777, "end_char": 21797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government 'of India in alh itS' depart- .-· - Th4 U•ionofl•dia ments."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22026, "end_char": 22032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "they evidently\n\nBengal and •thtrs - were ."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22318, "end_char": 22327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(2)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23685, "end_char": 23705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commtrcial Tax Olficer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26287, "end_char": 26309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nTht Union of India v.\n\nThe Commtrcial Tax Olficer, We.\\'t\n\nBengal and others\n\nDas Artg."}}, {"text": "S1N", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28651, "end_char": 28654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shrcc Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28865, "end_char": 28893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 of 1954 (Messrs Shrcc Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd.) to the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28947, "end_char": 28961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 of 1954, the Union of India (the Government of India at the time of the transactions in question) were liable to payment of <, a]es tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act VI of 1941), to be referred to hereinafter as \" The Act\".", "canonical_name": "C.:nion of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal Act VI of 1941", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29118, "end_char": 29139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st September 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29416, "end_char": 29434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The farn leading up to these appeals may shortly be stated as follows : The Government of India in the Ministry of Industry and Supply (which for the sake of brevity may be called \"The Government\" entered into a contract on the 1st September 1948 with Messrs Shree Gane<, h Jute Mills Ltd., which may be designated \"The Mills\", for the supply of hessian at certain rates and of certain description appearing in Exhibit A to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Mills."}}, {"text": "Shree Gane", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29447, "end_char": 29457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The farn leading up to these appeals may shortly be stated as follows : The Government of India in the Ministry of Industry and Supply (which for the sake of brevity may be called \"The Government\" entered into a contract on the 1st September 1948 with Messrs Shree Gane<, h Jute Mills Ltd., which may be designated \"The Mills\", for the supply of hessian at certain rates and of certain description appearing in Exhibit A to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Mills."}}, {"text": "Government of Wt'>t Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29888, "end_char": 29914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India will arrange direct payment of sales tax to the Government of Wt'>t Bengal if it is ultimately found that sales tax is payable in respect of this contract\"."}}, {"text": "A Huq", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30186, "end_char": 30191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contract was entered into and '>igned by \"A Huq, Deputy Director of Supplies, for and on behalf of the Governor-General of India\"."}}, {"text": "ommercial Tax Officer of Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30413, "end_char": 30444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the aforesaid contract the Mills rnpplied hessian goods to the Government of India of a certain valuation on which the\n\n:ommercial Tax Officer of Bengal, the main contesting respondent, made a demand of Rs."}}, {"text": "U11io11 of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30668, "end_char": 30684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nThe U11io11 of India\n\nv The CfJmmercial Tax O.fficer, H'est\n\nIJengal and others\n\nSinha]."}}, {"text": "CfJmmercial Tax O.fficer, H'est\n\nIJengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30692, "end_char": 30732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nThe U11io11 of India\n\nv The CfJmmercial Tax O.fficer, H'est\n\nIJengal and others\n\nSinha]."}}, {"text": "section 5(2)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30883, "end_char": 30903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30947, "end_char": 30969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually the Mills moved the High Court of Calcutta for an appropriate writ under article 226 of the Constitution against the contesting respondents."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31000, "end_char": 31011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "6th December 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31152, "end_char": 31169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was heard by a Single Judge of that Court who by his judgment dated the 6th December 1951 held that the Mills were not liable to pay the sales tax demanded and cancelled the notice of demand and directed the respondents 1 and 2 to forbear from enforcing the demand."}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31904, "end_char": 31916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st January 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32983, "end_char": 32999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Stores Department was constituted with effect from the 1st January 1922 as a result of the recommendations of the Stores Purchase Committee which had been constituted by the Government of India to examine the whole question of the constitution of an expert agency to carry out on a large scale purchase of supplies required for the public services, as recommended by the Indian Industrial Commission, with the object of encouraging the purchase of articles made in India for Government requirements."}}, {"text": "Indian Industrial Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33299, "end_char": 33327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Stores Department was constituted with effect from the 1st January 1922 as a result of the recommendations of the Stores Purchase Committee which had been constituted by the Government of India to examine the whole question of the constitution of an expert agency to carry out on a large scale purchase of supplies required for the public services, as recommended by the Indian Industrial Commission, with the object of encouraging the purchase of articles made in India for Government requirements."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35116, "end_char": 35121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But after the constitution of the Indian\n\nThe Uni.on of India v.\n\nThi Commercial Tax Officer, Wtst Bengal and others\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe (/nifJn qf India\n\nv; TM Commtrcial 1ax O.fficer, WtJl\n\nIJngal and r1lhtn\n\nSinha J.\n\nStores Department in 1922 the Army authorities alsr> began to utilize the services of the Indian Stores Department for procurement of several categories of stores required by them."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35972, "end_char": 35981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This branch of its activity was administered by the Directorate General, Supply Branch, located at New Delhi."}}, {"text": "Department of . Supply m 1940", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39427, "end_char": 39456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those functions were taken over by the Department of ."}}, {"text": "Department of Supply", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39639, "end_char": 39659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tht Union Qf India v.\n\nThe Cornrntrcial Tax Officer, J.Vest Btngal and others\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe Department of Supply itself merged m the Department of Industries and Supplies with effect from the 7th January 1941\\.\n\nBy a notification of the 2nd September 1947 the Department of Industries and Supplies was redesignate<l as the Ministry of Industry and Supply with effect from the 29th August 1947 as a result of the emergence of India as an Independent State."}}, {"text": "section 5(2)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42227, "end_char": 42247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42331, "end_char": 42347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As stated above, the Supply Department existed as a separate department up to the 6th January 1946."}}, {"text": "Commercial Tax Officer, lf'\"est Bengal and others", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43916, "end_char": 43965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government has so many functions and each of its functious or a group of functions is placed in charge of a particular Department which may be made up of a number of clerks organized in a group, whose work Is supervised by a hierarchy of officials with\n\nThe ( .. /nion of /ndit;\n\nT ht Commercial Tax Officer, lf'\"est Bengal and others\n\nSi,, hn ]."}}, {"text": "Indian Stores Department", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44301, "end_char": 44325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Stores Department which came to be incorporated in the Supply Department of the Government of India and later merged in the larger Department of the Ministry of Industry & Supply, could have continued its separate existence as it did until 1939 or could have become part of a larger department as it did after the 3rd August 1940, or the 7th January 1946, or the 29th August 1947 ; and conversely, its activities could be split up into a number of sub-departments under different heads classified according to the nature of the commodities to be purchased."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45831, "end_char": 45838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shakespeare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46028, "end_char": 46039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And one might feel inclined to exclaim with the great poet Shakespeare \"What is in a name !\""}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46607, "end_char": 46617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An instance of this is furnished by the case of Miller v. Salomons( 1 )· In that case the question arose whether a person of Jewish persuasion who was returned to Parliament as a Member of the House of Commons was entitled to sit without taking the prescribed oath."}}, {"text": "George", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46788, "end_char": 46794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, c. 53, mentioned the name of \"King George\" only."}}, {"text": "C.:nion of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48333, "end_char": 48349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C.:nion of India\n\n'\" The Commercial Tax Officer, West Bengal and others\n\nSinha .J.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nTht Commercial Tax Offiar, VVtJt\n\nBengal and others\n\nSinh11}.", "canonical_name": "C.:nion of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49276, "end_char": 49296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the Government of Bengal as then constituted was one of the Provinces of India which have been receiving subsidies and subventions to make up the deficit in their budget~. As a matter of fact, as stated on behalf of the Bengal Government the concesswn was granted in order to enable business communities within the Province of Bengal to compete on favourable terms with others outside Bengal in the matter of supplying the needs of the Government."}}, {"text": "Bengal Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49492, "end_char": 49509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the Government of Bengal as then constituted was one of the Provinces of India which have been receiving subsidies and subventions to make up the deficit in their budget~. As a matter of fact, as stated on behalf of the Bengal Government the concesswn was granted in order to enable business communities within the Province of Bengal to compete on favourable terms with others outside Bengal in the matter of supplying the needs of the Government."}}, {"text": "Government of hdia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51301, "end_char": 51319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The beneficiary certainly was not an amorphous body like a department but the Goveniment of India, because it is the Government of hdia which could be a unit for purposes of the Act."}}, {"text": "Union o,( bu!ia\n\n\\' The Commercial Ta., Officer, We-11\n\nBen, al and othen\n\nSin:.a J.\n\nTht Union ef India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52736, "end_char": 52840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union o,( bu!ia\n\n\\' The Commercial Ta.,"}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52972, "end_char": 52984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. L. LAKHANPAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55994, "end_char": 56009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. L. LAKHANPAL v.\n\nTHE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR."}}, {"text": "STATE OF JAMMU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56018, "end_char": 56032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. L. LAKHANPAL v.\n\nTHE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR."}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56053, "end_char": 56056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. DAS, ACTING C.J.,\n\nBHAGWATI, }AGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFER IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "AFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56117, "end_char": 56126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. DAS, ACTING C.J.,\n\nBHAGWATI, }AGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFER IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Arts. 13, 21, 22 and 35(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56157, "end_char": 56183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56194, "end_char": 56232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56251, "end_char": 56258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56271, "end_char": 56278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "ss. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56390, "end_char": 56395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Arts. 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56488, "end_char": 56503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Art. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56633, "end_char": 56640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56727, "end_char": 56735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was detained in Kothibagh sub-jail in Srinagar by the order of Jammu and Kashmir Government under the provisions of s. 3(1)(a) (i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56805, "end_char": 56815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56827, "end_char": 56875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1101_1113_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1101\n\nneither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder define those departments.\n\nIf the nomenclature only matt- ered, then there is no escape from the conclusion that whatever articles and commodities were purchased by the Indian Stores Department or its later substitutes, of whatever magnitude and value, would be within the mischief of the exemption clause in question. But that, in my opinion, was not the intention of the framers of the Act. They knew what the activities of the Government through those departments were and the exemption was granted only in respect of those functions of the Government, as already indicated.\n\nFor the aforesaid reasons I would allow these appeals, set aside the orders of the Letters Patent Bench and restore the orders passed by the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, with costs throughout.\n\nBY THE COURT.\n\nin accordance with the Judgment of the majority the appeals are dismissed with costs.\n\nP. L. LAKHANPAL v.\n\nTHE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR. ls. R. DAS, ACTING C.J.,\n\nBHAGWATI, }AGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nConstitution of .India, Arts. 13, 21, 22 and 35(c)-/ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011 (Act VI of 2011), s. 3(1) (a )(i) and s. 8(1) Proviscr-Constitution (Application to /am mu and Kashmi,.) 01der, 1954-Detention order under the provisions of ss. 3 (J)(a)(i) and 8(1) Proviso of the Act-Whether violates fundamental .-ights guaranteed under Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution-Nonsupply of grounds of detention to Detenu-Whether violates his fundamental right-Addition of clause (c) to Art. 35 of the Constitution- Effect of.\n\nThe petitioner was detained in Kothibagh sub-jail in Srinagar by the order of Jammu and Kashmir Government under the provisions of s. 3(1)(a) (i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011. ·\n\nThe UniMi of l•dia\n\nTiu CatRmucia Tax Ojfiar, Wis B•ngal and othtTJ\n\nSinha J\n\nD1ctmher 20.\n\nP. L. Lakhanpal\n\nThe Stat1 of Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nThe petitioner challenged the order of detention on the grounds,. inter alia, (i) that it cncroacheJ on his fundamental right to life an<l personal liberty guaranteed to hi1n under 1\\rt. 21 of the Consti tution as extended to the State of Jam1nu and Kash1nir, (ii) that it \\'i_olated his fundamental right guaranteed to him under clause (5) to Art. 22 cf the Constitution as extended to Jammu and Kashmir State inas:nuch as the petitioner \\Vas not supplied \\Vith the grounds on 'vhich the order of detention \\Vas based.\n\nIt \\Vas contended that s. S( 1) Proviso, of Ja111mu and l<.ashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011, under \\vhich the grounds of detention were not supplied to hin1, \\Vas unconstitutional as being inconsistent with Arts. 21 and 22 of: the Constitution and thus void to the extent of that inconsistency in Yie,;;,.· of the provisions of ,\\rt. 13 of the Constitution.\n\nHeld (overruling the contention) that s. ti(l) Proviso is not unconstitutional in vie\\V of the provisions of Constitution (Applicatic:1 t\"J j:.J.111111u and Kashrnir) Order, 195-lwhich supersedes the Con stitution (Jan1mu and Kashmir) ()rder, 1950, and of clause (..::) which has been .:id<l..::<l to Art. 35 of the Consti.tution.\n\nThe effect of the modification of Art. 35 by the addition of chtu!>C ( c) thereto is that su...:h of the provisions of the 1\\ct <lS are inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution shall he valid until the cxpiration of fiye years fron1 the commencemnt of the Order.\n\nORIGINAL 1955.\n\nJ UR!SD!CT!ON : Petition No. 396 of\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ m the nature of Habeas Corpus.\n\nR. Patnaik, for the petitioner.\n\nM. C. Setaivad, Attorney-General of India,\n\nC. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-Genera! of India, Raja faswant Singh, Advocatc-Gncrn!, fammu and Kashmir\n\n(P. A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dheb11r, with them) for the respondent.\n\nM. C. Seta/wad, Attorney-General of fodia (P. A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the Intervener.\n\n1955. December 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSI':IH ! --This application for a writ of habeas corpi1s is directed against the State of Jammu and Kashmir which has by its order dated the 4th October, 1955, directed the detention of the petitioner under section 3 of the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, (Jammu and Kashmir Act IV of 2011 ), hereinafter to be referred to as \"the Act\".\n\nOriginally the sole respondent impleaded was the State of Jammu and Kashmir. After a rule nisi was issued to the respondent, fhe Union of India intervened because the petitioner had challenged the validity of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954.\n\nThe petitioner, P. L. Lakhanpal, aged approximately 28 years, describing himself as the Chairman, End Kashmir Dispute Committee, has moved this Court against the order of the State detaining him in Kothi Bagh sub-jail in Srinagar.\n\nThe application is based on the following allegations.\n\nThe petitioner is normally a resident of 9821, Nawabganj, Delhi 6.\n\nHe went to Kashmir on a permit on the 24th September this year \"on a study-cum-pleasure trip\". He has been evincing keen interest in Kashmir politics since the year 1946, when as General Secretary of the Co:igress Socialist Party, Lahore, he was closely associated with the \"Quit Kashmir movement\".\n\nLast year he wrote a book entitled \"Communist Conspiracy in Kashmir\", copies of which had been seized by the Delhi Police but were subsequently released.\n\nThe petitioner in the book aforesaid, as also elsewhere in the press and on the platform, claims to have been making \"trenchant criticism of the Kashmir cabinet headed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and also of the Government of India's policy in regard to Kashmir\".\n\nHe claims to be known as the supporter of Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah; the former Prime Minister of Kashmir, and to have expressed the opinion that he \"has been the victim of a heinous conspiracy motivated by lust for power between the communists and the rightists on the one hand and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the present Kashmir Prime Minister, on the other\".\n\nHe also claims to have been advocating the cause of the ex-Prime Minister aforesaid of Kashmir whose detention has been severely criticized by him.\n\nHe has \"also publicly exposed and denounced tlh' brntal excesses committed by the police and auth.irities under the Bakshi Government throughout\n\nP, L. Lakhanpal v.\n\nTluStak of ]ammu and\n\nKas/tmjr\n\nSinha ].\n\nP. L. Lalcha'flpal\n\nTJr. Stau of Jammu ar1d\n\nKtultmir\n\nSinha].\n\nthe State\".\n\nHe has characterized the State Constituent Assembly as having forfeited the confidence of the people.\n\nHe claims to have \"declared that the Bakshi cabinet, which in his view is dominated by the communists, is the corruptest, the most tyrannical and the most hated Government that the State has ever had\". Similar views were expressed by him in telegrams said to have been sent to the Sadar-i- Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, to the President of India and to the Prime Minister of India. He claims to have organized a \"persistent campaign to secure support .for his views on Kashmir among the public and leaders of political thought\".\n\nThe aforesaid activities of the petitioner, he further claims, have \"provoked a bitter controversy between him and the Indian Prime Minister\". In this connection he makes reference to certain statements said to have been made by the Prime Minister of India which it is not necessary to detail here. except the following :-\n\n\"During the last few months, however, I have become aware of his (the petitioner's) activities and have inquired into them. These inquiries led me to the conclusion that these activities are of a most objectionable character which can only help the enemies of our country\".\n\nThe petitioner also claims to be the General Secretary of the World Democratic Peace Congress. In this connection he makes certain other allegations against the Prime Minister of India which are not relevant to the case.\n\nHe also makes a grievance that it was reported in a daily newspaper of Srinagar called Khidmat that the present Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir had described him as \"a traitor and an enemy of the nation\".\n\nHe then describes his activities during three days in Srinagar meeting people from various walks of life, including editors of the newspapers and members of the State Assembly.\n\nOn the 29th September, he says, he left Srinagar for Anantnag in the company of the alleged leader of the opposition in the Assembly and President of the Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front, named Mirza Afzal Mohd. Beg, who, it may be added, has also\n\nbeen in detention under the orders of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, as stated by the Advocate- General of that State. At Anantnag he claims to have spent two days as the guest of Mr. Beg meeting people of the town and neighbouring areas \"listening to their harrowing tales of woe\".\n\nOn the 30th September he \"addressed an informal meeting of the Plebiscite Front Workers at Mr.\n\nBeg's residence\".\n\nHe came back to Srinagar on the 1st October and left for Sopore on the 2nd October.\n\nThere he addressed an informal gathering of a few hundred workers on the same lines as he had done at Anantnag.\n\nOn the 3rd October he personally handed to the P.A. to the Chief Secretary of J ammu and Kashmir an application seeking permission for an interview with Sheikh Abdullah in the Kud jail where he has been in detention. During his stay in Srinagar, he states, he made unsuccessful attempts to contact the State Prime Minister for a meeting. In the afternoon of the 4th October he held a press conference at which he \"made a written statement\" complaining of \"such barbaric brutalities, such insecurity of life, property and honour and such callousness on the part of the administration as are evidenced in your valley only go to show rhat the Bakshi Government is just another name for legalized lawless, disorder, corruption and nepotism\". In the early hours of the morning of the 5th October the Superintendent of Police, Srinagar, read out to him the order of detention passed by the Cabinet and took him into .custody and detained him in the sub-jail Kothi Bagh. The order of detention (Annexure \"D\" at page 20 of the paperbook) is in these terms :-\n\n\"GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR\n\nCHIEF SECRETARIAT\n\n(GENERAL DEPARTMENT) Subject :-Detention of P. L. Lakhanpal, Chairman, End Kashmir Dispute Committee at present residing in Kashmir Guest House, Lal Chowk, Amira Kadal, Srinagar, under section 3(1)(a)(i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011.\n\nThi State of Jammu and Kashmir\n\nSinha J.\n\nP. /,. IAkharipal\n\nv. 'FhtStait of .7ammu and\n\nf:ashmir\n\nSinha J.\n\nRead :-Memorandum No.\n\nIS-164-0/55 dated 4-10-1955, from the Minister Order.\n\nIncharge, Law and\n\nOrder No. 1644-C of 1955 T)ated 4th October, 1955.\n\nThe Government having considered the facts stated in the memo of the Minister Incharge, Law and Order are satisfied that it is necessary to detain P. L. Lakhanpal, Chairman, End Kashmir Dispute Committee at present residing in Kashmir Guest House, Lal Chowk, Amira Kadal, Srinagar, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. Acwrdingly the Government hereby accord sanction to the Order annexed hereto and authorize the Chief Secretary to Go•:ernment to issue the ame over his signature.\n\nBy Order of the Cabinet,\n\nSd. G. M. Bakshi\n\nPrime Minister\".\n\nThe order actually served on the petitioner is an annexure to the cabinet order ( Annexure 'E' at page 21 of the paper-book) which is in these terms :\n\n\"GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR.\n\nAnnexure to Cabinet Order No. 1644-C of 1955, dated 4-10-1955.\n\n0 rd er.\n\nWhereas the Government are satisfied with respect to P. L. Lakhanpal, Chairman, End Kashmir Dispute .Committee, at present residing in Kashmir Guest House, Lal Chowk, Amirakadal, Srinagar that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State it is necessary to make an order directing that the said P. . L.\n\nLakhanpal be detained ; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011, the Government are pleased to order that the said P. L.\n\nI ',.\n\nLakhanpal be detained in sub-jail, Kothibagh, Srinagar; Notice of this Order shall be given to the said P. L. Lakhanpal by reading over the same to him.\n\nBy order of Government.\n\nSd. Ghulam Ahmad Chief Secretary to Government\".\n\nIt is this order which the petitioner challenges as \"malicious, mala fide, vague and capricious, illegally depriving the petitioner of his fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under article 21\n\nof the Constitution as extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir\". The order of the petitioner's detention is also challenged as unwarranted and illegal as the order sent to the jail authorities does not bear the signature of the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and also because the petitioner has not been suprilied, in spite of demands made by him, with the grounds on which the order of his detention is based, \"in clear violation of his fundamental rights guapnteed under clause (5) of article 22 of the Constitution as extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954\".\n\nThe State has filed an answer to the petitioner's affidavit in support of his petition. The affidavit filed on behalf of the State is sworn to by Shri Pirzada Ghulam Ahmad, Chief Secretary to the Government.\n\nIn this affidavit he denies that the petitioner had come to Kashmir on a study-cum-pleasure trip as alleged by him. He further states that the petitioner during his stay in Kashmir \"actually_ engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the security of the State\" and that the Government was \"satisfied that it is not in the public interest to communicate to the petitioner the grounds of the said detention order\".\n\nThe affidavit further states that the petitioner's \"detention was ordered by the Cabinet not for any collateral purpose but because the Government was satisfied that the activities of the petitioner were calculated to prejudice the security of the State\".\n\nT\"8Stau Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nSinha ].\n\nT/reStal4 of ]ammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nSinha :f.\n\nThe allegations of improper motive and mala fides made by the petitioner are denied as wholly \"unfounded and baseless\". It is also denied that the petitioner's detention was illegal or that the provisions of the Act under which the order had been passed were unconstitutional.\n\nThe affidavit ends by stating that it is apprehended that if the petitioner were to be released, he is 'likely to indulge further in activities which would greatly jeopardize the security of the State\" and that the detention order had been made solely with a view to preventing the petitioner from doing any further mischief.\n\nThe Act impugned in this case provides that it shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of its commencement. The relevant portion of section 3 is in these terms :-\n\n\" ( 1) The Government may- ( a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-\n\n(i) the security of the State ; or ...... it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such per. son be detained\".\n\nThe main attack against the orders served upon the petitioner is against the following paragraph in the order dated the 7th October 1955 :-\n\n\"Now, therefore, the Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sub-section ( 1) of section 8 bf the said Act, hereby declare that it would be against the public interest to communicate to the said P. L. Lakhanpal the grounds on which the detention order has been made\".\n\nThat part of the order of detention passed against the petitioner is in consonance with section 8 of the Act which is in these terms :-\n\n\" ( 1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the Government ;\n\nProvided that nothing contained. in this sub-section shall apply to the case of any person detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State if the Government by order issued in this behalf declares that it would be against the public interest to communicate to him the grounds on which the detention order has been made.\n\n(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose\".\n\nThe proviso to the section just quoted makes provision for such cases as come within the purview of section 3(1)(a)(i) of the Act; that is to say, a person in the position of the petitioner who has been detained for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is outside the general rule laid down in section 8 ( 1) if the Government declares, as it has done in this case, that it would be against the public interest to communicate to him the grounds on which the detention order has been made.\n\nIt is not contended that the orders served upon the petitioner are not justified by the terms of the section quoted above.\n\nBut it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the terms of the section are unconstitutional inasmuch as they are inconsistent with the provisions of articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and are therefore to the extent of such inconsistency void in view of the provisions of article 13 of the Constitution.\n\nThis argument presupposes that the petitioner can invoke the aid of those articles. It has not been contended on behalf of the petitioner that apart from the provisions of Part III of the Constitution the petitioner has any fundamental rights guaranteed to him. Therefore, if articles 21 and 22 are out of the way, as will presently appear, the argument is without any force.\n\nThe Constitution does not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety. On the 14th May, 1954, the President of India in exercise of the powers conferred by clause ( 1) of article 370 of the Constitution made and promulgated with the concur-\n\n\"· The Stall of Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nSinha J.\n\nP. L. LaJ./wnpal\n\nThe Slat1 of Jammu and\n\nKaslimir\n\nSinha ].\n\nrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and . Kashmir, the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 (which shall be described hereinafter as \"The Order\"). It came into force on the same <lay and superseded the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950.\n\nBy its terms the Order provides that in addition to articles 1 and 370, the specified provisions of the Constitution shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir subject to the exceptions and modifications indicated therein.\n\nIn so far as those exceptions and modifications are relevant to our present purpose, it is provided that in clauses ( 4) and (7) of article 22 \"The Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir\" shall be substituted for \"Parliament\", so that the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is competent to legislate in respect of preventive detention. In article 35, clause ( c) has been added, which is in these terms :-\n\n\"No law with respect to preventive detention made by the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, whether before or after the commencement of the Constitution. (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Part, but any such law shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, cease to have effect on the expiration of five years from the commencement of the said Order, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof\".\n\nThe effect of this modification in article 35 of the Constitution is that such of the provisions of the Act as are inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution shall be valid until the expiration of five years from the commencement of the Order. This is an exception which has been engrafted on the Constitution in respect of fundamental rights relating to personal liberty for the limited period of five years. The Act itself has a limited life of five years. Thus the exception aforesaid is co-extensive with the life of the Act itself.\n\nHence, so long as the Act continues in force in its present form, the provisions of articles 21 and 22 in\n\nso far as they are inconsistent with the Act are out of the way of the respondent and the petitioner cannot take advantage of those provisions.\n\nTherefore, there is no question of the provisions of section 8 of the Act being unconstitutional by reason of their being inconsistent with articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution ; ancl consequently article 13 is of no assistan.ce to the petitioner.\n\nWt:. hae assumed that article 32 of the Constitution under which this application has been made to this Court is available to the petitioner, though the Attorney-General who appeared to show cause on behaif of the respondents, went to the length of suggesting that even the benefit of article ~2 of the Constitution is not available to the petitioner. As he did not raise this point by way of a preliminary objection and as we did not hear the petitioner's counsel on this aspect of the case, because in our view clause ( c) added to article 35 of the Constitution by the President's Order was enough to deprive the petitioner of the benefit of articles 21 and 22 at least, we have not thought it necessary to examine and pronounce upon that extreme proposition.\n\nRealizing the difficulty in the petitioner's way in view of the provisions of clause ( c) added as aforesaid to article 35 of the Constitution, the learned counsel for the petitioner faintly suggested that clause\n\n(c) of article 35 added by the President's Order was itself bad inasmuch as, so the argument further ran, that provision was in excess of the powers conferred on the President by article 370 of the Constitution.\n\nNo attempt was mde on behalf of the petitioner to show how the Order promulgated by the President was in excess of his powers under article 370 of the Constitution. It was not contended that that article did not authorise the President to promulgate the Order. What was suggested was that in promulgating the Order which the P1esident was authorised to make under article 370 he had exceeded his powers. Beyond saying so, no tangible reason was adduced in support of this extreme position. It is manifest that article 370 ( 1) ( c) and ( d) authorizes the President by Order\n\nI'. L. Lakhanpal v.\n\nTluStt111 of Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nSinha J.\n\nP. L. lA/chanpal\n\nTM Slal1 ef , Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nto specify the exceptions and modifications to the provisions of the Constitution (other than articles 1 and 370) subject to which the Constitution shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Clause (c) as indicated above has been added to article 35 of the Constitution only so far as the State of . Jammu and Kashmir is concerned. Section 8 of the Act is not in excess of or inconsistent with the provisions of clause ( c) so added to article 35 of the Constitution. That being so the orders as served upon the petitioner arc not inconsistent with or in excess of such provisions of Part III of the Constitution as apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It must therefore be held that the petitioner was not entitled to know the grounds upon which he had been detained beyond what is disclosed in the order itself.\n\nIt was argued that the order of detention served on the petitioner or the oqler sent to the officer in charge of the jail where he was detained, did not bear the signature of the Prime Minister of J ammu and Kashmir. But no provisions of any law have been brought to our notice which require that the Prime Minister himself should have signed the copy of the order to be served on the detenu or the copy of the order which was forwarded to the officer in charge of the jail. Even the long petition submitted by the petitioner which is not characterized by sobriety of language or strict accuracy does not contain any the least suggestion to that effect ; and no material in support of it has been shown to us. We cannot, therefore, take notice of such an irresponsible and unfounded suggestion.\n\nIt must therefore be held that all the grounds of law urged or suggested in support of the petition are without any substance. We may add that we did not call upon the Attorney-General who appeared on behalf of the respondents to show cause with reference to the allegations of the order impugned being malicious or wanting in bona fides because no foundation had been laid in the petition on the facts stated in the affidavit which could lead us even remotely to make such an inference.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid it must be held that there ts no merit in the application and the rule is accordingly discharged, and the application is dismissed.\n\nSADHU RAM v.\n\nTHE CUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEE\n\nPROPERTY.\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nFundamental Rights, Infringement of-Transfer of evacuee property-Requirement of confirmation by Custodian-Retrospective effect, if amounts to deprivation of property-If a reasonable restriction-Refusal of confirmation by quasi-judicial order based on irrelevant material-Application under Art. 32, if maintainable-Constitution of India, Arts. 19, 31, 32-East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947) as amended by East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Pr'bperty)\n\n(Amendment) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act XXVI of 1948), s. 5-A.\n\nThe applicant purchased certain agricultural lands from a Muslim evacuee. The sale deed was executed, registered and possession was delivered to the applicant in September, 1947, before the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act of 1947 came into operation on the 12th of December, 1947.\n\nBy subsequent amendments a new section, s. 5-A, was inserted into the Act with retrospective effect from the 15th of August, 1947, render ing transactions in respect of evacuee property ineffective unless confirmed by the Custodian. The applicant applied for confirmation.\n\nThe Assistant Custodian recommended such confirmation but the Additional Custodian, acting in terms of a circular issued by the Custodian-General enunciating a policy of non-confirmation with regard to agricultural lands, refused to confirm the applicant's purchase and this order was affirmed by the Assistant Custodian- General in revision.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the applicant, inter alia, that the retrospective oper; ition of s. 5-A of the Act was in effect a deprivation of property without compensation and was hit by Art. 31 of the Constitution.\n\nHeld that s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act though retrospective in operation does not amount to deprivation of property in respect of past transactions and is valid.\n\nIn respect of future transactions the requirement of con-\n\nP. L. Laklianpal\n\nT\"4 Stale of Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nSinha J.\n\nOclob.r 28.", "total_entities": 125, "entities": [{"text": "Indian Stores Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the nomenclature only matt- ered, then there is no escape from the conclusion that whatever articles and commodities were purchased by the Indian Stores Department or its later substitutes, of whatever magnitude and value, would be within the mischief of the exemption clause in question."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 825, "end_char": 844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the aforesaid reasons I would allow these appeals, set aside the orders of the Letters Patent Bench and restore the orders passed by the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, with costs throughout."}}, {"text": "P. L. LAKHANPAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 972, "end_char": 987, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. L. LAKHANPAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 992, "end_char": 1022, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1050, "end_char": 1058, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. 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L. Lakhanpal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1950, "end_char": 1965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. L. Lakhanpal\n\nThe Stat1 of Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nThe petitioner challenged the order of detention on the grounds,.", "canonical_name": "P. L. LAKHANPAL"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2344, "end_char": 2351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Arts. 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2733, "end_char": 2748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Art. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Art. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3251, "end_char": 3258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3620, "end_char": 3630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Patnaik, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setaivad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3653, "end_char": 3667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setaivad, Attorney-General of India,\n\nC. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-Genera!", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setaivad"}}, {"text": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3697, "end_char": 3712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setaivad, Attorney-General of India,\n\nC. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-Genera!"}}, {"text": "Raja faswant Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3742, "end_char": 3760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, Raja faswant Singh, Advocatc-Gncrn!,"}}, {"text": "A.\n\nMehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fammu and Kashmir\n\n(P. A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dheb11r, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dheb11r", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fammu and Kashmir\n\n(P. A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dheb11r, with them) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "R. H. Dheb11r"}}, {"text": "M. C. Seta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3863, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/wad, Attorney-General of fodia (P. A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the Intervener.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setaivad"}}, {"text": "P. A.\n\nMehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3906, "end_char": 3918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/wad, Attorney-General of fodia (P. A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3923, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/wad, Attorney-General of fodia (P. A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the Intervener.", "canonical_name": "R. H. Dheb11r"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--This application for a writ of habeas corpi1s is directed against the State of Jammu and Kashmir which has by its order dated the 4th October, 1955, directed the detention of the petitioner under section 3 of the J ammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, (Jammu and Kashmir Act IV of 2011 ), hereinafter to be referred to as \"the Act\"."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4238, "end_char": 4247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4301, "end_char": 4322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4431, "end_char": 4457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Originally the sole respondent impleaded was the State of Jammu and Kashmir.", "canonical_name": "State of Jammu and Kashmir"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4511, "end_char": 4525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a rule nisi was issued to the respondent, fhe Union of India intervened because the petitioner had challenged the validity of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954."}}, {"text": "P. L. Lakhanpal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4673, "end_char": 4688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, P. L. Lakhanpal, aged approximately 28 years, describing himself as the Chairman, End Kashmir Dispute Committee, has moved this Court against the order of the State detaining him in Kothi Bagh sub-jail in Srinagar.", "canonical_name": "P. L. LAKHANPAL"}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, P. L. Lakhanpal, aged approximately 28 years, describing himself as the Chairman, End Kashmir Dispute Committee, has moved this Court against the order of the State detaining him in Kothi Bagh sub-jail in Srinagar."}}, {"text": "Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5024, "end_char": 5031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He went to Kashmir on a permit on the 24th September this year \"on a study-cum-pleasure trip\"."}}, {"text": "Co:igress Socialist Party, Lahore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has been evincing keen interest in Kashmir politics since the year 1946, when as General Secretary of the Co:igress Socialist Party, Lahore, he was closely associated with the \"Quit Kashmir movement\"."}}, {"text": "Delhi Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5422, "end_char": 5434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Last year he wrote a book entitled \"Communist Conspiracy in Kashmir\", copies of which had been seized by the Delhi Police but were subsequently released."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5639, "end_char": 5661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in the book aforesaid, as also elsewhere in the press and on the platform, claims to have been making \"trenchant criticism of the Kashmir cabinet headed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and also of the Government of India's policy in regard to Kashmir\"."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5678, "end_char": 5697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in the book aforesaid, as also elsewhere in the press and on the platform, claims to have been making \"trenchant criticism of the Kashmir cabinet headed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and also of the Government of India's policy in regard to Kashmir\"."}}, {"text": "Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5773, "end_char": 5794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He claims to be known as the supporter of Sheikh Mohd."}}, {"text": "P. L. Lalcha'flpal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6443, "end_char": 6461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. L. Lalcha'flpal\n\nTJr."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6924, "end_char": 6941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar views were expressed by him in telegrams said to have been sent to the Sadar-i- Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, to the President of India and to the Prime Minister of India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar views were expressed by him in telegrams said to have been sent to the Sadar-i- Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, to the President of India and to the Prime Minister of India."}}, {"text": "World Democratic Peace Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7814, "end_char": 7845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner also claims to be the General Secretary of the World Democratic Peace Congress."}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also makes a grievance that it was reported in a daily newspaper of Srinagar called Khidmat that the present Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir had described him as \"a traitor and an enemy of the nation\"."}}, {"text": "Anantnag", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8415, "end_char": 8423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th September, he says, he left Srinagar for Anantnag in the company of the alleged leader of the opposition in the Assembly and President of the Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front, named Mirza Afzal Mohd."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8516, "end_char": 8550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th September, he says, he left Srinagar for Anantnag in the company of the alleged leader of the opposition in the Assembly and President of the Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front, named Mirza Afzal Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mirza Afzal Mohd. Beg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8558, "end_char": 8579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th September, he says, he left Srinagar for Anantnag in the company of the alleged leader of the opposition in the Assembly and President of the Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front, named Mirza Afzal Mohd."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8655, "end_char": 8683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beg, who, it may be added, has also\n\nbeen in detention under the orders of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, as stated by the Advocate- General of that State."}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8800, "end_char": 8803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At Anantnag he claims to have spent two days as the guest of Mr. Beg meeting people of the town and neighbouring areas \"listening to their harrowing tales of woe\"."}}, {"text": "Sopore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9072, "end_char": 9078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He came back to Srinagar on the 1st October and left for Sopore on the 2nd October."}}, {"text": "J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9291, "end_char": 9309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 3rd October he personally handed to the P.A. to the Chief Secretary of J ammu and Kashmir an application seeking permission for an interview with Sheikh Abdullah in the Kud jail where he has been in detention."}}, {"text": "Sheikh Abdullah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9366, "end_char": 9381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 3rd October he personally handed to the P.A. to the Chief Secretary of J ammu and Kashmir an application seeking permission for an interview with Sheikh Abdullah in the Kud jail where he has been in detention."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9853, "end_char": 9870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the afternoon of the 4th October he held a press conference at which he \"made a written statement\" complaining of \"such barbaric brutalities, such insecurity of life, property and honour and such callousness on the part of the administration as are evidenced in your valley only go to show rhat the Bakshi Government is just another name for legalized lawless, disorder, corruption and nepotism\"."}}, {"text": "GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10266, "end_char": 10285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of detention (Annexure \"D\" at page 20 of the paperbook) is in these terms :-\n\n\"GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR\n\nCHIEF SECRETARIAT\n\n(GENERAL DEPARTMENT) Subject :-Detention of P. L. Lakhanpal, Chairman, End Kashmir Dispute Committee at present residing in Kashmir Guest House, Lal Chowk, Amira Kadal, Srinagar, under section 3(1)(a)(i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011."}}, {"text": "P. L. Lakhanpal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10362, "end_char": 10377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of detention (Annexure \"D\" at page 20 of the paperbook) is in these terms :-\n\n\"GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR\n\nCHIEF SECRETARIAT\n\n(GENERAL DEPARTMENT) Subject :-Detention of P. L. Lakhanpal, Chairman, End Kashmir Dispute Committee at present residing in Kashmir Guest House, Lal Chowk, Amira Kadal, Srinagar, under section 3(1)(a)(i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011.", "canonical_name": "P. L. LAKHANPAL"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10503, "end_char": 10521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10529, "end_char": 10577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10584, "end_char": 10610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi State of Jammu and Kashmir\n\nSinha J.\n\nP. /,.", "canonical_name": "State of Jammu and Kashmir"}}, {"text": "G. M. Bakshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11412, "end_char": 11424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. M. Bakshi\n\nPrime Minister\"."}}, {"text": "GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11597, "end_char": 11628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order actually served on the petitioner is an annexure to the cabinet order ( Annexure 'E' at page 21 of the paper-book) which is in these terms :\n\n\"GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12157, "end_char": 12166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12174, "end_char": 12222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lakhanpal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12288, "end_char": 12297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakhanpal be detained in sub-jail, Kothibagh, Srinagar; Notice of this Order shall be given to the said P. L. Lakhanpal by reading over the same to him."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Ahmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12471, "end_char": 12483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Ahmad Chief Secretary to Government\"."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12720, "end_char": 12730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13227, "end_char": 13237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pirzada Ghulam Ahmad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13525, "end_char": 13545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit filed on behalf of the State is sworn to by Shri Pirzada Ghulam Ahmad, Chief Secretary to the Government."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15099, "end_char": 15108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7th October 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15527, "end_char": 15543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main attack against the orders served upon the petitioner is against the following paragraph in the order dated the 7th October 1955 :-\n\n\"Now, therefore, the Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sub-section ( 1) of section 8 bf the said Act, hereby declare that it would be against the public interest to communicate to the said P. L. Lakhanpal the grounds on which the detention order has been made\"."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15655, "end_char": 15664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15931, "end_char": 15940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16906, "end_char": 16924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17098, "end_char": 17124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proviso to the section just quoted makes provision for such cases as come within the purview of section 3(1)(a)(i) of the Act; that is to say, a person in the position of the petitioner who has been detained for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is outside the general rule laid down in section 8 ( 1) if the Government declares, as it has done in this case, that it would be against the public interest to communicate to him the grounds on which the detention order has been made."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17166, "end_char": 17175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17659, "end_char": 17677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17786, "end_char": 17796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18095, "end_char": 18113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "14th May, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18286, "end_char": 18300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 14th May, 1954, the President of India in exercise of the powers conferred by clause ( 1) of article 370 of the Constitution made and promulgated with the concur-\n\n\"· The Stall of Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nSinha J.\n\nP. L. LaJ./wnpal\n\nThe Slat1 of Jammu and\n\nKaslimir\n\nSinha ]."}}, {"text": "article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18379, "end_char": 18390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 1 and 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18907, "end_char": 18925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19214, "end_char": 19224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19230, "end_char": 19275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In so far as those exceptions and modifications are relevant to our present purpose, it is provided that in clauses ( 4) and (7) of article 22 \"The Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir\" shall be substituted for \"Parliament\", so that the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is competent to legislate in respect of preventive detention."}}, {"text": "article 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19439, "end_char": 19449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20090, "end_char": 20100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20681, "end_char": 20699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20902, "end_char": 20911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20989, "end_char": 21007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21048, "end_char": 21058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21122, "end_char": 21132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21634, "end_char": 21644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21745, "end_char": 21763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21976, "end_char": 21986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22085, "end_char": 22095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22257, "end_char": 22268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22423, "end_char": 22434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22655, "end_char": 22666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22801, "end_char": 22812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 1 and 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23077, "end_char": 23095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23226, "end_char": 23236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23319, "end_char": 23328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23423, "end_char": 23433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25310, "end_char": 25319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25334, "end_char": 25345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25347, "end_char": 25363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25365, "end_char": 25375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25380, "end_char": 25400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25696, "end_char": 25703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25721, "end_char": 25742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19, 31, 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25744, "end_char": 25760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25823, "end_char": 25838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25942, "end_char": 25957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25973, "end_char": 25977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "12th of December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26262, "end_char": 26284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale deed was executed, registered and possession was delivered to the applicant in September, 1947, before the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act of 1947 came into operation on the 12th of December, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26327, "end_char": 26331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "15th of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26396, "end_char": 26416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By subsequent amendments a new section, s. 5-A, was inserted into the Act with retrospective effect from the 15th of August, 1947, render ing transactions in respect of evacuee property ineffective unless confirmed by the Custodian."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27000, "end_char": 27004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27094, "end_char": 27101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27134, "end_char": 27138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1113_1117_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1113\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid it must be held that there ts no merit in the application and the rule is accordingly discharged, and the application is dismissed.\n\nSADHU RAM v.\n\nTHE CUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEE\n\nPROPERTY.\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nFundamental Rights, Infringement of-Transfer of evacuee property-Requirement of confirmation by Custodian-Retrospective effect, if amounts to deprivation of property-If a reasonable restriction-Refusal of confirmation by quasi-judicial order based on irrelevant material-Application under Art. 32, if maintainable-Constitution of India, Arts. 19, 31, 32-East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947) as amended by East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Pr'bperty)\n\n(Amendment) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act XXVI of 1948), s. 5-A.\n\nThe applicant purchased certain agricultural lands from a Muslim evacuee. The sale deed was executed, registered and possession was delivered to the applicant in September, 1947, before the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act of 1947 came into operation on the 12th of December, 1947.\n\nBy subsequent amendments a new section, s. 5-A, was inserted into the Act with retrospective effect from the 15th of August, 1947, render ing transactions in respect of evacuee property ineffective unless confirmed by the Custodian. The applicant applied for confirmation.\n\nThe Assistant Custodian recommended such confirmation but the Additional Custodian, acting in terms of a circular issued by the Custodian-General enunciating a policy of non-confirmation with regard to agricultural lands, refused to confirm the applicant's purchase and this order was affirmed by the Assistant Custodian- General in revision.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the applicant, inter alia, that the retrospective oper; ition of s. 5-A of the Act was in effect a deprivation of property without compensation and was hit by Art. 31 of the Constitution.\n\nHeld that s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act though retrospective in operation does not amount to deprivation of property in respect of past transactions and is valid.\n\nIn respect of future transactions the requirement of con-\n\nP. L. Laklianpal\n\nT\"4 Stale of Jammu and\n\nKashmir\n\nSinha J.\n\nOclob.r 28.\n\nJ95li\n\nSadhu Ram\n\nTire Cuslodian- Gmual of Eoacue1\n\nProper!,]\n\nfirmation is clearly a restriction and not a deprivation.\n\nSuch restriction \\Vas also reasonable having regard to the purpose and policy of the Evacuee Property Law. The requirement of confirmation being thus in essence only a restriction and not a deprivation, retrospectivity in the operation of that restriction does not make it deprivation.\n\nThat the applicant's loss \\Vas occasioned not by any unconstitutional la\\V but by a quasi-judicial order of the Custodian refusing confirmation ari_d~ consequently, his contention that any fundamental right had been violated must be rejected.\n\n'['hat even if the contention that the order was itself illegal being based on irrelevant material be correct, that did not by itself raise any question of violation of any fundamental right and would be no ground for an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nORIGINAL JuR1so1cT10N : Petition No. 306 of 1954.\n\nU ndcr Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nKundan Lal Mehta and B.RL. Iyengar, for the petitioner.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1955. October 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution which arises under the following circumstances. The pet1t1oner, Sadht1 Ram, purchased from one lmam-ud-Din, a muslim evacuee, 43 Bighas 14 Biswas of agricultural land comprised in Khasra Nos. 2135 to 2139, 2158, 2159, 2171, 2204 and 2206 with Sham/at rights in village Kaithal, District Karna!, Punjab. The sale deed was executed on the 6th September, 1947, and registered on the 9th September, 1947, before lmam-ud-Din left for Pakistan. The cons1deration therefore was Rs. 3,000 and as much as Rs. 2,700 thereof appears to have been paid by the petitioner to the vendor before the Sub-Registrar.\n\nPossession also was transferred on the execution of the sale-deed.\n\nMutation was made by the revenue authorities on the 23rd January, 1948.\n\nEast Punjab\n\nEvacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947) came into force on the 12th of December, 1947. It was amended by East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1948 (East Punjab Ordinance No. II of 1948) which came into force on the 16th January,\n\n1948. This gave place to East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act XXVI of 1948) which came into force on the 11th April, 1948.\n\nBy these amendments a new section, section 5-A, was inserted in the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947. It will be seen\n\nhat these amendments were subsequent to the date of the execution and registration of the sale-deed and the transfer of possession thereof.\n\nSection\n\n5-A, so far as it is relevant for our present purpose, is in the following terms :\n\n\"5-A. ( 1) No sale, mortgage, pledge, lease, ex- .change or other transfer of any interest or right in or over any property made by an evacuee or by any person in anticipation of his becoming an evacuee, or by the agent, assign or attorney of the evacuee or such person on or after the fifteenth day of August, 1947, shall be, effective so as to confer any rights or remedies on the parties to such transfer or on any person claiming under them unless it is confirmed by the Custodian.\n\n(2) An application for confirming such transfer may be made by any person claiming thereunder or by any person lawfully authorised by him\".\n\nThis section purports to be retrospective.\n\nHence an application for confirmation was made by the petitioner on the 23rd March, 1948. The Assistant Custodian, Karna], on being satisfied about the genuineness of the transaction, recommended confirmation.\n\nBut the Additional Custodian, Jullundur, by his order dated the 11th February, 1953, rejected the application for confirmation acting on the Custodian- General's circular dated the 9th March, 1950, under which a policy of not confirming transactions relating to agricultural property was enunciated. This was 16-85 S. C. India/59.\n\nSadhu Ram v.\n\nThe Custodian- General of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJatannaahadas ].\n\nSatfhu Ram v.\n\nTht Custodian- Gennal of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJagannadhad as J.\n\naffirmed by the Assistant Custodian-General on an application to him for revision.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner relies on the fact that his transaction which, on enquiry, was held to be genuine, was entered i, nto before the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 was enacted and before the amendment thereof by insertion of section 5-A came into operation.\n\nHe contends that the retrospective operation of section\n\n5-A in such circumstances amounts to deprivation of his property, without any compensation and is, therefore, hit by article 31 of the Constitution. Whatever may have been the position if this matter had to be dealt with much earlie<, it seems doubtful whether any such contention can be raised by the petitioner before us, on this date, in view of the recent Constitution (Fourth /,::iendment) Act, 1955, which has come into force on the 27th April, 1955. It is unnecessary, however, to base our decision on this ground.\n\nIt appears to us clear that section 5-A cannot be read as a legislative provision depriving the owner of his property. The; e can be no doubt that so far as transactions subsequent to the date of amendment are concerned, it is nothing more than a restriction on the transfer of propert;· by the owner thereof.\n\nAny transferee in such a situation takes the property subject to the requirement of confirmation. The case would, then, be one which falls under article 19 of the Constitution and not nnder article 31. There can be no doubt that having regard to the purpose and policy underlying the hw relating to Evacuee Property and the abnormal conditions which arose from and after the 15th August, 1947, th' requirement of confirmation with reference to transactions affecting Evacuee Property cannot but be considered a reasonble restriction. If this requirement was in essence not a deprivation but a .restriction in respect of future transactions, thero?. is no reason for treating it as deprivation hy virtue of its having been given retrospective effect, such retrospectivity being within the competence of the 3ppropriate legislature. The retrospectivity commencin~ from the 15th August, 1947, is\n\nalso not only reasonable but called for in the circumstances, which occasioned the Evacuee Property laws.\n\nIn this case the petitioner is deprived of his bargain and incurs consequential loss, not by virtue of any unconstitutional law but by reason of the quasijudicial order of the Custodian declining to confirm the transaction. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that any fundamental right of his has been violated must, therefore, be reiected.\n\nLearned counsel next urges that the action of the Custodian in basing his decision on some circular of the Custodian-General is illegal and that it is not relevant material under section 5-A. It is enough to say that even if this contention be correct, this does not raise any question of violation of fundamental rights. If this is the sole ground, this application is misconceived. ·\n\nThis petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but in the circuqistances without costs.\n\nINDIRA SOHANLAL\n\nti.\n\nCUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY,\n\nDELHI & OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nEvacuee Pt'Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional powers- Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950), ss. 27, 58(3)-Transaction before the passing of the Act-Application for confirmation-East Punjab Evacttees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), ss. 5-A, 5-B-Order of confirmation .afte1 passing of Act XXXI of 1950-Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 6-Applicability.\n\nThe appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee. On the 23rd of February, 1948, she made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the transaction of ex-\n\nSadhll Ram v.\n\nThe Custodian- Gentral of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJagannadhadaJ ].\n\nOctob<r 28.", "total_entities": 68, "entities": [{"text": "SADHU RAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 196, "end_char": 205, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Satfhu Ram", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE CUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEE\n\nPROPERTY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 210, "end_char": 252, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE CUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEE PROPERTY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 256, "end_char": 265, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 280, "end_char": 291, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 311, "end_char": 321, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 326, "end_char": 350, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 642, "end_char": 649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 667, "end_char": 688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19, 31, 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 769, "end_char": 784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 888, "end_char": 903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 919, "end_char": 923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "12th of December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1208, "end_char": 1230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale deed was executed, registered and possession was delivered to the applicant in September, 1947, before the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act of 1947 came into operation on the 12th of December, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1273, "end_char": 1277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "15th of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1342, "end_char": 1362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By subsequent amendments a new section, s. 5-A, was inserted into the Act with retrospective effect from the 15th of August, 1947, render ing transactions in respect of evacuee property ineffective unless confirmed by the Custodian."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1946, "end_char": 1950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2040, "end_char": 2047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2080, "end_char": 2084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sadhu Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2413, "end_char": 2422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J95li\n\nSadhu Ram\n\nTire Cuslodian- Gmual of Eoacue1\n\nProper!,]", "canonical_name": "Satfhu Ram"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3386, "end_char": 3396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kundan Lal Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3461, "end_char": 3477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kundan Lal Mehta and B.RL."}}, {"text": "B.RL. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3482, "end_char": 3495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kundan Lal Mehta and B.RL."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3518, "end_char": 3532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3581, "end_char": 3593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3688, "end_char": 3701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution which arises under the following circumstances.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kaithal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4034, "end_char": 4041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2135 to 2139, 2158, 2159, 2171, 2204 and 2206 with Sham/at rights in village Kaithal, District Karna!,"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab."}}, {"text": "9th September, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4145, "end_char": 4164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale deed was executed on the 6th September, 1947, and registered on the 9th September, 1947, before lmam-ud-Din left for Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale deed was executed on the 6th September, 1947, and registered on the 9th September, 1947, before lmam-ud-Din left for Pakistan."}}, {"text": "23rd January, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4484, "end_char": 4502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mutation was made by the revenue authorities on the 23rd January, 1948."}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4742, "end_char": 4763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "16th January,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4809, "end_char": 4828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II of 1948) which came into force on the 16th January,\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4923, "end_char": 4938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5036, "end_char": 5045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5074, "end_char": 5096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section\n\n5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "fifteenth day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5635, "end_char": 5664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section\n\n5-A, so far as it is relevant for our present purpose, is in the following terms :\n\n\"5-A. ( 1) No sale, mortgage, pledge, lease, ex- .change or other transfer of any interest or right in or over any property made by an evacuee or by any person in anticipation of his becoming an evacuee, or by the agent, assign or attorney of the evacuee or such person on or after the fifteenth day of August, 1947, shall be, effective so as to confer any rights or remedies on the parties to such transfer or on any person claiming under them unless it is confirmed by the Custodian."}}, {"text": "Sadhu Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6564, "end_char": 6573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadhu Ram v.\n\nThe Custodian- General of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJatannaahadas ].", "canonical_name": "Satfhu Ram"}}, {"text": "Satfhu Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6641, "end_char": 6651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satfhu Ram v.\n\nTht Custodian- Gennal of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJagannadhad as J.\n\naffirmed by the Assistant Custodian-General on an application to him for revision.", "canonical_name": "Satfhu Ram"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6956, "end_char": 6978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7040, "end_char": 7049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "section\n\n5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7122, "end_char": 7132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "27th April, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7570, "end_char": 7586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever may have been the position if this matter had to be dealt with much earlie<, it seems doubtful whether any such contention can be raised by the petitioner before us, on this date, in view of the recent Constitution (Fourth /,::iendment) Act, 1955, which has come into force on the 27th April, 1955."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7682, "end_char": 7691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8110, "end_char": 8120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8155, "end_char": 8165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8340, "end_char": 8357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that having regard to the purpose and policy underlying the hw relating to Evacuee Property and the abnormal conditions which arose from and after the 15th August, 1947, th' requirement of confirmation with reference to transactions affecting Evacuee Property cannot but be considered a reasonble restriction."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9509, "end_char": 9518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "INDIRA SOHANLAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9808, "end_char": 9823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INDIRA SOHANLAL\n\nti."}}, {"text": "CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY,\n\nDELHI & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY,\n\nDELHI & OTHERS."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHA-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9918, "end_char": 9929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9951, "end_char": 9972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional powers- Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9990, "end_char": 10078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 27, 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10095, "end_char": 10108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional powers- Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional powers- Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10243, "end_char": 10258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10273, "end_char": 10278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10343, "end_char": 10380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10394, "end_char": 10398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act", "statute": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10454, "end_char": 10460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee."}}, {"text": "10th of October, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10504, "end_char": 10525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10609, "end_char": 10614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee."}}, {"text": "23rd of February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10651, "end_char": 10673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd of February, 1948, she made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the transaction of ex-\n\nSadhll Ram v.\n\nThe Custodian- Gentral of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJagannadhadaJ ]."}}, {"text": "Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural),", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10706, "end_char": 10755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd of February, 1948, she made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the transaction of ex-\n\nSadhll Ram v.\n\nThe Custodian- Gentral of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJagannadhadaJ ]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1117_1140_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1117\n\nalso not only reasonable but called for in the circumstances, which occasioned the Evacuee Property laws.\n\nIn this case the petitioner is deprived of his bargain and incurs consequential loss, not by virtue of any unconstitutional law but by reason of the quasijudicial order of the Custodian declining to confirm the transaction. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that any fundamental right of his has been violated must, therefore, be reiected.\n\nLearned counsel next urges that the action of the Custodian in basing his decision on some circular of the Custodian-General is illegal and that it is not relevant material under section 5-A. It is enough to say that even if this contention be correct, this does not raise any question of violation of fundamental rights. If this is the sole ground, this application is misconceived. ·\n\nThis petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but in the circuqistances without costs.\n\nINDIRA SOHANLAL\n\nti.\n\nCUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY,\n\nDELHI & OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nEvacuee Pt'Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional powers- Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950), ss. 27, 58(3)-Transaction before the passing of the Act-Application for confirmation-East Punjab Evacttees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), ss. 5-A, 5-B-Order of confirmation .afte1 passing of Act XXXI of 1950-Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 6-Applicability.\n\nThe appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee. On the 23rd of February, 1948, she made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the transaction of ex-\n\nSadhll Ram v.\n\nThe Custodian- Gentral of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJagannadhadaJ ].\n\nOctob<r 28.\n\nIndirtl Sohonlal v.\n\nCust.Jian of &acuu Property,\n\nDelhi and othtrs\n\nchange under s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees' {Administration of Property) Act, 1947, as amended in 1948 and applied to the State of Delhi. Under s. 5-B of the Act an order if passed by the Custodian or Additional Custodian would not be subject to appeal or revision, and would become final and conclusive.\n\nBut the application \\.Vas not disposed of until the 20th of March, 1952, and on that date the Additional Custodian passed an order confirming the exchange.\n\nIn the 1neanwhile~ there were changes in the la\\v relating to evacuee property by \\Vhich the East Punjab Act as applied to the State of Delhi v1as repealed and re-enacted, and ultimately Central Act XXXI of 1950 was passed which, among other things, conferred by s. 27 revisional powers on the Custodian-General. The Custodian-General issued a notice under s. 7.7 to the appellant and, after hearing her, set aside the order of confirmation and directed the matter to be reconsidered by the Custodian, It was contended for the appellant that the order of confirmation by the Additional Custodian was not open to revision, on the ground that on the filing of the application in 1948 the appellant got a vested right to have it determined under s. 5-A, with the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under s. 5-B attaching to such determination, and that the subsequent repe3l and re-enactment of these provisions cannot affect such a right, in view of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, and s. 58(3) of Act XXXI of 1950.\n\nHeld, (i) that s. 6 of~ General Clauses Act (X. oj 1897) was not applicable to the case, as s. 58(\\) ~\\ Act XXXI 'of 1950 was a self-contained provision indicative \"f the intention to e:icclude the operatic n of s. 6 ;\n\n(ii) that the right to a determination with the attribute of finality, assuming that such a right exists, is not a vested right and it does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, ~1hen alone it becon1es an existing right.\n\nColonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving ([1905] A.C. 369) and Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tar Commissioner ( [ 1927] J.L.R. 9 Lah. 284 ; 54 I.A. 421 ), distinguished;\n\n(iii) that the words \"the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of the repealed law\" in s. 58(3) of Act XXXI of 1950 cannot be construed 3.s meaning \"the repeal shall not affect the future operation of the previous law\" ; and\n\n(iv) that the scheme underlying s. 58(3) is that every matter to which the new Act applies has to be treated as arising, and to dealt with, under the new la\\v except in so far as certain consequences have already ensured or acts have been completed prior to the new Act, to \\Vhich it is the old law that wi!J pply.\n\nIn view of s. 58, the application of the appellant for confirmation pending on te date when Act XXXI of 1950 came into force, had to be dealt with and disposed of under this Act and the order of confirmation passed in 1952 was subject to the revisional power of the Custodian-General under s. 27 of the said Act.\n\nQuaere.-Whether a right of. appeal in respect of a pending action can be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant on the commencement of the action.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal :No. 195 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20th May, 1953 of the Custodian- General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi in Revision No. 387-R/Judl/53.\n\nAchhru Ram, (Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for respondents Nos. 1 & 2.\n\n1955.\n\nOctober 28.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Custodian-General 0£ Evacuee Property dated the 20th May, 1953, revi~ ing an order of the Additional Custodian of East Punjab, Delhi, elated the 20th March, 1952. The two questions raised before us on the facts and circumstances, to be stated, are (1) whether the Custodian- General had the revisional power which he purported to exercise, and (2) was the order of the Custodian- General on its merits such as to call for interference by this Court.\n\nThe appellant before us, one Mrs. Indira Sohanlal, is a displaced person from Lahore. She was the owner of a house at Lahore known as 5, Danepur Road.\n\nMalik Sir Firoz Khan Noon of West Pakistan owned 766 'bighas of agricultural land in a village called Punjab Khore within the State of Delhi. An oral exchange is said to have taken place between these two, of the said properties, on the 10th October, 1947.\n\nIn pursuance of that exchange Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon is said to have taken possession of the Danepur Road House. The appellant is also said to have been put in possession of the said agricultural lands in Punjab Khore presumably by way of attornment\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nGus to di an of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacute Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadaJ J.\n\nof tenants who were in actual cultivating possession of the lands. Under section 5-A of the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), as amended in 1948 and applied to the State of Delhi, such a transaction required confirmation by the Custodian.\n\nIn compliance with this section the appellant made an application on the 23rd February, 1948, to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the above transaction of exchange and of the consequent transfer to her of the property in agricultural land.\n\nIn view of certain rules which came into force later and which prescribed that the application was to be in a set form furnishing certain particulars, the appellant filed an amended application dated the 14th August, 1948, furnishing the required particulars.\n\nThis application was not disposed of by the Additional Custodian, for reasons not clear on the record, until the 20th March,\n\n1952. On that date he passed an order confirming the exchange.\n\nMeanwhile, however, a proposal was put up to the Additional Custodian by his Revenue Assistant to allot agricultural lands of the village Punjab Khore, including those covered by this exchange, to a number of refugee cultivators. The proposal was approved by the Additional Custodian on the 12th June, 1949. In pursuance thereof a detailed allotment was made to twenty six individual allotees on the 27th October, 1949. There is a report of the Rehabilitation Patwari dated the 27th February 1950, on the record showing that the allottees entered into possession of the land and cultivated their respective lands and settled down in the village. After the order confirming the exchange was passed by the Additional Custodian on the 20th March, 1952, the appellant filed an application on the 5th May, 1952, asking to be placed in possession, and for a warrant of delivery of possession to be issued against the various allottees and tenants of the land. The Naib. Tehsildar recommended that possession may be given to the appellant\" and that the Patwari may be informed accordingly to take the necessary action in the matter. But it does\n\nnot appear from the record whether this was done or whether possession was in fact delivered.\n\nAt this st:ige, a notice under section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Central Act XXXI of 1950), appears to have been issued to the appellant by th:'.\n\nCustodian-General to show cause why the order of the Additional Custodian dated the 20th March, 1952, confirming . the exchange and the further orders dated the 20th and 28th July, 1952, sar.ct!oning mutation and other consequential and incidental orders made in connection therewith be not set aside.\n\nThis notice appears to have been issued asking the appellant to show cause on the 4th May,\n\n1953. The case was adjourned to the 12th May, 1953, at the request of counsel for the appellant and thereafter a more detailed notice dated the 14th May, 1953, was issued setting out the various grounds on which the previous orders were sought to be set aside. The learned Custodian-General passed . the order now under appeal on the 20th May, 1953, setting aside the order of confirmation. He directed the' Custodian to decide the case after giving notice to all those who might be affected by the confirmation of this transaction.\n\nAs the earlier part of his order shows, the reference to the persons affected was to those who were allotted the lands in question by virtue of the order of the Additional Custodian of the year 1949 above referred to.\n\nTo appreciate the first question that has been raised as to the validity of the exercise of revisional powers by the Custodian-General on the above facts, it is necessary to set out the course of the relevant legislative measures from time to time.\n\nTo meet the unprecedented situation of sudden migration of vast section of population on a large scale from West Punjab to East Punjab and vice versa, leaving most of the properties which they had, moveable and immoveable, agricultural and nonagricultural, the concerned Governments had to take wide legislative powers to deal with the situation, to set up the necessary administrative machinery, and to evolve and give effect to their policies\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nin regard thereto from time to time. The earliest of these legislature measures so far as we are concerned, was the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), which came into force on the 12th December, 1947. This Act was amended by the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1948 (East Punjab Ordinance No. II of 1948) and later by East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Act, 1948, (East Punjab Act XXVI of 1943), which inserted two new sections, 5-A and 5-B, prescribing the requirement of confirmation of transactions relating to evacuee property and providing a right of appeal or revision therefrom.\n\nThese sections were specifically made applicable to transactions on or after the 15th August,\n\n1947. The above Punjab Legislative measures were extended to the State of Delhi by Central GoYernment notifications under the Delhi Laws Act, dated the 29th December, 1947, the 28th January, 1948, and the 22nd April, 1948, respectively.\n\nIn so far as these measuces applied to Chief Commissioners' Provinces they were repealed by the Administration of Evacuee Property (Chief Commissioners' Provinces) Ordinance, 1949, (Central Ordinance No. XII of\n\n1949) which came into force so far as Delhi is concerned on the 13th June, 1949. This Ordinance, in its turn, was repealed and a fresh Central Ordinance came into force in its place, applicable to all the ProYinces of India except Assam and West Bengal.\n\nThat was Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, (Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949), which came into force on the 18th October, 1949.\n\nThis Central Ordinance in its turn was repealed and replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Central Act XXX.I of 1950) which came into force on the 17th April, 1950.\n\nIt is necessary to notice at this stage that until the Central Ordinance XXVII of 1949 was passed, the Evacuee Property law was regulated by the respective Provincial Acts and were under the respective Provincial administrations.\n\nCentral Ordinance\n\nNo. XXVII of 1949 provided for a centralised law and ce1tralised administration which was. continued by Central Act No. XXXI of 1950. One of the main steps taken for such centralised administration was to create the office of Custodian-General with powers of appeal and revision as against the orders of Provincial Custodians. Section 5 of the Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 authorised the Central Government to appoint a Custodian-General of Evacuee Property in India for the purpose of discharging the duties imposed on him by or under the Ordinance, while the appointment of Provincial Custodians, Additional, Deputy or Assistant Custodians, wa> still left to the various Provincial Governments.\n\nThese provisions were continued by sections 5 and 6 of Central Act XXXI of 1950. As regards the transactions by evacuees relating to evacuee property, the first legislative interference in East Punjab and Delhi appears to have been by virtue of East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1948 (East Punjab Ordinance No. II of 1948) and the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act XXVI of 1948) which inserted two new sections 5-A and 5-B into the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947.\n\nThe said sections were as follows :\n\n\"5-A.(l) No sale, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange or other traasfer of any interest or right in or over any property made by an evacuee or by any person in anticipation of his becoming an evacuee, or by the agent, assign or attorney of the evacuee or such person, on or after the fifteenth day of August, 1947, shall be effective so as to confer any rights or remedies on the par!ies to such transfer or on any person daiming under them unless it is confirmed by the Custodian.\n\n(2) An application for confirming such transfer may be made by any person claiming thereunder or by any person lawfully authorised by him.\n\n(3) The Custodian shall reject any application made after the thirty first day of March, 1948 or after\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Eva.cue6 ProlJtrty,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nthe expiration of two months from the date the transaction was entered into, whichever is later. ( 4) The Custodian shall hold a summary enquiry into an application, which is not rejected under subsection (3) and may decline to confirm the transaction if it appears to the Custodian that- ( a) the transaction was not a bona fide one for valuable consideration ; or\n\n(b) the transaction is in the opinion of the Custodian prejudicial to the prescribed objects ; or ( c) for any other reason, to be given hy the Custodian in writing, the transaction ought not to be confirmed.\n\n(5) If the Custodian confirms the transaction, he may confirm it unconditionally or subject to such conditions and terms as he may consider proper. ( 6) The Custodian, if the order is not pronounced in the presence of the applicant, shall forthwith give notice in writing to the applicant of any order passed by him under sub-sections (3), (4) or (5). 5-B. If the original order under section 5-A is passed by an Assistant or Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, any person aggrieved by such order may appeal within sixty days from the date of the order to the Custodian of Evacuee Property who may dispose of the appeal himself or make it over for disposal to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property ; and subject only to the decision on such appeal, if any, the order passed by the Assistant or Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, or any original or appellate order passed by the Custodian or Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property shall be final and conclusive\".\n\nIt will be seen that these two sections enjoined that transfers by an evacuee or intending evacuee relating to his property from and after the 15th August, 1947, required confirmation and provided for appeal or revision from the orders passed on applications therefor and subject thereto, such orders were made final and conclusive. The requirement as to confirmation has been substantially continued in more or less the same form by sections 25, 38 and 40 respectively of\n\nthe successive legislative measures with certain modifications which are not material for this case. But\n\nIndira Sohanla<'\n\nv. so far as the appealability or revisability of an order passed on an application for confirmation is concerned, there have been changes from time to time.\n\nIt will be seen from section 5-B of the East Punjab Act, XIV of 1947, as quoted above, that any original order passed by the Custodian or Additional Custodian is not subject to appeal or revision and it\n\nCu.rtodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nis specifically declared to be final and conclusive.\n\nCentral Ordinance No. XII of 1949 by section 30(1)\n\n(b) thereof provided for an appeal to the High Court against an original order of a Custodian or Additional Custodian or authorised Deputy Custodian\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\nbut there was no provision for revision of such an order. Under the Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 the position was substantially different.\n\nSecti<:>n / 24 thereof, inter alia, provided that any person aggrieved by an order made under section 38 (which corresponds to the previous section 5-A of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947) may prefer an appeal in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, to the Custodian-General where the original order has been passed by the Custodian, Additional Custodian or an Authorised Deputy Custodian. Section 27 thereof provided for revisional powers of the Custodian-General but it was specifically confined to appellate orders and there was no power given thereunder for revision by the Custodian-General of an original order passed by the Custodian. But under Central Act XXXI of 1950 which repealed and replaced this Ordinance the position became different.\n\nThe provision for appeal under section 24 thereof was virtually the same as before, in so far as it is relevant here.\n\nBut as regards revision, however, section 27 of the Act provided for the revisional powers of the Custodian-General in the following terms :\n\n\"27. ( 1) The Custodian-General may at any time, either on his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, call for the record of any proceeding in which any district judge or ustodian has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying him-\n\nIndira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of EvtUuu Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit :\n\nProvided that the Custodian-General shall not pass an order under this sub-section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.\n\n\" The question relating to the validity of the revisional powers exercised by the Custodian-General in the present case arises with reference to the provisions above mentioned.\n\nIt is not disputed that Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon was an evacuee. Nor is it disputed that this property in Punjab Khore which was the subject-matter of the exchange was evacuee property.\n\nThough the exchange in question was alleged to have taken place on the 10th October, 1947, at a time when there was no restriction against any evacuee dealing with the property he left behind, it is indisputable that section 5-A of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 which has been specifically made retrospective from the 15th August, 1947, operates in respect of the present transaction also.\n\nIt, therefore, requires confirmation under the said section and under the corresponding sections in the subsequent legislative measures in this behalf. It was in compliance with this requirement that the appellant made an application for confirmation on the 23rd February, 1948, and that a subsequent amended application was filed on the 14th August, 1948. It is these applications that were disposed of on the 20th March, 1952, by the Additional Custodian, Delhi, by an order confirming the exchange, which has since been revised by the Custodian-General on the 20th May, 1953.\n\nThe main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the powers which are vested in the Custodian-General to revise the original orders of the Custodian or Additional Custodian under section 27 of the Central Act XXXI of 1950 are not applicable to an order passed by the Custodian or Additional\n\nCustodian on an application made long prior to the time when the office of the Custodian-General was set up and he was clothed with powers of revision.\n\nIt is urged that on the date when the application for confirmation was first made on the 23rd February, 1948, an order passed under section 5-A by the Custodian or Additional Custodian is final and conclusive under section 5-B. It is strongly urged that the subsequent repeal and re-enactment of these provisions cannot affect the right vested in the appellant to obtain a final and conclusive order from the Custodian or Additional Custodian on her application for confirmation. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and the Privy Council case in the Coionial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. lrving(1) were relied on in support of this contention.\n\nTo determine the validity of this contention, it is necessary to trace the course of the various relevant statutory provisions from time to time which repealed the prior corresponding legislative measures and to determine the effec~ thereof.\n\nThe East Punjab Act XI\\1 of 1947 was 'replaced by the Central Ordinance No. XII of 1949 relating to Chief Commissioners' Provinces.\n\nSection 40 thereof which repealed the prior Act was as follows :-\n\n\"40. (1) The East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), as in force in Ajmer-Merwara and Delhi, is hereby repealed.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything <lone or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by the Act aforesaid shall, in relation to the Provinces of Ajmer-Merwara and Delhi, be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by this Ordinance, and any penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under the said Act shall be deemed to be a penalty incurred, or proceeding commenced under this Ordinance as if this Ordinance were in force on the day when such thing was done, action taken, penalty incurred or proceeding commenced\".\n\nWhen this Ordinance was in turn repealed by\n\n(!) [1905] A.O. 369.\n\nIndira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of Eu'ac::ee Property, Delhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nIndira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Proper!; P,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nCentral Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949, the repealing section 55 was as follows :\n\n\"55. (1) The Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (XII of 1949), as in force in the Chief Commissioners' Provinces ............ is hereby repealed.\n\n(2) ......................... .\n\n(3) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Ordinance of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, or of any corresponding law, anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by that Ordinance or law shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by this Ordinonce, and any penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under that Ordinance or law shall be deemed to be a penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under this Ordinance as if this Ordinance were in force on the day on which such thing was done, action taken, penalty incurred or proceeding com\"menced\".\n\nOrdinance No. XXVII of 1949 was in its turn repealed by Central Act XXXI of 1950.\n\nThis Act was amenqed by an Ordinance and later by an Act of the same year. Section 58 is the repealing provision of this Act as so amended. The material portion thereof is as follows :\n\n\"58. ( 1) The perty Ordinance, repealed.\n\nAdministration of Evacuee Pro- 1949\n\n(XXVII of 1949) is hereby\n\n(2) ............................. .\n\n(3) The repeal by this Act of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (XXVII of\n\n1949) ................ shall not affect the previous operation thereof, and subject thereto, anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by or under that Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act, as if this Act were in force on the day on which such thing was done or actio11 \\Vas taken\".\n\nThus in the transition of the Evacuee Property law\n\nrelating to Delhi, from the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 to the present Central Act XXXI of 1950, there have been three repeals. The first two repealing provisions are in almost identical terms but the third is somewhat different. The difference is in two respects. ( 1) The provision in the previous repealing sections that \"any penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under the repealed law shall he deemed to be a penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under the new law as if the new law were in force on the day when the penalty was incurred or proceeding commenced\" is now omitted. (2) The provision that \"anything done or any actiol1 taken in exercise of any power conferred by the previous law shall be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred by the new law as if the riew law were in force on the day when such thing was done or action taken\" is .continued. But it is specifically provided that this is subiect to the repeal not affecting the \"previous operation of the repealed law\" which in the context clearly means the previous operation of the repealed law in respect of \"anything done or any action taken\". The question thus for consideration is what is the result brought about by these provisions.\n\nBefore proceeding to determine it, it is desirable to consider whether section 6 of the General Clauses Act can be relied on. The position as regards section 6 of the General Clauses Act in the case of repeal and re-enactment has been considered by this Court in State of Puniab v. Mohar Singh(') and laid down as follows at page 899 :\n\n\"Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion.\n\nBut when repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to took to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention.\n\n(I) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1393, 899.\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evatue< Properly,\n\nDtlhi and othm\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nlttdira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Et acute ProP.,'T{1,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadharfaJ ].\n\nThe line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them.\n\nWe cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactme!]J' followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law ...... \".\n\nIn the present case sub-section ( 3) of section 58 of Central Act XXXI of 1950 . purports to indicate the effect of that repeal, both in negative and in positive terms. The negative portion o.f it relating to \"the previous operation\" of the pnor Ordinance appears to have been taken from section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, while the positive portion adopts a \"deeming\" provision quite contrary to what is contemplated under that section.\n\nUnder the General Clauses Act the position, in respect of matters covered by it, would have to be determined as if the repealing Act had not been passed, while under section 58 of Central Act XXXI of 1950, the position-so far a• the pos1t1ve portion is concerned-has to be judged as if the repealing Act were in force at the earlier relevant <late. Therefore where, as in this case, the repealing section which purports to indicat~ the effect of the repeal on previous matters, provides for the operation of the previous law in part and in negative terms, as also for the operation of the new law in the other part and in positive terms, the said prov1s1on may well be taken to be self-contained and indicative of the intention to exclude the application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the said section cannot be called in aid in this case.\n\nNow, as to the meaning of section 58(3) of Central Act XXXI of 1950, it must be admitted that this ;, not free from difficulty. This kind of provision in a\n\nrepealing Act appears rather unusual. Learned counsel for the appellant urges that the positive portion of this provision, i.e., \"anything done or any action taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken\" applies only to purely administrative matters and that his case falls within the scope of the first portion, viz., \"the repeal ...... shall not affect the previous operation of the\n\n(repealed) Ordinance\". His contention is. that the application for confirmation which was made by the appellant in 1948 and which remained pending until Act XXXI of 1950 came into force and superseded the earlier legislation in this behalf, had to be disposed of in accordance with sections 5-A and 5-B of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947, as amended in 1948 ; that the order of confirmation passed by the Additional Custodian m such a pending application was not open to appeal or revision but became final and conclusive.\n\nIt is urged that on the filing of the application in 1948, the appellant got a vested right to have it determined under section\n\n5-A with the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under section 5-B attaching to such determination.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel this follows from the \"previous operation\" of the repealed law and is in consonance with the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd; v. Irving (1) relates pears to us that these contentions are unsustainable.\n\nColonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving( 1) relates to the case of a right of appeal against an order passed . or to be passed in a pending action. Their LorJ:; hips treated the right of appeal to a superior tribunal in a pending action as an existing right and held that the suitor cannot be retrospectively deprived of it except by express words or by necessary implication.\n\nThis doctrine was affirmed by the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.\n\n[\\] [1905] A.C. 369.\n\nI 7-35 S. C. India/59\n\nIndira Sohanla/ v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi and others\n\nJagannadhadlJI ],\n\nIndira Sohan/al v.\n\nCustodian of Evacutt Property, Delhi and others\n\nJagannadhada! J.\n\nv. Income Tax-Commissioner, Delhi(') in its application to the converse case in the following terms :\n\n\"Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which, if applied retrospectively; would deprive of their existing finality orders which, when the statute - came into force, were final, are provisions which touch existing rights\".\n\nGeneral Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Commissioner (1),\n\nGeneral Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Commissioner('), the orders of the High Court from which appeals were sought to be filed to the Privy Council were dated the 6th January, 1926 and 12th January, 1926.\n\nAs the .Indian Income-tax Act stood at the time and according to the interpretation of section 66 thereof by the Privy Council in Tata Iron & Steel Co. v.\n\nChief Revenue Authority, Bombay (2) there was no appeal to the Privy Council. The legislature by an amendment of the Income-tax Act, which came into force on the 1st April, 1926, inserted therein section 66-A and gave a right of appeal against such orders as provided therein. In this situation the Privy Council repelled the contention that the litigant could avail himself of the new provision by pointing out the finality of the orders sought to be appealed against and referring to it as an existing right. This is obviously so because finality attached to them, the moment orders were passed, prior to the new Act. In the present case, the position is different. The action was still pending when Central Act XXXI .of 1950 came into force. No order was passeJ '•which could attract the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under section 5-B of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947. Further the possibility of such finality was definitely affected by the repealing provision in Central Ordinance No.\n\nXII of 1949 and Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949, which specifically provided that a pending action was to be deemed to be an action commenced under the new Ordinance as if it were in force at the time and therefore required to be continued under the new Ordinances.\n\nEach of these Ordinances provided for [!] [1927] l.L.R. 9 Lahore 284.\n\n[2] [1923] L.R. 50 I.A. 212.\n\nappeal against such an 6rder and the second of them provided for the exercise of revisional power against an appellate order of the Custodian. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that, even so, the finality and conclusiveness, which would have attached to an order made under section 5-A, if made before Ordinance XII of 1949 was promulgated, was affected only to the extent of its being subject to an appeal and not to revision. But once the attribute of finality in respect of such an order is affected by subsequent legislation, it does not appear to be of consequence that it was affected first by a provision for appeal and later by provisions for appeal and revision. It is difficult to see that such provisions, in those circumstances, are anything more than alterations m procedure.\n\n However this may be, it appears to be clear that while a right of appeal in respect of a pending action may conceivably be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant on the commencement of the action-though we do not so decide-no such vested right to obtain a determination with the attribute of finality can be predicated in favour of a litigant on the institution of the action. By the very terms of section 5-B of East Punjab Act XIV of 1947, finality attaches to it on thf making of the order. Even if there be, in law, any such right at all as the right to a determination with the attribute of finality, it can in no sense be a vested or accrued right. It does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, when alone the right to finality becomes an existing right as in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. lncome- Tax Commissioner(1).\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that the principle of Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. lrving( 2 ) cannot be invoked in support of a case of the kind we are dealing with.\n\nNor can this be brought under the ambit of the phrase \"previous operation of the repealed law\".\n\nWhat in effect, learned counsel for the appellant contends for is not the \"previous operation of the repealed law\" but the \"future operation of the previous\n\n{I) [1927] l.L.R. 9 Lahore 284.\n\n[2] [1905] A.C. 369.\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nlaw\". There is no justification for such a construction.\n\nBesides, if in respect of the pending application in the present case, the previous repealed law is to continue to be applicable by virtue of the first portion of section 58(3) the question arises as to who are the authorities tMt. can deal with it. The application can be dealt with by the Custodian and on appeal by the Custodian-General only as functioning under the previous law. But as such Custodian or Custodian-General they have disappeared by virtue of the repeal.\n\nIt is only the second portion of section 58(3) which continues them as though the appointments were made under the new Act-a position which could scarcely be controverted. To the extent of the future operation, if any, of the repealed law they can have no function.\n\nIndeed, a comparison of the wording of section 58 of Act XXXI of 1950 with the wording of section 6 of the General Clauses Act would show that if the legislature intended either that pending proceedings were to be continued under the previous law or that anything in the nature of vested right of finality of determination or some right akin thereto was to arise in respect of such pending proceedings, the negative portion of section 58(3) would not have stopped short with saving only the \"previous operation\" of the repealed law. It would have borrowed from out of some portions of the remaining sub-sections ( c), ( d )'and ( e) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, and provided in express terms for the continuance of the previous law in respect of pending proceedings. Obviously no particular sub-section of section 6 of the General Clauses Act could be borrowed in toto as that would contradict the positive portion of section 58(3) of Act XXXI of 1950 and would be inconsistent with the idea underlying it. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the appellant cannot call in aid the principle of the case in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving('), nor can his case fall within the ambit of the first portion of sub-section (3) of section 58 of Act XXXI of 1950.\n\nThe next question for consideration is how the\n\n(!) [1905] A.G. 369.\n\nsecond and positive portion of section 58(3) of Act XXXI of 1950 is to be understood, This portion says that \"anything done or any action taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under the\n\n(repealed) Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken\". To appreciate the meaning of this it is desirable to have a general idea of the scheme of the repealed Ordinance, the powers exercisable thereunder, and the nature of the things that may be done or action that may be taken, thereunder. The powers exercisable are to be gathered from vanous sections and broadly speaking fall under the following categories.\n\n1. To make appointments-sections S and 6.\n\n2. To make enquiries-sections 7, 16, 19 and 38 and to make dedarations or issue notifications as a result thereof. ·\n\n3. To make various kinds of consequential or administrative order such as those under sections 9, 10, 11, 12 and 21.\n\n4. To hear and dispose of appeals, reviews or revisions-sections 24, 25, 26 and 27.\n\n5. Power of the Central Government, to exempt, to give directions, to take action with regard to evacuee property, to delegate powers and to make rules-sections 49, SO, 51, 52 and 53.\n\nIn addition there are provisions which bring about various consequences such as vesting in the Custodian, valid discharge by payment to the Custodian, attachment, and so forth, sections 7(2), 8, 11, 13, 16(3), 19(3), 20 and 22, etc. The above enumeration is by no means intended to be exhaustive but is merely to illustrate the scheme of the various provisions in the Ordinance with reference to which section 58 of the Act has to be understood. There are also rules framed by virtue of section 53 of the Ordinance under which various powers may be exercised, thihgs done, and action taken.\n\nIf section 58(3) of Central Act XXXI of 1950 which\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacute Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nrepealed the prior Ordinance is understood with reference to the above scheme, there is no reason to confine the operation of the second portion . of section 58(3) to administrative action as suggested by learned counsel for the appellant.\n\nBroadly speaking, the second portion of section 58(3) refers to the whole range of, things that may be done, or action that may be taken, under the previous Ordinance and the rules framed thereunder, while the first portion of section 58(3) relates to the legal consequences resulting under the Ordinance or the rules from certain facts or from completed acts or things done thereunder. Without attempting to be meticulously accurate, it may be stated in general terms, that the scheme underlying section 58(3) appears to be. that every matter to which the new Act applies has to be treated as arising, and to be dealt with, under the new law except inso far as .certain consequences have already ensued or acts. have been completed prior thereto, to which it is the old law that will apply. In this view of section 58, the application of the appellant for confirmation pending on the date when Central Act XXXI of 1950 came into force had to be dealt with and disposed of under this Act and the order of confirmation passed in 1952 would clearly be subject to the revisional power of the Custodian- General under section 27 of the said Act.\n\nIt is next contended that the revisional power cannot be exercised when there was an appeal provided but no appeal was filed, that it was open to the Assistant Custodian who appeared before the Custodian-General in support of the notice for revision or to the allottees of the property in whose interest the revisional order appears to have been passed, to I\n\nfile an appeal under the Act as persons aggrieved.\n\nSection 27 however is very wide in its terms and it cannot be construed as being subject to any such limitations, Nor can the scope of revisional powers be confined only to matters of jurisdiction or illegality as is contended, because under section 27, the Custodian-General can exercise revisional powers \"for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or\n\npropriety of any order of the Custodian\". We are thus clearly of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the exercise of revisional powers in this case by the Custodian- General is without jurisdiction or is illegal, must fail.\n\nThe next question to be considered is as regards the merits of the revisional order of the Custodian- General which is under appeal before us. Learned counsel for the appellant attacked it on various grounds. He urged that the ground on which the learned Custodian-General set aside the Additional Custodian's order, viz., absence of notice to the prior allottees is wholly untenable.\n\nHe contended that the allottees had no kind of interest in the land which entitled them to contest the application for confirmation, that they were at best only lessees for three years which was due to expire very shortly after the order of confirmation was passed by the Additional Custodian. He pointed out that as soon as the application for confirmation was filed on the 23rd February, 1948, general notice by beat of drum and affixture in the locality and by publication in the Indian News Chronicle was given, that the persons in possession at the time were only the previous tenants on the land, who either attorned to the appellant or left the village, that the allottees came into possession much later and pending the disposal of the confirmation proceedings and presumably subject to its result. He also pointed out that even when the rules in this behalf c.ame into force under Act XXXI of 1950, it was discretionary with the Custodian to give notice to persons other than the transferor and transferee, if he considered them to be interested, and urged that since the same officer, Shri R. Dayal, made the allotment as also the• confirmation, he must be taken to have exercised his discretion properly in not giving any notice to them, in view of the imminent expiry of the three years term for which they were put in possession. It is strongly urged that having regard to the above considerations and to the categorical findings of the Custodian-General himself that the\n\nIndira Sohan/al v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadaJ ].\n\npg55\n\nIndira Sokanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDtlhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J•\n\ntransaction which was confirmed, was perfectly bona fide, the setting aside of the order of confirmation against which no appeal was filed by any one, and the consequential disturbance of the vested property rights of the appellant, was in the nature of perverse exercise of revisional power. The learned Solicitor- General appearing for the respondent contended that the finding of the Custodian-General about the bona fides of the transaction was only tentative, that the allottees, though provisionally placed in possession for three years had, what has come to be recognised as, a quasi-permanent interest, that they had a genuine interest in opposing the confirmation sought, which related to a large tract of agricultural land, and which would reduce the pool of agricultural lands available for rehabilitation of displaced agriculturists and that confirmation of transactions relating to such land was opposed to the policy and directives of the Government and that the confirmation should not, in the circumstances, have been lightly granted by the Addi- tional Custodian without notice to the allottees and a proper consideration of the policies and directives in this behalf. In reply thereto learned counsel for the appellant m ged that the alleged policies or directives are not relevant matters for consideration by the Custodian in these proceedings which must he taken to he quasi-judicial, if not judicial, unless such policies or directives are embodied in rules made by the Central Government under section 56(2) ( q) and that no such rules were prescribed by the relevant dates and that even the Custodian-General himself in his order under appeal discounted the usefulness of any reference to notifications and directives for the purposes of this case. It was also urged that the matters which could be taken into consideration are regulated by section 40( 4) of Act XXXI of 1950 and that clause '( c) thereof must he construed as referring to matters ejusdem gen eris with clauses (a) and (h ).\n\nBut in the view we take of the order under appeal and the course we propose to adopt, we do not wish to express any opinion on the merits of the above arguments.\n\nThe order under appeal is. one passed by virtue of the wide powers of revision vested in the Custodian- General under section 27 of the Act':-;. The jurisdiction which has been challenged having been found in favour of the Custodian-General, this Court would normally be slow to interfere with the order on hs merits.\n\nBut with respect to the learned Custodian- General, his order is such that it is difficult to maintain it. The learned Solicitor-General himself has been obliged to put forward arguments in support of it which cannot be clearly gathered from the order itself. It is also difficult to gather from it whether the remand to the Additional Custodian for reconsideration, after notice was a general and open remand where all que'stions on the merits are to be reconsidered or was only a limited remand and if so what the limitations are. If it was meant to be an open general remand, as the concluding portion of his order seems to indicate, his definite findings on points ( 1) and (2) which he formulated for himself and the doubt he has expressed in his order about the usefulness of examining afresh the various notifications and directives to which his attention was drawn by the Assistant Custodian, would render it difficult for any Custodian on remand to consider any of those matters. If so, the remand would appear to serve no substantial purpose. In the circumstance!, and in fairness to the learned Custodian-General, the only proper course would be to set aside his order under appeal and to remit the matter back to him for fresh consideration.\n\nOn such fresh consideration he will give full opportunity to both sides for presentation of their respective points of view. If on the rehearing, he decides to remand the case to the Custodian, he will clearly indicate what are the matters to be considered by him. The learned Custodian-General may also consider the feasibility of his dealing with the matter finally by himself, calling for a report, if need be, from the Custodian on specified matters, in order to obviate any further delay by appeal and revision in this already protracted matter.\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Solumlal\n\nCustodian of Evacute Propm,,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nOctober 31.\n\nThe appeal is allowed and the order of the Custodian- General is set aside. The case is remanded to him so that he may reconsider and dispose of the same in the light of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nWILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.\n\n[S. R. DAs, Acrrna C.J., V1vrAN BosE, }AGANNADHA\n\nDAS, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nSessions Trial-Charge under s. 304 read evith s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code against tevo persons-Acquittal of one-Omission to frame alternative charge against the other-Conviction under s. 302 simpliciter-Validity-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of\n\n~898), ss. 225, 226, 227, 228, 232, 233, 237, 238, 535, 537-lndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 34, 149, 302.\n\nThe appellant and his brother were put up for trial on charges under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was specifically charged with murder in prosecution of the common intention. There was evidence to show that he and not his brother had struck the fatal blow. The brother was acquitted and the appellant was convicted under s. 302 and sentenced to transportation for life. The High Court upheld the convietion and sentence and dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe question was whether the omission to frame an alternative charge under s. 302 simpliciter was an illegality that vitiated the trial and invalidated the conviction and whether there was a conflict of decisions of this Court on the matter in controversy.\n\nHeld per curiam, that the omission to frame an alternative charge under s. 302 in the facts and circumstances of the case was not an illegality that vitiated the trial bUt was a curable irregularity as it had not occasioned any prejudice to the appellant and the conviction was not liable to be set aside.\n\nThat s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code by itself does not create any offence and where, as in the present case, it is possible to ascertain who struck the fatal blow, the fact that another was also sought to be made liable does not invalidate a conviction for murder unless there was prejudice.\n\nThat the expression 'illegality' used in Nanak Chand'i case must be read with reference to the facts of that case where the court", "total_entities": 224, "entities": [{"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 687, "end_char": 696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "INDIRA SOHANLAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 986, "end_char": 1001, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Indirtl Sohonlal", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY,\n\nDELHI & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1008, "end_char": 1054, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "USTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, DELHI & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1058, "end_char": 1067, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1083, "end_char": 1094, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1114, "end_char": 1124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1129, "end_char": 1154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional powers- Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1168, "end_char": 1256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 27, 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1273, "end_char": 1286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional powers- Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Dperty-Custodian-General-Revisional powers- Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1421, "end_char": 1436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1451, "end_char": 1456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1521, "end_char": 1558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1572, "end_char": 1576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act", "statute": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1632, "end_char": 1638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee."}}, {"text": "10th of October, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1682, "end_char": 1703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1787, "end_char": 1792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a displaced person from Lahore, was the owner o( a house there and on the 10th of October, 1947, she arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi, belonging to M, an evacuee."}}, {"text": "23rd of February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1829, "end_char": 1851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd of February, 1948, she made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the transaction of ex-\n\nSadhll Ram v.\n\nThe Custodian- Gentral of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJagannadhadaJ ]."}}, {"text": "Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1884, "end_char": 1939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd of February, 1948, she made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the transaction of ex-\n\nSadhll Ram v.\n\nThe Custodian- Gentral of Evacuee\n\nProperty\n\nJagannadhadaJ ]."}}, {"text": "Indirtl Sohonlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2076, "end_char": 2092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indirtl Sohonlal v.\n\nCust.", "canonical_name": "Indirtl Sohonlal"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2158, "end_char": 2162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act", "statute": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act", "statute": "Revision-Validity-General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "20th of March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the application \\.Vas not disposed of until the 20th of March, 1952, and on that date the Additional Custodian passed an order confirming the exchange."}}, {"text": "Vhich the East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2696, "end_char": 2721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2800, "end_char": 2824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2876, "end_char": 2881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2970, "end_char": 2974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3356, "end_char": 3360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3420, "end_char": 3424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3567, "end_char": 3571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3579, "end_char": 3598, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3604, "end_char": 3612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3650, "end_char": 3654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3659, "end_char": 3678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 58(\\)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3727, "end_char": 3735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3847, "end_char": 3851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4378, "end_char": 4386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4549, "end_char": 4557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4844, "end_char": 4849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5541, "end_char": 5551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram, (Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5554, "end_char": 5564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram, (Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5647, "end_char": 5655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5660, "end_char": 5672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5777, "end_char": 5790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Custodian-General 0£ Evacuee Property dated the 20th May, 1953, revi~ ing an order of the Additional Custodian of East Punjab, Delhi, elated the 20th March, 1952.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Indira Sohanlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant before us, one Mrs. Indira Sohanlal, is a displaced person from Lahore.", "canonical_name": "Indirtl Sohonlal"}}, {"text": "Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6457, "end_char": 6482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon of West Pakistan owned 766 'bighas of agricultural land in a village called Punjab Khore within the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "West Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6486, "end_char": 6499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon of West Pakistan owned 766 'bighas of agricultural land in a village called Punjab Khore within the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Punjab Khore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6559, "end_char": 6571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon of West Pakistan owned 766 'bighas of agricultural land in a village called Punjab Khore within the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "10th October, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6694, "end_char": 6712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An oral exchange is said to have taken place between these two, of the said properties, on the 10th October, 1947."}}, {"text": "JagannadhadaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7112, "end_char": 7125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is also said to have been put in possession of the said agricultural lands in Punjab Khore presumably by way of attornment\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nGus to di an of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacute Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadaJ J.\n\nof tenants who were in actual cultivating possession of the lands.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7203, "end_char": 7212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23rd February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7501, "end_char": 7520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In compliance with this section the appellant made an application on the 23rd February, 1948, to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural), Delhi, for confirmation of the above transaction of exchange and of the consequent transfer to her of the property in agricultural land."}}, {"text": "14th August, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7921, "end_char": 7938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of certain rules which came into force later and which prescribed that the application was to be in a set form furnishing certain particulars, the appellant filed an amended application dated the 14th August, 1948, furnishing the required particulars."}}, {"text": "20th March,\n\n1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was not disposed of by the Additional Custodian, for reasons not clear on the record, until the 20th March,\n\n1952."}}, {"text": "12th June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8459, "end_char": 8474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proposal was approved by the Additional Custodian on the 12th June, 1949."}}, {"text": "27th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8568, "end_char": 8586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance thereof a detailed allotment was made to twenty six individual allotees on the 27th October, 1949."}}, {"text": "27th February 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8646, "end_char": 8664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a report of the Rehabilitation Patwari dated the 27th February 1950, on the record showing that the allottees entered into possession of the land and cultivated their respective lands and settled down in the village."}}, {"text": "20th March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8900, "end_char": 8916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the order confirming the exchange was passed by the Additional Custodian on the 20th March, 1952, the appellant filed an application on the 5th May, 1952, asking to be placed in possession, and for a warrant of delivery of possession to be issued against the various allottees and tenants of the land."}}, {"text": "5th May, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8960, "end_char": 8973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the order confirming the exchange was passed by the Additional Custodian on the 20th March, 1952, the appellant filed an application on the 5th May, 1952, asking to be placed in possession, and for a warrant of delivery of possession to be issued against the various allottees and tenants of the land."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9433, "end_char": 9443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9451, "end_char": 9495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9497, "end_char": 9521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14th May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10118, "end_char": 10132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was adjourned to the 12th May, 1953, at the request of counsel for the appellant and thereafter a more detailed notice dated the 14th May, 1953, was issued setting out the various grounds on which the previous orders were sought to be set aside."}}, {"text": "20th May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10308, "end_char": 10322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the order now under appeal on the 20th May, 1953, setting aside the order of confirmation."}}, {"text": "West Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11085, "end_char": 11096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To meet the unprecedented situation of sudden migration of vast section of population on a large scale from West Punjab to East Punjab and vice versa, leaving most of the properties which they had, moveable and immoveable, agricultural and nonagricultural, the concerned Governments had to take wide legislative powers to deal with the situation, to set up the necessary administrative machinery, and to evolve and give effect to their policies\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nin regard thereto from time to time."}}, {"text": "East Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11100, "end_char": 11111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To meet the unprecedented situation of sudden migration of vast section of population on a large scale from West Punjab to East Punjab and vice versa, leaving most of the properties which they had, moveable and immoveable, agricultural and nonagricultural, the concerned Governments had to take wide legislative powers to deal with the situation, to set up the necessary administrative machinery, and to evolve and give effect to their policies\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nin regard thereto from time to time."}}, {"text": "Indira Sohanlal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11423, "end_char": 11438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To meet the unprecedented situation of sudden migration of vast section of population on a large scale from West Punjab to East Punjab and vice versa, leaving most of the properties which they had, moveable and immoveable, agricultural and nonagricultural, the concerned Governments had to take wide legislative powers to deal with the situation, to set up the necessary administrative machinery, and to evolve and give effect to their policies\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nin regard thereto from time to time.", "canonical_name": "Indirtl Sohonlal"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11493, "end_char": 11506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To meet the unprecedented situation of sudden migration of vast section of population on a large scale from West Punjab to East Punjab and vice versa, leaving most of the properties which they had, moveable and immoveable, agricultural and nonagricultural, the concerned Governments had to take wide legislative powers to deal with the situation, to set up the necessary administrative machinery, and to evolve and give effect to their policies\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nin regard thereto from time to time.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11773, "end_char": 11788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11832, "end_char": 11851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest of these legislature measures so far as we are concerned, was the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), which came into force on the 12th December, 1947."}}, {"text": "East Punjab Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11961, "end_char": 11982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12087, "end_char": 12102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th August,\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12390, "end_char": 12408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These sections were specifically made applicable to transactions on or after the 15th August,\n\n1947."}}, {"text": "29th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12556, "end_char": 12575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above Punjab Legislative measures were extended to the State of Delhi by Central GoYernment notifications under the Delhi Laws Act, dated the 29th December, 1947, the 28th January, 1948, and the 22nd April, 1948, respectively."}}, {"text": "28th January, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12581, "end_char": 12599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above Punjab Legislative measures were extended to the State of Delhi by Central GoYernment notifications under the Delhi Laws Act, dated the 29th December, 1947, the 28th January, 1948, and the 22nd April, 1948, respectively."}}, {"text": "22nd April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12609, "end_char": 12625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above Punjab Legislative measures were extended to the State of Delhi by Central GoYernment notifications under the Delhi Laws Act, dated the 29th December, 1947, the 28th January, 1948, and the 22nd April, 1948, respectively."}}, {"text": "13th June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12918, "end_char": 12933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XII of\n\n1949) which came into force so far as Delhi is concerned on the 13th June, 1949."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13072, "end_char": 13077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Ordinance, in its turn, was repealed and a fresh Central Ordinance came into force in its place, applicable to all the ProYinces of India except Assam and West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13085, "end_char": 13090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Ordinance, in its turn, was repealed and a fresh Central Ordinance came into force in its place, applicable to all the ProYinces of India except Assam and West Bengal."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13095, "end_char": 13106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Ordinance, in its turn, was repealed and a fresh Central Ordinance came into force in its place, applicable to all the ProYinces of India except Assam and West Bengal."}}, {"text": "That was Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13109, "end_char": 13168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "18th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13238, "end_char": 13256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXVII of 1949), which came into force on the 18th October, 1949."}}, {"text": "17th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13429, "end_char": 13445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Central Ordinance in its turn was repealed and replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Central Act XXX.I of 1950) which came into force on the 17th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14025, "end_char": 14034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This Central Ordinance in its turn was repealed and replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "This Central Ordinance in its turn was repealed and replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14093, "end_char": 14111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXVII of 1949 authorised the Central Government to appoint a Custodian-General of Evacuee Property in India for the purpose of discharging the duties imposed on him by or under the Ordinance, while the appointment of Provincial Custodians, Additional, Deputy or Assistant Custodians, wa> still left to the various Provincial Governments."}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14438, "end_char": 14454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14458, "end_char": 14482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14728, "end_char": 14749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14848, "end_char": 14863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14901, "end_char": 14911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14936, "end_char": 14958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16862, "end_char": 16871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17597, "end_char": 17614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be seen that these two sections enjoined that transfers by an evacuee or intending evacuee relating to his property from and after the 15th August, 1947, required confirmation and provided for appeal or revision from the orders passed on applications therefor and subject thereto, such orders were made final and conclusive."}}, {"text": "sections 25, 38 and 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17888, "end_char": 17910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indira Sohanla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18034, "end_char": 18048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But\n\nIndira Sohanla<'\n\nv. so far as the appealability or revisability of an order passed on an application for confirmation is concerned, there have been changes from time to time.", "canonical_name": "Indirtl Sohonlal"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18232, "end_char": 18241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18557, "end_char": 18570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18981, "end_char": 18991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19027, "end_char": 19036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19051, "end_char": 19073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19294, "end_char": 19304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19556, "end_char": 19567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19687, "end_char": 19697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But under Central Act", "statute": "But under Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19809, "end_char": 19819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But under Central Act", "statute": "But under Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21127, "end_char": 21136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21151, "end_char": 21173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22082, "end_char": 22092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22100, "end_char": 22124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22480, "end_char": 22489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22563, "end_char": 22572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22828, "end_char": 22837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22845, "end_char": 22864, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23368, "end_char": 23378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23510, "end_char": 23525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Merwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23555, "end_char": 23568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) The East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947), as in force in Ajmer-Merwara and Delhi, is hereby repealed."}}, {"text": "Indira Sohanlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24241, "end_char": 24256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Sohanlal\n\nCustodian of Eu'ac::ee Property, Delhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "Indirtl Sohonlal"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24465, "end_char": 24475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24507, "end_char": 24557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25381, "end_char": 25405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25483, "end_char": 25493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "repeal by this Act of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25745, "end_char": 25821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26310, "end_char": 26332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26348, "end_char": 26372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27596, "end_char": 27605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27613, "end_char": 27632, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27675, "end_char": 27684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 28925, "end_char": 28934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29256, "end_char": 29266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29270, "end_char": 29294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29504, "end_char": 29516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29524, "end_char": 29543, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29671, "end_char": 29690, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29827, "end_char": 29837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29841, "end_char": 29865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30419, "end_char": 30428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30436, "end_char": 30455, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30578, "end_char": 30591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30595, "end_char": 30619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31592, "end_char": 31602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31625, "end_char": 31647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section\n\n5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31954, "end_char": 31964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32023, "end_char": 32032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Indira Sohan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32864, "end_char": 32876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 7-35 S. C. India/59\n\nIndira Sohanla/ v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi and others\n\nJagannadhadlJI ],\n\nIndira Sohan/al v.\n\nCustodian of Evacutt Property, Delhi and others\n\nJagannadhada!", "canonical_name": "Indirtl Sohonlal"}}, {"text": "6th January, 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33595, "end_char": 33612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Commissioner (1),\n\nGeneral Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Commissioner('), the orders of the High Court from which appeals were sought to be filed to the Privy Council were dated the 6th January, 1926 and 12th January, 1926."}}, {"text": "12th January, 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33617, "end_char": 33635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Commissioner (1),\n\nGeneral Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Commissioner('), the orders of the High Court from which appeals were sought to be filed to the Privy Council were dated the 6th January, 1926 and 12th January, 1926."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33646, "end_char": 33667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33725, "end_char": 33735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33911, "end_char": 33925, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1st April, 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33956, "end_char": 33971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legislature by an amendment of the Income-tax Act, which came into force on the 1st April, 1926, inserted therein section 66-A and gave a right of appeal against such orders as provided therein."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33990, "end_char": 34000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34632, "end_char": 34641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34656, "end_char": 34678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 50 I.A. 212", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 35151, "end_char": 35167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35453, "end_char": 35462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further the possibility of such finality was definitely affected by the repealing provision in Central Ordinance", "statute": "Further the possibility of such finality was definitely affected by the repealing provision in Central Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36384, "end_char": 36393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36399, "end_char": 36414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37325, "end_char": 37382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nlaw\"."}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37722, "end_char": 37735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38067, "end_char": 38080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38340, "end_char": 38350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38391, "end_char": 38400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38408, "end_char": 38427, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38728, "end_char": 38741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38937, "end_char": 38946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38954, "end_char": 38973, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39119, "end_char": 39128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39136, "end_char": 39155, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39231, "end_char": 39244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39555, "end_char": 39565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39689, "end_char": 39702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 7, 16, 19 and 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40493, "end_char": 40518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 9, 10, 11, 12 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40676, "end_char": 40705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 24, 25, 26 and 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40764, "end_char": 40790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40945, "end_char": 40956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 7(2), 8, 11, 13, 16(3), 19(3), 20 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41155, "end_char": 41204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41380, "end_char": 41390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41465, "end_char": 41475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41573, "end_char": 41586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41590, "end_char": 41614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41948, "end_char": 41961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42079, "end_char": 42092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42266, "end_char": 42279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "section 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42536, "end_char": 42549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42847, "end_char": 42857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42934, "end_char": 42958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43153, "end_char": 43163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43594, "end_char": 43604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43836, "end_char": 43846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "R. Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45716, "end_char": 45724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also pointed out that even when the rules in this behalf c.ame into force under Act XXXI of 1950, it was discretionary with the Custodian to give notice to persons other than the transferor and transferee, if he considered them to be interested, and urged that since the same officer, Shri R. Dayal, made the allotment as also the• confirmation, he must be taken to have exercised his discretion properly in not giving any notice to them, in view of the imminent expiry of the three years term for which they were put in possession."}}, {"text": "section 56(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47801, "end_char": 47814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48149, "end_char": 48163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48582, "end_char": 48592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indira Solumlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50678, "end_char": 50693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nIndira Solumlal\n\nCustodian of Evacute Propm,,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nOctober 31.", "canonical_name": "Indirtl Sohonlal"}}, {"text": "WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50996, "end_char": 51019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH."}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51025, "end_char": 51048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH."}}, {"text": "Acrrna C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51063, "end_char": 51074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, Acrrna C.J., V1vrAN BosE, }AGANNADHA\n\nDAS, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V1vrAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51076, "end_char": 51087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, Acrrna C.J., V1vrAN BosE, }AGANNADHA\n\nDAS, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "AGANNADHA", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51090, "end_char": 51099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, Acrrna C.J., V1vrAN BosE, }AGANNADHA\n\nDAS, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "AFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51107, "end_char": 51116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, Acrrna C.J., V1vrAN BosE, }AGANNADHA\n\nDAS, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]", "canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51121, "end_char": 51141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, Acrrna C.J., V1vrAN BosE, }AGANNADHA\n\nDAS, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51176, "end_char": 51182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51194, "end_char": 51199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51207, "end_char": 51224, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51335, "end_char": 51341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51363, "end_char": 51389, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51468, "end_char": 51478, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 34, 149, 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51498, "end_char": 51514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51586, "end_char": 51592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51603, "end_char": 51608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51616, "end_char": 51633, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51872, "end_char": 51878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52073, "end_char": 52079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52328, "end_char": 52334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52568, "end_char": 52573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52581, "end_char": 52598, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand'i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52897, "end_char": 52910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the expression 'illegality' used in Nanak Chand'i case must be read with reference to the facts of that case where the court"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1140_1196_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Indira Solumlal\n\nCustodian of Evacute Propm,,\n\nDelhi and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nOctober 31.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nThe appeal is allowed and the order of the Custodian- General is set aside. The case is remanded to him so that he may reconsider and dispose of the same in the light of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nWILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.\n\n[S. R. DAs, Acrrna C.J., V1vrAN BosE, }AGANNADHA\n\nDAS, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nSessions Trial-Charge under s. 304 read evith s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code against tevo persons-Acquittal of one-Omission to frame alternative charge against the other-Conviction under s. 302 simpliciter-Validity-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of\n\n~898), ss. 225, 226, 227, 228, 232, 233, 237, 238, 535, 537-lndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 34, 149, 302.\n\nThe appellant and his brother were put up for trial on charges under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was specifically charged with murder in prosecution of the common intention. There was evidence to show that he and not his brother had struck the fatal blow. The brother was acquitted and the appellant was convicted under s. 302 and sentenced to transportation for life. The High Court upheld the convietion and sentence and dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe question was whether the omission to frame an alternative charge under s. 302 simpliciter was an illegality that vitiated the trial and invalidated the conviction and whether there was a conflict of decisions of this Court on the matter in controversy.\n\nHeld per curiam, that the omission to frame an alternative charge under s. 302 in the facts and circumstances of the case was not an illegality that vitiated the trial bUt was a curable irregularity as it had not occasioned any prejudice to the appellant and the conviction was not liable to be set aside.\n\nThat s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code by itself does not create any offence and where, as in the present case, it is possible to ascertain who struck the fatal blow, the fact that another was also sought to be made liable does not invalidate a conviction for murder unless there was prejudice.\n\nThat the expression 'illegality' used in Nanak Chand'i case must be read with reference to the facts of that case where the court\n\nfound prejudice, and the apparent conflict of view between the ju?gment in that case and that in Suraj Pal's case had really no bearing on the present one.\n\nNanak Chand v. The State of Punjab ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1~01), and Suraj Pal v. The State of U.P. ([1955] 1 s.C.R. 1332), explamed.\n\nThat the Code does not use the word 'illegality' nor define 'irregularity' and 'illegality' can only mean an incurable irregularity, incurable because of prejudice leading to a failure of justice. The question of prejudice is a question of fact to be decided by the court in each particular case.\n\nThat the offence committed by the appellant fell under the second part of s. 304 of the Indian Penal Code and not s. 302 and the conviction must be altered to one under that section.\n\nN. A. Subramania Iyer v. King-Emperor ([1901] L.R. 28 I.A. 257), explained.\n\nBabula/ Choukhani v. The King-Emperor ([1938] L.R. 65 I.A. 158), Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor ([1947] L.R. 74 I.A. 65), Abdul Rahman v. King-Emperor ( [ 1926] L.R. 54 I. A. 96), Atta Mohammad v. King-Emperor ([1929] L.R. 57 I.A. 71), Karnail Singh v. The State of Punjab ([1954] S.C.R. 904) and Begu v. King- Emperor ([1925] I.L.R. 6 Lah. 226), referred to.\n\nPer S. R. DAs, AcTJNG C.J. and BosE J.-Like all procedural htws the Code of Criminal Procedure is designed to subserve the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by mere technicalities. It regards some of its provisions as vital but others not, and a breach of the latter is a curable irregularity unless the accused is prejudiced thereby. It places errors in the charge, or even a total absence of a charge in the curable class. . This is made clear by ss. 535 and 537 of the Code.\n\nThe object of the charge is to give the accused notice of the matter he is charged with and does not touch jurisdiction. If, therefore, the necessary information is conveyed to him in other ways and there is no prejudice, the trial is not invalidated by the mere fact that the charge was not formally reduced to writing. The essential part of this part of the law is not any technical formula of words but the reality, whether the matter was explained to the accused and whether he understood what he was being tried for.\n\nIt is not correct to say that s. 535 of the Code has no application to a case in both which there is no charge at all or that it cannot apply except where ss. 237 and 238 apply or that it is governed by s. 233.\n\nSections 237, 238, 535 and 537 should not be read disjunctively.\n\nThey cover every possible case that relates to the charge and they . place all failures to observe the rules about the charge in the category of curable irregularities.\n\nSections 535 and 537 apply to every case in which there is a\n\nSlaney\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nSlane; i\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\ndeparture from the rules set out in Chapter XIX ranging from error, omissions and irregularities in charges that are framed, do\\vn to charges that might have been. framed and were not and include a total omission to frame a charge at all at any stage of the trial.\n\nIn judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, courts n1ust act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to technicalities ; and their main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew \\\\'hat he \\Vas being tried for, \\Vhether the main facts sought to be established against him \\Vere explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself.\n\nThere is no conflict of view between Nanak Chand v. The State of Punjab and Su.-aj Pal v: The State of U.P. and a close consideration of the reasons given in Nanak Chand's case show that, here ¥.'as in fact no difference of opinion as regards cases where therC is a charge to start with.\n\nNeither case, however, deals with the position where there is no charge at all. The remarks made in Nanak Chand's case must be read in the perspective indicated and expres- .sions which appear to travel wider do not give a correct exposition of the law.\n\nThe effect of charging two persons with murder committed in pursuance of a common intention under s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is that the accused is unmistakably told that he participated in the crime. Where it cannot be ascertained \\vho struck the fatal blow no conviction can follow unless a comn1on intention is proved. But the converse does not hold good.\n\nPer\n\nJAGANNADHADAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR\n\nJJ.- (IMAM J. agreeing).\n\nSections 225, 227, 232( I), 237, 535 and 537 indicate that in the generality of cases the omissions to frame a charge is not per se fatal.\n\nIt is not, therefore, correct to say that where there is no charge the conviction must be illegal, prejudice or no prejudice. Nor is it <'orrect to say that s. 535 is sufficiently wide to apply to every case where there is no charge of any kind from the outset. The section cannot be construed in such an unlimited sense and must normally be read in the same context as ss. 225, 226 and 232, that is, with reference to a trial that validity commenced, for there may be cases where a trial without any kind of charge fron1 the outset \\vill be \\vholly contrary to the provisions of the Code and as such illegal \\Vithout the necessity of a positive finding of prejudice.\n\nThe provisions of s. 535 mainly apply to cases of inadvertence to frame a charge induced by the belief that the matter on record is sufficient to warrant the conviction for a particular offence without express specification and \\vhere the facts proved constitute a separate and distinct offence but closely relevant to and springing out of the same set of facts connected with the one charged.\n\nThe Code requires that in a sessions trial there should be a\n\ncharge in wntmg.\n\nA deliberate breach of this basic requirement cannot be covered by the assertion that every thing was orally explained to the accused, the assessors or jurors and there was no prejudice. So also where the conviction is for a totally different offence from the one charged and not covered by ss. 236 and 237 of the Code, the omission to frame a separate charge would be an incurable irregularity amounting to illegality.\n\nIn cases rnming under ss. 34, 114 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code the charge against persons actuated by a common intention is a rolled--up one. It involves direct liability and constructive liability without distinct specification.\n\nThe absence of a charge under one or other of the various heads of criminal liability for the offence in such cases is not fatal and a conviction for the substantive offence, without a charge, can be set aside only where there is prejudice.\n\nIn considering whether a defect is illegal or merely irregular,. several facts will have to be considered, including its gravity to determine if it falls within one class or the other. The answer must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If the defect is so grave that prejudice would necessarily be implied, it is an illegality. If less serious, it will be an irregularity and prejudice by way of failure of justice must be established.\n\nHoward v. Bodington ([1877] 2 P.D. 203), referred to.\n\nPer IMAM J .-On the facts of the present case the question raised by the reference does not arise.\n\nThere is no substantial conflict of view between the two decisions of this court in Nanak Chand's case and Suraj Pal's case.\n\nSection 233 of the Code is a mandatory provision and the force of its direction is not weakened by the fact that another provision of the Code permits the conviction of the accused for an offence with which he had not been charged.\n\nThe total absence of a charge from the beginning to the end where it is incumbent that a charge must be framed is a contravention of the Code regarding the mode of trial it prescribes and a conviction of the accused in such a case is invalid and no question of prejudice can arise.\n\nIn cases, however, where a charge is framed but there is an omission or irregularity but the mode of trial is not affected, the Code provides that the conviction may be set aside if, in fact, a failure of justice has resulted. _ It is difficult to Jay down any hard and fast rule as to the applicability of s. 535.\n\nThat will depend on the facts of each case.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE J URISD!CTiON : Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special order dated the 3rd Court of Judicature\n\nleave from November, at Nagpur\n\nthe judgment and 1953 of the High m Criminal Appeal\n\nWillie (William) Slaney\n\nThe State of Madi!)la Pradtsk\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nNo. 220 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 21st July 1953 of the Court of Sessions Judge at Jabalpur in Sessions Trial No. 32 of 1953.\n\nH. /. Umrigar and Rajinder Narain, for the appellant. The courts below were wrong in convicting the appellant of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code in the absence of a .charge framed for the offence.\n\nThe charge framed against the appellant was different and he was never charged individually of having committed murder. When the other person was acquitted the charge of an offence under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code falls and the appellant is bound to be acquitted. It is a fundamental principle of criminal law as administered in India that there should be a separate charge for every distinct offence as the accused person must have notice of the charge which he has to meet. The only exceptions are contained in ss. 236, 237 and 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The offence of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code being separate, distinct and different from an offence under s. 302 read with 34 or an offence under s. 302 read with 149 which creates a distinct head of criminal liability known as constructive liability, a conviction under s. 302 simpliciter without a charge being framed therefor is an illegality in the mode of trial. Where a person has been convicted of an offence with which he has not been charged ( unless allowed by exceptions) the prejudice is inherent in the absence of the charge itself and it is unnecessary to look any further. Where there is an illegality in the mode of trial as contemplated in ss. 233 to 239 it is an illegality which is not cured by the provisions of ss. 535 and 537. There is no difference in principle between a charge under s. 302 read with 34 and a charge under s. 302 read with 149\n\n\nv. State of 71. P. ([1955]\n\n1 S.C.R.\n\n1332) ]. It is incorrect to say that the decision of the Privy Council in Subramania Iyer's case as to what is an illegality has been modified by the subsequent decisions of the Privy Council, and, in fact, in Babu!al Chowkhani's case Lord Wright in delivering the judgment of the Board actually stated that it was taken as settled law by both sides that the breach of the provisions of s. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be an 'illegality' which would vitiate the trial as opposed to a mere 'irregularity' which would not vitiate the trial. Similarly the courts in India have also taken the view that a breath of any of the mandatory provisions relating to ss. 233 to 239 of the Code, would be an 'illeg; ility' in the mode of trial which would vitiate the tri?l, as opposed to an 'irregularity' in the course of trial which could be cured. [See N.A. Subramania Iyer v. King-Emperor ([1901] 28 I.A. 257), Abdul Rahman v. The King-Emperor ([1926] 54 I.A. 96), Purukuri Kotayya and Others v. King-Emperor ([1946] 74 I. A. 65), Babula! C/iowkhani v. King-Emperor ([1938] L.R. 65 I.A. 158), Chintaman v. King- Emperor ([1945]\n\nI.L.R. 24 Patna 303), Begu and Others v. The King-Emperor ([1925] I.L.R. 6 Lahore 226), In re Boreddi Kondamma and Another (A.LR. 1948 Mad. 293), Thaur Singh and Others v. Emperor (A.LR. 1939 All. 665), Govind Prasad v. Gomti and Others ([1908] I.LR. 30 Cal. 288), Lang v.\n\nWillis ([1934] 52 C.W.N. 637), Sita Ahir v. Emperor ([1917] I.L.R. 40 Cal. 168), Bijo Gape and Others v. Emperor\n\n(A.LR. 1945 Pat. 376)] Section 535 appears in Chapter XL V of the Code and is headed \"Of irregular proceedings\" and cannot possibly apply to breaches of the mandatory provisions of ss. 233 to 239 of the Code ; it may relate to those cases where it is optional to frame a charge. See ss. 263, 362 ( 4).\n\nAssuming that actual prejudice is necessary, then as the only charge against the appellant being one under s. 302 read with s. 34, and that having failed due to the acquittal of the co-accused, and the appellant having successfully shown that there was no \"common intention\" as contemplated by s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code prejudice is bound to occur due to his conviction under s. 302 simpliciter, with which. he was never charged.\n\nIn any event, the\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nWillie (William) Slaney v.\n\nT hei State of Madh;•a Pradesh\n\noffence committed in the case, even though the blow was struck on the head, could never be murder, as even the medical evidence showed that the head miury \"was likely\" to result in fatal consequences.\n\nThe offence committed would either be one of grievous hurt under s. 325, or alternatively, it is covered by exception 4 to s. 300, and punishable under the second part of s. 304.\n\nB. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The word 'illegality' which is frequently used in the judgments is nowhere defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. This word had been used by the judges to convey that the trial has been irregular and the irregularity is not curable under the provisions of the Code.\n\nThe word has been used in three senses, namely:\n\n(a) In cases where the trial and conviction are ab initio void due to some inherent defect which goes to the root and is by itself enough to vitiate the trial, as in cases of lack of jurisdiction, e.g., where s. 197 of the Code has not been complied with ; (b) In cases where a mandatory prohibition of the Code has been disregarded and it is apparent from tl1e provision itself that, having regard to its objects and purposes, such disregard is bound to lead to prejudice ; ( c) In a more popular sense, that is, in respect of a particular case or cases where having regard to the facts and circumstances, whether' it be due to prejudice or otherwise, the conviction cannot be sustained. Proceeding on the basis that an offence under s. 302 read with s. 149 is a distinct and separate offence from an offence under s. 302, the question is whether in the absence of actual prejudice the conviction of a person of the latter offence, when he is only charged with the former, is illegal. The answer depends on the determination as to whether the failure to frame a charge is such a disregard of the mandatory provisions of the Code so as to lead to the conclusion that prejudice must have heen caused.\n\nIn N. A. Subramania Iyer v. King-Emperor ([1901] 28\n\nI.A. 257) the decision was based on the facts of the case in which actual prejudice was caused.\n\nIn any event, that decision stands modified by the\n\ndecisions of the Privy Council in the later cases : [See Abdul Rahman v. The King-Emperor ([19261 54 I.A.\n\n96) and Pulukuri Kotay)'a and Others v. The King-Emperor\n\n([1946] 74 I.A. 65). It is clear from those decisions that every breach of a mandatory provision is not such as would ipso facto vitiate a trial.\n\nIf one looks at the relevant sections, the object behind the enactment of those provisions and the intention of the legislature, it is clear that the framing of a charge though mandatory is not of a vital nature. See ss. 210, 254, 271, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 232 and 535.\n\nAll that the Code contemplates is that an accused person must in fact receive notice of what he is being tried for. When a person i~ charged with an offence under s. 302 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code there is no objection to his being convicted under s. 302 without a charge being framed, if it appears from the evidence that he has committed the actual murder and it appears from the record that either by the trend of cross-examination or by reason of questions being put to him under s. 342 he understood that he was actually being tried for murder: [See Karnail Singh and Another v. The State of Punjab ([1954] S.C.R-\n\n904) and Lachman Singh and Others v. The State ([1952]\n\nS.C.R. 839) ].\n\nA case of this nature may even be covered by the provisions of s. 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe cases of Nanak Chand v.\n\n\nSection 34 does not create a specific offence and a person who is charged under s. 302 read with s. 34 is really being charged for his act in the murder itself. It is therefore not necessary to frame a separate charge :inder s. 302.\n\nThe Privy Council as well as the High 18-Wi S. C. Indirt/ 59\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Mcdhya Pradesh\n\nWiUU (William)\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of .Yadh.)a Pra,/esh\n\nCourts in India have always taken this view.\n\nSee The King-Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose\n\n(A.LR. 1924 Cal. 257), Emperor v. Destrali ([1930] 58 Cal. 822), Debiprasad Kalowar v. Emperor ([1932] 59 Cal. 1192), Devki Nandan and Others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1941 Lah. 423) and Bhondu Das v. King-Emperor ([19281 7 Patna 758).\n\nIn this case there was no actual prejudice as the accused knew that he was being charged with murder which is clear from the tren<l of cross-examinations of witnesses and his examination un<ler s. 342 of the Co<le of Criminal Procedure. The facts clearly show that the offence committed by the accused is one of murder as the deceased died as a result of injuries an<l the injury was sufficient to cause death according to the <loctor's evidence.\n\nUmrigar in reply. If s. 535 is given its literal meaning it would mean that a trial for any offence could be held and terminated without the. framing of any charge whatsoever.\n\nIt would also mean that a person could be charged with a minor offence and conivcted of a major offence, whereas s. 238(2) only allows conviction of a minor offence without a charge, if the major offence with which the person is charged is nor made out.\n\nIt would further mean that the elaborate procedure set out in ss. 226 to 231 as to the alteration and amendment of charges could be ignored. Further s. 271 ( 1) which /rovides that the charge shall be read out and explalne to the accused would also become meaningless.\n\nSuch a wide meaning which would lead to absurdities should not be given to s. 535.\n\n1955. October 31. The judgment of S. R. Das, Acting C.J. and Bose J. was delivered by Bose J. The judgment of Jagannadhadas and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. was delivered by Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.\n\nJafer Imam J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nBosE J.-This appeal was referred to a Bench o~ five Judges in order to <letermine whether there was a conflict of view between Nanak Chand v. The St{lte of Punjab(1) and Suraj Pal v. The State of U.P.(') and\n\n(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 120!.\n\n(2) [1955] I S.C.R. !332.\n\nif so, to <letermine' it.\n\nThe appeal is against a conviction for murder in which the lesser sentence was given.\n\nThe ma111 ground is that the appellant was charged under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34.\n\nHis co-accuse<l was acquitted, so, it was urged the element of common intention drops out and ac- .cordingly section 34 cannot be called in aid.\n\nBut the Courts below hold that the appellant inflicted the fatal blow and have made him directly liable for the murder.\n\nHe contends that as he was not charged with having murdered the man personally he cannot he convicted under section 302.\n\nHe relies on certain observations in Nanak Chand v. The State of Punjab(1) and contends that the conviction is an illegality which cannot be cured and claims that he must either be acquitted or, at the most, be retried, though he adds further that in the circumstances of this case the Court should not in the exercise of its discretion order a retrial.\n\nAs against this it is contended for the State that an omission to frame a separate charge in the alternative under section 302 simpliciter is a curable irregularity provided there is no prejudice to the accused.\n\nTherefore, the only matter for determination is a question of fact whether there was prejudice in this case.\n\nThe charge was as follows: \"That you, on or about the 12th day of February 1953, at Civil Lines, Jabalpur, went with your\n\nbrother Ronnie Slaney to the house of Mrs.\n\nWaters (P.\\V. 20) at about 7 p. m. and in furthereance of the common intention did commit murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of her brothe~ D. Smythe and thereby committed an offence punish~ able un<ler section 302 -0f the Indian Penal Code read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code ...... \".\n\nAn exactly similar charge with the necessary change of name was framed against the co-accused Ronnie Slaney.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the State that this is really a charge under section 302 of the Indian\n\n11) (1955] I S.C.R. 1201.\n\nWillie (William)\n\nSlm1ry\n\nThe State of Madl!J'a Pradesh\n\nBose J.\n\n1'Vi!lie (William)\n\nSlane)'\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nPenal C<; ide and that the references to common intention and to section 34 arc mere surplusage. There is much to be said for this but we will assume in this case (without so deciding) that the charge is ambiguous and that it means what the appellant says it means, name! y a charge under section 302 read with section 34 and not one under section 302 simpliciter _ On that assumption the question for our decision is whether the omission to frame an alternative charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is an illegality that cuts at the root of the conviction and makes it invalid or whether it is a curable irregularity in which all that we are concerned to see is whether there was prejudice.\n\nWhat it narrows down to is this: Is the charge to be regarded as a ritualistic formula so sacred and fundamental that a total absence of one, of any departur\" in it from the strict and technical requirement, of the Code, is so vital as to cut at the root of the trial and vitiate it from the start, or is it one of many regulations designed to ensure a fair and proper trial so that substantial, as opposed to purely technical, compliance with the spirit and requirements of the Code in this behalf is enough to cure departures from the strict letter of the law ?\n\nBefore we proceed to set out our answer and examine the provisions of the Code, we will pause to observe that the Code is a code of procedure and, like all procedural laws, is designed to funher the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities.\n\nThe object of the Code is to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along certain well-established and well-understood lines that accord with our notions of natural justice.\n\nIf he does, if he is tried by a competent court, if he is told and clearly understands the nature of the offence for which he is being tried, if the case against him is fully and fairly explained to him and he is afforded a full and fair opportunity of defending himself, then, provided there is substantial compliance with the outward forms of the law, mere mistakes in procedure, mere inconsequential errors and omissions •\n\n1n the trial are regarded as venal by the Code and the trial is not vitiated unless the accused can show substantial prejudice.\n\nThat, broadly speaking, is the basic principle on which the Code is based.\n\nNow here, as in all procedural laws, certain things .1re regarded as vital.\n\nDisregard of a provision of that nature is fatal to the trial :rnd at once invalidates the conviction.\n\nOthers are not vital and whatever -rhe irtegularity they can be cured; and in that event the conviction must stand unless the Court is satisfied that there was prejudice. Some of these matters are (\\ealt with by the Code and wherever that is the case full effect must be given to its provisions.\n\nThe question here is, does the Code deal with the absence of a charge and irregularities in it, and if so, into which -ef the two categories does it place them ? But before looking into the Code, we deem it desirable to refer to certain decisions of the Privy Council be- .cause much of the judicial thinking in this country has been moulded by their observations.\n\nIn our opinion, the general effect of those decisions can be summarised as follows.\n\nFirst comes a class of case in which the Code deals with the matter expressly.\n\nIn that event, foll effect must be given to the plain meaning of the words used.\n\n\"The language of that Code is conclusive. and must be construed according . to ordinary principles, so as to give effet to the plain meaning of the language used.\n\nNo doubt, in the case of an ambiguity, that meaning must be preferred which is more in accord with justi<::e and convenience, but in general the words used read in their context must prevail\".\n\nBabula/ Choukhani v. The King-Emperor(').\n\nAnd at page 177-\n\n\"But, even so, . that can be no ground why the Court should misconstrue the section\", and at page 178-\n\n\"Their Lordships decide the question on what they regard as the plain meaning of the language 11sed\".\n\n!I) [1938) L.R. 65 I.A. 158, 175.\n\nSla11ey\n\nThe State of Maahya Prades/i\n\nBose].\n\nWillit (William)\n\nSlaney\n\nTheStiite of Madh)'a Pradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nNext comes. a class of case for which there is n<> express provision in the Code, or where there is ambiguity.\n\nIn that event, the question is whether the trial has been conducted the substantial compliance with the Code or in a manner substantially different from that prescribed.\n\n\"When a trial is conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code (as in N. A. Subramania l1w's case ( 1 ), the trial is bad and no question) of curing an irregularity arises ; but if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of such conduct, the irregularity can be cured under section 537, and none the less so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always be the case, a breach of one or more of the very comprehensive prov1s10ns of the Code\". Pulukuri Kotayya v. King- Emperor( 2).\n\nNow it is obvious that the question of curing an irregularity can only arise when one or more of the express provisions of the Cooe is violated. The question in such cases is whether the departure is so violent as to strike at the root of the trial and make it no trial at all or is of a less vital character• It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule but taken by and large the question usually narrows down to one of prejudice. In any case, the courts must be guided by the plain provisions of the COOe without straining at its language wherever there is an express provision.\n\nFor a time it was thought that all provisions of the Code about the mode of trial were so vital as to make any departure therefrom an illegality that could not be cured.\n\nThat was due to the language of the Judicial Committee in N. A. Subramania Iyer v. King- Emperor( 1 ).\n\nLater this was construed to mean that that only applies when there 1s an express prohibition and there is prejudice.\n\nIn Subramania lyer's case('), the Privy Council said- . \"The remedying of mere ( l) [1901] L.R. 28 I.A. 257, 263. irreegularities is familiar\n\n(2) [1947] L.R. 74 I.A. 65,75.\n\nin most systems of jurisprudence, but it would be an extraordinary extension of s, uch a branch of administering the criminal law to say that when the Code positively enacts that .such a trial as that which has taken place here shall not be permitted that this contravention of the Code comes within the description of error, omission or irregularity\".\n\nThis was examined and explained m Abdul Rahman\n\nv. King-Emperor(1) as follows:\n\n\"The procedure adopted was one which the Code positively prohibited, and it was possible that it might have UJorked actual injustice to the acrnsed\".\n\nIn our opinion, the key to the problem lies in the words underlined.\n\nExcept where there is something so vital as to cut at the root of jurisdiction or so abhorrent to what one might term natural justice. the matter resolves itself to a question of prejudice.\n\nSome violations of the Code will be so obvious that they will speak for themselves as, for example, a refusal to give the accused a hearing, a refusal to allow him to defend himself, a refusal to explain the nature of the charge to him and so forth.\n\nThese go to the foundations of natural justice and would he struck down as illegal forthwith. It hardly matters whether this is because prejudice is then patent or because it is so abhorrent to well-established notions of natural justice that a trial of that kind is only a mockery of a trial and not of the kind envisaged by the laws of our land, because either way they would be struck down at once. Other violations will not be so obvious and it may be possible to show that having regard to all that occurred no prejudice was occasioned or that there was no reasonable probability of prejudice.\n\nJn still another class of case, the matter may be so near the border line that very slight evidence of a reasonable possibility of prejudice would swing the balance in favour of the accused.\n\nThis, in our opinion, has been the trend of the more recent decisions of the Privy Council and indeed of latter-day criminal jurisprudence in England as well as in ludia.\n\nThe swing of the pendulum has been\n\n(I) [ 1926] L.R. 54 I._A: 96, 109.\n\nWillie' 11 riliam\\\n\nSla111.1 ...\n\nThe State of Madl!Ya Pra:tesh\n\nBost].\n\nf.Villit 1William)\n\nStoney .,, T !1e State of\n\n11tfadlpa Pradesh\n\nBost].\n\naway from technicality, and a greater endeavour has been made to regard the substance rather than the shadow and to administer justice fairly am! impartially as it should be administered; fair to the accused, fair to the State and fair to the vast ma55 of the people for whose protection penal laws are made and administered.\n\nThe more recent attitude of the Judicial Committee is summed up by Sir John Beaumont in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor(') where he says that-\n\n\"The distinction drawn in many of the cases 111 India between an illegality and an irregularity IS one of degree rather than of kind\" and by Viscount Sumner in Atta Mohammad v. King- Emperor(2)-\n\n\"In the complete absence of any substantial injustice, in the complete absence of anything that outrages what is due to natural justice in criminal cases, their Lordsihps find it impossible to advise His Maiesty to interfere\".\n\nWe prefer this way of stating the law, for-the distinction that was once sought to be drawn between an express prohibition and an eqaully express provision positively stated strikes us as unreal.\n\nThe real question is not whether a matter is expressed positively or is stated in negative terms but whether disregard of a particular provision amounts to rubstantial denial of a trial as contemplated by the Code and understood by the comprehensive expression \"natural justice\". It will be observed that disregard of an express prohibition was regarded as curable in Zahiruddin\n\nv. King-Emperor('), so the question whether a particular provision is stated in positive or in negative terms is not the true criterion.\n\nIt is possible (though we need not so decide in this case) that the recent amendment to section 537 in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act XXVI of 1955 (where misjoinder of charges has been placed in the curable category, will set at rest the\n\n(!) [1947] L.R. 74 I.A. 65, 75.\n\n(2) [1929] L.R. 57 I.A. 71, 76.\n\n(3) [1947] L.R 74 I.A. BO.\n\ncontroversy that has raged around the true meaning of N. A. Subramania Iyer v. Kmg-Emperor(l}. In any case, our opinion is that the real object of the Code is to leave these matters to the discretion and vigilance of the courts.\n\nSlightly to alter the language of the Privy Council in Babula/ Choukhani v. The King- Emperor(2) we would say-\n\n\"It must be hoped, and indeed assumed, that magistrates and judges will exercise their jurisdiction fairly and honestly. Such is the implied condition of the exercise of judicial power. If they do not, or if they go wrong in fact or in law, the accused has prima f acie a right of recourse to the superior courts by way of appeal or revision; and the cases show how vigilant and resolute the High Courts are in seeing that the accused is not prejudiced or embarrassed by unsubstantial departures from the Code and how closely and jealously the Supreme Court guards the position of the accused.\n\nThese safeguards may well have appeared to the Legislature to be sufficient when they enacted the remedial provisions of the Code and have now left them substantially unaltered in the new Code recently introduced\".\n\nThis, we feel, is the true intent and purpose of section 537(a) which covers every proceeding taken UJith jurisdiction in the general phrase \"or other proceedings under this Code\".\n\nIt is for the Court in all these cases to determine whether there has been prejudice to the accused; and in doing so to bear in mind that some violations are so obviously opposed to natural justice and the true intendment of the Code that on the face of them and without anything else they must be struck down, while in other cases a closer examination of all the circumstances will be called for in order to discover whether the accused has been prejudiced.\n\nWe now proceed to examine the relevant sections of the Code.\n\nChapter XL V deals generally with irregular proceedings.\n\nThere are certain irregularities which do not vitiate the proceedings.\n\nThey are set out in section 529.\n\nNo question of prejudice arises\n\n(I) [19011L.R.231.A. 257.\n\n(2) [1938] L.R. 65 I.A. 158, 177.\n\n1955.\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya PrOdesh\n\nBose],\n\nlVillie (William!\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of\n\nMad/~)1a Pradesh\n\nBost].\n\nin this class of case because the section states categorically that they shall not vitiate the proceedings.\n\nCertain other irregularities are treated as vital and there the proceedings are void irrespective of prejudice.\n\nThese are set out in section 530. A third class is dealt with in sections 531, 532, 533, 535, 536(2) and 537.\n\nThere, broadly speaking, the question is whether the error has caused prejudice to the accused or, as some of the sections put it, has occasioned a failure of justice.\n\nThe examples we have given are illustrative and not exhaustive. What we are seeking to demonstrate is that the Code has carefully classified certain kinds of error and expressly indicates how they are to be dealt with. In every such case the Court is bound to give effect to the express commands of the legislature: there is no scope for further speculation.\n\nThe only class of case in which the Courts are free to reach a decision is that for which no express provision is made.\n\nThe present case is concerned with the nature of the charge and we find that the Code expressly deals with this in several of its section.\n\nOur only task therefore is to interpret them and, having propounded their meaning, to give effect to whatever they say.\n\nNow there is no doubt that a charge forms the foundation of a sessions trial and is a most important step in it. The accused must know and understand what he is being tried for and must be told in clear and unambiguous terms: section 271 ( 1). There can be no shirking that or slurring over it, and this must appear on the face of the record.\n\nIt cannot be established by evidence taken after the trial.\n\nBut there is, in our 01nn1on, equally no doubt that the Code expressly deals with this and expressly provides that no error, omission or irregularity in the charge or even total absence of a. charge, shall vitiate a trial unless prejudice to the accused is shown. This is repeatedly reiterated in a number of sections.\n\nThe whole question therfore is whether the \"charge\" must be formally reduced to wnt1ng and expressed as a ritualistic formula in order to save the trial from the fundamental defect of an inurable illegality or\n\nwhether the information that is the substance of the matter can be conveyed in other way&. The question is whether we are to grasp at the substance or play hide and seek among the shadows of procedure.\n\nFirst of all, sections 221 to 223 of the Code, which undoubtedly envisage a formal written charge, set out what a charge must contain.\n\nA perusal of them reveals the reasons why a charge is required. ft must set out the offence with which the accused is charged an1i if the law which creates the offence does not give' it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offrnce must be stated \"as to give the accused notice of the matter with 111/iic/1 lie is charged\". The charge must also contain such particulars of d'ate, time, pbce and person \"as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with whiCh he is charged\"; and section 223 says-\n\n\"When the nature of the case is such that the parti-· cul:irs mentioned in sections 221 and ZZ2 do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shall also contain such parfrculars of the manner in which the alleged offence was. committed as will be sufficient for that purpose\".\n\nIt is clear to us that the object of the charge is not to introduce a provision that goes to the root of jurisdiction as, for example, the requirement of previous sa;; ction under section 197, but to enable the accused to have a clear idea of what he is being tried for and or the essential facts that he has to meet.\n\nBut there are other ways of conveying this information.\n\nFor ex:.imple, in summons cases no formal charge is required: all that is necessary is to tell the accused the substance of the accusation made against him (sectio; i 242). The whole question is whether, in warrant casc:s and in sessions trials, the necessary information must be conveyed in one way and one way only, n:i.mely in a formal charge in order that the entire\n\ntrial may not be ipso facto vitiated because of an incurable illegality, or whether that can be done in other and less formal! ways, provided always that it is in fact conveyed in a clear and unambiguous manner and in circumstance~ that the court will regard\n\n'9:i5\n\nll'il/ie r William\".\n\nSlaney\n\nv. 1iie State e( Madltra Pra; lesl1\n\nBo.\"].\n\n; J'flillie William)\n\nSlaney\n\n\"\" T!te State of _Vadizya Pr0ffe3h\n\nBose J.\n\nas fair and in substantial as, opposed to purely technical, compliance with the requirements of the Code.\n\nTbe law could have provided one way as easily as an0ther, but what it has chosen to do is set out in the following sections.\n\nThe marginal note to section 225 is headed \"Effect of errors.\" and the section states that-\n\n\"No err.or in stating either the offence or the particulars require to be stated in the charge, and\n\n1TO 0mission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice\".\n\nTherefore, when there is a charge and there is either error or om1sswn in it or both, and whatever its natllre, it is not to be regarded as material unless two conditions are fulfilled both of which are matters of fact: (1) the accused has in fact been misled by it and (2) -it has occasioned a failure of justice. That, in our opinion, is reasonably plain language.\n\nNext, sections 226 and 227 show that errors in a charge, and even the total absence of a charge, do r.ot vitiate a trial from the start so as to render it cio trial at all as would the absence of sanction under section 197.\n\nThis is evident because these errors and omissions can be remedied at any time during rhe course of the trial in the sessions Court (section 226) or even at the very end of the trial (section 227), a:-id when this is done the trial need not proceed de novo but can go on from the stage at which the alteration was made provided neither side is prejudiced (section 228).\n\nThat is conclusive to show that no error or omission in the charge, and not even a total absence of a charge, cuts at the root of the trial.\n\nThe proceedings up to the stage of the alteration, which, as we have seen, can be at the very end of the trial, are not vitiated unless there is prejudice; they are good despite these imperfections.\n\nThat is impossible when the error is so vital as to cut at the root of the trial.\n\nIt follows that errors in the charge, and even a total absence 'Of a charge, are not placed in the non-curable class.\n\nNext, we have a case in which the error is not observed and corrected during the trial and the accused is convicted.\n\nIn such a case, the High Court is empowered to direct a retrial only if, in its opinion, the accused was \"misled in his defence\" (section 232).\n\nIt is to be observed that this is so whether there was a total absence of a charge or merely an error in it.\n\nIt is evident that a conviction cannot stand if the defect cuts at the root of the trial, therefore defect&\n\nC\\ en of this nature are not regarded as fatal..\n\nFrom there we proceed to section 535.\n\nThe margi nal note is \"Effect of omission to prepare charge\" •. and the section says-\n\n\"No finding or sentence pronounced or passed shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no' charge was framed, unless, in the opinion of the Court of a appeal or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby\".\n\nHere again the language is clear and wide and emphar tic.\n\nThe section summarises what was already indicated in sections 226, 227, 228 and 232.\n\nNext, there is section 537: \"Subject to etc .... no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Chapter XXVII or on appeal. or revision on account- ( a) of any error, omission or irregularitiy in the .... charge .... or other proceedings before or during: trial. .....\n\nunless such error, omission, irregularity ...... has m fact occasioned a failure of justice\".\n\nThe Explanation is also important:\n\n\"In determining whether any error, om1ss1on or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings\".\n\nThis repeats what was set out in greater detail in section 225 and is all the more impressi\\'e because\n\nl11illie (U'illiam~\n\nSlanry\n\nThe State of Mltdhya Ptades/r.\n\nBo.re].\n\nWillie riVilliam)\n\nS/an.~\n\nv. 1-he State of ,},;/adhya P1adesh\n\n.Bose].\n\neven when a death sentence is under review in confirmation proceedings under Chapter\n\nXXVII the Court is expressly directed not to regard any error, omission or irregularity m the charge as fatal unless it has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. Reading these pf(l)visions as a whole, there is, in our opinion, 1no room left for doubt about what was intended.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the appellant that these sections must be read along with sections 236, 237 and .238. Counsel conceded that there are occasions when an accused person can be convicted in the absence of a charge but he said that they are expressly set out in sections 237 and 238 and he contended that no fur- 1ther departure is permissible.\n\nHe put his argument as follows.\n\nHe said that sections 237 and 238 deal with cases in which there is a charge to start with but none to support a conviction for an offence which the Court feels is made out by the evidence. These sec- :tions define the limits within which the Court may convict in spite of the fact that there is no charge for ithat particular offence.\n\nWhen section 535 is read along with these two sections it is seen that it cannot :apply to a case in which there is no charge at all, nor can it apply to any case that is not covered by these two sections.\n\nIt is limited to cases in which sections 237 and 238 permit a conviction without a charge.\n\nIn answer to this the following argument was put -ro counsel • and he was asked to meet it. The point was put this way.\n\nSection 535 cures convictions that would be invalid but for its provisions. This, it was said. follows from the. words \"shall be deemed in- -valid\".\n\nIt was suggested that these words show that a conviction without a charge is in truth and in fact invalid but that it can be cured in certain cases, and when that is done, that which in truth is invalid is deemed not to be invalid because of this section. But as sections 237 and 238 expressly permit convictions in certain cases without a charge for those offences, J'.rovided there is a charge in the case to start with, the conv1ct10ns so permitted cannot be invalid oc even irregular because it would be wrong to say that that which the Code expressly allows is, or can be.\n\nirregular.\n\nTherefore, section 535 cannot apply to cases covered by sections 237 and 238.\n\nThe result is .that in these cases no question of prejudice can arise ; the convictions are good, prejudice or no prejudice.\n\nCouncil replied that even if that is so, section 535 is still governed by section 233 and so cannot apply to cases in which there is no charge at all.\n\nW<;. do not agree with either view. In our opinion, the cases contemplated by section 237 are just as much a departure from section 233 as are those envisaged in sections 225, 226, 227, 228, 535 and 537.\n\nSections 236, 237 and 238 deal \"'ith joinder.of charges and so does section 233.\n\nThe first condition is that there shall be a separate charge for each offence and the second is that each charge must be tried separately except in the cases mentioned in sections 234, 235 and 236.\n\nIt is to be observed that the exceptions .are confined to the rule about joinder of charges and that no exception is made to that part of the rule that requires separate charges for each offence.\n\nIt will be seen that though sections 234, 235 and 236 are expressly mentioned, section 237 is not referred to, nor is section 238.\n\nTherefore, so far as section 233 is concerned, there can be no doubt that it requires a separate charge for each offence and does not envisage a situation in which there is either no arge at all or where, there being a charge for some other offence of which the accused is acquitted, he can be convicted instead of something else for which he was not charged. We are unable to hold that the Code regards sections 237 and 238 as part of the normal procedure.\n\nWhat then is the position if there is some departure from the normal procedure ? In our opinion, sections 225, 226, 227, 228, 535 and 537 furnish the answer and they apply with equal force to every kind of departure from that part of section 233 that requires a separate charge for each offence. Section 237 is only a corollary to section 236 and is there to emphasise that even when a number of charges could be joined together in the cases set out in section 236 and one or more are not put in, even then, there can be convictions in respect of those offences despite the\n\nWillie ( Willim}\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nBose].\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nBost].\n\nabsence of a charge or charges. But all these sections are governed by the overriding rule about prejudice mentioned in one form or another in sections 225, 226, 227, 228, 535 and 537.\n\nWe think it would be monstrous to hold that a conviction cannot be set aside even when gross prejudice is proved in cases covered by section 237 just because it does not speak of prejudice.\n\nWe can envisage cases where there would be grave prejudice under that section just as clearly as we can see cases where there would be none under the others.\n\nThe sort of problem that we are now examining can only arise when an express provision of the Code is violatd and then the root of the matter is not whether there is violation of an express provision, for the problem postulates that there must be, nor b it whether the provision is expressed in positive or in negative terms, but what are the consequences of such disregard.\n\nDoes it result in an illegality that strikes at the root of the trial and cannot be cured or is it an irregularity that is curable?\n\nWe .have used the terms \"illegality\" and \"irregularity\" because they have acquired a technical significance and are convenient to demarcate a distinction between two classes of case. They were first used by the Privy Council in N. A. S11bramania Iyer v. King- Emperor( 1) and repeated in Babula!\n\nChot4khani v.\n\nKing-Emperor() and in Pt1lt4kt1ri Kotayya v. King- Emperor('), but it is to be observed that the Code does not use the term \"illegality\".\n\nIt refers to both classes as \"irregularities\"; some vitiate the proceedings (section 530) and others do not (section 529).\n\nProceedings that come under the former head are \"void\". Section 535 uses the words \"shall be deemed invalid\" which indicate that a total omission to frame a charge would render the conviction invalid but for section 535 which serves to validate it when that sort of \"irregulariy\" has not occasioned a \"failure of justice\".\n\nSection 537 does not use any of these expressions but merely says that no conviction or\n\n(I) [1901] L.R. 28 !..\\, 257.\n\n12) r1938] L, R. 65 L\\. 158, 174.\n\n(3) [1947] L.R. 7-1 I..\\. 65, 75.\n\n....... .... ,\n\nsentence \"shall be reversed or altered\" unless there has in fact been a failure of justice.\n\nWe do not attach any special significance to these terms.\n\nThey are convenient expressions to convey a thought and that is all.\n\nThe essence of the matter does not lie there.\n\nIt is embedded in broader considerations of justice that cannot be reduced to a set formula of words or rules.\n\nIt is a feeling, a way of thinking and of living that has been crystallized into judicial thought and is summed up in the admittedly vague and indefinite expression \"natural justice\": something that is incapable of being reduced to a set formula of words and yet which is easily recognisable by those steeped in judicial thought and tradition.\n\nIn the end, it all narrows down to this: some things are \"illegal\", that is to say, not curable, because the Code expressly makes them so; others are struck down by the good sense of judges who, whatever expressions they may use, do so because those things occasion prejudice and offend their sense of fair play and justice.\n\nWhen so struck down, the conviction is \"invalid\"; when not, it is good whatever the \"irregularity\".\n\nIt matters little whether this is called an \"illegality\", an \"irregularity that cannot be cured\" or an \"invalidity\", so long as the terms are used in a clearly defined sense.\n\nTurning next to the second branch of of the argument about section 535.\n\nWe cannot agree that because sections 237 and 238 expressly permit convictions without a charge in the cases contemplated by them, therefore they lift them out of the Chapter on Irregularities, because, if they do, then so does section 232 ( 1) in the cases with which it deals. Between them, these sections cover every kind of case in which there is an error. omission or irregularity in a charge and an omission to frame a charge, so, if sections 232(1) and 237 and 238 save departures from section 233 from. being irregularities,, then there is nothing left for sections 535 and 537 to operate on. In our opinion, the truth is that the Code deals with the same subject-matter under different heads, so there is some\n\noverapping.\n\n19-85 S. C. India/59\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Prarlt1h\n\nBoie]•\n\nH7illie (William)\n\nSI~\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradrsh :...._\n\nBotJ.\n\nSections 222 to 224 deal with the form of a charge and explain what a charge should contain.\n\nSection 225 deals with the effect of errors relating to a charge.\n\nSections 233 to 240 deal with the joinder of charges.\n\nSections 535 and 537 are in the Chapter that deals with irregularities generally and these two sections deal specifically with the charge and make it clear that an omission to frame a charge as well as irregularities, errors and omission in a charge are all irregularities that do not vitiate or invalidate a conviction unless there is prejudice.\n\nBut, apart from that, if we examine the learned counsel's contention more closely the fallacy in his argument becomes clear.\n\nSections 237 and 238 deal with cases in which there is a charge to start with and then they go on l'o say that in certain cases tbe trial can proceed beyond the matter actually charged and a conviction for an offence disclosed in the evidence in that type of case will be good despite the absence of a charge in respect of it.\n\nBut what are those cases?\n\nOnly those in which the additional charge or charges could have been framed from the start; and that is controlled by sections 234, 235 and 239 which set out the rules about joinder of charges and persons.\n\nIt is evident that if charges A and B cannot be tried together because of the prohibition in section 233 read with sections 234, 235 and 239, then no conviction could be sustained on either A or B, and if that is the case when specific charges are drawn up it is all the more so when though there is a charge in respect of A there is none in respect of B, for clearly you cannot do indirectly that which you are prohibited from doing direct! y.\n\nIn our opinion, sections 233 to 240 deal with joinder of charges and they must be read together and not in isolation.\n\nThey all deal with the same subjectmatter and set out different aspects of it.\n\nWhen they are read as a whole, it becomes clear that sections 237 and 238 cover every type of case in which a conviction can be sustained when there is no charge for that offence provided there is a charge to start with.\n\nThey do not deal with a case in which there is no charge at all, and anything travelling beyond that when there is a charge w_ould be hit by sections 233, 234, 235 and 239 read as a whole, for the reasons we have just given.\n\nJ:3ut if that is so, and if section 535 is excluded where sections 237 and 238 apply, then what is there left for it to operate on except cases in which there is a total omission to frame a charge? We do not think these sections should be regarded disjunctively.\n\nIn our opinion, they between them (including sections 535 and 537) cover every possible case that relates to the charge and they place all failures to observe the rules about the charge in the 5'.ategory of curable irregularities. Chapter XIX deals comprehensively with charges and sections 535 and 537 cover every case in which there is a departure from the rules set out in that Chapter. Such departures range frpm errors, omissions and irregularities in charges that are framed, down to charges that might have been framed and were not and include a total omissi:on to frame a charge at all at any stage of the trial.\n\nIn all these cases the only question is about prejudice.\n\nWe say this because the Code repeatedly says so in express and emphatic terms and because that is the foundation on which rules of procedure are based.\n\nWe say it because that accords with logic and principle and reason and because it touches the deep verities on which the structure of justice is erected and maintained.\n\nWith the utmost respect we cannot read the words \"by the absence of a charge\" in section 232(1) and \"no charge was framed\" in section 535 to mean not what they would appear to mean on the face of them but \"where there is a charge but none for the offence of which the accused is ronvicted\".\n\nThat would necessitate reading into the section words that are not there.\n\nWe see no reason for straining at the meaning of these plain and emphatic provisions unless ritual and form are to be regarded as of the essence in criminal trials. We are unable to find any magic or charm in the ritual of a charge.\n\nIt is the substance of these provisions that count and not their outward\n\nWillir, William) Slaney v.\n\nThe Stale of Madh; a Pradesh\n\nBose].\n\nHitlie ~William)\n\nSlaney\n\nTiu State of Marlhya Pradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nform.\n\nTo hold otherwise is only to provide avenues of escape for the guilty and afford no protection to the innocent.\n\nWe agree that a man must know what offence he is being tried for and that he must be told in clear and unambiguous terms and that it must all be \"explained to him'\" so that he really understands (section 271 ( 1) in sessions trials, section 255 ( 1) in warrant cases) but to say that a technical jargon of words whose -significance no man not trained to the law can grasp or follow affords him greater protection or assistance than the informing and the explaining that are the substance of the matter, is to base on fanciful theory wholly divorced from practical reality; and the same applies to the vast bulk of jurors who attend our courts. They are none the wiser because of a formal charge except in a vague and general way that is of no practical account.\n\nThe essence of the matter is not a technical formula of words but the reality.\n\nWas he told? Was it explained to him? Did he understand? Was it done in a fair way?\n\nWe attach equal importance to other sections of the Code that are just as emphatic as section 233, namely, sections 342 and 364; and yet no one doubts that irregularities there are curable.\n\nIt is the spirit of section 271 that must be observed in a sessions trial rather than its letter and the essence of that lies in the words \"and explained to him\".\n\nWe do not mean to imply that laxness of procedure should be encouraged in the matter of the charge any more than this Court encourages it in matters relating to section 342; nor do we mean to suggest that a trial can be regarded as good when the accused does not know what he is being tried for and is not, told and the matter is not explained to him as section 271 requires.\n\nOf course, the rules should and ought to be punctually observed.\n\nBut judges and magistrates are fallible and make mistakes and the question is what is to be done in the exceptional class of case in which there has been a disregard of some express provision.\n\nAs an illustration we give a case in which a Sessions Judge in a sessions trial having no charge\n\nbefore him from the committal court omits to frame one himself but instead, carefully and painstakingly, explains the particulars md the substance of the offence as in section 242 and complies with the spirit and object of section 271 but omits to observe its technical form.\n\nThen, when the witnesses are examined, the accused shows by his cross-exan1ination that he knows just what he is being tried for. He is examined fully and fairly under section 342 and his answers show that he is under no delusion. He calls witnesses in defence to meet the very point, or points the prosecution seek to make out against him.\n\nHe puts in a written statement and is defended by :m able lawyer who raises no objection from start to finish.\n\nWill a technical defect in a case like that vitiate the trial ? If the Code says Yes, then there is an end of the - matter.\n\nBut, in our opinion, the Code very emphatically says No; but even if that is not the case and cevm if the very plain and clear words of sections 232 and 535 are susceptible of two meanings, surely they should be construed so as to accord with what will best serve the ends of justice. We have put a case in which there neither is, nor can be, prejudice.\n\nSurely it would be a travesty of justice to brand a conviction in a case like that as illegal.\n\nAnd yet that must be done if these words that are otherwise plain are construed in a strained and unnatural manner.\n\nOn the other hand, there is nothing in the view we take to imperil or harass an accused however innocent he may be.\n\nHow does the technical formula of a charge afford greater protection than the \"explaining\" under section 271 ( 1) and the examination under section 342?\n\nAnd yet, on the argument before us, an omission to observe these other rules that are of the substance is curable when .there is no prejudice but not the sacred ritual of the framing of the charge; once that is there, the accused cannot be heard to say that he did not understand however much that may be the fact.\n\nSurely, this cannot be right.\n\nNow, as we have said, sections 225, 232, 535 and 537 (a) between them, cover every conceivable type of ermr and irregularity referable to a charge that\n\nWillie iWi//iam)\n\nSlnry . .v.\n\nTht Stale of Madfrya Prfl<lesh\n\nBost J.\n\nWillie '1Vi/liam,\n\nSlaney\n\nVf Thr State of\n\nMmllva Pradesh\n\n)Jost J.\n\n can possibly arise, ranging from cases in which there is a coi; viction with no charge at all from start to finish down to cases in which there is a charge but with errors, irregularities and omissions in it.\n\nThe Code is emphatic that whatever the irregularity it i~ not to be regarded as fatal unless there is prejudice.\n\nIt is the substance that we must seek.\n\nCourts have to administer justice and justice includes the punishment of guilt just as much as the protection of innocence. Neither can be done if the shadow 1s mistaken for the substance and the goal is lost m a labyrinth of unsubstantial technicalities.\n\nBroad vision is required, a nice balancing of the rights of the State and the protection of society in general against protection from harassment to the individual and the risks of unjust conviction.\n\nEvery reasonable presumption must be made in favour of an accused person: he must be gi, cn the benefit of every reasonable doubt. The same broacl principles of justice and fair play must be brought to bear when determining a matter of prejudice as in adjudging guilt.\n\nBut when all is said and done, what we are concerned to see is whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. If all these clements are there and no prejudice is shown the conviction must stand whatever the irregularities whether traceable to the charge or to a want of one.\n\nIn adjudging the question of prejudice the fact that the absence of charge, or a substantial mistake 111 it, ts a serious lacnna will naturdly operate to the benefit of the accused and if there is any reasonable and substantial doubt about whether he was, or was reasonably likely to have been, misled in the circumstances of any particular case, he is as much entitled to the benefit of it here as elsewhere ; hut if, on a careful consideration of all the facts, prejudice, or a reasonable and substantial likelihood of it, is .not disclosed the conviction must stand; also it will always be material to consider w4ether objection to the nature of the charge, or a total want of one, was taken at an early stage.\n\nIf it was not, and particularly where the accused is defended by counsel [Atta Mohammad v. King-Emperor(')], it n1ay in a given case be proper to conclude that the accused was satisfied and knew just what he' was being tried for and kriew what was being alleged .against him and wanted no further particulars, provided it is always borne in mind that \"no serious defect in the mode of conducting a criminal trial can be justified or cured by the consent of the advocate of the accused\" [Abdul Rahman v. King- Emperor(2) j.\n\nBut these arc matters of fact which will be special to each different case and no conclusion. on these questions of fact in any one case can ever be regarded as a precedent or a guide fo~ a conclusion of fact in another, because the facts can never be alike in any two cases however alike they may seem.\n\nThere is no such thing as a judicial precedent on facts though counsel, and even judges, are sometimes prone to argue and to act as if there were.\n\nEndeavour was made in the argument to draw a distinction between cases falling uncle section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and those under section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. It was contended that even if no separate charge is necessary when section 34 is called in aid because section 34 does not create a separate offence, one is essential for a conv1ct1on under section 149 and that there, at any rate, the absence of a Separate charge is fatal.\n\nThis is not a case under section 149 of the Indian Penal Code so the question does not really arise but it is necessary to advert to the argument because, on the view we take of sections 225, 535 and 537, it is immaterial what the offence is and whether there is a charge at all.\n\nThe only question is whether the irregularity occasioned prejudice.\n\nWe now turn to an examination of the cases of this Court that are said to give rise to a conflict of view.\n\nIn our opinion, there is in reality no conflict and\n\n(I) [1929]L.R. 57 I.A. 71, H.\n\n(2) [1926] L.R. 54 I.A. 96, 104, 110.\n\nWillir 'Williami\n\nSlaney\n\nThe Stale af MrrrfJ, ra Prmirslz\n\nBos<]\n\n1955 w; uu \\ U-'illiam)\n\nSlar1ey\n\nThe State of J\\ladhJa Pradesh\n\n80,>eJ,\n\nthough the language used in one case might suggest that, a close consideration of its reasons will disclose that there was .in fact no difference of view in the type of case where there is a charge to start with.\n\nNone of the cases deals with the position where there is no charge at all.\n\nThe following cases afford no difficulty because they directly accord with the view we have set out at length above.\n\nIn Lachman Singh v. The State(') it was held that when there is a charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 149 and the charge under section 149 disappears because of the acquittal of some of the accused, a conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read witb section 34 is good even though there is no separate charge under section 302 rea<t with section 34, provided the accused could have been so chargc1\\ on the facts of the case.\n\nThe decision in Karnail Singh v.\n\nThe State of Punjab(') js to the same effect and the question about prejudice was also considered.\n\nPandurang. Tukia and Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad(') also presents no difficuty because though the point was taken in that case it was expressly left open at page 1093.\n\nFrom there we come to Suraj Pal v. The State of U. P.('). That was a case in which a number of accused were charged under sections 307 /149 and sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. It was found that there was no common object to kill, so all the accused were acquitted under section 149.\n\nBut the evidence disclosed that the appellant had himself made an attempt on the life of one man and had himself shot another dead.\n\nAccordingly, the High Court convicted him under sections 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code respectively, though there was no separate charge under either of those section'- Those convictions were challenged here. This Court held that the omission to frame a charge is a serious lacuna but despite that the real question is whether that caused prejudice.\n\nThe learned Judges then\n\n(1) [1952] s.c.R.839, 848.\n\n(2) [1954] s.c.R. 904, 911.\n\n13) [1955] I S.C.R. 1083.\n\n(4) [1955] I s.c.R. 1332,\n\nproceeded to determine the question of prejudice on the facts of that case. The conclusion reached on the facts was that prejudice was disclosed, so an acquittal was ordered.\n\nIt was argued before us that the ground of the decision there was that the absence of charges under sections 307 and 302 simpliciter was in itself conclusive to establish prejudice and that therefore one need go no further.\n\nIt is enough to say that that was not the decision and though that was one of the matters taken into consideration, the conclusion was based on a careful and lengthy investigation of all the facts in the case including the way in which it was conducted, the evidence of several witnesses, the medical evidence, the first information report and certain documents including two filed by the accused.\n\nNext comes Nanak Chand v. The State of Punjab(').\n\nThat was also a case in which the charge was under section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code with the conviction under section 302 simpliciter without any separate charge under that section.\n\nThe Sessions Judge had convicted under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code holding that the charge of rioting was not proved. The High Court held that no common intention was proved either but as the evidence indicated that the appellant had done the actual killing he was convicted under section 302 .\n\nNow it is true that there are observations there which, without close examination, would appear to support the learned counsel for the appellant. But those observations must be construed in the light of the facts found, the most crucial fact being that patent prejudice was disclosed. It was found that the appellant there was in fact misled in his defence and one of the factors taken into consideration, as indeed must always be the case, was that when he was told that he was to be tried under section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code that indicated to him that he was not being tried for a murder committed by him personally but that he was only being\n\n(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 1201.\n\nWillie (William)\n\nSlaney\n\nT!teState of Madhya Pradesh\n\nBose].\n\nfi'illie ·:Williani)\n\nSlane_}· ...\n\nThe Slate o)·\n\nMttd}~; a Pradtlh\n\nBose J.\n\nmade .vicariously liable for an act that another had done m prosecution of the common object of an unlawful assembly of which he was a member. But that . was only one of the matters considered and it does not follow that every accused will be so misled. It all depends. on the circumstances.\n\nThe entire evidence and facts on which the learned Judges founded are not set out in the judgment but there is enough to indicate that had the appellant's attention been drawn to his own part in the actual killing he would probably have cross-examined the doctor with more care and there was enough in the medical evidence to show that had that been done the appellant might well have been exonerated. As judges of fact they were entitled, and indeed bound, to give the accused the benefit of every rt:asonable doubt and so were justified in reaching their conclusion on the facts of that case.\n\nIllustrations ( c) and ( e) to section 225 of the Criminal Procedure Code show that what the accused did or omitted to do in defence are relevant on the question of prejudice. If the Court finds that a vital witness was not cross-examined when he might have been, and that if he had been, the further facts elicited might well have been crucial, then material from which prejudice can be inferred is at once apparent: that is exactly Illustrations\n\n(c) and (e).\n\nThat, however, was, and remains, a pure conclusion of fact resting on the evidence and circumstances of that particular case.\n\nThe decision was special to the facts of that case and no decision on facts can ever be used as a guide for a conclu; ion on facts in another case.\n\nNow having reached the conclusion that there was prejudice, the learned Judges were of the opinion that the irregularity, if it can be so called when prejudice is disclosed, was incurable and from tl1at they concluded that an incurable irregularity is nothing but an illegality: a perfectly possible and logical conclusion when the words \"irregularity\" and \"illegality\" are not defined.\n\nAs we have already said, section 535 of the Criminal Procedure Code says that no finding or sentence \"shall be deemed to be invalid\" unless etc. and it can well be argued from this that this indicates\n\nthat an omission to follow the provisions of the Code does in truth and in fact render the decision invalid but because of section 535 that which is in truth and in fact invalid must be deemed .to be valid unless prejudice is disclosed.\n\nAs there was prejudice in that case, the decision was invalid and being invalid it was illegal. We do not say that that is necessarily so but it is a reasonably plausible conclusion and was what the learned Judges had in mind.\n\nIt is to be obsen•ed that section 535 of the Code is mandatory in its terms, just as mandatory as section\n\n233. If it be accepted that an absence of a charge would, but for its provisions, render a conviction invalid, this section cures such an invalidity when there is in fact, not in theory but in fact, no failure of justice. The section is just as mandatory as section 233 and we can see no justification for giving it less weight than section 237.\n\nIf section 237 validates a departure from section 233 and saves it from the stigma of an irregularity, then so does section 535, for it says very expressly that no conviction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge wa' framed unless that in fact occasioned a failure of justice; and if section 535 is held not to apply to cases covered by sections 237 and 238, then it must apply to cases that lie outside the scope of those sections and the only kind of case left is a case in which there is a total absence of a charge, for any other type of case would be excluded because of misjoinder.\n\nIf section 233 is mandatory, that part of it which prohibits misjoinder except in the cases mentioned in sections 234, 235, 236 and 239 is just . as mandatory as the portion that requires a separate charge for each offence. It is unfortunate that we have no definition of the terms \"illegality\", \"irregularity\" and \"invalidity\" because they .can be used in differing senses, but however that may be, the decisions we are now examining and the remarks made in that case must be read in the light of this background. We agree that some of the expressions used in the judgment appe; ir to travel wider than this but in order to dispel tnisconception we would now hold that the\n\nWillir \\William•\n\nstanry\n\nTh•State f Madhya Praddt\n\nBese ].\n\nWillie 1 WiUiam\n\nSlaney\n\nTht:Slalt o.f\n\nMadya Pradt:jh\n\nBose].\n\ntrue view is the one we have propounded at length in the present judgment.\n\nWe now turn to the questi9f1 of fact: is there material in this case to justify a finding of prejudice? that will turn largely on the differences between section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and on the measure of criminal liability to which the appellant would be exposed in those two cases; and here again, the matter must be viewed broadly and not in any technical or pettifogging way.\n\nNow what is an accused person entitled to know from the charge and in what way does the charge in this case fall short of that? All he is entitled to get from the charge is-\n\n( 1) the offence with which he is charged, section 221(1), Criminal Procedure Code,\n\n(2) the law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed, section 221(4),\n\n(3) partiulars of the time, section 222(1), and\n\n(4) of the place, section 222(1), and\n\n(5) of the person against whom the offence is said to have been committed, section 222(1), and\n\n(6) when the nature of the case is such that tho; e particulars do not give him sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, such particulars of the manner in , which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose, section 223.\n\nHe is not entitled to any further information in the charge: see Illustration (e) to section 223 of the Code.\n\n\"A is accused of the murder of B at a given time and place. The charge need not state the manner in which A murdered B.\"\n\nIt is clear from this that when the case is one of murder, the accused is not entitled to be told in the charge bow it was committed, whether with a pistol or a latbi or a sword.\n\nHe is not entitled to know from the charge simpliciter any further circumstance.\n\nHow then is he expected to defend himself? He has the police challan, he has the evidence recorded in the\n\nCommittal Court, he hears the prosecution witnesses and he is examined under section 342 of the Code. It is these proceedings that furnish him with all the necessarv, and indeed vital, information, and it is his duty to, look into them and defen<l himself.\n\nIt will be seen that if the logic of the appellant's contention is carried to its fullest extent the accused could complain of prejudice because he was not told in the charge whether a pistol was used for the crime or a sword and if a pistol, its calibre and bore and the type of cartridge.\n\nNow when several persons join in the commission of a crime and share a common intention, it means that each has the requisite intention in himsef; the fact that others share it does not absolve any one of them in<lividually, and when the crime is actually committed in pursuance of the common intention and the accused is present at its commission, the crime becomes the offence actually committed because of section 114 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSection 114 does not create the offence nor does section 34. These sections enunciate a principle of criminal liability.\n\nTherefore, in such cases all that the charge need set out is the offence of murder punishable. under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code committed by the accused with another and the accused is left to gather the details of the occurrence as alleged by the prosecution from other sources. The fact that he is told that he is charged with murder committed by himself with another imports that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence of murder committed in this way was fulfilled: section 221(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nNow what are those legal conditions? What is the effect of charging two persons with a murder com• mitted in pursuance of a common intention? It means that the accused is unmistakably told that he participated in the crime; exactly how is no more a matter for the charge than it is to set out the circumstances in which the murder was committed.\n\nIt also means that he is informed that 1t 1s immaterial who struck the fatal blow.\n\nThe charges here against the appel-\n\nWillie (Willis\"''\n\nSlarey\n\nTheStauof , Madhya Pradeslt\n\nBo.re].\n\n1}Villit \\ iVilliam)\n\nSlaney\n\n'\" The Stale of .l.Jadhya P1ariesh\n\nBust].\n\n!ant and his brother Ronnie are identical.\n\nAs there was only one fatal blow and as only one person could have inflicted it and as both are charged in this way, it can only mean that each is put on his guard arid made to realise that the prosecution allege that one of the two was responsible for that and which must be discovered from the evidence and not from the charge, just as surely as it must when the question turns on who possessed or used a pistol and who a sword.\n\nIt is true that if it cannot be ascertained who struck the fatal blow, then the accused cannot be convicted unless the common intention is proved and in that type of case an acquittal of the co-accused may be fatal to the prosecution.\n\nBut the converse does not hold good, and if the part that the accused played can be clearly brought home to him and if it 'is sufficient to convict him of murder simpliciter he cannot escape liability because of the charge unless he can show prejudice.\n\nPut at its highest, all that the appellant can urge is that a charge in the alternative ought to hav.e been framed, which in itself imports that it could have 'been so framed.\n\nAs was said by the Privy Council in Begu v. King-Emperor(1) and also by this Court in Lachman Singh v. Tht: State(')-\n\n\"A man may be convicted of an offence, although there has been no charge in respect of it, if the evidence is such as to establish a charge that might have been made.\n\nThat is what happened here ........ They were not charged with that formally, but they were tried on evidence which brings the case under section 237\" (1).\n\nThe variation between murder and concealing evidence after the crime is no more than the variation between killing a man jointly with another, sharing his intention, or allowing the other to do the actual killing with the same common intention.\n\nNow what do the proceedings in this case show?\n\nThe police charge-sheet states that the appellant hit the deceased with a hockey stick while his brother (I) [1925] I.L.R. 6 Lah. 226, 231.\n\n(2) [1952] s.c.R. 839, 848.\n\nQnly threw stones.\n\nFrom there we go to his examination under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the Committal Court.\n\nHe is specifically told that the only eye-witness in the case accuses him and not his brother of having hit the deceased over the head, with a hockey stick.\n\nNo one could misunderstand that.\n\nIn the Sessions Court we find the same evidence repeated.\n\nNo witness suggests that anyone else hit the deceased on the head.\n\nThere was no possibility of misunderstanding or mistake.\n\nThe fact that the appellant di<l not attempt to confront any of the witnesses with their statements before either the Committing Magistrate or the police on this point shows that the witnesses told a consistent story from the start.\n\nNext, the appellant was examined under section 342 in the Sessions Court and was asked the same questions and was confronted in his examination with the same eye-witness.\n\nHe was told clearly and unambiguously that the evidence was that he hit the deceased over the head.\n\nNow what was his defence? A curious procedure was adopted, a procedure that has been condemned by the Nagpur High Court in other cases and which we regret to see still persists. Instead of the accused speaking for himself he made a statement through his advocate. However, the defence was this:\n\n(1) an alibi: \"I wasn't there\".\n\n(2) It was dark and the deceased rushed at the appellant (who is now said to .have been there despite the alibi), fell down the stairs and broke his head;\n\n(3) The deceased was the aggressor and the ; tppellant struck him in self defence.\n\nThere is no suggestion here that the other accused hit the deceased or that anyone other than the appellant did.\n\nThe appellant places it beyond doubt that he knew that the case against him was that he is said to have struck the fatal blow.\n\nNext, what was the cross-examination of the only eye-witness ? There was no suggestion that she was mistaken in her identity, whereas she was crossexamined about this very matter of self defence and questions were put to show . that the deceased\n\nIYillie (William)\n\nSlar.ey\n\n\\'.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nJVillie (William)\n\nSl=y\n\nThe Stale of Madll)'O Pradesh\n\nBose].\n\nand not his brother had threatened the appellant with his fist.\n\nIn the High Court the plea of alibi was dropped and the on! y argument advanced was self defence.\n\nThere was no hint of prejudice even in the grounds of appeal.\n\nThere was no pretence in the arguments that the appellant did not know he was being accused of having hit the deceased.\n\nOn the contrary, there was a clear admission in the High Court that he did hit the man but that he acted in self defence.\n\nAs the appellant knew that the case against him was that he is the one who is said to have struck the fatal blow, and as he was told in the charge that the offence he is said to have committed was that of murder and was informed of the date and place and person, we find it impossible to infer pre\n\njudice.\n\nAs the Privy Council said in Atta Mohammad\n\nv. Emperor( 1 )-\n\n\"He appeared by an advocate on the appeal and had been legally defended at the trial, and it is as clear as possible that, with full knowledge of the course which the trial had taken, neither the appellant himself nor those who represented him had any sense whatever of the injustice that is now urged or any idea of his having been deprived of the opportunity of knowing the charge on which he was tried or of raising defences appropriate to that charge.\" We would hold that there was no prejudice and that the conviction is not invalid because of the nature of the charge.\n\nWe now come to the merits, and the question is whether this is a case under section 302 or under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe injury was inflicted with a hockey stick. The head was fractured but the deceased lived for ten days.\n\nThe doctor says- \"I consider the head injury on the head of Smythe was of a very serious nature and was likely to result in fatal consequences.\" Therefore, the doctor in whose care the patient was\n\n(1) [1929] L.R. 57 I.A. 71, 74.\n\ntill he died places the injury no higher than \"likely\" to cause death.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge exonerated the appellant of any intention to kill and the learned High Court Judges say that they agree with his findings. If there was no intention to kill, then it can be murder only if\n\n(1) the accused knew that the injury inflicted would be likely to cause death or\n\n(2) that it would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or\n\n(3) that the accused knew that the act must in all probability cause death.\n\nIf the case cannot be placed as high as that and the act is only likely to cause death and there is no special knowledge, the offence comes under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe doctor thought that it was only likely to cause death.\n\nThe appellant is only 22 years old and not a doctor and can hardly be presumed to have had this special knowledge at the time he struck the blow.\n\nAll blows on the head do not necessarily cause death, and as the deceased lived for ten days, we are unable to deduce from the nature of the injury and from the mere fact of death that the appellant had, or should have had, the special knowledge that section 300 of the Indian Penal Code requires.\n\nAdmittedly, there was no premediation and there was a sudden fight, so we are unable to ascribe the necessary knowledge to the appellant; nor was the injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause -death.\n\nSo the offence falls under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn the question of sentence. There was no enmity accordingly to the finding of the learned Sessions Judge.\n\nThe appellant did , not go there armed with a stick.\n\nHe was in love with the deceased's sister who reciprocated his affection but could not marry him because her husband had turned her out in England and she had no divorce.\n\nThe deceased, who was the girl's brother, resented this.\n\nThe appellant went to the house and asked the sister to come down. The 20-85 S. C. India/59\n\nSlaney\n\nThe Staie of Madhya Pradesh\n\nBose].\n\nWillie (William) Slaney v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nBose].\n\nbrother came instead and there was a quarrel.\n\nThe appellant slapped the deceased across the face.\n\nThe qeceased, who was a big and strong man, shook his fist in the appellant's face and the appellant snatched a hockey stick from his younger brother Ronnie and hit the deceased one blow over the head and two blows on the hips.\n\nIn the circumstances, we think five years' rigorous imprisonment will suffice.\n\nWe would acquit the appellant on the charge of murder and alter the conviction to one under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and reduce the sentence to one of five years' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR J.-This appeal comes before us on a reference owing to a conflict between two decisions of this Court, Nanak Chand v. The State of Punjab(') and Suraj Pal v. The State of U.P.(2).\n\nWhere there is a charge against an accused under section 302, read with section 149, if section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is inapplicable to the facts, can the accused be convicted under section 302 without a separate charge? In the first case, it was held that the omission to have a specific charge under section 302 amounted to an illegality. In the latter case, the view was taken that it was a mere irregularity, curable if no prejudice was caused to the accused.\n\nSection 149 creates a specific offence and without applying its povisions a member of an unlawful assembly could not be made liable for the offence committed not by him but by another member of that assembly.\n\nTherefore the case is not similar to the one where there is charge under section 302, read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nWhen secticm 149 is ruled out, the liability for murder ceases to be constructicve; it becomes direct and there must be a separate charge therefore under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. This was the line of reasoning in Nanak Chand's case. In Suraj Pal's case , the same line is taken but the absence of a specific charge\n\n(1) [1955] 1 S. C.R. 1201.\n\n(2) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1332.\n\nis treated as a serious lacuna merely; and not regarded as an illegality.\n\nThis conflict does not arise in the case before us where the offence charged against two brothers William and Ronnie for the murder of Donald was under section 302, read with sectioµ 34 of the 'Indian Penal Code.\n\nRonnie was acquitted.\n\nBut William was found guilty and sentenced to transportation for life.\n\nAs pointed out by Lord Sumner in his classic judgment in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King-Emperor(1 ), there is much difference in the scope and applicability of sections 34 and 149, though they have some resemblance and are to some extent overlapping.\n\nThe two sections are again compared and contrasted in Karnail Singh and another v. The State of Punjab(2). Section 34 does not by itself create any offence, whereas it has been held that section 149 does.\n\nIn a charge under section 34, there is active participation in the commission of the criminal act; under section 149, the liability arises by reason of the membership of the unlawful assembly with a common object, and there may be no active participation at all in the perpetration or commission of the crime.\n\nThe overlapping arises in those cases where two or more persons commit a murder in furtherance of the common . intention, but it is not possible to say which of them was responsible for the fatal injury, or whether any one injury by itself was responsible for the death. There may also be a case where it is known that out of the assailants one in particular was responsible for the fatal injury and the others are sought to be made liable for the result owing to the common intention involved.\n\nBut whereas in this case, the appellant has been individually charged with murder and there is proof that his hand caused the injury, the fact that his brother was also sought to be made liable owing to the existence of a common intention, is neither here nor there, so far as the legality of the conviction is concerned, as there has been no prejudice by way of failure of justice.\n\nIt is, however, necessary having regard to the\n\n(1/ [1924] L. R. 52 I. A. 40.\n\n(2) [1954] S. C.R. 90~.\n\nWillie (William) Slaney v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChanarasekhara\n\nA!Jiar J.\n\nWillie (William)\n\nSlaney\n\nThe Stat1 of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!J>ar J.\n\nlengthy arguments addressed to us, to consider the main question arising on the reference.\n\nThough the two cases which gave rise to this reference were cases relating to section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and not to section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as the present case is, the order of reference was occasioned by the fact that in Nanak Chand's case it was stated specifically that the parallel case under section 34 also stood on the same footing. In our attempt to resolve the conflict, we covered a wide area of sections and decisions.\n\nA detailed discussion of all the decisions cited at the Bar is not of much use as it is not possible to gather from a study of those cases anything very decisive by way of any guiding principle.\n\nBut a few of them, more important than the rest, must be noticed.\n\nThe Criminal Procedure Code does not use the word \"illegality\".\n\nEven defects or violations that vitiate the proceedings and render them void are spoken of only as irregularities in section 530.\n\nThe word illegality was used almost for the first time in the judgment of the Privy Council, L.R. 28 Indian Appeals 257 (familiarly known as Subramania Aiyar's case) where they speak of a contravention of section 234 of the Code, resulting in a misjoinder of charges, as an illegality.\n\nThe idea that it was a mere irregularity was repelled in these words:-\n\n\"Their Lordships are unable to regard the disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial as a mere irregularity.\n\nSuch a phrase as irregularity is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time, and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law could have been joined together in one indictment.\n\nThe illustration of the section itself sufficiently shows what was meant\": Again, they say:-\n\n\" ...... it would be an extraordinary extension of such a branch of administering the criminal law to say that when the Code positively enacts that such a trial as that which has taken place here shall not be permitted that his contravention of the Code comes\n\nwithin the description of error, omission, or irregularity\".\n\nSubsequently, however, there have been systematic attempts to explain away the said decision and restrict its scope to narrow limits.\n\nThis was possibly because it was realised even by the Judicial Committee itself that the view taken by them to the effect that a violation of the mandatory provisions of the Code would be an illegality was rather an extreme one. It may be pointed out that even in 'that case the question of prejudice was not entirely absent from their Lordships' minds.\n\nBoth sides referred to it in the course of the arguments, and the Lord Chancellor alludes to the prejudice inherent in the trial on a multitude of charges.\n\nIn passing, it may be mentioned here that the legislature has now specifically included misjoinder of charges in sub-clause (b) of section 537.\n\nThe exact effect of this inclusion may require consideration in an appropriate case.\n\nBefore dealing with the other relevant sections of the Code, let us examine some of the later decisions of the Privy Council which seem to indicate a swing of the pendulum to the other side. In Abdul Rahman\n\nV The King-Emperor(1), there was a violation of section 360 of the Code which provides that the deposition of each witness shall be read over to him in the presence of the accused or his pleader. The High Court held that this was a mere irregularity, and confirmed the conviction as no failure of justice had resulted.\n\nIt was contended on appeal before the Privy Council that the section was obligatory, and that non-compliance with such a mandatory provision , was illegal, on the principle laid down in Subramania Aiyar's case(Z ).\n\nBut thr Lordships rejected this contention pointing out that in the earlier case the procedure adopted was one which the Code positively prohibited, and it was possible that it might have worked actual injustice to the accused; and they confirmed the conviction.\n\nThe question was again raised in Babula! Choukhani v. The King-Emperor( 9 )\n\n(I) [1926] L. R. 54 I. A. 96.\n\n(2) [1901] L. R. 28 I. A. 257.\n\n(3) [1938] 65 I. A. 158.\n\nl955\n\nWilli~ (William)\n\nSbmey\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhtrra\n\nA!Yar J.\n\nWilli• (William)\n\nSlll1llly\n\nThe State of Madhya Praduh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAbar J.\n\nas to what would be an ill<;, gality as distinguished from an irregularity. Lord Wright who delivered the judgment of the Board assume that an infringement of section 239 (b) of the Code would be an illegality, and proceeded to state that the question did not, however, arise, and it was hence unnecessary to discuss the precise scope of what was decided in Subramania Aiyar' s case('). The matter cropped up once again in Pulukuri Kotayya and others v.\n\nKing- Emperor(•) where there was a breach of the statutory requirement found in section 162 of the Code, inasmuch as the accused were not supplied with copies of the statements first recorded by a police officer for cross-examining the prosecution witnesses.\n\nThe defect was recognized to be a matter of gravity, and if the statements had been completely destroyed, or if there had been a total refusal to supply copies to the accused, the convictions were liable to be quashed.\n\nBut in the case before them, as the statements were made available, though too late to be effective, and the Circle Inspector's notes of the examination of witnesses were put into the hands of the accused, it was taken to be an irregularity merely. Referring to the contention that the breach of a direct and important provision of the Code carmot be cured but must lead to the quashing of the conviction, Sir John Beaumont observed:-\n\n\" ...... In their Lordships' opm10n, this argument is based on too narrow a view of the operation of section 537.\n\nWhen an trial is conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code (as in N. A. Subramania Iyer's case('), the trial is bad, and no question of curing an irregularity arises; but if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of such conduct, the irregularity can be cured under section 537, and nonetheless so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always be the case, a breach of one or more of the very comprehensive provisions of the Code. The distinction drawn in many of the cases in India between an illegality and\n\n(1) [1901] L. R. 28 I. A. 257.\n\n(2) (1947] L. R. 74 I. A. 56.\n\nan irregularity is one of degree rather than of kind.\n\nThis view finds support in the decision of their Lordships' Board in Abdul Rahman v. The King-Emperor(1) where failure to comply with section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was held to be cured by sections 535 and 537.\n\nThe present case falls under section 537, and their Lordships hold the trial valid notwithstanding the breach of section 162\".\n\nOf course, lack of competency of jurisdiction, absence of a complaint by the proper person or authority specified, want of sanction prescribed as a condition precedent for a prosecution, in short, defects that strike at the very root of jurisdiction stand on separate footing, and the proceedings taken in disregard or disobedience would be illegal. The difficulty arises only when we have to consider the other provisions in the Code which regulate procedure and which are found in a mandatory form, positive or negative. It is in this class of cases that the distinction becomes important and material.\n\nThe scope of the decision in Subramania Aiyar's case( 2 ) has become so circumscribed that it is doubtful if it applies to the generality of cases of omissions and defects that come before the courts, excepting where they bring about the result that the trial was conducted in a .manner different from that prescribed by the Code.\n\nLet us now turn our attention to the relevant sections of the Code bearing on the requirement of a charge, the omission of a charge and the effect thereof Section 233 provides as follows :- \"For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately, except in the cases mentioned in sections 234, 235, 236 and 239\".\n\nA power to alter or add to a charge, at any time before judgment is pronounced, is conferred on a court under section 227.\n\nSections 228 to 231 provide for the steps to be taken consequent on such alteration.\n\nSection 225 shows what would be the effect of any errors in the framing of a charge. ft runs as follows:-\n\n(1) [1926] L. R. 54 I. A. 96.\n\n(2\\ [1901] L. R. 28 I. A. 257.\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar J.\n\nWillie (William)\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar J.\n\n\"No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice\".\n\nSection 232(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers more specifically to the effect of such error where an appellate Court or the High Court in revision or in confirmation proceedings, notices such an error and is in the following terms:-\n\n\"If any Appellate Court, or the High Court in the exercise of its powers of revision or of its powers under Chapter XXVII, is of opinion that any person convicted of an offence was misled in defence by the absence of a charge or by an error in the charge, it shall direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks lit\".\n\nThen we have section 237, dealing with a case where an accused charged with one offence for which he might have been charged unc\\er the provisions of section 236 could be convicted of a different offence.\n\nThis applies only to cases where it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute. Begu's case(') is n example; the conviction was under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code for causing .the disappearance of evidence relatffig to a murder, though the charge was under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Viscount Haldane observes:-\n\n\" ...... A man may be convicted of an offence, although there has been no charge . in respect of it, if the evidence is such as to establish a charge that might have been . made. That is what happened here.\n\nThe three men who were sentenced to rigorous imprinsonment were convicted of making away with the evidence of the crime by assisting in taking away the body.\n\nThey were not charged with that formally but they were tried on evidence which brings the case under section 237\".\n\n(1) [1925] L. R. 521. A. 191.\n\nFinally, we come to sections 535 and 537 of the Code.\n\nThe former is in these terms:- \" ( 1) No finding or sentence pronounced or passed shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed, unless, in the opinion of the Court of appeal or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.\n\n(2) If the Court of appeal or revision thinks that :a failure of justice has; been occasioned by an omission to frame a charge, it shall order that a charge be framed, and that the trial be recommenced from the point immediately after the framing of the charge\".\n\nThe latter runs thus:- \"Subject to the provisions herein before contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Chapter XXVII or on appeal or revision on account- ( a) of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or\n\n(b) ................... . ( c) of the omission to revise any list of jurors or :assessors in accordance with section 32.4, or ( d) of any misdirection in any charge to a jury, unless such error, omission, irregularity or misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice\".\n\nA case of complete absence of a charge is covered by section 535, whereas an error or omission in a charge is dealt with by section 537.\n\nThe consequences seem to be slightly different.\n\nWhere there is no charge, it is for the court to determine whether there is any failure of justice. But in the latter where there is mere error or omission in the charge, the court is also bound to have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.\n\nThe sections ref erred to indicate that in the generality, of cases the omission to frame a charge is\n\nSlanty\n\nThe State ef Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nWillie (William)\n\nSlamy\n\nTheSttJteof Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAbar J.\n\nnot per se fatal. We are unable, therefore, to accept as sound the very broad. proposition advanced for the appellants by Mr. Umrigar that where there is no charge, the conviction would be illegal, prejudice or no prejudice.\n\nOn the other hand, it is suggested that the wording of section 535 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is sufficiently wide to cover every case of 'no charge'.\n\nIt is said that it applies also to the case of a trial in which there has been no charge of any kind even from the very outset.\n\nWe are unable to agree that section 535 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be construed in such an unlimited serise.\n\nIt may be noticed that this group of sections relating to absence of a charge, namely, sections 225, 226 and 232 and the powers exercisable thereunder, are with reference to a trial which has already commenced or taken place. They would, therefore, normally relate to errors or omissions which occur in a trial that has validly commenced. There is no reason to think that section 535 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not also to be understood with reference to the same context. There may be cases where, a trial which proceeds wihout any kind of charge at the outset can be said to be a trial wholly contrary to what is prescribed by the Code.\n\nIn such cases the trial would be illegal without the necessity of a positive finding of prejudice. , By way of illustration the following classes of cases may be mentioned:-(a) Where there is no charge at all as required by the Code from start to finish-from the Committing Magistrates court to the end of the Sessions trial; the Code contemplates in section 226 the possibility of a committal without any charge and it is not impossible to conceive of an extreme case where the Seisions trial also proceeds without any formal charge which has to be in writing and read out and explained to the accused (section 210(2) and section 251(A) (4) and section 227).\n\nThe Code requires that there should be a charge and it should be in writing.\n\nA deliberate breach of this basic requirement cannot be cured by the assertion that everything was orally explained to the accused and the assessors . or jurors, and there was\n\nno possible or probable prejudice (b) Where the conviction is for a totally different offence from the one charged and not covered by sections 236 and 237 of the Code.\n\nOn a charge for a minor offence, there can be no conviction for a major offence, e.g., grievous hurt or rioting and murder. The omission to frame a separate and specific charge in such cases will be an incurable irregularity amounting to an illegality.\n\nSections 34, 114 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code provide for criminal liability viewed from different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by a common object or a common intention; and the charge is a rolled-up one involving the direct liability and the constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable and who are sought to be made constructively liable. In such a situation, the absence of a charge under one or other of the various heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for the substantive offence, without a charge, can be set aside, prejudice will have to be made out.\n\nIn most of the cases of this kind, evidence is noramlly given from the outset as to who was primarily responsible for the act which brought about the offence and such evidence is of course relevant.\n\nAfter• all, in our considering whether the defect is illegal or merely irregular, we shall have to take into account several factors, such as the form and the language of the mandatory proviswns, the scheme and the object to be achieved, the nature of the violation, etc.\n\nDealing with the question whether a provision in statute is mandatory or directory, Lord Penzance observed in Howard v. Bodington(1). \"There may be many provisions in Acts of Parliament which, although they are not strictly obeyed yet do not appear to the court to be of that material important to the subject-matter to which they refer, as that the\n\nlgislature could have intended that the non-observance of them should be followed by a total failure of the whole proceedings.\n\nOn the other hand, there are fl) [1877]2P.D.203.\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAar J.\n\nWiilie (William)\n\nSlanry\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAfyar J.\n\nsome provisions in respect of which the court would take an opposite view, and would feel that they are matters which must be strictly obeyed, otherwise the whole proceedings that subsequently follow must come to an end\". These words can be applied mutatis mutandis to cases where there is no charge at all.\n\nThe grwity of the defect will have to be considered to determine if it falls within one class or the other.\n\nIs it a mere unimportant mistake in procedure or is it substantial and vital?\n\nThe answer will depend largely on the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nIf it is so grave that prejudice will necessarily be implied or imported, it may be described as an illegality.\n\nIf the seriousness of the omission is of a lesser degree, it will be an irregularity and prejudice by way of failure of justice will have to be established.\n\nThis judgment should not be understood by the subordinate courts as sanctioning a deliberate disobedience to the mandatory requirements of the Code or as giving any license to proceed with trials without an appropriate charge.\n\nThe omission to frame a charge is a grave defect and should be vigilantly guarded against.\n\nIn some cases, it may be so serious that by itself it 'would vitiate a trial and render it illegal, prejudice to the accused being taken for granted. In the main, the provisions of section 535 would apply to cases of inadvertence to frame a charge induced by the belief that the matter on record is sufficient to warrant the conviction for a particular offence, without express specification, and where the facts proved by the prosecution constitute a separate and distinct offence but closely relevant to and springing out of the same set of facts connected with the one charged.\n\nComing now to the facts of the present case; William was on terms of intimacy with Bery I P. W. 13.\n\nShe was the sister of Donald Smythe.\n\nThe aceused was practically living with her in her house. The br<>- ther did not like their intimacy and was making attempts to separate Beryl from the ac.cused.\n\nOn the evening of the day of the oceurrence, Donald and his mother went to Beryl's house.\n\nThere was a quarrel\n\nbetween them and the accused was asked to get away. He left the place but returned a little later with his brother (Ronnie) and asked Beryl who was on the first floor to come down to him.\n\nShe did not come but Donald came down into the courtyard.\n\nThere was !! heated exchange of words.\n\nThe accused slapped Donald on the check. Donald lifted his fist.\n\nThe accused gave one blow on his head with a hockey stick with the result that his skull was fractured.\n\nDonald died in the hospital ten days later. A plea of alibi was given up in the High Court. The suggestion that Donald fell down and sustained the head injury while descending te stairs was ruled out by the evidence of the eye-witnesses.\n\nNothing was established to justify any exercise of the right of private detence.\n\nOn these facts, which have been proved, the only question that arises is whether the appellant is guilty of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, or guilty only of culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, under the second part of section 304.\n\nThe High Court did not address itself to the nature of the offence.\n\nIt is obvious that the appellant did not intend to kill the deceased.\n\nThe evidence of the doctor is that the injury was likely to result in fatal consequences.\n\nThis by itself is not enough to bring the case within the scope of section\n\n300. There is nothing to warrant us to attribute to the appellant knowledge that the injury was liable to cause death or that it was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. The fact that Donald lived for ten days afterwards shows that it was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nThe elements specified in section 300 of the Indian Penal Code are thus wanting.\n\nWe take the view, considering all the circumstances that the offence is' the lesser one.\n\nThe appellant is acquitted of the charge of murder but is convicted under the second Part of section 304, and sentence to five years' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nIMAM J.-I agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. but\n\nWillie !William} Slaney v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nSlanry\n\nThe SJate of Madh;'a Pradesh\n\nImam ].\n\nwould add some observations of my own as I was party to the judgment of this Court in Nanak Chand's case.\n\nThe appellant was charged with murder and nothing short of it, although it was stated in the charge that the offence was committed by him in furtherance of a common intention. If the evidence failed to prove that the offence committed by him was in furtherance of a common intention, it would be nonetheless his offence, namely, murder, if his act in law amounted to murder. The law does not require in such a case that a separate charge for murder should be framed, because the charge of murder was alerady on the record.\n\nStrictly speaking, on the facts of the present case, the question raised by the reference does not anse.\n\nSince it has been raised, it must be considered.\n\nIn Nanak Chand's case the view taken was that when an accused is charged under section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, it is illegal to convict him under section 302 Qf the Indian Penal Code without a charge having been framed against him under that section.\n\nIt was also held that if this was only an irregularity then on the facts of the case, the accused was 11Jisled in his defence. In Suraj Pal's case, in similar circumstances, it was held that failure to frame a charge under section 302 was a serious lacuna and the conviction was set aside on the ground that the accused had been prejudiced.\n\nA careful examination of these two cases does not reveal any substantial conflict between them.\n\nAs I undrstand the prov1s10ns of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a separate procedure is set out for various class of cases triable by a court exercising powers under the Code.\n\nSo far as the framing of a charge is c; oncerned, the Code expressly states the kind of cases in which no charge is to be framed.\n\nIn trial of warrant cases, cases before a Court of Sessions and a High Court, a charge must be framed. Failure to frame a charge in such cases would be a contravention of the mandatory provisions of the Code. Would such contravention amount to an illegality? Prima\n\n\\ f acie a conviction of an accused person for an offence with which he had not been, charged but for which he ought to have been charged, is invalid. It is said that by virtue of the provisions of sections 535 and 537 of the Code failure to frame a charge or an omission or irregularity in a charge, which is framed, does not by itself invalidate the conviction, unless the Court is satisfied that in fact a failure of justice has resulted.\n\nIt is, therefore, necessary to examine how far these provisions of the Code override its provisions relating to the framing of charges.\n\nSection 233 of the Code expressly states that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately except in the cases mentioned in secti9ns 234, 235, 236 and 239.\n\nThere is no ambiguity in the language of this section.\n\nWhile it insist upon a separate charge for every distinct. offence it permits a single trial on several charges in the cases mentioned in sections 234, 235, 236 and 239.\n\nSection 233 is a mandatory provision and the force of its direction is not weakened by the fact that another provision of the Code does permit a conviction of an accused for an offence with which he had not been charged.\n\nIn such a case no question of illegality or irregularity arises, as the conviction is expressly authorized by the Code.\n\nThe conviction is valid because of the statute itself and not because of section 535.\n\nThe framing of a charge in trial of cases in which a charge is required to be framed, is one of the important elements in the mode of a trial.\n\nOn the charge framed, after it has been explained to the accused, the plea of guilty or not guilty is recorded.\n\nIf the accused pleads guilty, certain consequences follow. If he pleads not guilty, the trial must proceed according to law.\n\nWhen a charge is not framed, obviously no plea of the accused with reference to it is taken and the trial has proceeded without such a plea.\n\nIs the framing of a charge and the recording of the plea of the accused mere! y a ritual or a fundamental provision of the Code concerning procedure\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam J.\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam ].\n\nin a criminal trial ? I think it is the latter.\n\nAre the express provisions of the Code as to the manner in which a trial is to proceed to be ignored, or considered as satisfied, merely because the Court explained to the accused as to what he was being tried for? I apprehend not.\n\nFor to do so is to replace the provisions of the Code by a procedure unwarranted by tpe statute itself.\n\nIn my opinion, a total absence of a charge from start to finish in a case where the law requires a charge to be framed, is a contravention of the provisions of the Code as to the mode of trial and a conviction of the accused of an offence in such a case is invalid and the question of prejudice does not arise.\n\nNone of the decisions of the Privy Council suggest that in such a case the conviction will be deemed to be valid by virtue of the provisions of section 535, unless the Court is satisfied that there has been a failure of justice.\n\nIn cases where a charge has been framed and there is an omission of irregularity in it, it is difficult to see how the mode of trial is affected.\n\nIn any event, the Code expressly provides that in such cases the conviction need not be set aside, unless, in fact a failure of justice has resulted.\n\nUnder the provisions of section 232 of the Code an appellate Court or a High Court exercising its powers of revision or its powers under Chapter XXVII, must direct a new trial of a case in which an accused person has been convicted of an offence with which he had not been charged, if it is satisfied that he had been misled in his defence by the absence of a charge.\n\nIn such a case a . court is. bound to act according to its prov1S1ons.\n\nBut this does not mean that by virtue of these provisions that which was invalid shall be deemed to be valid, unless, prejudice was shown. It is the provision of section 535 to which reference must be made in order to ascertain whether that which was invalid shall be deemed to be valid, unless the court was satisfied that there had been a failure of justice.\n\nI regard with concern, if not with dismay, a too liberal application of its provisions to all cases in which ti).ere is an absence of a charge,\n\n.although a charge ought to have been framed. It is .difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the provisions of section 535 will or will not be applicable. The facts of each case, as they arise, will have to be carefully considered in order to decide that that which was prima f acie invalid is deemed to be valid by virtue of its provisions. There may be cases where the omission to frame a charge was merely a technical defect in which case section 535 would apply.\n\nOn the other hand, there may be cases where failure to frame a charge affects the mode of trial or it is such a substantial contravention of the provisions of the Code relating to the framing of charges that prejudice may be inferred at once and th~ conviction which was prima facie invalid continued to be so.\n\nIn a criminal trial innocence of an accuse( is presumed, unless there is a statutory presumptior. against him, and the prosecution must prove that the accused is guilty of the offence for which he is being tried..\n\nThe prosecution is in possession of all the evidence upon which it relies to establish its case against the accused.\n\nIt has the privilege to ask the Court to frame charges with respect to the offences which it wishes to establish against the accused. On\n\nthe Court itself a duty is cast to frame charges for offences which, on the evidence, appear to it prima f acie to have been committed. If in spite of this a charge under section 302 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code only is framed against an accused person and not under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, it will be reasonable to suppose that neither the prosecution nor the Court considered the evidence sufficient to prove that murder was committed by the accused and the omission to frame a charge under section 302\n\nmust be regarded as a deliberate act of the Court by way of notice to the accused that he was not being tried for that offence.\n\nIt would not be a case of mere omission to frame a charge. If, therefore, the accused is convir.ted under section 302, I would consider his conviction as invalid, as he was misled in his defence.\n\nIn conclµsion I would point out that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are meant to be\n\n11-65 S. C. India/59\n\nSlaney\n\nTkl State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam J.\n\nJ '( ' 1955\n\nWillie {W.1liam)\n\nSl1m9\n\n.v.\n\nThe Stattof Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam J.\n\nDecember 20.\n\nobeyed Contravention oC.· its . provisions are unnecessary and neither the . prosecution nor the Courts of trial should . ignore -'its. provisions in the hope that they might find shelter under sections 535 and 537 of the Code. , Where the contravention is substantial and a retrial. becomes necessary, public time is wasted and the accused is put to unnecessary harassment and expense. . - . . .\n\nI agree that the appellant's conviction be altered from section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to 304 of the Indian Penal Code and that he be sentenced to J five years' - rigorous imprisonment . . ' ' . - ',\n\nA. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR\n\nM. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R.\n\n(with connected appeal)\n\nDAS, AcnNG\n\nC.J, VIVIAN BosE, J AGANNADIIADAS and B. P. S1NHA JJ.]\n\nBHAGWATI,\n\nConstitution of India-Article 14-Travancore Taratioh on Income (Investigatian Commissian) Act, 1124 (Act XIV. of 1124), s. 5(1)-Whether ultra vires theConstitution -Read along with s. 47(1) of Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121 (Act XXlll of 1121)- High Court-Jurisdiction-Article 226 of the Constitution-Writ Petition against authorised Official-Appointet! under s. 6_ of the Tra\n\nvancore Act (XIV of 11'24)-Investigation Commission-Whether competent under the provisions of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 to invstigate cases_ not referred to it y Government.\n\n The petitioncr...:..:i native 0£ Qllilon within the Travancore State -'-had been assesied' to income-tax for the years 1942 and 1943, the final orders in his assessment having been passed by the Chief Rcvc nue authority of Travancore in December )946 and November 1946\n\nrspectively.\n\nTravanorc ~Taxation on lnc'?mc -(Investigation _<; ommission) Act, 1124. {Act XIV of 1124) modelled on.the Indian Act XXX of 1947,.was passed by the Travancore Legislature, to provide for an investigation .into matters r, elatingto taxation on inc6me. In July 1949, 'the United State ofTravancore and -Cochin was brwght into existence as , a result of i.Iltegration hetweeri the two States. All existing la\\vS of Travancorc were to contin_ue in force by virtue of Ordinance I of 1124 which was later enacted as Act VI of 1125. In, November 1949 the Government of the United State: of Travancre-", "total_entities": 528, "entities": [{"text": "Jagannadhadas J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jagannadhadas J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 348, "end_char": 371, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 373, "end_char": 400, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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R. 54 I. A. 96", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 97037, "end_char": 97054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L. R. 28 I. A. 257", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 97068, "end_char": 97086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Praduh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 97235, "end_char": 97257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l955\n\nWilli~ (William)\n\nSbmey\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhtrra\n\nA!Yar J.\n\nWilli• (William)\n\nSlll1llly\n\nThe State of Madhya Praduh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAbar J.\n\nas to what would be an ill<;, gality as distinguished from an irregularity.", "canonical_name": "Stat1 of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara"}}, {"text": "Abar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97275, "end_char": 97279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l955\n\nWilli~ (William)\n\nSbmey\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhtrra\n\nA!Yar J.\n\nWilli• (William)\n\nSlll1llly\n\nThe State of Madhya Praduh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAbar J.\n\nas to what would be an ill<;, gality as distinguished from an irregularity."}}, {"text": "section 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97443, "end_char": 97454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But thr Lordships rejected this contention pointing out that in the earlier case the procedure adopted was one which the Code", "statute": "But thr Lordships rejected this contention pointing out that in the earlier case the procedure adopted was one which the Code"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97819, "end_char": 97830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98756, "end_char": 98767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. A. Subramania Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98859, "end_char": 98880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When an trial is conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code (as in N. A. Subramania Iyer's case('), the trial is bad, and no question of curing an irregularity arises; but if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of such conduct, the irregularity can be cured under section 537, and nonetheless so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always be the case, a breach of one or more of the very comprehensive provisions of the Code.", "canonical_name": "N. A. Subramania Iyer"}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99138, "end_char": 99149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L. R. 28 I. 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A. 257", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 101562, "end_char": 101580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 101595, "end_char": 101634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Slaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar J.\n\nWillie (William)\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar J.\n\n\"No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice\".", "canonical_name": "Stat1 of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara"}}, {"text": "A!Jar J.\n\nWillie", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101636, "end_char": 101652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Slaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar J.\n\nWillie (William)\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar J.\n\n\"No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice\"."}}, {"text": "Section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102049, "end_char": 102063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102071, "end_char": 102097, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102657, "end_char": 102668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102794, "end_char": 102805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Begu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 102971, "end_char": 102975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Begu's case(') is n example; the conviction was under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code for causing .the disappearance of evidence relatffig to a murder, though the charge was under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103025, "end_char": 103036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103044, "end_char": 103061, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103156, "end_char": 103167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103175, "end_char": 103192, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103194, "end_char": 103210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Haldane observes:-\n\n\" ...... A man may be convicted of an offence, although there has been no charge ."}}, {"text": "section 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103691, "end_char": 103702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 535 and 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103757, "end_char": 103777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104894, "end_char": 104904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105119, "end_char": 105130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105190, "end_char": 105201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aryar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105728, "end_char": 105733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sections ref erred to indicate that in the generality, of cases the omission to frame a charge is\n\nSlanty\n\nThe State ef Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nWillie (William)\n\nSlamy\n\nTheSttJteof Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAbar J.\n\nnot per se fatal."}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 105942, "end_char": 105949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "proposition advanced for the appellants by Mr. Umrigar that where there is no charge, the conviction would be illegal, prejudice or no prejudice.", "canonical_name": "Umrigar"}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106097, "end_char": 106108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106116, "end_char": 106142, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106358, "end_char": 106369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106377, "end_char": 106403, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 225, 226 and 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106540, "end_char": 106565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106825, "end_char": 106836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106844, "end_char": 106870, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107454, "end_char": 107465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 210(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107707, "end_char": 107721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 251(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107726, "end_char": 107740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107749, "end_char": 107760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 236 and 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108153, "end_char": 108173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 34, 114 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108442, "end_char": 108466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108474, "end_char": 108491, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penzance", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109696, "end_char": 109704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the question whether a provision in statute is mandatory or directory, Lord Penzance observed in Howard v. Bodington(1). \""}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 109782, "end_char": 109792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There may be many provisions in Acts of Parliament which, although they are not strictly obeyed yet do not appear to the court to be of that material important to the subject-matter to which they refer, as that the\n\nlgislature could have intended that the non-observance of them should be followed by a total failure of the whole proceedings."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110173, "end_char": 110187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Slaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAar J.\n\nWiilie (William)\n\nSlanry\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAfyar J.\n\nsome provisions in respect of which the court would take an opposite view, and would feel that they are matters which must be strictly obeyed, otherwise the whole proceedings that subsequently follow must come to an end\".", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Afyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110268, "end_char": 110273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Slaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAar J.\n\nWiilie (William)\n\nSlanry\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAfyar J.\n\nsome provisions in respect of which the court would take an opposite view, and would feel that they are matters which must be strictly obeyed, otherwise the whole proceedings that subsequently follow must come to an end\"."}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111624, "end_char": 111635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bery", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 112108, "end_char": 112112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming now to the facts of the present case; William was on terms of intimacy with Bery I P. W. 13."}}, {"text": "Donald Smythe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112148, "end_char": 112161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was the sister of Donald Smythe."}}, {"text": "Beryl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112301, "end_char": 112306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The br<>- ther did not like their intimacy and was making attempts to separate Beryl from the ac.cused."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113340, "end_char": 113351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113359, "end_char": 113376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113465, "end_char": 113476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113777, "end_char": 113789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114148, "end_char": 114159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114167, "end_char": 114184, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114387, "end_char": 114398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Willie !William} Slaney", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114554, "end_char": 114577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IMAM J.-I agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. but\n\nWillie !", "canonical_name": "WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAryar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114611, "end_char": 114632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "William} Slaney v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nSlanry\n\nThe SJate of Madh;'a Pradesh\n\nImam ].", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115550, "end_char": 115561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115572, "end_char": 115583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115591, "end_char": 115608, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115645, "end_char": 115656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Qf the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115657, "end_char": 115681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115974, "end_char": 115985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qf the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Qf the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116227, "end_char": 116253, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 535 and 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116963, "end_char": 116983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117345, "end_char": 117356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 234, 235, 236 and 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117790, "end_char": 117820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117823, "end_char": 117834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118239, "end_char": 118250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Imam J.\n\nSlaney", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118965, "end_char": 118980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y a ritual or a fundamental provision of the Code concerning procedure\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam J.\n\nSlaney\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam ]."}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119863, "end_char": 119874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120271, "end_char": 120282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120850, "end_char": 120861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121322, "end_char": 121333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121653, "end_char": 121664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302 read with 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122633, "end_char": 122658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122666, "end_char": 122683, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122739, "end_char": 122750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122758, "end_char": 122775, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122979, "end_char": 122990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123227, "end_char": 123238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 123377, "end_char": 123403, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123480, "end_char": 123484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In conclµsion I would point out that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are meant to be\n\n11-65 S. C. India/59\n\nSlaney\n\nTkl State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam J.\n\nJ '( ' 1955\n\nWillie {W.1liam)\n\nSl1m9\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "IMAM"}}, {"text": "Stattof Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 123536, "end_char": 123558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stattof Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam J.\n\nDecember 20.", "canonical_name": "Stat1 of Madhya Pradesh\n\nChandrasekhara"}}, {"text": "sections 535 and 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123777, "end_char": 123797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124037, "end_char": 124048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124056, "end_char": 124073, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124088, "end_char": 124105, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124188, "end_char": 124213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR\n\nM. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R.\n\n(with connected appeal)\n\nDAS, AcnNG\n\nC.J, VIVIAN BosE, J AGANNADIIADAS and B. P. S1NHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124215, "end_char": 124237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR\n\nM. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R.\n\n(with connected appeal)\n\nDAS, AcnNG\n\nC.J, VIVIAN BosE, J AGANNADIIADAS and B. P. S1NHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124301, "end_char": 124312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR\n\nM. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R.\n\n(with connected appeal)\n\nDAS, AcnNG\n\nC.J, VIVIAN BosE, J AGANNADIIADAS and B. P. S1NHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "AGANNADIIADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124316, "end_char": 124329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR\n\nM. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R.\n\n(with connected appeal)\n\nDAS, AcnNG\n\nC.J, VIVIAN BosE, J AGANNADIIADAS and B. P. S1NHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S1N", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124340, "end_char": 124343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124363, "end_char": 124384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124385, "end_char": 124395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124483, "end_char": 124490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124544, "end_char": 124552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124556, "end_char": 124587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124633, "end_char": 124644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121", "statute": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124724, "end_char": 124728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121", "statute": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121"}}, {"text": "Investigation Commission-Whether competent under the provisions of the Travancore Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124769, "end_char": 124854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 124975, "end_char": 124985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioncr...:..:i native 0£ Qllilon within the Travancore State -'-had been assesied' to income-tax for the years 1942 and 1943, the final orders in his assessment having been passed by the Chief Rcvc nue authority of Travancore in December )946 and November 1946\n\nrspectively."}}, {"text": "Travanorc", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 125207, "end_char": 125216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Travanorc ~Taxation on lnc'?mc -(Investigation <; ommission) Act, 1124. {"}}, {"text": "Indian Act XXX of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125314, "end_char": 125336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United State ofTravancore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 125478, "end_char": 125503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In July 1949, 'the United State ofTravancore and -Cochin was brwght into existence as , a result of i.Iltegration hetweeri the two States."}}, {"text": "Travancorc", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 125620, "end_char": 125630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All existing la\\vS of Travancorc were to continue in force by virtue of Ordinance I of 1124 which was later enacted as Act VI of 1125."}}, {"text": "Government of the United State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125756, "end_char": 125786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In, November 1949 the Government of the United State: of Travancre-"}}, {"text": "Travancre-", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 125791, "end_char": 125801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In, November 1949 the Government of the United State: of Travancre-"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1196_1247_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "J '( ' 1955\n\nWillie {W.1liam)\n\nSl1m9\n\n.v.\n\nThe Stattof Madhya Pradesh\n\nImam J.\n\nDecember 20.\n\n- 1196 :\n\n, SUPREME COURT REPORTS .· [1955]\n\nobeyed Contravention oC.· its . provisions are unnecessary and neither the . prosecution nor the Courts of trial should . ignore -'its. provisions in the hope that they might find shelter under sections 535 and 537 of the Code. , Where the contravention is substantial and a retrial. becomes necessary, public time is wasted and the accused is put to unnecessary harassment and expense. . - . . .\n\nI agree that the appellant's conviction be altered from section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to 304 of the Indian Penal Code and that he be sentenced to J five years' - rigorous imprisonment . . ' ' . - ',\n\nA. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR\n\nM. VENKITACHALAM.POTTI AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R.\n\n(with connected appeal)\n\nDAS, AcnNG\n\nC.J, VIVIAN BosE, J AGANNADIIADAS and B. P. S1NHA JJ.]\n\nBHAGWATI,\n\nConstitution of India-Article 14-Travancore Taratioh on Income (Investigatian Commissian) Act, 1124 (Act XIV. of 1124), s. 5(1)-Whether ultra vires theConstitution -Read along with s. 47(1) of Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121 (Act XXlll of 1121)- High Court-Jurisdiction-Article 226 of the Constitution-Writ Petition against authorised Official-Appointet! under s. 6_ of the Tra\n\nvancore Act (XIV of 11'24)-Investigation Commission-Whether competent under the provisions of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 to invstigate cases_ not referred to it y Government.\n\n The petitioncr...:..:i native 0£ Qllilon within the Travancore State -'-had been assesied' to income-tax for the years 1942 and 1943, the final orders in his assessment having been passed by the Chief Rcvc nue authority of Travancore in December )946 and November 1946\n\nrspectively.\n\nTravanorc ~Taxation on lnc'?mc -(Investigation _<; ommission) Act, 1124. {Act XIV of 1124) modelled on.the Indian Act XXX of 1947,.was passed by the Travancore Legislature, to provide for an investigation .into matters r, elatingto taxation on inc6me. In July 1949, 'the United State ofTravancore and -Cochin was brwght into existence as , a result of i.Iltegration hetweeri the two States. All existing la\\vS of Travancorc were to contin_ue in force by virtue of Ordinance I of 1124 which was later enacted as Act VI of 1125. In, November 1949 the Government of the United State: of Travancre-\n\nCochin issued orders under s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 and 1943 (called Evasion Cases Nos. 1 & 2 of 1125) for investigation by the Travancore Income-Tax Investigation Commission.\n\nBefore the Commission could make its report the Constitution of India came into force and the United State of Travancore-Cochin became a part of India (Part B State) and the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was continued in force until altered, amended or repealed by a competent authority.\n\nIn April 1950 Parliament passed Act XXXIII of 1950 whereby Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, (Act XXX of 1947) was extended to Travancore-Cochin and the law of Travancore corresponding to Act XXX of 1947 was to continue in force with certain modifications. In October 1951, a notification issued by the Indian Investigation Commission appointed Respondent No. 1 as an authorised official under s. 6 of Travancore Act XIV of 1124 read with Act XXXIII of 1950. Respondent No. 1 sent a copy of that notification to the petitioner on 21st November, 1951 for his information and further intimated to him that the investigation proposed to be conducted will not be confined to the year> 1942 and 1943 but that it would be necessary for him to investigate the petitioner's income for the period from 1940 to the last completed assessment year.\n\nThe petitioner filed a writ petition in the Travancore High Court against Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 (Indian Income-Tax Investigation Commission) for a writ of prohibition or any other writ prohibiting the Respondents from holding an enquiry into the cases registered as Evasion Cases Nos. 1 & 2 of 1125 or from holding an investigation into the income of the petitioner from the year 1940 to the last completed assessment year.\n\nThe Travancore High Court held that the Respondent No. 2 had all the powers that the Travancore Commission had under Travancore Act XIV of 1124 and no more and granted the writ prohibiting respondents from conducting an enquiry into years other than 1942 and 1943.\n\nBoth the parties appealed to the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court. A preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the writ petition was repeated in the Supreme Court by the Attorney-General.\n\nHeld, that the High Court had jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ against Respondent No. 1 because under the provisions of s. 6 of the Travancore Act XIV. of 1124 the authorised official (Respondent No. 1) had considerable pmv, rs conferred upon him in the conduct of the investigation, and if he did anything as authorised official which was not authorised by law or was violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner as in the present case he would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nHeld, further that under the provisions of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 the Commission had no authority to investigate any case suo motu. It could only investigate cases referred to it by\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nYo M. Vmkila&halam\n\nPolti and another\n\n.A. Thagol KURja\n\nM.,..J; ar ...\n\nM.Vmkila</ul/am\n\nPoui ll1ld llMt/1#\n\nGovernment.\n\nAll that was done in the preserit case was that by two separate orders made under s. 5(1) of the Act the C'-r0vernment referred two cases of the petitioner for the two years 1942 and 1943 to the Commission. There was no other order under s. 5(1) at any time before 16th February 1950 and none could be made under that sub-section after that date.\n\nTherefore neither Respondent No. 2 nor Respondent No. 1 who had been appointed as authorised Official by Respondent No. 2 had jurisdiction to cover any period beyond the two specific years 1942 and 1943 and the notice dated 21st November 1951 issued by Respondent No. 1 to investigate the petitioner's income for the period from 1940 to the last completed assessment year was clearly illegal and without jurisdiction.\n\nHeld, also that s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 which is to be read in juxta-position with s. 47 of the Travancore Income-Tax Act, 1121 {XXIII of 1121) is not discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nSection 47( 1) of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1!21 was directed only against those persons concerning \\Vhom definite information came into the possession of the Income-tax Officer an<l in consequence of which the Income-tax Officer discovered that the income of those persons had escaped or been under-assessed or assessse<l at too low a rate or had been the subject of excessive relief. The class of persons envisaged by s. 47(1) was a definite class about which there was definite information leading to discovery within 8 years or 4 years as the case may be of definite item or items of incomcwhich had escaped assessment. The action to be taken under Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 was not confined to escapement from assessn1ent of income inade during the war period (September 1939 to 1946). Action could be taken in respect of income which escaped assessment even before the war and also more than 8 years after the end of the war.\n\nOn the other hand under s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 the class of persons sought to be reached comprised only these persons about whom there was no definite information and no discovery of any definite item or items of income w}:iich escaped taxation but about whom the Government had only prima facic reason to believe that they had evaded payment of tax to a substantial amount. Further, action under s. 5(1) read with s. 8(2) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was definitely limited to the evasion -of payment of taxation on income made during the war period and therefore s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was not discriminatory in comparison with s. 47(1) of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121.\n\n. Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao ([1953] S.C.R. 1144), K. S. Rashid & Son v. The Income-tax Investigation CommissiOn, etc. ( [1954 l S.C.R. 738), Azmat Ullah v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, U.P., Lucknow (A.I.R. .1955 All. 435), Burhanpur\n\nNation,,/ Textile Wol'kers Union, Burhanpur v. Labour Appellate Tribumil of India at Bombay and others (A.LR. 1955 Nag. 148), /oginde1: Singh Waryam Singh v. Director, Rural Rehabilitation, Pepsu, Patiala and others (A.LR. 1955 Pepsu 91), Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India ([1950] S.C.R. 869), Budhan Chowdhury and others v. The State of Bihar ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045), Suraj .\\fall 1Hohta & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and another ( 119551 1 S.C.R. 448), Sh1ee Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Sri A. V. Visva- 11atha Sastri and Another ( [1955] I S.C.R. 787), Astvini Kumar Ghose's case (!1953 J S.C.R. 1), Subodh Gopal Bose's case ([1954] S.C.R. 587, 62il), Kathi Raning Ratl'at v. The State of Saurashtl'a (11952] S.C.R. 4.15). Palser Y. Grinling (119481 A.C. 291) and Kedar Nath Bajoria\n\nv. The State of West Bengal (1954] S.C.R. 30), referred to.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1cnoN : Civil Appeals Nos. 21 and 22 of 1954.\n\nAppeals under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the 18th September 1953 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court at Ernakulam in 0. P. No. 41 of 1952.\n\nM. K. Nambiar, (N. Palpu, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain) for the appellant in C. A. No. 21 of 1954 and respondent in C. A. No. 22 of 1954.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi), R. Ganapatlzy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and R. H.\n\nDhebar), for the respondents in C. A. No. 21 of 1954 and appellants in C. A. No. 22 of 1954.\n\n1955. December 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBttAGWATI J.-These two appeals with certificates under article 133 of the Constitution are directed against a judgment of the High Court of Travancore- Cochin in a writ petition filed by one A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar, hereinafter called the petitioner.\n\nThe petitioner is a native of Quilon within the Travancore State which was originally under the sovereignty of the Maharaja of Travancore. He is the Managing Director of Messrs.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju Musaliar & Sons Ltd., Quilon, and had been assessed to income-tax for the years 1942 and 1943 and the final orders in his assessment for the said years were\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. YmkiJa&holam\n\nPoffi and (IJl/}f/utr,\n\n..!. Tlllmgal ir .. ju\n\nMusalia!-\n\nM. VmlUadialam\n\nPotti and anolhir\n\nBhagwali].\n\npassed by the Chief Revenue Authority of Travancore on the 6th December 1946 and 30th November 1946 respectively.\n\nOn the 7th March 1949, the Travancore Legislature passed Act XIV of 1124 (M.E.) modelled on our Act XXX of 1947, styled the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act 1124, to provide for an investigation into matters relating to taxation on income. Section 1 (3) of the Act provided that it was to come into force on such date as the Travancore Government may by notification in the Government Gazette appoint.\n\nUnder section 3, a Commission to be called the Income-tax Investigation Commission was to be constituted inter alia to investigation in accordance with the provisions of the Act cases referred to . it under section 5 and report thereon to the Government.\n\nThe Commission was to be appointed to act in the first instance up to the last day of Karkadakom 1125 (16-8-1950) but the Government was empowered to extend its appointment to any period up to the last day of l(arkadakom 1126 ( 16-8-1951).\n\nSection 5 ( 1) enacted that the Government might, at any time before the last day <Jf Makaram 1125 (15-2-1950) refer to the Commission for investigation and report any case or points in a case in which the Government had prima facie reasons for belief that a person had to a substantial extent evaded payment of tax on income together with such material as might be available in support of such belief. Section 6 prescribed the powers of the Commission and inter alia provided for the appointment by the Commission of an authorised official to examine accounts or documents, interrogate persons or obtain statements from persons.\n\nOn the 1st July 1949, the Travancore State and the Cochin State integrated with each other and there was brought into existence the United State of Tra\".ancore and Cochin.\n\nBy virtue of Ordinance I of 1124 promulgated on the same day, called the United State of Travancore and Cochin Administration and Application of Laws Ordinance, 1124 (Ordinance I was enacted later as Act VI of 1125),\n\nall existing laws of Travancore were to continue in force till altered, amended or repealed by competent .authority.\n\nThe existing law of Travancore was defined to mean any law in force in the State of Travancore immediately prior to the 1st July 1949.\n\nOn the 26th July 1949, a notification was published in the Travancore-Cochin Government Gazette whereby, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 1(3) of the Travancore Taxation on Income Investigation Commission) Act XIV of 1124 as continued in force by the United State of Travancore and Cochine Administration & Application of Laws (Ordinance, 1124 (I of 1124), the Government appointed the 7th Karkadakom 1124 (22-7-1949) to be the date -0n which the said Act was to have come into force\n\nOn the 26th November 1949 the Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin issued orders under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 .and 1943 for investigation by the Travancore Income-tax Investigation Commission.\n\nThese orders had specific reference to the years 1942 and 1943 and the investigation to be made by the Commission was with reference to the alleged evasion of tax by t1'e petitioner for those respective years.\n\nThe cases were registered as Evasion Cases 1 and 2 of 1125.\n\nOn the 10th December 1949 the petitioner received from the Secretary of the ComJ:\"ission a notice in regard to the said cases. The relevant portion of the said notice stated:\n\n\"Whereas the Income-tax Investigation Com mission having been informed that a substantial portion of your income for 1942 and 1943 has escaped -assessment, has ordered investigation into the matter, you are hereby required to produce the following on -or before 21-12-1949 before the Commission.\n\n1. The account books (day books and ledgers) :for the years 1942 and 1943 • . 2. 3. 4. . ...\n\nA. T lllmgal Kunju\n\nMUS!lliar\n\nM. Y lllkilackalam\n\nPotti and fJtUJt/zlr\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nA. Thangal K1Jnj\"\n\nMusaliar\n\n\"· M. V enkitachalam\n\nPotti and anoth\"\n\nBhagwati].\n\n5. 6.\n\nPursuant to this notice the petitioner produced the relevant books and the Commission duly completed its investigation under the terms of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124: Before the Commission could, however, make itsc report, the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January 1950 and the United State of Travancore and Cochin became a part of the territory of India, forming a Part 'B' State.\n\nUnder article 372(1) of the Constitution, the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1124 (Travancore Act XIV of 1124) was continued in force \"until altered, amended or repealed by a competent authority\".\n\nAn Indian States Finance Enquiry Committee had been appointed in 1948-49 and it had made its recommendations regarding the agreements to be entered into between the President of the Union and the Rajpramukhs in regard to financial arrangements.\n\nIn accordance with the recommendations of the Com-- mittee, an agreement was entered into on the 25th February 1950 between the President of the Union and the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin in regard' to these matters and on the 31st March 1950 the Finance Act, .1950 (Act XXV of 1950) came \"into force and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) was extended to Travancore-Cochin.\n\nOn the 18th April 1950, the Opium and Revenue Laws (Extention of Application) Act, 1950, being Act XXXIII of 1950, was passed by Parliament extending to Travancore-Cochin Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947\n\n(XXX of\n\n1947) and section 3 of that Act provided that the law of Travancore corresponding to the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947) shall continue to remain in force with the following modifications, viz.,\n\n(a) that all cases referred to or pending before the State Commission (by whatever name called) in respect of matters relating to taxation on income\n\nother than agricultural income shall stand transferred to the Central Commission for disposal; and\n\n(b) that the State law shall, so far as may be, apply to determine the procedure that may be followed and powers that may be exercised by the Central Commission in the disposal of cases transferred under clause (a).\n\nThe Travancot='c Commission had been appointed in the first instance to act up to the last day of Karkadakom 1125 (16-8-1950).\n\nNeither the Travancore Commission nor the Indian Commission to which\n\nthe pending cases before the Travancore Commission were transferred as aforesaid made any report on these casrs of the petitioner before the expiry of this period nor was any extension of the term of appoint-- ment of the Travancore Commission made up to the\n\nlat day of Karkadakom 1126 (16-8-1951) as originally contemplated.\n\nOn the 25th August 1951, therefore,, the Opium and Revenue Laws (Extension of Application) Amendment Act, 1951, being Act XLIV of 1951, was passed amending Act XXXIII of 1950 whereby it was provided that in the place of clause (b) of section 3 of Act XXXIII of 1950, the following\n\nclause shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been substituted, viz., \"in the disposal of cases transferred to the Central Commission the Commission shall have and exercise the s:tme powers as it has and exercise in the investigation 9£ cases referred to it under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947) and shall be entitled to act for same term as under subsectic•n (3) of section 4 of that Act\" and it was furher provided that any decision given by the Chief Revenue Authority of Travancore or of Travancore-Cochin shall be deemed a decision of the Income-tax Auth<> rity for the purposes of sub-section\n\n(2) of section 8 of the Travancore Act XIV off 1124.\n\nOn the 18th October 1951, a notification was issued by the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission appointing M. V enkitachalam Potty, Income-tax Officer on Special Duty, Trivandrum, as an\n\nA. Thanga IKUllp\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachdam-\n\nPotti and another>\n\nBha, f<Wali J;\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti orid another\n\nBhagwaJi].\n\nauthorised official under , section 6 of the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1124 read with Act XXXIII of 1950. The authorised official, hereinafter - referred to as respondent l, forwarded to the petitioner on the 21st November 1951 for his information a copy of that notification investing him with the powers of an authorised official and intimated that the investigation proposed to be conducted will no be confined to the years 1942 and 1943, the two years originally covered by Evasion Cases Nos. l and 2 of 1125 but that it would be necessary for him to investigate the petitioner's income for the period from 1940 to the last completed asse\"- ment year notwithstanding the fact that the erstwhile State Commission had not specifically intimated to him that they proposed to cover the full period.\n\n; rhe petitioner, by his registered letter dated the 23rd February 1952 pointed out to respondent 1 the illegality of the steps proposed to be taken by him to 'which, however, the la_tter replied - by his letter dated the 13th March 1952 stati1ig that he proposed to consider income for the full investigation period, viz., from 1940 -to the last completed assessment year.\n\nThe petitioner thereupon filed on the 6th May 1952 a writ petition in the High Court of Travancore- Cochin, being 0. P. 41 of 1952 against respondent 1 as also the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission, hereinafter called respondent 2, for a writ of prohibition or any other appropriate writ or direction prohibiting the respondents from holding any enquiry into the cases registered as Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125 on the file of Income-tax Investigation Commission of Travancore or from holding any investigation into the income of the petitioner from 1940 to the last completed assessment year or for any other period.\n\nRespondent 1 filed a counter-affidavit in which it was inter alia submitted:\n\n\"that the Commission by these proceedings is not trying to clutch at non-existent jurisdiction.\n\nThey are fully prepared to shape their proceedings in accordance with the direction of this Hon'ble Court\".\n\nThis affidavit was stated to have been filed as the answer of both the counter-petitioners, viz., respondents 1 and 2 and respondent 1 stated that he had been fully authorised to do so.\n\nThe writ petition was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court consisting of K. T. Koshi C. J. and P. K. Subramonia Iyer and M. S. Menon,\n\nJJ.\n\nThe learned Judges held that respondent 2 had all thl\". powers that the Travancore Commission had undi; r the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 and no more and accordingly issued a writ prohibiting respondent l from conducting an investigation into years other than 1942 and 1943 observing that any attempt to enlarge the scope of the enquiry was without legislative warrant.\n\nThe petitioner appealed in so far as the order of the High Court was against him permitting the enquiry for the years 1942 and 1943, his appeal being Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1954.\n\nRespondents 1 and 2 appealed against the order of the High Court in so\n\nfar as it prohibited respondent 1 from conducting investigation for the years which were not covered by the Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125, their appeal being Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1954.\n\nBoth these appeals came for hearing and final disposal before us on the 20th September 1955.\n\nAfter the argument had proceeded for some time Shri Nambiyar, for the petitioner, asked for leave to urge additional grounds, viz., (a) that section 5 ( 1) of Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was ultra vires under articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, and (b) that in particular the said section 5 ( 1) infringed article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it was not based on any rational classification whatsoever, and the word \"substantial\" therein could not possibly be deemed to be any form of classification.\n\nOn our giving him such leave the 'learned Attorney-General, appearing for respondents 1 and 2 asked for time to put in an affidavit showing the background against which Travancore Act XIV of 1124 had been passed by the Travancore Legislature.\n\nAn affidavit was accordingly filed before us by Gauri Shanker, Secretary of\n\nA. Thangol Kunju\n\nMusolior\n\nM. V enkittUholam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhogwati].\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBh.agwali].\n\n(espondent 2 setting out facts and events as and by way of answer to these new contentions of the peti-. ti oner.\n\nA preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the writ pet1t10n may be dealt with first. This objection was not taken in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, they having expressed their readiness to shape their proceed-- ings in accordance with the directions of the Court.\n\nThe \"learned Advocate-General of Travancore-Cochin however, urged before the High Court that the Court was not competent to entertain the petition in view of the that that respondent 2 was not amenable to its jurisdiction and the argument was that as respondent 2 functioned outside the State of Travancore- Cochin and respondent 1 was a mere subordinate of respondent 2, it was beyond the competence of the High Court to grant the prayer embodied in the petition.\n\nThe High Court overruled the objection observing, that respondent 1 was resident within the State of Travancore-Cochin, his office was situated at Trivandrum, all his communications to the petition.er had emanated from within the State and the act1v1t1es complained about were acuv1t1es confined to the State.\n\nIt was of the opinion that the prayer in the petition was, in essence, a prayer to paralyse the hands of respondent 1 and thus prevent the mischief and that, by his residence and the location of his office within the State, respondent 1 was clearly amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court under article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nIt was further of opinion that the writ against respondent 1, if issued, was sufficient for stopping the mischief complained about and therefore it was unnecessary for it to decide whether or not a writ could be issued so far as respondent 2 was concerned.\n\nIt, therefore, issued the necessary writ of prohlbition against respondent 1.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General pressed this preliminary objection at the outset while arguing Civir Appeal No. 22 of 1954.. He pointed out that respondent 2 had its office in New Delhi and was permanently located' there and the mere fact of its having appointed: respondent 1 to function and carry on the investigation within the State of Travancore under its direction did not make it amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court. He, therefore, contended that the High Court had no jurisdicion to entertain the writ petition Jgainst respondent 2. He further contended that the High Court could not .do indirectly what it was not able to do directly an<l that it could not issue any writ of prohibition against respondent 1 either even though he had his office at Trivandrum and had a permanent location within the jurisdiction of the High Court inasmuch as he was merely an arm of respondent 2 and any writ issued against him would have the indirect effect of prohj_biting respondent 2 from exercising its legitimate functions within the ambit of its powers under the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 read with A.ct XXX of 1950 and Act XLIV of 1951.\n\nReliance was placed by him on the decision of this Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka T'enkat.1 Rao(1 ).\n\nThe respondent in that case had applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 for a writ restraining the Election Commission, a statutory authority constituted by the Presi<lent and having its office permanently located at New Delhi from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly, and a single Judge of the High Court had issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission from doing so. The Election Commission filed an ; ippeal to this Court arid agitated the question of the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 to issue the writ agai.11st it.\n\nWhile discussing this question, Patanjali Sastri C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed as under:-\n\n\"Rut wide as were the powers thus conferred, a two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise.\n\nIn the first place, the power is to exercised \"throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises ·\n\njurisdiction'', that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction.\n\nSecondly, the person or authority to\n\n(I) [1953] SCR 1!44.\n\nA. Tlzangal Ku, Yu\n\nUusaliar\n\nM. Vtnkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhagwali].\n\nA. Thangal Ku, Yu\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPatti and another\n\nBhagwaliJ.\n\nwhom the .writs must ly implies tion either tories\".\n\nHigh Court is empowered to issue such be \"within those territories\" , which clearthat they must be amenable to its jurisdicby residence or location within those terri-\n\nThe learned Chief Justice then traced the origin and development of the power to issue prerogative writs as a special remedy in England and observed at page 1151:-\n\n\"These writs were thus specifically directed to the persons or authorities against whom redress was sought and were made returnable in the Court issuing them and, in case of disobedience, were enforceable by attachment for contempt.\n\nThese characteristics of the special form of remedy rendered it necessary for its effective use that the persons or authorities to whom the Court was asked to issue these writs should be within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction\".\n\nThe mere functioning, of the tribunal or authority permanently located and nurmally carrying on its activities elsewhere, within the territorial limits was not considered sufficient to invest the High Court with jurisdiction under article 226 nor was the accrual of...,. the cause of action within the territories considered sufficient for the purpose.\n\nThe residence or location within the territories of the person or authority was considered a condition of the High Court being empowered to issue such writs with the result that the Election Commission having its office permanently located at New Delhi was held not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court for the issue of a writ under article 226.\n\nThis decision in Saka Venkata Rao's case was followed by this Court in K. S. Rashid & Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission, etc.(').\n\nIn that case, the assessees who were within the State of U.P. and whose original assessments were made by the ipcome-tax authorities of that State had filed writ petitions in the Punjab High Court for the issue of writs under article 226 to the Income-tax Investigation Commission located in Delhi and investigating\n\n(1) [1954] SCR 738 ..\n\ntheir cases under section 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947.\n\nThe Punjab High Court had sustained the objection urged on bi; half of the respondents to the effect that the assessees having belonged to the State of U.P. their assessment was to be made by the Income-tax Commissioner of that State and the mere fact that the location of . the Investigation Commission was in Delhi would not confer jurisdiction on the Punjab High Court to issue writs under article 226 and had dismissed the petitions.\n\nThis Court, on appeal, distinguished the decision in Parlakimidi's case which was sought to be relied upon by the respondents before it and followed the position in law as it had been enunciated in Saka Venkata Rao's case supra, and held that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ under article 226 to the Investigation Commission which was located in Delhi in spite of the fact that the assessees were within the State of U.P. and their original assessments were made by the income-tax authorities of that State.\n\nThe principle of these decisions would, it was urged by the learned Attorney-General, eliminate respondent 2 and the High Court of Travancore-Cochin would have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against it.\n\nIt was, however, urged on behalf of the petitioner that, in the affidavit filed by the respondents, both the respondents had submitted that they were fully prepared to shape their proceedings in accordance with the directions of the Court. This, it was submitted, was a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the High Court investing the High Court with jurisdiction to issue the appropriate writ against respondent 2.\n\nWe need not, however, express any opinion on this point because no writ was in fact issued by the High Court against respondent 2 nor was any appeal filed by the petitioner against that part of the decision of the High Court.\n\nThe real question, however, is whether a writ could issue against respondent 1 who is, it was submitted, a mere arm of respondent 2 and a writ against whom.\n\nA. Thangal KUJ!iu\n\nMusaliar v.\n\nM. V1nkitae/ullam\n\nPotti artd a11otlwi\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n.. A. Thanxal Kunju\n\nMu.salitJT\n\nM. Vtnkitacludam\n\nPotti anJ anothtr\n\n-Bhagwa#J.\n\nwould be equivalent to a writ issued by the High Court against respondent 2 which it had no jurisdiction. to do.\n\nAn authorised official derives his appointment from the O>rnmission under section 6 of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124.\n\nSection 6(4) of the Act provides that if in the course of any investigatior> conducted by the Commission it appears to the Commission to he necessary to examine any accounts or tlocuments of ta interrogate any person or to obtain any statement from any person the Commission may authorise any income-tax authority not below the rank of an\n\nincome-tax officer (called the \"authorised official\") in that behalf subject to such directions as may be issued by the Commission from time to time and the authorised official shall examine the accounts or documents, interrogate the personi and obtain the statements from the persons.\n\nThe authorised official is invested, under section 6, sub-section (5), subject to the direction of the Commission, with the same powers . as the Commission under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) which empower the Commission to require any person or banking or other company to prepare and furnish written statements of accounts and affairs giving information on such points or matters as in the opinion of the Commission may directly or indirectly be useful or relevant to any case referred to it; to administer' oaths and exercise all powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing attend- aJlce of witnesses and of persons whose cases are being investigated, compelling the production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and to impound and retain in its custody for such period as it thinks fit any documents produced before it.\n\nThe authorised official is, under section 6, sub-section (10), to have full and free access to all documents, books and other papers which in his opinion are relevant to the proceedings in any case or cases under the Act and if specially authorised in this behalf by the Commission to any buildings and places where he may have reason to believe that such books,\n\ndocuments or papers may be found and also to have power to place identification marks on such books, documents or papers and to make extracts or copies therefrom or if he considers it necessary to take possession of or seize such books, documents or papers.\n\nUnder section 6, sub-section ( 11), the authorised official is deemed to be a public servant wihin the meaning of section 16 of the Travancore Penal Code (I of\n\n1074).\n\nIt is clear from the above provisions that the authorised official has considerable powers conferred upon him in the conduct of the investigation and even though he could be called a mere arm of the Commission or an authorised agent of the Commission, he has important functions to discharge and is not merely a mouth-piece of the Commission or a conduit-pipe transmitting the orders or the directions of the Commission.\n\nHe is no doubt under the general control and supervision of the Commission but he performs the various functions assigned to him on his own initiative and in the exercise of his discretion.\n\nIf, therefore, he does anything in the discharge of his functions as authorised official which is not authorised by law or is violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner, he would be amenable to the iunstktion of the High Court under article 226.\n\nEven though this is the prima facie position, it was urged that he is acting under the directions of the Commission as its authorised agent and as such no writ can issue against him, because the principal who directs the activities and not the agent would be liable for the same.\n\nThis contention is unsound.\n\nThere can be no agency in the matter of the commission of a wrong.\n\nThe wrong doer would certainly be liable to be dealt . with as the party directly responsible for his wrongful action.\n\nThe relationship between principal and agent would only be relevant for the purpose of determining whether the principal also is vicariously liable for the wrong perpetrated by his agent.\n\nOn the analogy of criminal liability, the 22-85 S. C. India/59\n\nA, T hangal K 1111ju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Tienkilachalam\n\nPotti and another -· Bhagwali ].\n\nA. Thangal KU1jju\n\nMusa liar\n\n•• M. V tnkitachalam\n\nPetti and anotktr\n\nBhagwati].\n\noffender could certainly not be heard to say that he was comm1ttmg the offence under the behest or directions of his principal. On the analogy of a civil wrong, the tortfeasor fould certainly not protect himself against liability on the ground of having committed the tort under the directions of his principal. The agent could in no event exculpate himself from liability for the wrongful act done by him and if he is thus amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court the fligh Court could certainly issue an appropriate writ against him under article 226.\n\nThe jurisdiction under article 226 is exercised by the High Court in order to protect and safeguard the rights of the citizens and wherever the High Court finds that any person within its territories is guilty of iloing an act which is not authorised by' law or is violative of the fundamental rights of the citizen, it exercises that jurisdiction in order to vindicate his rights :rnd redress his grievances and the only conditions of its exercise of that jurisdiction are those laid down in the passage from Patanjali Sastri, C. J.'s judgment cited above. The argument that by issuing a writ against the agent under those circumstances the High Court would be putting him in a position whereby he would be compelled to disobey the directions of his principal is also of no avail for the simple reason that an agent is bound to obey all lawful directions of his principal anc? not directions which the High Court holds to be unlawful or not justified in law. The agent could certainly be prohibited from obeying the unlawful directions of his principal and even if the principal cannot be reached by reason of his being outside the territories, the arm of the law could certainly reach the agent who is guilty of having committed the wrong and the High Court could certainly issue a writ against him under aricle 226.\n\nIt was further contended that by issuing such a writ agaimt the authorised official the High Court would be indirectly prohibiting the Commission from conducting the investigation within the territories even though it could not directly prohibit the Commission from doing so.\n\nIf the Commission was doing something within the territories through its auth~ rised official which was not justified in law, it would not lie in the mouth of the Commission to urge that the High Court. could not issue a writ of prohibition against its agent, the authorised official, who had his residence or permanent location within the territories merely because it would be indirectly prohibited from perpetrating a wrong within the territories.\n\nThe principal could, in no event urge that his agent should be allowed to function for him wihin the territories in a manner which was not warranted by law or had no justification in law. It is expected that once this Court has declared the law the Investigation Commission would comply with it and not place its agent in the wrong by directing him to act contrary to the law so declared.\n\nOur attention was drawn by the learned Attorney- General in this connection to three recent decisions of the High Courts of Allahaba<l, Nagpur and Pepsu which, according to him, supported his contention, viz., Azmat Ullah v.\n\nCustodian, Evacuee Prope;-t)'.\n\nU.P., Lttcknow (1), Burlianpur National Textile Worker.c\n\nUnion, Burhanpur v.\n\nLabour Appellate Tribunal of India at Bomba.v and others (2) and f oginder Singh\n\nWaryam Singh v. Director, Rural Rehabilitation, Pepm, Patia/a and others ('1).\n\nThese decisions, however, are clearly not in point for, in each of them, the order passed by the authority within the territories and accordingly wihin the jurisdiction of the High Court concerne<l had merged in the order of the superior authority which was located outside the territories and was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of that High Court.\n\nIn that situation, a writ against the inferior authority within the territories could be of no avail to the petitioner concerned and could give him no relief for the order of the superior authority outside the territories would remain outstanding and operative against him.\n\nAs, therefore, no writ could be issued against that outside authority and as the (I) A.I.R. 1955 All 435.\n\n(2) ,\\.l.R. 19551\\'a~. 1-18.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1955 Pt•psu !JI.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v.\n\nM. Venkitachalam Potti and another\n\nBhagwaJi].\n\n.d. Thangol Kunju\n\nMwaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotli anJ another\n\nBhagwati ].\n\norders against the authority within the territories would, in view of the orders of the superior authority, have been infructuous, the High Court concerned had, of necessity, to dismiss the petition .. Such, however, was not the position in the present petition before the High Court of Travancore-Cochine.\n\nThere was here no question of merger of any judicial order of respondent 1 into the judicial order of respondent 2.\n\nIn this case respondent 1 was actually claiming to exercise powers conferred upon him by certain sections of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 which it was S]Jbmitted, were contrary to law or discriminatory and consequently ultra vires the Constitution.\n\nThe fact that respondent 1 was .the agent of respondent 2, which being beyond its jurisdiction could not i;!e reached by the High Court, could not make his acts any the less objectionable or discriminatory and ultra vires.\n\nIt is sufficient to say that if his action was contrary to law or if the provisions of law under which he was claiming to act became, after the commencement of the Constitution, void under article 13(1) as being repugnant to article 14 and the doer of the illegal act was within the reach of the High Court, the High Court had jurisdiction under article 226 to issue a writ against respondent 1 and thereby prevent further infringement of the petitioner's fundamental rights.\n\nThe preliminary objection urged by the learneq Attorney-General against the jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, fails.\n\nThe next question canvassed in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1954 was that respondent 2 was entitled to investigate the alleged evasion of tax by the petitioner not only for the years 1942 and 1943 but also the other years from 1940 to the last completed assessment year.\n\nThe decision of this question turns on a construction of the terms of . the references made by the Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124. A report dated the 17th November 1949 had been made by the Board of Revenue in regard to the income-tax assessment of the petitioner for the years 1119 and 1120 (M.E.) and two orders were passed\n\non the 26th November 1949 by the Government on the strength of that report.\n\nThe first of these orders related to taxation on the petitioner's income for 1119 and the second related to the taxation on his income for 1120.\n\nThe return of income for the year ending the 31st December 1942 was the subject-matter of the first order and after setting out the materials in the order the Government stated that they had prima f acie reasons for believing that the petitioner had to a substantial extent evaded payment of tax on his income for 1119 and they considered that this was a fit case for reference to the Income-tax Investigation Commission under section 5(1) of the Act. The second order' referred to the petitioner's return of income for the year ending the 31st December 1943 and after setting out the materials, wound up similarily by stating that the Government had prim a f acie reasons for believing that the petitioner had to a substantial extent evaded payment of tax on his income for 1120 and they considered that this was a fit case for reference to the Income-tax Investigation Commission under section 5(1) of the Act.\n\nA cursory perusal of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 will show th<it the Commission had n~ authority to investigate any case suo motu. It could only investigate cases referred to it by the Government.\n\nThus under section 5(1), Government might refer to it for investigation and report any case or points in a case in which the Government had prim a f acie reasons for believing that a person had to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income.\n\nSuch reference, however, could be made at any time before the 16th February 1950 but not later.\n\nAgain, under sub-section ( 4) of the same section, if in the course of investigation into any case or points in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) the Commission had reason to believe that some other person had evaded payment of taxation on income or some other points required investigation, it might make a report to the Government and the Government would forthwith refer to the Commission for investigation the case of such nther person or such additional points as might\n\nA. Thangal KWfiu\n\nMusqliar v.\n\nM. Venkilachalam\n\nPotti and. another\n\nBhagwati].\n\nA. Thangal Kunju.\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Vmkitachalam\n\nP1tti and onolhtr\n\nBhagwati].\n\nbe indicated in that report. All that was done in the present case was that by .two separate orders made under section 5 (I) of the Act the Government referred two cases of the petitioner for the two vears 1942 and 194.3 to the Commission and they were \"tegistered\n\nas Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125. There was no other order under section 5 ( 1) at any time before the 16th February 1950 and none could be made under that sub-section after that date.\n\nIt was not suggested that there was any report by the Commission or any reference of any case or additional points in a case under section 5 ( 4).\n\nIt was, therefore, contended for the petitioner that the Commission had no jurisdiction to enquire into any alleged evasion in any • year prior or subsequent to the years 1942 and 1943 . The learned Attorney-General, on the other Jland, contended that the Government could, under section 5 ( 1) of the Act, only refer the case of the petitioner who - was reasonably suspected to have evaded the tax and, therefore, the whole case of the petitioner for all the years referred to in section 8(2) of the Act was the subject-matter cif the investigation which had been entrusted to the Commission.\n\nWe are• unable to accept this contention. Under section 5 ( 1) the Government could refer any case or points in a case.\n\nThere is nothing in that sub-section which requi.res that a \"case\" referred thereunder must cover ,; he entire prio<l mentioned in section 8(2).\n\nIndeed, the Government might have reason to believe that an assessee evaded the tax only in, say, two years and not in others and in such a case the Government could only refer the case for investigation of evasion during those two years only but cn:uld not refer any case for other years as to which they had no reasonable belief.\n\nTherefore, in such a situati:m' the reference must be limited to the particular yeats in which the evasion was believed to have taken place.\n\nIt makes no difference whether one calls the matter referred a \"case\" or \"points in a case\".\n\nIt follows, therefore, that, in order to ascertain whether, in a given case the reference covers the entire period or only a shorter period, one has only to look at the order\n\nof reference.\n\nThe operative parts of the two orders of reference dated the 26th November 1949 in the present case clearly record the fact that the Government had prima facie reasons for believing that the petitioner had to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on his income for 1119 and 1120\n\n(M.E.) and that they considered that \"this was a fit case for reference to the Income-tax Investigation Commission under section 5(1) of Act XIV of 1124\".\n\nWhat was a fit case for reference was described as 1bis\" which clearly referred back to the evasion Gt payment on taxation on income for the two specific years in the two orders.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that neither repondent 2 nor respondent 1 who was appointed an authorised official by respondent 2 had jurisdiction to cover any period beyond those specific years 1942 and 1943 and the notice which was issued by respondent 1 on the 21st November 1951 was, therefore, not warranted by law.\n\nRespondent 1 had no warrant or authority whatever for issuing the said notice and we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in the conclusion to which it came that the action of respondent 1 was clearly illegal, wihout jurisdiction and unsupported by law.\n\nThe writ of prohibition issued against respondent 1 was, therefore, in order and Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1954 must stand dismissed with costs.\n\nAs regards Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1954, the petitioner contended that respondent 2 J1ad no power or authority to conduct an investigation in regard to the alleged evasion of tax by the petitioner for the years 1942 and 1943 also. Shri Nambiyar urged that :\n\n(1) The Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was not a law in force prior to the integration and was not an \"existing law\" continued in force by Ordinance I of 1124;\n\n(2) The notification dated the 26th July 1949 which purported to bring the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 into force from the 22nd July 1949 was ineffective and invalid;\n\n(3) Even if the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\n. :v.\n\nM. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhagwati].\n\nA. Thangal KPju\n\nMusaliar\n\n•• M. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nin force, it could not apply to or override the assessment orders conduded by the Chief Revenue Authority, Travancore;\n\n(4) The Rajpramukh's agreement read with article 245 of the Constitution precluded any investigation except in accordance with the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 and Act XXXIII of 1950 amended by Act XLIV of 1951 was invalid to the extent that it authorised investigation otherwise than in accordance with the Travancore Law;\n\n(5) Assuming 'all the foregoing points were held against the petitioner, section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was in any event unconstitutional and void as being inconsistent with article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nRe. (J) : The Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was passed by the Travancore Legislature on the 7th March 1949.\n\nIt was, however, under section 1 (3) to come into force on such date as the Travancore Government might by notification in the Government Gazette appoint.\n\nNo such notification was issued by the Travancore Government up to the 1st July 1949 when the Travancore State and the Cochin State integrated into the United State of Travancore and Cochin.\n\nOn the 1st July 1949, the United State of Travancore and Cochin promulgated -Ordinance I of 1124 thereby all existing laws of Travancore were continued in force till altered, amended or repealed by competent authority and the \"existing law of Travancore\" was therein defined to mean any law in force in the State of Travancore immediately prior to the ht July 1949.\n\nIt was only on the 26th July 1949 that a notification was issued under section 1(3) by the United State of Travancore and Cochin bringing Act XIV of 1124 into force retrospectively from 22nd July, 1949.\n\nThe contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner was that as no notification under section 1 (3)\n\nof Act XIV of 1124 had been issued up to the 1st July 1949, that Act had not been brought into force and was not in force on that date and, therefore, was nor then an \"existing law\" which alone was given continuity by Ordinance I of 1124 which was promulgated on that very day.\n\nThe contention further was that in the circumstances the Act was not continued by Ordinance I of 1124 but had lapsed and, therefore, the subsequent notification issued on the 26th July 1949 was wholly ineffective and consequently the reference of the cases of the petitioner to the Commission for investigation under section 5(1), the appointment of respondent 1 as the authorised official and the notices issued by him were unauthorised and wholly devoid of any authority of law. The question for our consideration is whether Act XIV of 1124 or any part of it was, on the 1st July 1949, an existing \\aw.\n\nThe general rule of English law, as to the date of the commencement of a statute, since 1797, has been and is that when no other date is fixed by it for its coming into operation it is in force from the date when it receives the royal assent (33 Geo. 3, c. 13).\n\nThe same rule has been adopted in section 5 of our General Clauses Act, 1897.\n\nWe have not been referred to any Travancore Law which provides otherwise. If, therefore, the same principle prevailed in that State, Travancore Act XIV of 1124 would have come into force on the 7th March 1949 when it was passed by the Travancore Legislature.\n\nWhat prevented that result? The answer obviously points to section 1( 3) which authorises the Government to bring the Act into force on a later date by issuing a .notification.\n\nHow could section 1(3) operate to postpone the commencement of the Act unless that section itself was in force? One must, therefore, concede that section 1(3) came into operation immediately the Act was passed, for otherwise it could not postpone. the coming into operation of the Act.\n\nTo put the same argument in another W;\\y, if the entire . Act including section 1(3) was not in operation at the date of its passing, how could the Government issue any notification under that very section? There must be some law authorising the Government to bring the Act into force. Where is that law to be found unless it were in section 1 (3) ?\n\nIn answer, Shri Nambiyar referred\n\nA. Thangal Kwfiu\n\nMusalw\n\nM. V enkita&halam\n\nPotti and anothef\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. V 1nkitachalam\n\nPolti and onothe r\n\nBhagwali].\n\nus to the principle embodied in section .37 of the\n\nnglish Interpretation Act which corresponds to sect10n 22 of our General Clauses Act. That section does not help the petitioner at all.\n\nAll that it does is to authorise the making of rules or bye-laws and the issuing of orders between the passing and the commencement of the enactment but the last sentence of the section clearly says that \"rules, bye-laws or orders so made or issued shall not take effect till the commencement of the Act or Regulation\". Suppose Shri Nambiyar is right in saying that the Government could issue a notification under section 1 (3) by virtue of the principle embodied in section 22 of the General Clauses Act, it will not take his argument an inch forward, for that notification by reason of the last sentence of section 22 quoted above, will not take effect till the commencement of the Act.\n\nIt will bring about a stalemate.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that a notification bringing an Act into force is not contemplated by section 22 of the General Clauses Act.\n\nSeeing, therefore, that it is section 1(3) which operates to prevent the commencement of the Act until a notification is issued thereunder by the Government and that it is section 1 (3) which operates to authorise the Government to issue a notification thereunder, it must be conceded that that section 1(3) came into force immediately on the passing o{ the Act.\n\nThere is, therefore, no getting away from the fact that the Act was a11 \"existing law\" from the date of its passing right up. to. the 1st July 1949 and was, consequently, continued by Ordinance I of\n\n1124. This being the position, the validity of the notification issued on the 26th July 1949 under section 1(3), the reference of the case of the petitioner, the appointment of respondent 1 as the authorised official and all proceedings under the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 cannot be questioned. n the ground that the Act lapsed and was not continued by Ordinance I of 1124.\n\nRe. (2) : It is urged that the notification issued on the 26th July 1949 was bad in that it purported to bring the Act into operation as from the 22nd July 1949.\n\nThe reason relied upon is that the Government:'could not,•;, in .the] absence: of express. provision, authorising it: in that behalf, fix the commencement of the.• Act· retrospectively. :-,.The: reason for which the Court:c disfavours . retroactive , operation : of laws. is . that it: 'may ·:prejudicially. affect vested:. rights .. No. such reason. is• involvetl in this case,• Section;-.1(3) - autho:- rises the Government to . bring the .. Act :1 into force on such.< date as it may, . by: , notification,''. appoint .... In exercise oL. the : power conferred by this section the Government surely had the power to issue the' , notifi~ cation :bringing the. Act into force on any. date subsequent 'to the passing of the _Act .. There can there~ fore, be . no , objection . to the notification fixing . the commencement of.: the Act-•. on . .o the 22nd - July_.1949 which was: a date subsequent , to the. passing of the Act.; So.the .Act; has; not been given.: retrospective operation, . that is to say, it has, not . been inade,, to - commence from , a.-date .. prior._ to ,. .the . date of its passing. , It is true,; that the date ; of commencement as fixed. by the notification ·is , anterior, to .: the date , of the notification :.:but i,-that 1circumstance does,. not attract the principle .disfavouing the retroactive operation of, a statute,,., Here,, thers is no question. of affecting vested. rights.:, The cipertion. , of , the notification it- , _self. is. not..retrospective, .. It' :only brings the Act _into\n\noperation , on and. friiin an earlier ·. oate. In' any case it' was . 'in terms ' authoised ' to issue : the -notification bringing the - Act irito , foce on . any date. subseq,; ent .to the passing . of the , Act ', and.; th:it . is all . that the Go,; ernmcnt did. . Ill ' this view. of . ' the ' matter, the further 1argument advanced:_by .. the lned 'Attorney~ General,. an, d; whicl( foud . favur with : the:, , Cburi below, , namely( that the not1ficat1on was at any. rate good to bring the, Act into operation :is on and from the date of. its' issue 'need not be'corisidered.\n\nThere is no substance ; in this contention. also. '. : .. .\n\nRe. (J) ;:J~ 1was, urged that, ven if die , Trv; noe Act . XIV of 1124 , was, in: force -on the 1st , July· 1949 and was validly brought into. operation . from ; the 22nd July 1949, the terms of section 8(2) of the . Act could not , apply: to.· or override the• assessment , orders of the petitioner, . for the years 1942 and .1943 which . . . .\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nAfusaliar\n\nM~ Venkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\n}Jhagwati J.\n\nA. Thangal Kurrju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\n Bhagwati J.\n\nwere concluded by the Chief Revenue Authority of Travancore.\n\nSection 8(2) of the Act , provided that, after considering the report of the Commission, the Government shall, by an order in writing direct that such proceedings as they think fit under the various Income-tax Acts of Travancore therein mentioned or any other law shall be taken against the person to whose case the report relates in respect of the income of any period commencing after the last day of Karkadakom 1115 (16-8-1939) and upon such a direction being given such proceedings may be taken and completed under the appropriate law notwithstanding any decision to a different effect given in the case by any income-tax authority or Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nIt was contended that the Chief Revenue Authority was not included in the description of \"any income-tax authority\" and, therefore, e.ven if the report of respondent 2 was adverse to the petitioner. the assessment orders which were concluded by the Chief Revenue Authority could not be affected by the provisions of section 8(2) and could not be reopened.\n\nThis argument is based on a misconception of the true position of the Chief Revenue Authority. The Chief Revenue Authority was an income-tax authority mentioned in the hierarchy under the Travancore Act VIII of 1096. 'Vhen the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 came to be passed, the income-tax authorities enumerated therein included the Board of Revenue at the apex, substituting the Board of Revenue for the Chief Revenue Authority which occupied a similar position in the old Act.\n\nBy section 10 of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124, the Travancore Act VIII of 1096 was deemed to be in force for the purpose of the Act and to the extent necessary, with the result that in construing the provisions of section 8(2) of the Act, the words \"any income-tax authority\" would include the Chief Revenue Authority which was an income-tax authority under the Travancore Act V!II of 1096.\n\nIt may also be noted that section 4 of the Travancore Act XVII of 1122 continued all proceedings and petitions pending before the\n\nChief Revenue Authority and provided that the same may be disposed of by the said authority or by such authority as may be appointed by the Government for the purpose as if the said Travancore Act VIII of 1096 had not been repealed. It, therefore, follows that the Chief Revenue Authority was included within the expression \"any income-tax authority\" in section 8(2) of the Act and the assessment orders of the petitioner for the years 1942 and 1943 which were concluded by the Chief Revenue Authority could be affected or overridden by any order which might be passed by the Government under section 8(2) of the Act.\n\nThis contention of the petitioner also, therefore, does not avail him.\n\nRe. ( 4) : The Indian States Finance Enquiry Committee 1948-49 made two interim reports.\n\nIt recommended in the first interim report that subject to certain limitations indicated therein which were designed to secure legal \"continuity\" of pending proceedings and \"finality and validity\" of completed proceedings under the pre-existing State legislation, the whole body of State legislation relating to \"federal\" subjects should be repealed and the corresponding body of Central legislation extended proprio vigore to the States with effect from the prescribed date or as and when the administration of particular \"federal\" subjects was assumed by the Centre.\n\nAll matters and proceedings pending under or arising out of preexisting States Acts should be disposed of under those Acts by, so far as may be, the \"corresponding\n\nauthorites\" under the corresponding Indian Acts.\n\nThe income, profits and gains accruing and arising in States of all periods which were 'previous years' of the States' assessment years '1949-50 or earlier should be assessed wholly and in accordance with the States' laws and at the States' rates respectively, appropriate to the assessment years con~ cerned.\n\nExcept in Travancore, there was no Income-tax Investigation Commission in any State.\n\nShould the Travancore Commission still be functioning at the time of the federal financial integration; all cases pending before it should be taken over by\n\n195!>\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar . v.\n\nM. Vmkita&halam\n\nfoUi (Z1ld another\n\nBhagwati].\n\n.A. Thangal KnJu\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. VtnAitochalam\n\n.Potti and anothn\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe Indian Commission.\n\nThe disposal of those cases should, however, (as in the case of pending assessments) be in accordance with the pre-existing Travancore Law .. It recommended in the Second Interim Report that the Travancore Commission should be wound up and the. cases referred to it should be transferred to the corresponding Commission in India.\n\nThese recommendations of the Committee in so far as they applied to Travancore-Cochin were accepted by and incorporated into the agreement entered into between the President of India and the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin on the 25th February 1950 subject to certain modifications which are not relevant for the purpose of the present enquiry.\n\nThe result of the agreement was the enactment of Act XXXIII of 1950 which extended to Travancore-Cochin the Act\n\nXXX of 1947 and section 3 of that Act provided that the law of Travancore corresponding to Act XXX of 1947 shall continue to remain in force with the modification that all cases referred to or pending before the Travancore Commission shall stand transferred to the Central Commission for disposal and . that the State law shall determine the procedure to. be followed and the powers to be exercised by the Central Commission in the disposal of those cases. Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125 which were pending before the Travancore Commission thus became transferred to respondent 2 and were to be disposed of in accordance with the procedure laid down and the powers conferred on the Travancore Commission by the Travancore Act XIV of 1124. Two questions, however, arose in the matter of this investigation by respondent 2, viz., (1) whether the life of the Travancore Commission, not having been extended beyond 16-8-1950, respondent 2 had the power and authority to continue the investigation of the cases of the petitioner after\n\n16'8~1950, and (2) whether any orders passed by the Government on the report made by respondent 2 would have the . effect of overriding the assessment orders concluded by the Chief Revenue Authotity, Travancore, in cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 and 1943.\n\nIn regard to the first question, it was urged by Shri Nambiyar that the life of the Travancore Commission having come to an end on the 16th August 1950, respondent 2 also, which was its successor and to which the pending cases of the petitioner were transferred, &ould not function beyond 16-8-1950. Parliament, however, passed, on the 26th August 1951, Act\n\nXLIV of 1951 amending Act XXXIII of 1950 whereby it provided with retrospective effect that, in the disposal of cases transferred to respondent 2, it shall have and exercise the same powers as it has and exercises in the investigation of cases transferred to it under Act XXX of 1947 and shall be entitled to act for the same term as under sub-section (3) of section 4 of that Act thus extending the life of respondent 2 beyond 16-8-1950.\n\nThis, it was submitted, Parliament was not competent to do by reason of the terms of the agreement dated the 25th February, 1950, the effect of the enactment of Act XLIV of J951 being to amend the law of the Travancore State , which was to govern the investigation of pending cats by respondent 2.\n\nThe agreement was one whlch was contemplated under article 295 of the 'Constitution and, being provided by the Constitution itself, was a bar to the legislative competence of the Central Legislature under article 245.\n\nThe Central Legislature, it was submitted, was, therefore, not competent to pa5s Act XLIV of 1951 extending the life of respondent 2 beyond 16-8-1950 and respondent 2 was, therefore, not entitled to carry on any further investigation in the Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125.\n\nConsiderable argument was addressed to us on the effect of the agreement on the legislative competence of the Central Legislature under article 245.\n\nWe do not, however, consider it necessary to decide this question as, in our opinion, the life of respondent 2 was not a part of the law of Travancore State which was to govern the procedure followed or the powers exercised by it in the investigation of the cases of the petitioner. Respondent 2 to which the pending cases of the petitioner were transferred, was a body with a longer lease of life and the fact that the Travancorc\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMwaliar\n\nYo M. V enkitathalam\n\nPotti and anothn\n\nBhagwali].\n\nA. Tluzngal KUf!iu\n\nMusaliat\n\ny, M. V enkffaeh4lam\n\nPotti and anothn'\n\nBhagwali].\n\nCommission had a shorter lease could 110t have the effect of curtailing the life of respondent 2.\n\nThe life of respondent 2 depended upon the law which established it and it was extended from time to time by subsequent legislation up to December, 1955, and that accident which gave to respondent 2 a longer •lease .of life did not contravene any provision of the Travancore law which determined the procedure to be followed and the powers to be exercised by the Travancore Commission.\n\nThe transfer to respondent 2 of the cases pending before the T ravancore Commission, of necessity involved that those cases would be dealt with by respondent 2 which had a longer lease of life and respondent 2 could conduct the investigation of these cases and complete the same within the span of life which had been allotted to it by the relevant provisions of the Indian Law, the only limitations imposed upon the conduct of such investigation being that the procedure to be followed as also the powers to be exercisec! by it would be those obtaining in the Travancore Law.\n\nAct XLIV of 1951 merely accepted this position and there was nothing in that Act which ran counter to the agreement.\n\nAs regards the second question also, the Chief Revenue Authority, as observed before, was an income-tax authority within the meaning of the term as used in section 8(2) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 read with section 10 of that Act which continued in force the provisions of the Travancore Act VIII of\n\n1096 so far as it was necessary for the purpose of the Act. There also Act XLIV of 1951 did not make any changes in the existing Travoncore Law which was to govern the investigation of the pending cases . by respondent.\n\n2. This contention of the petitioner, therefore; is equally untenable.\n\nRe. (5) : This contention urged by Shri Nambiyar questions the t1ires of section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124. This section provides:\n\n\"Section 5(1): Our Gov.ernment may at any time before the last day of Makaram 1125 refer to the Commission for investigation and report any case or\n\npoints in a case in which our Government have prima facie reasons for believing that a person has to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income, together with such material as may be available in support of such belief, and may at any time before the last day of Meenam 1125 apply to the Commission for the withdrawal of any case or points in a case thus referred, and if the Commission approves of the withdrawal, no further proceedings shall thereafter be taken by or before the Commission in respect of the case or points so withdrawn\".\n\nIt corresponds to section 5(1) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 194_7) which reads as under :\n\n\"Section 5 (J) : The Central Government may at any time before the last day of September 1948 refer to the Commission for investigation and report any case or points in a case in which the Central Government has pfima .facie reasons for believing that a person has to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income, together with such material as may be available in support of such belief, and may at any time before the first day of September 1948 apply to the Commi.; sion for the withdrawal of any case or points in a case thus referred, and if the Commission approves of the withdrawal, no further proceedings shall thereafter be taken by or before the Commission in respect of the case or points so withdrawn.\" We may also at this stage refer to the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 which relates to income escaping assessment:\n\n\"Section 47 (1) : If in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the Income-tax Otficer discovers that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year, or have been under-assessed, or have been assessed at too low a rate, or have been the subject of excessive relief under this Act the Incometax Officer may, in any case in which he has reason to believe that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccu-\n\n23-'-85 S. C. India/59\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar ,.\n\nM. V enkita&/zlllam\n\nPatti and another\n\nBhagwaJi].\n\nA. Thangal Irlllfiu\n\nMrualiar ..\n\nM. V mkilaehalam\n\nPatti and another\n\nBhagwati].\n\nrate particulars thereof, at any time within eight years, and in any other case at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the person liable to pay tax on such income, profits or gains, or, in the case of a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under subsection (2) of section 29, and may proceed to asse•s or re-assess such income, profits or gains, and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section: ................ \" The corresponding prov1S1on of the Indian Incometax Act was contained in section 34 which provided\n\n\"Section 34(1): If in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the Income-tax Officer discovers that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year, or have been under-assessed, or have been assessed at too low a rate, or have been the subject ofexcessive relief under this Act the Income-tax Officer may, in any case in which he has reason to believe that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars thereof, at any time within eight years, and in any other case at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the person liable to p:ty tax on such income, profits or gains, or, in the case of a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under subsection (2) of section 22, and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains, and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordiiigly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section: ............ \"\n\nSection 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act was amended by Act XL VIII of 1948 which received the assent of the Governor-General on the 8th September 1948.\n\nIt was further amended by the Indian Income-tax Act, 1954 (XXXIII of 1954) which was assented to by the President on the 25th September\n\n1954 and introduced sub-sections\n\n(1-A) to\n\n(1-D) therein.\n\nIt may, however be noted that no amendment was made in section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 at any subsequent period and the question as to whether the provisions of section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 became discriminatory and violative . of the fundamental right guaranteed underarticle 14 of the Constitution will have to be determined with reference to the provisions of that section set out above.\n\nThe true nature, scope and effect of article 14 of the Constitution have been explained by this Court in a series of cases beginning with Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v The Union of Indian (1) and ending with Budhan Chowdhury and others v. The State of Bihar e).\n\nIt is, therefore, not necessary to refer to the earlier cases and it will suffice to quote the principle as summarised in the decision of the Full Court in the last mentioned case at page 1049 in the following terms: \"It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible diff erentia which distinguishes persons or things that arc grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achived by the statute in question.\n\nThe classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects of occupations or the like What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of cla&sification and the object of the Act under consideration.\n\nIt is also well-established by the decl'sions of this Court that article 14 condenms discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.\"\n\nThe principles underlying article 14 of the Constitution are well-settled.\n\nThe only difficulty which\n\n(I) [1955] S. C. R. 869.\n\n(2) [1965] I S. C.R. 104-:i.\n\nA. T hangal K rufiu\n\nMusalilll'\n\nM. Vmkitaehalam\n\nPolli and 4lllJlhlr\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti and anothtr\n\nBhagwati].\n\narises 1s in regard to the application of those principles to the facts of a particular case and the Court has to consider the terms of the impugned legislation having regard tO' the background and the surrounding circumstances so far as it may be necessary to do so in order to arrive at a conclusion whether it infringes the fundamental right in question.\n\nSection 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 (which 1s m pari materia with section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124) was impugned in the case of Sura; Mall Motha & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and another(').\n\nThe references for investigation in that case had been made in pursuance of a report made by the Commission to the Central Government under the provisions of section 5( 4) of the Act requesting that the case of the petitioner along with other cases may be referred to the Commission for investigation.\n\nThe contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the provisions of sections 5 (1), 5(4), 6, 7 and 8 of Act XXX of 1947 had become void being discriminatory in character after the coming into force of the Constitution.\n\nThe attack made against the provisions of section 5(1) of the Act was two-fold: \"(l) That the section was not based on any valid classification; the word \"substantial\" being vague and uncertain and having no fixed meaning, could furnish no basis for any classification at all; (2) That the Central Government was entitled by the provisions of the section to discriminate between one person and another m the same class and it was authorised to pick and choose the cases of persons who fell within the group of those who had substantially evaded taxation.\n\nIt could, if it chose, send the case of . one person to the Commission and show favouritism to another person by not sending his case to the Commission though both of these persons be within the group of those who had evaded the payment of tax to a substantial extent\".\n\nAs regards section 5(4), it was urged that it had no independent existence and was bound to fall with section 5 ( l) if his contention regarding its invalidity\n\n(I) [1955] S, C. R. 448.\n\ni I\\\n\n2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUI,!.t REPORTS. 1231\n\nprevailed.\n\nIn the alternative, it was urged that as.- suming that section 5(1) was valid, even then section 5 ( 4) had to be declared void becaust; it gave arbitrary power to the Commission to pick and choose and secondly because the clause was highly discriminatory in character inasmuch as an evasion, whether substantial or insubstantial, came within its ambit as well as within the ambit of section 34( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThis Court considered it sufficient for the decision of that case to examine the contentions urged against the validity of section 5 ( 4) of the Act because the case of the petitioner was referred to the Commission under those provisions of the Act and not under section 5(1) and decided that case on the assumption that section 5(1) of the Act was based on a valid classification and dealt with a group of persons . who came within the class of war-profiteers which required special treatment, that the classification was rational and that reasonable grounds existed for making a distinction between those who fell within that class and others who did not come within it, but without in any way deciding or even expressing any opinfon on that question.\n\nThis Court compared the provisions of section 5(4) oE the Act with \"those of section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and came to the conclusion that section 5 ( 4) dealt with the same class of persons who fell within the ambit of section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act arid were dealt with in sub-section (1) .of that section and whose income could be caught by a procee<ling under that section. It held that , there was nothing uncommon either in properties or in characteristics between persons who had been • discovered as evaders of income-tax during an investigation conducted under section 5 (1) of the Act and those who had been discovered by the Income-tax Officer to have evaded payment of income-tax. Both those . kinds of persons had common properties and had common characteristics and therefore required equal treatment.\n\nThe Court thus held that both section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and sub-sec-\n\n!955\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusalia;\n\nVI M. V mkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nA. Thangal Ku•ju\n\nMusali1J1\n\nM. V1nlcitachalam\n\nPotli and another\n\ntion ( 4) of section 5 of the impugned Act dealt with persons who had similar characteristics and similar properties, the common characteristics being that they were persons who had not truly disclosed their income and had evaded payment of taxation on in-\n\n.Bluiewati ]. come ..\n\nThe court then considered whether the procedure prescribed by Act XXX of 1947 for discovering the concealed profits of those who had evaded payment of taxation on their income was substantially different and prejudicial to the assessees than the procedure prescribed in the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nAfter comparing the provisions o£ section 8 of Act XXX of 1947 and those df sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act, this court came to the conclusion that there was material and substantial difference between the two procedures and there was no doubt that the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act deprived a person who was dealt with under that Act of those rights of appeal, second appeal and revision to challenge questions of fact decided by the judge of first instance. The procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in sections 6 and 7 was also compared with the procedure prescribed in sections 37 and 38 in the Indian Income-tax Act and this Court held that the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act was substantially more prejudicial to the assessee than the procedure prescribed under the Indian Income-tax Act. It was thus clear that persons dealt with under Act XXX of 1947 were submitted to a procedure which was more drastic nd prejudicial than the procedure which was available to those who were dealt with under section . 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThis Court, therefore, was of the opinion that section 5( 4) and the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in so far as it affected the persons proceeded against thereunder being a piece of discriminatory legislation offended against the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution and were thus vOid and unenforceable.\n\nIt was after this decision of this Court in S11rai\n\nMall Mohta's case, supra, that Parliament enacted the Indian Income-tax Amendment Act, 1954\n\n(XXXIII of 1954) introducing sub-sections (1-A) to\n\n(1-D) in section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThough Act XXXIII of 1954 received the assent of the President on the 5th September 1954 it was to come into effect from the 17th July 1954.\n\nSection 34(1-A) purported to meet two criticisms which had been, in the main, offered against the constitutionality of section 5(1) of the Act in Suraj Mall Mohta's case.\n\nOne criticism was that the classification made in section 5(1) of the Act was bad because the word 'substantial' used therein was a word which had no fixed meaning and was an unsatisfactory medium for carrying the idea of some ascertainable proportion of the whole, and thus the classification being vague and uncertain, did not save the enactment from the mischief of article 14 of the Constituti, on.\n\nThat aHeged defect was cured in section 34 ( 1-A) inasmuch as the Legislature clearly indicated there . what it meant when it said that the said object of Act XXX of 1947 was to catch persons who, to a substantial extent, had evaded payment of tax, in other words, what was seemingly indefinite within the meaning of the word 'substantial' had been made definite and clear by enacting that no evasion below a sum of one lakh was within the meaning of that expression.\n\nThe other criticism was that section 5(1) did not necessarily deal with the persons, who, during the war, had made huge profits and evaded payment of tax on them. Section 34(1-A) remedied . this defect also.\n\nIt clearly stated that it would operate on income made between the 1st September 1939 and 31st March 1946 tax on which had been evaded.\n\nSection 5(1) was again attacked in the case of Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd .• v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another(1).\n\nThis was a petition under article 32 of the Constitution filed on the 16th July 1954 after the decision in Suraj Mall Mohta's case, supra, had been pronounced.\n\nSection 5(1) of the Act was attacked on the very same grounds which were mentioned in\n\n(I) [19j5] IS.CR. 787.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitaehalam\n\nPatti and another\n\nBhagwati J\n\n.d. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusoliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPatti and atWthtr\n\nB/zagwati J.\n\nthe judgment in Sura; Mall M ohta' s case, supra, but had not been dealt with by this Court it being considered sufficient to strike down section 5( 4) of the Act without expressing any opinion on the vires of section 5(1). Even in this case, section 5(1) was not struck down as void on a comparison of its provi- . sions with those of section 34( 1) of the Indian Incometax Act as was done in the case of section 5( 4) in Sura;. Mall Mohta's case, supra.\n\nBy the time this petition came to be heard by this Court, the Parliament had enacted Act XXXIII of 1954 which, as stated above, introduced section 34(1-A) in section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act and this Court came to the conclusion on a comparison of the provisions of section 5(1) of the Act with section 34(1-A) of the , Indian Income-tax Act that the new sub-section in-\n\n. serted in section 34 by Act XXXIII of 1954 was intended to deal with the class of persons who were said to have been classified for special treatment by section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947.\n\nThis Court reiterated the conclusions to which it had come in Surai Mall Mohta's case, supra, that the procedure prescribd by the Act for making the investigation under its provisions was of a summary and drastic nature and it constituted a departure from the ordinary law of pre>- cedure and in certain important aspects was detrimental to the persons subjected to it and as such was discriminatory.\n\nIt did not again express an opinion on the validity of section 5 ( 1) as being based on a valid classification and being thus saved from the mischief of article 14 of the Constitution, but on a comparison of the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the Act with those of section 34( 1-A) of the Indian Income tax Act which came into effect from the 17th July 1954, came to the conclusion that this defence of the provisions of section 5(1) being saved from the mischid of article 14 of the Constitution on the basis of a valid classification was no longer available in support of it after the introduction of the new sub.\n\nsection in section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act which sub.section dealt. with the saine class of persons dealt with by section 5(1) of the impugned\n\n' Act.\n\nThe result was that proceedings could no longer be continued under the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act and section 5(1) was thus struck down as unconstitutional and void after the coming -into operation of section 34(1-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThese two cases, viz., Suraj Mall Mohta's case supra, and Shri Beenakshi Mills' case, supra, did not directly pronounce upon the vires of section 5(1) of the Act fo comparison with section 34(1) of the Indian\n\nIncome-true Act though the vires were the subjectmatter of a direct challenge therein. The ratio of these decisions is, however, helpful in the determination of the question that arises directly before us, viz., whether section 5(1) of the Act is discriminatory in its character and thus violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIn both these cases, this Court was of the opinion that the procedure for investigation prescribed by Act XXX of 1947 (corresponding with the Travancore Act XIV of 1124) was of a summary and drastic nature and constituted a departure from the ordinary law of procedure and in certain aspects was detrimental to persons subjected to it as compared with the procedure prescribed by the corresponding provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act (corresponding to the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121) and was as such discriminatory. The provisions of sections 5(4) and 5(1) of the Act were compared respectively with the provisions of section 34(1) and section 34(1-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act and, on a comparison of these provions, this Court came to the conclusion that the dasses of persons who were said to have been classified for special treatment by those respective sections of the Act were intended to be and could be dealt with under section 34(1) and section 34(1-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act and there could, therefore, be no basis of a valid classification for special treatment under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 (corresponding with the Travancore Act XIV of 1124).\n\nThe procedure prescribed by the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 being thus discriminatory as compared\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nv M. V mkilachalam\n\nPol Ii and another\n\nBhazwat; J.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkilaehalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nB/ragwati J.\n\nwith the procedure prescribed in the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121, the questions that arise for our consideration are, ( 1) whether there is a rational basis of classification to be found in the enactment of section 5(1) of the Act, and (2) whether the same class of persons were intended to be and could be dealt with under the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121.\n\nIn order to ascertain the scope and purpose of the impugned section reference must first be made to the Act . itself.\n\nThe preamble of a statute has been said to be a good means of finding out its meaning and as it were a key to the understanding of it. The preamble to the Travancore Act XIV of 1124, like that of Act XXX of 1947, runs thus: \"Whereas it is expedient for 'the purpose of ascertaining whether the actual incidence of taxation on income is and has been in recent years in accordance with the provisions of law and the exterit to which the existing law and procedure for the assessment and recovery of such . taxation is adequate to prevent the evasion thereof, to m<ike provision for an investigation to be made into such matters.\n\nIt is hereby enacted as follows\".\n\nIt does not unfortunately give any assistance in the solution of the problem before us.\n\nSection 5(1) itself, however, gives some indication as to the real object of it.\n\nThe condition on which the action of the Government under that section is made dependent is that the Government must have prima facie reasons for believing that a person has to a subs.tantial extent evaded payment of taxation on his income.\n\nThe powers conferred on the Commission by section 6 and the procedure prescribed for the Commission by section 7 are dearly very drastic and harsh.\n\nThis unmistakably shows that the legislative authority took the view that these stringent measures were necessary for unearthing the tax evasions which had gone unnoticed before when the usual procedure under the Income-tax law was applied.\n\nThen comes section 8(2) which authorises the Government after perusal of the report of the Commission to direct proceedings to be taken against the person to whose\n\ncase the report relates in respect of the income of any period commencing after the 16th August 1939. This provision_ clearly evinces that the intention of the legislative authority is to catch the income evaded from after the 16th August 1939.\n\nSection 5(1) also provides that the reference thereunder of a case must be made at any time before the 16th February 1950.\n\nFrom these sections it will appear that the object of this law was to uncover the evasion of tax on income made after the 16th August 1939 and before the 16th February 1950 about the existence of which evasion the Government had prim a f acie reason to believe.\n\nThe question at once arises as to why it was that the legislative authority took the view that there were possible cases of tax evasion.\n\nIt has been said that although . the statement of the objects and reasons appended to a bill is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the Act as passed (see Aswini Kumar Ghose's case (1), yet it may be referred to only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which necessitated the making of the law (see Subodh Gopal Bose's case( 2 ) ). - Similar observations were made by Fazal Ali, J. with reference to legislative proceedings being relevant for the proper understanding of the circumstances under which an Act was passed and the reasons which necessitated it in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India(-). Indeed, in the case of Kathi R{lning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra( 4 ), this Court permitted the State to file an affidavit stating in detail the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law there under consideration had been passed and which necessitated the passing of that law.\n\nIn the present case also, an affidavit has been filed' by Gauri Shanker, Secretary of respondent 2, stating the reasons why it was thought necessary to enact the impugned Act including section 5(1).\n\nThis affidavit clearly brings out the serious problem that faced the revenue authorities.\n\nA war of unprecedented magnitude had raged from September 1939 to 1946.\n\nThe\n\n(I) [1953] S.C.R. I.\n\n(2) (1954] S. C.R. 587, ~8.\n\n(3) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 879.\n\n(4' (1952) S.C.R. 435.\n\nA. Thangal Irun ,.,\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. V enkitacha/arr,\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nA. ThMgal K ., Yu\n\nMusaliar\n\n\"· M. V 1nki1athalom\n\nPolti and anotht:r\n\nBkagwati J.\n\nwar conditions brought in their train a sudden rise in the demand of all kinds of goods, both consumer and _industrial, which, naturally pushed up the prices to abnormal heights affording a great opportunity to the producers, manufactures and merchants to reap huge profits.\n\nThere was good reason to believe that these abnormal profits were not being brought into regplar accounts but were being concealed.\n\nFaced with this situation, means had to be devised to enquire into the tax evasions and to realise the legitimate dues of the State.\n\nIf regard be had to this background it is obvious that section 5(1) had reference to a class of substantial .. evaders of income-tax who required to be specially treated under the drastic procedure provided by Act XXX of 1947.\n\nIt was, however, urged that the words \"substa!!tial extent\" were of such vague import that they did not afford any reasonable basis of classification, Reference was made to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd ed., Vol. 4, page 2901, where the word \"substantial\"\n\nhas been described to be:\n\n\"A word of no fixed meaning, it is an unsatisfactory medium for carrying the idea of some ascertainable proportion of the whole (Terry's Motors, Ltd. v.\n\nRinder, [1948] S.A.S.R. 167)\".\n\nThe word \"subtantial\" has been used legislative enactments and even though be a word of no fixed meaning, Viscount Palser v. Grinling(' ) observed:\n\n. . m vanous it is said to Simon m\n\n\"One of the primar)l meanings of the word is equivalent to considerable, solid, or big.\n\nIt is in this sense that we speak of a substantial fortune; a substantial meal, a substantial man, a substantial argument or ground of defence. Applying the word in this sense, it must be left to the discretion of the judge -of fact to decide as best he can according to the circumstances in each case . ... ,, and it has been described at page 2902 of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary to be \"equivalent to onsiderable,\n\n-olid or big\".\n\nEven though the word \"substantial\" by itself might\n\n(l) [1948) A.C. 291,317.\n\n2 S.C.ll.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1239\n\nnot afford a denite measure or yard-stick for including particular individuals within the classification, the background and the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid affidavit of Gauri Shanker indicate with reasonable certainty the class of persons who are intended to be subjected to this drastic procedure. It does not require much effort to pick out persons who would fall within this group or category of substantial evaders of income-tax and even though a definite amount be not specified in section 5(1) of the Act as constituting a substantial evasion of income-tax the Government, to whom the process of selection for the purposes of reference of the cases for investigation to the Commission is entrusted, would not have any difficulty in finding out the persons coming within this group or category.\n\nTo use the language of Viscount Simon, the income-tax which has been evaded would have to be considerable, solid or big, and once that conclusion was reached by the Government, the cases of such persons would indeed be referred by them for investigation by the Commission under section 5(1) of the Act.\n\nIt was, however, urged that it would be open to the Government within the terms of section 5(1) of the Act itself to discriminate. between persons and persons who fell within the very group or category; the Government might refer the case of A to the Commission leaving the case of B to be dealt with by the ordinary procedure laid down in the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121.\n\nThe possibility of such discriminatory treatment of persons falling within the same group or category, however, cannot necessarily invalidate this piece of legislation. It is to be presumed, unless the contrary were shown, that the administration of a particular law would be done \"not with an evil eye and unequal hand\" and the selection made by the Government of the cases of persons to be ref erred for investigation by the Commission would not be discriminatory.\n\nThis question was considered by this Court in tw<> cases, viz., Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Sau-\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMiualillr\n\nM. Venkitachalan:\n\nPotti and anot/rn\n\nBkagwati ].\n\n.4. Thattgal Ku, Yu\n\nMusaliar\n\nv. .M. V enkilachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nrashtra(i) and Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal(•).\n\nMr. Justice Mukherjea, as he then was, .dealt with the argument in Kathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurastra( 1) as under:-\n\n\"It is a doctrine of the American courts which seems to be well-founded on principle that the equal protection clause can be invoked not merely where discrimination appears on the express terms of the statute itself, but also when it is the result of improper or prejudiced execution of the law. (Vide Weaver on Constitutional law, p. 404). But a statute will not necessarily be condemned as discriminatory, because it does not make the classification itself but, as an effective way of carrying out its policy, vests the authority to do it in certain officers or administrative bodies ......... .In my opinion, if the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an effective method of carrying out that policy a discretion is vested by the statute upon a body of administrators or officers to make selective application of the law to certain classes or groups of persons, the statute itself cannot be condemned as a piece of discriminatory legislation.\n\nAfter all \"the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy .... and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far as its means allow\" (Vide Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208). In such cases, the power given to the executive body would import a duty on. it to classify the subject-matter of legislation in accordance with the objective indicated in the statute.\n\nThe discretion that is conferred on official agencies in such circumstances is not an unguided discretion, it has to be exercised in conformity with the policy to effectuate which the direction is given and it is in relation to that objective that the propriety of the classification would have to be tested.\n\nIf the adm1rustrative body proceeds to classify persons or things on a basis which has no rational relation to the objective of the legislature, its action can certainly be annulled as offending against the equal protection clause.\n\nOn the other hand if the statute\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 435, 459.\n\n(2) [1954] S.C.R. 30, 41.\n\nitself does not disdose a definite policy or objective\n\nand it confers authority on another to make selection at is pleasure, the statute would be held on the fae of it to be discriminatory irrespective of the way m\n\nwhich it is applied ........ \" The same line of demarcation was also emphasized by Patanjali Sastri , C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal(1).\n\nIt, therefore, follows that the mere fact that the Government is entrusted with the power to select .cases of persons falling within the group or category of substantial evaders of income-tax for reference to the Commission would not render section 5(1) discriminatory and void.\n\nThe object sought to be achieved by the impugned piece of legislation is quite definite and that is to catch substantial evaders of income-tax out of those who have made huge profits during the war period.\n\nThey form a class by themselves and have to be specially treated under die procedure laid down in the Act.\n\nBeing a class by themselves, the procedure to which they are subjected during the course of investigation of their cases by the Commission is not at all -discriminatory because such drastic procedure has reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act and therefore such a classification is within the constitutional limitations.\n\nThe selection of the cases of persons falling within that category by the Government cannot be challenged as discriminatory for the simple reason that it is not left to the unguided or the uncontrolled discretion of the Government.\n\nThe selection is guided by the very objective which is set out in the terms of section 5\n\n(1) itself and the attainment of that object controls the discretion which is vested in the Government and guides the Government in making the necessary selection of cases of persons to be referred for . investigation by the Commission.\n\nIt cannot, therefore, be disputed that there is a valid basis of classification .to be found in section 5 ( 1) of the Act.\n\n(I) (1954J S.C.R. 30, 41.\n\nA. T haagal K\"'fiu\n\nMU1alial'\n\nM. Ven/ritadullam\n\nPotti and atUJtlitr\n\nBha&wati J.\n\nA. Tltangal Kunja\n\nM111alw\n\nM. V ln/; ilaehalam\n\nPotli and (JJll)l/ier\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe validity of the classification was further attacked on the ground that the limitation of the period within which the cases of the substantial evaders of income-tax falling within this group or category may he referred for investigation by fhe Government to the Commission, viz., 16th February 1950 imports a discrimination in so far as those persons whose cases are referred before that date would be treated under the procedure laid down in the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 whereas those whose cases have not been referred by that date would not be subjected to the same treatment even though they fell within the same category.\n\nThis would bring about a discrimination between the same class of persons some of whom would be subjected to that special treatment and others who would escape the same. Section 5(4) of the Act also would not cure this defect because the cases contemplated therein are either the cases which have been already referred for investigation to the Commission -under section 5(1) of the Act or cases of other persoris about whose alleged evasion of income-tax the Commission has gathered information during the course of their investigations.\n\nEven if these other persons be thus subjected to the special procedure prescribed in the Act there would remain, outside the jurisdiction of the Commission; numbers of persons. whose cases are not covered by sections 5(1) or 5f4) but who nonetheless are comprised withe\n\nin the class of substantial evaders of income-tax.\n\nThey would have to be dealt with under the ordinary law and presumably under section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 if they could be dealt with thereunder.\n\nIf they could not be so dealt with, the only result would be that they would escape the surveillance of the Government and_ the escapement of income-tax in their cases would be without any remedy. This, it was urged, was discriminatory .and was enough to strike down section 5 ( l) of the Act.\n\nIt would be impossible in the normal course to reach all substantial evaders of income-tax. Those persons falling within that category in. respect of whom the\n\n2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT llEPORTS 12..143\n\nGovernment had received the requisite information -and in whose cases the Government had prima f acie\n\nreasons for believing that they had to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income would have their cases referred by the Government for investigation by the Commission; Those persons in respect of whom no such information was available to the Government would certainly escape detection but that is the position with regard to each and every law which may be passed in order to detect evasion of payment of income-tax.\n\nEven under the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore Act XX:Ill of\n\n1121 (corresponding to section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood before the amendment in 1948), those persons in respect of whom the Incometax Officer had gathered definite information and consequently discovered that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had escaped assessment in any year could be dealt with under the relevant provisions of that Act. Those persons in respect. of whom no such information had been received by the Income-tax Officer could not be reached at all. The fact that some persons failing within a particular category may escape detection altogether is not necessarily destructive of the efficacy of the particular legislation.\n\nThe only thing required is that, as between persons who fall. within the same category and who can be dealt with under the same procedure, there should , be no dis, crimination, some being treated in one way and others being treated in another.\n\nIt was also urged that discrimination was inherent in the terms of section 5(1) itself by reason of its operation being limited only to those persons whbse cases were referred to the Comsion on or before the 16th February 1950.\n\nIt thus arbitrarily left out persons who evaded payment of taxation on income made during the war period but whose cases were not discovered or referred to the Commission on or before that date although they were otherwise similarly situated.\n\nReliance was placed in support of this position on the following passage from the judgment of Mahajan, C. J. in Shree Meenakshi Milli case, 24--'85 S.C. Ibdia/59\n\n.4. Thangtll Ku, P\n\nMwaliar ,,.\n\nM. V illditaclialflfll\n\nPotJi and anot!r\"\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar ...\n\nM. venkitaeWam r olti and anolhn r- B1iagwa1; J.\n\nsupra, at pages 795-796:\n\n\"Assuming that evasion of tax to a substantial amount could form a basis of classification at all for imposing a drastic procdure on that class, the inclusion of only such of them whose cases had been re£erred before 1st September, 1948, into a class for being dealt with by the drastic procedure leaving other tax evaders to be dealt with under the ordinary law will be a clear discrimination for the reference of the case within a particular time has no special or rational nexus with the necessity for drastic procedure ........ \" These observations were made to repel the first argument of the learned Attorney-General that the class of substantial evaders who fall within section 5(1) were only those whose cases had been referred within the date fixed. It was pointed out that if the class was so circumscribed then that by itself would make the classification discriminatory by leaving out those substantial evaders whose cases had not been referred by that date. By that passage, however .• this Court did not hold that in fact section 5 ( 1) was confined to such a limited class.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the fixation of the date for references for investigation by the Government to the Commission, viz., the 16th February 1950 was not an attribute of the class of substantial evaders of income-tax which were inten.ded to be specifically treated under the dractic procedure prescribed in the Travanore Act XIV of 1124 but was a mere accident and a measure of administrative convenience.\n\nThe date of such references could, without touching the nature and purpose of the classification, be extended by the Travancore Legislature by a necessary amendment of the Travancore Act, XIV of 1124, and if such an amendment had been grafted on the Act as originally passed, no one belonging to the particular class or category of substantial evaders of incometax could have complained against the same.\n\nThe next question to consider is whether the same class of persons dealt with under section 5(1) of the 'l'ravancore At XIV of 1124 were intended to and\n\ncould be dealt with under the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121.\n\nBecause, if that was the position at any particular period of time, section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 would certainly be discriminatory in so far as there will be two distinct provisions simultaneously existing in the statute book, one of which could be applied to some persons within the same class or category and the other could be applied to others also falling within the same class or category, thus discriminating between the two groups.\n\nSection 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121, as already observed, was in -the same terms as section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood before its amendment in 1948.\n\nEach of the following condi..; tions had to be fulfilled before the Income-tax Officer could take action under this section, viz.:\n\n(i) that definite information had come into the possession of the Income-tax Officer that income, etc. had escaped;\n\n(ii) that in consequence of such definite information the Income-tax Officer discovered that income, etc.\n\n(a) had escaped assessment, or\n\n(b) had been under-assessed, or ( c) had been assessed at too low a rate, or\n\n(d) had been the subject of excessive relief;\n\n(iii) that the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that- ( a) the assessee had concealed the particulars of his income, or (b) deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars thereof.\n\nIt is, therefore, abundantly dear that section 47(1) of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 was directed only against those persons conerning whom definite. information came into the posse8$ion of the Income. tax Officer and in consequence of which the Incometax Officer discovered that the income of those persons had ecapcd or been under-assessed or assessed at too 10-w a rate or had been the subject of excessive relief.\n\nThe class of persons envisaged by\n\nA. Thmigal K!Jtifu\n\nMusaliar\n\nv• M. Tr mkita&halam\n\nPotii and aMihn\n\nB/llJgwatiJ.\n\n!955\n\nA. Thongal Kunju\n\nMUJQ!iar\n\nV• M. V mkitacha/a,,.\n\nPotti and anothlr\n\n1:246\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR~ [t955J\n\nsection 47(1) was a definite class about which there was definite information leading to discovery within 8 years or 4 years as the case may be of definite item or items of income which had escaped assessment.\n\nThe Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 was passed on the 9th July 1946.\n\nThe action to be ta.ken under it was not confined to escapement from assessment of income made during the war period (September 1939 to 1946).\n\nAction could be taken in respect of income which escaped assessment even before the war and also more than 8 years after the end of the war.\n\nTurning now to section 5(1) it will be noticed that the . class of persons sought to be reached comprises only persons about whom there was no definite information and no discovery of any definite item or items of income which escaped taxation but about whom the Government had only prima facie reason to believe that they evaded payment of tax to a substantial amount. The class of persons who might fall within section 5(1) of the Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124 was, therefore, not the same class of persons who may come under section 47(1) of the. Travancore Act XXIII of ll21.\n\nFurther, action under section 5(1) read with section 8(2) of the Travancore Act XIV of ll24 is definitely limited to the evasion of payment of taxation on intome made during the war period.\n\nIt cannot, therefore, be urged that section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of ll24 was discriminatory in comparison with section 47(1) of' the Travancore Act XXIII of ll21, for the persons who came under section 5(1) were not similarly situated as persons who came under section 47(1). Section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 was struck down in Shru Meenakshi Mills' case, supra, as it comprised the same class of person& who were brought in in the amended section, 34(1-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 but the same caruwt be said about section 5(1) as compared to section 47(1)..\n\nThese two section do not ovcdap: and: do not coYCr the sairu: class of persons.\n\n'fhe result, therefore, is that section 5(1) of the 'Jltavamiore Act XIV of 1124 which. has to: be read for\n\nthis purpose in juxta-position with section 47 of. the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 cannot be held to be\n\ndiscriminatory and violative of the fondamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution. The proceedings which took place in the course of investigation by the Commission up to the 26th January 1950 were valid and so also were the proceedings during. the course of investigation which took place after the inauguration of the Constitutiol). on the 26th January 1950 under which the petitioner, as a citizen of our Sovereign Democratic Republic acquired inter alia .guarantee of the fundamental right under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that .all the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner fail and Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1954 must be dismissed with costs.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 21 and 22 of 1954 wil~ accordingly be diSlllissed with costs.\n\nThere wm be a set off for costs.\n\nM. CT. MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS\n\nti •.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS &, ANOTHER;\n\n[S. R.\n\nDAs~\n\nACTING\n\nC.J, V1vr:rn BosE, BHAcrWAn, J AGANNADHADAS and B. f. SINHA JI.)\n\nConstitution of India, Art. ]'/--Taxation on Income (Investigation Commisiion) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), s. 5(1)-'Whetil~ .ultra vires 'lhe Constitution in vie1v of s. 34 of Indian lncome-Ta1r\n\nAct, 1922 (Act XI of 1922) as amended by the 'Income-Tax and Bu1iness Profits .Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948 (Act XLVlll tif 1948) and the Indian Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, 1954 (Act X!XXW uf 1954).\n\nHld (Per S .. R. DAs, .A, cTING C.J., V1v1AN iBoSE, .BHAcwATI and B. P. SINHA, JJ . .}AGANNAoHADAS J., dissenting) that s. 5.(1) of the T<1xation on .. Income (Investigation Commission) Ac~,· .1947 (Act XXX of 1947) iis ultra vires the Constitution as it ii discriminawry and violative of the fundamental .right guaranteed by . Art. l4 of the Constitution by reason of two amenc; lments which were made in , s. 34 of thf: Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI afl922) one ia .1948 by the .c:nac[ment of the Income-T.u: and Busine$& Profit$ Ta\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nV• M. Vmliit°'halam\n\nPolti and anothlr\n\nBhagwati].\n\nD1umbu 20.", "total_entities": 551, "entities": [{"text": "sections 535 and 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 333, "end_char": 353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 593, "end_char": 604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 612, "end_char": 629, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 644, "end_char": 661, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. THANGAL KUNJU MUSALIAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 769, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. 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"statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1039, "end_char": 1046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1100, "end_char": 1108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1112, "end_char": 1143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1189, "end_char": 1200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121", "statute": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121", "statute": "Travancore Income-tar Act, 1121"}}, {"text": "Investigation Commission-Whether competent under the provisions of the Travancore Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1325, "end_char": 1410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Act XXX of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1870, "end_char": 1892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United State ofTravancore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2034, "end_char": 2059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In July 1949, 'the United State ofTravancore and -Cochin was brwght into existence as , a result of i.Iltegration hetweeri the two States."}}, {"text": "Government of the United State: of Travancre-\n\nCochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2312, "end_char": 2365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In, November 1949 the Government of the United State: of Travancre-\n\nCochin issued orders under s. 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 and 1943 (called Evasion Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2386, "end_char": 2393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Act XXX of 1947", "statute": "Indian Act XXX of 1947"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2401, "end_char": 2427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore Income-Tax Investigation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2561, "end_char": 2607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 & 2 of 1125) for investigation by the Travancore Income-Tax Investigation Commission."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2658, "end_char": 2679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the Commission could make its report the Constitution of India came into force and the United State of Travancore-Cochin became a part of India (Part B State) and the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 was continued in force until altered, amended or repealed by a competent authority."}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2784, "end_char": 2810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In April 1950 Parliament passed Act XXXIII of 1950 whereby Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, (Act XXX of 1947) was extended to Travancore-Cochin and the law of Travancore corresponding to Act XXX of 1947 was to continue in force with certain modifications."}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin and the law of Travancore corresponding to Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3040, "end_char": 3104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Investigation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3216, "end_char": 3247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In October 1951, a notification issued by the Indian Investigation Commission appointed Respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore-Cochin and the law of Travancore corresponding to Act", "statute": "Travancore-Cochin and the law of Travancore corresponding to Act"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3315, "end_char": 3341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "21st November, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 sent a copy of that notification to the petitioner on 21st November, 1951 for his information and further intimated to him that the investigation proposed to be conducted will not be confined to the year> 1942 and 1943 but that it would be necessary for him to investigate the petitioner's income for the period from 1940 to the last completed assessment year."}}, {"text": "Travancore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner filed a writ petition in the Travancore High Court against Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-Tax Investigation Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 (Indian Income-Tax Investigation Commission) for a writ of prohibition or any other writ prohibiting the Respondents from holding an enquiry into the cases registered as Evasion Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "Travancore Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4277, "end_char": 4298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 had all the powers that the Travancore Commission had under Travancore Act XIV of 1124 and no more and granted the writ prohibiting respondents from conducting an enquiry into years other than 1942 and 1943."}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4309, "end_char": 4335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the parties appealed to the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4744, "end_char": 4752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4846, "end_char": 4850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5237, "end_char": 5245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5315, "end_char": 5341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. Thangal Kunju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5459, "end_char": 5475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It could only investigate cases referred to it by\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nYo M. Vmkila&halam\n\nPolti and another\n\n.A. Thagol KURja\n\nM.,..J; ar ...\n\nM.Vmkila</ul/am\n\nPoui ll1ld llMt/1Government.", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "M. Vmkila&halam\n\nPolti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5490, "end_char": 5512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It could only investigate cases referred to it by\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nYo M. Vmkila&halam\n\nPolti and another\n\n.A. Thagol KURja\n\nM.,..J; ar ...\n\nM.Vmkila</ul/am\n\nPoui ll1ld llMt/1Government.", "canonical_name": "M. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti"}}, {"text": ".A. Thagol KURja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It could only investigate cases referred to it by\n\nA. 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The Union of India ([1950] S.C.R. 869), Budhan Chowdhury and others v. The State of Bihar ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045), Suraj .\\fall 1Hohta & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and another ( 119551 1 S.C.R. 448), Sh1ee Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Sri A. V. Visva- 11atha Sastri and Another ( [1955] I S.C.R. 787), Astvini Kumar Ghose's case (!", "canonical_name": "Astvini Kumar Ghose"}}, {"text": "Subodh Gopal Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9174, "end_char": 9191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1953 J S.C.R. 1), Subodh Gopal Bose's case ([1954] S.C.R. 587, 62il), Kathi Raning Ratl'at v. The State of Saurashtl'a (11952] S.C.R. 4.15)."}}, {"text": "Palser Y. Grinling", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9297, "end_char": 9315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Palser Y. Grinling (119481 A.C. 291) and Kedar Nath Bajoria\n\nv. The State of West Bengal (1954] S.C.R. 30), referred to."}}, {"text": "Kedar Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9338, "end_char": 9348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Palser Y. Grinling (119481 A.C. 291) and Kedar Nath Bajoria\n\nv. The State of West Bengal (1954] S.C.R. 30), referred to."}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9503, "end_char": 9517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9529, "end_char": 9550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. K. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9684, "end_char": 9697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, (N. Palpu, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "N. Palpu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9700, "end_char": 9708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, (N. Palpu, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "Narain Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9714, "end_char": 9727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, (N. Palpu, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9732, "end_char": 9747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, (N. Palpu, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain) for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9832, "end_char": 9846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi), R. Ganapatlzy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and R. H.\n\nDhebar), for the respondents in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9876, "end_char": 9888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi), R. Ganapatlzy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and R. H.\n\nDhebar), for the respondents in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapatlzy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9891, "end_char": 9909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi), R. Ganapatlzy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and R. H.\n\nDhebar), for the respondents in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9911, "end_char": 9925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi), R. Ganapatlzy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and R. H.\n\nDhebar), for the respondents in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "R. H.\n\nDhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9930, "end_char": 9943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi), R. Ganapatlzy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and R. H.\n\nDhebar), for the respondents in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "BttAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10094, "end_char": 10103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBttAGWATI J.-These two appeals with certificates under article 133 of the Constitution are directed against a judgment of the High Court of Travancore- Cochin in a writ petition filed by one A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar, hereinafter called the petitioner."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10149, "end_char": 10160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Travancore- Cochin", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10220, "end_char": 10252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBttAGWATI J.-These two appeals with certificates under article 133 of the Constitution are directed against a judgment of the High Court of Travancore- Cochin in a writ petition filed by one A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar, hereinafter called the petitioner."}}, {"text": "A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10285, "end_char": 10310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBttAGWATI J.-These two appeals with certificates under article 133 of the Constitution are directed against a judgment of the High Court of Travancore- Cochin in a writ petition filed by one A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar, hereinafter called the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10702, "end_char": 10728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is the Managing Director of Messrs.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju Musaliar & Sons Ltd., Quilon, and had been assessed to income-tax for the years 1942 and 1943 and the final orders in his assessment for the said years were\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. YmkiJa&holam\n\nPoffi and (IJl/}f/utr,\n\n..!.", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "M. YmkiJa&holam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is the Managing Director of Messrs.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju Musaliar & Sons Ltd., Quilon, and had been assessed to income-tax for the years 1942 and 1943 and the final orders in his assessment for the said years were\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. YmkiJa&holam\n\nPoffi and (IJl/}f/utr,\n\n..!."}}, {"text": "M. VmlUadialam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10806, "end_char": 10820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tlllmgal ir .. ju\n\nMusalia!-\n\nM. VmlUadialam\n\nPotti and anolhir\n\nBhagwali]."}}, {"text": "Travancore Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10995, "end_char": 11017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th March 1949, the Travancore Legislature passed Act XIV of 1124 (M.E.) modelled on our Act XXX of 1947, styled the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act 1124, to provide for an investigation into matters relating to taxation on income."}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11236, "end_char": 11245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11321, "end_char": 11342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 1 (3) of the Act provided that it was to come into force on such date as the Travancore Government may by notification in the Government Gazette appoint."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11405, "end_char": 11414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11606, "end_char": 11615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11896, "end_char": 11905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12299, "end_char": 12308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st July 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12534, "end_char": 12547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st July 1949, the Travancore State and the Cochin State integrated with each other and there was brought into existence the United State of Tra\".ancore and Cochin."}}, {"text": "Travancore State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12553, "end_char": 12569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st July 1949, the Travancore State and the Cochin State integrated with each other and there was brought into existence the United State of Tra\".ancore and Cochin."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12578, "end_char": 12584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st July 1949, the Travancore State and the Cochin State integrated with each other and there was brought into existence the United State of Tra\".ancore and Cochin."}}, {"text": "Tra\".ancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12675, "end_char": 12686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st July 1949, the Travancore State and the Cochin State integrated with each other and there was brought into existence the United State of Tra\".ancore and Cochin."}}, {"text": "United State of Travancore and Cochin Administration and Application of Laws Ordinance, 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12773, "end_char": 12865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ordinance I was enacted later as Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12867, "end_char": 12903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th July 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th July 1949, a notification was published in the Travancore-Cochin Government Gazette whereby, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 1(3) of the Travancore Taxation on Income Investigation Commission) Act XIV of 1124 as continued in force by the United State of Travancore and Cochine Administration & Application of Laws (Ordinance, 1124 (I of 1124), the Government appointed the 7th Karkadakom 1124 (22-7-1949) to be the date -0n which the said Act was to have come into force\n\nOn the 26th November 1949 the Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin issued orders under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 .and 1943 for investigation by the Travancore Income-tax Investigation Commission."}}, {"text": "section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13316, "end_char": 13328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance I was enacted later as Act", "statute": "Ordinance I was enacted later as Act"}}, {"text": "United State of Travancore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13437, "end_char": 13463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th July 1949, a notification was published in the Travancore-Cochin Government Gazette whereby, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 1(3) of the Travancore Taxation on Income Investigation Commission) Act XIV of 1124 as continued in force by the United State of Travancore and Cochine Administration & Application of Laws (Ordinance, 1124 (I of 1124), the Government appointed the 7th Karkadakom 1124 (22-7-1949) to be the date -0n which the said Act was to have come into force\n\nOn the 26th November 1949 the Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin issued orders under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 .and 1943 for investigation by the Travancore Income-tax Investigation Commission."}}, {"text": "26th November 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13678, "end_char": 13696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th July 1949, a notification was published in the Travancore-Cochin Government Gazette whereby, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 1(3) of the Travancore Taxation on Income Investigation Commission) Act XIV of 1124 as continued in force by the United State of Travancore and Cochine Administration & Application of Laws (Ordinance, 1124 (I of 1124), the Government appointed the 7th Karkadakom 1124 (22-7-1949) to be the date -0n which the said Act was to have come into force\n\nOn the 26th November 1949 the Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin issued orders under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 .and 1943 for investigation by the Travancore Income-tax Investigation Commission."}}, {"text": "Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13701, "end_char": 13756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th July 1949, a notification was published in the Travancore-Cochin Government Gazette whereby, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 1(3) of the Travancore Taxation on Income Investigation Commission) Act XIV of 1124 as continued in force by the United State of Travancore and Cochine Administration & Application of Laws (Ordinance, 1124 (I of 1124), the Government appointed the 7th Karkadakom 1124 (22-7-1949) to be the date -0n which the said Act was to have come into force\n\nOn the 26th November 1949 the Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin issued orders under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 .and 1943 for investigation by the Travancore Income-tax Investigation Commission."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13777, "end_char": 13789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance I was enacted later as Act", "statute": "Ordinance I was enacted later as Act"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13797, "end_char": 13823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore Income-tax Investigation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13916, "end_char": 13962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th July 1949, a notification was published in the Travancore-Cochin Government Gazette whereby, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 1(3) of the Travancore Taxation on Income Investigation Commission) Act XIV of 1124 as continued in force by the United State of Travancore and Cochine Administration & Application of Laws (Ordinance, 1124 (I of 1124), the Government appointed the 7th Karkadakom 1124 (22-7-1949) to be the date -0n which the said Act was to have come into force\n\nOn the 26th November 1949 the Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin issued orders under section 5(1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 referring the cases of the petitioner for the years 1942 .and 1943 for investigation by the Travancore Income-tax Investigation Commission."}}, {"text": "10th December 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14244, "end_char": 14262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th December 1949 the petitioner received from the Secretary of the ComJ:\"ission a notice in regard to the said cases."}}, {"text": "21-12-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14675, "end_char": 14685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the said notice stated:\n\n\"Whereas the Income-tax Investigation Com mission having been informed that a substantial portion of your income for 1942 and 1943 has escaped -assessment, has ordered investigation into the matter, you are hereby required to produce the following on -or before 21-12-1949 before the Commission."}}, {"text": "A. T lllmgal Kunju", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14804, "end_char": 14822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T lllmgal Kunju\n\nMUS!lliar\n\nM. Y lllkilackalam\n\nPotti and fJtUJt/zlr\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nA. Thangal K1Jnj\"\n\nMusaliar\n\n\"· M. V enkitachalam\n\nPotti and anoth\"\n\nBhagwati]."}}, {"text": "A. Thangal K1Jnj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14889, "end_char": 14905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T lllmgal Kunju\n\nMUS!lliar\n\nM. Y lllkilackalam\n\nPotti and fJtUJt/zlr\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nA. Thangal K1Jnj\"\n\nMusaliar\n\n\"· M. V enkitachalam\n\nPotti and anoth\"\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15119, "end_char": 15145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15207, "end_char": 15228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15252, "end_char": 15269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this notice the petitioner produced the relevant books and the Commission duly completed its investigation under the terms of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124: Before the Commission could, however, make itsc report, the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January 1950 and the United State of Travancore and Cochin became a part of the territory of India, forming a Part 'B' State."}}, {"text": "United State of Travancore and Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15278, "end_char": 15315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this notice the petitioner produced the relevant books and the Commission duly completed its investigation under the terms of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124: Before the Commission could, however, make itsc report, the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January 1950 and the United State of Travancore and Cochin became a part of the territory of India, forming a Part 'B' State."}}, {"text": "article 372(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15390, "end_char": 15404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15498, "end_char": 15524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th February 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15956, "end_char": 15974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the recommendations of the Com-- mittee, an agreement was entered into on the 25th February 1950 between the President of the Union and the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin in regard' to these matters and on the 31st March 1950 the Finance Act, .1950 (Act XXV of 1950) came \"into force and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) was extended to Travancore-Cochin."}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the recommendations of the Com-- mittee, an agreement was entered into on the 25th February 1950 between the President of the Union and the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin in regard' to these matters and on the 31st March 1950 the Finance Act, .1950 (Act XXV of 1950) came \"into force and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) was extended to Travancore-Cochin."}}, {"text": "31st March 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16089, "end_char": 16104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the recommendations of the Com-- mittee, an agreement was entered into on the 25th February 1950 between the President of the Union and the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin in regard' to these matters and on the 31st March 1950 the Finance Act, .1950 (Act XXV of 1950) came \"into force and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) was extended to Travancore-Cochin."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16171, "end_char": 16198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "18th April 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16255, "end_char": 16270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th April 1950, the Opium and Revenue Laws (Extention of Application) Act, 1950, being Act XXXIII of 1950, was passed by Parliament extending to Travancore-Cochin Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947\n\n(XXX of\n\n1947) and section 3 of that Act provided that the law of Travancore corresponding to the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947) shall continue to remain in force with the following modifications, viz.,"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16495, "end_char": 16504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Central Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16931, "end_char": 16949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(a) that all cases referred to or pending before the State Commission (by whatever name called) in respect of matters relating to taxation on income\n\nother than agricultural income shall stand transferred to the Central Commission for disposal; and\n\n(b) that the State law shall, so far as may be, apply to determine the procedure that may be followed and powers that may be exercised by the Central Commission in the disposal of cases transferred under clause (a)."}}, {"text": "Travancot='c Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17190, "end_char": 17213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Travancot='c Commission had been appointed in the first instance to act up to the last day of Karkadakom 1125 (16-8-1950)."}}, {"text": "Indian Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17356, "end_char": 17373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neither the Travancore Commission nor the Indian Commission to which\n\nthe pending cases before the Travancore Commission were transferred as aforesaid made any report on these casrs of the petitioner before the expiry of this period nor was any extension of the term of appoint-- ment of the Travancore Commission made up to the\n\nlat day of Karkadakom 1126 (16-8-1951) as originally contemplated."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17803, "end_char": 17822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17946, "end_char": 17955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18420, "end_char": 18429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18660, "end_char": 18669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "18th October 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18714, "end_char": 18731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th October 1951, a notification was issued by the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission appointing M. V enkitachalam Potty, Income-tax Officer on Special Duty, Trivandrum, as an\n\nA. Thanga IKUllp\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachdam-\n\nPotti and another>\n\nBha, f<Wali J;\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti orid another\n\nBhagwaJi]."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18766, "end_char": 18808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th October 1951, a notification was issued by the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission appointing M. V enkitachalam Potty, Income-tax Officer on Special Duty, Trivandrum, as an\n\nA. Thanga IKUllp\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachdam-\n\nPotti and another>\n\nBha, f<Wali J;\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti orid another\n\nBhagwaJi]."}}, {"text": "M. V enkitachalam Potty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18820, "end_char": 18843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th October 1951, a notification was issued by the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission appointing M. V enkitachalam Potty, Income-tax Officer on Special Duty, Trivandrum, as an\n\nA. Thanga IKUllp\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachdam-\n\nPotti and another>\n\nBha, f<Wali J;\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti orid another\n\nBhagwaJi].", "canonical_name": "M. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti"}}, {"text": "M. Venkitachalam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19010, "end_char": 19026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th October 1951, a notification was issued by the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission appointing M. V enkitachalam Potty, Income-tax Officer on Special Duty, Trivandrum, as an\n\nA. Thanga IKUllp\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachdam-\n\nPotti and another>\n\nBha, f<Wali J;\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti orid another\n\nBhagwaJi].", "canonical_name": "M. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19088, "end_char": 19097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th May 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20309, "end_char": 20321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner thereupon filed on the 6th May 1952 a writ petition in the High Court of Travancore- Cochin, being 0."}}, {"text": "K. T. Koshi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21463, "end_char": 21474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court consisting of K. T. Koshi C. J. and P. K. Subramonia Iyer and M. S. Menon,\n\nJJ."}}, {"text": "P. K. Subramonia Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21485, "end_char": 21506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court consisting of K. T. Koshi C. J. and P. K. Subramonia Iyer and M. S. Menon,\n\nJJ."}}, {"text": "M. S. Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21511, "end_char": 21522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court consisting of K. T. Koshi C. J. and P. K. Subramonia Iyer and M. S. Menon,\n\nJJ."}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21640, "end_char": 21666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20th September 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22417, "end_char": 22436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both these appeals came for hearing and final disposal before us on the 20th September 1955."}}, {"text": "Nambiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22491, "end_char": 22499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the argument had proceeded for some time Shri Nambiyar, for the petitioner, asked for leave to urge additional grounds, viz., ("}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22580, "end_char": 22589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22598, "end_char": 22624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22647, "end_char": 22665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22723, "end_char": 22732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22748, "end_char": 22758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23119, "end_char": 23145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gauri Shanker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23242, "end_char": 23255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An affidavit was accordingly filed before us by Gauri Shanker, Secretary of\n\nA. Thangol Kunju\n\nMusolior\n\nM. V enkittUholam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhogwati]."}}, {"text": "A. Thangol", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23271, "end_char": 23281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An affidavit was accordingly filed before us by Gauri Shanker, Secretary of\n\nA. Thangol Kunju\n\nMusolior\n\nM. V enkittUholam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhogwati].", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "M. V enkittUholam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23299, "end_char": 23316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An affidavit was accordingly filed before us by Gauri Shanker, Secretary of\n\nA. Thangol Kunju\n\nMusolior\n\nM. V enkittUholam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhogwati]."}}, {"text": "A. Thangal Kunju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23349, "end_char": 23365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBh.agwali].", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24931, "end_char": 24942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25475, "end_char": 25484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22 of 1954.. He pointed out that respondent 2 had its office in New Delhi and was permanently located' there and the mere fact of its having appointed: respondent 1 to function and carry on the investigation within the State of Travancore under its direction did not make it amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Trivandrum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26067, "end_char": 26077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further contended that the High Court could not .do indirectly what it was not able to do directly an<l that it could not issue any writ of prohibition against respondent 1 either even though he had his office at Trivandrum and had a permanent location within the jurisdiction of the High Court inasmuch as he was merely an arm of respondent 2 and any writ issued against him would have the indirect effect of prohj_biting respondent 2 from exercising its legitimate functions within the ambit of its powers under the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 read with A.ct XXX of 1950 and Act XLIV of 1951."}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26372, "end_char": 26398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26611, "end_char": 26631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent in that case had applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 for a writ restraining the Election Commission, a statutory authority constituted by the Presi<lent and having its office permanently located at New Delhi from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly, and a single Judge of the High Court had issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission from doing so."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26638, "end_char": 26649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26677, "end_char": 26696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent in that case had applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 for a writ restraining the Election Commission, a statutory authority constituted by the Presi<lent and having its office permanently located at New Delhi from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly, and a single Judge of the High Court had issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission from doing so."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27134, "end_char": 27145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27211, "end_char": 27227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While discussing this question, Patanjali Sastri C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed as under:-\n\n\"Rut wide as were the powers thus conferred, a two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise."}}, {"text": "A. Tlzangal Ku", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27694, "end_char": 27708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Tlzangal Ku, Yu\n\nUusaliar\n\nM. Vtnkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhagwali].", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "A. Thangal Ku", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27773, "end_char": 27786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Thangal Ku, Yu\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPatti and another\n\nBhagwaliJ.\n\nwhom the .writs must ly implies tion either tories\".", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28944, "end_char": 28955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29410, "end_char": 29421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Saka Venkata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29441, "end_char": 29453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision in Saka Venkata Rao's case was followed by this Court in K. S. Rashid & Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission, etc.(').", "canonical_name": "Saka Venkata Rao"}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29625, "end_char": 29629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the assessees who were within the State of U.P. and whose original assessments were made by the ipcome-tax authorities of that State had filed writ petitions in the Punjab High Court for the issue of writs under article 226 to the Income-tax Investigation Commission located in Delhi and investigating\n\n(1) [1954] SCR 738 ..\n\ntheir cases under section 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29747, "end_char": 29764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the assessees who were within the State of U.P. and whose original assessments were made by the ipcome-tax authorities of that State had filed writ petitions in the Punjab High Court for the issue of writs under article 226 to the Income-tax Investigation Commission located in Delhi and investigating\n\n(1) [1954] SCR 738 ..\n\ntheir cases under section 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29794, "end_char": 29805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29860, "end_char": 29865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the assessees who were within the State of U.P. and whose original assessments were made by the ipcome-tax authorities of that State had filed writ petitions in the Punjab High Court for the issue of writs under article 226 to the Income-tax Investigation Commission located in Delhi and investigating\n\n(1) [1954] SCR 738 ..\n\ntheir cases under section 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29926, "end_char": 29935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30394, "end_char": 30405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parlakimidi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30493, "end_char": 30504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, on appeal, distinguished the decision in Parlakimidi's case which was sought to be relied upon by the respondents before it and followed the position in law as it had been enunciated in Saka Venkata Rao's case supra, and held that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ under article 226 to the Investigation Commission which was located in Delhi in spite of the fact that the assessees were within the State of U.P. and their original assessments were made by the income-tax authorities of that State."}}, {"text": "Saka Venkata Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30638, "end_char": 30654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, on appeal, distinguished the decision in Parlakimidi's case which was sought to be relied upon by the respondents before it and followed the position in law as it had been enunciated in Saka Venkata Rao's case supra, and held that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ under article 226 to the Investigation Commission which was located in Delhi in spite of the fact that the assessees were within the State of U.P. and their original assessments were made by the income-tax authorities of that State.", "canonical_name": "Saka Venkata Rao"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30744, "end_char": 30755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31089, "end_char": 31120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle of these decisions would, it was urged by the learned Attorney-General, eliminate respondent 2 and the High Court of Travancore-Cochin would have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against it."}}, {"text": "A. Thangal KUJ!iu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32002, "end_char": 32019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Thangal KUJ!iu\n\nMusaliar v.\n\nM. V1nkitae/ullam\n\nPotti artd a11otlwi\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n.. A. Thanxal Kunju\n\nMu.salitJT\n\nM. Vtnkitacludam\n\nPotti anJ anothtr\nBhagwaJ.\n\nwould be equivalent to a writ issued by the High Court against respondent 2 which it had no jurisdiction.", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "Potti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32053, "end_char": 32058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Thangal KUJ!iu\n\nMusaliar v.\n\nM. V1nkitae/ullam\n\nPotti artd a11otlwi\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n.. A. Thanxal Kunju\n\nMu.salitJT\n\nM. Vtnkitacludam\n\nPotti anJ anothtr\nBhagwaJ.\n\nwould be equivalent to a writ issued by the High Court against respondent 2 which it had no jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "A. Thanxal Kunju", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32089, "end_char": 32105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Thangal KUJ!iu\n\nMusaliar v.\n\nM. V1nkitae/ullam\n\nPotti artd a11otlwi\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n.. A. Thanxal Kunju\n\nMu.salitJT\n\nM. Vtnkitacludam\n\nPotti anJ anothtr\nBhagwaJ.\n\nwould be equivalent to a writ issued by the High Court against respondent 2 which it had no jurisdiction.", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "M. Vtnkitacludam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32119, "end_char": 32135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Thangal KUJ!iu\n\nMusaliar v.\n\nM. V1nkitae/ullam\n\nPotti artd a11otlwi\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n.. A. Thanxal Kunju\n\nMu.salitJT\n\nM. Vtnkitacludam\n\nPotti anJ anothtr\nBhagwaJ.\n\nwould be equivalent to a writ issued by the High Court against respondent 2 which it had no jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32356, "end_char": 32365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32373, "end_char": 32399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32402, "end_char": 32414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33072, "end_char": 33081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Civil Court under the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33574, "end_char": 33600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33991, "end_char": 34000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Court under the Code", "statute": "Civil Court under the Code"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34586, "end_char": 34595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Court under the Code", "statute": "Civil Court under the Code"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34694, "end_char": 34704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34723, "end_char": 34733, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35606, "end_char": 35617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37086, "end_char": 37097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37123, "end_char": 37134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Courts of Allahaba<l, Nagpur and Pepsu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39648, "end_char": 39691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was drawn by the learned Attorney- General in this connection to three recent decisions of the High Courts of Allahaba<l, Nagpur and Pepsu which, according to him, supported his contention, viz.,"}}, {"text": "High Court of Travancore-Cochine", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41262, "end_char": 41294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "orders against the authority within the territories would, in view of the orders of the superior authority, have been infructuous, the High Court concerned had, of necessity, to dismiss the petition .. Such, however, was not the position in the present petition before the High Court of Travancore-Cochine."}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41527, "end_char": 41553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42079, "end_char": 42092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42115, "end_char": 42125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42236, "end_char": 42247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42921, "end_char": 42933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42941, "end_char": 42967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17th November 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42988, "end_char": 43006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A report dated the 17th November 1949 had been made by the Board of Revenue in regard to the income-tax assessment of the petitioner for the years 1119 and 1120 (M.E.) and two orders were passed\n\non the 26th November 1949 by the Government on the strength of that report."}}, {"text": "31st December 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43433, "end_char": 43451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The return of income for the year ending the 31st December 1942 was the subject-matter of the first order and after setting out the materials in the order the Government stated that they had prima f acie reasons for believing that the petitioner had to a substantial extent evaded payment of tax on his income for 1119 and they considered that this was a fit case for reference to the Income-tax Investigation Commission under section 5(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Investigation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43773, "end_char": 43808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The return of income for the year ending the 31st December 1942 was the subject-matter of the first order and after setting out the materials in the order the Government stated that they had prima f acie reasons for believing that the petitioner had to a substantial extent evaded payment of tax on his income for 1119 and they considered that this was a fit case for reference to the Income-tax Investigation Commission under section 5(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43815, "end_char": 43827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "31st December 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43928, "end_char": 43946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second order' referred to the petitioner's return of income for the year ending the 31st December 1943 and after setting out the materials, wound up similarily by stating that the Government had prim a f acie reasons for believing that the petitioner had to a substantial extent evaded payment of tax on his income for 1120 and they considered that this was a fit case for reference to the Income-tax Investigation Commission under section 5(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44276, "end_char": 44288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44327, "end_char": 44353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44514, "end_char": 44526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "16th February 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44822, "end_char": 44840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such reference, however, could be made at any time before the 16th February 1950 but not later."}}, {"text": "A. 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Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45612, "end_char": 45621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45837, "end_char": 45846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46089, "end_char": 46098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46386, "end_char": 46395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46587, "end_char": 46599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46749, "end_char": 46758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46953, "end_char": 46965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48139, "end_char": 48151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49345, "end_char": 49371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49569, "end_char": 49595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Even if the Travancore Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49665, "end_char": 49691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. 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'"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60269, "end_char": 60296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vhen the Travancore Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60299, "end_char": 60322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60565, "end_char": 60575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vhen the Travancore Act", "statute": "Vhen the Travancore Act"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60583, "end_char": 60609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60615, "end_char": 60642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60778, "end_char": 60790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096", "statute": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60982, "end_char": 60991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096", "statute": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XVII of 1122", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60999, "end_char": 61026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61269, "end_char": 61296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61441, "end_char": 61453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096", "statute": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096"}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61680, "end_char": 61692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096", "statute": "Travancore Act VIII of 1096"}}, {"text": "Indian States Finance Enquiry Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61793, "end_char": 61832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) : The Indian States Finance Enquiry Committee 1948-49 made two interim reports."}}, {"text": "A. Thangal Kunju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 63214, "end_char": 63230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar .", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "M. Vmkita&halam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63247, "end_char": 63262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nM. Vmkita&halam\n\nfoUi (Z1ld another\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "M. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti"}}, {"text": "Thangal KnJu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63300, "end_char": 63312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".A. Thangal KnJu\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. VtnAitochalam\n\n.Potti and anothn\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe Indian Commission.", "canonical_name": "Thangal KnJu"}}, {"text": "M. VtnAitochalam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63324, "end_char": 63340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".A. Thangal KnJu\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. VtnAitochalam\n\n.Potti and anothn\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe Indian Commission.", "canonical_name": "M. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64203, "end_char": 64212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act provided that the law of Travancore corresponding to Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64221, "end_char": 64281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64902, "end_char": 64928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "16-8-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65102, "end_char": 65111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) whether the life of the Travancore Commission, not having been extended beyond 16-8-1950, respondent 2 had the power and authority to continue the investigation of the cases of the petitioner after\n\n16'8~1950, and (2) whether any orders passed by the Government on the report made by respondent 2 would have the ."}}, {"text": "26th August 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65827, "end_char": 65843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parliament, however, passed, on the 26th August 1951, Act\n\nXLIV of 1951 amending Act XXXIII of 1950 whereby it provided with retrospective effect that, in the disposal of cases transferred to respondent 2, it shall have and exercise the same powers as it has and exercises in the investigation of cases transferred to it under Act XXX of 1947 and shall be entitled to act for the same term as under sub-section (3) of section 4 of that Act thus extending the life of respondent 2 beyond 16-8-1950."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66209, "end_char": 66218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66399, "end_char": 66418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, it was submitted, Parliament was not competent to do by reason of the terms of the agreement dated the 25th February, 1950, the effect of the enactment of Act XLIV of J951 being to amend the law of the Travancore State , which was to govern the investigation of pending cats by respondent 2."}}, {"text": "article 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66640, "end_char": 66651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66794, "end_char": 66805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Legislature", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 66812, "end_char": 66831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Legislature, it was submitted, was, therefore, not competent to pa5s Act XLIV of 1951 extending the life of respondent 2 beyond 16-8-1950 and respondent 2 was, therefore, not entitled to carry on any further investigation in the Evasion Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67222, "end_char": 67233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. 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T hangal K rufiu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 76423, "end_char": 76442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T hangal K rufiu\n\nMusalilll'\n\nM. Vmkitaehalam\n\nPolli and 4lllJlhlr\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPotti and anothtr\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "A. 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Thangal Kunju\n\nMusalia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 80871, "end_char": 80896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusalia;\n\nVI M. V mkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nA. Thangal Ku•ju\n\nMusali1J1\n\nM. V1nlcitachalam\n\nPotli and another\n\ntion ( 4) of section 5 of the impugned Act dealt with persons who had similar characteristics and similar properties, the common characteristics being that they were persons who had not truly disclosed their income and had evaded payment of taxation on in-\n\n.Bluiewati ].", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "M. V1nlcitachalam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 80968, "end_char": 80985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusalia;\n\nVI M. V mkitachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nA. Thangal Ku•ju\n\nMusali1J1\n\nM. V1nlcitachalam\n\nPotli and another\n\ntion ( 4) of section 5 of the impugned Act dealt with persons who had similar characteristics and similar properties, the common characteristics being that they were persons who had not truly disclosed their income and had evaded payment of taxation on in-\n\n.Bluiewati ]."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81019, "end_char": 81028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 81568, "end_char": 81582, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81619, "end_char": 81628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 31, 32 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81661, "end_char": 81683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 81698, "end_char": 81712, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82124, "end_char": 82140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 37 and 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82192, "end_char": 82210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82225, "end_char": 82239, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82408, "end_char": 82422, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82657, "end_char": 82671, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82721, "end_char": 82734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82929, "end_char": 82939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83043, "end_char": 83046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament enacted the Indian Income-tax Amendment Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83082, "end_char": 83142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83205, "end_char": 83215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament enacted the Indian Income-tax Amendment Act, 1954", "statute": "Parliament enacted the Indian Income-tax Amendment Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83230, "end_char": 83244, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83247, "end_char": 83272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83389, "end_char": 83404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954", "statute": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83508, "end_char": 83520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954", "statute": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954"}}, {"text": "Suraj Mall Mohta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83535, "end_char": 83551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 34(1-A) purported to meet two criticisms which had been, in the main, offered against the constitutionality of section 5(1) of the Act in Suraj Mall Mohta's case.", "canonical_name": "Suraj Mall Mohta"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83611, "end_char": 83623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954", "statute": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83930, "end_char": 83940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954", "statute": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83997, "end_char": 84007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954", "statute": "Though Act XXXIII of 1954"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84463, "end_char": 84475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84597, "end_char": 84612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st September 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84710, "end_char": 84728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It clearly stated that it would operate on income made between the 1st September 1939 and 31st March 1946 tax on which had been evaded."}}, {"text": "31st March 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84733, "end_char": 84748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It clearly stated that it would operate on income made between the 1st September 1939 and 31st March 1946 tax on which had been evaded."}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84780, "end_char": 84792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84930, "end_char": 84940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85065, "end_char": 85077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "zagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85321, "end_char": 85328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thangal Kunju\n\nMusoliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPatti and atWthtr\n\nB/zagwati J.\n\nthe judgment in Sura; Mall M ohta' s case, supra, but had not been dealt with by this Court it being considered sufficient to strike down section 5( 4) of the Act without expressing any opinion on the vires of section 5(1)."}}, {"text": "Sura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 85349, "end_char": 85353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thangal Kunju\n\nMusoliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPatti and atWthtr\n\nB/zagwati J.\n\nthe judgment in Sura; Mall M ohta' s case, supra, but had not been dealt with by this Court it being considered sufficient to strike down section 5( 4) of the Act without expressing any opinion on the vires of section 5(1)."}}, {"text": "Mall M", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85355, "end_char": 85361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thangal Kunju\n\nMusoliar\n\nM. Venkitachalam\n\nPatti and atWthtr\n\nB/zagwati J.\n\nthe judgment in Sura; Mall M ohta' s case, supra, but had not been dealt with by this Court it being considered sufficient to strike down section 5( 4) of the Act without expressing any opinion on the vires of section 5(1).", "canonical_name": "Mall Mohta"}}, {"text": "section 5( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85471, "end_char": 85484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85543, "end_char": 85555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85576, "end_char": 85588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85669, "end_char": 85683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85739, "end_char": 85752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mall Mohta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85763, "end_char": 85773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mall Mohta's case, supra.", "canonical_name": "Mall Mohta"}}, {"text": "section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85929, "end_char": 85944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85948, "end_char": 85958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85973, "end_char": 85987, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86063, "end_char": 86075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86092, "end_char": 86107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86117, "end_char": 86138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86181, "end_char": 86191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86324, "end_char": 86336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Surai Mall Mohta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86420, "end_char": 86436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court reiterated the conclusions to which it had come in Surai Mall Mohta's case, supra, that the procedure prescribd by the Act for making the investigation under its provisions was of a summary and drastic nature and it constituted a departure from the ordinary law of pre>- cedure and in certain important aspects was detrimental to the persons subjected to it and as such was discriminatory.", "canonical_name": "Suraj Mall Mohta"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86815, "end_char": 86824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86913, "end_char": 86923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86986, "end_char": 86995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 34( 1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87026, "end_char": 87042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "17th July 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87104, "end_char": 87118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It did not again express an opinion on the validity of section 5 ( 1) as being based on a valid classification and being thus saved from the mischief of article 14 of the Constitution, but on a comparison of the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the Act with those of section 34( 1-A) of the Indian Income tax Act which came into effect from the 17th July 1954, came to the conclusion that this defence of the provisions of section 5(1) being saved from the mischid of article 14 of the Constitution on the basis of a valid classification was no longer available in support of it after the introduction of the new sub."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87182, "end_char": 87194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87227, "end_char": 87237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87389, "end_char": 87399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87414, "end_char": 87428, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87500, "end_char": 87512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87654, "end_char": 87666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87753, "end_char": 87768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87783, "end_char": 87797, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Beenakshi Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 87863, "end_char": 87878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Mall Mohta's case supra, and Shri Beenakshi Mills' case, supra, did not directly pronounce upon the vires of section 5(1) of the Act fo comparison with section 34(1) of the Indian\n\nIncome-true Act though the vires were the subjectmatter of a direct challenge therein."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87938, "end_char": 87950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87981, "end_char": 87994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88230, "end_char": 88242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88350, "end_char": 88360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88525, "end_char": 88551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88806, "end_char": 88820, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88843, "end_char": 88871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5(4) and 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88923, "end_char": 88945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89007, "end_char": 89020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89025, "end_char": 89040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89055, "end_char": 89069, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89321, "end_char": 89334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89339, "end_char": 89354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89369, "end_char": 89383, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89536, "end_char": 89562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89598, "end_char": 89624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. Venkilaehalam\n\nPotti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89773, "end_char": 89796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The procedure prescribed by the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 being thus discriminatory as compared\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nv M. V mkilachalam\n\nPol Ii and another\n\nBhazwat; J.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nM. Venkilaehalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nB/ragwati J.\n\nwith the procedure prescribed in the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121, the questions that arise for our consideration are, ( 1) whether there is a rational basis of classification to be found in the enactment of section 5(1) of the Act, and (2) whether the same class of persons were intended to be and could be dealt with under the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121.", "canonical_name": "M. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89861, "end_char": 89889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90032, "end_char": 90044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90167, "end_char": 90177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90185, "end_char": 90213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90490, "end_char": 90516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91087, "end_char": 91099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91453, "end_char": 91462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91514, "end_char": 91523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91813, "end_char": 91825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92213, "end_char": 92225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aswini Kumar Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 92905, "end_char": 92923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the statement of the objects and reasons appended to a bill is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the Act as passed (see Aswini Kumar Ghose's case (1), yet it may be referred to only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which necessitated the making of the law (see Subodh Gopal Bose's case( 2 ) ). -", "canonical_name": "Astvini Kumar Ghose"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93160, "end_char": 93169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar observations were made by Fazal Ali, J. with reference to legislative proceedings being relevant for the proper understanding of the circumstances under which an Act was passed and the reasons which necessitated it in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India(-)."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93884, "end_char": 93896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. Thangal Irun", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 94172, "end_char": 94187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Thangal Irun ,.,", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "A. ThMgal K .", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94256, "end_char": 94269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Musaliar\n\nM. V enkitacha/arr,\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nA. ThMgal K .,"}}, {"text": "Bkagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94327, "end_char": 94335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yu\n\nMusaliar\n\n\"· M. V 1nki1athalom\n\nPolti and anotht:r\n\nBkagwati J.\n\nwar conditions brought in their train a sudden rise in the demand of all kinds of goods, both consumer and _industrial, which, naturally pushed up the prices to abnormal heights affording a great opportunity to the producers, manufactures and merchants to reap huge profits.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94938, "end_char": 94950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95284, "end_char": 95290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, urged that the words \"substa!!tial extent\" were of such vague import that they did not afford any reasonable basis of classification, Reference was made to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd ed.,"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96910, "end_char": 96922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97247, "end_char": 97261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To use the language of Viscount Simon, the income-tax which has been evaded would have to be considerable, solid or big, and once that conclusion was reached by the Government, the cases of such persons would indeed be referred by them for investigation by the Commission under section 5(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97502, "end_char": 97514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97611, "end_char": 97623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97872, "end_char": 97900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thattgal Ku", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 98560, "end_char": 98571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thattgal Ku, Yu\n\nMusaliar\n\nv. .M. V enkilachalam\n\nPotti and another\n\nBhagwati ]."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98721, "end_char": 98730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Mukherjea, as he then was, .dealt with the argument in Kathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurastra( 1) as under:-\n\n\"It is a doctrine of the American courts which seems to be well-founded on principle that the equal protection clause can be invoked not merely where discrimination appears on the express terms of the statute itself, but also when it is the result of improper or prejudiced execution of the law. ("}}, {"text": "S. 200, 208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100006, "end_char": 100017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101498, "end_char": 101510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102513, "end_char": 102522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102858, "end_char": 102867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. T haagal K\"'fiu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 102913, "end_char": 102931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T haagal K\"'fiu\n\nMU1alial'\n\nM. Ven/ritadullam\n\nPotti and atUJtlitr\n\nBha&wati J.\n\nA. Tltangal Kunja\n\nM111alw\n\nM. V ln/; ilaehalam\n\nPotli and (JJll)l/ier\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe validity of the classification was further attacked on the ground that the limitation of the period within which the cases of the substantial evaders of income-tax falling within this group or category may he referred for investigation by fhe Government to the Commission, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Bha&wati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102984, "end_char": 102992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T haagal K\"'fiu\n\nMU1alial'\n\nM. Ven/ritadullam\n\nPotti and atUJtlitr\n\nBha&wati J.\n\nA. Tltangal Kunja\n\nM111alw\n\nM. V ln/; ilaehalam\n\nPotli and (JJll)l/ier\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe validity of the classification was further attacked on the ground that the limitation of the period within which the cases of the substantial evaders of income-tax falling within this group or category may he referred for investigation by fhe Government to the Commission, viz.,", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "A. Tltangal Kunja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102997, "end_char": 103014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T haagal K\"'fiu\n\nMU1alial'\n\nM. Ven/ritadullam\n\nPotti and atUJtlitr\n\nBha&wati J.\n\nA. Tltangal Kunja\n\nM111alw\n\nM. V ln/; ilaehalam\n\nPotli and (JJll)l/ier\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe validity of the classification was further attacked on the ground that the limitation of the period within which the cases of the substantial evaders of income-tax falling within this group or category may he referred for investigation by fhe Government to the Commission, viz.,", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "BhagwaJi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103069, "end_char": 103077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. T haagal K\"'fiu\n\nMU1alial'\n\nM. Ven/ritadullam\n\nPotti and atUJtlitr\n\nBha&wati J.\n\nA. Tltangal Kunja\n\nM111alw\n\nM. V ln/; ilaehalam\n\nPotli and (JJll)l/ier\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe validity of the classification was further attacked on the ground that the limitation of the period within which the cases of the substantial evaders of income-tax falling within this group or category may he referred for investigation by fhe Government to the Commission, viz.,", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103532, "end_char": 103558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103885, "end_char": 103897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104077, "end_char": 104089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "sections 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104462, "end_char": 104475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104654, "end_char": 104664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104672, "end_char": 104700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105009, "end_char": 105018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105805, "end_char": 105815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105872, "end_char": 105882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105897, "end_char": 105911, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106840, "end_char": 106852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107340, "end_char": 107347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed in support of this position on the following passage from the judgment of Mahajan, C. J. in Shree Meenakshi Milli case, 24--'85 S.C. Ibdia/59\n\n.4."}}, {"text": "Shree Meenakshi Milli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107358, "end_char": 107379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed in support of this position on the following passage from the judgment of Mahajan, C. J. in Shree Meenakshi Milli case, 24--'85 S.C. Ibdia/59\n\n.4."}}, {"text": "Thangtll Ku", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 107413, "end_char": 107424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thangtll Ku, P\n\nMwaliar ,,.", "canonical_name": "Thangal KnJu"}}, {"text": "M. V illditaclialflfll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107442, "end_char": 107464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V illditaclialflfll\n\nPotJi and anot!r\"\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar ...\n\nM. venkitaeWam r olti and anolhn r- B1iagwa1; J.\n\nsupra, at pages 795-796:\n\n\"Assuming that evasion of tax to a substantial amount could form a basis of classification at all for imposing a drastic procdure on that class, the inclusion of only such of them whose cases had been re£erred before 1st September, 1948, into a class for being dealt with by the drastic procedure leaving other tax evaders to be dealt with under the ordinary law will be a clear discrimination for the reference of the case within a particular time has no special or rational nexus with the necessity for drastic procedure ........ \" These observations were made to repel the first argument of the learned Attorney-General that the class of substantial evaders who fall within section 5(1) were only those whose cases had been referred within the date fixed."}}, {"text": "M. venkitaeWam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107517, "end_char": 107531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V illditaclialflfll\n\nPotJi and anot!r\"\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar ...\n\nM. venkitaeWam r olti and anolhn r- B1iagwa1; J.\n\nsupra, at pages 795-796:\n\n\"Assuming that evasion of tax to a substantial amount could form a basis of classification at all for imposing a drastic procdure on that class, the inclusion of only such of them whose cases had been re£erred before 1st September, 1948, into a class for being dealt with by the drastic procedure leaving other tax evaders to be dealt with under the ordinary law will be a clear discrimination for the reference of the case within a particular time has no special or rational nexus with the necessity for drastic procedure ........ \" These observations were made to repel the first argument of the learned Attorney-General that the class of substantial evaders who fall within section 5(1) were only those whose cases had been referred within the date fixed.", "canonical_name": "M. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108270, "end_char": 108282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108629, "end_char": 108638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travanore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108999, "end_char": 109024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109585, "end_char": 109597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travanore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travanore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109699, "end_char": 109709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travanore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travanore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109717, "end_char": 109745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109816, "end_char": 109828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109836, "end_char": 109862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110207, "end_char": 110217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110225, "end_char": 110253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110302, "end_char": 110315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110330, "end_char": 110344, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111128, "end_char": 111141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111149, "end_char": 111177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. Thmigal K!Jtifu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111547, "end_char": 111565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The class of persons envisaged by\n\nA. Thmigal K!Jtifu\n\nMusaliar\n\nv• M. Tr mkita&halam\n\nPotii and aMihn\n\nB/llJgwatiJ.\n\n!"}}, {"text": "M. Tr mkita&halam\n\nPotii", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 111580, "end_char": 111604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The class of persons envisaged by\n\nA. Thmigal K!Jtifu\n\nMusaliar\n\nv• M. Tr mkita&halam\n\nPotii and aMihn\n\nB/llJgwatiJ.\n\n!"}}, {"text": "A. Thongal Kunju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 111636, "end_char": 111652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nA. Thongal Kunju\n\nMUJQ!iar\n\nV• M. V mkitacha/a,,.", "canonical_name": "A. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar"}}, {"text": "M. V mkitacha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 111667, "end_char": 111680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nA. Thongal Kunju\n\nMUJQ!iar\n\nV• M. V mkitacha/a,,.", "canonical_name": "M. Venkitachalarn\n\nPotti"}}, {"text": "section 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111742, "end_char": 111755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111957, "end_char": 111985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "9th July 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 112004, "end_char": 112017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 was passed on the 9th July 1946."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112321, "end_char": 112333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112719, "end_char": 112731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112739, "end_char": 112753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112832, "end_char": 112845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112907, "end_char": 112919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112930, "end_char": 112942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113112, "end_char": 113124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113197, "end_char": 113210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113280, "end_char": 113292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113347, "end_char": 113360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113362, "end_char": 113374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act\n\nXIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Shru Meenakshi Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 113413, "end_char": 113433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 was struck down in Shru Meenakshi Mills' case, supra, as it comprised the same class of person& who were brought in in the amended section, 34(1-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 but the same caruwt be said about section 5(1) as compared to section 47(1)..\n\nThese two section do not ovcdap: and: do not coYCr the sairu: class of persons."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113549, "end_char": 113576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113611, "end_char": 113623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113639, "end_char": 113652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113769, "end_char": 113781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Jltavamiore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113790, "end_char": 113817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113882, "end_char": 113892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jltavamiore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Jltavamiore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113901, "end_char": 113929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114023, "end_char": 114033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114472, "end_char": 114482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "M. CT. MUTHIAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 114775, "end_char": 114789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. CT."}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 114813, "end_char": 114839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS\n\nti •.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS &, ANOTHER;\n\n[S. R.\n\nDAs~\n\nACTING\n\nC.J, V1vr:rn BosE, BHAcrWAn, J AGANNADHADAS and B. f. SINHA JI.)"}}, {"text": "BHAcrWAn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114903, "end_char": 114911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS\n\nti •.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS &, ANOTHER;\n\n[S. R.\n\nDAs~\n\nACTING\n\nC.J, V1vr:rn BosE, BHAcrWAn, J AGANNADHADAS and B. f. SINHA JI.)"}}, {"text": "AGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114915, "end_char": 114927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS\n\nti •.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS &, ANOTHER;\n\n[S. R.\n\nDAs~\n\nACTING\n\nC.J, V1vr:rn BosE, BHAcrWAn, J AGANNADHADAS and B. f. SINHA JI.)", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "B. f. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114932, "end_char": 114943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS\n\nti •.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS &, ANOTHER;\n\n[S. R.\n\nDAs~\n\nACTING\n\nC.J, V1vr:rn BosE, BHAcrWAn, J AGANNADHADAS and B. f. SINHA JI.)", "canonical_name": "B. f. SINHA"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114950, "end_char": 114971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115058, "end_char": 115065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115118, "end_char": 115123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V1v1AN iBoSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115382, "end_char": 115394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hld (Per S .. R. DAs, .A, cTING C.J., V1v1AN iBoSE, .BHAcwATI and B. P. SINHA, JJ ."}}, {"text": ".BHAcwATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115396, "end_char": 115405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hld (Per S .. R. DAs, .A, cTING C.J., V1v1AN iBoSE, .BHAcwATI and B. P. SINHA, JJ ."}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115410, "end_char": 115421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hld (Per S .. R. DAs, .A, cTING C.J., V1v1AN iBoSE, .BHAcwATI and B. P. SINHA, JJ .", "canonical_name": "B. f. SINHA"}}, {"text": ".}AGANNAoHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115428, "end_char": 115442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".}AGANNAoHADAS J., dissenting) that s. 5.(1) of the T<1xation on .. Income (Investigation Commission) Ac~,· .1947 (Act XXX of 1947) iis ultra vires the Constitution as it ii discriminawry and violative of the fundamental .right guaranteed by ."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115464, "end_char": 115468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115752, "end_char": 115757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115766, "end_char": 115792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. Vmliit", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 115916, "end_char": 115925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l4 of the Constitution by reason of two amenc; lments which were made in , s. 34 of thf: Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI afl922) one ia .1948 by the .c:nac[ment of the Income-T.u: and Busine$& Profit$ Ta\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nV• M. Vmliit°'halam\n\nPolti and anothlr\n\nBhagwati]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1247_1285_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2s.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1247\n\nthis purpose in juxta-position with section 47 of. the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 cannot be held to be\n\ndiscriminatory and violative of the fondamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution. The proceedings which took place in the course of investigation by the Commission up to the 26th January 1950 were valid and so also were the proceedings during. the course of investigation which took place after the inauguration of the Constitutiol). on the 26th January 1950 under which the petitioner, as a citizen of our Sovereign Democratic Republic acquired inter alia .guarantee of the fundamental right under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that .all the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner fail and Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1954 must be dismissed with costs.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 21 and 22 of 1954 wil~ accordingly be diSlllissed with costs.\n\nThere wm be a set off for costs.\n\nM. CT. MUTHIAH & 2 OTHERS\n\nti •.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS &, ANOTHER;\n\n[S. R.\n\nDAs~\n\nACTING\n\nC.J, V1vr:rn BosE, BHAcrWAn, J AGANNADHADAS and B. f. SINHA JI.)\n\nConstitution of India, Art. ]'/--Taxation on Income (Investigation Commisiion) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), s. 5(1)-'Whetil~ .ultra vires 'lhe Constitution in vie1v of s. 34 of Indian lncome-Ta1r\n\nAct, 1922 (Act XI of 1922) as amended by the 'Income-Tax and Bu1iness Profits .Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948 (Act XLVlll tif 1948) and the Indian Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, 1954 (Act X!XXW uf 1954).\n\nHld (Per S .. R. DAs, .A, cTING C.J., V1v1AN iBoSE, .BHAcwATI and B. P. SINHA, JJ . .}AGANNAoHADAS J., dissenting) that s. 5.(1) of the T<1xation on .. Income (Investigation Commission) Ac~,· .1947 (Act XXX of 1947) iis ultra vires the Constitution as it ii discriminawry and violative of the fundamental .right guaranteed by . Art. l4 of the Constitution by reason of two amenc; lments which were made in , s. 34 of thf: Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI afl922) one ia .1948 by the .c:nac[ment of the Income-T.u: and Busine$& Profit$ Ta\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nV• M. Vmliit°'halam\n\nPolti and anothlr\n\nBhagwati].\n\nD1umbu 20.\n\n.M. Ct. Mutkiah\n\na.ti 2 otlrns\n\nV Thi c....,;., ioner\n\nqf ltlcomrtax, Ma, Jrasand\n\nanot/rn.\n\n(Amendment) Act, 1948 (Act XLVIII of 194~) andthe other in 1954 by the enactment of the Indian Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, 1954 I Act XXXIII of 1954).\n\nIf the provisions of s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood before its amendment by Act XLVIII of 1948 had been the only provisions to be considered, the .Court would have reached the same conclusion as it did in A. !hangal. Kunju Mu. saliar v. M. Venkitai:halam Potti & Anr., (rl955] 2 S.C.R. 1196), but the position was materilly affected by reason of two amend ments made in that section by two Acts, one in 1948 atid the other in 1954.\n\nAmended s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Ace was substantially different fwm the old s. 34(1) which was in operation up to the 8th September 1948. The words \"if in consequence of definite in formation which has come_ into his possession the lncometax Officer discovers that income, profits or gains cP.argeable to incbmetax have escaped assessment irt any yea1 ........ \" which appear in the old section were substituted by the words uif the Incom~-rax Officer has reason to \\>elieve that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the :assessee ........ income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment ........ \". The requisites of (i)\n\n14definite\" information (ii) which had ucome into\" possession of the Income-tax Officer and in consequence of which (iii) he \"discovers\" that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had escaped assessment,. were no longer necessary a.nd the only thing which was required to enable the Income-tax Officer to take proceedings under s. 34(1) as amended was that he should have reason to believe that by reason of the omission or_ faiiurc on .the part of the as!iessee income, profits qr gains chargeable to income-tax had escaped assessment for a particular year.\n\nWhereas before this amended s. 34(1) came to be substituted for the olds. 34(1) there was no comparison between the provisions of .s. 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and s. 34( I) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it then stood, the provisions of s. 34(1) as amended after the 8th September 1948 could stand comparison with the provisions of s, 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and the cases which were covered by s. 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 194 7 could be dealt with under the procedure laid down in s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. After the 8th September 1948, therefore, even in the case of substantial evaders of income-tax who were a distinct class by themselves intended to be treated by the drastic and summary procedure laid down 1'Y Act XXX of 1947, some c:; tses that were already referred by the Central Government !or investigation by the Comm'ission could be dealt with under that Act _arid other cases, though falling within the sam~ class or category, could be dC:alt With tinder the procedure prescribed in the amended s. 34( 1) of the Indian .Y.ncome-x Act; The persons who were thus dealt with under s, 34( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Act had available to them the whole oroeedure laid down in that Act including the right to inspect\n\ndocument< and the nght to question the findings of fact arrived at\n\nby the Income-tax Officer by the procedure of appeal and revision and ultimate scrutiny by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which was denied to those persons whose cases had been referred by the Central Government for investigation by the Commission under s. 5(1) of Ac.t XXX of 1947.\n\nDifferent persons, though falling under the same class or category of substantial evaders of income-tax, would, therefore, be subject to different procedures, one a summary and drastic procedure and the other a normal procedure which gave to the assessees various rights which were denied to those who were specially treated under the procedure prescribed in Act XXX of 1947.\n\nPe1 JAGANNADHADAS J.-The class of persons falling under s. 5(1) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act,\n\n1947 (Act XXX of 1947) is totally different from that which falls within amended s. 34 of the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922 (Act XI of 1922) and therefore s. 5( 1) of Act XXX of 1947 is not unconstitutional as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nSuraj Mall Mohta v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another (f 19551 1 S.C.R. 448), Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another (f 1955] 1 S.C.R. 787), A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Patti & Anr. and M. Venkitachalam Patti & Anr. \\', A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar,\n\n([1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196), Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad and Others (f1953] S.C.R. 581), Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of Hyderabad (f 1953] S.C.R. 661) and Gangadhar Baijnath and others v. Income-tax Investigation Commis,:ion, etc. (A.LR. 1955 All. 515), referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. 646 of 1954.\n\nPetition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.\n\nC. R. /agadisan, Nattnit Lal and krishnan, (T. V. Balakrishnan. with the the Court) for the petitioners.\n\nV. Balapermission of\n\nC. K. Dapluary, Solicitor-General of India, ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1955.\n\nDecember 20.\n\nBttAGWATI J.-This pet1t1on under Article 32 of the Constitution also raises the question about the constitutionality of section 5 ( 1) of the Taxation on Income Investigation Commission Act, 1947\n\n(XXX of 1947).\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah and 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nqf Income-tax, Madras and another.\n\nand 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras and\n\naMther\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe facts which led to the filing of this petition may be shortly stated.\n\nSir M. Ct. Muthiah Chettiar who carried on a flourishing banking business in India and foreign countries died in or about 1929 leaving behind him two sons M. Ct. M. Chidambaram Chettiar (since deceased) and M. Ct. M. Muthiah Chettiar, petitioner 3, and his widow Devanai Achi.\n\nCt.\n\nChidambaram Chettiar continued the ancestral banking business and also started several commercial enterprises. He died by an accident while travelling in a plane in the year 1954 leaving behind him his two sons, the petitioners 1 & 2.\n\nDevanai Achi had predeceased him.\n\nThe petitioners 1 & 2 are the legal representatives of the deceased M. Ct. M. Chindambaram Chettiar and also the representatives of their grandmother Devanai A chi.\n\nThe Central Government, in exercise of its powers under section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947, referred to the Income-tax Investigation Commission R.\n\nC. Nos. 516, 517 and 518 relating to M. Ct. M. Chidambaram Chettiar, M.\n\nCt. M. Muthiah Chettiar, petitioner 3, and Devanai Achi. The Commission, after holding an enquiry in all the three cases, recorded their findings and held that an aggregate sum of Rs. 10,07,322-4-3 represented the undisdosed income during the investigatjon period and directed . distribution of this sum over the several years in the manner indicated by them in Schedule A to their report.\n\nThis report was submitted by the Commission to the Government on the 26th August\n\n1952. The Central .3overnment considered the report and, purporting to act under section 8(2) of the Act, directed by their order No. 74 (26) I.T/52 dated the 16th September 1952 that appropriate action under the Indian Income-tax Act be taken against the assessees with a view to assess or re-assess, the income which had escaped assessment for the years 1940-41 to 1948-49.\n\nIn pursuance of the said directions of the Central Government the Income-tax Officer, City Circle I, Madras, issued notices under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act and made the re-assessment for the\n\nyears 1940-41, 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49 based upon the findings, of the Commission which were treated as final and conclusive.\n\nThe assessment orders for the years 1940-41, 1941-42 and 1948-49 were served on the assessees on the 20th February 1954.\n\nAssessment orders for the years 1943-44 to 1947-48 were served on the 12th May 1954. The re-assessment order for the year 1942-43 was not made thaugh notices under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act had been issued by the Income-tax Officer on the assessees on the 19th March 1954.\n\nIt appears that these re-assessment proceedings for the year 1942-43 are yet pending and no assessment order in respect 'Of that year has yet been served on the petitioners.\n\nIn regard to , the assessment orders which were served on the 20th February 1954, the petitioners preferred on the 18th May 1954 applications to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, under section 8(5) of the Act for references to the High Court on questions of law arising out of those re\"assessment orders passed by the Income-tax Officer.\n\nSimilar applications were preferred thereafter in respect of the re-assessment orders which were served on the petitioners on the 12th May\n\n1954. These applications are still pending.\n\nOn the 6th Decernber 1954, the petitioners filed the present petition contending that the provisions of the Act XXX of 1947 were illegal, ultra vires and unconstitutional mainly on the ground that they were violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe grounds urged in support of this contention were not felicitously expressed.\n\nThe petitioners appear to have mixed up the contentions which could be urged as a result of our judgments in Sw:aj Mall Mohta v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Anvther(1) and Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. A. V.\n\nVisvanatha Sastri and Another(2 ).\n\nThey contended in the first instance that after the amendment of section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act by Act XXXIII of 1954, which inter\n\n(l) [1955] I S.C.R. 448.\n\n(2) (1955] l S.'C.R. 7e7.\n\nM .. Ot. Muthiaiz\n\nl1lld 2 olMr> ,,.\n\nThlCommi.si....,\n\nof lncume-1/Jx,\n\nMadrssallii\n\nllll!lthrr\n\n.Bhtrgwati J.\n\nM. Ct. MuJhi.h\n\nand 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, MadrD> and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwati].\n\nalia, added sub-seetions (1-A) to (1-D) to section 34, the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the Act became discriminatory, as on a reading of both the enactments, Act XXX of 1947 and the Income-tax Act as amended in 1954 showed that they pplied to the same category of persons and there was nothing in section 5(1) of the Act or any other provision of the said Act disclosing any valid or reasonable classification.\n\nThe provisions of Act XXX of 1947 could not, therefore, be sustained 011 the ground of classification to avoid the mischief of article 14 of the Constirution.\n\nThe petitioners obviously relied upon our decision in Shree Meenakshi Mill's case, supra, in support of this contention.\n\nThe petitioners thereafter proceeded to set out their alternative contention based upon our decision in Suraj Mall Mohta's case, supra, though it was not so stated in express terms.\n\nThey contended that Act XXX of 1947 enabled the Central Government to discri.minate between one person and another inasmuch as they were authorised to pick and choose cases of persons who fell within the group of those who had substantially evaded taxation on income, that the act of the Government in rekrring some evaders to the Commission was wholly arbitrary and there was nothing to eliminate the possibility of a favouritism or a discrimination against an individual by sending or not sending cases to the Commission as between two persons both of whom might be within the group of those who have evaded the payment of tax to a substantial extent.\n\nThey further contended that the procedure prescribed under the impugned Act was substantially more prejudicial and more drastic to the assessee than the procedure prescribed under the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThere was no reasonableness or justification that one person should have the advantage of the procedure prescribed by the Indian Income-tax Act while another person similarly situated should be deprived of it.\n\nThey, therefore, contended that section 5(1) of the Act was discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution and asked for the issue of a writ of\n\nrertiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction. or order quashing the report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 29th August 1952 en- closed as Annexure A to the petition and the assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer for the years 1940-41, 1941-42, and 1943-44 to 1948-49 as being unconstitutional, null and void and also of a writ of prohibition calling upon the Commissioner of Incometax, Madras; respondent 1 and the Income-tax Officer, City Circle I, Madras, respondent 2 or their subordinate officers to forbear from implementing the findings of the Investigation Commission with regard to the year l942-43.\n\nThis petition was heard a:long with Civil Appeals Nos. 21 and 22 of 1954, A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar\n\nv. M. Venkitachaalam Patti & Another and M. Venkita- Musaliar (1), which also raised inter alia the cognate question about the constitutionality of section 5 ( 1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 which was in pari materia with section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947.\n\nIn regard to the question whether there is a rational basis of clasification to be found in the enactment of section 5(1) of the Act, the preamble and the relevant provisions of Act XXX of 1947 are the same as were considered by us in considering this question in rlation to the Travancore Act XIV of 1124.\n\nThe words \"substantial extent\" also have been used in both the Acts and in the present case as in the cases of the Travancore petitioners concerned in . the Evasion Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1125 (M.E.), Gauri Shanker, Secretary, Income-tax Investigation Commission made an affidavit dated the 21st September 1955 wherein he set out the events and circumstances under which Act XXX of 1947 came to be passed.\n\nIn paragraph 4 of that affidavit he stated:\n\n\"It was found that during the period of the last war large fortunes . had been made by businessmen.\n\nControls imposed by Government on prices and distribution, were often evaded and secret profits re made and. kept outside the books and often kept invested ia shares and real property acquired in the\n\n(I) [1955] 2 S. C.R. 1196.\n\nand 2 others\n\nV• The-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras and another\n\n.Bhagwati ].\n\nand 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nnames of benarnidars or in cash purchases of gold, silver and jewellery.\n\nThe machinery of Income-tax administration was unable to cope with the large number of complex cases that had to be dealt with, during the war years and a few years after its termination.\n\nAs there had been a large scale evasion of tax during this period, it became necessary in the public interests to investigate cases .of evasion of income-tax and bring under assessment huge profit that had escaped assessment.\n\nAs a preliminary step in this direction, a demonetisation Ordinance was passed in January 1946 sterilising the High Denomination Notes in which secret profits earned during the war years had been partly kept and calling for a statement regarding the source of such profits. This was followed by the Income-tax Investigation Commission Bill.\n\nIn view of the prolonged and complicated enquiries that had to be made to unearth these secret war profits and bring them under assessment a special Commission was constituted to enquire into the profits made since 1939 but which had escaped assess.ment.\n\nI say that what is intended to in., estigate is evasion of payment of taxation which could reasonably be called \"Substantial\" and therefore the classification is real classification.\n\nThe statute merely leaves the selective application of the law to be made by the executive authorities in accordance with the standards indicated in the Act itself\" This affidavit furnished the background and the surrounding circumstances obtaining at the time when Act XXX of 1947 was enacted and if this background is taken into account it would be obvious that the substantial evaders of pavment of income-tax whose cases were referred by the Central Government to the Commission formed a class by themselves and there was a rational basis of classification in the enactment of section 5 ( 1) of the Act.\n\nThe argument that the terms of section 'i(l) enabled the Central Government to pi<:k and choose the cases of p\"articular individuals falling within thot category leaving the cases of other persons falling within the same category to be dealt with in accord-\n\n2S.CR.\n\nSUPREM'E C()U:RT REPORTS 1255\n\nance with the provisions of section 34(1) of the Indian Incometax Act as. it stood prior to the amendment of 1948 has been already dealt with in our judgment in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v M. Venkitachalam Patti & Another, supra; while dealing with the corresponding provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 and section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121 and we have pointed out that so far as the Indian Income-tax Act as it was in existence on the 18th April 1947 which was the date on which Act XXX of 1947 received the assent of the Governor-General) stood unamended by Act XL VIII of 1948, the cases of persons who fell within the category of substantial evaders of incometax within the meaning of section 5(1) of the Act could not have been dealt with under the provisions of section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and, therefore, there was no discrimination and no violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe other argument that the selection of the persons whose cases were to be referred by the Central Government for investigation to the Commission was left to the unguided and uncontrolled discretion of the executive or the administrative officials also has been dealt with in that j_udgment and we need not repeat our reasons for rejecting the same.\n\nIf th~ provisions of section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood unamended by Act XL VIII of 1948 (which corresponded with the provisions of section 47 of the Travancore Act XXIII of 1121) had been the only provisions to be considered we would have reached the same conclusion as we did in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Patti & Another, supra.\n\nThe position, however, in the present case is materiaHv affected by reason of the two amendments which were made in section 3.4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, one in 1948 by the enactment of Act XL VIII of 1948 and the other in 1954 by the enactr.11'..ltl of: Act XXXHL of 1954~\n\nSee1!ion 34 as amended by Act Y..L VJII of 1948 read as uruler;\n\n!955\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah\n\nand 2 othen\n\nV• The Commissicner\n\nof IncoT111Jtax, MadraJ and\n\narwther\n\nBhagwati].\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah\n\nand 2 others\n\nThe Commissionu\n\nof Income-tax, Madras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n\"Section 34(1) : If- ( a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the om1ss10n or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act, or exces.siv~ loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, or\n\n(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the p1rt of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or that excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time within eight years and in cases falling under clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the assessee, or, if the assessee is a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section :\n\n\" Act XXXIII of 1954 introduced into section 34 sub-sections (1-A) tu (1-D).\n\nSection 34(I-A) which is material for our purposes provided:\n\n\"Section. 34 (1-A) : If, in the case of any assessee, the Income-tax Officer has reason to be!ieve'-\n\n(i) that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year in\n\nrespect of which the relevant previous year falls wholly or partly within the period beginning on the 1st day of September, 1939, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1946; and,\n\n(ii) that the income, profits or gains which have so escaped asses, sment for any such year or years amount, or are likely to amount, to one lakh of rupees or more; he may, notwithstanding that the period of eight years or, as the case may be, four years specified in sub-section ( 1) has expired in respect thereof, serve on the asses, see, or, if the assessee is a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22, and may proceed to assess or re-assess the income, profits or gains of the assesee for all or any of the years referred to in clause (i), and thereupon the provisions of this Act (excepting those contained in clauses ( i) and (iii) of the proviso to sub-section (1) and in subsections\n\n(2) and (3) of this section) shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly: Provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under this sub-section unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so, and the Central Board of Revenue is.' satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice: Provided further that no such notice shall be issued after the 31st day of March, 1956\".\n\nAmended section 34 ( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Act was substantially different from the old section 34(1) which was in operation up to the 8th September 1948.\n\nThe words \"if in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the Income-tax Officer discovers that income, profits or gams chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year .......... \" which appear in the old section were substituted by the words \"If the Incometax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee ....... , .. income, profits or gains chargeable to in:- come-ta'x have escaped assessment ....... ; \" . The\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah and 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras and another\n\nBhagwati].\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah and 2 others\n\nV The Commissiontr\n\nof lncome-.ttzx, Madras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwati].\n\nSDPREME C'OORT REPORTS [19551\n\nrequmtes of (i) \"definire\" information (ii) which had \"come into\" possession of the Income -tax Officer and in consequence of which (iii) he \"discovers\" that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had escaped assessment, were no longer necessary and the only thing which was required to enable the Incom~ tax Officer to take proceedings under section 34 (1) as amended was that he should have reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee income, profits or gains chageable to income-tax had escaped assessment for a particular year.\n\nWhereas before this amended section 34( 1) came to be substituted for the old section 34 ( 1) there was no comparison between the provisions of section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it then stood, the provions of section 34(1) as amended after the 8th September 1948 could stand comparison with the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947 and the cases which were covered by section 5( 1) of Act XXX of 1947 could be dealt with under the procedure laid down in section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nAfter the 8th September 1948, therefore, even in the case of substantial evaders of income-tax who were a distinct class by themselves intended to be treated by the drastic and summary procedure laid down by Act XXX of 1947, some cases that were already referred by ' the Central Government for investigation by the Commission could be dealt with under that Act and other cases, though falling within the same class or category, could be dealt with under the procedure prescribed in the amended section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThe persons who were thus dealt with under section 34(1) of the Indian Incometax Act had available to them the whole pmcedure laid down in that Act including the right to inspect documents and the right to question the findings of fact arrived at by the Income-tax Officer by the procedure of appeal and revision and ultimate scrutiny by the Incometax Appellate Tribunal which was denied tt> those persons whose cases had been. refeued by the Central Government for investigation by the\n\nCommission under section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947.\n\nThe juxta-position of dates is also very instructive.\n\nIt may be noted that in Act XXX of 1947 as it was originally enacted, the period up to which the Central Government could make the references to the Commission for investigation was laid down in section 5(1) of the Act to be 30th June 1948. This period was extended to the 1st September 1948 by the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Second Amendment Act, 1948 (XLIX of 1948). Act XLIX of 1948 was passed by the Central Legislature and received the assent of the Governor-General on the 8th September 1948, the s, ame day on which Act XL VIII of 1948 which amended section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act also received the assent of the Governor-General. Both these Acts, viz., Act XLVIII of 1948 and Act XLIX of 1948 were passed simultaneously and obviously with a view to bring the provisions of section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act in tune with each other.\n\nIt appears to have been realized that the substantial evaders of income-tax in respect of whom the Central Government had prim a f acie reasons for believing that they had to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income could not have their cases referred for investigation by the Commission after the 30th June 1948, that having been the time limit originally prescribed in section 5(1) of the Act.\n\nIt also appears to have been felt that the period could . not possibly be extended beyond the 1st September 1948 with the result that apart from the cases of sustantial evaders of income-tax which were referred by the Central Government for investigation to the Commission up to the 1st September 1948 there would be a large number of such cases which though they could not be referr.ed for investi- gation to the Commission would have to be dealt with under the ordinary provisions for taxation of income that had escaped assessment available in section 34 and the cognate sections of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nAs section 34(1) then stood, the requisites of\n\n25-85 S. C. India/59.\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah and 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwati].\n\nI9D5\n\nM. Ct. Muthish\n\nand 2 oth1rJ\n\nTiu Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras and\n\natroth~\n\nBhsgwali].\n\ndefinite information coming into the possession of the Income-tax Officer in consequene of which he discovered that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had escaped assessment would certainly net have availed the Government in tracking down these substantial evaders of income-tax and it appears, therefore, to have been thought necessary that section 34( I) of the Indian Income-tax Act should be amended so as to enable the Income-tax Officer to take proceedings thereunder if he had reason to beli:ve that by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee ........ income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had escaped assessment for the relevant period.\n\nAn amendment of section 34(1) in this manner would enable Government to pass on the requisite information which they had obtained in regard to the substantial evaders of income-tax to the Income-tax Officers concerned and ask the Income-tax Officers to take proceedings against those evaders of income-tax under the amended section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThat appears to have been the real object of the amendment of section 34(1) of the Indiau Income-tax Act with effect from the 8th September 1948.\n\nThe Commission would proceed with the references which were made to them up to the 1st September 1948 and the Income-tax Offi.; ers concerned would take the requisite proceedings under section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act as amended after the 8th September 1948 against all persons whose income, profits or gains had escaped assessment including substantial evaders of income-tax whose casrs would certainly have been referred by the Central Government for investigation to the Coµ1mission if it had been possible for them to do so before the first September 1948..\n\nAfter the 8th September 1948, there were two procedures simultaneously in operation, the one under Act XXX of 1947 and the other under the Indian Income-tax Act with referenc.c to persons who fell within the same class or category\n\nviz~ that of the substantial evaders of income-tax.\n\nAfter the 8th September 1948, therefore, some persons who fell within the class of substantial evaders of\n\nincome-tax were dealt with under the drastic and summary procedure prescribed under Act XXX of 1947, while other persons who fell within the same class of substantial evaders of income-tax could be dealt with under the procedure prescribed in the Indian Income-tax Act after service of notice upon them under the amended section 34(1) of the Act.\n\nDifferent persons, though falling under the same class or category of supstantial evaders of income-tax, would, therefore, be subject to different procedures, one a summary and drastic procedure and the othr a normal procedure which gave to the assessees various rights which were denied to those who were specially treated under the procedure prescribed in Act XXX of 1947.\n\nThe l_egislative competence being there, these provisions, though discriminatory, could not have been challenged before the advent of the Constitution.\n\nWhen, however, the Constitution came into force on the 26th January 1950, the citizens obtained the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution including the right to equality of laws. and equal protection of laws enacted in article 14 thereof, and whatever may have been the position before the 26th January 1950, it was open to the persons alleged to belong to the class of substantial evaders there; after to ask as to why some of them were subjected to the summary and drastic procedure prescribed in Act XXX of 1947 and others were subjected to the normal procedure prescribed ip section 34 and the cognate sections of the Indian Income-tax Act, the procedure prescribed in Act\n\nXXX of 1947 bemg obviously discriminatory and, therefore, violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt would be no answer to suggest that those substantial evaders whose. cases were referred by the Central Government for inves; tigation by the Commission before the 1st September 1948 formed a class by themselves leaving others though belonging to the same class or category of substantial evaders of\n\nM•OI. Mrilllidh\n\nand2 othm\n\nV• Thr Go1nmwio111r\n\nof1mo~,\n\nMadrM arid\n\nanothlr\n\nBhagwati J•\n\nand 2 others\n\nTM Commissioner\n\nQf Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nincome-tax to be dealt with by the ordinary procedure prescribed in the Indian Income-tax Act without infringing the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nA similar argument had been advanced before us by the learned Attorney- General appearing for the Commission in Shree Meenakshi Mills' case, supra.\n\nThe ground which he had urged was \"that the class of persons dealt with under section 5(1) of Act XXX.of 1947 was not only the class of substantial tax dodgers but it was a class of persons whose cases the Central Government, by 1st September, 1948, had referred to the Commission and that class had thus become determined finally on that date, and that that clas$ of persons could be dealt with by the Investigation Commission under the drastic pz:ocedure of Act XXX of 1947 while section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act as amended empowered the I11come-tax Officer to deal with cases other than those whose cases had been referred under section 5(1) to the Investigation Commission ...... \" Mahajan, C. J. who delivered the judgment of the Court dealt with this argument at page 795 (')\n\nas under:\n\n\"As regards the first contention canvassed by the learned Attorney-General it seems to us that it cannot stand scrutiny. The class of persons alleged to have been dealt with by section 5 ( 1) of the impugned Act was comprised of those unsocial elements in society who during recent years prior to the passing of the Act and made substantial profits and had evaded payment of tax on those profits and whose cases were referred to the Investigation Commission before 1st September, 1948.\n\nAssuming that evasion of tax to a substantial amount could form a basis of classification at all for imposing a drastic procedure on that class,, che inclusion of only such of them whose cases had been referred before 1st September, 1948, into a class. for being dealt with by the drastic procedure, leaving other tax evaders to be dealt with under the ordinary law will be a clear discrimination for the reference of the case within a particular time\n\n(!) [1955] l $.C.R. 787, 795.\n\nhas no special or rational nexus with the necess.ity for drastic procedure ...... \" These observations were made to repel the particular argument of the learned Attorney-General but they did not lay down that in fact section 5(1) was confined to such a limited class.\n\nWe are further supported in this view by the fact that by the later amend111ent of section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act effected by Act XXXIII of 1954, the time limit for the issue of notice under section 34(1-A) of the Indian focometax Act has been fixed as the 31st day of March 1956.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the period miginally fixed for the reference of the cases of substantial evaders of income-tax for investigation by the Commission, viz., 30th June, 1948 or the extended period, viz., 1st September, 1948 provided in section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 or the period fixed by the new section 34(1-A) of the Indian Income-tax Act., viz., 31st day of March 1956 was not a necessary attribute of the class of substantial evaders of income-tax but was merely an accident and a measure of administrative convenience and was not an element in the formation of the particular class of substantial evaders of income-tax.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that after the inauguration of the C, onstitution on the 26th January, 1950, the persons whose cases were referred for investigation by Central Government to the Commission up to the 1st September, 1948 could, to use the words of Mahajan, C. J. in Shree Meenakshi Mills' case, supra, at page 794 ask:\n\n\" ...... why are we now being dealt with by the discriminatory and drastic procedure of Act XXX of 1947 when those similarly situated as ourselves can be dealt with by the Income-tax Officer under the amended provisions of section 34 of the Act? Even if we once bore a distinctive label that distinction no longer subsists and the label now borne by us is the same as is borne by persons who can be dealt with under section 34 of the Act as amended; in other words, there is nothing uncommon either in properties or in characteristics between us and those evaders of\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah and 2 others\n\n\"· T ht Gommissiontr\n\nof Income-tdx,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwat. J.\n\n1955 - M. Cl. Mulhiah\n\nad2 oU-1\n\n. ~.\n\nTM Commi1,; o,,,,\n\nof I11eonu-lax,\n\nMadra10nd\n\nQMJ/ur\n\nBhagwali].\n\nincome-tax who are to be discovered by the Incometax Officer under the provision~ of amended section 34\" .\n\nWe may also add, adopting the same phraseology, that in our judgment, no satisfactory answer can be returned to this query because the field on which the amended section 34(1) operated from and after the 26th fanuary 1950 induded the strip of territory which was also occupied by section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947 and two Siubstantially different laws of pr<>- cedure, one being more prejudicial to the assessee than the other, could not be allowed to operate on the same field in view of the guarantee of article 14 of the Constitution. The result, therefore, is that barring the cases of persons which were already concluded by reports made by the Commission and the directions given by the Central Government under section 8(2) of Act XXX of 1947 culminating in the assessment or reassessment of the escaped income, those .cases which were pending on the 26th January 1950 for investigation before the Commission as also the assessment or re-assessment proceedings which were pending on, the 26th January 1950 before the Income-tax Officers concerned in pursuance of the directions given by the Central Government under section 8(2) of the Act would be hit by article 14 of the Constitution and would be invalidated.\n\nThe R. C. Cases 516, 517 and 518 relating to M. Ct. M. Chidambaram Chettiar, M.\n\nCt. Muthiah Chettiar and Devanai Achi were pending before the Commission on the 26th January 1950, the report therein not having been made by the Commission till the 26th August 1952 and the Commission had, after the 26th January 1950, no jurisdiction to complete the investigation and make their report, the whole procedure . being violative of the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners under article I4 of the Cons ti tu tio n.\n\nThis position was not in terms argued before us by the learned counsel for the petitioners.\n\nIt Was. urged in th!' first in; tance that the case was governed by\n\nour decision in Shree Meenakshi Mjl/s' case, supra, 011\n\nthe basis that by reason of the applications to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, made by the pet1t10ners under section 8(5) of the Act for reference to the High Court on questions of law arising out of the Income-tax Officer'.s re-asses3ment orders above referred to, the proceedings under Act XXX of 1947 had not become final and the petitioners were, therefore, entitled to relief on the ratio of our judgment in that case.\n\nReliance was placed in support of this position on the provisions. of section 8(4) of the Act:\n\n\"In all assessme.nt or re-assessment proceedings taken in pursuance of a direction under sub-section (2), the findings recorded by the Commission on . the case or on the points referred to it shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6), be final; but no proceedings taken in pl, lTsuance of such direction shall be a bar to the initiation of proceedings under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922)\".\n\nSub-section (5) has reference to the applicacion made by the assessee to the Commissioner of Income-tax to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of the assessment or re-'assessment orders and sub-section (6) has reference to the power of the Commission either of their own motion or on the application of the person concerned or of the Central Government to cmrect clerical or arithmetical mistakes in their report or errors therein arising from any accidental slip or omission ........... These provisions contained in sub-sections\n\n(5) and (6), however, would not make the findings recorded by the Commission any less final.\n\nThese findings were invested with finality subject to this that if the High Court, on reference under sub-section (5), gave any opinion which would require a revision of those findings or if any clerical or arithmetical mistakes were found or errors were detected arising from accidental slip or omission within the meaning of $Uh-section (6) which also required some a iterations in the findings, these findings would be divested of their finality and would have to be revised accordingly.\n\nThe' assess· ment or re-assessment orders made by the Income-\n\nM. Ct. Muthiala\n\nllff(f 2 othet•\n\nThe CorrrmiJsi11111r\n\nof w-lllx,\n\nMllllruad\n\nantJlhtr\n\nBha11111oli J.\n\nM. Cl. MuJhiah\n\nand 2 othlrs ·\n\nThe Commissio1t1r\n\nof Incomet~,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother ·\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nSUBREME COURT REPORTS [1955}\n\ntax Officers based upon those. findings would also be binding on the assessees subject only to the result of the reference, if any, made to the High Court on questiofl.I ()f law arising out of such orders;\n\nIf this was the true position it could not be urged that by rn:J$bn of the. pendency of the applications for reference to the High Court the proceedings under Act XXX of. 1947 had not been concluded against the petitioners and it could not also be urged that when Act XXXIII of 1954 was enacted introducing section 34(1-A) in the Income-tax Act with effect from the 19th July 1954, the R.C. Cases 516 to 518 were pending and the whole proceedings under Act XXX of 1947 against the petitioners were invalidated.\n\nAs a matter of fact the report had been made by the Commission against the petitioners as early as the 26th August 1952, the Central Government had given the directions under sectior 8(2) for re-assessment of the petitioners on the 16th September 1952 and the re-assessment orders for all the years except the year 1942-43 had been made by the Income-tax Officer against them by the 12th May 1954 which was long before the Act XXXIII of 1954 came into operation.\n\nAll these re-assessments had thus become binding on the petitioners and were not affected by the mere pendency of the applic; ations for reference to the High Court made by them to the Commissioner of lncometax, Madras, under section 8(5) of the Act . . There is also a further point to be considered in this c.onnection and it is that whatever discriminatory procedure the petitioners were subjected to by reason of the reference of their cases by the Central Government to the Commission under section 5(1) of the Act had been completed long before the Act XXXI!l of 1954 came into operation and the only further procedure which they would be subjected under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 would be that of a reference to the High Court on questions of law arising out of the orders of re-assessment if these applications were granted either by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, or by the High Court on further application.\n\nIn the event of such reference being\n\n,_.\n\nmade, the petitioners had the additional advantage of having their references heard by the High Court in a Bench constituted of not less than three Judges as contrasted with the normal procedure obtaining under seGtions 66 and 66-A of the Indian lncome-taX Act under which the references could be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nWhatever was, therefore, the procedure to which the petitioners would be subjected under Act XXX of 1947, after the coming into operation of Act XXXIII of 1954 it was, intead of being prejudicial to them, really advantageous to them, and following our decisions in the cases of Syed Qasim Rawi v. The State of Hyderabad and Others(1) and Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of Hyderabad{2), we are of the opinion that the further proceedings, if any, which could be taken under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947 would not be at all discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe only relief which the petitioners would have been entitled to in that event would have been one in regard to the re-assessment proceedings for the year 1942-43 which were pending before the Income- tax Officer by . virtue of the notice under section 34 issued by him to the petitioners on the 19th March 1954.\n\nReliance was placed up9n a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in .Gangadhar Baijnath and others v. Income-tax Investigation Commission, .etc.(3) in support of this position.\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General did not contest . this position but undertook on behalf of the Income-tax authorities that they will not proceed against the petitioners for the re-assessment for the year 1942-43 in pursuance of the notice under section 34 served upon them in that behalf.\n\nThis would have been the only relief to which the petitioners would have become entitled on the main contention urged by them in their petition. The petitioners are, however, entitled to succeed on the :alternative contentions which were raised by them as\n\n(!) [1953] S.C.R. 589.\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. 661. !3) A.LR. 1955 All. 515.\n\nan1f2 o•Mr•\n\nV' T lie Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nBMgwati'J.\n\nM. Ct. MuJbiaJi\n\nand 2. others\n\nThe CommilsioM\n\nof lncomt.J4X,\n\nMadras01J4\n\n\"\"\"'\"\" Bhagwati ].\n\nthe result of the conclusion whicl'. we have reached above in regard to the proceedings pending before the Commission having become discriminatory after the 26th January 1950 by reason of, section 5 ( 1) of the A.ct having become unconstitutional after the inauguration of the Constitution on that date.\n\nIn the result, the petitioners will be entitled to the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 29th August 1952 and the ssessment orders of the Incometax Officer for the years 1940-41, 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49 as being unconstitutional, null and void, and also to the issue of a writ of prohibition against the respondents from implementing the findings of the Investigation Commission referred to above with regard to the year 1942-43 and we do order that such writs do issue against the respondents accordingly.\n\nThe respondents will pay the petitioners' costs of this petition.\n\n]AGANNADHADAS J .-This petition raises the question whether section 5(1) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947) (here:nafter referred to as the Investigation Commission Act) is unconstitutional as offending article 14 of the Constitution and has therefore become void on the coming into force of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950.\n\nThis question was specifically left open in the two previous decisions of this Court, -.'.z. in Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. v. A. V.\n\nVisvanatha Sastri(') and S/zree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v.\n\nA. V. Visvanatha Sastri(').\n\nAlmost the identical question arose in the Travancore Appeals(\") .in which judgment has just now been delivered.\n\nThe provision with which we were concerned in those appeals is section 5(1) of Travancore Act XIV of 1924 which is almost in identical terms as section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act. we have held that this section of the Travancorc Act did not, on the coming\n\n(!) [1955] I S.C.R. 448.\n\n(2) [19.oSJ ! S.C.R. 787.\n\n(3) A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v.\n\nAulorised Official, J:T., [1955] 2\n\nS.C.R. 1196.\n\ninto opcraticti ' of . the, Constitution, 'Tio late : article , 14\n\ntherrof , and that. :it; accdrdinglr continued to ' . be valid.\n\nThis rault was based on; the: .following. conclusions. ·\n\n(a) The: apre.ssion•.t'a.personwho. has , fo a snl:istantial cxte1it;:•cva0ed payment of<, taii:ation ·.on income\" has' to .be. interpreted .. having regard to the batkground ·; . •Or , . the; i. circumstances ., that,.': preceded at the time thel section.> came< to be. enacted ' and .which\n\nwerediscloscd .in .the :i.Jlidavit.\"filed\"in this Cotirt by the Secretary of. the! Investigation\"· Conhnission and so interpreted• ,. the 1word,1. ''.s'ubstantial'\"; .:indicates. with reasonable certainty the class of persons intended . to be subjected to•thedra!tic:· procedtm! .-of the: Act.'\n\n(b) The 'selective :application 'of1thelaw•to.'•persons in this: class .. canribt be .. considered . invalid since the selection is • guided by .. the 'very objective' set• out iri section.5(1)itself.:. \"'\"•· ·• \"'\"' \"\" ....... . (c), The fact\" that some persons may Csc:apethe.:ipplication .. of .. the law ·, fa not necessarily .. destructive of the dlicicy of •the provision;\" . i.\" >. ·\" \"'. . ·.' It was also: held, on :i. •comparison with.section-47:.of\n\nthe Travancore Act XXIII of. 1121; corresponding' to section.· 34 '.ofthe>.Indian1Income'.tax .:Act;• 1922,.(XI. of 1922) as it stood 1prior to 'its',:iniendment in•'.1948,\n\nthat .. the persons ; wbo fall under the .. class of sub-. stantiab evaders of. income-tax within the , meaning •of section 5 ( l) of the 1 • Investigation Commission cAct: were not .interided .. ,, to '' be1and. could not have i: been '.:dealt with under the'.prcivisions ... of, isection 47 of.the T; avan.i\n\ncore 'Act -.XXIIL.of,,.1~21. and that I therefore: there would be no.-discriminatory :ipplieatiorr of: two parallel\n\nt:-statu:rygo;~=;,'.'c~~Lr h~~e~:: •t~~· ajrl~ f th~\n\nCourt has;;; taken.1 the•.vlew~: that section:, 5(1) of.the Investigation ''\"Commission .. , Act . his,,] :become'. unconstitutianal ' by' the\" date of the;\" Constitution' in compa-.\n\nrison ,.:with•: 'section;.,34, of the .Incotrie, taxL.-Act. as amended. in:~1 l948;;\" Itw'as .. poirlted 1 out.• that section 47. of :i•the i Travancore• i Act' XXIII ·.of' 112hwhich' rwas.the same ... 'as sectionl3-Lof1•the\"\"1ncome-tax 'Actc:•as it:stood from, 1939,, tD• 1943 ,,; did1 not'' undergo •'any:!' amendmmt -< by tho date 1 coftlie ... Constitutioll'\" bubmritiriuedr., as brio\n\n195.i\n\nM. Cl.MuJ/iia4\n\na>rd 2 •'\"\"' ...\n\nTu CommisJ;.,,,,,.\n\nofl=-taz,\n\n.&!a<l=a>rd\n\nOJWl/1n\n\njag\"\"1U1dNiJas ].\n\nM. Ct. MuJhiall\n\nand 2 others\n\nV' The Commissioner\n\nof /tuom8\"-tax,\n\nMlldras and\n\nanother\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\nfore and it is said that this makes a difference. I feel constrained, howevei, with the utmost respect, to hold, on a careful , consideration that there is no room for making any such distinction which is relevant for the purposes of this question. Undoubtedly it is true that section 34 of the Income-tax Act as it stood prior to 1948 is more restrictive i.n its operation than the same section as amended in 1948. But I am unable to see how the class falling under sec!ion 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act is still not different from that which falls within amended section 34 of the Income-tax Act.\n\nUnder section 5( I) of the Investigation Commission Act the requirement is that . the Central Government has \"pr.ima fade reasons for believing that a person has to a , substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income\".\n\nThis is quite different from the criteri0n applicable under the amended section 34 of the Jn,, otne-tax Act.\n\nIn the first place, section 34 of the Income-tax Act relates to cases of evasion however small, while section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act relates only to large-scale evaders comprised within the terl}1 \"substantial evasion\".\n\nSecondly, the belief of the Government as to the existenc~ of evasion need not satisfy any rigorous standard because it need not be based on any material directly connected with the suspected evasion.\n\nIt is enough if it is a \"prima facie reason to believe\" which having regard to the scheme of the Act would cover cases m which tell-tale appearances may call for probing and effective investigation.\n\nThis may well be no more than \"well-grounded reason io suspect\".\n\nThis is quite different from the standard to \"reason to believe\" required of the Income-tax Officer under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. \"Prima facie reason to believe\" and \"reason to believe\" are as different from each other as \"prim a facie proof\" and \"proof\". therefore \"reason to believe\" is something definitely higher than \"reason to suspect\". Indeed, it is difficult to compare the standards required under the two sections.\n\nThough no doubt the power exercisable by the Central Government under section 5 ( 1) of the\n\nInvestigation Commission Act and that exercisable by the Income-tax Officer under section 34 of the Income-tax Act have this in common that both have reference to \"reason to believe\", the standard of belief and the basis of belief is expressed in such different terminology that it is not possible to compare the two and equate the two as being the same. Nor indeed can it be posited that every case of the class comprised in section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act must necessarily fall within section 34 of the Income-tax Act.\n\nApart, however, from any question as to the comparison between the two sections and as to the standards and basis of the belief required, once it is accepted (as has been done in the Travancore Appeals(1) that substan'tial evasion is a definite legal standards determinative of a distinct class, it is clear that the class comprised thereunder is not identical with the class comprised under section 34 of the Income-tax Act.\n\nIn the alternative, it is a select, group of a wider class.\n\nIf the smaller grouping is on a rational basis relevant to the policy of the Act, it would form a distinct class by itself for purposes of article 14.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to bear in mind the entire scope of the Investigation Commission Act in order to determine what the class is which is contemplated and covered by it.\n\nFive main features may be noticed of the scheme of the Investigation Commission .Act .\n\n(1) It relates only to those in respect of whom the Government have \"prima facie reason to believe that there has been substantial evasion of tax\".\n\n(2) The belief does not result straightaway in proceedings .for reassessment (unlike under section 34 of the Income-tax Act) but the question of reassessment (i.e., reopening of the assessment) depends on investigation into the correctness of that belief. The first step in the scheme is section 5(2) which contemplates that the investigation may result in substantial ([) A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Authorised Official, I.T., [1955] 2\n\nS.C.R. 1196.\n\nand 2 others v.\n\nThe CommiJSioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah and 2 other1\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nagannadhadas J.\n\nevasion not being revealed.\n\nIf so the further proceedings would be dropped on a report by the Commission to that effect.\n\nHence no reassessment starts in such a case.\n\n(3) An effective procedure for investigation is provided to bring out all the necessary and relevant facts and material to substantiate the evasion and quantum thereof. ( 4) Proceedings for reassessment are taken on! y on the emergence of such material and on a report to that effect and that too on a further direction by the Government as to the exact nature of the proceedings to be taken and as to the exact period to be covered falling within the limits of 31st December, 1938 and 1st September, 1948. (See sections 8(2) and 5(3) of the Investigation Commission Act).\n\n(5) A reference could be made by the Gover'1ment to the Commission only up to a specified date line statutorily determined.\n\nIf all these facts which are essential part of the scheme under the Investigation Commission Act are borne in mind it becomes apparent that the class contemplated under section 5(1) of the lnvestigz.tion Commission Act for reassessment is totally different from that which could be got at either under section 34 of the Income-tax Act as it stood between 1939 and 1~48 or as it stands since 1948.\n\nOne has only to compace the provisions in the Income-tax Act relating to the means by which the normal income-tax authorities can get information or obtain material which might lead to a reopening \"of the assessment under section 34 of the Income-tax Act to appreciate that the class contemplated under section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act cannot be the same. The only provisions in the income-tax law for the purpose are sections 37, 38 and 39 of the Incometax Act.\n\nThe primary scheme of the Income-tax Act is that the basic materials for the assessment are ibe returns and the accounts or other evidence to be furnished by the 1Ssessce himself (sections 22 and 23 of the Income-ta.•: Act) or the checking material that may be availa'.ile from the returns and the accounts\n\nof other assessees who have transactions with this assessee.\n\nIt may also consist of information received from other public authorities, etc., as well as the examination of persons appearing to have interconnected transactions.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer has not the power to probe into suspecious features or obtain and seize material in verification or support thereof.\n\nAll that normally he can do, where there is room for grave suspicion is to reject the accounts and make his assessment on the basis of \"best judgment\"\n\n(see section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act) which cannot be sustained if it is a wild guess based on mere susp1C1on.\n\nNow, the whole scheme of the Investigation Commission Act is obviously inspired by the realisation that the normal machinery available to the Income-tax Officer for the reassessment of large scale suppressed income is not adequate.\n\nAll the same, the Legislature realising that drastic investigation into the affairs of assessees on seemingly wellgrounded suspicions might . result in serious encroachment of personal liberties, has not chosen to vest the Income-tax Officer with any such powers of investigation and has confined this drastic procedure to evasion of income during the period commencing 1st January, 1939 to the 1st September, 1948 ( vide sections 8(2) and 5(3) of the Investigation Commission Act) and limited the same to cases of substantial evasion.\n\nIn considering, therefore, what is the ambit of the class contemplated by section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission Act, it is necessary to remember these features of the scheme. It would follow that the class comprised in. section 5(1) is the class of substantial evaders whose evasion appeared to the Government to call for a high-powered machinery for effective investigation, not available to an ordinary Income-tax Officer functioning under section 34 of the Income-tax Act.\n\nSo understood it is quite dear, to my mind, that section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act relates to a class totally different from what can be brought in under section 34 of the Income-tax Act as it, either stood before; or stands after,. 1948.\n\nThat this .class was\n\nM. Ct. Mitthiah\n\narid 2 others\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and another\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nM. CJ. MuJhiak\n\nand 2 others v.\n\nThe Commis; ioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nJaganr.adhadas J.\n\nreally contemplated to be distinct is also indicated by the following provision of section 8(4) of the Investigation Commission Act.\n\n\"No proceedings taken in pursuance of such direction (direction made under section 8(2) for reassessment) shall be a bar to the initiation of pmceedings under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act\".\n\nThis seems to indicate the possibility of concurrent assessment proceedings as against any particular assessee under section 34 of the Income-tax Act as also under section 8(2) of the Investigation Commission Act.\n\nThe idea appears to be that section 34 proceedings may go on in respect of such income of the assessee the escaping of which comes to the knowledge of the officer by the normal procedure, and that the reassessment under the Investigation Commission Act is expected to be in respect of such evaded income which is to be discovered only as a result of regular and effective investigation.\n\nIt has been suggested in the course of arguments that no objection could be taken to Government taking only sufficient powers for investigation in appropriate cases, without any question arising as to discrimination or classification but that this cannot justify discriminatory procedure as regards actual reassessment.\n\nThat raises a different aspect of the matter which will be presently dealt with.\n\nAssuming however that substantial evaders contemplated under section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act fall also within the larger class of evaders who fall within the class contemplated by section 34 of the Income-tax Act as it stands, what follows? The selective group under section-5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act is determined with reference to the criteria ( 1) that they are substantial evaders of income-tax, and (2) that they are assessees within the period 1939 to 1948 which is well-known to be the period of war profits and black-marketing and in respect of whom the Government get information before 1st September, 1948, justifying investigation.\n\nThis is by itself a well-defined class and the\n\nclassification has a reasonable relation to the object to be achieved, viz., the catching up of the escaped black-market war profits, for assessment.\n\nIt is to be assumed that the Government would have made their references to the Investigation . Commission of all the cases of persons about whom they have the requisite belief or information before 1st September, 1948.\n\nIf there are any war profiteers of that period against whom there was no information by then and against whom information becomes available later, it will be probably found -that the information so received is not such as to enable the ordinary Income-tax Officer to rope him in.\n\nIt may turn out that he has evaded once for all.\n\nBut even if, in some cases, the Incometax Officer could by the ordinary process get the escaped income of such assessees for rea&sessment, that by itself is no ground for thinking that a classification of substantial war profiteers who have evaded iI).come-tax and against whom there was information up to a specified date is not in itself a valid classification.\n\nIt is well-recognised that a classification otherwise reasonable is not invalid by reason of the classification not being comprehensive.\n\nJn Joseph Patsone v. Commont11ealth of Pennsylvania (1) the Supreme Court of the United States of America laid down that-\n\n\"a state may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated against is or .reasonably might be considered to define those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out.\n\nA lack of abstract symmetry does not matter.\n\nThe question is a practical one dependent upon experience ........ It is not enough to invalidate the law that others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact, it is found that the •danger is characteristic of the class named\".\n\nAgain in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Ernest Parrish(') the same Court stated-\n\n\"This Court has frequently held that the legisla-\n\n(1) 232 U.S. 138 144; 58 L. Ed. 539, 543.\n\n(2) 300 U.S. 379, 400; 81 L. Ed. 703, 713.\n\n26-85 S.C. India/59\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah and 2 othm\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-ta.'<,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nand 2 others\n\nThe Commissiotrlf of Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother ·\n\nJagannadhadas .7\n\ntive authority, acting within its proper field, is not bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach.\n\nThe legislature 'is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest'.\n\nIf 'the law presumably 11its the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied'.\n\nThere is no 'doctrinaire requirement' that the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms\".\n\nIt is substantially the above view of permissible classification for the purposes of article 14 that has been recognised by this Court in Sakhawat .1li v. The State of Orissa( ') where this Court laid down as follows:\n\n\"Legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose need not be all embracing.\n\nIt is for the legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fun<la- , mental right guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution\".\n\nEven if therefore section 34 of the IncomNax Act as amended in 1948 is wide enough in its ambit to catch up any and every case which could be dealt with under section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act, it is still a distinctive and selective group. out of a larger group and is a class by itself determined with reference to the criteria above indicated. It is no objection to the constitutionality of that classification that some out of them who may have been left out may be taken up later for being proceeded against under the amended section 34 of the Income-tax Act.\n\nThe Class falling within the scope of the Investigation Commission Act is a class closed with reference to the date-line, 1st September, 1948, and it appears to me difficult to envisage the possibility of any member (I) (1955] i S. C.R. 1004, 1010.\n\nof that class being available to be dealt with by the Income-tax Officer under the amended section 34 of the Income-tax Act which came into operation from after that date-line except by imputing mala ft.des to the Government in the selective application of section 5(1)- of the Investigation Commission Act.\n\nIt is true that the date-line was changed by legislature from 30th June, 1948 to 1st September, 1948. But it was an essential part of the whole scheme of the legislation that there was to be no reference beyond a dateline to be fixed by the legislature, so as to limit the application of the Act.\n\nHence it is also an attribute of the class contemplated by the Act.\n\nI am aware that there are observations in Surai Mall Mohta's case<1) and Shree Meenakshi Mills' case(2 ) which appear not to have accepted the idea of the class being with reference to a date-line.\n\nBut the actual decision in Suraj Mall Mohta's case( 1 ) was based on the distinction between section 5 ( 4) and section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act and the consequential parallelism between the class falling under section 5(4) of the Investigation Commission Act and section 34(1) of the Income-tax Act.\n\nIn Meenakshi Mills' case(2) the decision was rested on the parallelism between section 5(1) of the Inve3tigation Commission Act and section 34(1) of the Income-tax Act as amended in 1954.\n\nThe decision in neither of these cases was based on any final determination of the scope of the class contemplated by section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act.\n\nThe actual decisions in those cases are of course binning but not necessarily all the reasoning therein.\n\nBesides, with great respect, the relevancy of the date-line in section 5(1) as having been related to the then contemplated date for the lapse, in 1948, of the controls under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946) was not noticed.\n\nThe principle of Sakhawat Ali's case( 8 ) was not also by then laid\n\ndown by this Court (that case having been decided later in November, 1954).\n\n( ) [1955) I S. C.R. 448;\n\n(2) [1955] I S~ C.R. 787.\n\n(3) [J9551:1 S. C.R. !004, 1010.\n\nand 2 others v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\n-of Income-tax,\n\nMatlraJ and\n\nanother\n\nJagannatlhatlas J.\n\naM 2 others\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Jncomela:t,\n\nMadras and another\n\nJagannodhaJas J.\n\nFurther, even if the date-line is not an essential part of the classification under section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission Act, the other four essential features of the scheme of the class contemplated in section 5(1) as set out by me above are by themselves enough to constitute a complete and rational differentiation of the class comprised under section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act from that under section 34(1) of the Income-tax Act as amended in\n\n1948. If on such a classification some cases of substantial evasion happen to have escaped the machinery of the Investigation Commission Act, that would not invalidate the classification on the principle accepted in Sakhawat Ali's case( ).\n\nI am in any case unable to visualise the reasonable possibility of any person falling within the category contemplated under section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission Act, being taken up for reassessment under section 34 of the Income-tax Act as amended in 1948 and consequently of two parallel reassessment proceedings relating to such persons remaining pending by the 26th January, 1950, so as to bring about discriminatory operation between them and to render section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act ultra vires in respect of such pending matters.\n\nIt appears to me, therefore, that section 5(1) of the Investigation Commission Act and the other sections following thereupon cannot be declared unconstitutional on the ground of absence of reasonable classification.\n\nOne other matter has been relied upon as beirig relevant. It was pointed out that the amendment of section 34 of the Income-tax Act in 1948 was simultaneous with the amendment of section 5(3) of the Investigation Commission Act, extending the time for a reference under section 5 ( 1) by the Central Government up to the 1st September, 1948.\n\nIt has been suggested that this clearly shows the intention of the legislature to the effect that after the 1st September, 1948, all cases which might have fallen under section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission Act are left to be dealt with under section 34 of the\n\n(l) [1955] I S. C.R. 1004, JOJO.\n\nAct as amended.\n\nIt appears to me with respect that there is no basis for this inference.\n\nOn the other -hand it appears to me (if what I have said above as being the scheme of the Investigation Commission Act is correct) that the legislature deliberate! y limited the application of the Investigation Commission Act by a date-line, realising the seriousness of its continued operation. It did not want to perpetuate the drastic provisions thereof to any new cases in view of the fact that the official war period ended and controls had been lessened by the above date-line, if not totally abolished.\n\nIt may be mentioned that by proclamation, the war situation was formally terminated as from the 1st April, 1946, and that the Control Orders under the Defence of India Act ceased to be operative from the 1st October, 1946, and that the Essential Supplies\n\n(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, was passed in substitution thereof.\n\nThis 1946 Act was intended originally to be in operation only until March, 1948. (See /oyal Agarwala v. The State(1 ). The date-line of 1st September, 1948, in section 5(1) seems to be related to this situation. It appears to me that with the full consciousness that any new cases of the same category, if any, are not likely to be caught up under the normal procedure, the legislature merely purported by virtue of the amended section 34 of the Incometax Act to remove certain lacuna in the normal machinery, which had been noticed and reported upon by the income-tax administration and by the Investigation Commission, with reference to section 34 as it stood between 1939 to 1948. (See paragraph 22 of the General Report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission issued in 1948 making its recommendations for the improvement of the machinery at page 8 of that report and Appendix A thereto which would show that amendment of section 34 was not connected with the extension of the date for making references under section 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission Act).\n\nI am unable, therefore, to assume that the simultaneous enactment of section 34 of the Incometax Act and the amendment of Investigation Com-\n\n(\\) [\\952) S. C.R. 127, 130.\n\nand 2 others\n\n.v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanothn-\n\nJagannadluzdas J.\n\nM. Ct. Mulhian\n\nand 2 othtrs\n\nTM Commis!ioner\n\nef Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\n\"\"\"'\"\" JagOllllad/iadas J.\n\nmission Act in 1948 have a bearing on the question at issue.\n\nUndoubtedly the re-assessment proceedings under the Investigation Commission Act appear to deprive the assessee of certain procedural advantages.\n\nHe is deprived eif an appeal on facts to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nHe is given the right of appeal only on points of law by means of a reference to the High Court. But such reference is to be heard by a Bench of not less than three Judges. Now, once there is a valid classification the nal:Ure and extent of the actual discrimination which results under the scheme of legislation relating thereto is largely a question of policy, which the courts have nothing to do with, except possibly where the discrimination has no reasonable relation to the policy and purpose of the classification.\n\nThe policy underlying the Investigation Commission Act is, as already stated, to catch up for reassessment large scale evasions of income-tax of the war period.\n\nIt is obvious that having regard to the magnitude of the interests that would be involved therein, it was quite legitimate that the matters concerned therewith, should be entrusted to a highly-qualified and high-powered authority, and not to the ordinary machinery.\n\nNo grievance can be made if the legislature tought fit not to entrust the responsibility for fact-finding to the normal machinery involving lesser qualifications and experience.\n\nIt is true that the investigation might have been placed in the hands of one authority and the factfinding on the material so gathered in the hands of another authority or that at least there might have been provided one appeal on facts also to a highplaced authority like the High Court. It may also appear somewhat disquieting that the same body is invested both with the power of investigation and the power of fact-finding and that there is no appeal provided as against its findings on facts.\n\nBut these are all matters of policy and cannot be, said to be either unreasonable or unrelated to the purpose and policy of the classification.\n\nInvestigation is a com- - l\n\nprehensive term and it will be seen that the investigation procedure itself under the Act is in two stages, one before the authorised official a:t which the assessee is not entitled to be represented and the other before the Investigation Commission at which the assessee is entitled to . be represented by a pleader, a registered accountant of an authorised employee (vide section 7(3) and the proviso thereto).\n\nThese two stages may be taken roughly, though not necessarily, to indicate two parts of the investigation, (1) the process of probing into the evasion and collecting the material in support of it, and (2) arriving at conclusions with reference to the material so collected and presented.\n\nThe latter is the judicial part at which the Commission is directed under section 7(2) to follow the principles of the Indian Evidence Act and to give the assessee a reasonable opportunity of rebutting evidence and generally to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The procedure relating to this stage is assimilated to a judicial enquiry in a larger measure than is the procedure before the Income-tax Offi, cer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in respect of whose proceedings there is no provision that thev must follow as far as practicable the principles of the Indian Evidence Act.\n\n(See section. 23 of the Income-tax Act). It is wellsettled that the assessment proceedings by the Income-tax Officer under section 23 of the Incometax Act-and hence also under section 34 thereofare not regulated by the technical standards of evidence though of course they cannot be based on caprice or suspicion.\n\nIt would, therefore, appear that accor.ding to the scheme of the Investigation Commission Act, the judicial part of it approximates much more to judicial standards than the assessment proceedings by the income-tax authorities and that though in theory there is a combination of the functions of an investigator and the judge in the Investigation Commision, in normal practice it is likely to be kept .distinct by the appointment of an authorised official to conduct the first porticn.\n\nIt is also to be remembered that the combination of the investigator\n\nM. Cl. Muthialr\n\ntllft/ 2 others\n\nThi CommisswMr\n\nof Income.tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nand 2 others\n\nThe Commisii<mer\n\nof lncometmt.\n\nMadras and\n\n\"\"\"'\"\" ]agannad/uJdas ].\n\nand judge is inherent even in the normal income-tax machinery where the Income-tax Officer and the Assistant Income-tax Commissioner are in the nature of Judges interested in their own cause.\n\nIt has been suggested that there is something opposed to ordinary canons of judicial procedure or natural justice in the matter of making relevant documents available to the assessee in the proceedings before the Investigation Commission. It appears to me, with respect, that this is based on a misapprehension.\n\nIt is true that section 7 ( 4) of the Investigation Commission Act says: ''No person shall be entitled to inspect, call for, or obtain copies of, any documents, statement or papers or materials furnished to, obtained by or produced before the Commission or any authorised official in any proceedings under this Act; but the Commission, and after the Commission has ceased to exist such au\\hority as the Central Government may in this behalf appoint, may, in its discretion, allow such inspection and furnish such copies to any person.\" and section 6(8) of the Investigation Commission Act says:\n\n\"All material gathered by the authorised official and materials reference under sub-section ( 1) brought on record ; it such stage may think fit\".\n\nCommission or the accompanying the of section 5 may be as the Commission\n\nBut these provisions have to be read subject to the proviso to section 7 ( 4) and to the opening part of section 7(2) of the Investigation Commission Act. The proviso to section 7 ( 4) is as follows:\n\n\"Provided that, for the purpose of enabling the person whose case or points in whose case is or are being investigated to rebut any evidence brought on the record against him, he shall, on application made in this behalf and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed by Rules made under this Act, be furnished with certified copies of documents, statements, papers and materials brought on the record .by the Commission''.\n\nFurther, the opening part of section 7(2) says:\n\n\"In making an investigation under clause (b) of section 3, the Commission shall act in accordance with the principles of natural justice, shall follow as far as practicable the principles of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and shall give the person whose case is being investigated a reasonable opportunity of rebutting any evidence adduced against him ........ \".\n\nThe above provisions preclude the possibility of the Commission. pushing in into the final record on which the report is to be based any ex parte material to which the assessee has had no access.\n\nThese also preclude the possibility of depriving him of the use of any relevant material in the Commission's possession which the assessee may call for.\n\nAll that section 7 ( 4) implies is that the assessee is not entitled to a roving inspection of the material gathered by the Investigation Commission in the course of investigation, which may relate to the affairs of various other persons.\n\nSuch a provision is not opposed to natural justice for even in the mai.ter of criminal judicial trials the accused is not entitled to a roving inspection of the material gathered by the police during investigation. (I may notice, with very great respect, tha.t the observation in Suraj Mall Mohta's case(1 ) at page 464 that \"the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer are judicial proceedings and (that therefore) all the incidents of such judicial proceedings have to be observed, i.e., in other words, the assessee should be entitled to inspect the record and all relevant documents'' seems to have failed to note that section 37 ( 1) specifically limits the judicial character of the proceedings to the purposes covered by sections 193, 196 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and also that the said section vests in the Income-tax authorities, the powers of a court only for specified purposes). If, therefore, in view of all these circumstances the Legislatlire thought fit to entrust the combined responsibility for investigation and fact-finding to a single high-powered and highly-qualified body consisting of three members of whom one is or has been a Judge of the High Court and made their findings of (I) [19551 1 s. c. R. 448.\n\nM. Ct. Muthiah and 2 others\n\nThe Commissio•er\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanothlr\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nM. Ci, Mlllhioh\n\nand 2 olJierj\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof [lt; omd-ltvt,\n\nMi>irasand\n\n\"\"\"'\"\" Jaganmrd/iadat J•\n\nfact final, without pmviding for access to the regular heirarchy of appeals to the Assistant Commissioner and a Bench of two members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, there appears to I:..: nothing unreasonable therein.\n\nOn the other hand cii.ere are counterbalancing featw-es with reference to the composition of the Commission and the statutory standards by which the judicial part of its proceedings have to be governed.\n\nI am, therefore, unable to feel that the discriminati9n brought about in the procedure relating o assessment calls for any such adverse reaction as to be. a reasonable basis for founding thereon an inference of unconstitutional inequality.\n\nHowever, as I have already said above, this appears to be ultimately a question of policy.\n\nOnce the classification is found to be justified and reasonably related to the clearly under!y.ing policy of the Investigation Commission Act, I am unable to feel that section 5{1) of the Investigation Commission Act can be struck down as ultra vires in relation to its supposed concurrent operation with sectior. 34 of the Income-tax Act as ameuded in 1948, I hold, therefore, that section 5(1} of the Investigation Commission Act was not hit by article 14 of the Constitution notwithstanding amendment of section 34 of the Income-tale Act in 1948 and that it continued to be valid.\n\nOn all other points urged on behalf of the petitioners, I agree with the view expressed in the judgment delivered by my learned brother Justice Bhagwati on behalf of the majority of the Court. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to deal with them.\n\nIn the result, in my opinion, this petition must be dismissed with costs except as regards the incomplete reassessment for 1942-43 for which the learned Solicitor-General has given an undertaking not to proceed. with it under the provisions of the Investigation Commission Act, as stated in the judgment of my le:i.rned brnther.\n\nORDER Bv THE CoURT : In accordance with the Judgment of the majority the petition is allowed and. it is ordered that a writ of certiorari do issue quashing the\n\n2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO~TS 1285\n\nreport of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 26th August 1952 and the assessment orders of the Income-Tax Officer for the y.ears . 1940-41, 1941\"42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49, and that a writ of prohibition do i$sue against the resP, ondents restraining them from implementing the findings. of the Investigation Commission with rg;µ-~ to the year 1942-43.\n\nThe respondents do pay the peritioners' costs of their petition.\n\nAHER RAJA K.HIMA\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA-\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l\n\nAppeal against Acqu#tal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417\n\nPel\"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ,\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting). It is well settled that the High' Court should not set aside an order of acquittal under s, 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure simply because it differs from the trial Court as to the appreciation of the evidence ; there must be substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. Whete the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference is not justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for holding otherwise.\n\nAmar Singh v; State of Punjab ([1953] S.C.R. 418) and Surajpal Singh v. State ( f19521 S.C.R. 193), referred t, o.\n\nThe accused in a criminal case must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt and, therefore when he offers a reasonable explanation of his conduct, althougl; i he cannot prove it, that explanation should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that it is false.\n\nConseq11ently,. in a case where an accused person, charged under ss. 302 and 447 of the lndian Penal Code, repudiated his confession at the earliest opportunity as having been made under Police threats administered to l>im at night while in, jail custody and there was evidence to show that the Police had access to hiru there, and there was nothing to displace his statement that he was threatened by them, the finding of the Sessions Judge that the t:onfession was not voluntary in character was fair and reasonaok and in the absence of auy compellihg reason the High Court shotild not have set aside the order of acquittal.\n\nM- Ct. Mulhiah\n\nand 2 others\n\nv.\n\nThe' Commission.,\n\nof ltu:of/14-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nJaganlladhadas J.\n\nDecmiher 22.", "total_entities": 408, "entities": [{"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 83, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214, "end_char": 224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "26th January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 338, "end_char": 355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings which took place in the course of investigation by the Commission up to the 26th January 1950 were valid and so also were the proceedings during."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "CT. 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Income (Investigation Commission) Ac~,· .1947 (Act XXX of 1947) iis ultra vires the Constitution as it ii discriminawry and violative of the fundamental .right guaranteed by ."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1655, "end_char": 1659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1943, "end_char": 1948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1957, "end_char": 1983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. Vmliit", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l4 of the Constitution by reason of two amenc; lments which were made in , s. 34 of thf: Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI afl922) one ia .1948 by the .c:nac[ment of the Income-T.u: and Busine$& Profit$ Ta\n\nA. Thangal Kunju\n\nMusaliar\n\nV• M. Vmliit°'halam\n\nPolti and anothlr\n\nBhagwati]."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2434, "end_char": 2442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2457, "end_char": 2471, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2873, "end_char": 2881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Inomc-Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "8th September 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2993, "end_char": 3011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amended s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Ace was substantially different fwm the old s. 34(1) which was in operation up to the 8th September 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3879, "end_char": 3887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4139, "end_char": 4147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4242, "end_char": 4249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4273, "end_char": 4282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4311, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4348, "end_char": 4356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4589, "end_char": 4597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4612, "end_char": 4626, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4902, "end_char": 4920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the 8th September 1948, therefore, even in the case of substantial evaders of income-tax who were a distinct class by themselves intended to be treated by the drastic and summary procedure laid down 1'Y Act XXX of 1947, some c:; tses that were already referred by the Central Government !"}}, {"text": "s. 34( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5130, "end_char": 5139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5237, "end_char": 5251, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5673, "end_char": 5680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6084, "end_char": 6097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pe1 JAGANNADHADAS J.-The class of persons falling under s. 5(1) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act,\n\n1947 (Act XXX of 1947) is totally different from that which falls within amended s. 34 of the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922 (Act XI of 1922) and therefore s. 5( 1) of Act XXX of 1947 is not unconstitutional as offending Art.", "canonical_name": "Jaganr.adhadas"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6136, "end_char": 6143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6284, "end_char": 6289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6297, "end_char": 6323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6355, "end_char": 6363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6420, "end_char": 6427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Suraj Mall Mohta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6450, "end_char": 6466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Mall Mohta v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another (f 19551 1 S.C.R. 448), Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Another (f 1955] 1 S.C.R. 787), A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Patti & Anr.", "canonical_name": "Suraj Mall Mohta"}}, {"text": "1955] 1 S.C.R. 787", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6599, "end_char": 6617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6746, "end_char": 6766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7089, "end_char": 7099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7107, "end_char": 7128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nattnit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7148, "end_char": 7159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. R. /agadisan, Nattnit Lal and krishnan, (T. V. Balakrishnan."}}, {"text": "krishnan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7164, "end_char": 7172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. R. /agadisan, Nattnit Lal and krishnan, (T. V. Balakrishnan."}}, {"text": "T. V. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7175, "end_char": 7193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. R. /agadisan, Nattnit Lal and krishnan, (T. V. Balakrishnan."}}, {"text": "V. Balapermission", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7237, "end_char": 7254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Balapermission of\n\nC. K. Dapluary, Solicitor-General of India, ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "C. K. Dapluary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7259, "end_char": 7273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Balapermission of\n\nC. K. Dapluary, Solicitor-General of India, ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7305, "end_char": 7317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Balapermission of\n\nC. K. Dapluary, Solicitor-General of India, ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Balapermission of\n\nC. K. Dapluary, Solicitor-General of India, ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7341, "end_char": 7353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Balapermission of\n\nC. K. Dapluary, Solicitor-General of India, ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "BttAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7408, "end_char": 7417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BttAGWATI J.-This pet1t1on under Article 32 of the Constitution also raises the question about the constitutionality of section 5 ( 1) of the Taxation on Income Investigation Commission Act, 1947\n\n(XXX of 1947)."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7441, "end_char": 7451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7528, "end_char": 7537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Taxation on Income Investigation Commission Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7550, "end_char": 7603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. Ct. Muthiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7621, "end_char": 7635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Ct.", "canonical_name": "M. Ct. Muthiah"}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nqf Income-tax, Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7657, "end_char": 7692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthiah and 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nqf Income-tax, Madras and another.", "canonical_name": "-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7728, "end_char": 7763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras and\n\naMther\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe facts which led to the filing of this petition may be shortly stated.", "canonical_name": "-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7777, "end_char": 7785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras and\n\naMther\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe facts which led to the filing of this petition may be shortly stated.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "M. Ct.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7869, "end_char": 7875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir M. Ct."}}, {"text": "M. Muthiah Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8079, "end_char": 8098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Muthiah Chettiar, petitioner 3, and his widow Devanai Achi."}}, {"text": "Devanai Achi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8128, "end_char": 8140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Muthiah Chettiar, petitioner 3, and his widow Devanai Achi.", "canonical_name": "Devanai A chi"}}, {"text": "Chidambaram Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8148, "end_char": 8168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chidambaram Chettiar continued the ancestral banking business and also started several commercial enterprises."}}, {"text": "Devanai Achi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8384, "end_char": 8396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devanai Achi had predeceased him.", "canonical_name": "Devanai A chi"}}, {"text": "M. Chindambaram Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8494, "end_char": 8518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Chindambaram Chettiar and also the representatives of their grandmother Devanai A chi.", "canonical_name": "M. Chindambaram Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Devanai A chi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8569, "end_char": 8582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Chindambaram Chettiar and also the representatives of their grandmother Devanai A chi.", "canonical_name": "Devanai A chi"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8641, "end_char": 8650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "-tax Investigation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8698, "end_char": 8727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government, in exercise of its powers under section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947, referred to the Income-tax Investigation Commission R.\n\nC. Nos."}}, {"text": "M. Chidambaram Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8776, "end_char": 8799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Chidambaram Chettiar, M.\n\nCt.", "canonical_name": "M. Chindambaram Chettiar"}}, {"text": "26th August\n\n1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9265, "end_char": 9282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This report was submitted by the Commission to the Government on the 26th August\n\n1952."}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9359, "end_char": 9371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16th September 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9437, "end_char": 9456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "74 (26) I.T/52 dated the 16th September 1952 that appropriate action under the Indian Income-tax Act be taken against the assessees with a view to assess or re-assess, the income which had escaped assessment for the years 1940-41 to 1948-49."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9498, "end_char": 9512, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9756, "end_char": 9762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the said directions of the Central Government the Income-tax Officer, City Circle I, Madras, issued notices under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act and made the re-assessment for the\n\nyears 1940-41, 1941-42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49 based upon the findings, of the Commission which were treated as final and conclusive."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9785, "end_char": 9795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9810, "end_char": 9824, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10281, "end_char": 10291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10306, "end_char": 10320, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10771, "end_char": 10783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th May\n\n1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11055, "end_char": 11069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar applications were preferred thereafter in respect of the re-assessment orders which were served on the petitioners on the 12th May\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "6th Decernber 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11117, "end_char": 11135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th Decernber 1954, the petitioners filed the present petition contending that the provisions of the Act XXX of 1947 were illegal, ultra vires and unconstitutional mainly on the ground that they were violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11369, "end_char": 11379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11794, "end_char": 11804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11819, "end_char": 11833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, MadrD>", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12073, "end_char": 12108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuJhi.h\n\nand 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, MadrD> and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "alia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12135, "end_char": 12139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "alia, added sub-seetions (1-A) to (1-D) to section 34, the provisions of section 5 ( 1) of the Act became discriminatory, as on a reading of both the enactments, Act XXX of 1947 and the Income-tax Act as amended in 1954 showed that they pplied to the same category of persons and there was nothing in section 5(1) of the Act or any other provision of the said Act disclosing any valid or reasonable classification."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12178, "end_char": 12188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12208, "end_char": 12217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12321, "end_char": 12335, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12436, "end_char": 12448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12678, "end_char": 12688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shree Meenakshi Mill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12765, "end_char": 12785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners obviously relied upon our decision in Shree Meenakshi Mill's case, supra, in support of this contention.", "canonical_name": "Shree Meenakshi Mill"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13862, "end_char": 13876, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14008, "end_char": 14022, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14122, "end_char": 14134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no reasonableness or justification that one person should have the advantage of the procedure prescribed by the Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "There was no reasonableness or justification that one person should have the advantage of the procedure prescribed by the Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14182, "end_char": 14192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no reasonableness or justification that one person should have the advantage of the procedure prescribed by the Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "There was no reasonableness or justification that one person should have the advantage of the procedure prescribed by the Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Investigation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14340, "end_char": 14375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or order quashing the report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 29th August 1952 en- closed as Annexure A to the petition and the assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer for the years 1940-41, 1941-42, and 1943-44 to 1948-49 as being unconstitutional, null and void and also of a writ of prohibition calling upon the Commissioner of Incometax, Madras; respondent 1 and the Income-tax Officer, City Circle I, Madras, respondent 2 or their subordinate officers to forbear from implementing the findings of the Investigation Commission with regard to the year l942-43."}}, {"text": "29th August 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14386, "end_char": 14402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or order quashing the report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 29th August 1952 en- closed as Annexure A to the petition and the assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer for the years 1940-41, 1941-42, and 1943-44 to 1948-49 as being unconstitutional, null and void and also of a writ of prohibition calling upon the Commissioner of Incometax, Madras; respondent 1 and the Income-tax Officer, City Circle I, Madras, respondent 2 or their subordinate officers to forbear from implementing the findings of the Investigation Commission with regard to the year l942-43."}}, {"text": "M. Venkita- Musaliar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15035, "end_char": 15055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 and 22 of 1954, A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar\n\nv. M. Venkitachaalam Patti & Another and M. Venkita- Musaliar (1), which also raised inter alia the cognate question about the constitutionality of section 5 ( 1) of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 which was in pari materia with section 5 ( 1) of Act XXX of 1947."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15142, "end_char": 15151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15164, "end_char": 15190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15367, "end_char": 15379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124"}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1124", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15537, "end_char": 15563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15681, "end_char": 15691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words \"substantial extent\" also have been used in both the Acts and in the present case as in the cases of the Travancore petitioners concerned in ."}}, {"text": "Gauri Shanker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15766, "end_char": 15779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 of 1125 (M.E.), Gauri Shanker, Secretary, Income-tax Investigation Commission made an affidavit dated the 21st September 1955 wherein he set out the events and circumstances under which Act XXX of 1947 came to be passed."}}, {"text": "21st September 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15856, "end_char": 15875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 of 1125 (M.E.), Gauri Shanker, Secretary, Income-tax Investigation Commission made an affidavit dated the 21st September 1955 wherein he set out the events and circumstances under which Act XXX of 1947 came to be passed."}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S. C.R. 1196", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16323, "end_char": 16344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16367, "end_char": 16404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and 2 others\n\nV• The-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras and another\n\n.Bhagwati ].", "canonical_name": "-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16453, "end_char": 16489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and 2 others\n\nV• The Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nnames of benarnidars or in cash purchases of gold, silver and jewellery.", "canonical_name": "-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18369, "end_char": 18378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", 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{"in_sentence": "Muthiah\n\nand 2 othen\n\nV• The Commissicner\n\nof IncoT111Jtax, MadraJ and\n\narwther\n\nBhagwati]."}}, {"text": "Commissionu\n\nof Income-tax, Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20890, "end_char": 20924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthiah\n\nand 2 others\n\nThe Commissionu\n\nof Income-tax, Madras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n\"Section 34(1) : If- ( a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the om1ss10n or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act, or exces.siv~ loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, or\n\n(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the p1rt of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or that excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time within eight years and in cases falling under clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the assessee, or, if the assessee is a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section :\n\n\" Act XXXIII of 1954 introduced into section 34 sub-sections (1-A) tu (1-D).", "canonical_name": "-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20952, "end_char": 20965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21128, "end_char": 21138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121", "statute": "Travancore Act XXIII of 1121"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22392, "end_char": 22402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22696, "end_char": 22706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(I-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22737, "end_char": 22752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st day of September, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23103, "end_char": 23129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 (1-A) : If, in the case of any assessee, the Income-tax Officer has reason to be!ieve'-\n\n(i) that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year in\n\nrespect of which the relevant previous year falls wholly or partly within the period beginning on the 1st day of September, 1939, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1946; and,\n\n(ii) that the income, profits or gains which have so escaped asses, sment for any such year or years amount, or are likely to amount, to one lakh of rupees or more; he may, notwithstanding that the period of eight years or, as the case may be, four years specified in sub-section ( 1) has expired in respect thereof, serve on the asses, see, or, if the assessee is a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22, and may proceed to assess or re-assess the income, profits or gains of the assesee for all or any of the years referred to in clause (i), and thereupon the provisions of this Act (excepting those contained in clauses ( i) and (iii) of the proviso to sub-section (1) and in subsections\n\n(2) and (3) of this section) shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly: Provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under this sub-section unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so, and the Central Board of Revenue is.'"}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23149, "end_char": 23172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 (1-A) : If, in the case of any assessee, the Income-tax Officer has reason to be!ieve'-\n\n(i) that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year in\n\nrespect of which the relevant previous year falls wholly or partly within the period beginning on the 1st day of September, 1939, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1946; and,\n\n(ii) that the income, profits or gains which have so escaped asses, sment for any such year or years amount, or are likely to amount, to one lakh of rupees or more; he may, notwithstanding that the period of eight years or, as the case may be, four years specified in sub-section ( 1) has expired in respect thereof, serve on the asses, see, or, if the assessee is a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22, and may proceed to assess or re-assess the income, profits or gains of the assesee for all or any of the years referred to in clause (i), and thereupon the provisions of this Act (excepting those contained in clauses ( i) and (iii) of the proviso to sub-section (1) and in subsections\n\n(2) and (3) of this section) shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly: Provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under this sub-section unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so, and the Central Board of Revenue is.'"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23700, "end_char": 23710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24393, "end_char": 24416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice: Provided further that no such notice shall be issued after the 31st day of March, 1956\"."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24428, "end_char": 24438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24458, "end_char": 24472, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": 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"end_char": 32258, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32311, "end_char": 32324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33109, "end_char": 33119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33469, "end_char": 33479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33519, "end_char": 33533, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33678, "end_char": 33688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34093, "end_char": 34101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrilllidh\n\nand2 othm\n\nV• Thr Go1nmwio111r\n\nof1mo~,\n\nMadrM arid\n\nanothlr\n\nBhagwati J•\n\nand 2 others\n\nTM Commissioner\n\nQf Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nincome-tax to be dealt with by the ordinary procedure prescribed in the Indian Income-tax Act without infringing the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34266, "end_char": 34280, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34339, "end_char": 34349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shree Meenakshi Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34484, "end_char": 34505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar argument had been advanced before us by the learned Attorney- General appearing for the Commission in Shree Meenakshi Mills' case, supra."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34599, "end_char": 34611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34750, "end_char": 34769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ground which he had urged was \"that the class of persons dealt with under section 5(1) of Act XXX.of 1947 was not only the class of substantial tax dodgers but it was a class of persons whose cases the Central Government, by 1st September, 1948, had referred to the Commission and that class had thus become determined finally on that date, and that that clas$ of persons could be dealt with by the Investigation Commission under the drastic pz:ocedure of Act XXX of 1947 while section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act as amended empowered the I11come-tax Officer to deal with cases other than those whose cases had been referred under section 5(1) to the Investigation Commission ...... \" Mahajan, C. J. who delivered the judgment of the Court dealt with this argument at page 795 (')\n\nas under:\n\n\"As regards the first contention canvassed by the learned Attorney-General it seems to us that it cannot stand scrutiny."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35003, "end_char": 35013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35028, "end_char": 35042, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35160, "end_char": 35172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35214, "end_char": 35221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ground which he had urged was \"that the class of persons dealt with under section 5(1) of Act XXX.of 1947 was not only the class of substantial tax dodgers but it was a class of persons whose cases the Central Government, by 1st September, 1948, had referred to the Commission and that class had thus become determined finally on that date, and that that clas$ of persons could be dealt with by the Investigation Commission under the drastic pz:ocedure of Act XXX of 1947 while section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act as amended empowered the I11come-tax Officer to deal with cases other than those whose cases had been referred under section 5(1) to the Investigation Commission ...... \" Mahajan, C. J. who delivered the judgment of the Court dealt with this argument at page 795 (')\n\nas under:\n\n\"As regards the first contention canvassed by the learned Attorney-General it seems to us that it cannot stand scrutiny."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35499, "end_char": 35508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36510, "end_char": 36522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36645, "end_char": 36655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36670, "end_char": 36684, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36762, "end_char": 36777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st day of March 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36828, "end_char": 36850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are further supported in this view by the fact that by the later amend111ent of section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act effected by Act XXXIII of 1954, the time limit for the issue of notice under section 34(1-A) of the Indian focometax Act has been fixed as the 31st day of March 1956."}}, {"text": "30th June, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37020, "end_char": 37035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30th June, 1948 or the extended period, viz.,"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37098, "end_char": 37110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37161, "end_char": 37176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37191, "end_char": 37205, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37571, "end_char": 37589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It follows, therefore, that after the inauguration of the C, onstitution on the 26th January, 1950, the persons whose cases were referred for investigation by Central Government to the Commission up to the 1st September, 1948 could, to use the words of Mahajan, C. J. in Shree Meenakshi Mills' case, supra, at page 794 ask:\n\n\" ...... why are we now being dealt with by the discriminatory and drastic procedure of Act XXX of 1947 when those similarly situated as ourselves can be dealt with by the Income-tax Officer under the amended provisions of section 34 of the Act?"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38039, "end_char": 38049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38232, "end_char": 38242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38684, "end_char": 38694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38861, "end_char": 38874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38979, "end_char": 38988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39205, "end_char": 39215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39417, "end_char": 39429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39822, "end_char": 39834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39862, "end_char": 39872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Muthiah Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40005, "end_char": 40021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthiah Chettiar and Devanai Achi were pending before the Commission on the 26th January 1950, the report therein not having been made by the Commission till the 26th August 1952 and the Commission had, after the 26th January 1950, no jurisdiction to complete the investigation and make their report, the whole procedure ."}}, {"text": "26th August 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40167, "end_char": 40183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthiah Chettiar and Devanai Achi were pending before the Commission on the 26th January 1950, the report therein not having been made by the Commission till the 26th August 1952 and the Commission had, after the 26th January 1950, no jurisdiction to complete the investigation and make their report, the whole procedure ."}}, {"text": "Shree Meenakshi Mjl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40620, "end_char": 40639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "first in; tance that the case was governed by\n\nour decision in Shree Meenakshi Mjl/s' case, supra, 011\n\nthe basis that by reason of the applications to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, made by the pet1t10ners under section 8(5) of the Act for reference to the High Court on questions of law arising out of the Income-tax Officer'.s re-asses3ment orders above referred to, the proceedings under Act XXX of 1947 had not become final and the petitioners were, therefore, entitled to relief on the ratio of our judgment in that case.", "canonical_name": "Shree Meenakshi Mill"}}, {"text": "section 8(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40779, "end_char": 40791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41165, "end_char": 41177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41568, "end_char": 41578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41586, "end_char": 41613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 34(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43581, "end_char": 43596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43604, "end_char": 43618, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "12th May 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44169, "end_char": 44182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a matter of fact the report had been made by the Commission against the petitioners as early as the 26th August 1952, the Central Government had given the directions under sectior 8(2) for re-assessment of the petitioners on the 16th September 1952 and the re-assessment orders for all the years except the year 1942-43 had been made by the Income-tax Officer against them by the 12th May 1954 which was long before the Act XXXIII of 1954 came into operation."}}, {"text": "section 8(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44476, "end_char": 44488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44746, "end_char": 44758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46167, "end_char": 46177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46446, "end_char": 46456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th March 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46497, "end_char": 46512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "virtue of the notice under section 34 issued by him to the petitioners on the 19th March 1954."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 46558, "end_char": 46578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed up9n a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in .Gangadhar Baijnath and others v. Income-tax Investigation Commission, .etc.(3) in support of this position."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46944, "end_char": 46954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47689, "end_char": 47698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48457, "end_char": 48469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "]AGANNADHADAS J .-This petition raises the question whether section 5(1) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947) (here:nafter referred to as the Investigation Commission Act) is unconstitutional as offending article 14 of the Constitution and has therefore become void on the coming into force of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Jaganr.adhadas"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48516, "end_char": 48528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48705, "end_char": 48715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49231, "end_char": 49243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1924", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49247, "end_char": 49273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49312, "end_char": 49324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Act XIV of 1924", "statute": "Travancore Act XIV of 1924"}}, {"text": "[1955] 2\n\nS.C.R. 1196", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 49552, "end_char": 49573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51107, "end_char": 51116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51273, "end_char": 51283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51775, "end_char": 51785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof /tuom8\"-tax,\n\nMlldras and\n\nanother\n\nJagannadhadas J", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52198, "end_char": 52266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuJhiall\n\nand 2 others\n\nV' The Commissioner\n\nof /tuom8\"-tax,\n\nMlldras and\n\nanother\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\nfore and it is said that this makes a difference.", "canonical_name": "Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanothn-\n\nJagannadluzdas J.\n\nM. 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Ci, Mlllhioh\n\nand 2 olJierj\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof [lt; omd-ltvt,\n\nMi>irasand\n\n\"\"\"'\"\" Jaganmrd/iadat J•\n\nfact final, without pmviding for access to the regular heirarchy of appeals to the Assistant Commissioner and a Bench of two members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, there appears to I:..: nothing unreasonable therein.", "canonical_name": "-Commissioner\n\nof Ineome-tax,\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof [lt; omd-ltvt,\n\nMi>irasand\n\n\"\"\"'\"\" Jaganmrd/iadat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83303, "end_char": 83369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthiah and 2 others\n\nThe Commissio•er\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanothlr\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nM. Ci, Mlllhioh\n\nand 2 olJierj\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof [lt; omd-ltvt,\n\nMi>irasand\n\n\"\"\"'\"\" Jaganmrd/iadat J•\n\nfact final, without pmviding for access to the regular heirarchy of appeals to the Assistant Commissioner and a Bench of two members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, there appears to I:..: nothing unreasonable therein."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84304, "end_char": 84313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84460, "end_char": 84474, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85933, "end_char": 85949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA-\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l\n\nAppeal against Acqutal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417\n\nPel\"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ,\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting)."}}, {"text": "STATE OF SAURASHTRA-", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 85955, "end_char": 85975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA-\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l\n\nAppeal against Acqutal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417\n\nPel\"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ,\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting)."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85978, "end_char": 85989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA-\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l\n\nAppeal against Acqutal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417\n\nPel\"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ,\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting)."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85991, "end_char": 86008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA-\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l\n\nAppeal against Acqutal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417\n\nPel\"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ,\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting)."}}, {"text": "NDRASEKHARA Arr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86018, "end_char": 86033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA-\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l\n\nAppeal against Acqutal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417\n\nPel\"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ,\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting)."}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86161, "end_char": 86167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86184, "end_char": 86206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA-\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l\n\nAppeal against Acqutal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417\n\nPel\"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ,\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting)."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86350, "end_char": 86376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 447", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87162, "end_char": 87177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87192, "end_char": 87202, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mulhiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87732, "end_char": 87739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mulhiah\n\nand 2 others\n\nv.\n\nThe' Commission.,"}}, {"text": "Jaganlladhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87818, "end_char": 87832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of ltu:of/14-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nJaganlladhadas J.\n\nDecmiher 22.", "canonical_name": "Jaganr.adhadas"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1285_1314_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO~TS 1285\n\nreport of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 26th August 1952 and the assessment orders of the Income-Tax Officer for the y.ears . 1940-41, 1941\"42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49, and that a writ of prohibition do i$sue against the resP, ondents restraining them from implementing the findings. of the Investigation Commission with rg;µ-~ to the year 1942-43.\n\nThe respondents do pay the peritioners' costs of their petition.\n\nAHER RAJA K.HIMA\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA-\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l\n\nAppeal against Acqu#tal....-Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code .of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417\n\nPel\"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ,\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting). It is well settled that the High' Court should not set aside an order of acquittal under s, 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure simply because it differs from the trial Court as to the appreciation of the evidence ; there must be substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. Whete the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference is not justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for holding otherwise.\n\nAmar Singh v; State of Punjab ([1953] S.C.R. 418) and Surajpal Singh v. State ( f19521 S.C.R. 193), referred t, o.\n\nThe accused in a criminal case must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt and, therefore when he offers a reasonable explanation of his conduct, althougl; i he cannot prove it, that explanation should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that it is false.\n\nConseq11ently,. in a case where an accused person, charged under ss. 302 and 447 of the lndian Penal Code, repudiated his confession at the earliest opportunity as having been made under Police threats administered to l>im at night while in, jail custody and there was evidence to show that the Police had access to hiru there, and there was nothing to displace his statement that he was threatened by them, the finding of the Sessions Judge that the t:onfession was not voluntary in character was fair and reasonaok and in the absence of auy compellihg reason the High Court shotild not have set aside the order of acquittal.\n\nM- Ct. Mulhiah\n\nand 2 others\n\nv.\n\nThe' Commission.,\n\nof ltu:of/14-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nJaganlladhadas J.\n\nDecmiher 22.\n\nAhtr Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashlra\n\nAs the evidence otherwise was insufficient to warrant a conviction the accused was acquitted.\n\nPer VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.\n\nThis is not a case in which the Supreme Court should interfere under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Consti.tution by specifically providing for an appeal on facts under Art. 134( 1) intended to exclude it under Art, 136 and like the Privy Council this Court will not function as a further Court of appeal on facts in criminal Cases.\n\nThe fact that the appeal in the High Court was one against an order of acquittal makes no difference as the powers of an appellate Court are the same in all appeals, whether -against acquittal or against conviction.\n\nPritam Singh v. The State ([1950] S.C.R. 453), Shea Swarup v.\n\nKing-Emperor ([19341 L.R. 61 I.A. 398) and Nur Mohammad v.\n\nEmperor (A.LR. 1945 P.C. 151), relied on.\n\nThe expression \"compelling reasons\" used in Surajpal Singh's case should be read only in the context of that case and should not be treated as a rigid formula so as to restrict the powers of the Court, or the right of appeal conferred on the State by s. 417 of the Code or to place a judgment of acquittal in a l'osition of vantage and give the accused a protection which the law does not afford to them.\n\nSuch a formula can be of use only as guiding principle for the appellate Courts in determining questions of fact.\n\nSurajpal Singh v. The State ([1952] S.C.R. 193), considered.\n\nConsequently, the findings arrived at by the High Court were not open to review by this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution and as there was evidence apart from the retracted confession to support the view it had taken on merits, the appeal must be diSmissed.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\n.APPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 64 of 1955.\n\nOn appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 27th February 1954 of the Saurashtra High Court at Rajkot in Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 5th March 1953 of the Court of Sessions Judge, Halar Division in Sessions Case No. 26 of 1952.\n\nV. N. Sethi, for the appellant.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.\n\n1955. December 22.\n\nBoSE J.-The only question in this whether the High Court had in mind the appeal is principles -\n\nwe have enunciated about interference under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code when it allowed the appeal field by the State against the acquittal of the appellant.\n\nIt is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial Court was wrong: Amar Singh v. State of Punjab( 1); and if the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference under section 417 is not justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for reversing that view: Surajpal Singh v. State( 2 ).\n\nThe appellant was prosecuted under sections 302 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Aher Jetha Sida.\n\nIt is not necessary at the moment to set out the facts.\n\nIt is enough to say that the High Court based its conviction on a retracted confession plus certain circumstances which the learned Judges regarded as corroborative. , The learned Sessions Judge excluded the confession on the ground that it was neither voluntary nor true.\n\nThe learned Judge's reasoning about its falsity is weak.\n\nWe do not think there is material on which a positive finding about its falsity can be reached but when he savs that he is not satisfied that it was made voluntarily .we find it impossible to hold that that is a view which a judicial mind acting fairly could not reasonably reah.\n\nThe facts about that are as follows. The offence was committed during the night of the 18th/19th May 1952.\n\nThe police were informed on the 19th morning at 9-30.\n\nThe police station was only 4 miles distant and they started investigation immediately.\n\nThe appellant was arrested on the 20th.\n\nHe says in his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, that three other persons were also arrested but were later released.\n\nThey are Bhura, Dewayat and Kana.\n\nThe investigating officer was not examined, so he could not be asked . about this and the point could not be developed further.\n\nBut the appellant did cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses\n\n(I) [1953] S. C.R. 4-18, 4-23.\n\n(2) [1952] S. C.R. 193, 201.\n\nAker Raja Khimo.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nBose].\n\nAher Raja Khima\n\nThe State of\n\ni.Saurashtra\n\nBose].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] \\ about this and elicited contradictory replies.\n\nKana, P. W. 4, said-\n\n\"! was not arrested. Dewayat, Barat Lakhmansingh was arrested first ...... All the three of us were released the same evening. We were not put under arrest at all\".\n\nDewayat, P. W. 5, denied that either he or any of the others were arrested and Maya, P. W. 15, said the same thing but Meraman, P.W. 11, insisted that Dewayat was arrested.\n\nIn the absence of the Sub- Inspector it is difficult to say definitely that the appellant is wrong. It is evident that the others were at least suspected, especially as one of the points made against the appellant is that he was seen sharpening an axe on the evening of the murder and Meraman, P.W. 11, says that not only was the appellant sharpening an axe but so was Dewayat. If this was a matter of suspicion against the appellant it must equally have been so against Dewayat and accord- 'ingly there is nothing improbable in the appellant's statement about these other arrests; and as the Sub- Inspector was not there to clear up the matter it is only fair to accept what the appellant says.\n\nThe appellant was sent to a Magistrate at 8 p.m. on the 21st for the recording of a confession but the Magistrate did not record it till the 3rd of June. He was examined as P.W. 21 and explained that he gave the appellant ten days for reflection.\n\nThe length of time is unusual but no objection about its fairness to the accused could reasonably have been raised had it not been for the fact that the judicial lock-up is in charge of a police guard which is under the direct control, orders and supervision of the very Sub- Inspector who had conducted the investigation and had earlier suspected and, according to the accused, actually arrested three other persons; and two of them are now called as prosecution witnesses to depose against the appellant about a matter on which the prosecution lay great importance, namely the sharpening of an exe.\n\nThe danger that they might exaggerate their stories or give false evidence in their anxiety to avert further suspicion from themselves is\n\none that cannot be overlooked.\n\nBut apart from that.\n\nThis is the description of the judicial lock-up which the Magistrate who recorded the confession (P. W. 21) gives us: \"A police guard is on 24 hours duty at the Bhanwad Judicial lock-up.\n\nThe prisoner is so placed within the compound wall that he can see the police all the 24 hours through the bars and can talk. These police officers are under the police Sub-Inspector. A peon is working as warder. He stays there on duty by day.\n\nAt night he is not there.\n\nClerk Jailor does. not remain present there. The police lock-up is within the jail itself. Inside the jail gate is the police lock-up. The police can go into the police lock-up when they choose\".\n\nNow the appellant repudiated his confession at the earliest opportunity.\n\nHe told the Committing Court on 12-12-1952 in a written statement that-\n\n\"After my arrest by the police I was sent to jail.\n\nAt night time the police, having arrived at the jail, threatened me to make confession before Court as they directed.\n\nThe police frightened me with beating if I did not confess. As a result of which through fright, I have made a false confession as directed by the police and which I now deny\".\n\nAnd in his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Cod.e, he said-\n\n\"I have made the confession because the police were threatening to beat me in the jail.\n\nHe repeated these statements in the Sessions Court.\n\nHe said he was beaten at the time of his arrest and then after he had been sent to the jail he said- \"I was daily threatened. They said 'confess the offiehce of murder. We shall get you on remand. You will live as an importent man'. On the morning of the 3rd date, they took me to a big police officer after administering extraordinary threats.\n\nOnly now I come to know that he is the Magistrate\".\n\nNow it may be possible to take two views of this statement but there are two important factnrs in every criminal trial that weigh heavily in favour of an accused person: one is that the accused is entitled\n\nAher Raja Khima v.\n\nTm State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nBose.].\n\nAker Raja Khima\n\nv, The State of Saurashtra\n\nBOse J.\n\n1290 sUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nto the benefit of every reasonable doubt and the other, an off-shoot of the same principle, that when an accused person offers a reasonable explanation of his conduct, then, even though he cannot prove his assertions, they should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that they are false. What the appellant said in this case is not impossible ; such things do happen and it is understandable that the police, frustrated in their endeavour to find the culprit among three other persons, should make an all out endeavour to make sure of the fourth.\n\nWe do not say that that happened here.\n\nBut that it might have happened is obvious, and when the police absent themselves from the witness box and forestall attempts at cross-examination, we find it impossible to hold that a judge acting judicially, and bearing in mind the important principles that we have outlined above, can be said to have reached an unreasonable or an unfair conclusion when he deduces from these circumstances that there is a reasonable probability that the appellant's story is true and that therefore the confession was not voluntary.\n\nThe only reason that the learn<:d High Court Judges give for displacing this conclusion is that\n\n\"in Saurashtra .... though judicial and police lock-ups are placed under a common guard the judicial lock-ups are in charge of Magistrates and are looked after by their clerks and peons, who are assigned the duties of jailors and warders respectively\" and they conclude-\n\n\"It is therfore difficult to say that the police could have effectively threatened him\".\n\nBut what the learned Judges overlook is the fact that this control is only effective during the day and that at night neither the peon nor the clerk is there; and even during the day the \"clerk-cum-jailor does not remain present there\".\n\nThe appellant said in his written statement that \"at night time the police, having arrived at the jail, threatened me, etc\".\n\nThere is nothing on th_e record to displace this statement.\n\nHad the Sub-Inspector or some policeman been examined as a witness and had the appellant omitted to\n\ncross-examme him about this, that might have raised an inference that what the accused said was only an afterthought.\n\nBut here we find that this defence about the involuntary nature of the confession due to threats by t:1e police was; raised at the outset, even in the Committing Magistrate's Court, and was persisted in throughout and the appellant did what he could to build up this part of his case by cross examining the only official witness who did appear, namely the Magistrate who recorded the confession; and he succeeded in establishing that there was ample opportunity for coercion and threat.\n\nThe fact that this defence was raised in the Committal Court should have put the prosecution on its guard and the absence of refutation in the Sessions Court is a matter that can legitimately be used in the appellant's favour.\n\nIn the circumstances, we do not think the High Court has squarely met the learned Sessions Judge's reasoning and shown that there are compelling reasons for holding that he was wrong; on the contrary, the learned Sessions Judge's hesitation is grounded on well established judicial principles.\n\nNow the law is clear that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the Court is satisfied that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is true or false does not arise.\n\nIt is abhorrent to our notions of justice and fair play, and is also dangerous, to allow a man to be convicted on the strength of a confession unless it is made voluntarily and unless he realises that anything he says may be used against him; and any attempt by a person in authority to bully a person into making a\n\nconfssion or any threat or coercion would at once invalidate it if the fear was still operating on his mind at the time he makes the confession and if it \"would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him\": section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nThat is why the recording of a confession is hedged around with so many safeguards and is the 27-85 S. C. India/59\n\nAher Raja Khims\n\nThe Staie of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nAhtr Raja Khima v.\n\nTh~ State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nRose J.\n\nreason why magistrates ordinarily allow a period for reflection and why an accused person is remanded to jail custody and is put of the reach of the investigating police before he is asked to make his confession.\n\nBut the force of these precautions is destroyed when, instead of isolating the accused from the investigating police, he is for all practical purposes sent back to them for a period of ten days.\n\nIt can be accepted that this was done in good faith and we also think that the police acted properly in sending the appellant up for the recording of his confession on the 21st; they could not have anticipated this long remand to so-called \"jail custody\".\n\nBut that is hardly the point. The fact remains that the remand was made and that that opened up the very kind of opportunities which the rules and prudence say should be guarded against; and, as the police are as human as others, a reasonable apprehension can be entertained that they would be less than human if they did not avail themselves of such a chance.\n\nIf the confession is excluded, then there is not, in our opinion, sufficient evidence against the appellant on which a conviction can be based.\n\nIt will now be necessary to set out the facts.\n\nThe murdered man is one J etha.\n\nHe married Sunder, P.W. 3, about three years before he was killed, but we gather that she had not gone to live with her husband; any way, she was living in the appellant's village Shiva with her people at the time of the occurrence and this afforded the pair opportunities for a long continued course of illicit amours, chances which it seems they were not slow to seize.\n\nThe husband lived in a village Kalawad which is three miles distant. At the time of the murder arrangements were being made for Sunder to go to her husband and preparations for the ceremonial appropriate to such occasions were in the course of progress. The prosecution case is that this was resented by the appellant who wanted the girl for himself; so he went to the husband's village Kalawa<l on the night of the 18th/ 19th and murdered. him with an axe which the prose-\n\n' _,\n\ncution say belongs to him and which they say he later produced.\n\nBoth Courts hold that the motive is proved; and that can be accepted.\n\nNext comes the evidence about the sharpening of the axe on the evening of the 18th at Kana's house in the village Shiva.\n\nThe axe was produced in Court and DewiJ.yat (P.W. 5) tells us that it was blunt.\n\nNow there is nothing suspicious or unusual in a villager sharpening a blunt axe and, as we have pointed cmt, Meraman (P. W. 11) says that Dewayat was also sharpening an axe at the same time and place ; and Dewayat is one of the other three against whom suspicion was directed; also, the fact that the axe was sharpened in this open way in the presence of a number of persons, including two strangers to the village, (the two Satwara witnesses, P.Ws. 9 and 10), points to innocence rather than guilt.\n\nBut the prosecution do not rely on this alone. Their witnesses say that when the appellant was asked why he was sharpening his axe (Dewayat does not seem to have been put a similar question though he was doing the same thing) he replied that he wanted to offer a green cqconut to Lord Shanker.\n\nAll the witnesses are agreed that this has no special significance and that they attributed no sinister meaning to it at the time.\n\nIt has acquired significance only in the light of after events.\n\nEven here, there seems to us to be some danger that what the appellant really said has got mixed up with what these witnesses say and, no doubt, honestly believe he said.\n\nWe say this because Sunder, P~W. 3, and her mother Vali, P.W. 2, tell us that the appellant came to the mother that evening and offered her eight annas in lieu of a coconut.\n\nIt seems that this is a customary offering given by relatives when a daughter leaves her parents' home for her father-inlaw's place.\n\nThe appellant is distantly related to Sunder and s6 such an offering would be normal, and as it was made the same evening, apparently shortly after the other incident, we think there is a strong probability that his remark about the offering of a\n\nAlier Rqja Khima\n\nThi State of\n\nSaurashlra\n\n. Bose].\n\n, jhn Raja Khima\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nBose].\n\ncoconut had reference to this and was later thought to have reference to a vow: the sort of mistake that persons reconstructing a crime might easily make and then honestly believe; and we are the more prone to think that this was what probably happened because the conduct attributed to the appellant is so unlike that of a murderer deliberately planning a cold blooded crime while, on theother hand, it is wholly consistent with innocence.\n\nA reasonable doubt arises and the appellant is entitled to its benefit.\n\nNext comes the evidence of Samant, P.W. 16, who says that he saw the appellant that night on the outskirts of Kalawad where the murder was committed.\n\nHe was wearing a false beard and a mask.\n\nThat of course is an important piece of evidence but the danger of mistaking the identity of a man so disguised at night cannot be disregarded, especially as this witness qualified his statement at the end of his crossexamination by saying: \"The person was just like him\".\n\nIt is evident to us that his statement about identity is not based on his recognition of the appellant but on the fact that he saw a man who looked like the appellant and so, when he found that tbc appellant was under suspicion, he inferred that the man must have been the appellant.\n\nBut that is -the very question that the Court has to decide. The only fact that this witness can be said to prove is that he saw a man that night wearing a false beard and mask who looked like the appellant.\n\nThen we come to the recoveries.\n\nThe false beard and mask were found buried in the grounds of Dewayat's house and the appellant is said to have recovered them in the presence of panchas.\n\nBut those discoveries are inadmissible in evidence because the police already knew where they were hidden. Their information was not derived from the appellant but from Dewayat (one of the other suspects).\n\nThe way the police came to find this out was this. Dewayat says that the appellant confessed the murder to him and told him that he had gone there wearing a false beard and a mask and that he had buried th se articles\n\nunder the Shami tree in the grounds of Dewayat's bada. Dewayat says-\n\n\"Next the police called me to go to Kalawad. At that time Raja had been arrested ........ I was interrogated.\n\nI spoke about the beard at that time. Then the police came to my field with Raja\".\n\nIf Meraman (P. W. 11), read with the confused statement of Kana (P. W. 4), is to be believed, Dewayat was also under arrest either at the time or on the day before.\n\nAs the Sub-Inspector was not examined, we are unable to clear this up and so are bound to give weight to the criticism of the Sessions Judge where he says-\n\n\"However, Dewayat confesses that his statement was not recorded on the 19th of May 1952 but was recorded on 20-5-1952 only after he was questioned by the police\".\n\nIn our opinion, not only is this evidence about recovery not admissible but the danger that Samant (F'. W. 16) mistook Dewayat, who was also under strong suspicion or someone else who looked like the appellant, for the appellant, has not been excluded.\n\nLastly, there is the recovery of the axe. But this was not hidden.\n\nIt was kept behind an earthen jar in the appellant's house just, as an axe might be normally kept in any average household.\n\nThe only point of suspicion is that the axe had stains of human blood on it. But the difficulty we are faced with there is that the extent of the stains and their position is not disclosed.\n\nWe have had occasion to comment before on the very slovenly and ineffective way in which some Chemical Analysers do their dury.\n\nThis is another case in which what might otherWise have been a valuable piece of evidence has to be disregarded.\n\nThe axe was not recovered till the 21st and was standing where it could have been handled by other members of the household.\n\nIn any case, villagers frequently have slight cuts or scratches or a prick from a thorn on their persons and a few drops of blood could easily be transferred to an article like an axe without anybody noticing or knowing. The important thing in a case like this, where everything\n\nAhtr Raja Khima\n\n.v.\n\nTheStauof\n\nSaUTashlra\n\nBose].\n\nAluir Raja Khima v.\n\nTh•Slaltof\n\nSaurashtra\n\nBose].\n\nis now seen to hang on this one fact, would be the extent of the blood and its position. The post-mortem reveals that the injuries were incised and that the bleeding . was profuse. If therefore there was blood all along the cutting edge and around it, that would have been a strong circumstance; but if there was only a small smear of blood, say, on the back of the axe and none on or near the edge, then that would have been a circumstance for complete exoneration.\n\nWhen everything hangs on this one point, we cannot assume without proof that stains which might be compatible with either guilt or innocence must have been of what we might term the guilty kind.\n\nOn a careful examination of the evidence in this case, we are not satisfied that the circumstances disclose \"strong and compelling reasons\" to set aside the acquittal. The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence are set aside and the appellant is acquitted.\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-I regret I am unable to agree with the judgment just delivered.\n\nThe appellant belonged to the village of Katkora, and developed intimacy with an unmarried woman called Sunder in the neighbouring village of Shiva.\n\nSubsequently, Sunder was married to one Jetha of Kalawad, a village about 3 miles distant from Shiva.\n\nIt had been arranged to take Sunder to her husband's house on the 19th May 1952, and for that purpose, Sida, the father of J etha, had come to Shiva on the 18th.\n\nThe case of the prosecution was that the appellant was determined to prevent Sunder from joining her husband, and with that object he went to Kalawad on the night of the 18th, and killed Jetha with his axe, when he was asleep.\n\nThe murder came to light next morning, and the matter was reported to the police.\n\nThe appellant was arrested on 20-5-1952.\n\nOn his information the police recovered from his house at Katkora an axe, and the panchnama discloses that it then had stains of blood which was subsequently found by the Chemical Analyst to be human.\n\nThe appellant next showed to the police\n\na false beard, which was buried under a tree in the village of Shiva.\n\nIt is alleged that this was worn by the appellant at the time of the murder.\n\nOn 21-5-1952 the police sent the appellant to the First-Class Magistrate (P.W. 21), with a letter stating that he wanted to make a confession. The Magistrate, however, decided to give him time \"to cool down'', and put him in judicial lock-up.\n\nHe then went on duty to another place, and on his return, recorded the confession of the appellant, which is as follows :\n\n\"I, having gone to his Wadi, have killed him.\n\nI have killed him with axe. I have killed him for the sake of Sunderbai.\n\nSunderbai is the wife of Jetha.\n\nI had illicit connection with her.\n\nI have murdered Jetha Sida with the idea of marrying Sunderbai.\n\nI gave him an axe-blow on the neck. At that time I had put on a tunic and a pair of trousers. I had a turban on my head.\n\nI had worn artificial beard.\n\nAfter the murder, the artificial beard buried in the field of Dewanand Mope.\n\nI took the axe to my house\".\n\nThe appellant retracted this confession before the Committing Magistrate, as made under police beatings and threats.\n\nHe was then sent up to the Sessions Court, Halar, to take his trial, which took place with the aid of four assessors.\n\nThere was no direct evidence that the appellant had committed the murder.\n\nThe circumstantial evidence on which the prosecution sought to establish his guilt consisted of a confession made by him to the Magistrate, the recovery of the axe and the false beard, and the existence of strong motive. There was, besides, a considerable body of evidence that on the 18th May the appellant was haunting the village of Shiva where Sunder was residing, with an axe in his hand and threats in his tongue.\n\nThe assessors were unanimously of the opinion that the appellant was guilty, but the Sessions Judge disagreed with them, and held that the confession was neither true nor voluntary, and that though there were strong grounds for suspecting him, the evidence was not sufficient to convict him, and so acquitted him.\n\nThere was an appeal against this judgment by the\n\nAher Raja Khima\n\nTheStateef\n\nSaura•hlra\n\nV enkalarama\n\nA•yar J.\n\nAher Raja Khima v.\n\nTh1Stakof\n\nSaurashtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nState to the High Court of Saurashtra.\n\nThe learned Judges, differing from the Sessions Judge, held that the confession was true and voluntary, that there was ample corroboration thereof in the evidence, and that even apart from it, the other facts proved by the prosecution were sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant.\n\nThey accordingly set aside the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge, convicted the appellant under section 302 and sentenced him to transportation for life.\n\nIt is against this judgment that the present apptal by special leave has been brought.\n\nThe question is whethet having regard to the principles on which this Court exercises its jurisdiction under article 136, there are grounds for interference in this appeal. Those principles are well-settled and may briefly be recapitulated.\n\nPrior to the abolition of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, the law of this country did not in general provide for appeals against judgments of the High Courts in criminal matters.\n\nIndeed, the policy of the legislature as expressed in sections 404 and 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and departing in this respect from that adopted in the Civil Procedure Code, has been that decisions of courts passed in criminal appeals should be final and subject to specified exceptions, not open to 11 further appeal on facts. So far as judgments of the High Courts are concerned, the limitation on further appeal imposed by the Indian statures could not affect the jurisdiction of the Privy Council to entertain appeals against them in the exercise of the prerogative of the Crown.\n\nThat was a power which the Privy Council possessed in respect of orders passed by the courts all over the Dominions. and th~ limits within which the Judicial Committee exercised that power were thus stated by Lord Watson in In re Abraham Mallory Dillett( 1):\n\n\"The rule has been repeatedly laid down, and has been invariably followed, that Her Majesty will not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it is shown that, by a disregard of\n\n(1) [1887] 12 A.C. 459, 467.\n\nthe forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done\".\n\nThese principles were followed in quite a number of appeals against judgments of Indian courts in criminal matters.\n\nIn Dal Singh v. King-Emperor(1), the Privy Council, stating the practice of the Judicial Committee in dealing with an appeal in a criminal case, observed:\n\n\"The general principle is established that the Sovereign in Council does not act, in the exercise of the prerogative right to review the course of justice in criminal cases, in the free fashion of a fully constituted Court of criminal appeal.\n\nThe exercise of the prerogative takes place only where it is shown that injustice of a serious and substantial character has occurred.\n\nA mere mistake on the part of the Court below, as for example, in the admission of improper evidence, will not suffice if it has not led to injustice of a grave character.\n\nNor do the Judicial Committee advise interference merely because they themselves would have taken a different view of evidence admitted.\n\nSuch questions are, as a general rule, treated as being for the final decision of the Courts below\".\n\nIn Taba Singh v. Emperor(2), Lord Buckmaster observed that the responsibility for the administration of criminal Justice rested with the courts in India, and that the Board would not interfere \"unless there has been some violation of the principles of justice or some disregard of legal principles\". In George Gfeller\n\nv. The King(3), which was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Sir George Rankin observed :\n\n\"Their Lordships have repeated ad .nauseam the statement that they do not sit as a Court of Criminal Appeal.\n\nFor them to interfere with a criminal sentence there must be something so irregular or so outrageous as to shock the very basis of justice: per Lord Dunedin in Mohindar Singh v. Emperor('). Cf.\n\nMuhammad Nawaz v. Emperor(\")\".\n\n(I) [1917] L.R. 44 I.A. 137, 140.\n\n(2) [1924] I.LR. 48 Born. 515.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 2' l.\n\n(4) [1932] L.R. 59 I.A. 233, 235.\n\n(5) [1941] L.R. 68 I.A. 126, 129.\n\nAher Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nV enkataramo,\n\nAyyar].\n\nAher Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\n; lyyar J.\n\nOn these principles, the Privy Council refused m M acre a, Ex parte( 1 ) leave to appeal on the ground of misdirection to the jury and in Mohindar Singh v.\n\nEmperor( 2) on the ground that a wrong yiew had been taken of the law.\n\nThus, the law was well-settled that the Privy Council would not entertain appeals against iudgments in criminal cases, unless there was an error of procedure or disregard of legal principles amounting to a denial of fair trial and resulting in grave mjustice.\n\nUnder the Constitution, the position of the Supreme Court which has taken the place of the Privy Council is this. Its jurisdiction as that of the Privy Council in respect of criminal appeals may be classed under two categories, cases where a right of appeal is expressly granted by the Constitution or by the statutes, as for example, articles 132( 1) and 134 (1) of the Constitution or section 411-A(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the scope of the appeal would depend upon the terms of the en-· actments which confer the right; and cases where it is called upon to exercise its powers under article B6, which corresponds substantially to the prerogative jurisdiction exercised by the Privy Council with reference to which the practice of the Judicial Committee might usefully be referred to for indicating the rea of interfereni:e.\n\nThe question was considered by this Court in Pritam Singh v. The State('), where the law was thus laid down:\n\n\"On a careful examination of article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only .... The Privy Council have tried to lay down from time to time certain principles for granting special leave in criminal cases, which were rev; ewed by the Federal Court In Kapildeo v.\n\nThe King(').\n\nIt is sufficient for our purpose to say that though we are not bound to follow them too\n\n(1) [1893] L.R. 20 I.A. 90.\n\n(2) [1932] L.R. 59 I.A. 233, 235.\n\n(3) [1950] s.c.R. 453, 458.\n\n(4) A.l.R. 1950 F.C. 80.\n\n.....\n\nrigidly since the reasons, constitutional and administr::.tive, which sometimes weighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special leave.\n\nGenerally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done. and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against\".\n\nThe preceding article referred to in the opening passage is clearly article 134. Article 134(1) confers a right of appeal to this Court in certain cases, in terms unqualified, on questions both of fact and of law, and if the scppe of an appeal under article 136 is to be extended likewise to questions of fact, then article 134(1) would become superfluous.\n\nIt is obvious that the intention of the Constitution in providing for an appeal on facts. under articles 134 ( 1)\n\n(a) and (b) was to exclude it under article 136, and it strongly supports the conclusion reached in Pritam Singh v. The State(') that like the Privy Council this Court would not function as a further court of appeal on facts in criminal cases.\n\nHav; ng regard to the principles enunciated in this decisic, n, the question is whether there are sufficient grou;1ds for interfering with the judgment of the High Court in the present appeal.\n\nThe point which the learned Judges had to decide in the appeal was whether it was the appellant who had murdered Jetha.\n\nThJ.[ is a pure question of fact turning on appreciation of evidence.\n\nThe High Court has gone into the mJ. tter fully, examined the entire evidence exhaustive! y, and in a judgment which is as closely reasone<l as it is elaborate, has come to the conclusion that the guilt of the appeliant has been established beyond all reasonable doubt.\n\nDoes that decision call for our interference in special appeal? No, unles this CoLirt is to function as a court of appeal on facts.\n\nIJ) [!950] S.C.R. 453, 458.\n\nAher Raja Khima\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].\n\nAher Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA'; JflT ].\n\nBut then, it is argued that the appeal before the High Court was one against acquittal, that such an appeal was subject to the limitation that there should be compelling reasons for reversing an order oi acquittal, and that it would be open to this Court in special appeal to consider whether that limitation nad been du! y observed.\n\nOn this contention, two questions arise for determination:\n\n(1) what are the powers of a court which hears an appeal against an order of acquittal ?\n\nAnd (2) what are the grounds on which the decision of that court can be reviewed by this Court under article 136?\n\nThe right to appeal against an order of acquittal is conferred on the State by section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is in terms unqualified.\n\nNevertheless, the view was taken at one time in some of the decisions that appeals against acquittals were in a less favoured position than appeals against convictions, and that an .order of acquittal should not be interfered with in appeal except \"where through the incompetence, stupidity or perversity of certain tribunal such unreasonable or distorted conclusions have been drawn from the evidence so as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice\", or where \"the lower court has so obstinately blundered or gone wrong as to produce a result mischievous at once to the administration of justice and the interests of the public\".\n\nVide Empress v.\n\nGayadin(' ), Queen-Empress v.\n\nRobinson('), Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Amttlya Dwan(') and King-Emperor v.\n\nU. San Win('). In Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor('), the question was raised .for determination by the Privy Council whether there was any legal basis for the limitation which the above decisions had placed on the right of the State to appeal under section 417.\n\nAnswering it in the negative, Lord Russell observed that there was \"no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction on the High Court in the exercise of its powers as an appellate tribunal\", that no distinction was drawn (I) [1881] 1.L.R. 4 All. 148.\n\n(2) [1894] l.L.R. 16 All. 2·2.\n\n13) [!914] 18 C.W.N. 666. (4J [<932] l.L.R. JO Rang. 312.\n\n(5) 1934 L.R. 61I.A.398, 403, 404.\n\n\"between an appeal from an order of acquittal and an appeal from a conviction'', and that \"no limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in the Code\". He went on to remark at page 404 that,\n\n\"the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, ( 3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and\n\n(4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of act arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses\".\n\nThese observations, however, do not mean that the scop:: of appeals against acquittals is different from that of other appeals.\n\nThey merely embody the principles applicable to all appeals, civil and criminal, to appeals alike against conviction and acquittal.\n\nThus, if A files a suit on a promissory note against B and the latter denies execution, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish its genuineness.\n\nIf the trial Judge does not accept the evidence adduced by him and dismisses his suit and he appeals, he has the burden still on him to prove on the evidence adduced that the promissory note is. genuine, and in discharging that burden he has to show that the judgment appealed against is clearly wrong. In Naba Kishore Manda/ v. Vpendra Kishore Manda/(1) Lord Buckmaster stated:\n\n\"The only further observation that their Lordships desire to make is to call attention once more to the fact - that in appeals the burden of showing that the judgment appealed from is wrong lies upon the appellant.\n\nIf all he can show is nicely balanced calculations which' lead to the equal possibility of the judgment on either the one side or the other being right, he has not succeeded\".\n\nAdapting these observations to criminal trial, when the State appeals against an order of acquittal, it\n\n(I) [1921] 42 M.L.J. 253, 257 (P.C.).\n\nAhe7 Raja Khim v The Stat< of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nA.htr Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar].\n\nhas to establish on the evidence that the accused is guilty, and to establish it, it has to satisfy the court that the judgment of the trial court is erroneous. The oft-repeated observation that on acquittal the presumption of innocence becomes reinforced is merely this principle stated in terms of criminal law. Likewise, the weight to be attached by an appellate court to a finding of the trial court based upon appreciation of oral evidence is the same whether it is given in a civil litigation or a criminal trial.\n\nDealing with the position of an appellate court hearing a civil appeal, the Privy Council observed in Bombay Cotton Ma11ufacturi11g Co. v. Motilal Shiv/al(') :\n\n\"It is doubtless true that on appeaJ the whole case, including the f; icts, is within the jurisdiction of the Appeal Court.\n\nBut generally speaking, it is undesirable to interfere with the findings of fact of the Trial Judge who sees and hears the witnesses and has an opportunity of noting their demeanour, especially in cases where the issue is simple and depends on the credit which attached to one or other of conflicting witnesses ...... .In making these observations their Lordships have no desire to restrict the discretion of the Appellate Courts m India in the consideration of evidence\".\n\nIt is clearly these principles that Lord Russell had in mind when he made the observations at page 404 in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor(') quoted above, and that will be clear from the observation next following: 'To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognized m the administration of justice\".\n\nThe scope of the decision in Sheo Swarup v. King- Emperor(') with special reference to the observations discussed above was thus explained by the Privy Council in Nur Mohammad v. Emperor(') :\n\n\"Their Lordships were referred, rightly enough, to the decision of this Board in the case in Sheo (I) [1915] L.R. 4Z I.A. 110., l J3.\n\n12) [i934] L.R. 61 I.A. 398.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 151.\n\nSruamp v. Ki11g-Emperor(1), and in particular to the passage at p. 404 in the judgment delivered bv Lord Russell.\n\nTheir Lordships do not think it ncessary to read it all again, but would like to observe that there really is only one principle, in the strict use of the word, laid down there; that is that the High Court has fuli power to review at large all the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed\".\n\nThese authorities establish bevond all controversy that an appeal against acquittal under section 417 stands as regards the powers of :rn appelbte court, on the same footing as appeals against conviction.\n\nIf that is the true scope of an appeal under section 417, where then does the doctrine of \"compelling reasons\" come in? And how do we fit it among the powers of a court under that section? The words \"conwelling reasons\" are not a legislative expression.\n\nThey are not found in section 417.\n\nAs far as I have been able to discover, it was first used in Surajpal Singh\n\na11d others v. The State(\"), wherein it was observed :\n\n\"It is well established that in an appeal under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons\".\n\nDo the words \"compelling reasons\" in the above passage import a limitation on the powers of a court hearing an appeal under section 417 not applicable to a court hearing appeals against conviction?\n\nIf they do, then it is merely the old doctrine that appeals against acquittal are in a less favoured position, dressed m a new garb, • and the reasons for rejecting it as unsound are as powerful as those which found favour with the Privy Council in Shea Swarup v. King-Em-\n\n(1) [1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 398.\n\n(2) [195~] S.C.R. !93, 201.\n\nAher Raja Khima \\'.\n\nThe State of\n\nSa.urashtrtJ\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar].\n\nAher Raja Kkima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nperor(') and Nur .Mohammad v. Emperor('). But it is probable that these word~ were intended to express, as were the similar words of Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor( 1 ), that the court hearing an appeal under section 417 should observe the rules which all appellate courts should, before coming to a conclusion different from that of the trial court. If so understood, the expression \"compelling reasons\" would be open to no comment.\n\nNeither would it be of any special sigruficance in its application to appeals againt . acquittals any more than appeals against conv1ct1on.\n\nBut the expression has been quoted in later judgments, especially of the courts below, as if it laid down that in appeals against acquittal, the standard of proof required of the appellant was far higher than what the law casts on appellants in other appeals, and as the words \"compelling reasons\" are vague and indefinite to a degree, the result has not seldom been that even when Judges hearing appeals under section 417 were convinced of the guilt of the accused, they refrained from setting\n\nasid~ the order of acquittal owing to the dark and unknown prohibition contained in the expression.\n\nThat is the impression which I have formed in the appeals which have come before me in this Court.\n\nThere is always a danger in taking a phrase, attractive and telling in its context, out of it, and erecting it into a judicial formula as if it laid down a principle universal in is application.\n\nAnd this danger is all the greater when the phrase is of undefined import, and relates to appreciation of evidence. It is in the interests of the public that crimes should be punished, and it is with this object that section 417 confers on the State a right to appeal against acquittal.\n\nTo fetter this right through such expressions as \"compelling reasons\" would not merely be to legislate but to defeat the plain intention of the legislature that an accused in lln. appeal against acquittal should have only those rights which the state in an appeal against conviction or a respo\\ld$ht¥ in a civil appeal has, and that he is to enjoy no' $pecial protection.\n\n(I) [1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 398.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1945 I>. C. 151.\n\nThe fundamental objection to regarding the expression \"compelling reasons\" as a rigid formula governing the decision of an appeal under section 417 is that it puts a judgment of acquittal, however rendered, in a position of vantage which the law did not accord to it, and throws around the accused who gets an order of acquittal in the trial court a protection which the law did not intend to give him. In my judgment, this is a situation in which great mischief must result, and the interests of the public must suffer.\n\nIf the expression \"compelling reasons\" does not impose a restriction on the powers of a court hearing an appeal under section 417, and if its true scope is to guide it in arriving at a decision, the question whether this Court can interfere with that decision on the ground that it is erroneous presents no difficulty.\n\nThe decision would then be one on a question of fact depending upon the appreciation of evidence, and this court cannot, on the principles. enunciated in Pritam Singh v. The State( 1 ) interfere with it. This position is, in fact, concluded by the decisions in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor( 2 ) and Nur Mohammad v.\n\nEm;>eror(3).\n\nIn Shea Swarup v.\n\nKing-Emperor(2), the Sessions Judge had characterised the prosecution witnesses as liars, and disbelieving their evidence had acquitted the accused.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court reviewed the evidence, and differing from the trial court as to the weight to be attached to it, convicted the accused.\n\nDeclining to interfere with this judgment, the Privy Council observed that even though there was no express mention in the judgment of the High Court that it had considered all the particulars which an appellate court should consider in deciding an appeal, there was \"no reason to think that the High Court had failed to take all proper matters into consideration in arriving at their .conclusions of fact\".\n\nIn Nur Mohammad v. Emperor(3), the judgment of the High Court did not disclose that it had considered the matters mentioned by Lord Russell at page 404\n\n(I) [1950] S. C.R. 453.\n\n(2) [1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 398.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 151. - 28-85 S. C. India/59.\n\n1955 -+- Aker Raja Khima y.\n\nThe State of\n\nSauroshtra\n\nVenkataratna\n\nAyyar J.\n\nAMT Raja Khima\n\nTh!Stattof\n\nf:Jaurashlra\n\nVenkalaTama\n\nA.J1ar J,\n\nin Sheo Swarup v •. King-Emperor(').\n\nNevertheless, the Privy Council dismissed the appeal observing:\n\n\"In the present case the High Court judgment shows that they have been at pains to deal in detail . with the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for dis- ( 1 believing the group of witnesses, the. Patwari and the '\n\nother three alleged eye-witnesses. . They have dealt in detail with them, showing on the face of their judgment .. that there is no necessity to presume in this ___ case that they have not done their duty .... \" _ • These decisions are authorities for the position that when in an appeal under section 417 tlie court considers . the evidence and comes to its own conclusion, the findings recorded .by it are not, even when they result in a reversal of the order of acquittal; open to interference in . special appeal. Different considerations would - have arisen if the law had pm vided a further appeal on facts against those orders of reversal, in which -case the appreciation of the evidence by the- appellate court would be . a .matter open to review in the superior court. That, as already stated, would be the position in an appeal under articles 132(1) and 134(1) (a) and (b), but where, as in ihe present, no appeal on facts is provided, . the decision of the ·.High Court is not open to review by this court urider . article 136 on the ground that there were no: compelling reasons for the learned Juoges to reverse an order of acquittal. This is sufficient to entail the dismissal of this appeal.\n\nBut, having gone through the evidence, 'I am of. opinion that even . on the merits the decision .... of the High , Court is correct.\n\nThe evidence against ihe . appellant is wholly circumstantial, and consists ._ mainly of\n\n(1) the existence of a strong motive, (2) , the conduct .: of . the . appellant on the day when the murder was committed, (3) the .recovery . of a bloodstained axe : and. a false beard at the. instance of the / appellant, and\n\n(4) ·.a confession. made byhim br..-;_ • fore_the Magistrate, _ P. W. 21, on 3-6-1952. Taking\"-- . the above items seriatim it is the case of :therprosc- ·\n\ncution. that the appellant was living . on: terms of inti- \\\n\n(1) [1934] L.R. 61 I.A: 398. °\\.\n\nmacy with Sunder, and as she was to be taken on the 19th May 1952 to Kalawad to join her husband, he wanted to do away with him .. hTe appelant admitted that he had illicit connection with Sunder for some years, and the Sessions Judge also found, basing himself on the prosecution evidence, that the appellant was very much agitated on the night of the 18th.\n\nA number of witnesses deposed that they saw him on 18-5-1952 at Shiva sharpening his axe, and that when questioned, he stated that he was going to offer a green coconut to Mahadevji, \"an expression\" say the learned Judges \"which in common parlance means sacrifice of a head\".\n\nThe appellant denied that he went to Shiva on the 18th, but his statement was disbelieved by the Sessions Judge who was impressed by the quality and number of the prosecution witnesses, and both the courts have concurred in accepting their evidence on this point.\n\nAs for the recovery of the axe, the appellant admitted it, but he stated in his examination under section 342 that there was no blood on it when he showed it to the police. The Sessions Judge was not prepared to accept this statement and observed:\n\n\"Accused admits that this is his axe. In light of chemical analysis, there is no doubt that there were stains of human blood on the axe.\n\nIt is also mentioned in the Panchnama, Ex. 21 itself that the Panch had suspected that there were marks of human blood _ on this axe\".\n\nBut all the same, he discounted the value of this evidence, because according to him, in view of certain circumstances \"the presence of human blood on the axe is by no means conclusive\", and that \"at best it r;::ises a suspicion against the accused\".\n\nThose circumstances are t):u-ee: Firstly, the panch who witnessed the recovery at Katkora belonged to Kalawad, and the criticism is that a local panch ought to have been got to witness the same.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court did not think JT':Kh of this criticistr. as the recovery at Katkora had to be amde in purst'' 1ce\n\n0£ the statment given by the appellant at Kaia.vad,\n\nAher Raja Khima\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar].\n\nAber Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSavrashtra\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand the police might have reasonably thought that the same panch should be present at both the places.\n\nAs the Sessions Judge has accepted the evidence of the panch that there were blood stains at the time of the recovery of the axe, his criticism on this point lacks substance.\n\nSecondly, though the recovery was made on 21-5-1952, it was sent to the medical officer for report only on 27-5-1952, and the delay is suspicious.\n\nIt is difficult to follow this criticism. When once the conclusion is reached that there was blood on the axe when it was recovered, this criticism has no meaning unless it is intended to suggest that the police required some time to wash the blood which was on the axe at the time of its recovery and to substitute human blood therefor. There is nothing in the evidence to support a suggestion so grotesque, and as observed by the learned Judges, if the police wanted to substitute blood, they would not have taken so much time over it.\n\nThirdly, in despatching the blood to the Chemical Analyst, the medical officer sent the parcel containing the blood scrapings to the railway station, not through his own peon or the compounder in the hospital but through the local police, and that, according to the Sessions Judge, is a suspicious circumstance.\n\nAs the parcel was received intact by the Chemical Analyst at Bombay, it is difficult to see what the point of the criticism is.\n\nThe Sessfons Judge himself observes: \"I do not believe that the police have intercepted this parcel and they deliberately sent an axe with human blood.\n\nHowever, there is no doubt that the procedure adopted by the doctor is wrong, and JS capable of mischief\".\n\nIt has not been explained and it is not possible to divine what that mischief could have been in this case.\n\nAnd who could have been the mischief-maker unless it be the police? The Sessions Judge stated that he did not believe the suggestion made against the police, but that nevertheless is the assumption underlying his comment. \"Anxious to wound, afraid to strike\" would appropriately described the situation.\n\nThe learned Judges disagreed with the reasoning of\n\nthe Sessions Judge, and held that as the appellant had admitted the recovery of the axe and as there was human blood on it at that time, it was clear and cogent evidence pointing to his guilt. I am unable to find any answer to this reasoning.\n\nPausing here, it will be seen that in discussing the question of the recovery of the blood-stained axe, as indeed throughout the judgment, the learned Sessions Judge has taken up an attitude of distrust towards the police for which it is difficult to find any justification in the evidence-an attitude which, I regret to say, is becoming a growing feature of judgments of subordinate Magistrates.\n\nWhen at the trial, it appears to the court that a police officer has, in the discharge of his duty, abused his position and acted oppressively, it is no doubt its clear duty to express its stern disapproval of his conduct. But it is equally its duty not to assume such conduct on the part of the officer gratuitously and as a matter of course, when there is, as in this case, no reasonable basis for it in the evidence or in the circumstances.\n\nThe presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police officer as of other persons and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds therefor. Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public.\n\nIt can only run down the prestige of the police administration.\n\nIt is the case of the prosecution that the appellant unearthed a false beard, which he had buried underneath a shami tree in Shiva, and that he had worn it at the time of the murder.\n\nThe appellant did not deny the recovery, but stated that it was not he that had uncovered it but the jamadar.\n\nBoth the courts below have accepted the version of the prosecution as true, but while the Sessions Judge held that it was not sufficient to implicate the appellant, the learned Judges held otherwise.\n\nP.W. 16 deposed that he saw the appellant at midnight on the 18th May on the outskirts of Kalawacl wearing a false beard, and the comme11t of the Sessions Judge on this evidence is:\n\n\"I do not see how this evidence will prove the\n\n1955\n\nAhtr Raja Khima\n\nTiu Stale of\n\nSDUlashtra\n\n~RajaKhif'lllJ ....\n\nTl1' Stale of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nV mkalorama\n\nAyyar].\n\nprosecution case beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nAt best it will suffice to raise suspicion against the accused\".\n\nBut if the beard was discovered by the appellant, then surely it is a valuable link in the chain of evidence against him.\n\nThen we come to the confession made by the appellant to P. W. 21.\n\nThe Magistrate has deposed that he had satisfied himself that it was voluntary, before he recorded it.\n\nThe Sessions Judge did not discredit his testimony, but was of opinion that in view of certain circumstances the confession was not voluntary.\n\nNow, the facts relating to this matter are these: The appellant was, as already stated, arrestetd on the 20th May and discoveries of the axe and the false beard were made through him, and on the 21st he was sent to the Magistrate with a letter that he desired to make a confession. The Magistrate has given evidence that he did not record the confession at once, as he wanted the appellant \"to cool down'', and accordingly gave him ten days to reflect, and committed him to judicial lock-up. There is nothing improper in this, and indeed, it is a commendable precaution for ensuring that the confession was made voluntary.\n\nFrom 21-5-1952 to 3-6-1952 the appellant continued in judicial lock-up, and this is a circumstance which normally should negative the possibility of there having been a threat or inducement.\n\nBut the Sessions Judge declined to attach any weight to it, because both the police lock-up and the judicial lock-up were situated in the same compound, separated by a distance of 20 feet, and were guarded by the same police officers, and though the judicial lockup had its own warder and clerk jailor, they kept watch only during daytime, and therefore even though the police could have had no access inside the lock-up, they had \"every opportunity to threaten and bully the accused\".\n\nThe Sessions Judge accordingly held that the confession was not voluntary. On appeal, the learned Judges came to a different conclusion.\n\nThey considered that the possibility of threats having been uttered through the bars was to remote and unsubstantial to form the basis for any\n\nconclusion, and that all the circumstances indicated that the confession was voluntary.\n\nThese are the salient pojnts that emerge out of the evidence.\n\nThe position may be thus summed up:\n\n(1) No special weight attaches to the findings of the Sessions Judge on the ground that they are based on the evidence of witnesses whom he had the advantage of seeing in the box, and believed.\n\nThe oral evidence was all on the side of the prosecution, and .that was substantially accepted by the Sessions Judge.\n\nHis judgment is based on the probabilities of the case, and of them, the learned Judges were at least as competent to judge, as he.\n\n(2) The finding of the Sessions Judge in so far as it related to the recovery of bloodstained axe was clearly erroneous, as it did not follow on his reasoning.\n\n(3) As regards the confession, the conclusion of the Sessions Judge rests on nothing tangible, and is largely coloured by a general distrust of the police, not based on evidence or justified by the circumstances.\n\n(4) The learned Judges were of the opinion that even excluding the confession, the other evidence in the case was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant.\n\n(5) All the four assessors were of the opinion that the appellant was guilty.\n\nNow, returning to the two questions which have formed the basis of the preceding discussion, (1) what is it that the High Court has to do in exercise of its powers under section 417, having regard to the findings reached by it and set out above, and how does the doctrine of \"compelling reasons\" bear upon it?\n\n(2) What are the grounqs on which we can interfere with its decision? A court hearing an appeal under section 417 might be confronted with three possibilities: (i) It might come to the same conclusion as the trial court on the questions in issue, in which case, of course, it should dismiss the appeal; (ii) It might consider that the evidence was not clear and conclu- . si; e one way or the other, in which case its duty\n\n1~55\n\nAirer Raja Khima\n\nThi 5'.taJIOf\n\nSaurashtra\n\nV nikatarama\n\nAJJar J.\n\nAher Ra.fa Khima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSauraJhtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\n4,_,.,. J.\n\nas an appellate court would be not to interfere with the judgment appealed agaimt; and (iii) it might come to a conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence opposite to that reached by the court of first instance, in which case it would clearly be its duty in exercise of its powers under section 417 to set aside the order of acquittal.\n\nWherein does the theory of \"compelling reasons\" come in the scheme? There is no need for it in the second category, because even apart from it, the same result must, as already stated, follow on the principles applicable to all courts of appeal.\n\nThen, there remains the third category of cases. If the High Court comes to the conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence that the appellant is guilty, has it, nevertheless, to confirm the order of acquittal on the basis of this theory? Surely not, as that would render the right .conferred by sectio•1 417 illusory. Thm, the doctrine of \"compelling reasons\" would appear to have use only as a guide to the appellate court in determining questions of fact. It has no independent value as bearing on its powers under section 417.\n\nIf that is the true position, it follows on the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor(') and Nier Mohammad v. Emperor(') and in Pritam Singh v.\n\nThe State(•) that this Court cannot interfere with the\n\norde.rs passed under section 417 merely on the ground that the findings of fact were not justified, having regard to the doctrine of \"compelling reasons\".\n\nIn my opinion, this appeal ought to be dismissed.\n\nORDER.\n\nBv THE CouRT.-ln accordance with the Judgment of the majority this Appeal is allowed.\n\nThe conviction and sentence are set aside and the Appellant is acquitted.\n\nII) [1934] LR. 61I.A.398.\n\n(2) A.LR 1945P.C•151.\n\n(3) [1950] S.C.R. 453.\n\n' •", "total_entities": 148, "entities": [{"text": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 471, "end_char": 487, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 489, "end_char": 512, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 516, "end_char": 527, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 699, "end_char": 705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 888, "end_char": 914, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 447", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1730, "end_char": 1740, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mulhiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2270, "end_char": 2277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mulhiah\n\nand 2 others\n\nv.\n\nThe' Commission.,"}}, {"text": "Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mulhiah\n\nand 2 others\n\nv.\n\nThe' Commission.,"}}, {"text": "Jaganlladhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2356, "end_char": 2370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of ltu:of/14-tax,\n\nMadras and\n\nanother\n\nJaganlladhadas J.\n\nDecmiher 22."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2588, "end_char": 2601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.\n\nThis is not a case in which the Supreme Court should interfere under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2625, "end_char": 2633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 134( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2729, "end_char": 2741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 61 I.A. 398", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3195, "end_char": 3211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Surajpal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3321, "end_char": 3335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression \"compelling reasons\" used in Surajpal Singh's case should be read only in the context of that case and should not be treated as a rigid formula so as to restrict the powers of the Court, or the right of appeal conferred on the State by s. 417 of the Code or to place a judgment of acquittal in a l'osition of vantage and give the accused a protection which the law does not afford to them."}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3528, "end_char": 3534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. N. Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4498, "end_char": 4509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Sethi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4531, "end_char": 4548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4749, "end_char": 4760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5223, "end_char": 5234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 302 and 447", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5384, "end_char": 5404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5429, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Aher Jetha Sida", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5448, "end_char": 5463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was prosecuted under sections 302 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Aher Jetha Sida."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6475, "end_char": 6498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhura", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6579, "end_char": 6584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are Bhura, Dewayat and Kana."}}, {"text": "Dewayat", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6586, "end_char": 6593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are Bhura, Dewayat and Kana."}}, {"text": "Kana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6598, "end_char": 6602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are Bhura, Dewayat and Kana."}}, {"text": "Aker Raja Khimo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6867, "end_char": 6882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aker Raja Khimo.", "canonical_name": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA"}}, {"text": "State of Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6889, "end_char": 6908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Saurashtra\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "State of\n\ni.Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6939, "end_char": 6961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aher Raja Khima\n\nThe State of\n\ni.Saurashtra\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "Barat Lakhmansingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7102, "end_char": 7120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dewayat, Barat Lakhmansingh was arrested first ...... All the three of us were released the same evening."}}, {"text": "Dewayat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7238, "end_char": 7245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dewayat, P. W. 5, denied that either he or any of the others were arrested and Maya, P. W. 15, said the same thing but Meraman, P.W. 11, insisted that Dewayat was arrested."}}, {"text": "Maya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7317, "end_char": 7321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dewayat, P. W. 5, denied that either he or any of the others were arrested and Maya, P. W. 15, said the same thing but Meraman, P.W. 11, insisted that Dewayat was arrested."}}, {"text": "Meraman", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7357, "end_char": 7364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dewayat, P. W. 5, denied that either he or any of the others were arrested and Maya, P. W. 15, said the same thing but Meraman, P.W. 11, insisted that Dewayat was arrested."}}, {"text": "Clerk Jailor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9612, "end_char": 9624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clerk Jailor does."}}, {"text": "12-12-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9915, "end_char": 9925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He told the Committing Court on 12-12-1952 in a written statement that-\n\n\"After my arrest by the police I was sent to jail."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10334, "end_char": 10345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only reason that the learn<:d High Court Judges give for displacing this conclusion is that\n\n\"in Saurashtra .... though judicial and police lock-ups are placed under a common guard the judicial lock-ups are in charge of Magistrates and are looked after by their clerks and peons, who are assigned the duties of jailors and warders respectively\" and they conclude-\n\n\"It is therfore difficult to say that the police could have effectively threatened him\"."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15374, "end_char": 15384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15392, "end_char": 15411, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Aher Raja Khims", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15530, "end_char": 15545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why the recording of a confession is hedged around with so many safeguards and is the 27-85 S. C. India/59\n\nAher Raja Khims\n\nThe Staie of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nAhtr Raja Khima v.\n\nTh~ State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nRose J.\n\nreason why magistrates ordinarily allow a period for reflection and why an accused person is remanded to jail custody and is put of the reach of the investigating police before he is asked to make his confession.", "canonical_name": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA"}}, {"text": "Rose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15619, "end_char": 15623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why the recording of a confession is hedged around with so many safeguards and is the 27-85 S. C. India/59\n\nAher Raja Khims\n\nThe Staie of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nAhtr Raja Khima v.\n\nTh~ State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nRose J.\n\nreason why magistrates ordinarily allow a period for reflection and why an accused person is remanded to jail custody and is put of the reach of the investigating police before he is asked to make his confession."}}, {"text": "Sunder", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16894, "end_char": 16900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He married Sunder, P.W. 3, about three years before he was killed, but we gather that she had not gone to live with her husband; any way, she was living in the appellant's village Shiva with her people at the time of the occurrence and this afforded the pair opportunities for a long continued course of illicit amours, chances which it seems they were not slow to seize."}}, {"text": "Shiva", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17063, "end_char": 17068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He married Sunder, P.W. 3, about three years before he was killed, but we gather that she had not gone to live with her husband; any way, she was living in the appellant's village Shiva with her people at the time of the occurrence and this afforded the pair opportunities for a long continued course of illicit amours, chances which it seems they were not slow to seize."}}, {"text": "Kalawad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17287, "end_char": 17294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The husband lived in a village Kalawad which is three miles distant."}}, {"text": "Kalawa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17643, "end_char": 17649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that this was resented by the appellant who wanted the girl for himself; so he went to the husband's village Kalawa<l on the night of the 18th/ 19th and murdered."}}, {"text": "Kana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17959, "end_char": 17963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next comes the evidence about the sharpening of the axe on the evening of the 18th at Kana's house in the village Shiva."}}, {"text": "DewiJ.yat", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18029, "end_char": 18038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The axe was produced in Court and DewiJ.yat (P.W. 5) tells us that it was blunt."}}, {"text": "Satwara", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18502, "end_char": 18509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now there is nothing suspicious or unusual in a villager sharpening a blunt axe and, as we have pointed cmt, Meraman (P. W. 11) says that Dewayat was also sharpening an axe at the same time and place ; and Dewayat is one of the other three against whom suspicion was directed; also, the fact that the axe was sharpened in this open way in the presence of a number of persons, including two strangers to the village, (the two Satwara witnesses, P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Shanker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18863, "end_char": 18870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their witnesses say that when the appellant was asked why he was sharpening his axe (Dewayat does not seem to have been put a similar question though he was doing the same thing) he replied that he wanted to offer a green cqconut to Lord Shanker."}}, {"text": "Vali", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19293, "end_char": 19297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We say this because Sunder, P~W. 3, and her mother Vali, P.W. 2, tell us that the appellant came to the mother that evening and offered her eight annas in lieu of a coconut."}}, {"text": "Sunder", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19589, "end_char": 19595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is distantly related to Sunder and s6 such an offering would be normal, and as it was made the same evening, apparently shortly after the other incident, we think there is a strong probability that his remark about the offering of a\n\nAlier Rqja Khima\n\nThi State of\n\nSaurashlra\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Sunderbai"}}, {"text": "s6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19600, "end_char": 19602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nSaurashlra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19821, "end_char": 19841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is distantly related to Sunder and s6 such an offering would be normal, and as it was made the same evening, apparently shortly after the other incident, we think there is a strong probability that his remark about the offering of a\n\nAlier Rqja Khima\n\nThi State of\n\nSaurashlra\n\n.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashlra"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nSaurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19875, "end_char": 19895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", jhn Raja Khima\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "coconut", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19905, "end_char": 19912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "coconut had reference to this and was later thought to have reference to a vow: the sort of mistake that persons reconstructing a crime might easily make and then honestly believe; and we are the more prone to think that this was what probably happened because the conduct attributed to the appellant is so unlike that of a murderer deliberately planning a cold blooded crime while, on theother hand, it is wholly consistent with innocence."}}, {"text": "Samant", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20447, "end_char": 20453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next comes the evidence of Samant, P.W. 16, who says that he saw the appellant that night on the outskirts of Kalawad where the murder was committed."}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22123, "end_char": 22127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time Raja had been arrested ........ I was interrogated."}}, {"text": "19th of May 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22654, "end_char": 22670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Sub-Inspector was not examined, we are unable to clear this up and so are bound to give weight to the criticism of the Sessions Judge where he says-\n\n\"However, Dewayat confesses that his statement was not recorded on the 19th of May 1952 but was recorded on 20-5-1952 only after he was questioned by the police\"."}}, {"text": "20-5-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22691, "end_char": 22700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Sub-Inspector was not examined, we are unable to clear this up and so are bound to give weight to the criticism of the Sessions Judge where he says-\n\n\"However, Dewayat confesses that his statement was not recorded on the 19th of May 1952 but was recorded on 20-5-1952 only after he was questioned by the police\"."}}, {"text": "Ahtr Raja Khima", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24034, "end_char": 24049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The important thing in a case like this, where everything\n\nAhtr Raja Khima\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA"}}, {"text": "Katkora", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25197, "end_char": 25204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant belonged to the village of Katkora, and developed intimacy with an unmarried woman called Sunder in the neighbouring village of Shiva."}}, {"text": "Jetha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25346, "end_char": 25351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, Sunder was married to one Jetha of Kalawad, a village about 3 miles distant from Shiva.", "canonical_name": "Jetha Sida"}}, {"text": "19th May 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25475, "end_char": 25488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had been arranged to take Sunder to her husband's house on the 19th May 1952, and for that purpose, Sida, the father of J etha, had come to Shiva on the 18th."}}, {"text": "Sida", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25512, "end_char": 25516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had been arranged to take Sunder to her husband's house on the 19th May 1952, and for that purpose, Sida, the father of J etha, had come to Shiva on the 18th."}}, {"text": "etha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25534, "end_char": 25538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had been arranged to take Sunder to her husband's house on the 19th May 1952, and for that purpose, Sida, the father of J etha, had come to Shiva on the 18th.", "canonical_name": "Jetha Sida"}}, {"text": "Shiva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25552, "end_char": 25557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had been arranged to take Sunder to her husband's house on the 19th May 1952, and for that purpose, Sida, the father of J etha, had come to Shiva on the 18th."}}, {"text": "21-5-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26320, "end_char": 26329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21-5-1952 the police sent the appellant to the First-Class Magistrate (P.W. 21), with a letter stating that he wanted to make a confession."}}, {"text": "Sunderbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26793, "end_char": 26802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have killed him for the sake of Sunderbai.", "canonical_name": "Sunderbai"}}, {"text": "Jetha Sida", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26890, "end_char": 26900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have murdered Jetha Sida with the idea of marrying Sunderbai.", "canonical_name": "Jetha Sida"}}, {"text": "Sessions Court, Halar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27344, "end_char": 27365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was then sent up to the Sessions Court, Halar, to take his trial, which took place with the aid of four assessors."}}, {"text": "Aher Raja Khima", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28297, "end_char": 28312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was an appeal against this judgment by the\n\nAher Raja Khima\n\nTheStateef\n\nSaura•hlra\n\nV enkalarama\n\nA•yar J.\n\nAher Raja Khima v.\n\nTh1Stakof\n\nSaurashtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nState to the High Court of Saurashtra.", "canonical_name": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Saurashtra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28440, "end_char": 28464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was an appeal against this judgment by the\n\nAher Raja Khima\n\nTheStateef\n\nSaura•hlra\n\nV enkalarama\n\nA•yar J.\n\nAher Raja Khima v.\n\nTh1Stakof\n\nSaurashtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nState to the High Court of Saurashtra."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28870, "end_char": 28881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29126, "end_char": 29137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 404 and 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29500, "end_char": 29520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29528, "end_char": 29554, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Watson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30257, "end_char": 30263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and th~ limits within which the Judicial Committee exercised that power were thus stated by Lord Watson in In re Abraham Mallory Dillett( 1):\n\n\"The rule has been repeatedly laid down, and has been invariably followed, that Her Majesty will not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it is shown that, by a disregard of\n\n(1) [1887] 12 A.C. 459, 467."}}, {"text": "Abraham Mallory Dillett", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30273, "end_char": 30296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and th~ limits within which the Judicial Committee exercised that power were thus stated by Lord Watson in In re Abraham Mallory Dillett( 1):\n\n\"The rule has been repeatedly laid down, and has been invariably followed, that Her Majesty will not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it is shown that, by a disregard of\n\n(1) [1887] 12 A.C. 459, 467."}}, {"text": "Buckmaster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31789, "end_char": 31799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Taba Singh v. Emperor(2), Lord Buckmaster observed that the responsibility for the administration of criminal Justice rested with the courts in India, and that the Board would not interfere \"unless there has been some violation of the principles of justice or some disregard of legal principles\"."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31902, "end_char": 31907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Taba Singh v. Emperor(2), Lord Buckmaster observed that the responsibility for the administration of criminal Justice rested with the courts in India, and that the Board would not interfere \"unless there has been some violation of the principles of justice or some disregard of legal principles\"."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Nigeria", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32119, "end_char": 32143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In George Gfeller\n\nv. The King(3), which was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Sir George Rankin observed :\n\n\"Their Lordships have repeated ad .nauseam the statement that they do not sit as a Court of Criminal Appeal."}}, {"text": "George Rankin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32149, "end_char": 32162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In George Gfeller\n\nv. The King(3), which was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Sir George Rankin observed :\n\n\"Their Lordships have repeated ad .nauseam the statement that they do not sit as a Court of Criminal Appeal."}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32434, "end_char": 32441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For them to interfere with a criminal sentence there must be something so irregular or so outrageous as to shock the very basis of justice: per Lord Dunedin in Mohindar Singh v. Emperor(')."}}, {"text": "L.R. 44 I.A. 137", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32523, "end_char": 32539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 233", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32618, "end_char": 32634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 68 I.A. 126", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32653, "end_char": 32669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 132( 1) and 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33642, "end_char": 33666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33694, "end_char": 33705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33718, "end_char": 33744, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34296, "end_char": 34307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 20 I.A. 90", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34794, "end_char": 34809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 233", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34823, "end_char": 34839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35573, "end_char": 35584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35586, "end_char": 35600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35755, "end_char": 35766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35821, "end_char": 35835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35959, "end_char": 35971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36014, "end_char": 36025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aher Raja Khima", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37042, "end_char": 37057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aher Raja Khima\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].", "canonical_name": "AHER RAJA K.HIMA"}}, {"text": "State of Saurashtra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37063, "end_char": 37082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aher Raja Khima\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashlra"}}, {"text": "State of Saurashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37130, "end_char": 37149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aher Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA'; JflT ].", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashlra"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37763, "end_char": 37774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37856, "end_char": 37867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37875, "end_char": 37901, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38941, "end_char": 38952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38990, "end_char": 38997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Answering it in the negative, Lord Russell observed that there was \"no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction on the High Court in the exercise of its powers as an appellate tribunal\", that no distinction was drawn (I) [1881] 1.L.R. 4 All."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41466, "end_char": 41483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ahe7 Raja Khim v The Stat< of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nA.htr Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar].", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama Ayyar"}}, {"text": "L.R. 61 I.A. 398", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 43598, "end_char": 43614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44250, "end_char": 44261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44411, "end_char": 44422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44643, "end_char": 44654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44838, "end_char": 44849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45424, "end_char": 45435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 61 I.A. 398", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 45784, "end_char": 45800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of\n\nSa.urashtrtJ\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45857, "end_char": 45898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nSa.urashtrtJ\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar]."}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46193, "end_char": 46204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46971, "end_char": 46982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47670, "end_char": 47681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 61 I.A. 398", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 48125, "end_char": 48141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48311, "end_char": 48322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48815, "end_char": 48826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 61 I.A. 398", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 50260, "end_char": 50276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of\n\nSauroshtra\n\nVenkataratna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50363, "end_char": 50397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 -+- Aker Raja Khima y.\n\nThe State of\n\nSauroshtra\n\nVenkataratna\n\nAyyar J.\n\nAMT Raja Khima\n\nTh!Stattof\n\nf:Jaurashlra\n\nVenkalaTama\n\nA.J1ar J,\n\nin Sheo Swarup v •. King-Emperor(')."}}, {"text": "Patwari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 50775, "end_char": 50782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patwari and the '\n\nother three alleged eye-witnesses. ."}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51088, "end_char": 51099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 132(1) and 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51638, "end_char": 51664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51820, "end_char": 51831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kalawad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52775, "end_char": 52782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "°\\.\n\nmacy with Sunder, and as she was to be taken on the 19th May 1952 to Kalawad to join her husband, he wanted to do away with him .. hTe appelant admitted that he had illicit connection with Sunder for some years, and the Sessions Judge also found, basing himself on the prosecution evidence, that the appellant was very much agitated on the night of the 18th."}}, {"text": "18-5-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53117, "end_char": 53126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of witnesses deposed that they saw him on 18-5-1952 at Shiva sharpening his axe, and that when questioned, he stated that he was going to offer a green coconut to Mahadevji, \"an expression\" say the learned Judges \"which in common parlance means sacrifice of a head\"."}}, {"text": "Mahadevji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53238, "end_char": 53247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of witnesses deposed that they saw him on 18-5-1952 at Shiva sharpening his axe, and that when questioned, he stated that he was going to offer a green coconut to Mahadevji, \"an expression\" say the learned Judges \"which in common parlance means sacrifice of a head\"."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53706, "end_char": 53717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54810, "end_char": 54827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as the recovery at Katkora had to be amde in purst'' 1ce\n\n0£ the statment given by the appellant at Kaia.vad,\n\nAher Raja Khima\n\nThe State of Saurashtra\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar].", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama Ayyar"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nSavrashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54855, "end_char": 54875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aber Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSavrashtra\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand the police might have reasonably thought that the same panch should be present at both the places.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashlra"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54891, "end_char": 54896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aber Raja Khima v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSavrashtra\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand the police might have reasonably thought that the same panch should be present at both the places."}}, {"text": "27-5-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55288, "end_char": 55297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, though the recovery was made on 21-5-1952, it was sent to the medical officer for report only on 27-5-1952, and the delay is suspicious."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56242, "end_char": 56248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the parcel was received intact by the Chemical Analyst at Bombay, it is difficult to see what the point of the criticism is."}}, {"text": "Sessfons", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56314, "end_char": 56322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessfons Judge himself observes: \"I do not believe that the police have intercepted this parcel and they deliberately sent an axe with human blood."}}, {"text": "mkalorama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59302, "end_char": 59311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 16 deposed that he saw the appellant at midnight on the 18th May on the outskirts of Kalawacl wearing a false beard, and the comme11t of the Sessions Judge on this evidence is:\n\n\"I do not see how this evidence will prove the\n\n1955\n\nAhtr Raja Khima\n\nTiu Stale of\n\nSDUlashtra\n\n~RajaKhif'lllJ ....\n\nTl1' Stale of\n\nSaurashtra\n\nV mkalorama\n\nAyyar]."}}, {"text": "3-6-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60511, "end_char": 60519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From 21-5-1952 to 3-6-1952 the appellant continued in judicial lock-up, and this is a circumstance which normally should negative the possibility of there having been a threat or inducement."}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62881, "end_char": 62892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63124, "end_char": 63135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63883, "end_char": 63894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64700, "end_char": 64711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64950, "end_char": 64961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1315_1330_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "is.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nJ. K. IRON AND STEEL CO. LTD., KANPUR\n\nTHE IRON AND STEEL MAZDOOR UNION,\n\nKANPUR\n\n(with connected appeal)\n\n[V1v1AN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947, (Act XIV of 1947), ss. 7 and 11- Adjudicator-Scope and authority of-Democratic Constitution- Essentials thereof-Rule of Law-Benevolent despotism-Foreign thereto.\n\nHeld, that adjudication by an adjudicator under the Industrial Disputes Act does not mean adjudication according to the strict law of master and servant and that an adjudicator's award may contain provisions for the settlement of a dispute which no court could .irder\n\nif it was bound by ordinary law. Thus the scope of an adjudication under t{ie Industrial Disputes Act is much wider than that of an arbitrator making an award.\n\nIndustrial Tribunals are not fettered by such limitations and an adjudicator has jurisdiction to investigate disputes about discharge and dismissal and where necessary, to direct reinstaten:ient.\n\nNevertheless, wide as their powers are, these Tribunals are not absolute and there are limitations to the ambit of their authority.\n\nThough they are not courts in the strict sense of the term, they haye to discharge quasi judicial functions and as such are subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nTheir powers arc derived from the statute that creates them and they have to function within the limits imposed there and to act according to its provisions. Those provisions invest them with many of the \"trappings\" of a court and deprive them of arbitrary or absolute discretion and power.\n\nBene, olent despotism is foreign to a democratic Constitution. \\Vhen the Constitution of India converted this country into a so\\-creign, democratic, republic, it did not invest it with the mere trappings of democracy hut invested it with the real thing. the true kernel of which is the ultimate authority of the courts to restrain all exercise of absolute and arbitrary power not only by the executive and by officials and lesser tribunals but also by the legislatures and e\\en bv Parliament itself. The Constitution established a \"Ruic of\n\nLa\\\\\"\" n th; s land and that carries with it restraints and restrictions that are foreign to despotic power.\n\nThe courts, however, must always exercise caution and should not substitute their own judgment and discretion for that of such tribunals.\n\nDeamber 2 3.\n\nStetl Co. Lid.,\n\nKan/NJ' v. \\ The Iron and Steel\n\nMazdoor Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nIn view of SS. 7 and II or the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and U.P. State Industrial Tribunal Standing Orders 1951 these Tribunals, though not bound by all the technicalities of Civil Courts must nevertheless follow the general pattern of the Civil Courts in the matter of taking the pleadings of the parties in writing and the drawing up of issues. It is not open to the Tribun::ls to disregard the pleadings and to reach any conclusion that they think are just and proper.\n\nThe Supreme Court remitted the case to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for a rehearing of the appeals as the Adjudicator and the Labour Appellate Tribunal had adopted the attitude of benevolent despots and had based their conclusion on irrelevant considerations and ignored thC real questions that arose for decision and the issues that arose out of the pleadings of the parties.\n\nWestern India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay {[19491 F.C.R. 321, 345), State of Madras v, C. P. Sa,.athy, {[1953] S.C.R. 334, 348), Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., {[1950] S.C.R. 459, 497), Muir Mills Co. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur ([1955] I S.C.R. 991, 1001), referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1CTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 22 and 22-A and 301 of 1955.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 4th July 1952 of the . Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow in Appeals Nos. 391 and 392 of 1951 arising out of the Award dated the 1st November 1951 of the Adjudicator and Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur in Case No. 53 of 1951.\n\nG. S. Pathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Narain), for the appellants in all the appeals.\n\nG. C. Mathur, for the respondent in C. 22 and 22-A and respondent No. 4 in C. A. of 1955. .\n\nRajinder\n\nA. Nos.\n\nNo. 301\n\nK. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent No. 3 in C. A. No. 301 of 1955.\n\n1955.\n\nDecember 23.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by BoSE J.-We are concerned here with three appeals.\n\nThey arise out of a dispute between the J. K.\n\nIron and Steel Company Limited and the Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union.\n\nWe will call them the\n\n' '\n\nCompany and the Mazdoor Union respectively.\n\nThe facts are as follows.\n\nThe Company had its . factory and other works at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh. On 10-4-1948 the Ministry of Commerce in the Government of India ordered the Company to shift its Jute Baling Hoops factory from Kanpur to Calcutta.\n\nAs no land was available in Calcutta no effect could be given to this order till the year 1950-51.\n\nOn 19-3-1951 the Iron and Steel Controller ordered the Company to stop the rolling of jute baling hoops at once.\n\nAccordingly, the production of these hoops was stopped from that date .\n\n. At the same time there was scarcity of scrap iron and the Company's case is that that forced it to reduce the working of its furnace from three shifts a day to one.\n\nThe Company states that because of these two causes it was obliged to retrench its staff.\n\nTherefore, it issued the following notice dated 15-5-1951 to 128 of its workers:\n\n\"Consequent to transfer of the Rolling Mill to Calcutta and want of scrap to Furnace Department in full, the services of the persons as per lists attached are dispensed with from today.\n\nTheir wages and other dues in full settlement will be paid after 2 P.M.\"\n\nTwenty fi,, e of the 128 accepted their wages and other dues in full settlement but the remaining 103 refused.\n\nTheir cause was accordingly espoused by the Mazdoor. Union which made an application to the Regional Conciliation Officer at Kanpur on 16-5-1951 complaining that the retrenchment was illegal and asking that the workmen be reinstated with full payment of their wages for the period they were out of work.\n\nThis was forwarded to the Government of Uttar Pradesh and on 28-6-1951 the Governor of that State referred the following issue to the Regional Conciliation Officer at Kanpur under sections 3, 4 and 8 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication:\n\n\"Whether the retrenchment of the workmen\n\nJ. K. Iron attd\n\nStell Co. Ud.,\n\nKanpur v.\n\nThe Iron and Sle•l\n\nMaz:.door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose].\n\n]. K. Iron and Stttl Co. l.Jd.,\n\nKanpur\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMa::door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J.\n\ngiven in the Annexure by Messrs J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur,- is unjustified ? If so, to what relief are the workmen entitled ?\"\n\nThe parties filed their written statements on 14-7-1951 and the Company filed a rejoinder on 20-7-1951. The Adjudicator thereupon took evidence, oral and documentary, and gave his award on 1-11-1951.\n\nBut before that was done the case of one of the workmen (Kapil Deo Singh) was withdrawn and that left 102 for him to deal with.\n\nThe Adjudicator reached the following conclusions.\n\nThe Mazdoor Union had contended that the retrenchment was not in good faith.\n\nThe Adjudicator held that it was and that there was neither harassment nor v1cum1sation.\n\nSo also on the question about the shortage of scrap he held that there was a shortage but that it was only temporary and that It was not likely to last for more than 8 or 9 months.\n\nHe then referred to the Standing Orders and said that the Company was not entitled to resort to retrenchment except as a last resort and that in the circnmstances of the present case these workmen should\n\n(1) have been offered the option of employment in the new set up at Calcutta; and (2) those that did not want it should have been laid off in rotation instead of being retrenched.\n\nHe accordingly ordered that that should be done and drew up a graduated scale of compensation.\n\nWe observe in passing that the expression used throughout has ?een \"played off\".\n\nThe reason for that is that that is the phrase used in the Standing O!ders and in the copy of the Act and Model Standing Orders reproduced by the U. P. Department of Labour in its Annual Review of Activities.\n\nBut it seems to us that that was due to printer's error at some stage which has been repeated in various places.\n\nThe correct expression is \"lay off\". That is the expression used and defined in the Act.\n\nThe Standing Orders should have used the same phrase.\n\nApart from the definition in the Act, \"lay off\" is a well-known industrial term meaning, accorcling to the Oxford Dictionary, \"a period during which\n\n. a workman is temporarily discharged\".\n\nWe wiH use the correct expression in this judgment.\n\nBoth sides appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThe decision there was as follows.\n\nThe Tribunal upheld the finding that there was in fact a shortage of scrap iron an<l also agreed with the Adjudicator that that was only likely to be temporary.\n\nThen it held, apparently as a matter of law, that under the Standing Orders it is not permisible to retrench workmen and deprive them of their maintenance when there is only a temporary shortage of material whatever the duration of the shortage; all that the employer can do in a case like that is to lay them off.\n\nThe Tribunal also upheld the finding that the Hoop Mill was in che course of transfer to Calcutta consequent on the orders of Government, but they held that there was nothing on the record to show which of the 105 persons (it should be 102) whose cases they were considering were \"specifically engaged in the Hoop Mills and had become surplus by reason of the transfer to Callcutta\".\n\nThis is one of the findings attacked before us by the Company on the ground that the Tribunal has failed to realise that the Company's operations must be considered as a whole and that because of the interdependence of its various departments a closure of one section, coupled with a shortage of materials in another, is bound to affect its all round working and therefore the question of retrenchment cannot be looked at from the narrow point of view of only one department but must be viewed in its all round setting.\n\nWe will deal with this later.\n\nAnother of the Tribunal's findings on the \"transfer\" aspect of the case was that a cut in profits is not in itself a good ground for retrenchment.\n\nIt held that retrenchment can only be made when there is a total closure of the mill \"or when for any such other reason the workmen become surplus\".\n\nThe final conclusion of the Tribunal was that the retrenchment was \"wholly unjustified\".\n\nAccordingly, it set aside the retrenchments and held that the\n\n1955 J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMazdoor U11ion,\n\nKanpur\n\n/Jose J.\n\nJ. K. Iron ond Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron ond Steel\n\nMaz:door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose].\n\naffected workmen will be deemed to be \"still in. service\", and directed that they be reinstated.\n\nThe appeal of the Mazdoor Union was partly allowed and that of the Company dismissed.\n\nThis impelled the Company to do the following things: ( 1) to file a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court on 4-8-1952. This was dismissed by that Court on 9-4-1953 and Civil Appeal No. 301 of 19.55 is the appeal to us against that order;\n\n(2) to file two appeals to this Court against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThese appeals are Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1955 and Civil Appeal No. 22-A of 1955.\n\nThis judgment covers all three appeals.\n\nMr. G. C. Mathur, who appeared for the Mazdoor Union, raised a preliminary objection against the Company's appeals based on the following facts.\n\nThe Company had appealed to this Court against the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision on 26-8-1952.\n\nThe petition was summarily dismissed on 10-9-1952.\n\nCounsel contended that that barred the present appeals: Civil Appeal 22-A of 1955 because it is an appeal against the very order that is now under appeal, and Civil Appeal 301 of 1955 on the basis of res judicata because it raises the same points as were raised in the petition for special leave which was dismissed.\n\nWe rejected this objection because the previous petition for appeal does not appear to have been dismissed on the merits but on two technical grounds.\n\nIt is true order of dismissal is general but the office note states ( 1) that no certified copy of the decision appealed against was filed though Order 13, rule 4, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, requires that and (2) that the reliefs sought in the petition for special leave and in the writ petition before the High Court are the same.\n\nIt is evident that that formed the basis of the order of dismissal especially as it is th<: usual practice not to entertain an appeal here when a similar matter is pending in the High Court.\n\nBefore we come to the merits it will be necessary to set out the grounds on which the High Court proceeded.\n\nThe learned Judges were concerned with a writ for certiorari and so naturally focused their attention on questions of jurisdiction rather than on the merits.\n\nThey considered that the Adjudicator was free to take into consideration all matters bearing on the question of retrenchment and to consider whether it was \"absolutely necessary\" to retrench the workmen. They looked at Standing Order 16(a) and decided that the Adjudicator had jurisdiction to determine th~ scope and meaning of this Order and that he and the Labour Appellate Tribunal were competent to hold that these orders meant that the Company was not entitled to take what the learned Judges called the \"extreme step of retrenchment\" so long as it was possible for it to \"lay off\" the workmen.\n\nThat at once raises quesions about the scope and authority of an adjudicator under the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nBut that we feel, is now settled by authority.\n\nThe Federal Court held in Western India Automobile Association v.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, Bombay(1) that adjudication does not mean adjudication according to the strict law of master and servant and held that an adjudicator's award may contain provisions for settlement of a dispute which no Court could order if it was bound by ordinary law. They held that Industrial Tribunals are not fettered by these limitations and held fu:-ther that an adjudicator has jurisdiction to investigate disputes about discharge and dismissal and, where necessary, to direct reinstatement.\n\nThat decision was followed with approval by this Court in State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy( 2 ) and it was again pointed out that the scope of an adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act is much wider than that of an arbitrator making an award.\n\nIt would be pointless to cover the same ground; so we must take that now as settled law.\n\nAll the same, wide as their powers are, these Tri-\n\n(1) [1949] F.C.R. 321, 345.\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. 334, 348.\n\n]. K. Iron and Stul Co. Ltd.,\n\nKanpur\n\nTiii Iron and Steel\n\nMa:i:door Unitm,\n\nKanp16\n\nBost].\n\nStel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMa(, door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J.\n\nbunals are not absolute and there are limitations to the ambit of their authority. In Bharat Bank Ltd. v.\n\nEmployees of Bharat Bank Ltd.(') this Court held by a majority that though these Tribunals are not Courts in the strict sense of the term they have to discharge quasi judicial functions and as such are subject to the overriding jurisdiction of this Court under article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nTheir powers are derived from the statute that creates them and they have to function within the limits imposed there and to act according to its provisions.\n\nThose provisions invest them with many of the \"trappings\" of a court and deprive them of arbitrary or absolute discretion and power.\n\nThere is, in our opinion, an even deeper reason which is hinted at in the judgment of Mahajan, J. (as he then was) at page 500 where he says that \"benevolent despotism is foreign to a democratic Constitution\".\n\nThat, in our opinion, is the heart of the matter.\n\nWhen the Constitution of India converted . this country into a great sovereign, democratic, republic, it did not invest it with the mere trappings of democracy and leave it with merely its outward forms of behaviour but invested it with the real thing, the true kernel of which is the ultimate authority of the Courts to restrain all exercise of absolute and arbitrary power, not only by the executive and by officials and lesser tribunals but also by the legislatures and even by Parliament itself.\n\nThe Constitution establisheJ a \"Rule of Law\" in this land and that carries with it restraints and restrictions that are foreign to despotic power.\n\nDespite thi'I, however, the Courts must always exercise caution and see that they do not substitute their own judgment and discretion for that of these Tribunals, for, as Mahajan, J. said in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.(') the overriding powers of this Court under article 136 are exceptional; and he went on to point out that-\n\n\"extraor<linary powers of this character can only be justifiably used where there has been a grave miscarriage of justice or where the procedure adopted by\n\n(I) [1950] S.C.R. 459, 497.\n\nthe Tribunal is such that it offends against all notions of legal procedure\".\n\nNow the position in the present case is this. The Tribunals are directed by section 7 of the Industrial _ Disputes Act to adjudicate industrial disputes \"in accordance with the provisions of the Act\" and section 11 directs them to follow \"such procedure as may be prescribed\".\n\nThe procedure for the Uttar Pradesh Tribunals is laid down by the U. P. State Industrial Tribunal Standing Orders, 1951.\n\nVery broadly it follows the Pattern of the Civil Courts. Once the reference is made by Government, the Tribunal has to take the pleadings of the parties in writing and to draw up issues.\n\nThen it takes evidence, hears argument's and finally pronounces its \"judgment\" \"in open Court\".\n\nIt is evident from this that though these tribunals are not bound by all the technicalities of civil Courts, they must nevertheless follow the same general pattern.\n\nNow the only point of requiring pleadings and issues is to ascertain the real dispute between the parties, to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ.\n\nIt is not open to the Tribunals to fly off at a tangent and, disregarding the pleadings, to reach any conclusions that they think are just and proper.\n\nWhat exactly was the dispute in the present case?\n\nThe broad conflict was of course about the retrenchment and the Tribunal was asked to decide whether the retrenchment of these 103 persons was unjustified; but that by itself left the issue much too broad, so it was neces5ary to \"particularise\" and that was done in the pleadings.\n\nThe Company justified its action on two grounds:\n\n(1) because of the shortage of scrap and (2) because of the stoppage of work in the Hoop Department consequent on the orders of Government.\n\nBut none of the persons retrenched came from the Hoop Department and the Company explained that that was because of the interdependence of its various departments and, taking the retrenchments in groups, department by department, it explained just why reduction was effected in those particular places. In\n\n9-8.'l S. C. Iadia/5!1\n\n195.'l_\n\nJ.X. Iron /Ull/\n\nSl11l C,. Utl.,\n\nKanpur\n\n\"· Thi Iron anti Slee I\n\nM a:etloor Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBm].\n\nJ.K. Iron and\n\nSttll Co. lJd.,\n\nKanpur , ..\n\nThi fro11 and Slttl\n\nM11zdoor Union,\n\nKanpur\n\n.... J.\n\n.1324 iUPREME COURT REPORTS [19551\n\nthis way, it dealt serially with the retrenchments in\n\n(1) the Scrap Department, (2) the Cast Iron Foundry,\n\n(3) the Punching and Pressing Department, (4) the Watch and Ward Department and (5) the Clerical Department.\n\nThe Company also made the following assertions, ( 1) that retrenchment is a necessary incidence of an industry and that the discretion of the management should not be interfered with; (2) that it is the exclusive function of the management to determine the 'ize of its working force and (3) that the employer must be the sole judge as to how economically or efficiently its business is to be run.\n\nThe Mazdoor Union retorted that the retrenchments were not done in good faith.\n\nIt denied that there was any shortage of scrap but admitted the interdependence of the various departments and used that fact as an argument to indicate the Company's bad faith.\n\nThe Union said the very fact that there had been no retrenchment in the department that was directly affected, namely the Hooping Department, and that there was no retrenchment in certain allied departments that would have been the first to be hit, had there been any real shortage of scrap, showed that the reasons given by the Company for the retrenchment were untrue.\n\nIn particular, the Union pointed out that there had been no retrenchment in the following departments which, accordingly to it, would hne been the hardest hit had there been any truth in the Company's case, namely, (1) the Furnace Department, (2) Rolling Mill Department, (3) Workshop, ( 4) Painting and Bundling, (5) Works and Maintenance.\n\nThen, as regards the Foundry Department and the Scrap Department where there had been retrenchments, the Union said that these departments had sub-sections and yet there were no retrenchments in the sub-sections that would have been hit if the Company's allegations were true_ The Union gave no reply to the Company's assertions about its right to retrench in the absence of bad faith, its right to determine the size of its working force and its right to judge of the economy and efficiency of its business\n\nThe Company filed a written rejoinder and explained in detail why there had been no retrenchments in the places where, according to the Union, there should have been on the facts alleged by the Company and it again explained why it had retrenched workers in the departments which; according to the Union, ought to have been the hardest hit.\n\nThis explanation again brought out the interdependence of the various departments.\n\nInstead of drawing up issues, as it is required to do by Standing Order 22 of 1951, and determining just where the parties disagreed, the Adjudicator at once proceeded to record evidence and entered upon a rambling enquiry which embraced questions which had not been raised at all. On the only point on which the parties were really at issue, namely the good faith of the mai1agement, the findings were in favour of the Company.\n\nSo also the Adjudicator accepted the Company's assertion about its right to determine the size of its labour force and to effect retrenchment where necessary subject only to the proviso which the Adjudicator added, namely that this uust be done in good faith; and indeed the Mazdoor Union had not challenged these assehions in its written statement.\n\nThe Adjudicator said\"\"'.'\"\"\n\n\"It is however an accepted principle that such changes as are being done by the management now form a part of managerial discretion and cannot be interfered with unless it is coloured with the clement of victimisation or unfair labour practice.\" But despite this, and despite his findings about good faith, the Adjudicator considered that, in spite of it all, \"the right of the workmen has to be safeguarded to certain extent\".\n\nWhat is left of the right if the \"accepted principle\" be what he says it is and if there is no victimisation or bad faith, he did not proceed to explain.\n\nIf the principle he enunciated and accepted is sound, .- then the only rights they have are to complain of\n\n-· ...\n\nSteel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMazdoor Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J.\n\n].K. Iron alld SU1l Co. IJtl.,\n\nKanpur\n\nTM Iron and Steil\n\nMazdoo' Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBos~].\n\nbad faith, victimisation and so forth. However, feeling under a compulsion to safeguard these unexplained rights he had recourse to Standing Order 16(a) and ignored Standing Orders 19 and 20.\n\nThe \"accepted principle\" to which the Adjudicator refers in the passage quoted above is implicit in Standing Orders 19(a) and 20(a). They deal with the termination of service by an industrial establishment and prescribe a certain quantum of notice in writing, and then comes this important proviso in Standing Order 19(a)-\n\n\"Provided that if a _permanent workman feels that he has been discharged for reasons not connected with his employment or that the reason of discharge communicated to him is not genuine, he may make an appeal to the Labour Commissioner.\n\nThe decision of the Labour Commissioner .......... shall be binding on both the parties\".\n\nReading the body of Standing Order 19( a) along with the proviso in the light of the \"accepted principle\",, it is evident that the only right the workman has, when his service~ are lawfully terminated after service of due notice and so forth, is to question the order on only two grounds- ( 1) that he has been discharged for reasons not connected with his employment, and\n\n(2) that , the reason of discharge communicated to him is not genuine.\n\nThere is nothing in these Standing Orders to indicate that retrenchment is a measure of last resort and that an employer must continue to lay off his workmen however uneconomical that may be to the business; still less that he must lay them off in rotation and thus affect other workmen who would not be affected by a legitimate order of retrenchment. That cuts at the root of the \"accepted principle\".\n\nIn any event, the ground on which the adjudicator proceeded was not a matter in dispute between the parties because it was not raised in their pleadings and could not have been put in issue had the Adjudicator troubled to draw up issues as he should have done.\n\nAs Mahajan, J. said, adjudicators and tribu-\n\n' r\n\n...\n\nnals cannot act as benev9lent despots and that is exactly what it comes to when an adjudicator, after setting out, correctly in our opinion, the Compmy's rights, holds against the Union on the only grounds that it did raise and then proceeds to give an award, not only on grounds that are not raised but on grounds that fly in the face of the very principles that he enunciated; and that only because he felt that he was under a compulsion to \"safeguard\" the workmen to \"a certain extent\".\n\nBoth sides appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the second ground of the appeal lodged by the Mazdoor Union was \"that _the award of the learned Adjudicator is quite arbitrary\" which, of course, is exactly what it was And so also ground No. 9: \"That the learned Adjudicator has gone beyond his jurisdiction in avyarding relief on a question not referred to it by Government\".\n\nThat again we feel is justified.\n\nWhat was referred was the question of the justification for retrenchment of certain specified workmen.\n\nWhat was awarded was the laying off of persons whose cases were not even considered, th; tt is to say, when the Adjudicator directed laying off in rotation his order necessarily affected persons who had neither been laid off nor retrenched and whose cases not even the Union had in mind.\n\nIt is to be observed that the Mazdoor Union complains about this part of the order in ground No. 11 though on a different ground.\n\nThe Company also appealed against the Adjudicator's order and grounds Nos. 6, 9 and 24 of their appeal are directed against that part of the order that deals with tl1e lay off of the workmen.\n\nAmong other reasons advanced is that this will adversely affect others who are not retrenched.\n\nThe other grounds repeat what was said in the company's written itatement though in different language.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal contrasted Standing Order 15(a) with Standing Order 16(a) but also ignored Standing Orders 19(a) and 20 which are the\n\nSteel Co. Lid.,\n\nKanpUT\n\nT kl Iron and Steel\n\nMozdoor Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBosiJ.\n\nJ.K.Iron and Slttl Co. LJd.,\n\nKanpur\n\nThi Iron ariJ Stttl\n\nMu.door Union,\n\nKan/Jur\n\nBo11j.\n\nonly ones that really apply to this case.\n\nIt upheld the finding of the Adjudictor that there was a shortage of scrap but held that as the shortage was for only 6 months retrenchment was not justified.\n\nIn point of fact, the Labour Appellate Tribunal is wrong about the six months.\n\nIt was under the impression that the Adjudicator had come to that conclusion.\n\nBut what the Adjudicator said was that the shortage at best was for a period of 8 01 9 months.\n\nThe passage which the Appellate Tribunaf quotes is not the finding of the Adjudicator but the argument advanced on behalf of the Company. The full passage runs thus:\n\n\"Shri Mahalingam stated that Standing Order 16( a) which provides for a lay off of a maximum period of 12 days in a month contemplates a temporary shortage of very short duration. It could not apply to shm-tage of raw materials lasting for more than 6 months and hence the C.ompany's right to retrench is not affected by the aforesaid Standing Order\".\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal quoted the portion we have underlined but ignored the rest of the sentence and the part that went before and concluded that the portion underlined was a part of the Adjudicator's findings.\n\nHowever, even if we assume that the Tribunal would have reached the same conclusion if it had realised that' the shortage was for as long as 8 or 9 months, the error into which it has fallen is that the question of retrenchment cannot be made to depend on the duration of the shortage or even on' the fact that those retrenched will be thrown out of employment but on the effect that an omission to retrench will have on the bminess.\n\nIn some cases, laying off even for 6 or 8 or 9 months might make the Company bankrupt, therefore, if the Appellate Tribunal considered that it had power to stop retrenchment for reasons other than those given in the proviso to Standing Order 19(a) it was bound to look into the Company's finances and determine the quetion of justification on that basis. T\\ie only question referred was, was the retrenchment justified? and we find it\n\n-'\n\nimpossible to see how that can be determined without considering the question of gocxl faith which in turn would largely depend on the finances of the Company, on the adverse effect that retention would have on the business and on whether retention would mean the deadweight of an uneconomic surplus and so forth.\n\nNext, when the Appellate Tribunal turned its attention to the trans.fer of the Hoop Mill to Calcutta, it agreed that that would have been a good ground for retrenching those who were specifically engaged in the Hoop Mill but not the others.\n\nBut this takes an impossibly narrow view and ignores the over-all working of a business concern and the repercussions that a trans.fer of this kind would have on other parts of the business.\n\nIt totally ignores the pleadings of the parties and, like the adjudicator, bases its conclusion on some airy view of what it considers would be a good thing for the workmen.\n\nThat is not a decision \"given in accordance with the Act\" and is as much open to objection on that score as the aard• of the Adjudicator. It is pertinent at this stage to refer to a decision of this Court reported in Muir Mills Co. v. St4ti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur(1 ) where Bhagwati, J. delivering the judgment of the Coun said-\n\n\"The considerations of social justice imported by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in arriving at the decision in favour of the respondent were not only irrelevant but untenable\".\n\nIn the present case also we are of opinion that the Adjudicator and the Labour Appellate Tribunal had\n\nadoped the attitude of benevolent despots and have based their conclusions on irrelevant considerations and have ignored the real questions that arose for decision and the issues that arose out of the pleadings of the parties.\n\nIt would not be right for us to substitute our judgment and discretion for that of the Adjudicator and the Tribunal: accordingly, as we are of opinion that the real questions that were in dispute between the\n\n(1) (1955] l S.C.R. 991, 1001.\n\nJ.K. Iron an4 Slttl Co. IJtl.,\n\nKIPIJM\n\nv~ Thi Iron and Stul\n\nMazdoor Union,\n\nKOllJM\n\nBmJ.\n\nJ.K. Iron \"nti Steel Co. Ud.,\n\nKanpur\n\nThe Iron and Stell\n\nMat:.door Unkn,\n\nK'npur\n\nBost].\n\nparties were neither appreciated nor considered we have no alternative but to remit the matter to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for a proper decision after drawing up issues that arise out of the pleadings, considering them and deciding the dispute accordingly, with liberty of course to remit the case to the Adjudicator for a retrial or for the taking of further evidence if it is of the opinion that the omission to draw up issues and focus attention on the points that seem to be in dispute has had the result of shutting out evidence that might otherwise have been led.\n\nAn agreement said to have been reached between the parties on 7-9-1953 was placed before us towards the end of the arguments but we have' not looked at it because counsel for the Mazdoor Union said it did not cover the case of these retrenched workers. The Company insisted that it did.\n\nWe were not prepared to investigate that dispute at that late stage but we make it plain that the Labour Appellate Tribunal will be at liberty to consider it or not as it deems right;,. aftq; hearing what both sides have to say about it.\n\nThe award and the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal are set aside and the case is remitted to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for a re-hearing of the appeals filed before it and for a fresh decision in the light of the foregoing observatigns.\n\nWe will, however, have to make some interim arrangement for payment of what may be termed a sort of subsistence allowance to the affected workmen during the pendency of those further proceedings.\n\nAs there is no agreement between the parties on the subject, we leave it to the Labour Appellate Tribunal or the Adjudicator, as the case may be, to make suitable orders in this respect.\n\nThere will be no order about costs as neither party is to blame for what has happened.\n\n...", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "J. K. IRON AND STEEL CO. LTD., KANPUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J. K. IRON AND STEEL CO. LTD., KANPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE IRON AND STEEL MAZDOOR UNION,\n\nKANPUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE IRON AND STEEL MAZDOOR UNION, KANPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V1v1AN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 200, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253, "end_char": 265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 472, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1327, "end_char": 1340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though they are not courts in the strict sense of the term, they haye to discharge quasi judicial functions and as such are subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1347, "end_char": 1355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1743, "end_char": 1764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Stetl Co. Lid", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2474, "end_char": 2487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stetl Co. Lid.,"}}, {"text": "SS. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2559, "end_char": 2564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "II or the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2569, "end_char": 2608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1CTION :", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1CTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4128, "end_char": 4140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Narain), for the appellants in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4143, "end_char": 4157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Narain), for the appellants in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "Narain)", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4162, "end_char": 4169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Narain), for the appellants in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4211, "end_char": 4223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Mathur, for the respondent in C. 22 and 22-A and respondent No.", "canonical_name": "G. C. Mathur"}}, {"text": "Rajinder", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4304, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajinder\n\nA. Nos."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4332, "end_char": 4345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "301\n\nK. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "301\n\nK. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "J. K.\n\nIron and Steel Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They arise out of a dispute between the J. K.\n\nIron and Steel Company Limited and the Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union."}}, {"text": "Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4614, "end_char": 4642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They arise out of a dispute between the J. K.\n\nIron and Steel Company Limited and the Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4794, "end_char": 4800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "factory and other works at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "10-4-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4822, "end_char": 4831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10-4-1948 the Ministry of Commerce in the Government of India ordered the Company to shift its Jute Baling Hoops factory from Kanpur to Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Commerce in the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4836, "end_char": 4883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10-4-1948 the Ministry of Commerce in the Government of India ordered the Company to shift its Jute Baling Hoops factory from Kanpur to Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4958, "end_char": 4966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10-4-1948 the Ministry of Commerce in the Government of India ordered the Company to shift its Jute Baling Hoops factory from Kanpur to Calcutta."}}, {"text": "19-3-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5072, "end_char": 5081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 19-3-1951 the Iron and Steel Controller ordered the Company to stop the rolling of jute baling hoops at once."}}, {"text": "15-5-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5563, "end_char": 5572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, it issued the following notice dated 15-5-1951 to 128 of its workers:\n\n\"Consequent to transfer of the Rolling Mill to Calcutta and want of scrap to Furnace Department in full, the services of the persons as per lists attached are dispensed with from today."}}, {"text": "Mazdoor. Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6014, "end_char": 6028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their cause was accordingly espoused by the Mazdoor."}}, {"text": "16-5-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6105, "end_char": 6114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Union which made an application to the Regional Conciliation Officer at Kanpur on 16-5-1951 complaining that the retrenchment was illegal and asking that the workmen be reinstated with full payment of their wages for the period they were out of work."}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6301, "end_char": 6328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was forwarded to the Government of Uttar Pradesh and on 28-6-1951 the Governor of that State referred the following issue to the Regional Conciliation Officer at Kanpur under sections 3, 4 and 8 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication:\n\n\"Whether the retrenchment of the workmen\n\nJ. K. Iron attd\n\nStell Co. Ud.,"}}, {"text": "28-6-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6336, "end_char": 6345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was forwarded to the Government of Uttar Pradesh and on 28-6-1951 the Governor of that State referred the following issue to the Regional Conciliation Officer at Kanpur under sections 3, 4 and 8 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication:\n\n\"Whether the retrenchment of the workmen\n\nJ. K. Iron attd\n\nStell Co. Ud.,"}}, {"text": "sections 3, 4 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6455, "end_char": 6474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6488, "end_char": 6517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Iron and Steel\n\nMa::door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6722, "end_char": 6770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanpur\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMa::door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J.\n\ngiven in the Annexure by Messrs J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur,- is unjustified ?", "canonical_name": "Iron and Steel\n\nMa(, door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J."}}, {"text": "-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7102, "end_char": 7110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Adjudicator thereupon took evidence, oral and documentary, and gave his award on 1-11-1951."}}, {"text": "Kapil Deo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7170, "end_char": 7185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before that was done the case of one of the workmen (Kapil Deo Singh) was withdrawn and that left 102 for him to deal with."}}, {"text": "Department of Labour in its Annual Review of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8948, "end_char": 8973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both sides appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Callcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9862, "end_char": 9871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal also upheld the finding that the Hoop Mill was in che course of transfer to Calcutta consequent on the orders of Government, but they held that there was nothing on the record to show which of the 105 persons (it should be 102) whose cases they were considering were \"specifically engaged in the Hoop Mills and had become surplus by reason of the transfer to Callcutta\"."}}, {"text": "Iron and Steel\n\nMazdoor U11ion,\n\nKanpur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10929, "end_char": 10968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, it set aside the retrenchments and held that the\n\n1955 J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMazdoor U11ion,\n\nKanpur\n\n/Jose J.\n\nJ. K. Iron ond Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron ond Steel\n\nMaz:door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "Iron and Steel\n\nMa(, door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J."}}, {"text": "Iron ond Steel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11026, "end_char": 11040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, it set aside the retrenchments and held that the\n\n1955 J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMazdoor U11ion,\n\nKanpur\n\n/Jose J.\n\nJ. K. Iron ond Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron ond Steel\n\nMaz:door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11350, "end_char": 11370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This impelled the Company to do the following things: ( 1) to file a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court on 4-8-1952."}}, {"text": "4-8-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11374, "end_char": 11382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This impelled the Company to do the following things: ( 1) to file a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court on 4-8-1952."}}, {"text": "9-4-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11420, "end_char": 11428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was dismissed by that Court on 9-4-1953 and Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11722, "end_char": 11734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. C. Mathur, who appeared for the Mazdoor Union, raised a preliminary objection against the Company's appeals based on the following facts.", "canonical_name": "G. C. Mathur"}}, {"text": "Mazdoor Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11757, "end_char": 11770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. C. Mathur, who appeared for the Mazdoor Union, raised a preliminary objection against the Company's appeals based on the following facts."}}, {"text": "26-8-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11955, "end_char": 11964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company had appealed to this Court against the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision on 26-8-1952."}}, {"text": "10-9-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12007, "end_char": 12016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was summarily dismissed on 10-9-1952."}}, {"text": "Order 13, rule 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12635, "end_char": 12651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13978, "end_char": 14001, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14793, "end_char": 14816, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15022, "end_char": 15039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Iron and Stul Co. Ltd.,\n\nKanpur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15079, "end_char": 15113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Iron and Stul Co. Ltd.,\n\nKanpur\n\nTiii Iron and Steel\n\nMa:i:door Unitm,\n\nKanp16\n\nBost]."}}, {"text": "Iron and Steel\n\nMa(, door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15200, "end_char": 15249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMa(, door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J.\n\nbunals are not absolute and there are limitations to the ambit of their authority.", "canonical_name": "Iron and Steel\n\nMa(, door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15619, "end_char": 15630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is, in our opinion, an even deeper reason which is hinted at in the judgment of Mahajan, J. (as he then was) at page 500 where he says that \"benevolent despotism is foreign to a democratic Constitution\"."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16217, "end_char": 16238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16689, "end_char": 16699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this country into a great sovereign, democratic, republic, it did not invest it with the mere trappings of democracy and leave it with merely its outward forms of behaviour but invested it with the real thing, the true kernel of which is the ultimate authority of the Courts to restrain all exercise of absolute and arbitrary power, not only by the executive and by officials and lesser tribunals but also by the legislatures and even by Parliament itself."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17143, "end_char": 17154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17548, "end_char": 17557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17676, "end_char": 17686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Iron and Steel\n\nMazdoor Union,\n\nKanpur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23824, "end_char": 23862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the principle he enunciated and accepted is sound, .- then the only rights they have are to complain of\n· ...\n\nSteel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v.\n\nThe Iron and Steel\n\nMazdoor Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J.\n\n].K. Iron alld SU1l Co. IJtl.,", "canonical_name": "Iron and Steel\n\nMa(, door Union,\n\nKanpur\n\nBose J."}}, {"text": "Mahalingam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28756, "end_char": 28766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The full passage runs thus:\n\n\"Shri Mahalingam stated that Standing Order 16( a) which provides for a lay off of a maximum period of 12 days in a month contemplates a temporary shortage of very short duration."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31394, "end_char": 31402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pertinent at this stage to refer to a decision of this Court reported in Muir Mills Co. v. St4ti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur(1 ) where Bhagwati, J. delivering the judgment of the Coun said-\n\n\"The considerations of social justice imported by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in arriving at the decision in favour of the respondent were not only irrelevant but untenable\"."}}, {"text": "J.K. Iron", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32200, "end_char": 32209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.K. Iron an4 Slttl Co. IJtl.,"}}, {"text": "J.K. Iron \"nti Steel Co. Ud.,\n\nKanpur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32292, "end_char": 32329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KIPIJM\n\nv~ Thi Iron and Stul\n\nMazdoor Union,\n\nKOllJM\n\nBmJ.\n\nJ.K. Iron \"nti Steel Co. Ud.,"}}, {"text": "7-9-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33022, "end_char": 33030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An agreement said to have been reached between the parties on 7-9-1953 was placed before us towards the end of the arguments but we have' not looked at it because counsel for the Mazdoor Union said it did not cover the case of these retrenched workers."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1331_1352_EN", "year": 1955, "text": ". .,.\n\n2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nPRADYAT KUMAR BOSE\n\nti.\n\nTHE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF\n\nCALCUTT A HIGH COURT.\n\nlVIVIAN BosE,\n\nBHAGWATI, ]AGANNADHADAs, B. P. SINHA and ]APER IMAM JJ.]\n\nCalcutta High Court-Letters Patent 1865 11s 11menied in 1919- Clause S read with clause 4-Chief Justice-Power of appointmenl-\n\nW !tether includes power of dismissal-Delegation of enquiry into charges by Chief Justice to another Judge-Competency thereof-P9Uln' to appoint or dismiss an officer-Whether an 11dminisrative power:- Dismissal of an official by Chief fustice-Whether prior consultation of Public Services Commission necessary-Constit#tion of India,\n\nArts. 229, 3H, 320(3) and 367(1)-General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act X of 1897), s. 16.\n\nThe appellant was appointed in March 1948 by the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court as Registrar nd Accountant-General of the High Court on its original side and confirmed therein in Nove1nber 1948. He was dismissed from that post with effect from ht September 1951 by the Chief Justice by his order dated 3rd September 1951. There were various charges against the appellant and Mr. Justice Das Gupta was deputed by the Chief Justice to make an enquiry and submit a report. Mr. Justice Das Gupta made a full enquiry and submitted a report in which he exonerated the appellant in respect of some of the charges but found him guilty in respect of other charges. His conclusion was that the appellant must be held guilty of misconduct and dishonest conduct and that he was unfit to hold the office of Registrar of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court. The Chief Justice issued notice to the appellant intimating that he agreed with the report and asked him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from his post. After he was given an opportunity to show cause, the appellant was dismissed by an order of the Chief Justice.\n\nThe appellant's petition to the Governor for the cancellation of the above order was dismissed. Subsequently his\" application for review to the Chief Justice of the orior order of dismissal and a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution filed in the High Court in respect of his dismissal were also dismissed one after the other. The appellant obtained leave; to appeal to the Supreme Court. The three main points for consideration by the Supreme Court were : I. Whether the Chief Justice of the High Court had no power to dismiss the appellant ;\n\n2. Even if the Chief Justice had such power whether he could not delegate the enquiry into the charges to another Judie bat\n\nshould have made the enquiry himself ; and\n\nl'Nd.Jld K....,\n\n&.1\n\nTlw H011'61' tlN CAitl Jrati<'. of\n\n~H1g/,\n\nCourt\n\n3. Whether the order of dismissal by the Chief Justice could have been passed without previous consultation with the Public Services Commission as provided by Art. 320 of the Constitution.\n\nHeld ( l) that the Chief Justice was competent to dismiH the appellant because both by virtue of the provisions of clause 8 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court read with clause 4 of the same as well as Arts. 229(1), 313 and 367(1) of the Constitution read with s. 16 of the General Clauses Act, the power of appointment includes the power of dismissal ;\n\n(2) the objection lo the validity of dismissal on the ground that the dclgation of enquiry amounted to a delegation of power is without substance because the exercise of power to appoint or dismiss an ofticer is the exercise not of a judicial power but of an administrative power and it is well settled that a statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have delegated his functioa merely because he has deputed a , responsible and competent oflicial to enquire and report ; and\n\n(3) it was not necessary to have the previous consultation with the Public Service Commission for the dismissal of the appellant by the Chief Justice because Art. 320(3) of the Constitution taken as a whole is inconsistent with Art. 229 of the Constitution and also because the language thereof is not applicable to the High Court Staff.\n\nNorth-West Frontier Province v. Suraj Nar•in Anand ([1948] L.R. 75 I.A. 343), Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board, ([1953] 2 Q.B. 18, 40), Board of Education v. Rice ([1911] A.C. 179), and Local Go•ernme•I Board v. Ar/illte ([1915] A.C. 120), referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE Ju1.1sDICTION :\n\nC1V1L\n\nAPPULS Nos. 245 and 202 of 1953.\n\nAppeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the 27th January 1953 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 139 of 1952.\n\nRanaddJ Chaudhry, Anil Kumar Das Gupta and Suklimar Ghose, for the appellant.\n\nS. M. Bose, Ad11ocate-General for West Bengal (B.\n\nSen and P. ~· Bose, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1955. December 23.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by leave of the High Court of Calcutta under article 132(1) of\n\nthe Constitution.\n\nThe appellant before us was the i.\n\nRegistrar and Accountant-General of the High Court at Calcutta on its Original Side.\n\nHe was appointed to the post by the Chief Justice of the High Court on the 4th March, 1948 and confirmed therein on the 15th of November, 1948. He was dismissed therefrom with effect from the 1st September, 1951, by an order of the Chief Justice dated the 3rd September,\n\n1951. There were various charges against him and Mr. Justice Das Gupta was deputed by order of the Chief Justice dated the 28th May, 1951, to make an enquiry and submit a report.\n\nMr. Justice Das Gupta made a full enquiry and submitted his report on the 11th August, 1951, in which he exonerated the appellant in respect of some of the charges but found him guilty in respect of the other charges.\n\nThe learned Judge expressed his conclusion as follows:\n\n\"Mr. Bose (the appellant) must be held to be guilty of misconduct and dishonest conduct and\n\n(that) he is unfit to hold the office of Registrar olf the Original Side of this Court\".\n\nThe Chief Justice issued to the appellant a notice on the 16th August, 1951, intimating that he agreed with the report after careful consideration thereof and asking him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from his post.\n\nThe appellant was given a hearing by the Chief Justice on the 31st August, 1951 The order dated the 3rd September, 1951, of the Chief Justice dismissing the appellant from his office, a copy of which was served on him, runs as follows :\n\n\"A full and thorough enquiry was held by Mr.\n\nJustice K. C. Das Gupta into the charges made against Sri P. K. Bose the Registrar of the Original Side of this Court.\n\nSri P. K. Bose was represented by eminent Counsel and every opportunity was given to him to meet the charges and put forward his explanation and efence.\n\nThe learned Judge however in a full and very carefully considered report found Sri P. K. Bose guilty of serious charges involving moral turpitude and dishonesty and further he was of opinion that Sri P. K.\n\nBose was by reason thereof unfit to hold the said office of Registrar.\n\nI considered this report and the evidence most\n\n1955 p,.q,., Xlllllllt\n\nBos1\n\n\"· Thi HDA'611 ,,_ Chiff }11.Jlid of\n\nCtikidta Hi11t c-t\n\n]o,_, a, J/tMu ].\n\nThe Hon'ble the Chief y.,1;,, of\n\nC'<llcuU4 High\n\nCourt\n\nanxiously and found myself in entire agreement with the learned Judge.\n\nSri P. K. Bose was, in my view, clearly guilty of the matter comprised in the charges specified by Mr. Justice K. C. Das Gupta.\n\nI considered that prima facie the conduct of Sri P. K.\n\nBose warranted dismissal and I therefore gave him notice under article 311 (2) of the Constituion of India to show cause against the action proposed against him, namely, dismissal.\n\nOn the 31st August, 1951, Sri P. K. Bose showed cause before me and I heard Sri Sachin Chaudhri his counsel and Sri P. K. Bose pesonally.\n\nIn all the circumstances this is not a case in which I can properly show any leniency. Sri P. K. Bose has abused the trust and confidence reposed in him and has been found guilty of serious malpractices and dishonesty.\n\nConduct such as this of an officer of the status of the Registrar of the Original Side of this Court is unpardonable and must be dealt with severe! y.\n\nI therefore dismiss Sri P. K. Bose from his office as Registrar of the Original Side of the Court, the dismissal to take clfect from the 1st September, 1951.\n\nLet a copy of this order be served on Sri P.\n\nBose\".\n\nOn the 25th January, 1952, the appellant submitted a petition to the Governor of West Bengal for cancellation of the above order.\n\nHe received intimation dated the 9th July, 1952, that the \"Governor declines to interfere on his behalf'.\n\nThereupon he filed an application to the Chief Justice for review of the prior order of dismissal.\n\nIt may be mentioned that it was Chief Justice, Sir Arthur Trevor Harries, who had initiated the proceedings against the appellant and passed the order of dismissal.\n\nHe retired in June, 1952.\n\nThe application for review was made to the successor Chief Justice, Shri P.\n\nB. Chakravarti, on the 11th September, 1952.\n\nThis application was rejected on the 16th September, 1952.\n\nThereafter on the 24th November, 1952, i.e., more than an year after the order of dismissal, a writ application was filed on the Original Side of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution against the Hon'ble\n\nthe Chief Justice of the High Court \"for calling upon him to bring up the records of the proceedings relatrng to his dismissal, in order that justice may be done by quashing or otherwise dealing with the said proceedings and the said order dated the 3rd September 1951, purporting to terminate his services and for directions being given to the Chief Justice to desist from giving effect to or acting in any manner under the said order\".\n\nOn the presentation of the application the learned Judge on the Original Side, Mr.\n\nJustice Bose, issued a rule nw calling upon the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to show cause why an order in the nature of a writ as asked for should not be made. This order was duly served and on its return the learned Judge made an order referring the hearing of the application to a Special Bench of three Judges as per the rules. of the Court.\n\nAccordingly the petition was, under the directions of the Chief Justice, heard by three learned Judges of the , High Court, who after elaborate hearing and consideration of the points urged on behalf of the appellant dismissed the application.\n\nLeave to appeal to this Court was, however, granted by them under article 132(1) on the ground that the case involves substantial questions of law relating to interpretation of the Constitution.\n\nThe main points that have been urged by the appellant before us, as before the High Court, are that- ( 1) the Chief Justice of the High Court had no power under the law to dismiss him;\n\n(2) even if he had the power, he could not delegate the enquiry into the charges, to another Judge but should have enquired into the same himself; and\n\n(3) in any case the order of dismissal could not have been passed in the absence of previous consultation with the Public Service Commission of the State as provided under article 320 of the Constitution.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent, i.e., the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta, the learned Advocate-General of West Bengal has\n\nPraiyu K umor\n\nBose\n\nThi Ho11'/Jk tlu Cltiif justice of\n\nCalcutt• High Court\n\nja, annadhaJas j.\n\nPradyat Kumar\n\nBose\n\nThe Hon'ble tht Chief Justict of\n\nCalcutttJ High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhaatu ].\n\nappeared before us.\n\nIn addition to controverting the correctness of the above contentions raised on behalf of the appeliant, he strongly urged that-\n\n(1) no writ could issue from the High Court against its own Chief Justice;\n\n(2) the order of the Chief Justice, the validity of which is being challenged, is a purely administrative order against which no application for writ is maintainable; and\n\n(3) this was not a case in which having regard to all the circumstances, any application by way of a writ •hould have been entertained.\n\nThe points urged on behalf of the appellant may first be taken up. The most important out of them is the one relating to the authority of the Chief Justice to pass the order of dismissal as against the appellant.\n\nIt is beyond dispute that the Chief Justice is the authority for appointing the appellant. It was in fact the Chief Justice who appointed the appellant and confirmed him.\n\nBut it is strongly urged that he had not the power to dismiss.\n\nThis argument is based on the assumption that the appellant falls within the category of public servants who are governed by the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Services Rules) of the year 1930 as amended from time to time and that the said rules continue to apply, to an officer holding the post which he did, even after the Government of India Act, 1935, and later the Constitution . of . India of 1950 successively came into force.\n\nThe argument recognises the fact that dismissal is a matter which falls within conditions of service of a public servant as held by the Privy Council in North-West Frontier Province v. Surai Narain Anand(') and that the power of making rules relating to conditions of service of the staff of the High Courts is vested in the Chief Justice of the Court under section 242(4) taken with section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as also under. article 229 (2) of the Constitution of India, 1950. But\n\n(I) [1948] L R. 75 I. A. 343.\n\nit is said that no such rules have been framed by the Chief Justice, and that therefore by virtue of-sectiqn 276 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and article 313 of the Constitution, the Civil Services Rules continued to apply to him.\n\nIt is necessary to examine the correctness of these assumptions.\n\nThe Civil Services Rules were framed by the Secretary of State in Council under powers vested in him by section 96-B (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, as amended in 1919.\n\nThese rules were framed on the 19th June, 1930, and published on the 21st June, 1930.\n\nIt is desirable therefore to consider the position relating to the staff of the High Courts before that date.\n\nIt is not disputed that the said position was governed by the Letters Patent of the High Court. Clause 8 of the Letters Patent of 1865 as amended in 1919, which continues to be operative, as also clause 4 thereof, are relevant for the present purpose. They are as follows:\n\n\"8. \\Ve do hereby authorize and empower the Chief Justice of the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, from time to time, as occasion may require, a~<l subject to any rules and restrictions which may be prescribed by the Governor- General in Council, to appoint so many and such clerks and other ministerial officers as shall be found necessary for the administfation of justice, and the due execution of all the powers and authorities granted and committed to the said High Court by these Our Letters Patent.\n\nAnd it is Our further will and pleasure and We do hereby for Us, Our heirs and successors give, grant, direct, and appoint, that all and every the officers and clerks to be appointed as aforesaid shall have and receive respectively such reasonable salaries as the Chief Justice shall, from time to time, appoint for each office and place respectively, and as the Governor-General in Council shall approve of: Provided always, and it is Our will and pleasure, that all and every the officers and clerks to be appointed as aforesaid shall be resident within the limits of the jurisdiction of the said Court, so long as they shall hold their respective offices; but\n\nPrad;-al Kumar\n\nBose\n\nThe Hon'bu t/i6\n\nCh~( Juslie1 of\n\nCalcutta High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n!955\n\nPradyal ,.., .. ,\n\n/Josi\n\nThi Hon'hU th1 Chitf Justice of\n\nCalculla High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nthis proviso shall not interfere with or prejudice the right of any officer or clerk to avail himself of leave of absence under any rules prescribed by the Governor-General in Council, and to absent himself from the said limits during the term of such leave, in accordance with the said rules\".\n\n\"4. We do hereby appoint and ordain, that every clerk and ministerial officer of the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, appointed by virtue of the said Letters Patent of the Fourteenth of May, One thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, shall continue to hold and enjoy his office and employment, with the salary thereunto annexed, until he be removed from such office and employment; and he shall be subject to the like power of removal, regulations, and provisions if he were appointed by virtue of these Letters Patent\".\n\nIt will be noticed that .clause 8 specifically vests in the Chief Justice the power of appointment, but makes no mention of the power of removal or of making regulations or provisions.\n\nBut it is obvious from the last portion of clause 4 that such power was taken to be implicit under clause 8 and presumably as arising from the power of appointment.\n\nIt may be mentioned that under clause 10 of the Charter of the Supreme Court of Calcutta issued in 1774, the said Court also was in specific terms \"authorized and empowered from time to time, as occ:i.- sion may require, to appoint so many and such clerks wd other ministerial officers as shall be found nece,... sary for the administration of justice\".\n\nThe power of removal or of taking other disciplinary action as regards such appointees was not in terms granted.\n\nBut there is historical evidence to show that the power of appointment conferred under the Charter was always understood as comprising the above powers.\n\nSir Charles Wood, the then Secretary of State for India in paragraph 10 of his dispatch to the Governor-General dated the 17th May, 1862, (on the formation of the new High Courts) stated as follows:\n\n\"The Supreme Court exercises an :i.uthority entirely independent of the Government in respect al\n\nits ministerial officers\".\n\nIt is this power and authority along with other judicial power and authority that was succeeded to by the High Courts (on their formation in supersession of the Supreme and Sadar Courts) by virtue of section 9 of the Indian High Courts Act, in the following terms.\n\n\"Each of the High Courts to be established under the Act shall have and exercise ................ all jurisdiction and every power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts ............. . . . . . . . . . . . abolished under this Act .................. \" Thus it is clear that both under the Charter of the Supreme Court as well as under the Letters Patent of the High Court, the power of appointment was throughout understood as vesting in the High Court or the Chief Justice, the complete administrative and disciplinary control over its staff, including the power of dismissal.\n\nThere can be no doubt that this position continued at least until the Government of India Act, 1915.\n\nNow, section 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915, in terms continued the above by providing that the jurisdiction of the High Court would \"include all such powers and authority over and in relation to the administration of justice including power to appoint clerks and other ministerial officers of the Court as are vested in them by Letters Patent\".\n\nIt follows that the position continued to be the same even under the GovernmeQ.t of India Act, 1915, at any rate up to 1930, when the Civil Services Rules came into operation. All the powers under the Letters Patent were, however, subject to alteration by competent legislative authority by virtue of clause 44 of the Letters Patent.\n\nClause 8 of the Letters Patent itself provided that the power of appointment of the Chief Justice was to be \"subject to rules and restrictions which may be prescribed by the Governor-General in Council\".\n\nNow, the Civil Services Rules were made by the Secretary of State in Council under section %-B of the Government. of India Act, 1915.\n\nIt is the case of the appellant that though the 30-95 S. C. India/59.\n\nProdvaJ Ir umar\n\nBose ...\n\nThe Hon'bu th,.\n\nChief Jwtica of\n\nCalcuJta High\n\nCourt\n\nJaganfUldhodAI J\n\nPradyal Kumar\n\nBos•\n\nThe Hon'blt Ou\n\nChi~{ ,]u.tlice of\n\nCO!c11tta Jligh\n\nCourl\n\nCivil Services Rules framed by virtue of delegated power under the Act could not override the specific power of appointment vested in the Chief f ustice by virtue of section 106 thereof, they would override the alleged implications of that power such as the power of dismissal and power to frame rules relating to conditions of service in so far as they are specifically provided for under the Civil Services Rules. It is further u.rged that the said situation continues up to date by virtue of section 276 of the. Government of India Act, 1935 and article 313 of the Constitution. Now, the appellant is a person who was appointed in 1948 and dismissed in 1951.\n\nIt is, therefore, desirable in the first instance to examine the situation under the Government of India Act, 1935 and under the Constitution of 1950 on the assumption that the Civil Services Rules made a change in the prior situation so far as the High Court staff is concerned and applied thereto between 1930 and 1935.\n\nUnder the Government of India Act, 1935, the position relating to the Civil Services of. the Crown in India is contained in a number of general provisiona in Chapter II of Part X thereof.\n\nSection 240(1) reiterates what was first statutorily declared by section 96-B of the 1915 Act, viz., that except as expressly provided by the Act every person who is a member of a civil service of the Crown in India, or holds any 6vil post under the Crown in India, holds office duing His Majesty's pleasure.\n\nSection 241 provides for the recruitment and conditions of service of such persons and prescribes the various authorities who can make the appointments and frame the rule•\n\nrelating to conditions of service. Section 242( 4), in so far as it is relevant fo, the present purpose, pro-. vides that section 241 in its application to appointments to and to persons serving on the staff attached to a High -Court shall have effect as if, in the case of a High Court, for any reference to fhe Governor in paragraph (b) of section (1) in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) and in sub-section (5), there was substituted a reference to the Chief fustice of the Court.\n\nMaking the necessary substitutions as prescrib\"l\n\n.above, the statutory provisions in the Government of India Act 1935, relating to recruitment and conditions of service of the staff of the High Court may be read as follows :\n\n\"(l) Appointments to the Civil Services and Civil posts under the Cown in India in relation to the staff attached to the High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice or such person as he may direct.\n\n(2) The conditions of service of persons servmg His Majesty in relation to the staff attached to the High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by some person or persons authorised by him to make the rules for the purpose.\n\nProvided that- ( a) the Governor may in his discretion require that in such . cases as he may in his discretion direct no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court\n\nsave after consultation with the Provincial Public 'Service Commission;\n\n(b) rules made under sub-section\n\n(2) by a Chief Justice shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor\".\n\nThese sections, while keeping intact the power of appointment of the members of the staff of the High Court with the Chief Justice as contained in the Letters Patent, provide, statutorily for the first time and in express terms what was implicit in clause 8 of the Letters Patent, viz., that the power to regulate and frame rules relating to conditions of service governing such staff is also vested in the Chief Justice subject however to two limitations indicated by the provisos mentioned above.\n\nThe corresponding provisions in the present Constitution relating to the powers of the Chief Justice in relation to the recruitment and service conditions of the staff of the High Court are almost identical and are contained in article 229.\n\nThey are as follows: ' \"229. (1) Appointments of officers and servants u£ a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of\n\nPr•tlyat 1\\ umat\n\nBou\n\nTht Hon'bk t/11 Chief Justice of Calcutta High\n\nCourt\n\nPradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose\n\n\"· The Hon'ble t/1e Chief Justice of\n\nCalcutta Hig/1\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nthe Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he may direct: Provided that the Governor of the State in which the High Court has its principal scat may by rule reql!ire that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission.\n\n(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such. as may be prescribed by trules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose:\n\nProvided that the rules made under this clause, shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowance\"S, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor of the State in which the Court has its principal seat\".\n\nIt does not appear from the record that any rules have been made by the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, at any rate, in so far as they may be applicable to the Registrar of the Original Side of the High Court.\n\nOn the assumption, therefore, that the Civil Services Rules applied to the case of a person in his position between 1930 and 1935, it has got to be seen whether they continue to be so applicable.\n\nThe relevant provisions in this behalf are section 276 of the Government of India Act. 1935, and article 313 of the Constitution.\n\nThey are as follows: \"Section 276: Until other provision is made under the appropiate provisions of this Part of this Act, any rules made under the Government of India Act relating to the Civil Services of, or civil posts under, the Crown in India which were in force immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act, shall, notwithstanding the repeal of that Act, continue in force so far as consistent with this Act, and shall be deemed to be rules made under the appropriate provisions of this Act\".\n\n\"Article 313: Until other provision is made in this behalf under this Constitution, all the laws in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution and applicable to any public service or any post which continues to exist after the commence- -ment of this Constitution, as an all-India service or as service or post under the Union or a Stat.:: shall Continue in force so far as consistent with the provisions of this Constitution\".\n\nNow, it has to be observed that the continuance, under section 276 of the Government of India Act, 1935, of the Civil Services Rules, could only be in so far as such continuance may be consistent with the new Act.\n\nFurther in their application to the High Court staff, the rules are to be deemed to be rules made under the appropriate provisions of the Act.\n\nThe rules, therefore, must be deemed to be rules made by the Chief Justice consistently with the scheme and the provisions of the Act relating to the High Court staff which specifically vest in him the powers of appointment and of the regulation of conditions of service including the power of dismissal.\n\nSuch continuance, therefore, can only operate by a process of adaptJtion implicitly authorised by the very terms of section 276.\n\nIt would follow that. in their continued application to the High Court. staff, the word \"Governor\" has to be read as substituted by the word \"Chief Justice\" wherever necessary in the same way as section 242( 4) of the Act requires the provisions of section 241 to be read as though any reference to the Governor therein is substituted by a reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court. The continued application of the Civil Services Rules without such adaptation would result in the anomalous position, that although the 1935 Act specifically vests in the Chief Justice the power of appointment and of framing rules regulating conditions of service including the power <0f dismissal and hence thereby indicates the Chief Justice as the authority having the power to exercise disciplinary control, he has no such disciplinary -control merely because he did not choose to make any\n\nfresh rules and was content with the continued appli-\n\nPrad;•at ii. umar\n\nBoS<\n\nThe llon'hl• the Chief :Justice nf\n\nCalcutta High\n\nCourt\n\n:JagannaJ:, adas J.\n\nPraJyat A11mu\n\nBoJt v.\n\nTM Hon\"blt IR1 Chief ]us tic1 of\n\nCalcuJta Hith\n\nCf!llfl\n\nation of the old rules.\n\nNow, the relevant provmon m the Civil Services Rules which deals with disciplinary action including dismissal is rule 52 thereof.\n\nThat rule shows that \"the Governor-General in Council or Local Government of a Governor's Province may impose any of the penalties specified in rule 49\n\n(which includes dismissal) on any person included in any of the classes 1 to 5 specified in rule 14 who 1' serving under the administrative control of the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government, as the case may be\".\n\nThis rule, if it originally applied to the High Court staff, must after 1935 be read by substituting \"Chief Justice\" in the place of \"the Local Government\" wherever it occurs therein and making other consequential alterations.\n\nThus read, there can be no doubt that as from the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935, the power of dismissal of a member of the High Court staff including, a person in the position of the appellant, would vest in the Chief Justice.\n\nThis would be so even apart from the normal implication of the power of appointment specifically recognised under the Act.\n\nIt follows that even on the assumption that Civil Services Rules applied between 1930 and 1935 to the High Court staff their continuance after 1935 makes a change in the dismissing autority and the power of dismissal is vested in the Chief Justice.\n\nThat being the correct position prior to 1950, the Constitution has made no change in this respect and article 3B would also continue rule 52 of the Civil Services Rules as above adapted.\n\nIt would, therefore, follow that,. at any rate, from the time of passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, as also under the Constitution, the power of dismissal vests in the Chief Justice notwithstanding that no specific rules have been made in this behalf by the Chief Justice.\n\nIt must be mentioned, at this stage, that so far as the power of dismissal is concerned, the position under the Constitution of 1950 is not open to any argument or doubt.\n\nArticle 229(1) which in terms vests the power of appointment in the Chief Justice is equally effective to vest in him the power of dis-\n\n. '\n\nmissal.\n\nThis results from section 16 of the General Clauses Act which by virtue of article 367(1) of the Constitution applies to the construction of the word \"appointment\" in article 229( 1).\n\nSection 16 of the General Clauses Act clearly provides that the power of \"appointment\" includes the power \"to suspend or dismiss\".\n\nIn view of the clear conclusion we have arrived at as aboe, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the arguments addressed to us on both sides as to the applicability or othrewisc of the Civil Services Rules to the High Court staff, including a person in the position of the appellant, and we express no opinion thereon.\n\nThe main contention, therefore, of the appellant as to the competency of the Chief Justice to pass the order of dismissal against him fails.\n\nThe further subordinate objectjons that have been raised remain to be considered.\n\nThe first objection that has been urged is that even if the Chief Justice had the power to dismiss, he was not, in exercise of that power, competent to delegate to another Judge the enquiry into the charges but should have made the enquiry himself.\n\nThis contention proceeds on a misapprehension of the nature of the power.\n\nAs pointed out in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board(1) at page ::10, it is true that \"no judicial tribunal can delegate its functions unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication\".\n\nBut the exercise of the power -to appoint or dismiss an officer is the exercise not of a judicial power but of an administrative power.\n\nIt is nonetheless so, by reason . of the fact that an opportunity to show cause and an e:nquiry simulating judicial standards have to precede the exercise thereof.\n\nIt is well-recognised that a statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have delegated his functions merely by deputing a respon\\ible and competent official to enquire and report.\n\nThat is the ordinary mode of exercise of any administrative power.\n\nWhat cannot be deleg; ited except where the law specifically so provides-is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise (\\\\ {\\95312 Q. B 18, 4o.\n\nPrdyat Kumar\n\nBose v.\n\nThe Ho11'ble 1/1' Chief J11stice of\n\nCalcutta Hig!i\n\nCourt\n\nJagarmadhadas J.\n\nPrad1•at Kumar\n\n. BQJI ... 1)u Hon'ble the Chief .7uJlice of Calculta lligh\n\nCourt\n\nJagannaJ:, adas J.\n\nof such power. As pointed out by the House of Lords in Board of Education v. Rice('), a functionary who has to decide an administrative matter, of the nature i11volved in this case, can obtain the materi[ll on which he is to act in such manner as may be feasible and convenient, provided only the affected party \"h.1s a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any relevant and prejudicial material\"· The fol\\owini>; passage from the speech of Lord Chancellor in Local Government Board v . .. Arlidge(') is apposite and instructive-\n\n\"M y Lords, I concur in this view of the pos1t10n of an administrative body to which the decision of a question in dispute between parties has been ent:usted.\n\nThe result of its enquiry must, as I have said, be taken, in the absence of directions in the statute to the contrary, to be intended to be reached by its ordinary procedure.\n\nIn the case of the Local Government Board it is not doubtful what this procedure is..\n\nTl1e Minister at the head of the Board is directly responsible to Parliament like other Ministers.\n\nHe is responsible not only for what he himself does but for all that is done in his department. The volume \"of work entrusted to him is very great and he cannot do the great bulk . of it himself. He is expected to obtain his materials vicariously through his officials, and he has discharged. his duty if he sees that they obtain these materials for him properly.\n\nTo try to extend his duty beyond this nd to insist that he and other members of the Board shou \\d do everything personally would be to impair . his efficiency. Unlike\n\na Judge in a Court he is not only at liberty but is compelled to .rely on the assistance of his staff\".\n\nIn view of the abm•e clear statement of the law the objection to the validity of the dismissal on the ground that the delegation of the enquiry amounts to the delegation of the power itself is without 3ny substance and must be rejected.\n\nThe second objection that has been taken is that even if the power of dismissal vested in the Chief Justice, the appellant. was entitled to the protection\n\n(l) [t9IJ] A.C. 179, 182; (2; [1~15] A.c. 120. 133.\n\n, ....\n\nof article 320( 3 )( c) of the Constituion.\n\nIt is urged that the dismissal in the absence of consultation with the Public Service Commission of the State was invatid. There can be no doubt that members of the staff in other Government departments of the Unioa or the State are normally entitled to the protection of the three constitutional safeguards provided in articles 311(1), 311(2) and 320(3)(c). Article 320(3)(c) so far as it is reievant for the present purpose, runs as follows:\n\n\"The Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil capacity, including memorials or petitions relating to such matters\".\n\nThe phrase \"all disciplinary matters affecting a person\" is sufficiently comprehensive to include any kind of disciplinary action p:oposcd to be taken in respect -of a particular person.\n\nThe question for comicleration, therefore, is whether a person belonging to the staff of a High Court is within the scope of the phrase \"a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civii capacity\". The learned Judges of the High Court were of the opinion that article 320(3) can have no application to the present case.\n\nIn their view the provisions of article 320(3) would be inconsistent with the power vested in the Chief Justice of a High Court under article 229, as regards the appointment of officers and servants of a High Cout and hence also of dismissal or removal and as regards the framing of rules prescribing conditions of service of such officers or serv:mts.\n\nThey also point out that the proviso to article 229(1) indicates the requirement that the State Public Service Commission should be consulted only in respect .of the specific cases of future appointments and that too if the Governor of the State so requires by rule.\n\nThey take this and the fact that under the Constitution the provisions relating to High Court staff are taken oot of Part XIV relating to the services, as imply-\n\n!955\n\nPradvilt Kwr.ur\n\nBose v.\n\nToe Hen' ble the\n\nChi~( ]11sttte oj-\n\nCalu1tin Hi.Y,'1.\n\nCourt -\n\n]a.gunnadhadas ].\n\nPn11Jyal J{umar\n\nBMt\n\nThe ll1111'blc th.r.\n\nr:liif ,]11Jlf, e o.f\n\nCalrulttt 11 i , z •\n\n(,',1111! '\n\nJar,<mua, f!, cdas ].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOI!.TS [1955]\n\ning, that in the exercise of the powers vested in the Chief Justice under article 229, consultation with the State Public Service Commission in respect of any other matter must be taken to have been excluded.\n\nThis reasoning is not without force.\n\nUndoubtedly there is much to be said for the view that article 320(3) taken as a whole is inconsistent with article 229.\n\nBut it is possible to treat the requirement of prior consultation under article 320(3) ( c) which relates to disciplinary action against individual Government employees and which is in the nature of an important constitutional safeguard for individual government employees as standing on a somewhat different footing from that under article 320(3) (a) or (b) which relate to general matters relating to recruitment!, appointments, etc.\n\nPrior consultation in respect of individual cases may not be considered necessarily inconsistent with the actual exercise of the overriding power of the Chief Justice in such cases. While, therefore, recognising the force of the view taken by the High Court, it appears desirable to consider the requirement under article 320(3) ( c) taken by itself with reference to the actual terms thereof, in view of the importance of this provision as a constitutional safeguard in cases to which it applies.\n\nA scrutiny of the provisions in Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution relating to the services shows that the various articles in this Chapter designate the services to which the articles relate by a variety of terminology.\n\nUnder article 309, the appropriate Legishture is vested with the power to regulate recruitn1ent and conditions of service uof persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State\".\n\nUnder article 310 \"every person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or holds any civil post under a State\" holds office during the pleasure of the President or, as the case may be, of the Governor or of the Rajpramukh of the State.\n\nUnder article 3\\1 the two constitutional safeguards, viz., ( 1) of not being liable to be dismissed or removed or reduced ill' rank until he has been given a reasonabie opportunity.\n\nof showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and (2) of not being liable to he dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, are available to \"a person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or of a civil service of a State, or holds a civil post under the Union or a State\".\n\nUnder article 320(3) (c) however, the requirement of consultation with the appropriate Public Service Commis&ion on disciplinary matters is available to \"a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil capacity\".\n\nA close scrutiny of the terminology so used shows a marked departure in the language of article 320(3) ( c) horn that in articles 310 and 311. Officers and members of the staff attached to a High Court clearly fall within the scope of the phrase \"persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State\" and also of the phrase \"a person who is a member of a civil service of a State\" as used in articles 310 and 311. The salaries of these perwns arc paid out of the State funds as appears from article 229(3) which provides that the administrative expenses of a High Court including all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of officers and servants of the High Court, are chargeable upon the Consolidated Fund of a State.\n\nThe item relating to such administrative expenses has to form part of the annual financial statement to be presented to the State Legislative Assembly under article 202 and estimates thereof can form the subject matter of the discussion in the Legisbture under article 203 ( 1).\n\nThey must, therefore, L be taken \"to hold posts in connection with the affairs of the State and to be members of the civil service ot the State\". But c3n it he said that members of the High Court staff are \"persons serving under the Government of a State in a civil capacity\" which is the phrase used in article 320(3)(c).\n\nThe use of different terminology in the various articles was not like!y to have been accidental.\n\nIt is to be noticed that even article 320 in its various clauses uses different phrases. Article 320 (1) refers to \"appointi!l55\n\nPr4Jral r..umar\n\n. BiJS(\n\nTkr H.n'bh Ifie Chief Jusl/c, Rf\n\nCil/cuUil High\n\nCourt\n\nJagann., d!iadils ].\n\n!955\n\nPradyat Kumar\n\nBose\n\nTM Hon'b/e the\n\nCkif Jujtice of\n\nCalcutta Hig.'1\n\nCout'I\n\n]agonnadiiadas ].\n\nmen ts to the services of the Union and the serv1ees of the State\" and the proviso to article 320(3) refers to \"services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union and to 5'rvices and posts in connection with the affairs of the State\".\n\nIt appears, therefoce, not unlikely that in using somewhat different phraseology, the intention was to demarcate the staff of the High Courts from the other civil services of the Union or the State.\n\nThe phrase \"persons serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State\" seems to have reference to such persons m respect of whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Governments functioning in the name of the President or of the Governor or of a Rajpramukh.\n\nThe officers and staff of the High Court cannot be said to fall within the scope of th.e above phrase because in respect of them the administrative control is clearlv vested in the Chief Justice, who under the Constitution, has the power of app:iintment and removal and of making rules for the conditions of services. Articles 53, 77, 154 and 166 of the Constitution show that while ti1e executive power of the Union or the State is vested, respectively, in the President or the Governor and thi: e; u, cutive action is to be taken in their respective names, such action is the action of the Government of India or the Government of a State.\n\nBut the administrative action of the Chief Justice is outside the scope of these articles.\n\nIt appears therfore that in nsing the phrase \"Government of India and Government of a\n\nState\" in article 320(3) (c), the Constitution had in view the above mentioned demarcation.\n\nA close comparison of the terminology used in the corresponding provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935 also seems to confirm this demarcation. Section 290 ( 1) of the said Act refers to \"every person who is a member of a civil service of the Crowll in India or holds any civil post under the Croum in India\" while section 266(3) (c) relates to \"a person serving His Majesty in a civil capacity in India\".\n\nA perusal of the main paragraph of sub-section (3) of section 266 clearly shows that it has reference to three c.11.egories of services ( 1) Secretary of States services, (2) Federal services under the Governor-General, and (3) Provincial Services under the Governor.\n\nIn the context of this section, the comprehensie phrase \"serving His Majesty\" seems to have been used as comprising only the above three services and should be exclusive of the staff of the High Court.\n\nThe fact that different phrases have been used in the relevant sections. of the Government of India Act and the Constitution, relating to the constitutional safeguards in this behalf appears to be meant to emphasise the differentiation of the services of the High Court from other services, and to place the matter beyond any doubt as regards the non-applicability thereto of this constitutional protection.\n\nIt may be noticed that while the constitutional safeguards under article 311 are available to every person in the civil service, the safeguard in article 320(3) (c) is one capable of being taken away by regulations to be made by the President or Governor.\n\nThe Constitution itself appears, therefore, to have classed this safeguard on a different footing.\n\nThis may well have been intended not to apply to the High Courts.\n\nTherefore, both on the ground that article 320(3) ( c) would be contrary to the implication of article 229 and on the ground that the language thereof is not applicable to the High Court 'staff, we are of the opinion that for the dismissal of the appellant by the Chief Justice, prior consultation with the Public Service Commission was not necessary. \\Ve accordingly hold that the appellant was not entitled to the protection under article 320(3)(c).\n\nIt follows that none of the three conteniions raised on behalf of the appellant, i.e., ( 1) as to the power of the Chief Justice to dismiss him, (2) as to his competence to delegate the enquiry to Mr.\n\nJustice Das Gupta, and (3) . as to his obligation to consult the State Public . Service Commission, have been sub:; tantiated.\n\nThis application must accordingly fail on the merits.\n\nThis would be enough to dispose of .the case against the :ippellant. The learned Judges of the High Court h:1ve also dealt at some length with the question as\n\nProdyat Kum\"r\n\nBo SI\n\nThe Hon'blt th1 Chuf ]usli£1 of\n\nCalculla High\n\nCourl\n\nJasan,..dhadar ].\n\n!955\n\nrady'al Kumar\n\nBost\n\nv. ihr lhm'hle lite Clzir( J:otire of\n\nCal11 tta High\n\n':.'&urt\n\nJagannt11//1a.das ].\n\nto the maintainability of an application for a writ in a c:tse of this kind and of the availability of any remedy by way of a writ against the action of the Chief Justice, 1vhether adrninistrative or judicial.\n\nArguments in this behalf have also heen strongly urged before us by the learned Advocate-General of Vv est Bengal.\n\nIn the view,· however, that we have taken as to the contentions raised before us regarding the validity of the order of dismissal, we <lo not feel called upon to enter into the discussion relating to the availability of the writ. \\Ve express no opinion on the questions so raised.\n\nWe consider it, however, desirable to say that our view that the exercise of power of dismissal of a civil servant is the exercise of administrative power may not necessarily preclude the availability of remedy under article 226 of the Constiution in an \"appropriate case.\n\nThat is a question on which we express no opinion one way or the other in this case.\n\nIn the result the appeal must be dismissed with costs-\n\nAlong with this appeal, the appellant filed an application to this Court for leave under article 136 to appeal against the orders dated the 3rd September, 1951, and 16th September, 1952, dismissing him from service and declining to review it.\n\nIn view of our judgment just delivered, that application must afao be rejected.", "total_entities": 186, "entities": [{"text": "PRADYAT KUMAR BOSE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Pradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF\n\nCALCUTT A HIGH COURT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE HONBLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF CALCUTTA HIGH COURT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "APER IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcutta High Court-Letters Patent 1865 11s 11menied in 1919- Clause S read with clause 4-Chief Justice-Power of appointmenl-\n\nW !"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 229, 3H, 320(3) and 367(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 654, "end_char": 686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 687, "end_char": 712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 730, "end_char": 735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2094, "end_char": 2102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2263, "end_char": 2276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant obtained leave; to appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2835, "end_char": 2843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3049, "end_char": 3057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 229(1), 313 and 367(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3140, "end_char": 3145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3153, "end_char": 3172, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3892, "end_char": 3903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3962, "end_char": 3970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I.A. 343", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4132, "end_char": 4148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4420, "end_char": 4434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4442, "end_char": 4463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "RanaddJ Chaudhry", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4575, "end_char": 4591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RanaddJ Chaudhry, Anil Kumar Das Gupta and Suklimar Ghose, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar Das Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RanaddJ Chaudhry, Anil Kumar Das Gupta and Suklimar Ghose, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Suklimar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4618, "end_char": 4632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RanaddJ Chaudhry, Anil Kumar Das Gupta and Suklimar Ghose, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. M. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Bose, Ad11ocate-General for West Bengal (B.\n\nSen and P. ~· Bose, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nSen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Bose, Ad11ocate-General for West Bengal (B.\n\nSen and P. ~· Bose, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. ~· Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Bose, Ad11ocate-General for West Bengal (B.\n\nSen and P. ~· Bose, with him) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "P. K.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4820, "end_char": 4833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by leave of the High Court of Calcutta under article 132(1) of\n\nthe Constitution.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4900, "end_char": 4914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "28th May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5455, "end_char": 5469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were various charges against him and Mr. Justice Das Gupta was deputed by order of the Chief Justice dated the 28th May, 1951, to make an enquiry and submit a report."}}, {"text": "11th August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5586, "end_char": 5603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Das Gupta made a full enquiry and submitted his report on the 11th August, 1951, in which he exonerated the appellant in respect of some of the charges but found him guilty in respect of the other charges."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge expressed his conclusion as follows:\n\n\"Mr. Bose (the appellant) must be held to be guilty of misconduct and dishonest conduct and\n\n(that) he is unfit to hold the office of Registrar olf the Original Side of this Court\".", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "31st August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6263, "end_char": 6280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was given a hearing by the Chief Justice on the 31st August, 1951 The order dated the 3rd September, 1951, of the Chief Justice dismissing the appellant from his office, a copy of which was served on him, runs as follows :\n\n\"A full and thorough enquiry was held by Mr.\n\nJustice K. C. Das Gupta into the charges made against Sri P. K. Bose the Registrar of the Original Side of this Court."}}, {"text": "September, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6305, "end_char": 6320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was given a hearing by the Chief Justice on the 31st August, 1951 The order dated the 3rd September, 1951, of the Chief Justice dismissing the appellant from his office, a copy of which was served on him, runs as follows :\n\n\"A full and thorough enquiry was held by Mr.\n\nJustice K. C. Das Gupta into the charges made against Sri P. K. Bose the Registrar of the Original Side of this Court."}}, {"text": "K. C. Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6493, "end_char": 6508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was given a hearing by the Chief Justice on the 31st August, 1951 The order dated the 3rd September, 1951, of the Chief Justice dismissing the appellant from his office, a copy of which was served on him, runs as follows :\n\n\"A full and thorough enquiry was held by Mr.\n\nJustice K. C. Das Gupta into the charges made against Sri P. K. Bose the Registrar of the Original Side of this Court."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6543, "end_char": 6553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was given a hearing by the Chief Justice on the 31st August, 1951 The order dated the 3rd September, 1951, of the Chief Justice dismissing the appellant from his office, a copy of which was served on him, runs as follows :\n\n\"A full and thorough enquiry was held by Mr.\n\nJustice K. C. Das Gupta into the charges made against Sri P. K. Bose the Registrar of the Original Side of this Court.", "canonical_name": "P. K.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "P. K.\n\nBose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6959, "end_char": 6970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge however in a full and very carefully considered report found Sri P. K. Bose guilty of serious charges involving moral turpitude and dishonesty and further he was of opinion that Sri P. K.\n\nBose was by reason thereof unfit to hold the said office of Registrar.", "canonical_name": "P. K.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7326, "end_char": 7336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri P. K. Bose was, in my view, clearly guilty of the matter comprised in the charges specified by Mr. Justice K. C. Das Gupta.", "canonical_name": "P. K.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7570, "end_char": 7581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sachin Chaudhri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7769, "end_char": 7784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 31st August, 1951, Sri P. K. Bose showed cause before me and I heard Sri Sachin Chaudhri his counsel and Sri P. K. Bose pesonally."}}, {"text": "1st September, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8337, "end_char": 8356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y.\n\nI therefore dismiss Sri P. K. Bose from his office as Registrar of the Original Side of the Court, the dismissal to take clfect from the 1st September, 1951."}}, {"text": "P.\n\nBose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8401, "end_char": 8409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Let a copy of this order be served on Sri P.\n\nBose\".", "canonical_name": "P. K.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "25th January, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8420, "end_char": 8438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th January, 1952, the appellant submitted a petition to the Governor of West Bengal for cancellation of the above order."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8494, "end_char": 8505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th January, 1952, the appellant submitted a petition to the Governor of West Bengal for cancellation of the above order."}}, {"text": "9th July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8577, "end_char": 8591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He received intimation dated the 9th July, 1952, that the \"Governor declines to interfere on his behalf'."}}, {"text": "Arthur Trevor Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8802, "end_char": 8823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that it was Chief Justice, Sir Arthur Trevor Harries, who had initiated the proceedings against the appellant and passed the order of dismissal."}}, {"text": "P.\n\nB. Chakravarti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9017, "end_char": 9035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for review was made to the successor Chief Justice, Shri P.\n\nB. Chakravarti, on the 11th September, 1952."}}, {"text": "11th September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9044, "end_char": 9064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for review was made to the successor Chief Justice, Shri P.\n\nB. Chakravarti, on the 11th September, 1952."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9294, "end_char": 9305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9878, "end_char": 9882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the presentation of the application the learned Judge on the Original Side, Mr.\n\nJustice Bose, issued a rule nw calling upon the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to show cause why an order in the nature of a writ as asked for should not be made.", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10525, "end_char": 10539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11165, "end_char": 11176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11271, "end_char": 11293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent, i.e., the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta, the learned Advocate-General of West Bengal has\n\nPraiyu K umor\n\nBose\n\nThi Ho11'/Jk tlu Cltiif justice of\n\nCalcutt• High Court\n\nja, annadhaJas j.\n\nPradyat Kumar\n\nBose\n\nThe Hon'ble tht Chief Justict of\n\nCalcutttJ High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhaatu ]."}}, {"text": "Praiyu K umor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11344, "end_char": 11357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent, i.e., the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta, the learned Advocate-General of West Bengal has\n\nPraiyu K umor\n\nBose\n\nThi Ho11'/Jk tlu Cltiif justice of\n\nCalcutt• High Court\n\nja, annadhaJas j.\n\nPradyat Kumar\n\nBose\n\nThe Hon'ble tht Chief Justict of\n\nCalcutttJ High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhaatu ]."}}, {"text": "Pradyat Kumar\n\nBose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11441, "end_char": 11460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent, i.e., the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta, the learned Advocate-General of West Bengal has\n\nPraiyu K umor\n\nBose\n\nThi Ho11'/Jk tlu Cltiif justice of\n\nCalcutt• High Court\n\nja, annadhaJas j.\n\nPradyat Kumar\n\nBose\n\nThe Hon'ble tht Chief Justict of\n\nCalcutttJ High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhaatu ].", "canonical_name": "Pradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhaatu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11519, "end_char": 11532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent, i.e., the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta, the learned Advocate-General of West Bengal has\n\nPraiyu K umor\n\nBose\n\nThi Ho11'/Jk tlu Cltiif justice of\n\nCalcutt• High Court\n\nja, annadhaJas j.\n\nPradyat Kumar\n\nBose\n\nThe Hon'ble tht Chief Justict of\n\nCalcutttJ High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhaatu ].", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12914, "end_char": 12943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 242(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13382, "end_char": 13396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13408, "end_char": 13419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13427, "end_char": 13456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13473, "end_char": 13484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13496, "end_char": 13517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L R. 75 I. A. 343", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13541, "end_char": 13558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13681, "end_char": 13710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13716, "end_char": 13727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13972, "end_char": 13982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13996, "end_char": 14025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "19th June, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14079, "end_char": 14094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rules were framed on the 19th June, 1930, and published on the 21st June, 1930."}}, {"text": "21st June, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14117, "end_char": 14132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rules were framed on the 19th June, 1930, and published on the 21st June, 1930."}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14342, "end_char": 14350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14442, "end_char": 14450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Fort William", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14590, "end_char": 14630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Ve do hereby authorize and empower the Chief Justice of the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, from time to time, as occasion may require, a~<l subject to any rules and restrictions which may be prescribed by the Governor- General in Council, to appoint so many and such clerks and other ministerial officers as shall be found necessary for the administfation of justice, and the due execution of all the powers and authorities granted and committed to the said High Court by these Our Letters Patent."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14634, "end_char": 14640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Ve do hereby authorize and empower the Chief Justice of the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, from time to time, as occasion may require, a~<l subject to any rules and restrictions which may be prescribed by the Governor- General in Council, to appoint so many and such clerks and other ministerial officers as shall be found necessary for the administfation of justice, and the due execution of all the powers and authorities granted and committed to the said High Court by these Our Letters Patent."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15792, "end_char": 15805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And it is Our further will and pleasure and We do hereby for Us, Our heirs and successors give, grant, direct, and appoint, that all and every the officers and clerks to be appointed as aforesaid shall have and receive respectively such reasonable salaries as the Chief Justice shall, from time to time, appoint for each office and place respectively, and as the Governor-General in Council shall approve of: Provided always, and it is Our will and pleasure, that all and every the officers and clerks to be appointed as aforesaid shall be resident within the limits of the jurisdiction of the said Court, so long as they shall hold their respective offices; but\n\nPrad;-al Kumar\n\nBose\n\nThe Hon'bu t/i6\n\nCh~( Juslie1 of\n\nCalcutta High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n!", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Pradyal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15816, "end_char": 15823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nPradyal ,.., .. ,\n\n/Josi\n\nThi Hon'hU th1 Chitf Justice of\n\nCalculla High\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nthis proviso shall not interfere with or prejudice the right of any officer or clerk to avail himself of leave of absence under any rules prescribed by the Governor-General in Council, and to absent himself from the said limits during the term of such leave, in accordance with the said rules\".", "canonical_name": "Pradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Fort William in", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16301, "end_char": 16344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do hereby appoint and ordain, that every clerk and ministerial officer of the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, appointed by virtue of the said Letters Patent of the Fourteenth of May, One thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, shall continue to hold and enjoy his office and employment, with the salary thereunto annexed, until he be removed from such office and employment; and he shall be subject to the like power of removal, regulations, and provisions if he were appointed by virtue of these Letters Patent\"."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16781, "end_char": 16789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16985, "end_char": 16993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17041, "end_char": 17049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17139, "end_char": 17148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17171, "end_char": 17196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that under clause 10 of the Charter of the Supreme Court of Calcutta issued in 1774, the said Court also was in specific terms \"authorized and empowered from time to time, as occ:i.- sion may require, to appoint so many and such clerks wd other ministerial officers as shall be found nece,... sary for the administration of justice\"."}}, {"text": "Charles Wood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17735, "end_char": 17747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Charles Wood, the then Secretary of State for India in paragraph 10 of his dispatch to the Governor-General dated the 17th May, 1862, (on the formation of the new High Courts) stated as follows:\n\n\"The Supreme Court exercises an :i.uthority entirely independent of the Government in respect al\n\nits ministerial officers\"."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17781, "end_char": 17786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Charles Wood, the then Secretary of State for India in paragraph 10 of his dispatch to the Governor-General dated the 17th May, 1862, (on the formation of the new High Courts) stated as follows:\n\n\"The Supreme Court exercises an :i.uthority entirely independent of the Government in respect al\n\nits ministerial officers\"."}}, {"text": "17th May, 1862", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17853, "end_char": 17867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Charles Wood, the then Secretary of State for India in paragraph 10 of his dispatch to the Governor-General dated the 17th May, 1862, (on the formation of the new High Courts) stated as follows:\n\n\"The Supreme Court exercises an :i.uthority entirely independent of the Government in respect al\n\nits ministerial officers\"."}}, {"text": "Supreme and Sadar Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18218, "end_char": 18242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this power and authority along with other judicial power and authority that was succeeded to by the High Courts (on their formation in supersession of the Supreme and Sadar Courts) by virtue of section 9 of the Indian High Courts Act, in the following terms."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18257, "end_char": 18266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Each of the High Courts to be established under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18324, "end_char": 18379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "can be no doubt that this position continued at least until the Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18936, "end_char": 19029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19037, "end_char": 19048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no doubt that this position continued at least until the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "There can be no doubt that this position continued at least until the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19056, "end_char": 19085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19473, "end_char": 19488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19690, "end_char": 19699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1915", "statute": "India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19724, "end_char": 19732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1915", "statute": "India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20046, "end_char": 20061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "JaganfUldhodAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20218, "end_char": 20232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Jwtica of\n\nCalcuJta High\n\nCourt\n\nJaganfUldhodAI J\n\nPradyal Kumar\n\nBos•\n\nThe Hon'blt Ou\n\nChi~{ ,]u.tlice of\n\nCO!c11tta Jligh\n\nCourl\n\nCivil Services Rules framed by virtue of delegated power under the Act could not override the specific power of appointment vested in the Chief f ustice by virtue of section 106 thereof, they would override the alleged implications of that power such as the power of dismissal and power to frame rules relating to conditions of service in so far as they are specifically provided for under the Civil Services Rules."}}, {"text": "Pradyal Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20236, "end_char": 20249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Jwtica of\n\nCalcuJta High\n\nCourt\n\nJaganfUldhodAI J\n\nPradyal Kumar\n\nBos•\n\nThe Hon'blt Ou\n\nChi~{ ,]u.tlice of\n\nCO!c11tta Jligh\n\nCourl\n\nCivil Services Rules framed by virtue of delegated power under the Act could not override the specific power of appointment vested in the Chief f ustice by virtue of section 106 thereof, they would override the alleged implications of that power such as the power of dismissal and power to frame rules relating to conditions of service in so far as they are specifically provided for under the Civil Services Rules.", "canonical_name": "Pradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose"}}, {"text": "Civil Services Rules framed by virtue of delegated power under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20317, "end_char": 20387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20483, "end_char": 20494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jligh\n\nCourl\n\nCivil Services Rules framed by virtue of delegated power under the Act", "statute": "Jligh\n\nCourl\n\nCivil Services Rules framed by virtue of delegated power under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 276", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20812, "end_char": 20823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jligh\n\nCourl\n\nCivil Services Rules framed by virtue of delegated power under the Act", "statute": "Jligh\n\nCourl\n\nCivil Services Rules framed by virtue of delegated power under the Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20832, "end_char": 20861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20866, "end_char": 20877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21065, "end_char": 21094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21313, "end_char": 21342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 240(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21492, "end_char": 21506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21557, "end_char": 21567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21802, "end_char": 21813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 242( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22010, "end_char": 22025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22097, "end_char": 22108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22548, "end_char": 22576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23848, "end_char": 23856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24327, "end_char": 24338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24545, "end_char": 24566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) Appointments of officers and servants u£ a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of\n\nPr•tlyat 1\\ umat\n\nBou\n\nTht Hon'bk t/11 Chief Justice of Calcutta High\n\nCourt\n\nPradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose\n\n\"· The Hon'ble t/1e Chief Justice of\n\nCalcutta Hig/1\n\nCourt\n\nJagannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "Pradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose"}}, {"text": "section 276", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26067, "end_char": 26078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26121, "end_char": 26132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 276", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26177, "end_char": 26188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Until other provision is made under the appropiate provisions of this Part of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26190, "end_char": 26276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26671, "end_char": 26682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Until other provision is made under the appropiate provisions of this Part of this Act", "statute": "Until other provision is made under the appropiate provisions of this Part of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 276", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27174, "end_char": 27185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Until other provision is made under the appropiate provisions of this Part of this Act", "statute": "Until other provision is made under the appropiate provisions of this Part of this Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27193, "end_char": 27222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 276", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27900, "end_char": 27911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 242( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28109, "end_char": 28124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28163, "end_char": 28174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "JagannaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28938, "end_char": 28946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "umar\n\nBoS<\n\nThe llon'hl• the Chief :Justice nf\n\nCalcutta High\n\nCourt\n\n:JagannaJ:, adas J.\n\nPraJyat A11mu\n\nBoJt v.\n\nTM Hon\"blt IR1 Chief ]us tic1 of\n\nCalcuJta Hith\n\nCf!llfl\n\nation of the old rules."}}, {"text": "PraJyat A11mu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28958, "end_char": 28971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "umar\n\nBoS<\n\nThe llon'hl• the Chief :Justice nf\n\nCalcutta High\n\nCourt\n\n:JagannaJ:, adas J.\n\nPraJyat A11mu\n\nBoJt v.\n\nTM Hon\"blt IR1 Chief ]us tic1 of\n\nCalcuJta Hith\n\nCf!llfl\n\nation of the old rules."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29877, "end_char": 29906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 3B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30532, "end_char": 30542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30698, "end_char": 30727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 229(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31075, "end_char": 31089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31244, "end_char": 31254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31262, "end_char": 31281, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 367(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31301, "end_char": 31315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 229( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31393, "end_char": 31408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31411, "end_char": 31421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31429, "end_char": 31448, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jagarmadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33432, "end_char": 33445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prdyat Kumar\n\nBose v.\n\nThe Ho11'ble 1/1' Chief J11stice of\n\nCalcutta Hig!i\n\nCourt\n\nJagarmadhadas J.\n\nPrad1•at Kumar\n\n.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34578, "end_char": 34588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the Local Government Board it is not doubtful what this procedure is..\n\nTl1e Minister at the head of the Board is directly responsible to Parliament like other Ministers."}}, {"text": "article 320( 3 )( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35708, "end_char": 35728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 311(1), 311(2) and 320(3)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36070, "end_char": 36107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 320(3)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36109, "end_char": 36126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36200, "end_char": 36231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 320(3)(c) so far as it is reievant for the present purpose, runs as follows:\n\n\"The Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil capacity, including memorials or petitions relating to such matters\"."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36859, "end_char": 36878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question for comicleration, therefore, is whether a person belonging to the staff of a High Court is within the scope of the phrase \"a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civii capacity\"."}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36992, "end_char": 37006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37085, "end_char": 37099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37187, "end_char": 37198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 229(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37447, "end_char": 37461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37497, "end_char": 37528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also point out that the proviso to article 229(1) indicates the requirement that the State Public Service Commission should be consulted only in respect .of the specific cases of future appointments and that too if the Governor of the State so requires by rule."}}, {"text": "Pradvilt Kwr.ur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37844, "end_char": 37859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nPradvilt Kwr.ur\n\nBose v.\n\nToe Hen' ble the\n\nChi~( ]11sttte oj-\n\nCalu1tin Hi."}}, {"text": "article 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38186, "end_char": 38197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38415, "end_char": 38429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38468, "end_char": 38479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38554, "end_char": 38568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38815, "end_char": 38829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39233, "end_char": 39247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39653, "end_char": 39664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 310", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39889, "end_char": 39900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40134, "end_char": 40143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40671, "end_char": 40685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41006, "end_char": 41020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 310 and 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41039, "end_char": 41059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 310 and 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41348, "end_char": 41368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 229(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41447, "end_char": 41461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41855, "end_char": 41866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41959, "end_char": 41970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42282, "end_char": 42299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42430, "end_char": 42441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42489, "end_char": 42500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pradyat Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42641, "end_char": 42654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nPradyat Kumar\n\nBose\n\nTM Hon'b/e the\n\nCkif Jujtice of\n\nCalcutta Hig.", "canonical_name": "Pradvat Kumar\n\n, Bose"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42825, "end_char": 42839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43478, "end_char": 43488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The phrase \"persons serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State\" seems to have reference to such persons m respect of whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Governments functioning in the name of the President or of the Governor or of a Rajpramukh."}}, {"text": "Articles 53, 77, 154 and 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43809, "end_char": 43837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44323, "end_char": 44337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44560, "end_char": 44571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 266(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44731, "end_char": 44745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 266", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44877, "end_char": 44888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45769, "end_char": 45780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45850, "end_char": 45864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46163, "end_char": 46177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46223, "end_char": 46234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 320(3)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46561, "end_char": 46578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bost", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47243, "end_char": 47247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nrady'al Kumar\n\nBost\n\nv. ihr lhm'hle lite Clzir( J:otire of\n\nCal11 tta High\n\n':.'&urt\n\nJagannt11//1a.das ]."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48162, "end_char": 48173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48450, "end_char": 48461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "3rd September, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48501, "end_char": 48520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result the appeal must be dismissed with costs-\n\nAlong with this appeal, the appellant filed an application to this Court for leave under article 136 to appeal against the orders dated the 3rd September, 1951, and 16th September, 1952, dismissing him from service and declining to review it."}}, {"text": "16th September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48526, "end_char": 48546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result the appeal must be dismissed with costs-\n\nAlong with this appeal, the appellant filed an application to this Court for leave under article 136 to appeal against the orders dated the 3rd September, 1951, and 16th September, 1952, dismissing him from service and declining to review it."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_164_185_EN", "year": 1955, "text": ". ·• ' \\ \\ .\n\n'. \\ ''' 164\n\nSUPREME COURT .REPORTS [1955]\n\n 1955 High Court already pronounced against his conviction after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties . u.!.s~hoJ>ra on notice being issued by the High Court in that bestate of &mbay half.· This right of his is not curtailed by anything contained in the earlier provisions of section 439 nor BhagwatiJ. by anything contained in either section 369 or section ·· 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nA}ril 6\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that the decision reae, hed by the High Court of Bombay in the case under appeal was wrong and must be reversed. We accordingly allow the appeal and remand the matter back to the High Court ofJudicatureatBombaywith . a direction that it shall allow the Appellant to show cause'against his conviction and dispose of the same ticcording tq law. ·· ·\n\nBY THE CouRT.-The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court of Bombay is . set aside, and thematter is sent back to the High Court with a direction that it shall allow the appellant an opportunity to show cause against his conviction and dispose of the matter according to law. .\n\nl\\IAHARAJ UMEG SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF BOl\\IBAY AND OTHERS.\n\n[l\\ImrnERJEA, C.J., DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\n AYYAR and JAFE~ lllIAM JJ.]\n\nBombay Merged Territories and Areas (J agirs Abolition) Act, 1953 (Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954)-Whether ultra vires-Agreement of Merger with, and letters of guarantee to, .Rulers of States by the G<YL- . ernment of India-Clause 5 of the letters of guarantee-Scope-Legislative powers of States under Article iU6 of the Constiiution-Limita• tion• thereon-Article'363 of the Constitution-Bar to Courts' jurisdiction-Fundamental rights-Articles 14, 19(1)(/), 31(2) of Con stitution-Applicability in view of Article 81-A(2)( a). · ·\n\nUnder Article 246(2) and (3) of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State has plenary powers to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to\n\nhe Co11stitutio11.\n\nThe legislative competence of the State Legisl~·\n\nture can only be circumscribed hy express prohibition contained in the Constimt[on itsdf and u.nless there is any provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting legislation on a subject either absolutely or conditionally, there is no fetter or limitation on the plenary powers which the State Legislture enjoys to legislate on the ropics enumerated in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Consticution. In view of Ar.icle 246 of the Constitution, no curtailment of legislative competence can be spelt out of the terms of Clause 5 of the Letters of Guarantee given by the Dominion Government to the Rukrs of \"States\" subsequent to the agreemnts of Merger, which guaranteed, inter alia, the continuance of Jagirs in the merged \"St1tes\". Indeed, Clause 5 of the Letters of Guarantee itself saved the legislative right of the State of Bombay subject to the limitation that enactments of the State shall not be discriminatory in nature.\n\nAttac1<s on the validity of the said Act on the basis of the rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(l)(f), and 32(2) of the Constitution cannot be countenanced in view of Article 31-A(2)(a) of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 363 (1) of the Constitution barred the jurisdiction of Courts in disputes arising out of any provision of the agreements of merger and the Letters of Guarantee.\n\nHeld, that Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954, the impugned Act, was intra vzres the State Legislature.\n\nPetitions Nos. 337 to 349, 365, 366, 481 and 690 of 1954 Dismi, sed.\n\nPetition No. 364 of 1954 Adiourned.\n\nVajesingji v. Secretary of State (51 I.A. 357), Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam (68 I.A. 109),_ State of Savaiella v. Union of India (1951 S.C.R. 474), Thakur Jagannath v. The United Provinces ([1943] F.C.R. 72), Thakur Jagannath v. The United Provinces ([1946] F.C.R. 111), referred to.\n\n0RIGWAL JurusmcnoN: .Petitions under Article 12 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights\n\nK. L. Ga11ba, (Gopal Singh, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 337 to 343 and 481 of \\954.\n\nK. l. Gauha, (S. D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 344, 446 and 349 of 1954.\n\nK. l. Gauba. (R. Patnaik and S. D. Sekhri, with himL for the Petitioner in Petition No. 345 of 1954.\n\n22-8 SCJ/ND.'82\n\n19$5\n\nMaharaj -Umeg Singh and \"'thers\n\nThe State ef Bombay and otkrs\n\nMaharaj Umeg Sin, I• dhd otltrs\n\nv •\n\nK .. L. Gauba, (N. C. Chakravarthy and S, D.\n\nSekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No. 347 of 1954.\n\n.so~%;':,; d:{hers K. L. Gauba, (8. Moropant and S. D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No. 348 of 1954.\n\nRajni Patel and M. S. K. Sastri, for the Petitioner in Petition No. 364 of 1954.\n\nRajni Patel and I. N. Shroff, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 365 and 366 of 1954.\n\n J. 8. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioner in Petition No. 690 of 1954.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P. 4. Mehta, R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the Respondents in all Petitions.\n\n1955. April 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution are directed against the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953, Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954 which was passed by the Legislature of the State of Bombay to abolish jagin in the merged territories and merged areas in the State of Bombay. The Bill. was passed by the Legislature on the .22nd September 1953 and received the sanction of the Upper House on the 26th September\n\n1953. The President gave his assent to it on the 13th June 1954 and by a notification dated the 15th July 1954 it was brought into effect from the !st August\n\n1954. In view of the notification the Petitioners filed these petitions on the 30th July 1954 challenging the vires of the Act (hereinafter called the impugned Act) and asking for the issue of appropriate writs restraining inter alia the State of Bombay from giving effect to its provisions. On application~ made to this CQurt on the 31st July 1954 the operation of the impugned Act was stayed pending the hearing and final disposal of the petitions,\n\nThe Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 337, 344, 345, 346, 195$ 347 and 349 of 1954 are relations of the Ruler of the Mdharai Umet erst while State of Idar. The Petitioners in Petitions Sinth and o111ers Nos. 338 and 342 of 1954 are relations of the Ruler of The Stte of the erstwhile State of Chhota Udaipur. The Peti- Bombayandother tioners in Petitions Nos. 339 and 341 are relations of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Devgad Baria. The Petitioner in Petition No. 343 of- 1954 is a relation of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Rajpipla. The Petitioners in Petition No. 340 of 1954 are jagirdars of the erstwhile State of Rajpipla. The Petitioner in Petition No. 3415 of 1954 is a relation of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Ba:nsda. The Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 365 and 366 of 1954 are jagirdars of the erstwhile States of Idar and Lunawada respectively. The Petitioner in Petition No. 481 of 1954 is a relation of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Mohanpur. The Petitioners n Petition No. 690 of 1954 are the holders of personal Inams from the erstwhile State of Rajpipla.\n\nAll the petitioners except the last claim to be hereditary jagirdars under grants made by the respective\n\nStates for the maintenance of themselves, their families and dependants and hold the jagirs as 'Jiwai Jagirs'. The holders of the personal Inams in Petition No. 690 of 1954 used to pay salami to the erstwhile State of Rajpipla and are included within the definition of \"jagirdar\" being holders of jagir villages within the meaning of the definition thereof contained in the impugned Act.\n\nThe Petitioner in Petition No. 364 of 1954 claims to be the owner of 60 villages in the patta or territory of Moti Moree comprised in the erstwhile State of Idar as the Bhumia or under-lord and contends that his holding does not fall within the definition of jagir as given in the impugned Act and that therefore in any event the State of Bombay is not entitled to enforce the impugned Act against him.\n\nAll these Petitioners have challenged the vires of the impugned Act mainly relying upon the agreements cf merger entered into by the Rulers of the respective St1tcs with the Dominion of India on or about the J 9th March 1948 and the collateral letters of guarantee\n\nB/iazwari J.\n\nJ9jS passed by the Ministry of States in their favour on Maharaj Umeg subsequent dates, the contents of which were regarded Singh an4 otliers as part of the merger agreements entered into by them\n\nTh;;,~,. 'If with the Dominion of India.\n\nBtJprbay and otlrers Tht merger agreements were in the form given in Appendix XIII to the White Paper at page 183: BhagwatiJ.\n\n\"FORM OF MERGER AGREEMENT SIGNED\n\nBY RULERS OF GUJARAT AND DECCAN\n\nSTATES\n\nAGREEMENT MADE THIS day between the Governor-General of India and the of Whereas in the immediate interests of the State and its people, the of is desirous that the administration of the State should be integrated as eariy as possible with that of the Province of in such manner as the Government of the Dominion of India may think fit; It is hereby agreed as follows:···-\n\nARTICLE I.\n\nThe of hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the day of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as \"the said day\").\n\nAs from the said day the Dominion Government will be cqmpetent to exercise the said powers, authority and jurisdiction in such manner and through such agency as it may think fit.\n\nARTICLE 2.\n\nTlie shall with effect from the said day be entitled to receive from the revenues ef the State annually for his privy purse the sum of rupees free of taxes. This amount is intended to cover all the expenses of the Ruier and his family. including expenses on account of his personal staff, maintenance of his residences .\n\nmarriages and other ceremonies, etc. and will neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever.\n\nThe said sum may be drawn by the m four equal instalments in advance at the beginning of 'each quartei: by presenting bills at the State Treasury or at such other Treasury as may be specified by the Dominion Government.\n\nARTICLE 3.\n\nThe shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) helonging to him on the date of this agreement.\n\nThe will furnish to the Dominion Government before the day of 1948 an inventory of all the immovable property, securities and cash balance held by him as such private property.\n\nIr any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the or State property, it shall be referred to such officer with judicial experience as the Dominion Government may nominate and the decision of that officer shall be final and bfoding on both parties.\n\nARTICLE 4.\n\nThe shall be entitled to all personal privileges enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August 1947.\n\nARTICLE 5.\n\nThe Dominion Government guarantees the succession, according to law and custom, to the gadi of the State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles.\n\nIn confirmation whe;:reof Mr. Vapal Pangunni Menon, Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of States, has appended his sigmtture on behalf and with the authority of the Governor-General of India and has appended his\n\nMaharaj Umi!g Singh and others v.\n\nThe State of Sombay and others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nMaharaj Un1e1\n\nSignature on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, of Singh and others Dated v. ,• Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of The State of Bombay wrd others\n\nBliagwatiJ ...\n\nStates\".\n\nThe l!!tters of guarantee' subsequently executed by the Ministry of States in favour of the respective Rulers contained the following guarantees:-\n\n\"(!) Your privy purse will be fixed in accordance with the formula applied in relation to the fixation of the privy purse of the Deccan States Rulers whose States have merged into the Bombay Province.\n\nThe amount will be fixed in perpetuity to you, your heirs and successors, and will neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever. Tt will be free of ail taxes, whether imposed by the Government of Born bay or by the Government of India and it will not be taken into account in the assessment of your world income to income-tax or super-tax.\n\n(2) The cash balances and other assets of your State on the day you transfer the administration of your State to the Dominion Government will, as far as possible, be spent for the benefit of the people of your State.\n\n(3) You will be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all Darbari or private properties (as distinct from State Properties) belonging to you on the date of your making over the administration of your State to the Dominion Government.\n\nDarbari properties will include palaces, houses, residence>, guest houses, stables, garages, quarters, outhouses. etc. which are at the date of transfer of administration in bona fide personal use or occupation of the Ruler or member~ of his family or personal staff. irrespective of whether the property is situated in the Capital, or at any other place in the State, or in Bombay, or anywhere else outside.\n\n14) The continuation in service of the permanent members of the public services of your State is hereby guaranteed on conditions which will be no less advantageous than those on which they were serving\n\non lst April 1948. In the event of continuation of service not being possible in any case, reasonable compensation will be paid.\n\n< 5) Pensions, gratuities, annuities, and allowances. granted by the State to the members of its public services who have retired or have proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement before 1st April 1948 as also the enjoyment of the ownership of Khangi villages. lands, jagir, grants, etc. existing on 1st April\n\n1918 are hereby guaranteed. This guarantee is without prejudice to the right of Government of Bombay to issue any legislation which does not discriminate against the States and their subjects.\n\n(6) AH emblems, insignia, articJes and other paraphernalia of the Ruler will be considered as belonging to. and be regarded as his private property.\n\n(7) No order passed or action taken by you before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken <tfter the l st of April 1948 and is considered by the Government of fodia to be palpably unjust or unreasonable. The decision of the Government of India in this respect will be final.\n\n<R) No enquiry shall be made nor shall proceeding~ lie in any Court in India against you, whether in a oersonal capacity or otherwise, in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by you or under vonr authority during the period of your administration of the State.\n\n(9) Every question of disnuted succession in reg.ard to a Gujarat State which has signed an agreement integrating the administration of the State with that of the Province of Bombav shall be decided bv a CNmcil of Rulers of Gujarat States after referrin!! it to the Hi!!h Court of Bombav and in accordance with the ooinion given by that Hi!!h Court. All questions relating to the rh?hts. dfonities and orivileges of tht3 Ruler will also he considereo bv the Council of Rulers who shaJI make suitable recommendationc; to the Government of Bombay and the Government of India. The Council shall consist of the Rulers of all\n\nMaltaraj Umeq Singh and orhs\n\nThe State of Bomba;• and others\n\nBlrafwati J.\n\n1955 full _jurisdictional Gujarat States, whether salue or Maharaj Umeg non-salute. No ruler who is less than 21 years of age Singh ai; others shall however be a member of the Council. The\n\nBoTlbie s1a1de 01, Council will elect one of its members to be the Presi- ,,, ay an ot11ers . , -- dent of the Counc1l. The President and the members Bhagwari.f. of the Council will hold office for a term of five years from tht date on which they enter upon the duties of their respective offices.\n\n2. The contents of this letter will be regarded as part ot the merger agreement entered into by you with the Governor-General of India\".\n\nThe contention which has been urged before us by the Petitioners relying upon clause 5 of the Letters of Guarantee aforesaid is that the enjoyment of the <Jwnership of the jagirs existing on the !st Ap_ril, 1948 was guaranteed, that this guarantee was binding on the State of Bombay, that the State of Bombay and therefore the State Legislature had waived the right, it any, or in any event had no legislative competence to enact any legislation depriving the holders of the jagirs oi their right of ownership over the same, and that even though the Government of Bombay has reserved to itself the right to issue any legislation which did not discriminate against the states and their subjects, the impugned Act was ultra vires inasmuch as no legislation could be undertaken which would have the effect of depriving the holders of the jagirs of their ownethip over the same and the provisions of the impugned Act were in any event discriminatory against the States and their subjects or in other words the impugned Act was confiscatory and also discriminatory.\n\nJt was contended on the other hand on behalf of the State of Bombay that the agreements of merger and the letters of p; uarantee were executed bv the Dominion of India and were not binding on the state of Bombay, that the Petitioners were not parties to the aitreements of mer11er and letters of p; uarantee and that thev were not entitled to enforce the same. that even if they be treated as parties thereto the disoute between the parties arose out of the provisions of the . a'!reements and covenants which were entered into or\n\nexecuted before the commencement of the Constitution by the Rulers of the respective states and to which the Government of Dominion of I1, dia was a party and that therefore this Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the said disputes by virtue of the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution, that the State Legislature had plenary powers of legislation within the ambit of its sphere unless the Constitution itself expressly prohibited legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally, that no sucli prohibition could be soelt out of the terms of clause 5 of the letters of guarantee and that the impugned Act was intra vires the power of the State Legislature and could not be challenged. Once that position was established it was further ur_ed that the jagirs in w1estion were estates within the definition of the expression in article 3 l-A(2)(a) of the Constitution and the impugned legislation being a legislation providing for the acquisition by the State of the estates and the rights therein or for the extinguishment or modificaticm of the same could not be challenged as void on the ground that it was inconsistent with or abridged any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution, and that therefore the impugned Act could not be challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights of the Petitioners. It was also urged that none of the provisions of the impugned Act were confiscatory or in any manner whatevr discriminatory, fair and adequate compensation having been provided for the abolition of the jagirs and the States and their subjects not having been dealt with in any discriminatory manner as compared wifh the subjects of the original State of Bombay.\n\nAs regards the contention that the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee were executed by the Dominion of India and were not binding on the State of Bombay it was urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the Government of the Dominion of India was certainly bound by those guarantees and this ohliQation of the Dominion Government devolved upo~ the Province of Bombay when the erstwhile State5 which were parties to the agreements of merger\n\nZ3--S ~IiND/82\n\nMaharaj Umeg Singh and others v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and'others\n\nBhagwat I J.\n\n1955 and the letters of guarantee became merged in the Mn/UJrlli Umeg Province of Bombay, under clause 8 of the States' Sin;'il and 01/iers Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949 (Appendix\n\nThelia1eof XLIV. White Paper, Page 297), that these obligations\n\n!k>mhnyandotlie~<were thus deemed to have been undertaken by the\n\nIlha11wa1i J..\n\nDominion Government on behalf of the absorbing Province, viz., the Province of Bombay and were binding upon the Province of Bombay, and that when the Constitution came into force from the 26th January\n\n1950 all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of each Governors' Province whether arising out of anv contract or otherwise were under article 294 of the- Constitution to be the rights, liabilities and obligations respectively of the Government of each corresponding State and these obligations of the Province of Bombay accordingly became the obligations of the State of Bombay. It was further urged that the State of Bombay was thus bound by all the obligations which had been undertaken by the Dominion Government under the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee above referred to, and it could not lie in the mouth of the State of Bombay to repudiate the same.\n\nThis argument is not without force, but we do not consider it necessary to decide this question because even assuming that the State of Bombay was bound by these obligations, the question still remains how tar the Petitioners before us are entitled to enforce these obligations against the State of Bombay.. The Petitioners were certainly not parties to these agreements of merger and letters of guarantee ea nominee.\n\nThey could only claim to be parties to the same by reason of the fact that the Rulers of the erstwhile States did not negotiate these agreements of merger or obtain the letters of guarantee '.lnly in respect of their personal rights and properties but also represented the States and their subjects in the matter of obtaining the same and the subject of these States were therefore represented by the Rulers and were entitled to the benefit of whatever obligations were under- . taken by the Dominion of India qua. the States and their subjects. It is therefore arguable that the Rulers\n\nof the erstwhile States as also their subjects would be m a position to enforce these obligations. This position was however sought to be negatived by relying upon the following observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vajesingji .Joravarsingji v. Secre tary of State for India in Council(') at page 360: -\n\n\"But a. summary of the matter is this: when a territory is acquired by a sovereign state for the first time that is an act of state. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hither to unoccupied by a recognized ruler. In all cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers. recognised. Such rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing.\n\nNay more even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights. that does not give a title to those inhabitants to enorce these stipulations in the municipal Courts.\n\nThe nght to enforce remains only with the high contracting parties\".\n\nThese observations were quoted with approval in Secretary of Stltte v. Sardar Rustam Khan & Others<') at page J 24. It was therefore urged that it will he the high contracting parties, viz., the Rulers of the respective States who would be in a position to enforce these obligations and not the Petitioners for whose benefit these obligations were undertaken by the Dominion Government\n\nWe do not feel called upon to pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of these contentions also for the simple. reason that the Petitioners would be out of Court either way. If they were deemed to be parties to the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee thev would be faced with the bar to the maintain- , ability of the petitions under article 363 of the Constit11tion which lays down that neither the Supreme\n\n(I) 51 Indian :\\ppcals 357.\n\n(2) 68 Indian Appeals 109.\n\nMaharaj Umeg Singh and other.<\n\nThe State Qj Bombay and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nl9SS Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in Maha; aJ umeg any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, Siniftand others agreement, covenant. engagement, sanad or other\n\nThe;,~,. of similar instrument which was entered into or executed Bombay and others before the commencement of the Constitution by any\n\nBha;;;;;,; J.\n\nRuler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India ............... was a party.\n\nIf on the other hand they were deemed not to have been parties to the same they would not be the contracting parties and would certainly not be able to enforce these obligations.\n\nIt was therefore urged on behalf of the Petitioners that thi: dispute between the parties did not arise , out of the provisions of the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee which were entered into or .executed by the Rulers of the respective States and to which the Government of the Dominion of India was a party. According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act and relied upon clause 5 of the letters of guarantee in order to establish the position that the State Legislature had no legislative competence to legislate\n\n(Ill the subject of the abolition of .iagirs. That was, it was submitted, not a dispute arising out of the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee but arose out of the act of the State Legislature in enacting the impugned Act in direct contravention of the guarantee incorporated in clause 5 of the letters of guarantee. This argument however would not avail the Pt:titioners, because if one looked into the averments contained in their petitions it was clear that the whole ambit of the petitions was to enforce clause 5 of the letters of guarantee. The Petitioners relied upon clause 5 of the letters of guarantee which had been obtained by the Rulers of the erstwhile State from the Dominion Government and complained that the State Legislature had enacted the impugned Act which it had no power to enact having regard to clause 5 of the said letters of guarantee and were wrongfully depriving the Petitioners of the jagirs, the ownership of which had been guaranteed thereunder. The whole of the petitions were nothing else except the\n\nclaim to enforce the Petitioners' rights under the 1955 letters of guarantee, and the disputes therefore were Maharaf Umeg clearly in respect of the agreements of merger and Singh and others the letters of guarantee and were covered by article The Site of 363< 1) of the Constitution. A similar ::ontention had Bombay and oriJers been raised on behalf of the plaintiffs in State of Bhagwati J.\n\nSeraikella and Others v. Union of India and Anot.her( 1 ) and was repelled by Kania, C.J. at page 490 as under:-\n\n\"The plaintiff contends firstly that it had signed the Instrument of Accession through its Ruler. The State next complains that, acting beyond the powers given over under the Instrument of Accession, the Dominion of India aJJ.d the State of Bihar are trespassing wrongfully on its legislative and executive functions, that the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are making laws which they have no power to make, having regard to the Instrument of Accession, and are wrongfully interfering with the administration of the State beyond the rights given to them under the Instrument of Accession. The whole plaint is nothing else except the claim to enforce the plaintiff'~ rfo:ht under the Instrument of Accession. The\n\ndispute~ therefore in my opinion clearly fs in respect of this Instrument of Accession and is covered by Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India. The question of the validity of the different enactments and orders is also based on the rights claimed under the Instrument of Accession so far as the plaintiff is concerned\"\n\nIt could not therefore be urged that what the Petitioners were doing was not to enforce the obligations undestaken by the Dominion . Government under the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee, or that the disputes between the parties did not arise out of the provisions of the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee which were entered into or executed by the Rulers of the respective States and to which the Government of Dominion of India was a party within the meaning of Article 363 of the Constitution.\n\n(I) 1951 S.C'.R. 47·1.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT8 [i955]\n\n1955 It that was the position the jurisdictwn of this Maharaj umec Court was ousted and this Court could not interfere Singh u11d others in those disputes. Assuming however that the Peti-\n\nThe 1tte of tioners wer!: entitled to enforce the obligation and Bombay and others guarantee incorporated in clause 5 of the letters of\n\nBhacwatiJ. guarantee the further difficulty in the way of the Petitioners is that the State Legislature was fully competent to enact the impugned Act notwithstanding the terms of the guarantee. The legislative competence of the State Legislature can only be circumscribed by express prohibition contained in the Constitution itself and unless and until . there is any provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting legislation on the sub1ect either absolutely or conditionaJly, there is no fetter or limitation on the plenary powers which the State Legislature enjoys to legislate on the topics enumerated in the Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It was concecied on behalf of the Pet; tioners that the topic cf legislation which was covered by the impugned Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act could not be challenged on that ground.\n\nThe ground of attack was that the Dominion Government. and therefore the State Government had waived its right to legislate on the topic of the abolition of jagirs or had in any event put a fetter or limitation or their power to issue any legislation in that behalf by the terms of the guarantee contained in clause 5 of the letters of guarantee. It was contended that under the terms of clause 5 an absolute guarantee had been given by the Dominion Government in regard to the.enjoyment of the ownership of jagirs and that the Dominion Government and there\" fore the State of Bombay were precluded from enacting anv legislation which had the effect of destroying that ownership. This contention however could not be supported by the terms of clause 5 which embodied in the first part thereof the terms of the guarante, and went on to provide in the second part that this guarantee was without prejudice to the right of the Government of Bombay to issue any legislation which did not cliscriminte against the States and their\n\nsub.iects. It was therefore not an absolute g11arantee but was circumscribed or cut down by the reservation of the power to make law with respect to jagirs provided such law did not discriminate against the State.s and_ their subjects. The right of the Government of Bombay which was th11s reserved covered the whole of the guarantee embodied in the first part of the clause and there was nothing in these terms which would go to show that the ownership of the jagirs could not be touched and the legislation, if any, was to be enacted in regard to certain incidents of enjoyment of such ownership. The right of the Government of Hom bay to issue any legislation with regard to the enjoyment of the ownership of jagir hmds was expressly reserved and this right covered also legislation in regard to the abolition of the jagirs and the Government of Bombay was therefore entitled under the terms of this clause 5 to issue any legislation iPregard to the same provided however that such legislation did not discriminate against the States :rnd their subjects. That was the only fetter or limitation, imposed upon the right of the Government of Bombay to issue any legislation in regard to the enjoyment of the ownership of jair lands and if that fetter or limitation could also be imposed on the State Legislature the Petitioners would have had a right to challenge the impt>gned Act on the ground that it discriminated\n\nagaint the States and their subjects.\n\nThe fetter or limitation upon the legislative power of the State Legislature which had plenary powers of Jegi, lation within the ambit of the legislative heads specifie<l in the Lists TI & III of the Seventh 'Schedule to the Cor<:titution onld only be imposed by the Constitution itself nd not by any obligatio11 which had been undertaken by either the Dominion Government or the Province of - Bombay or even the State of Bombay. Under Article 246 the State Legislature was invested with the oower to legislate on the topics enumerated in Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and this power was by virture of article 245(1) subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution itself laid down the fetters\n\nMahara Unlf'g Singh and other.f\n\nThe State of Bomba)' a11d others\n\nB/iagwmi J.\n\n1955 or limitations on this power, e.g., in article 303 or\n\nMaharaj Umq article 286(2). But unless and until the Court came Singh and others h . v. to t e conclusion that the Constitution itelf had ex-\n\nBoTlb\" Statde 01, pressly prohibited legislation on the sub1\"ect either m ay an 01'1trs b l I . . . -. a so ute y or cond1t1onally the power of the State Bhagwatl J.\n\nLegislature to enact legislation within its legislative 'Competence was plenary. Once the topic of legislation was comprised within any of the entries in the Lists IT & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the fetter or limitation on such legislative power had to be found within the Constitution itself and if there was no such fetter or limitation to be found there the State Legislature had full competence to enact the impugned Act no matter whether such enactment was contrary to the guarantee given, or the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even the State of Bombay. The Petitioners would have a legitimate grievance in the matter of the deprivation of their rights of ownership of the jagir lands in so far as the States and their su biects were discriminated against, hut they would not be able to have their grievance redressed by this Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act not being fettered at all by the terms of clause 5 of the letters of guarantee. The provisions ot article 294(b) of the Constitution which is said to have transferred the obligations of the Government of the Province to the State of Bombay w0uld not by involving the transference of the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government in clause 5 of the letters of guarantee to the State Government impose a fetter or limitation on the legislative competence of the State Legislature to en-act legislation on any of the topics enumerated in Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The remedy of the Petitioners would be elsewhere and not in this forum. The learned Judges of the Federal Court gave an answer to a similar complaint of the Taluqdars of Oudh made by them against the\n\nUnited Provinces Tenancy /\\ct XVII of 1939 in Th11kw\n\nJrrgannMh Raksh Singh v. The United Provinces(') at page 87:-\n\nMaharaj Umeg Singh alJd others \"We desire, however, to point out that what they The s~re of are now claiming is that no Legislature in India has Bombay and others any right to alter the arrangements embodied in their Bhag.;; tiJ. sanads nearly a century ago; and, for all we know, they would deny the right of Parliament itself to do so. We hope that no responsible Legislature or Government would ever treat as of no account solemn pledges given by their predecessors; but the readjustment of rights and duties is an inevitable process, and one of the functions of the Legislature in a modern State is to effect that readjustment, where circumstances have made it necessary, with justice to all concerned. It is however, not for this Court to pronounce upon the wisdom or the justice, in the broader sense, of legislative acts; it can only say whether they were validly enacted,. ............................. \"\n\nThese observations were quoted with approval by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur Jag(lnnath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces(')\" at page 122 and we also would observe in the same strain that we are not concerned with the policy of the State Legislature in enacting the impugned Act for abolition of jagirs but we are only qoncerned with the question whether the impugned Act was validly enacted.\n\nNo argument has been advanced before us which would enable us to hold that the impugned Act was ultra vires the State Legislature, the only ground of attack being that it was in contravention of the guarantee given in clause 5 of the letters of guarantee.\n\nBut that position is of no. avail to the Petitioners.\n\nConsiderable argument was addressed before us based on the comparison of the provisions of the various Acts of the Bombay State Legislature enacted during the years 1949 to 1953 in regard to the abolition of the various tenures obtaining within the State of Bombay with the provisions of the impugned Act, with a view to show that the provisions of the im- pugned Act were discriminatory against the States\n\n(1) 1943 F.C.R. 72\n\n~4-B SCI/ND. 82\n\n(2) 1946 F.C.R. 11 t.\n\n1955 anp their subjects within the meaning of clause 5 Maharaj UAreg of the letters of guarantee. We have not thought it Singh and orlier.v necessary to refer to the same in view of .the conclu-\n\nThc s~~'' ef sion which we have reached above that the impugned Bombay and others Act was intra vi res the powers of the State Legislature\n\nBhagwatil. and the State Legislature was C]Uite competent to enact the same.\n\nEven if it could be demonstrated that the provisions of the impugned Act were confiscatory as well as discriminatory in the manner suggested, the jagirs of the Petitioners (except in the case of the Petitioner in Petition No . .364 of 1954) were all estates within the meaning of the term as defined in Article 3 l-A(2)(a) of the Constitution and even if the impugned Act provided for the acquisition of the estates or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights the impugned Act could not 'be challenged as void on the ground that it was inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.\n\nAny challenge therefore on t.he ground of the impugned Act violating the fundamental rights of the Petitioners under article 14 or article 19(])(f) or article 31(2) of the Constitution was not available to the Petitioners. On the other hand if the grievance was that the impugned Act had brought about discrimination in breach of clause 5 of the letters of guac\n\nrantee then the dispute clearly arose out of the letters of guarantee and wou Id by article 363 be placed beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The Petitions of the Petitiopers except Petition No. 364 of 1954 which would be dealt with immediately hereafter therefore fail and are liable to be dismissed,\n\nPetition No. 364 of 1954\n\nIn addition to -the grounds common to all the Petitions which we have already dealt with above the Petitioner in Petition No. 364 of 1954 claims that he is the owner of the 60 villages in the Putta or territory of Moti Moree compriSed in the erstwhile State of Idar as the Bhumia or underlord and contends that his holding does not fall within the definition of\n\njagir as given in the impugned Act. In support of his 1955 contention he has traced the history of Moti Moree Maharaj umeg since 1250 A.O. and in any event since 1800 A.O. Si11gtumdotlzers when the then Chieftain of Moti Moree entered into The s~te of a treaty with the Maharaj a Zalimsinh of Modasa Bombay and others whereby in consideration of payment of Rs. 361 Blzagwati J. annually the said Zalimsinh agreed to protect Moti Moree against the attacks of the neighbouring State of Ooongarpur. He has pointed out that thereafter Modasa was absorbed into the Taluka of Amnagar in 1821 and subsequently in about 1849 it reverted to Idar State and continued with the Idar State until the latter merged into the Province of Bombay in\n\n1948. He contends that he and his predecessols were enjoying and exercising full sovereign rights over Moti Moree ever since the said treaty of 1800 and their position had remained unchanged, their only liability being to pay Rs. 361 annually for protection.\n\nHe further contends that they were enjoying the rights of excise and customs and revenue, that they did not pay and revenue to the Stale of Idar and enjoyed and continued to enjoy rights over all lands, forests, minerals, river beds, village sites, etc. and that when the Ruler of ldar wanted that there should be uniform customs levy thi; oughot'it the State, the said Ruler had to give compensation to the Petitioner and had also similarly negotiated with them and had to pay compensation to them in respect of salt, opium, excise, etc. He has pointed out that Rs. 457 for customs, Rs. 40 for opium and Rs. 7 for salt were being paid annually by the erstwhile State of Idar and thereafter _by the Government of State of Bombay to him by way of compensation for these sovereign rights of his, which amounts were set off against Rs. 361 being the annual payment of protection which he paid as aforesaid to them. These rights of his recognised by the erstwhile State of Idar and also by the State of Bombay constituted him a Thakur or underlord of Moti Moree and he contends that his estate of Moti Moree is not a--jagir within the definition of the trm given in the impugned Act.\n\nOur attention has also bee_n drawn in this behalf to\n\n1955 Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. 5 (1880), page 398, where Mahuruj umeg Mori (Meghraj) is described as the estate of the origi- Singh and others nal landlords Bhumias othenvise described as petty\n\nTh' siate of chiefs and underJords and to page 409 where the Bombay and others underlords (Bhumias) are stated to be the earlv chiefs Bhagwati J. who settled in Idar at least not later than the Rathod conquest (about 1250).\n\nThe State of Bombay on the other hand has denied the several allegations contained in the petition and contends that in the year 1891 the erstwhile State of Idar had conferred upon the Thakore of Moti Moree the powers of a Third Class Magistrate as an act of :'grace\", that in 1902 the management of the estate was taken over by the erstwhile State of ldar and one Kamdar Mathurlaji Wa.'i appointed as Japtidar, that in 1910 the management was lifted as a special case and the arrears of Nazrana were ordered to be recovered in instalments by the erstwhile State of Idar, that in several documents Moti Moree was described as Bhomia Jagir within the definition of the term Jagir as given in the impugned Act and that the sum of Rs. 361 was still being regularly. paid even after merger as \"Kichari hak\"~ It therefore contends that the Thakore of Moti Moree, the Petitioner is a jagirdar and Moti Moree is a jagir within the meaning of the definition thereof given in the impugned Act.\n\nThese allegations and counter-allegations do not however carry the matter any further. In order to exclude Moti Moree and the Petitioner from the operation of the impugned Act it will be necessary for the Petitioner to establish satisfactorily that Moti Moree is not a jagir within the definition thereof given in the impugned Act. Even though the allegations of the Petitioner go far enough to make it probable that Moti Moree was neither held by the Petitioner and his ancestors under a grant or was not recognised as a Grant by the Ruler of the erstwhile State of lclar, that would not be enough to enable us to grant him the relief prayed for by him. The question requires to be completely thrashed out and adjudicated upon by a Court of Law after going into the evidence\n\nadduced before it by both the parties. The learned 1955 Attorney-General appearing for the State of Bombay Maharllf umeg has t_herefore submitted that this question should be Singh and others enquired into by a proper tribunal and the Petitioner The Iire of should be referred to a civil suit in order to establish Bombay and others his rights. .\n\nBlzagwati J.\n\nWe accordingly feel that the Petition No. 364 of 1954 should be adjourned till after the disposal of a civil suit to be filed by the Petitioner in the proper Court for a declaration that Moti Moree is not a jagir within the definition of the term a~ given in the impugned Act and for consequential reliefs. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has given us to understand that a formal notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code in this behalf has already been served by the Petitioner on the State of Bolllbay. We therefore order that the Petitioner do file the necessary suit within 3 months from this date and this petition do stand adjou:rned till after the hearing and final disposal of that suit. The stay granted by this Court in this petition will continue in the meanwhile.\n\nWe may record here that the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the State of Bombay has also given his undertaking not to take any steps against the Petitioner in the meanwhile.\n\nPetitions Nos. 337 to 349, 365, 366, 481 and 690 of 1954 will therefore stand dismissed. Petition No. 364 of 1954 will stand adjourned sine die till after the disposal of the , civil su'it to be filed by the Petitioner as above indicated. If no such suit is filed within the aforesaid period this petition will also stand dismissed.\n\nEach party will bear and pay the respective costs of\n\nhe petitions.", "total_entities": 149, "entities": [{"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 349, "end_char": 360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 408, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 547, "end_char": 567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A}ril 6\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that the decision reae, hed by the High Court of Bombay in the case under appeal was wrong and must be reversed."}}, {"text": "High Court ofJudicatureatBombaywith .", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 691, "end_char": 728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly allow the appeal and remand the matter back to the High Court 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L. Ga11ba, (Gopal Singh, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954", "statute": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954"}}, {"text": "K. L. Ga11ba", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4019, "end_char": 4031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0RIGWAL JurusmcnoN: .Petitions under Article 12 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights\n\nK. L. Ga11ba, (Gopal Singh, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Ga11ba"}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4034, "end_char": 4045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0RIGWAL JurusmcnoN: .Petitions under Article 12 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights\n\nK. L. Ga11ba, (Gopal Singh, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "K. l. 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Sekhri, with himL for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Maharaj -Umeg Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22-8 SCJ/ND.'82\n\n19$5\n\nMaharaj -Umeg Singh and \"'thers\n\nThe State ef Bombay and otkrs\n\nMaharaj Umeg Sin, I• dhd otltrs\n\nv •\n\nK .. L. Gauba, (N. C. Chakravarthy and S, D.\n\nSekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "l\\IAHARAJ UMEG SINGH"}}, {"text": "K .. L. Gauba", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4456, "end_char": 4469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22-8 SCJ/ND.'82\n\n19$5\n\nMaharaj -Umeg Singh and \"'thers\n\nThe State ef Bombay and otkrs\n\nMaharaj Umeg Sin, I• dhd otltrs\n\nv •\n\nK .. L. Gauba, (N. C. Chakravarthy and S, D.\n\nSekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chakravarthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4472, "end_char": 4490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22-8 SCJ/ND.'82\n\n19$5\n\nMaharaj -Umeg Singh and \"'thers\n\nThe State ef Bombay and otkrs\n\nMaharaj Umeg Sin, I• dhd otltrs\n\nv •\n\nK .. L. Gauba, (N. C. Chakravarthy and S, D.\n\nSekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "S, D.\n\nSekhri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4495, "end_char": 4508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22-8 SCJ/ND.'82\n\n19$5\n\nMaharaj -Umeg Singh and \"'thers\n\nThe State ef Bombay and otkrs\n\nMaharaj Umeg Sin, I• dhd otltrs\n\nv •\n\nK .. L. Gauba, (N. C. Chakravarthy and S, D.\n\nSekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "K. L. Gauba", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4589, "end_char": 4600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".so~%;':,; d:{hers K. L. Gauba, (8.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Ga11ba"}}, {"text": "Moropant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4606, "end_char": 4614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moropant and S. D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Rajni Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4693, "end_char": 4704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajni Patel and M. S. K. Sastri, for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4709, "end_char": 4724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajni Patel and M. S. K. Sastri, for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4791, "end_char": 4803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajni Patel and I. N. Shroff, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Dadachanji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4872, "end_char": 4882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4887, "end_char": 4902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4953, "end_char": 4967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P. 4."}}, {"text": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4997, "end_char": 5012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P. 4."}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5049, "end_char": 5054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehta, R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the Respondents in all Petitions."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5056, "end_char": 5068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehta, R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the Respondents in all Petitions."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5073, "end_char": 5086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehta, R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the Respondents in all Petitions."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5232, "end_char": 5242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5354, "end_char": 5378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th September\n\n1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5642, "end_char": 5662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was passed by the Legislature on the .22nd September 1953 and received the sanction of the Upper House on the 26th September\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "13th June 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5707, "end_char": 5721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President gave his assent to it on the 13th June 1954 and by a notification dated the 15th July 1954 it was brought into effect from the !"}}, {"text": "31st July 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6151, "end_char": 6165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On application~ made to this CQurt on the 31st July 1954 the operation of the impugned Act was stayed pending the hearing and final disposal of the petitions,\n\nThe Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8433, "end_char": 8450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these Petitioners have challenged the vires of the impugned Act mainly relying upon the agreements cf merger entered into by the Rulers of the respective St1tcs with the Dominion of India on or about the J 9th March 1948 and the collateral letters of guarantee\n\nB/iazwari J.\n\nJ9jS passed by the Ministry of States in their favour on Maharaj Umeg subsequent dates, the contents of which were regarded Singh an4 otliers as part of the merger agreements entered into by them\n\nTh;;,~,. '"}}, {"text": "iazwari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8527, "end_char": 8534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these Petitioners have challenged the vires of the impugned Act mainly relying upon the agreements cf merger entered into by the Rulers of the respective St1tcs with the Dominion of India on or about the J 9th March 1948 and the collateral letters of guarantee\n\nB/iazwari J.\n\nJ9jS passed by the Ministry of States in their favour on Maharaj Umeg subsequent dates, the contents of which were regarded Singh an4 otliers as part of the merger agreements entered into by them\n\nTh;;,~,. '"}}, {"text": "BtJprbay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8778, "end_char": 8786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BtJprbay and otlrers Tht merger agreements were in the form given in Appendix XIII to the White Paper at page 183: BhagwatiJ.\n\n\"FORM OF MERGER AGREEMENT SIGNED\n\nBY RULERS OF GUJARAT AND DECCAN\n\nSTATES\n\nAGREEMENT MADE THIS day between the Governor-General of India and the of Whereas in the immediate interests of the State and its people, the of is desirous that the administration of the State should be integrated as eariy as possible with that of the Province of in such manner as the Government of the Dominion of India may think fit; It is hereby agreed as follows:···-\n\nARTICLE I.\n\nThe of hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the day of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as \"the said day\")."}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8893, "end_char": 8903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BtJprbay and otlrers Tht merger agreements were in the form given in Appendix XIII to the White Paper at page 183: BhagwatiJ.\n\n\"FORM OF MERGER AGREEMENT SIGNED\n\nBY RULERS OF GUJARAT AND DECCAN\n\nSTATES\n\nAGREEMENT MADE THIS day between the Governor-General of India and the of Whereas in the immediate interests of the State and its people, the of is desirous that the administration of the State should be integrated as eariy as possible with that of the Province of in such manner as the Government of the Dominion of India may think fit; It is hereby agreed as follows:···-\n\nARTICLE I.\n\nThe of hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the day of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as \"the said day\").", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Government of the Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9266, "end_char": 9301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BtJprbay and otlrers Tht merger agreements were in the form given in Appendix XIII to the White Paper at page 183: BhagwatiJ.\n\n\"FORM OF MERGER AGREEMENT SIGNED\n\nBY RULERS OF GUJARAT AND DECCAN\n\nSTATES\n\nAGREEMENT MADE THIS day between the Governor-General of India and the of Whereas in the immediate interests of the State and its people, the of is desirous that the administration of the State should be integrated as eariy as possible with that of the Province of in such manner as the Government of the Dominion of India may think fit; It is hereby agreed as follows:···-\n\nARTICLE I.\n\nThe of hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the day of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as \"the said day\")."}}, {"text": "Dominion Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9393, "end_char": 9412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BtJprbay and otlrers Tht merger agreements were in the form given in Appendix XIII to the White Paper at page 183: BhagwatiJ.\n\n\"FORM OF MERGER AGREEMENT SIGNED\n\nBY RULERS OF GUJARAT AND DECCAN\n\nSTATES\n\nAGREEMENT MADE THIS day between the Governor-General of India and the of Whereas in the immediate interests of the State and its people, the of is desirous that the administration of the State should be integrated as eariy as possible with that of the Province of in such manner as the Government of the Dominion of India may think fit; It is hereby agreed as follows:···-\n\nARTICLE I.\n\nThe of hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the day of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as \"the said day\")."}}, {"text": "15th day of August 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11314, "end_char": 11337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shall be entitled to all personal privileges enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August 1947."}}, {"text": "Dominion Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11356, "end_char": 11375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Dominion Government guarantees the succession, according to law and custom, to the gadi of the State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles."}}, {"text": "Vapal Pangunni Menon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11550, "end_char": 11570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In confirmation whe;:reof Mr. Vapal Pangunni Menon, Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of States, has appended his sigmtture on behalf and with the authority of the Governor-General of India and has appended his\n\nMaharaj Umi!g Singh and others v.\n\nThe State of Sombay and others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nMaharaj Un1e1\n\nSignature on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, of Singh and others Dated v. ,• Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of The State of Bombay wrd others\n\nBliagwatiJ ...\n\nStates\"."}}, {"text": "Government of Born bay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12589, "end_char": 12611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tt will be free of ail taxes, whether imposed by the Government of Born bay or by the Government of India and it will not be taken into account in the assessment of your world income to income-tax or super-tax."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12622, "end_char": 12641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tt will be free of ail taxes, whether imposed by the Government of Born bay or by the Government of India and it will not be taken into account in the assessment of your world income to income-tax or super-tax."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13591, "end_char": 13597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "irrespective of whether the property is situated in the Capital, or at any other place in the State, or in Bombay, or anywhere else outside."}}, {"text": "1st April\n\n1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14262, "end_char": 14277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "existing on 1st April\n\n1918 are hereby guaranteed."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14353, "end_char": 14373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This guarantee is without prejudice to the right of Government of Bombay to issue any legislation which does not discriminate against the States and their subjects."}}, {"text": "Government of fodia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14855, "end_char": 14874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(7) No order passed or action taken by you before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken <tfter the l st of April 1948 and is considered by the Government of fodia to be palpably unjust or unreasonable."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15057, "end_char": 15062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<R) No enquiry shall be made nor shall proceeding~ lie in any Court in India against you, whether in a oersonal capacity or otherwise, in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by you or under vonr authority during the period of your administration of the State."}}, {"text": "Ruler will also he considereo bv the Council of Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15679, "end_char": 15731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maltaraj Umeq Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15880, "end_char": 15899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Council shall consist of the Rulers of all\n\nMaltaraj Umeq Singh and orhs\n\nThe State of Bomba;• and others\n\nBlrafwati J.\n\n1955 full _jurisdictional Gujarat States, whether salue or Maharaj Umeg non-salute."}}, {"text": "State of Bomba;•", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15914, "end_char": 15930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Council shall consist of the Rulers of all\n\nMaltaraj Umeq Singh and orhs\n\nThe State of Bomba;• and others\n\nBlrafwati J.\n\n1955 full _jurisdictional Gujarat States, whether salue or Maharaj Umeg non-salute.", "canonical_name": "State of Bomba;•"}}, {"text": "Blrafwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15943, "end_char": 15952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Council shall consist of the Rulers of all\n\nMaltaraj Umeq Singh and orhs\n\nThe State of Bomba;• and others\n\nBlrafwati J.\n\n1955 full _jurisdictional Gujarat States, whether salue or Maharaj Umeg non-salute."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16155, "end_char": 16157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ruler will also he considereo bv the Council of Rule", "statute": "Ruler will also he considereo bv the Council of Rule"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ruler will also he considereo bv the Council of Rule", "statute": "Ruler will also he considereo bv the Council of Rule"}}, {"text": "Government of Dominion of I1", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18287, "end_char": 18315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a'!reements and covenants which were entered into or\n\nexecuted before the commencement of the Constitution by the Rulers of the respective states and to which the Government of Dominion of I1, dia was a party and that therefore this Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the said disputes by virtue of the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution, that the State Legislature had plenary powers of legislation within the ambit of its sphere unless the Constitution itself expressly prohibited legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally, that no sucli prohibition could be soelt out of the terms of clause 5 of the letters of guarantee and that the impugned Act was intra vires the power of the State Legislature and could not be challenged."}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18448, "end_char": 18459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18749, "end_char": 18757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19032, "end_char": 19041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20064, "end_char": 20079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the contention that the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee were executed by the Dominion of India and were not binding on the State of Bombay it was urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the Government of the Dominion of India was certainly bound by those guarantees and this ohliQation of the Dominion Government devolved upo~ the Province of Bombay when the erstwhile State5 which were parties to the agreements of merger\n\nZ3--S ~IiND/82\n\nMaharaj Umeg Singh and others v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and'others\n\nBhagwat I J.\n\n1955 and the letters of guarantee became merged in the Mn/UJrlli Umeg Province of Bombay, under clause 8 of the States' Sin;'il and 01/iers Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949 (Appendix\n\nThelia1eof XLIV."}}, {"text": "Bhagwat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20447, "end_char": 20454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the contention that the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee were executed by the Dominion of India and were not binding on the State of Bombay it was urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the Government of the Dominion of India was certainly bound by those guarantees and this ohliQation of the Dominion Government devolved upo~ the Province of Bombay when the erstwhile State5 which were parties to the agreements of merger\n\nZ3--S ~IiND/82\n\nMaharaj Umeg Singh and others v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and'others\n\nBhagwat I J.\n\n1955 and the letters of guarantee became merged in the Mn/UJrlli Umeg Province of Bombay, under clause 8 of the States' Sin;'il and 01/iers Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949 (Appendix\n\nThelia1eof XLIV.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20557, "end_char": 20565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ilha11wa1i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20785, "end_char": 20795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "k>mhnyandotlie~<were thus deemed to have been undertaken by the\n\nIlha11wa1i J..\n\nDominion Government on behalf of the absorbing Province, viz.,"}}, {"text": "26th January\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20989, "end_char": 21007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Province of Bombay and were binding upon the Province of Bombay, and that when the Constitution came into force from the 26th January\n\n1950 all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of each Governors' Province whether arising out of anv contract or otherwise were under article 294 of the- Constitution to be the rights, liabilities and obligations respectively of the Government of each corresponding State and these obligations of the Province of Bombay accordingly became the obligations of the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "article 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21154, "end_char": 21165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24662, "end_char": 24673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\n(I) 51 Indian :\\ppcals 357", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24728, "end_char": 24763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If they were deemed to be parties to the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee thev would be faced with the bar to the maintain- , ability of the petitions under article 363 of the Constit11tion which lays down that neither the Supreme\n\n(I) 51 Indian :\\ppcals 357."}}, {"text": "Maharaj Umeg Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24794, "end_char": 24812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharaj Umeg Singh and other.", "canonical_name": "l\\IAHARAJ UMEG SINGH"}}, {"text": "State Qj Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24830, "end_char": 24845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<\n\nThe State Qj Bombay and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nl9SS Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in Maha; aJ umeg any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, Siniftand others agreement, covenant.", "canonical_name": "State of Bomba;•"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24858, "end_char": 24866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<\n\nThe State Qj Bombay and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nl9SS Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in Maha; aJ umeg any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, Siniftand others agreement, covenant.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Maha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24929, "end_char": 24933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<\n\nThe State Qj Bombay and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nl9SS Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in Maha; aJ umeg any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, Siniftand others agreement, covenant."}}, {"text": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25829, "end_char": 25910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25927, "end_char": 25935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act", "statute": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26359, "end_char": 26367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act", "statute": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26589, "end_char": 26597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act", "statute": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26655, "end_char": 26663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act", "statute": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26901, "end_char": 26909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act", "statute": "According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27589, "end_char": 27594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar ::ontention had Bombay and oriJers been raised on behalf of the plaintiffs in State of Bhagwati J.\n\nSeraikella and Others v. Union of India and Anot.her( 1 ) and was repelled by Kania, C.J. at page 490 as under:-\n\n\"The plaintiff contends firstly that it had signed the Instrument of Accession through its Ruler."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27857, "end_char": 27871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State next complains that, acting beyond the powers given over under the Instrument of Accession, the Dominion of India aJJ.d the State of Bihar are trespassing wrongfully on its legislative and executive functions, that the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are making laws which they have no power to make, having regard to the Instrument of Accession, and are wrongfully interfering with the administration of the State beyond the rights given to them under the Instrument of Accession."}}, {"text": "Article 363(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28453, "end_char": 28467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28475, "end_char": 28496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29106, "end_char": 29137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government under the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee, or that the disputes between the parties did not arise out of the provisions of the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee which were entered into or executed by the Rulers of the respective States and to which the Government of Dominion of India was a party within the meaning of Article 363 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29172, "end_char": 29183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29558, "end_char": 29566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BhacwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29586, "end_char": 29596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "entitled to enforce the obligation and Bombay and others guarantee incorporated in clause 5 of the letters of\n\nBhacwatiJ. guarantee the further difficulty in the way of the Petitioners is that the State Legislature was fully competent to enact the impugned Act notwithstanding the terms of the guarantee.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30226, "end_char": 30242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30375, "end_char": 30457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30808, "end_char": 30816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act", "statute": "Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30887, "end_char": 30895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act", "statute": "Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31242, "end_char": 31250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act", "statute": "Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Government of Hom", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32142, "end_char": 32159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The right of the Government of Hom bay to issue any legislation with regard to the enjoyment of the ownership of jagir hmds was expressly reserved and this right covered also legislation in regard to the abolition of the jagirs and the Government of Bombay was therefore entitled under the terms of this clause 5 to issue any legislation iPregard to the same provided however that such legislation did not discriminate against the States :rnd their subjects."}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32429, "end_char": 32437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33420, "end_char": 33431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33545, "end_char": 33561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 245(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33615, "end_char": 33629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahara Unlf'g Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33724, "end_char": 33743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution itself laid down the fetters\n\nMahara Unlf'g Singh and other.f\n\nThe State of Bomba)' a11d others\n\nB/iagwmi J.\n\n1955 or limitations on this power, e.g., in article 303 or\n\nMaharaj Umq article 286(2)."}}, {"text": "State of Bomba", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33761, "end_char": 33775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution itself laid down the fetters\n\nMahara Unlf'g Singh and other.f\n\nThe State of Bomba)' a11d others\n\nB/iagwmi J.\n\n1955 or limitations on this power, e.g., in article 303 or\n\nMaharaj Umq article 286(2).", "canonical_name": "State of Bomba;•"}}, {"text": "article 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33848, "end_char": 33859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33876, "end_char": 33890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33928, "end_char": 33933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But unless and until the Court came Singh and others h ."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34354, "end_char": 34370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35225, "end_char": 35233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act", "statute": "Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "article 294(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35281, "end_char": 35295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act", "statute": "Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35522, "end_char": 35530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act", "statute": "Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35747, "end_char": 35763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act", "statute": "Court for the simole reason that the State Legislature was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Oudh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35955, "end_char": 35959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the Federal Court gave an answer to a similar complaint of the Taluqdars of Oudh made by them against the\n\nUnited Provinces Tenancy /\\ct XVII of 1939 in Th11kw\n\nJrrgannMh Raksh Singh v. The United Provinces(') at page 87:-\n\nMaharaj Umeg Singh alJd others \"We desire, however, to point out that what they The s~re of are now claiming is that no Legislature in India has Bombay and others any right to alter the arrangements embodied in their Bhag.;;"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36413, "end_char": 36423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tiJ. sanads nearly a century ago; and, for all we know, they would deny the right of Parliament itself to do so."}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37649, "end_char": 37657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1943 F.C.R. 72", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 38155, "end_char": 38169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1946 F.C.R. 11", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 38192, "end_char": 38206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38257, "end_char": 38265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38928, "end_char": 38937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39437, "end_char": 39447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(])(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39451, "end_char": 39467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39471, "end_char": 39484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39650, "end_char": 39658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39767, "end_char": 39778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Putta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40207, "end_char": 40212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "364 of 1954 claims that he is the owner of the 60 villages in the Putta or territory of Moti Moree compriSed in the erstwhile State of Idar as the Bhumia or underlord and contends that his holding does not fall within the definition of\n\njagir as given in the impugned Act."}}, {"text": "Moti Moree", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40229, "end_char": 40239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "364 of 1954 claims that he is the owner of the 60 villages in the Putta or territory of Moti Moree compriSed in the erstwhile State of Idar as the Bhumia or underlord and contends that his holding does not fall within the definition of\n\njagir as given in the impugned Act."}}, {"text": "Idar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40276, "end_char": 40280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "364 of 1954 claims that he is the owner of the 60 villages in the Putta or territory of Moti Moree compriSed in the erstwhile State of Idar as the Bhumia or underlord and contends that his holding does not fall within the definition of\n\njagir as given in the impugned Act."}}, {"text": "Blzagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40743, "end_char": 40752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "361 Blzagwati J. annually the said Zalimsinh agreed to protect Moti Moree against the attacks of the neighbouring State of Ooongarpur."}}, {"text": "Ooongarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40862, "end_char": 40872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "361 Blzagwati J. annually the said Zalimsinh agreed to protect Moti Moree against the attacks of the neighbouring State of Ooongarpur."}}, {"text": "Modasa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40909, "end_char": 40915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has pointed out that thereafter Modasa was absorbed into the Taluka of Amnagar in 1821 and subsequently in about 1849 it reverted to Idar State and continued with the Idar State until the latter merged into the Province of Bombay in\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "Amnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40948, "end_char": 40955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has pointed out that thereafter Modasa was absorbed into the Taluka of Amnagar in 1821 and subsequently in about 1849 it reverted to Idar State and continued with the Idar State until the latter merged into the Province of Bombay in\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "Government of State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42070, "end_char": 42099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 for salt were being paid annually by the erstwhile State of Idar and thereafter _by the Government of State of Bombay to him by way of compensation for these sovereign rights of his, which amounts were set off against Rs."}}, {"text": "Mahuruj umeg Mori", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42660, "end_char": 42677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 (1880), page 398, where Mahuruj umeg Mori (Meghraj) is described as the estate of the origi- Singh and others nal landlords Bhumias othenvise described as petty\n\nTh' siate of chiefs and underJords and to page 409 where the Bombay and others underlords (Bhumias) are stated to be the earlv chiefs Bhagwati J. who settled in Idar at least not later than the Rathod conquest (about 1250)."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42859, "end_char": 42865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 (1880), page 398, where Mahuruj umeg Mori (Meghraj) is described as the estate of the origi- Singh and others nal landlords Bhumias othenvise described as petty\n\nTh' siate of chiefs and underJords and to page 409 where the Bombay and others underlords (Bhumias) are stated to be the earlv chiefs Bhagwati J. who settled in Idar at least not later than the Rathod conquest (about 1250)."}}, {"text": "Kamdar Mathurlaji Wa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43388, "end_char": 43408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bombay on the other hand has denied the several allegations contained in the petition and contends that in the year 1891 the erstwhile State of Idar had conferred upon the Thakore of Moti Moree the powers of a Third Class Magistrate as an act of :'grace\", that in 1902 the management of the estate was taken over by the erstwhile State of ldar and one Kamdar Mathurlaji Wa."}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45548, "end_char": 45558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_186_206_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "April 7\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAJ KALI KlJER\n\nRAM RATTAN PANDEY\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nSINHA JJ.}\n\n[ 1955]\n\nHindu Law-Hereditary priestly office of a Puiari and Panda -Hindu female-Right to succeed-Usage.\n\nThough a female is personally disqualified from officiating as a Pujari for the Shastrically installed and consecrated idols in the temples, the usage of a Hindu female succeeding to a priestly office and getting the same performed through a competent Cleputy has been well-recognised and it is not contrary to textual Hindu Law nor opposed to public policy. Subject to the proper and efficient discharge of the duties of the office being safeguarded by appropriate action when necessary, a Hindu female has a right to succeed to the hereditary priestly office of a Pujari and Panda held by her husband and to get the duties of the office p<:rfom1ed by a substitute cxtcpt in ca:ses wh\\.'ft: uage 10 the ontrary i::; pleaded and established.\n\nQuacrc :--Whether and how far votive offerings can be appropriated by a Pujari for his emoluments if the temple is a public institutioni (i.e., not a private f; unily temple) and whether any usage in this bclnlf is valid.\n\nC<1:>c-la\\\\' and the relevant texts revie\\rcd.\n\nJudgment of the lligh Court of Patna reversed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE 'JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1953.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th day of May 1949 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 1918 of 1947 against the Decree dated the 23rd day of July 1947 of the Subordinate Judge; Arrah in Appeal No. 137 of 1946 arising from thct Decree dated the 29th March 1946 of the Court of the 2nd Munsif at Arrah in Suit No. T.S. 120 of 1943.\n\nR. C. Prasad, for tpe appellant.\n\nS. P. Varma, for the respondent.\n\n1955. April 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by leave granted under article 136(1) of the Constitution against the second appellate judgment of the High Court of Patna. It relates to the office of P11jari and Panda of a famous temple in the town of Arrah in the State of Bihar, known as the temple of Aranya Devi and Killa Ki Devi. The appellant before us-a woman--brought this suit claiming joint title to the office along with the defendant and as such entitled to perform the Puja either by herself or through her Karinda and to get a half share in the income of offerings of the said A stha11. It is the admitted case that this office belongs to the family of both the parties and that the duties of the office were being jointly performed by the defendant and his deceased brother, Rambeyas Pande, and that they were enjoying the emoluments jointly. The plaintiff-the widow of Rambeyas Pande-daims to have succeeded to her husband's share in this property and bases her suit on the said claim. In the written statement the defendant raised three main defences, two out of which are (1) the plaintiff was not. the legally wedded wife of his brother,_ Rambeyas Pande, and (2) during the life time of Rambeyas Pande, there was a division between them with reference to the office of Pujari and Panda belonging to this family in respect of two temples (a) at Arrah and (b) at Gangipul, that the office of Pujari at Gangipul was given to the plaintiff's husband and that the temple of Aran Devi at Arrah was given to the defendant and that since then, i.e., for about l l years prior to the date of the suit, the plaintiff's husband had no connection with the office of Pujari in this temple nor with the receipt of any offerings therein. Both these contentions were found against the defendant by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court and they have become conclusive. The further and third defence raised by the defendant was that the property in suit, riz., the office of Pujari and Panda of the tern:. pie cannot be inherited by a female. The contention\n\nRaj Kali Kuer v.\n\nRam Ratran Pandey\n\nJ955\n\nRaj Kali Kuer\n\n'/ ..\n\nRain Rattan Pandey\n\nJaganuadhadn.~ J.\n\nis set out in the following terms in the written statement:\n\n\"The plaintiff is not at all entitled to the office and the post of Pujari and Panda of Arun Devi and she is not entitled to get 112 share or any share in the income and offering of the said Asthan, nor has she got any right to perform Puja as a Panda personally, or through her karinda and to get the income, etc.\n\nThis is against the custom and usage and practice and also against the Sastras. The property in suit is such as cannot be inherited by a female\".\n\nIt is the question thus raised which has got to be considered in this appeal.\n\nThe trial Court held against this contention in the following terms:\n\n\"No authority has been cited nor any custom proved to show that female cannot inherit a property of this nature\".\n\nThe first appellate Court also affirmed this view as follows:\n\n\"The defendant's objection that the plaintiff being a female is not authorised to hold the office of a priest of the Aranya Debi temple is not borne out by any evidence or material on the record. There is nothing to show that by reason of her sex she is debarred from holding this office either by religion, custom or usage. Moreover admittedly she holds the office at the Gangi temple\".\n\nOn the findings arrived at by the trial court and the first appellate court, the plaintiff got a decree as prayed for declaring her right to half share in the office and for recovery of mesne profits on that footing. On second appeal to the High Court, the learned Judges went into the question at some length and were of the opinion that \"the plaintiff being a female is not entitled. to inherit the priestly .office in question and her claim to officiate as a priest in the temple by rotation cannot be sustained. The declaration sought for by her that she is entitled to the office of Pujari cannot, the.refore, 'be granted\". The.¥ he\\~, .however, \"that she 1s not debarr~ from bemg entitled to be maintained out of the estate of her husband which, in\n\nRu} Kali J(µ8r\n\n\"' Ram JlatlW!\n\nP,,,..y\n\nJl.\n\n!do~ with the.office of the manager of thetemple, who m ...:outh India, is known by the name of Dharmakarta. As early as in Mitt a K unth A udhicarry v.\n\nNeerunjun A udhicarryC), it was recognised that hereditary priestly office in a family is property liable to partition. A number of other decisions to he noticed in the later part of this judgment recognise this position. The learned Judges of the High Court in their judgment in the case under appeal, have attempted to distinguish the present case from that of the case of the Shehailship and have come to the conclusion that while in respect of Shehaiti right a woman may succeed by heirship, she is not entitled to such succession in respect of the right of a Panda and Pujari.\n\nut in making this distinction .they do not negative the idea that the right to the office of the Puiari itself is property to which a female could succeed, but for her supposed disqualification. The disqualification is said to arise with reference to the duties attached to this office, and it is said that in this respect it differs from the office of a Shehait.\n\nNow there can be no doubt that while in one sense the right to such a religious office is property it involves also substantial elements of duty. As has been stated by this Court in Angurbala v. Dehahratai') and in The Commissioner, H.\n\nE., Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar(') \"both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together <in such offices) and neither can be detached from the other\". It must <:1lso be recognised that in respect of such offices especially where they are attached to public institutions, the duties are to be regarded as primary and that the rights and emoluments are only appurtenant to the duties. See the observations of Justice Page in Nagendra. v.\n\nRahtndra(') at pages 495 and 496 and that of Justice Sadasiva Aiyar in Su1:darambal v. Y ogavanag11rukka!(') at .page 564, as also of Mukherjea on Endowments\n\n0) [1875] X!VB.L.R. 166.\n\n(2) [1951] S.C.R. 1125.\n\n• (3) [1954] S.C.R. 1005. (4)_A.!.R. 1926 Ca!cut<a 490.\n\n(5) A.I.R. 1915 Madras 561.\n\n(1952 Edn.) page 201. If, therefore, it is foui1d that 1955 the recognition of a female's right to succeed to the Roi .kali ,; t111I hereditary office of Pujari in a temple held by her v. husband is incompatible With due discharge Of the Rpn':;, laJI duties of the office, her right to succeed must be nega- -- tived. The correct approach .to a .. question of this 4~1iaM J. kind has been laid down by the Privy Council' in a case which relates to a Mohammadan religious office hut would equally be applicable to '1 Hindu religious office. Jn Shahar Bano v. Aga Mahomed Jafjer Bindaneein(') their Lordships, after noticing the view taken by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, that \"there is no legal prohibition against a woman holding a mutwalliship when the trust, by its nature involves no spiritual duties such as a woman could not properly discharge in person or by depury\" approved this view of the High Court and said ''it appears to their Lordships that there is ample authority for that proposition\" The question, therefore, that requires consideration in the present case 'is whether the office of the Puiari and Panda in a temple involves such duties as could not be discharged by a female in person and if so, whether she is also incompetent to get the same discharged by a deputy.\n\nNow for this purpose it is desirable to have a clear idea of the duties of a Pujari in an ordinary Hindu temple. A Pujari has to perform the prescribed daily worship of the image as well as the special worship of a periodical nature on particular occasions and for prescribed festivals during the year. In Ramahrahma\n\nChatterjee v. Kedar Nath Banerjee(') Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjce indicated the daily routine of worship in the following passage:\n\n\"The normal type of continued worship of a consecrated image consists of the sweeping of a temple, the process of smearing, the removal of the previous day's offerings of flowers, the presentation of fresh flowers and water, and other like practices. It is sulfcient to state that the deity is, in short, conceived as a living being and is treated in the same way as the\n\n(I) f l'J06f L.R. 311.A. 46. 53.\n\n!'2) :\\.IR 1923 Cdc:1::a 60, 62.\n\nllifi Kall &!kt\n\n\" Ram.Rat1an\n\nPandey\n\n!iiatd•.adhatfasJ.\n\nmaster of the house would be treated by his humble servant. The daily routine of life is gone through with minute accuracy; the vivified image is regaled with the necessaries and luxuries of life in due succession, even to the changing of clothes, the offering of cooked and uncooked food, and the retirement to rest\".\n\nIn Saraswati's Hindu Law of Endowments(') the nature of the daily worship of a consecrated idol in a temple 'is set out at pages 134 and 135 in detail. It must be recognised t.hat the daily worship differs according to the tenets and usages of the religious sect for which the temple is intended and the idol is consecrated. But whatever may be the details of the worship and the variations therein, there can be no doubt .that the ministration of various services involving personitl touch of the idol, and, often enough, the recita.tion of religious hymns inclusive of Vedic hymns are amongst the normal and essential features of a Pujari' s duties, at any rate in temples where the worship is conducted according to the Shastias. It is\n\nalso undisputed that according to Hindu Shastras the functions of a Pujari can be performed only by certain . limited classes and involves special qualifications and that these classt:s may vary with the nature of the institution. Now, whatever may have been the position in early times; of which there is no clear historical evidence, it appears to have been well established in later times that a female, even of the recognised limited classes. cannot by herself perform the duties of a Pujari. Even at a time when the institution of temple worship had probably not come into general vogue, the incapitcity of a woman to recite Vedic texts, to offer sacrificial fire, or to perform sacramental rites, is indicated in certain texts of Manu. (See Sacred Books of the East, Marni, Vol. 25, pages 330 and 437, Chapter 9, section 18 and Chapter 11, section 36).\n\nWhether it is on the basis of these texts or for some either reason, her incapacity to discharge, in person, the duties of the , Pujari appears to have been well\n\n(1) The Hin4u La\\\\· ofEndown1cnts by Pandi! Pranna1h Sa.rnswali, T.L.L.,\n\n1892. (1897 Edn.).\n\nsettled in later times as appears from the following text from Brihan-Naradiya Purana quoted in Saraswati\"s Hindu Law of Endowments at page 136.\n\nRo/Kali Kuer\n\nv.\" /tam Rat11111 \"W h . <l . h h h d Pandey omen. t ose unmveste wit. t e sacred t rea , ·- (i.e. the members of the Dvija class before the initia- Jawamrud/,.uJa, 1 tion ceremony has been performed for them), and Sudras are not competent to touch images of Vishnu or Siva. A Sudra, one uninvested with the sacred thread, a woman or an outcaste, having touched Vishnu or Siva, goes to hell'.\n\nThis passage, in terms, refers to the images of Vishnu and Siva but it may reasonably be assumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that in practice the incapacity of a female to discharge the duties of a Pujari by herself extended. at any rate, to all public temples where an image of whatever form had been consecrated and installed according to the Shasrras.\n\nIndeed, all the cases on the subject have assumed this incapacity of the female. The point of controversy has been whether .she is also incompetent to get the duties discharged by employing a qualified substit11te. If her competern.:e in this behalf is recognised and can be accepted there is no reason why she should not be held entitled to succeed to the office.\n\nThus the really important question for consideration in this case is whether the duties of the Pujari's office can be got done by a substitute and if so is there any particular reason or clearly established usage, against a female employing such a substitute and thus becoming entitled to the office.\n\nIn early Hindu society a priestly office could have relation only to the performance of various kinds of Vedic rituals and sacrifices either of a daily and routine nature or of a periodical and special nature.\n\nIn theory a Brahmin is to perform such functions for himself by himself while persons of other classes should get them do.ne through qualified Brahmins.\n\nOn principle a priest in the Hindu concept is chosen as such with reference to his personal qualities and competence. The system of hereditary priesthood, however, with the possibility of persons not fully\n\nI9S:S competent, succeeding to or occupying such an o!Iice, /t, Q Kati Kuer appears to have come into vogue from fairly early v. times. It appears. however, that from the very /tam Rslttan f h h h f Pand•Y nature o t e situation. t e temporary disc arge o d-d 1 .the priestly function by a substitute in the place of Jntmma ha as the hereditary priest was a matter of inevitable necessity since the Hindu Shastras recognised tempornry and casual disqualifications like that of birth and death pollution. But there does not appear to be any indication in the early books of any general practice about the functions of priestly office being discharged by proxies. In comparatively later days, however, there is clear indication of such a practice. In Saraswati's Hindu Law of Endowments at page 56, it is stated that in the Padmct Purana and other treatises incapacitated persons are ciirected to have the worship performed through Brahmins. This statement is with reference to the performance of service of an idol and has presumably reference to the incapacity of persons occupying a priestly ollicc. In Colebrooke's transla.- tion of the Digest of Hindu Law on Contracts and Successions with a commentary by Jagannatha Tercapanchanana (4th Edition, published by Higginbotham & Co., Maras, 1874), Vol. I, Book II, Chapter III, Section II, pages 360 to 381 deal with the topic of partnership among priests jointly officiating at holy rites. A perusal thereof and particularly of placita 28 to 44 containing citations from various Smrutis with Jaga11natha's commentary thereon, clearly indicate that the institution of hereditary priestship, became established by that date and that the performance of such priestly functions by substitutes had definitely come into vogue. Various rules are propounded as to the sharing of remuneration between the substitute priest and the hereditary priest when the former happens to perform the functions in the place of the latter. It is to be noticed that these pasages from Jagannatha's Digest refer in terms only to priestly office by way of officiating at holy rites, i.e., sacrifices and other Vedic or Shastric functions hut do not in terms refer to the discharge of a priest's duties in relation to the worship of an idol in a temple.\n\nThis is all the more remarkable because by the date 1955 of Jagannatha 's Digest the institution of wor- Raf xa1t'xu\" ship of consecrated idols in temples had become long /tam \"&,,11111 since fairly established. The probable explanation is l'Undey that Jag; annatha's Digest is a commentary on selected .1. -tllratltn J texts n1ostly of the various Smrutis from which he agann• ·· quotes and that in the days of the Smrutis the temple worship does not appear to have come sufficiently into vogue. The historical origin and growth of temple worship has been fully dealt with in Saraswti's Hindu Law of Endowments and has been also noticed in the referring judgment in A nnaya Tantri v. A mmaka Hengsu(1). It is pointed out therein that according to Hindu sentiment the performance of the duties of an A rchaka or Puiari for an idol has been considered sinful and it required inducements by way of liberal grants of land and promise of substantial perquisites to attract competent persons for the office of Pujari or Archaka. This, in course of time and with the change in social conditions and economic values, rendered the offices of Panda and Pujari in almost all the famous shrines in India, a lucrative affair, and has enabled the hereditary priests to get the functions discharged by pai4 substitutes and themselves enjoy a substantial margin of income. Here just in the same way as the patronage of the kings or the society may. have been a great incentive to the development of the system of discharge of hereditary priestly functions by substitutes in relation to sacrificial and Vedic religious rites, the phenomenal development and worship of idols in temples and the substantial emoluments which in course of time rendered the discharge of priestly office lucrative must have brought into vogue the employment of substitutes for performance of the duties of the priests not only for sacrificial or other religious rites but also for temple worship.\n\nWhether and how far this practice is permitted bv the Shastras is not the question before us. But it cannot be denied and is indeed a matter of common knowledge, that at the present day, hereditary priestly offices are, as often as not, performed by proxies,\n\n(I) A.T.R. 1919 Madras 598 (F.B.).\n\nRaj Ka/; Kuer v. -Ram Rattan\n\nPandey\n\nJ\"'qnadl1ad,,. 1.\n\nthe choice of proxy being, of course, limited to a small circle permitted by usage. The question for consideration of the courts is, whether, in this state of things, a female is to be excluded from succession to the hereditary office of Pujari on account of her well recognised personal disqualification to officiate as such Pujari for the Shastrical/y installed and consecrated idols in the temples and whether she is to be denied the capacity to retain the property by getting the priestly duties efficiently discharged through a competent substitute. The only basis for the alleged denial is a passage from .Jagannatha's Digest which is as follows: IVide Vol. T, pa_ge 379, commentary under placitum 43).\n\n\"Wives and others, disqualified by sex for the performance of h,1!y rites, cannot appoint a substitute; as defiled person cannot perform a solemn act ordained by the Vedas, therefore wives have no property in the office of priest\"\n\nNow apart from the question whether this passage can be taken to be st.:fficiently authoritative, there has been some difference of opinion as to the correct import thereof. In Sundaramhul A mmal v. Y ogavanagurukka/(') this passage has been relied upon by Justice Sadasiva Aiyar as showing that women are incompetent to discharge the functions of a priest even through a subsiitute and that, therefore, they have no right of succession to the office. The learned Judges of the High Court in the present case have also relied on it.\n\nIn Annaya Tantri v.\n\nAmmaka Hengsu('), Justice Scshagiri Aiyar in his referring judgment has referred to this passage and was of the opinion that it does not express a specific view. In Ganapathi Iver on Hindu and Mahomedan Endowments (2nd Edn.) the learned author while commenting on this very passage says as follows at page 453 of his book:\n\n\"Jagannatha there considers the question whether wives and others have a title to the succession to this priestly office.\n\nAs usual with the discussions nf\n\n(1).A.J.R. 1915 M;1d. '.'ifil.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1919 Mad. ;9H I F.R.J.\n\nJagannatha it is difficult to say what his final opinion is.\n\nBut we should certainly think that Jagannatha's opinion is that women can inherit doing the duties through a substitute, but enjoying the emoluments attached to that office\".\n\nle appears on a careful consideration of the disputed passage with reference to its context, that this view of the learned author is correct. In any case the pass;; gc cannot be definitely relied upon as an author:ty for the contrary view. The discussion in connection with which this passage occurs in the commentary is under placitum No. 43 in Section II of Chapter III, Book II, which is a text from Narada relating to hereditary priests. The statement relied on occurs at a place where there .is an attempt to reconcile the disqualification of the female to discharge the functions of a hereditary priest, and the reconition of her right to succeed to all property including a hereditary ofllce.\n\nThe relevant portions of the discussion are herein below set out:\n\n\"It is doubted whether wives and others have a title to this succession, althouh the partition, founded on the admission of a riglit vesting in Agraharicas and other officiating priests, ought to be\n\nimilar to the partition of inheritance in general. As the wife's title to succession, on failure of heirs in the male line as far as the greatgrandson, will be declared under the head of Inheritance. what should reverse h<'r titk in this instance? Jt should not be arnued. tliat the wife can have no right to the 1village, hecauseas a woman, she is disqualified for the performance of hnly rites. and because the wives of agraharicn~ and others .are totally incapable nf receiving\n\ntila delivered as a gift to priests. The tila may be received, and the rites be performed, through the intervention of a substitute.\n\nLet it not be argued, that. were it so, a property in the sacrificial fee and regular dues would vest in the substitute. The wife n1ay have the benefit of property acquired by the substitute, as a sacrificer has the benefit of rites perfNme<l by an officiating priest.\n\nHowever, there is this difference: the sacrificer acquires merit from rites\n\n26-8 SCIIND/82\n\nRafKa/i Kwr\n\nRam Rattan\n\nPandey\n\n/Qlfannadhadas . ./.\n\nRaj Kan Klirtr\n\nRam 'Jf.attdtl\n\nl'e11dry\n\nperformed by an officiating priest, and none is ever acquired by the intermediate performer of the rites; b\\1l if the duty of the officiating priest be performed hy rr substitute. property in the sacrificial fee is at first vested in the substitute, and through him, in the widow entitled thereto. It is alleged. that there is no a11thority for this construction. * * *\n\nThe text which ordains that \"a person unable to act shall appoint another to act for him\", is the foundat10n of this construction: but the property of an outcaste, or other person disqualified for solemn rites. is absolutely lost, in the same manner with his right to the paternal gold, silver, and the like.\n\nThis will be explained in the fifth book on Inheritance.\n\nWives and-others, disqualified by sex for the performance of holy rites. cannot appoint a substitute: as a defiled person cannot perform a solemn act ordained by the Vedas: therefore wives have 110 property in the\n\noffice of priest\".\n\nAt the end of the discussion there is the following significant passage:\n\n\"Therefore the difficulty is thus reconciled; women are entitled to that only for whk:h they are qualified. In regard to the assertion. that women, being disqualified, cannot appoint a substitute. this ml'st be understood: being disqualified for solemn\n\nact~ ordained by the Vedas, they cannot appoint a substitute for such acts; but, qualified for worldly acts, nothing prevents their appointment of a substitute for temporal affairs: and the right should devolve on the next in uccession, under the , text quoted in another place (Book 5. v. 477) and because women are dependent on men.\n\nGrain and similar property may be consumed by a woman entitled to the succession: but gold. silver. and the like. should be preserved: if she cannot 11uard it, let it be entrusted to her husband's heir, as will be mentioned under the title of inheritance.\n\nHere. since a woman cannot orcserve the office, it should be executed by her husband's daughter's son, or other heir; but tlie produce\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREi\\1£ COURT REPORTS 199\n\nshould be enjoyed by the woman .. However, should the daughter's son be at variance with his maternal grandh1other, it may be executed by another person: he is not entitled to his maternal grandfather's property, if that grandfather leave a wife: and should the maternalgrandmother litigate, it must be amicably adjusted''.\n\nThe concluding portion seems rather to indicate that the rnore categorical passage underlined above and re!ied upon is in the nature of an objection which is heing answered and that the final conclusion is the reCl\\gmtion <\"i a right to succeed bv getting the duties of the office performed by the next male in succession.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have in fact noticecl this concluding passage hut have missed its correct import.\n\nIt is desirable now to consider how this question stands with reference to the decided cases in the various High Courts. A fairly substantial number of cases appear in the reports of the Madras High Court,. One of the earliest decisions is that of the Madras Sadar\n\nDiwani Ada lat in Sesllll A mmal v. So1111daraja A iyarO whre111 it was held, following the opinion of the Sadar Court Pandits that a woman was disqualified\n\nby reason of her sex from i11heriting the office of A charyapurusha but the same Pandits' opinion distinctly recognises that religious offices like those of an Arc/10ka or P'ulari can be held by a female, hy her getting the duties thereof performed through a competent male substitute. In TanKirala Chiranjfri v. Rama Manikya Rao Rajaya Lakshmamma(') it was stated that there was no basis for the assumption that a\n\nminor, a female, or a person unlearned in the Vedas. wili lose the right to service in the temole and that the onus will be on the person who alleges the disqualificatioD to prove it. The learned Judges categorically asserted (aoperently as being a matter within general knowledge and exoerience) that \"service in temoles is being performed bv proxies\". In Ramasundaram Pillai v. Savundaratha A mmaU') the learned Jud_ges say as follows:\n\n(l) [1853] M.S.D.A. 261. (2\\ A.l.R. 1915 Madra• 505(1).\n\n(3) A.T.R. 1915 Madras 725.\n\n195$\n\nRaj Kali Kucr\n\n\"· Ram Rott<111\n\nPtJJ1dey\n\nJa/llUl1lllliharlal\n\nRaj 'KaU Kur\n\n' Rmii Jldttan\n\nPandey\n\n\"It is undeniable that this and other High Courts have Ill numerous cases acted on the 2_ssumption\n\n(which was not qnestioned) that women could hold religious offices and . get the duties performed by\n\nJogamwdhadm J. Proxy\".\n\nThey further say\n\n\"It may be that the parties concerned are so accustomed to the idea of female office-holders with proxies that it has usually not occurred to them to question the legality of such a state of affairs and that in the absence of contest, the Courts have somewhat too readily assumed it to be legal without requiring proof of a valid custom in support of it\".\n\nIn Rajeswari Ammal v. Subramaflia Archaka(') the learned Judges state as follows:\n\n\"We are of the opinion that a female is not under Hindu law or custom. disqualified from succeeding to a hereditary religious office and getting such duties as she may be disqualified by reason of her sex from performing, performed by proxy\"\n\nThe only dissentient view against this current of allthority in the Madras High Court was that of Justice Sadasiva Aiyar in Sundarambal A mmal v.\n\nY ogavanagurukka/O. He expressed a strong opinion that .the practice of allowing the priestly office to be performed by a substitute excepting for merely temporary occasions or casual purposes. is wholly opposed to public policy and that it should not be recognised.\n\nIn a later judgment in Annaya Tantri v. A mmaka Hengsu<') relating to the same topic he (Justice Sadasiva Aiyar) stated as follows:\n\n\"It is notorious that the deputy is usually chosen on the principle of a Dutch auction.\n\nThe man who a.!!rees to allow the widow to retain the largest portion of the emoluments of the office and to receive the ]east a~ his QWn remuneration is given the place of the deputy\".\n\nTJ1e learned Judge pointed out that\n\n\"sllch a practice was mischievous and that even\n\n(I) A.l R. 1917 Madros963(2).\n\n(2) A.1.R. 1915 Madras 561.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1919 Madras 598 (F.R).\n\nif it was sanctioned by usage it ought not to bl;! re- 1955 cognised by courts\".\n\nRaj Kali Kuer\n\nThere is certainly force in this comment.\n\nBut in a &;11 :'~ 1\"\n\n11 matter of this kind where there is no express prohibi- ~'~-e tion in the texts for the performance of the duties of Jaramwd!zadus J. the Pujari's office by the appointment of substitutes and where such an office has developed into a hereditary right of property, the consideration of public policy cannot be insisted on to the extent of negativing the right itself. In such a situation what has to be equally emphasised is the duty-aspect oi the office and to insist, on the superior authorities in charge of the temple exercising vigilantly their responsibility by controlling the then incumbent of the priestly office in the exercise of his rights (or by other persons having interest taking appropriate steps through _ cotirt), when it is found that the services are not being properly or efficiently performed. In view of the\n\npeculiar nature of such ottices as combining in them both tht: element of property and the element of duty, it cannot be doubted that superior authorities in\n\nchar~~ of the institutions or other persons interested have this right which may be enforced by appropriate\n\nlegal means. In Raja Peary Mohan Mukh<'l'ji v. Ma110- 'liar M uklwrji(') the Privy Council has recognised that notwithstanding the personal interest of a Slwbait in respect of his oftice, the performance of the duties thereof has got to be safeguarded and that he can be removed where he has put himself in a position in \\Vhich the obligation of his office can no longer be faithfuliy discharged.\n\nSo far as the Madras High Court area is concerned. the controversy has been seWed by the Full Bench case in A1111aya Tantri v. Ammaka HengsuO where the view taken by Justice Sadasiva Aiyar was specifical!Y overruled on the ground that \"there were nu-. merous decisions of the Madras High Court in conformity with the decisions of the other High Courts by which the widow and the daughter and the daughter\n\n(!) [19211 L.R. 4R I.A. 258. (.2) A.J.R. 1919 Madras 598 <F.B.).\n\nRaj Kali Ku.er\n\nRa11z Ruttflit\n\nPandey\n\nJaga1uiadhudus J..\n\nof the last male A rchaka are held entitled in accordance with the established user to succeed to the office of Archaka discharging his duties by deputy and to transmit it to their heirs, who as male heirs are preferred to female, and will generally be competent to perform the duties in person\". These decisions of tne Madras High Court seem to recognise both the factum and validity of the usage as one that has been accepted by the courts not only within its own jurisdiction but also within the jurisdiction of the other High Courts. It is urged, however, that there is no such usage that can be definitely said to be established with reference to the decisions of the other High Courts.\n\nA~ regards the other High Courts doubtless the actual cases appearing in the reports about this point are not many. In the Bombay High Court one of. the earliest decisions is the case in 1866 of Keshavbhat bin 'Ganeshbhat v. Bhagirhibai kom NarayanbhatC) where the.learned Judges say as follows:\n\n\"With respect to the otJjection. that a Hindu female cannot perform the duties which attach to the office for the maintenance of which the allowance was granted, it may be observed that the defendant had not proved the existence of any usage in confotmity with his allegation\".\n\nThe claim in question in that case was 10 an annual allowance paid from the Government Treasury to the 'members of a family for the maintenance of certain religious services at the temple of M ahadev at Baneshvar near Poona. In Sitarambhat et al v. Sitaram Ganesh(') the head-note shows as follows:\n\n\"Semble, that an hereditary priestly office descends in default of males through females\".\n\nThis i8 apparently the assumption on which that judgment appears to have proceeded though the matter does not appear to have been specifically so decided. In Calcutta one of the early cases is Poorun Narain Dutt v. Kasheessuree Dosee('). There it was recognised that a woman can succeed to a. priestly\n\n(I) 3 11.H.C.R, A.C'.J. 75.\n\n(2) 6 B.H.C.R. A.C.J. 250.\n\n(3) [1865] 3 W.R. 179.\n\noffice and the contention .to the contrary was over- 1955 ruled on the ground that the lower appellate court Raj Kali K11er found the same as a fact on the evidence and that no Ramvfl.attan •Orte but the defendant had raised the contention. In Pandey !Joy Deb Surma v. Huroputty Surma(') the same ques- J\"g\"'m-;; dhadas J. tion was raised, viz., whether according to Hindu law a woman can succeed to the priestly office and reliance appears to have been placed for that contention on the passage from Colebrooke's Digest already above referred to. In view of this contention the learned- .Judges remitted the case to the lower court for determination of the question whether with reference to any particular custom or rule of Hindu law a woman is entitled to succeed to the priestly office. In that case it was the office of the Dolloi of the temple. It does not appear what the finding received was and how this matter was finally decided. In Radha Mohun\n\nMu11dul v. Jadoommiee Dossee(') their Lorships of the Judicial Committee quoted with apparent approval the following passage from the judgment of the trial Court:\n\n\"They (the members of the family) merely say that as the said properties are of a debuttur character, they are not susceptible of division among the shareholders; and that since the plaintiff is a childless widow. she is not competent to c; arry on the service of the gods. That the properties in question do not admit of any partition among the co-shares. is a fact which must be admitted by me; but I do not see any reason why a widow of the family should be incapacit11ted from superintending the service of the gods. It is 11ot uned by the defendants that any such rule has been laid down in the family, and that under it the widows have been excluded from the above superintendence.\n\nOn the other hand. among the Hindoos.\n\nPersons belonging to no other caste except that of Brahmins can perform the service of a god with his mvn hands. that is. worhip the idol by touching its person. Men of other castes simply suoerintend the ser<1ir.e of the gods and goddesses established bv themselves. while they causetheir actual worshipto he\n\n(I) [1871] 16 W.R. 282.\n\n(2) 23 W.R. 369.\n\nRaj Kall Ktitt\n\nRam Rattan\n\nJ'andej\n\nJagannadhadas I.\n\n204 SUPREl'vfE COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nperformed by Brahmins.\n\nThus, when persons of the above description can conduct the service of idols in the above-mentioned manner, why should not the widows of their family be able to carry on worship in . 1 ? c a s1m1 ar way. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . onsequently, there 1s nothmg to prevent the Court from finding that the plaintiff has a right to hold possession of the debutter properties enumerated by the defendants in the 12th paragraph of their written statement, and to superintend the service of the gods conjointly with the other co-sharers\".\n\nIn Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas. Haldar(') it has been recognised that according to custom the palas of\n\nKtlighat shrine in Calcutta are heritable and that it was immaterial whether the heir is a male or a female.\n\nThis must necessarily have involved the recognition of the capacity of the female to get the worship performed by a male substitute who is to be taken from a limited class. As has been already noticed, the reported cases dealing with this math<r outside the Madras High Court do not appear to be many.\n\nAt ariy rate, no others have bee)l brought to our notice dealing with this question directly, though there are many cases relating to the question of succession to the office of Shebait and the performance of duties thereof by proxy, which is a matter distinguishable from a case relating to the office of Pujari or A rchaka simpliciter. The paucity of decided cases in the reports of the other High Courts may very well be due to what has been pointed out in one of the Madras cases, viz., that the practice of females 3ucceeding to this office and getting the duties thereof performed by a sn bstitute was so common and well recognised that it has not been seriously contested and brought up to the Courts.\n\nFurther the institution of private familv temoles and the endowments of latge and substantial properties for the Deb-seva ii:i such temoles though somewhat uncommon in South India is fairlv common in Bengal and some other. States. •Jn view of the Dayahhaga system of law of succession prevalent in Bengal and the very much larger number\n\n(I\\ A.r.R. 1915 Calcutta 161\\2).\n\nof occasions for wives and daughters succeeding to a\n\n195.S sonless coparcener in Dayabhaga joint families, the 1:11/ Kali xi.er practice of females succeeding to the prie~Jy office Rom v.Ra 1 and of getting the duties performed by other mem- Pande; \"n bers of the family as proxies in their places must, by J, -;,;;;\"\"' J the very. situation, have been common in these areas. aaa11n ai (fhe case reported in Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das(') is a case relating to Shebait's (priest's) office in the Singheswar temple of Bhagalpur and the facts therein show that there was umtuestioned female succession to the office. It is a clear indication of the prevalence of the usage of female succession to priestly office in the State of Bihar from which the present case arises .\n\n. A careful review, therefore, of the reported cases on this matter shows that the usage of a female succeeding to a priestly office and getting the same .performed through a competent deputy is one that has been fairly well recognised. There is nothing in the textual Hindu law to the contrary.\n\nNor can it be said that the recognition of such a usage is opposed to public policy, in the Hindu law sense. As already pointed out the consideration of public policy can only be given effect in the present state of the law, to the extent required for enforcing adequate discharge of the duties appurtenant to the office.\n\nSubject to the proper and efficient discharge of the duties of the office, there can be no reason either on principle or on authority to refuse to accord to a female the right to succeed to the hereditary office held by her hushand and to get the duties of the office performed hy a substitute excepting in cases where usage to the contrary is pleaded and established. In the present case such a usage was pleaded by the defendant\n\nin his written statement but no evidence of it was given.\n\nIndeed as pointed out by the first appellate Court, the plea that there has been a partition of the offices of the two temples and the implied re· cognition of the plantiff's right to the office of the other temple at Gangupal appears to indicate the contrary usage. We are accordingly of the opininn\n\n(1) A.T.R. 1914 P.C. 72. 27-8 SCT 1NDl82\n\n19S5\n\nRaf .Kali }(11er\n\n•• Ram Ratu1n\n\nPa11dey\n\nJagannadhadas.J.\n\nApril 7\n\nthat tht: claim of the plantiff-appellant is made out and that she is entitled to succeed.\n\nThe:: discussion above. is more germane to the case of a public t\"mple wherein the idol has been Shastrically installed and consecrated and the worship is in accordance with the Shastras. There is nothing on the record to shbw whether the temple in this case falls within this category. If; however, the temple\n\ns a private one or idol therein is not one Shastri cal!y consecrated, the case in favour of the plaintiff is much stronger and her right cannot be seriotisly challenged.\n\nAt this stage, it is desirable to mention one other matter.\n\nIn the present case the emoluments attached to the office ar.e stated to be the daily and other offerings made to the deity at the worship hy the visiting devotees.\n\nBoth the parties to thi~ case have come up to Court on the common footing that it is this which constitutes the emoluments.\n\nWhether and how far such votive offerings can be appropriated by a Pujari for his emoluments if the temple is a public institution, (i.e., not a private famiiy temple) and whether any usage i'l this behalf is valid is a matter which does not arise before us in this case.\n\nIn the result, the appeal must be allowed with costs throughout and the decree of the trial court must he restored.\n\nRAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA\n\nand IMAM J.T.] .\n\nConstitution of India-Art. 145(3)-Cottstruction of-Supreme Court-Whether competent to split Up the case for he purpose of hearing and decision.\n\nHeld (Per MUKHERJEA C:T, DAS, VIVIAN HOSE. and IMAM .TJ SINHA J. dissentini:) that a Constitution Bench of five or more Judges before which a cace happrns to be posted in the first. instance", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "RAM RATTAN PANDEY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM RATTAN PANDEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1729, "end_char": 1735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1746, "end_char": 1758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prasad, for tpe appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1780, "end_char": 1791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Varma, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "article 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1931, "end_char": 1945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2011, "end_char": 2030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by leave granted under article 136(1) of the Constitution against the second appellate judgment of the High Court of Patna."}}, {"text": "Arrah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2112, "end_char": 2117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It relates to the office of P11jari and Panda of a famous temple in the town of Arrah in the State of Bihar, known as the temple of Aranya Devi and Killa Ki Devi."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2134, "end_char": 2139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It relates to the office of P11jari and Panda of a famous temple in the town of Arrah in the State of Bihar, known as the temple of Aranya Devi and Killa Ki Devi."}}, {"text": "Aranya Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2164, "end_char": 2175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It relates to the office of P11jari and Panda of a famous temple in the town of Arrah in the State of Bihar, known as the temple of Aranya Devi and Killa Ki Devi.", "canonical_name": "Aranya Devi"}}, {"text": "Killa Ki Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It relates to the office of P11jari and Panda of a famous temple in the town of Arrah in the State of Bihar, known as the temple of Aranya Devi and Killa Ki Devi."}}, {"text": "Rambeyas Pande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2650, "end_char": 2664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the admitted case that this office belongs to the family of both the parties and that the duties of the office were being jointly performed by the defendant and his deceased brother, Rambeyas Pande, and that they were enjoying the emoluments jointly."}}, {"text": "_ Rambeyas Pande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3016, "end_char": 3032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the legally wedded wife of his brother,_ Rambeyas Pande, and (2) during the life time of Rambeyas Pande, there was a division between them with reference to the office of Pujari and Panda belonging to this family in respect of two temples (a) at Arrah and (b) at Gangipul, that the office of Pujari at Gangipul was given to the plaintiff's husband and that the temple of Aran Devi at Arrah was given to the defendant and that since then, i.e., for about l l years prior to the date of the suit, the plaintiff's husband had no connection with the office of Pujari in this temple nor with the receipt of any offerings therein."}}, {"text": "Gangipul", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3240, "end_char": 3248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the legally wedded wife of his brother,_ Rambeyas Pande, and (2) during the life time of Rambeyas Pande, there was a division between them with reference to the office of Pujari and Panda belonging to this family in respect of two temples (a) at Arrah and (b) at Gangipul, that the office of Pujari at Gangipul was given to the plaintiff's husband and that the temple of Aran Devi at Arrah was given to the defendant and that since then, i.e., for about l l years prior to the date of the suit, the plaintiff's husband had no connection with the office of Pujari in this temple nor with the receipt of any offerings therein."}}, {"text": "Aran Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3348, "end_char": 3357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the legally wedded wife of his brother,_ Rambeyas Pande, and (2) during the life time of Rambeyas Pande, there was a division between them with reference to the office of Pujari and Panda belonging to this family in respect of two temples (a) at Arrah and (b) at Gangipul, that the office of Pujari at Gangipul was given to the plaintiff's husband and that the temple of Aran Devi at Arrah was given to the defendant and that since then, i.e., for about l l years prior to the date of the suit, the plaintiff's husband had no connection with the office of Pujari in this temple nor with the receipt of any offerings therein.", "canonical_name": "Aranya Devi"}}, {"text": "Raj Kali Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3939, "end_char": 3952, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Raj Kali Ku.er", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Rain Rattan Pandey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4004, "end_char": 4022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention\n\nRaj Kali Kuer v.\n\nRam Ratran Pandey\n\nJ955\n\nRaj Kali Kuer\n\n'/ ..\n\nRain Rattan Pandey\n\nJaganuadhadn.~ J.\n\nis set out in the following terms in the written statement:\n\n\"The plaintiff is not at all entitled to the office and the post of Pujari and Panda of Arun Devi and she is not entitled to get 112 share or any share in the income and offering of the said Asthan, nor has she got any right to perform Puja as a Panda personally, or through her karinda and to get the income, etc."}}, {"text": "Ram JlatlW", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6058, "end_char": 6068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The.¥ he\\~, .however, \"that she 1s not debarr~ from bemg entitled to be maintained out of the estate of her husband which, in\n\nRu} Kali J(µ8r\n\n\"' Ram JlatlW!"}}, {"text": "Dharmakarta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6181, "end_char": 6192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "do~ with the.office of the manager of thetemple, who m ...:outh India, is known by the name of Dharmakarta."}}, {"text": "Pujari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6813, "end_char": 6819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court in their judgment in the case under appeal, have attempted to distinguish the present case from that of the case of the Shehailship and have come to the conclusion that while in respect of Shehaiti right a woman may succeed by heirship, she is not entitled to such succession in respect of the right of a Panda and Pujari."}}, {"text": "Page", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7896, "end_char": 7900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See the observations of Justice Page in Nagendra."}}, {"text": "Sadasiva Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7971, "end_char": 7985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nRahtndra(') at pages 495 and 496 and that of Justice Sadasiva Aiyar in Su1:darambal v. Y ogavanag11rukka!(')"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Shahar Bano v. Aga Mahomed Jafjer Bindaneein(') their Lordships, after noticing the view taken by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court, that \"there is no legal prohibition against a woman holding a mutwalliship when the trust, by its nature involves no spiritual duties such as a woman could not properly discharge in person or by depury\" approved this view of the High Court and said ''it appears to their Lordships that there is ample authority for that proposition\" The question, therefore, that requires consideration in the present case 'is whether the office of the Puiari and Panda in a temple involves such duties as could not be discharged by a female in person and if so, whether she is also incompetent to get the same discharged by a deputy."}}, {"text": "Asutosh Mookerjce", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9888, "end_char": 9905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramahrahma\n\nChatterjee v. Kedar Nath Banerjee(') Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjce indicated the daily routine of worship in the following passage:\n\n\"The normal type of continued worship of a consecrated image consists of the sweeping of a temple, the process of smearing, the removal of the previous day's offerings of flowers, the presentation of fresh flowers and water, and other like practices."}}, {"text": "llifi Kall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10412, "end_char": 10422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llifi Kall &!"}}, {"text": "Pandey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10443, "end_char": 10449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rat1an\n\nPandey\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Saraswati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10794, "end_char": 10803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saraswati's Hindu Law of Endowments(') the nature of the daily worship of a consecrated idol in a temple 'is set out at pages 134 and 135 in detail.", "canonical_name": "Saraswati"}}, {"text": "Manu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12267, "end_char": 12271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even at a time when the institution of temple worship had probably not come into general vogue, the incapitcity of a woman to recite Vedic texts, to offer sacrificial fire, or to perform sacramental rites, is indicated in certain texts of Manu. ("}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12350, "end_char": 12360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12377, "end_char": 12387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pandi! Pranna1h Sa.rnswali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12591, "end_char": 12617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether it is on the basis of these texts or for some either reason, her incapacity to discharge, in person, the duties of the , Pujari appears to have been well\n\n(1) The Hin4u La\\\\· ofEndown1cnts by Pandi!"}}, {"text": "Vishnu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13067, "end_char": 13073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t e sacred t rea , ·- (i.e. the members of the Dvija class before the initia- Jawamrud/,.uJa, 1 tion ceremony has been performed for them), and Sudras are not competent to touch images of Vishnu or Siva."}}, {"text": "Siva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13077, "end_char": 13081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t e sacred t rea , ·- (i.e. the members of the Dvija class before the initia- Jawamrud/,.uJa, 1 tion ceremony has been performed for them), and Sudras are not competent to touch images of Vishnu or Siva."}}, {"text": "Colebrooke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15923, "end_char": 15933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Colebrooke's transla.- tion of the Digest of Hindu Law on Contracts and Successions with a commentary by Jagannatha Tercapanchanana (4th Edition, published by Higginbotham & Co., Maras, 1874), Vol."}}, {"text": "Jagannatha Tercapanchanana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16028, "end_char": 16054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Colebrooke's transla.- tion of the Digest of Hindu Law on Contracts and Successions with a commentary by Jagannatha Tercapanchanana (4th Edition, published by Higginbotham & Co., Maras, 1874), Vol."}}, {"text": "Jaga11natha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16361, "end_char": 16372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A perusal thereof and particularly of placita 28 to 44 containing citations from various Smrutis with Jaga11natha's commentary thereon, clearly indicate that the institution of hereditary priestship, became established by that date and that the performance of such priestly functions by substitutes had definitely come into vogue.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Saraswti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17674, "end_char": 17682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The historical origin and growth of temple worship has been fully dealt with in Saraswti's Hindu Law of Endowments and has been also noticed in the referring judgment in A nnaya Tantri v. A mmaka Hengsu(1).", "canonical_name": "Saraswati"}}, {"text": "Panda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18231, "end_char": 18236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, in course of time and with the change in social conditions and economic values, rendered the offices of Panda and Pujari in almost all the famous shrines in India, a lucrative affair, and has enabled the hereditary priests to get the functions discharged by pai4 substitutes and themselves enjoy a substantial margin of income."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18284, "end_char": 18289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, in course of time and with the change in social conditions and economic values, rendered the offices of Panda and Pujari in almost all the famous shrines in India, a lucrative affair, and has enabled the hereditary priests to get the functions discharged by pai4 substitutes and themselves enjoy a substantial margin of income."}}, {"text": "Scshagiri Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20933, "end_char": 20948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Annaya Tantri v.\n\nAmmaka Hengsu('), Justice Scshagiri Aiyar in his referring judgment has referred to this passage and was of the opinion that it does not express a specific view."}}, {"text": "Ganapathi Iver", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21072, "end_char": 21086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ganapathi Iver on Hindu and Mahomedan Endowments (2nd Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Jagannatha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21232, "end_char": 21242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the learned author while commenting on this very passage says as follows at page 453 of his book:\n\n\"Jagannatha there considers the question whether wives and others have a title to the succession to this priestly office.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Narada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22095, "end_char": 22101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43 in Section II of Chapter III, Book II, which is a text from Narada relating to hereditary priests."}}, {"text": "Agraharicas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22604, "end_char": 22615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portions of the discussion are herein below set out:\n\n\"It is doubted whether wives and others have a title to this succession, althouh the partition, founded on the admission of a riglit vesting in Agraharicas and other officiating priests, ought to be\n\nimilar to the partition of inheritance in general."}}, {"text": "Raj Kan Klirtr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23694, "end_char": 23708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Kan Klirtr\n\nRam 'Jf.attdtl\n\nl'e11dry\n\nperformed by an officiating priest, and none is ever acquired by the intermediate performer of the rites; b\\1l if the duty of the officiating priest be performed hy rr substitute."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26762, "end_char": 26779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A fairly substantial number of cases appear in the reports of the Madras High Court,."}}, {"text": "Madras Sadar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26827, "end_char": 26839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the earliest decisions is that of the Madras Sadar\n\nDiwani Ada lat in Sesllll A mmal v. So1111daraja A iyarO whre111 it was held, following the opinion of the Sadar Court Pandits that a woman was disqualified\n\nby reason of her sex from i11heriting the office of A charyapurusha but the same Pandits' opinion distinctly recognises that religious offices like those of an Arc/10ka or P'ulari can be held by a female, hy her getting the duties thereof performed through a competent male substitute."}}, {"text": "Diwani Ada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26841, "end_char": 26851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the earliest decisions is that of the Madras Sadar\n\nDiwani Ada lat in Sesllll A mmal v. So1111daraja A iyarO whre111 it was held, following the opinion of the Sadar Court Pandits that a woman was disqualified\n\nby reason of her sex from i11heriting the office of A charyapurusha but the same Pandits' opinion distinctly recognises that religious offices like those of an Arc/10ka or P'ulari can be held by a female, hy her getting the duties thereof performed through a competent male substitute."}}, {"text": "Sadar Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26948, "end_char": 26959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the earliest decisions is that of the Madras Sadar\n\nDiwani Ada lat in Sesllll A mmal v. So1111daraja A iyarO whre111 it was held, following the opinion of the Sadar Court Pandits that a woman was disqualified\n\nby reason of her sex from i11heriting the office of A charyapurusha but the same Pandits' opinion distinctly recognises that religious offices like those of an Arc/10ka or P'ulari can be held by a female, hy her getting the duties thereof performed through a competent male substitute."}}, {"text": "Raj Kali Kucr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27946, "end_char": 27959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195$\n\nRaj Kali Kucr\n\n\"· Ram Rott<111\n\nPtJJ1dey\n\nJa/llUl1lllliharlal\n\nRaj 'KaU Kur\n\n' Rmii Jldttan\n\nPandey\n\n\"It is undeniable that this and other High Courts have Ill numerous cases acted on the 2_ssumption\n\n(which was not qnestioned) that women could hold religious offices and .", "canonical_name": "Raj Kali Ku.er"}}, {"text": "Raj Kali Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30061, "end_char": 30074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Kali Kuer\n\nThere is certainly force in this comment.", "canonical_name": "Raj Kali Ku.er"}}, {"text": "Jaramwd!zadus", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30260, "end_char": 30273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in a &;11 :'~ 1\"\n\n11 matter of this kind where there is no express prohibi- ~'~-e tion in the texts for the performance of the duties of Jaramwd!zadus J. the Pujari's office by the appointment of substitutes and where such an office has developed into a hereditary right of property, the consideration of public policy cannot be insisted on to the extent of negativing the right itself."}}, {"text": "Raj Kali Ku.er", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32113, "end_char": 32127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Kali Ku.er\n\nRa11z Ruttflit\n\nPandey\n\nJaga1uiadhudus J..\n\nof the last male A rchaka are held entitled in accordance with the established user to succeed to the office of Archaka discharging his duties by deputy and to transmit it to their heirs, who as male heirs are preferred to female, and will generally be competent to perform the duties in person\".", "canonical_name": "Raj Kali Ku.er"}}, {"text": "Jaga1uiadhudus", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32153, "end_char": 32167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Kali Ku.er\n\nRa11z Ruttflit\n\nPandey\n\nJaga1uiadhudus J..\n\nof the last male A rchaka are held entitled in accordance with the established user to succeed to the office of Archaka discharging his duties by deputy and to transmit it to their heirs, who as male heirs are preferred to female, and will generally be competent to perform the duties in person\"."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32989, "end_char": 33006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Bombay High Court one of."}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33660, "end_char": 33665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim in question in that case was 10 an annual allowance paid from the Government Treasury to the 'members of a family for the maintenance of certain religious services at the temple of M ahadev at Baneshvar near Poona."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33992, "end_char": 34000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Calcutta one of the early cases is Poorun Narain Dutt v. Kasheessuree Dosee(')."}}, {"text": "Raj Kali K11er", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34327, "end_char": 34341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "office and the contention .to the contrary was over- 1955 ruled on the ground that the lower appellate court Raj Kali K11er found the same as a fact on the evidence and that no Ramvfl.attan •Orte but the defendant had raised the contention.", "canonical_name": "Raj Kali Ku.er"}}, {"text": "Radha Mohun", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35162, "end_char": 35173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Radha Mohun\n\nMu11dul v. Jadoommiee Dossee(') their Lorships of the Judicial Committee quoted with apparent approval the following passage from the judgment of the trial Court:\n\n\"They (the members of the family) merely say that as the said properties are of a debuttur character, they are not susceptible of division among the shareholders; and that since the plaintiff is a childless widow."}}, {"text": "Raj Kall Ktitt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36421, "end_char": 36435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Kall Ktitt\n\nRam Rattan\n\nJ'andej\n\nJagannadhadas I.\n\n204 SUPREl'vfE COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nperformed by Brahmins."}}, {"text": "Ram Rattan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36437, "end_char": 36447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Kall Ktitt\n\nRam Rattan\n\nJ'andej\n\nJagannadhadas I.\n\n204 SUPREl'vfE COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nperformed by Brahmins.", "canonical_name": "RAM RATTAN PANDEY"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36728, "end_char": 36730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38069, "end_char": 38075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The paucity of decided cases in the reports of the other High Courts may very well be due to what has been pointed out in one of the Madras cases, viz.,"}}, {"text": "South India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38476, "end_char": 38487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further the institution of private familv temoles and the endowments of latge and substantial properties for the Deb-seva ii:i such temoles though somewhat uncommon in South India is fairlv common in Bengal and some other."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38508, "end_char": 38514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further the institution of private familv temoles and the endowments of latge and substantial properties for the Deb-seva ii:i such temoles though somewhat uncommon in South India is fairlv common in Bengal and some other."}}, {"text": "Shebait", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39146, "end_char": 39153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aaa11n ai (fhe case reported in Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das(') is a case relating to Shebait's (priest's) office in the Singheswar temple of Bhagalpur and the facts therein show that there was umtuestioned female succession to the office."}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39202, "end_char": 39211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aaa11n ai (fhe case reported in Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das(') is a case relating to Shebait's (priest's) office in the Singheswar temple of Bhagalpur and the facts therein show that there was umtuestioned female succession to the office."}}, {"text": "Gangupal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40785, "end_char": 40793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed as pointed out by the first appellate Court, the plea that there has been a partition of the offices of the two temples and the implied re· cognition of the plantiff's right to the office of the other temple at Gangupal appears to indicate the contrary usage."}}, {"text": "Raf .Kali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40917, "end_char": 40926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27-8 SCT 1NDl82\n\n19S5\n\nRaf .Kali }(11er\n\n•• Ram Ratu1n\n\nPa11dey\n\nJagannadhadas."}}, {"text": "Ram Ratu1n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40938, "end_char": 40948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27-8 SCT 1NDl82\n\n19S5\n\nRaf .Kali }(11er\n\n•• Ram Ratu1n\n\nPa11dey\n\nJagannadhadas.", "canonical_name": "RAM RATTAN PANDEY"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40959, "end_char": 40972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27-8 SCT 1NDl82\n\n19S5\n\nRaf .Kali }(11er\n\n•• Ram Ratu1n\n\nPa11dey\n\nJagannadhadas.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "fMUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42374, "end_char": 42384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA\n\nand IMAM J.T.] ."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42391, "end_char": 42400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA\n\nand IMAM J.T.] ."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42402, "end_char": 42413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA\n\nand IMAM J.T.] .", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE"}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42426, "end_char": 42430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA\n\nand IMAM J.T.] ."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42440, "end_char": 42461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 145(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42462, "end_char": 42473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA C:T, DAS,", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42595, "end_char": 42614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held (Per MUKHERJEA C:T, DAS, VIVIAN HOSE."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN HOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42615, "end_char": 42626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held (Per MUKHERJEA C:T, DAS, VIVIAN HOSE.", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE"}}, {"text": "IMAM .TJ SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42632, "end_char": 42646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and IMAM .TJ SINHA J. dissentini:) that a Constitution Bench of five or more Judges before which a cace happrns to be posted in the first."}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42670, "end_char": 42688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and IMAM .TJ SINHA J. dissentini:) that a Constitution Bench of five or more Judges before which a cace happrns to be posted in the first."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_1_21_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSANGRAM SINGH\n\nELECTION TRIBUNAL; KOTAH,\n\nBHUREY LAL BAY A\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, B. JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nBHUVANESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, JJ.)\n\nReprcse11tation of tht' People Act (XLIIJ) of 1951, section 105-Effect of-Finality and condusi\"£Jeness of orders of Election Tribunals-Article 136 of Constitution-7urisdiction of -:supreme Court-1urisdiction and powers of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution-Whether in any way affected-Writ of Certiorari-Principles governing grant of-Laws of procedure-Grounded on natural justice-Designed to promote justice-Representation of the People Act of 1951, sub-section (2) of section 90-Procedure\n\nfor trial of Election petitions-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, sections 27, 30 and 32-Disiinction between \"Penalty\" for non-appearance of parties to suir and consequences flowing from non-appearance in response to summons---Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 5, rules 1 and 5 and Order 8, rules 1 and 14, Order 9, rules 6(l)(a), 2, 7, 12 and 13-0rder 15, rule 3-0rder 17, rules 1(1) and 2- Trial of suits-First hearing and adjourned hearing-Disfinction- Conseq11c11ces of 1wn-appearancc-Ex part<! he<1ri11g and 'ex parte order-Principles i; m•erning discretion of Courts-Adjournment af hearing---{,'om•euiencc of wit11esses.\n\nNotwithstanding the provision in section 105 of the Representation of the People Act (Act XLill) of 1951 that every order of an Election Tribunal made under the Act shall be final and conclusive, the High Court and the Supreme Court have unfettered jurisdiction to examine whether the tribunal, in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, has acted kgally or otherwise. This jurisdic-· tion cannot be taken away bY. a legislative device that purports to confer power on a tribunal to act illegally. The legality of an act or conclusion is somethipg that exists outside and apart from the decision of an inferior tribunal. It is a part of the law of the land which cannot be finally dett\"rmined or altered by any tribunal of limited jurisdiction. The High Courts and the Supreme Court alone can determine what th.: law of the land is i•is-a-vis all other Courts and tribunals and they alone can pronounce with authority and finality on what is kgal and what is not. All that an inferior tribunal can do is to reach a t.:ntativc conclusion which is subject to review under Artidt>s 226 and 136 nf the Constitution. The jurisdicti1)n of th.: High Courts under Anick 226, with rhat of thi.: Supreme Court above them, n:mains to its fullest extent despite section 105\n\nMarch 22\n\n1Y55\n\nSu11gran1 Singh\n\nE/e,1iou Tribunal, Ko1uh, Bhurey Lat\n\nBay a\n\nof the Representation of the People Act. Limitations on the exercise of such jurisdiction can only be imposed by the Constitution.\n\nThe powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution are i::liscretionary and, though no limits can be placed upon that discretion, it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrarily. In the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Courts should not act as Courts of Appeal or revision to correct mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense.\n\nIt is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about special rights, as in election cases, decided as speedily as may be. The High Courts should not therefore en:crtain petitions for prerogative writs lightly in this class of case.\n\nThe appellant filed an election petition under section 100 of the Representation of the People Act. He appeared on the first and subsequeqt hearing at Kotah. The proceedings were then adjourned for certain hearings at Udaipur. The appellant did not appear on the first three hearings at that place so the tribunal proceeded \"' parte. His counsel appeared on the fourth hearing but was not allowed to take any further part in the proceedings because no good cause was shown for the earlier non-appearance and so the tribunal refused to set aside its \"ex parte order\".\n\nHeld, (I) J, Tnder section 90(2) of the Representation of the People Act the procedure for the trial of election petition is to b~, as near as may be, the same as in the trial of suits under the Civil Procedure Code;\n\n(2) under the Civil Procedure Code there is no such thing as an \"ex parte order for non-appearance\" which precludes further appearance at an adjourned hearing until the Order is set aside. If a party. appears at an adjourned hearing the court has a discretion (which must be exercised judicially) either to allow him to appear on such terms as it thinks fit, or to disallow further appearance; but\n\n(3) if he is allowed to appear then, unless good cause is shown under Order 9, rule 7 for the earlier non-appearance the proceedings must continue from the stage at which the later appearance 1s entered and the party so appearing cantlot be relegated to the position he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hearing or hearings; also,\n\n( 4) in exercising its discretion the court must see that justice is done to all concerned, including the witnesses.\n\nRule 6(1) (a) of Order 9 of the Civil Procedure Code is confined to the first hearing of the suit and does not apply, per se to subsequent hearings. 0.9, r.7 gives a pany a right to he relegated to .the position he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hearing or hearings if he shows good cause. It does not per se prevent further appearance when no good cause is shown. 0. I 7, r.2 applies at the adjourned hearing and there, the Court is given a wide discretion to make such order as it thinks fit.\n\n1955 A code of procedure is a body of law designed to facilitate justice and further its ends, and should not be treated as an enactment providing for. punishments and penalties. The laws of pro- Sangram Singh cedure are grounded on the principl~ of natural justice which rev. quires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions Elect ion Tribunal, should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that Kotah, Bhurey Lal affect their Ii ves and property should not continue in their absence Baya and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.\n\nSubject to clearly defined exceptions the laws of procedure should be construed, wherever reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. The court is invested with the widest possible discretion to see that justice is done to all concerned. No hard and fast rule can be laid down; and the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion will have, in a given case, to determine what consequences are to follow from non-appearance. An order awarding costs, or an adjournment, or the consideration of the written statement and the framing of the issues on the spot, can in some cases meet the ends of justice. In other cases, more drastic action may be called for.\n\nBy \"ends of justice\" is meant not only justice to the parties but also to witnesses and others who may be inconvei:ltenced. The convenience of the witnesses, which deserves the greatest consideration, is ordinarily lost sight of in this class of case. Justice strongly demands that this unfortunate section of the general public compelled to discharge public duties, usually at loss and inconvenience to themselves should not be ignored in the over-all picture of what will best serve the ends of justice; and it may well be a sound exercise of discretion in a particular case to refuse an adjournment and permit the plaintiff to examine the witnesses present and not allow the defendant to cross-examine them. But broadly speaking, after all the various factors have been taken into consideration and carefully weighed, the endeavour should 'be to avoid snap decisions and to afford the parties a real opportunity of fighting out their caso::s fairly squarely.\n\nThe Court must in e\\ery case exercise the discretion given to it. Its hands are not tied by a so-called \"ex parte order\", and, if it thinks they are tied by rule 7 of Order 9 of the Code, then it is not exercising the discretion which the law says it should, and in ii given case interference may be called for.\n\nHeld, that the Election Tribunal did not exercise the discretion given to it by law because of a misapprehension that it had none.\n\nIt was directed tO do so now and to proceed with the further hearing of the case in accordance with law.\n\nHari Vishnu v. Ahmed Ishaque ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104), Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghurai Singh ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 267), and .Raj Kruhna Bose \".· Binod Kanungo ([1954] S.C.R. 913, 918), apphed. Harzram v. Pnbhdas (A.LR. 1945 Sind 98, 102), distinguished. Sewaram v. Misrimal (A.I.R. 1952 Raj. 12, 14), overruled.\n\nVenkatasubbiah v. Lakshminarasimham (A.l.R. 1925 Mad. 1274), approved. Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar (I.L.R. 40 Mad.\n\nSa11gra111 Singh\n\nElectio11 Trih1111al, KotaJ,, B!iurey Lal\n\nBay a\n\n793), T. M. Ba,.,.et v. African l'roducts Ltd. (A.LR. 1928 P.C. 261,\n\n262) and Sa/1ibzada Zei111<labdi11 Khan v. Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Khan (5 I.A. 233, 236), applied.\n\nCase remilfed 10 the Trih1111a!:\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\n.IURISDIC110N: No. 214 of 1954.\n\nCivil Appeal\n\nAppeal under Article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 17th July 1953 of the High Court of Rajasthan (Bapna and Ranawat JJ.) in Civil Writ Application No. 128 of 1953.\n\nR. K. Ras1ogi and Gan pat Rai. for the appellant.\n\nR. C. Prasad, for S.l. Chhihhrr. for respondent No. 2.\n\n1955. March 22.\n\nThe; Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The second respondent Bhurey Lal filed an election petition under section 100 of the Representation of the People Act against the appellant Sangram Singh and two others for setting aside Sangram Singh's election.\n\nThe proceedings commenced at Kotah and after some hearings the Tribunal made an order on 11-12-1952 that the further sittings would be at Udaipur from the 16th to the 21st March, 1953. It was discovered later that the 16th was a public holiday, so on 5-1-1953 the dates were changed to \"from the 17th March onwards\" and the parties were duly notified.\n\nOn the 17th the appellant did not appear nor did any of the three counsel whom he had engaged, so the Tribuna I proceeded ex pa rte after waiting till\n\n1-15 P.M. . \" The Tribunal examined Bhurey Lal and two witnesses .on the 17th. five more witnesses on the 18th\n\nari~ , on the 19th the case was adjourned till the 20th.\n\n\"~On the\"20th one of the appellant's three counsel, Mr. 'Bhartit Raj, appeared but was not allowed to\n\n' ..\n\ntake any part in the proceedings because the Tribu- 1955 nal said that it was proceeding ex parte at that stage.\n\nSangram Singlr Three more witnesses were then examined. v.\n\nOn the following day, the 21st, the appellant made Election Tribunal. an application asking that the ex parte proceedings be Korah, Bhurey Lal set aside and asking that he be allowed to cross-ex- Baya amine those of Bhurey Lal's witnesses whose evidence BoseJ. had already been recorded.\n\nThe Tribunal _heard arguments and passed order the same day rejecting the application on the ground that the appellant had\n\n\"failed to satisfy ourselves that there was any just or unavoic; lable reason preventing the appearance of respondent No. l himself or of any of his three learned advocates between the I 7th and the I 9th of March. 1953\". and it added-\n\n\"at all events, when para 10 of the affidavit makes it clear that Shri Bharatra.i had already received instructions to appear on 17-3-1953 there was nothing to justify his non-appearance on the I 8th and 19th of March. I 953. if not. on the I 7th as well\".\n\nThe appellant thereupon filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan and further proceedings before the Tribunal were stayed.\n\nThe High Court rejected the petition on 17-7-1953 on two grounds- ()) \"In the first place. the Tribunal was the authority to decide whether the reasons were sufficient or otherwise and the fact that the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the reasons set forth by counsel for the petitioner were insufficient cannot be challenged in a petition of this nature\" and\n\n(2) \"On the merits also, we feel no hesitation in holding that counsel for the petitioner were grossly negligent in not appearing on the date which had been fixed for hearing. mol'C than two months previously\".\n\nFive months later. on 16-12-1953, the Hieb Court granted a certificate under article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution for leave to appeal to this Court.\n\n:?-8 SCI IND182\n\n1955 The only question before the High Court was whe- Sangram Singh ther the Tribunal was right in refusing to allow the v. appellant's counsel to appear and take part in the Election Tribunal, proceedings on and after the 20th of March, 1953, and Kotall, Bhnrey Lal the first question that we hve to decide is whether Baya , that is sufficient ground to give the High Court jurisdic- Bore J. ti on to entertain a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. That, in our opinion, is no longer res integra. The question was settled by a Bench of seven. Judges of this Court in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad !shaque(') in these terms:\n\n\"Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice\".\n\nThat is exactly the position here.\n\nIt was urged that that cannot be so \"in election matters because of section 105 of the Representation of the People Act of 195 l (Act XL III of 195 )), a section which was not considered in the earlier case.\n\nIt runs thus:\n\n\"Every order of the Tribunal made under this Act shall be final and conclusive\".\n\nIt was argued that neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court can itself transgress the law in trying to set right what it considers is an error of law on the part of the Court or Tribunal whose records are under consideration. It was submitted that the legislature intended the decisions of these tribunals to be final on all matters, whether of fact or of law, accordingly, they cannot be said to commit an error of law when, acting within the ambit of their jurisdiction, they decide and lay down what the law is. for in that sphere their decisions are absolute, as absolute as the decisions of the Supreme Court in its own sphere.\n\nTherefore, it was said, the. only question that is left open for examination under article 226 in the case of an Election Tribunal is whether it acted within the scope of its jurisdiction.\n\n(1) [1955) I S.C.R. 1104, 1121.\n\n. i\n\nBut this, also, is no longer open to question. The 1955 point has been decided by three Constitution Benches sungram Sillch of this Court. In Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Jshaque(') v. the effect of section 105 of tht< Representation of the Elec1io11 Trib1111at, People Act was not c<:msidered, but the Court laid Kotah, Blmrey Lat down in general terms that the jurisdiction under Baya article 226 having been conferred by the Constitution, BoseJ. limitations cannot be placed on it except by the Constitution itself: see pages 238 and 242. Section 105 was, however, considered in Durga Shankar Mehta v.\n\nRaghuraj Singh(') and it was held that that section cannot cut down or affect the overriding powers of this Court under article l 36. The same rule wa~ applied to article 226 in Raj Krusl111a Bose v. Binod Kanungo and others(') and it was decided that section l 05 cannot take away or whittle down the powers of the High, Court under article 226.\n\nFollowing those decisions we hold that the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 is not taken away or curtailed by section 105.\n\nThe jurisdiction which articles 226 and 136 confer entitles the High Courts and this Court to examine the decisions of all Tribunals to see whether they have acted illegally.\n\nThat jurisdiction cannot be taken away by a legislative device that purports to confer power on a tribunal to act illegally by enacting a statute that its illegal acts shall become legal the moment the tribunal chooses to say they are legal.\n\nThe legality of .an act or conclusion is something that exists outside and apart from the decision of an inferior tribunal. It is a part of the law of the land which cannot be finally determined or altered by any tribunal of limited ju.risdiction. The High Courts and the Supreme Court alone can determine what the law of the land is vis-a-vis all other courts and tribunals and they alone can pronounce with authority and finality on what is legal and what is not. All that an inferior tribunal can do is to reach a tentative conclusion which is subject to review under articles 226 and J 36. Therefore. the jurisdiction of the High\n\n(I) (1955] I S.C.R. 1104. 1121.\n\n(2) f1955] I S.CR. 267.\n\n(3) 1954 S.C.R. 913, 918.\n\nSangram Singh\n\nCourts under article 226 with that of the Supreme Court above them remains to its fullest extent despite section 105.\n\nElection Tribunal, .\n\nThat, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised whenever there is an error of law.\n\nThe High Courts do not, and should not, act as Courts of appeal under article 2.26. Their powers are purely discretionary a11d though 110 limits can be placed upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrarily; and one of the limitations imposed by the Courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in this class of case unless substantial injustice has e11sued, or is likely to ensue. They will not allow themselves to be turned into Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though no legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special rights decided as speedily as may be.\n\nTherefore, writ petitions should not be lightly entertained in this class of case.\n\nKotah, Bhurey Lal\n\nBaya\n\nBose J.\n\nWe now turn to the decision of the Tribunal. The procedure of these tribunals is governed by section 90 of the Act. The portion of the section that is relevant here is sub-section (2) .which is in these terms: . - \"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder. every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) to the trial of suits\":\n\nWe must therefore direct our attention to that portion of the Civil Procedure Code that deals with the trial of suits\".\n\nNow a code of procedure must be regarded as such.\n\nIt is procedw,-, something designed to facilitate justice\n\nand fort11er its ends: not a penal enactment for puni-\n\n. 1\n\nshment hnd penalties; not a thing designed to trip ' people up.\n\nToo kdrnic:d a con st rncti\"n uf si:dicms that leaves no room for ieasonable elasticity of inter-\n\n' I\n\n2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREi\\1E COURT REPORTS 9\n\n1955 pretation shou.ld therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) Jest Sa11gram Singh the very means designed for the furtherance of justice v. be used to frustrate it.\n\nElectio11 Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Next, there must be ever present to the mind the Baya fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a Bose!. principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they .should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to.\n\nBut taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.\n\nThe existence of such a principle has been doubted, and in any event was condemned '1S unworkable and impractical by O'Sullivan, J. in Hadram\n\nv. Pribhdas(').\n\nHe regarded it as an indeterminate term \"liable to cause misconception\" and his views were shared by Wanchoo, C. J. and Bapna, J. in Rajasthan: Sewa Ram v. Misrimal('). But that a law of n_atural justice exists in the sense that a party must be heard in a Court of law, or at any rate be afforded an opportunity to appear and defend himself, unless there is express provision to the contrary, is, we think, beyond dispute. See the observations of the Privy Council in Balakrishna Udayar\n\nv. Vasudeva Ayyar(\"), and especially in T. M. Barret\n\nv. African Products Ltd.(') where Lord Buckmaster said \"no forms or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence\". Also Hari Vishnu's case which we have just quoted.\n\nIn our opinion, Wallace, J. was right in Venkatasubbiah v.\n\nLaksluninarasimham(') in holding that \"One cardinal principle to be observed in trials by a Court obviously is that a party has a right to\n\n(I) A.I.R. 19•15 Sind 98. 10~.\n\n(2) A.J.R. 1952 Raj. 12. 14.\n\n(3) I.LR 40 Macl. 79.1. ROO.\n\n(4) A.T.R. 1928 P.C. 261, 262.\n\n(5) A.LR. 1925 Mad. I 27J.\n\nSa1tz,-am Singh v.\n\nElection Tribuna(, .Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya\n\nBoseJ.\n\nappear and plead his cause on all occasions when that cause comes on for hearing\", and that \"It follows that a party should not be deprived of that right and in fact the Court has no option to refuse that right, unless the Code of Civil Procedure deprives him of it\".\n\nLet us now examine that Code; and first, we will turn to the body of the Code. Section 27 provides that\n\n\"Where a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim\".\n\nSection 30 gives the Court power to\n\n\"(b) issue summonses to persons whose attendance is required either to give evidence or to produce documents or such other objects as aforesaid\".\n\nThen come the penalties for default. They are set out in section 32 but they are confined to cases in which a summons has been issued under section 30.\n\nThere is no penalty for a refusal or an omission to appear in response to a summons under section 27. It is true certain consequences will follow if a defendant does not appear and, popularly speaking, those consequences may be regarded as the penalty for nonappearance, but they are not penalties in the true sense of the term. They are not punishments which the Court is authorised to administer for disregard of its orders. The antithesis that section 32 draws between section 27 and section 30 is that an omission to appear in response to a summons under section 27 carries no penalty in the strict sense, while disregard of a summons under section 30 may entail punishment.\n\nThe spirit of this distinction must be carried over to the First Schedule. We deprecate the tendency of some Judges to think in terms of punishment and penalties properly so called when they should instead be thinking of compensation and the avoidance of injustice to hoth sides.\n\nWe turn next to the Rules in the First Schedule.\n\nIt is relevant to note that the Rules draw a distinction between the first hearing and subsequent hearings,\n\nand that the first hearing can be either (a) for settlement of issues only, or (b) for final disposal of the suit.\n\nFirst, there is Order V, rule I :\n\n1955 --- Sangram Sinzh\n\n. V. \" b . d .................. a summons may e issue the defendant to appear and answer the claim on day to be therein specified\".\n\nto Election Tribunal, a Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya\n\nThis summons must state whether the hearing is to be for settlement of isues only or for final hearing (rule 5). If it is for final hearfog, then (rule 8):\n\n\"it shall also direct the defendant to produce, on the day fixed for his appearance, all witnesses upon whose evidence he intends to rely in support of his case\".\n\nThen comes Order VIII. rule I which expressly speaks of \"the first hearing\". Order IX follows and is headed \"Appearance of parties and consequence of non-appearance\".\n\nNow the word \"consequence\" as opposed to the word \"penalty\" used in section 32 is significant. It emphasises the antithesis to which we have already drawn attention. So also in rule 12 the marginal note is \"Consequence of non-attendance\" and the body of the rule states that the party who does not tippear and cannot show sufficient cause\n\n\"shall be subject to all the provisions of the foregoing rules applicable to plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, who do not appear\".\n\nThe use of the word \"penalty\" is scrupulously avoided.\n\nOur attention was drawn to rule 6(2) and it was argued that Order IX does contemplate the imposition of penalties. But we do not read this portion of the rule in that light. All that the plaintiff has to do here is to pay the costs occasioned by the postponement which in practice usually means the cost of a fresh summons and the diet money and so forth for such of the witnesses as are present; and these costs the plaintiff must pay irrespective of the result.\n\nRule 1 of Order IX starts by saying-\n\n\"On the day fixed in the summons for the defendant to appear and answer ............................ ..\n\nBowl.\n\nSa11gra1n Singh\n\nV, Election Trihunal, Kntoh, Bhure.v Lal Bay a\n\nBose J.\n\nand the rest of the rules in that Order are consequential on that. This is emphasised by the use of the word \"postponement\" in rule 6 (I) (c), of \"adjournment\" in rule 7 and of \"adjournment\" in rule L Therefore, we reach the position that .Order IX, rule 6(1 )(a), which is the rule relied on, is confined to the first hearing of the suit and does not per se apply to subsequ\\:nt hearings: see Sahibzada Zeinulahdin Khan v. Sahihzada Ahmed Raza Khan(').\n\nNow to analyse rule 6 and examine its bearing on the first hearing. When the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, if it is proved that the summons was duly served-\n\n\"(a) ........................ the Court may proceed ex parte\".\n\nThe whole question is, what do these words mean?\n\nJudicial opinion is sharply divided about thi.s.\n\nOn the one side is the view propounded by Wall ace, J. in Venkatasuhbiah v. Lakshminarasimham(') that ex\n\nparte merely means in the absence of the other party, and on the other side is the view of O'Sullivan, J., in Hariram v. Prihhdas(') that it means that the Court is at liberty to proceed without the defendant till the termination of the proceedings unless the defendant shows good cause for his non-appearance. The remaining decisions, and there are many of them, take one or the other of those two views.\n\nIn our opinion, Wallace, J. and the other. Judges who adopt the same line of thought, are right.\n\nAs we have already observed, our laws of procedure are based on the principle that, as far as possible, no proceeding in a Court of law should be conducted to the detriment of a person in his absence. There are of course exceptions, and this is one of them. When the defendant has been served and has been afforded an opportunity of appearing, then, if he does not appear, the Court may proceed in his absence. But, be it noted, the Court is not directed to make an ex\n\n(I) 5 I.A. 233, 236.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1274.\n\n13) A.1.R. 1945 Sind 98. 102.\n\npartc order. Of course the fact .that it is proceeding ex 1955 parte will be recorded in the minutes of its proceedings Sa11gram Singh but that is merely a statement of the fact and is not v. an order made against the defendant in the sense of Election Tribunal, an ex parte decree or other ex parte order which the Kotah, Bhurey L.al Court is authorised to make. All that rule 6 (l) (a) Baya does is to remove a bar and no more.\n\nIt merely BoseJ. authorises the Court to do that which it could not have done without this authority, namely to proceed in the absence of one of the parties. The contrast in language between rules 7 and 13 emphasises this.\n\nNow. as we have seen, the first hearing is either for the settlement of issues or for final hearing. If it is only for the settlement of issues, then the Court cannot pass an ex /; arte decree on that date because of the proviso to Order XV, rule 3(1) which provides that that can only be done when\n\n\"the parties or their pleaders are present and none of them objects\".\n\nOn the other hand, if it is for final hearing, an ex parte decree can be passed, and if it is passed, then Order IX. rule 13 comes into play and before the decree is set aside the Court is required to make an order to set it aside. Contrast this with rule 7 which does not require the setting aside of what is commonly. though erroneously, known as \"the ex pa rte order\".\n\nNo order is contemplated by the Code and therefore no order to set aside the order is contemplated either.\n\nBut a decree is a command or order of the Court and so can only be set aside by another order made and recorded with due formality.\n\nThen. comes rule 7 which -provides that if at an adjourned hearing the defendant anpears and shows good cause for his \"previous non-appearance\", he can be heard in answer to the suit\n\n\"as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance\".\n\nThis cannot he read to mean, as it has been by some learned Judges, that he cannot be allowed to appear at all if he does not show good cause. All it means is that he cannot be relegated to the position he would have occupied if he had appeared.\n\n3-R SCT IND/82\n\n1955 We turn next to the adjourned hearing. That is Sangram Singh dealt with in Order XVII.\n\nRule l (]) empowers the v.\n\nCourt to adjourn the hearing and whenever it does so Election Tribunal, it must fix a day \"for the further hearing of the suit\", Koiah, Bhurey Lal except that once the hearing of the evidence has begun Baya it must go on from day to day till all the witnesses in Bo.<eJ. attendance have been examined unless the Court considers, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that a further adjournment is necessary. Then follows rule 2-\n\n\"Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf bv Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit''.\n\nNow rule 2 only applies when one or both of the parties do not appear on the day fixed for the adj{)lm1ed hearing. In that event the Court is thrown back to Order IX with. the additional power to make \"such order as it thinks fit\".\n\nWhen it goes back to Order IX it finds that it is again empowered to proceed ex parte on the adjourned hearing in the same way as it did, or could have done, if one or other of the parties had not appeared at. the first hearing, that is to say, the right to proceed ex parte is a right which accrues from day to day because at each adjourned hearing the Court is thrown back to Order IX, rule 6. It is not a mortgaging of the future but only applies to the particular hearing at which a party was afforded the chance to appear and did not avail himself of it.\n\nTherefore, if a party does appear on \"the day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned\", he cannot be stopped from participating in the proceedil)gs simply because he did not appear on the first or some other hearing.\n\nBut though he has the right to appear at an adjourned hearing, he has no right to set back the hands of the clock. Order IX, rule 7 makes that clear. Therefore, unless he can show good cause, he. must accept all that has gone before and be content to proceed from_ the stage at which he comes in. But what exactly does that import? To determine that it will be necessary to hark back to the first hearing.\n\nWe have already seen that when a s11mrcons is 1955 issued to the defendant it must state whether the sangram Singh hearing is for the settlement of issues only or for the v. final disposal of the suit (Order V, rule 5) Jn either Election Tribunal, event, Order VIII, rule I comes into play and if the Kotah, Bhurey Lal defendant does not present a written statement of his Baya defence, the Court can insist that he shall; and if, on Bose J. being required to do so, he fails to comply-\n\n\"the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit' (Order VllL rule JO).\n\nThis invests the Court \\\\(.ith the widest possible discretion and enables it to see that justice is done to ho!l1 sides; and also to witnesses if they are present: a matter on which we shall dwell later.\n\nWe have seen that if the defendant does not appear at the first hearing, the Court can proceed ex partc. which means that it can proceed without a written statement; and Order IX, rule 7 makes it clear that unless good cause is shown the defendant cannot be relegated to the position that he would have occupied if he had appeared. That means that he cannot put in a written statement unless he is allowed to do so, and if the case is one in which the Court considers a written statement should have been put in, the consequences entailed bv Order VIII. rule IO inust be suffered.\n\nWhat those consequences should be in a given case is for the Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion, to determine. No hard and fast rule can be laid down.\n\n~ In some cases an order awarding costs to the plaintiff would meet the ends of justice: an adjournment can be granted or a written statement can be considered on the spot and issues framed.\n\nIn other cases, the ends of justice may call for more drastic action.\n\nNow when we speak of the ends of justice, we mean justice not only to the defendant and to the other side but also to witnesses and others who may be in- • convenienced. It is an unfortunate fact that the convenience of the witness is ordinarily lost sight of in this class of case and yet he is t'.e one that deserves\n\n1955 the greatest consideration. As a rule, he is not partisa11grum Singh cularly interested in the dispute but he is vitally v. interested in his own affairs which he is compelled to Election Tribunal, abandon because a Court orders him to come to the Kotah, Bhurey Lal assistance of one or other .of l he partiesto a dispute.\n\nBaya His own business has to suffer. He may have to leave BoseJ. his family and his affairs for days on end.\n\nHe is usually out of pocket. Often he is a poor man living in an out of the way village and may have to trudge many weary miles on foot.\n\nAnd when he gets there, there are no arrangements for him.\n\nHe is not given accommoc.lation; and when he reaches the Court, in most places there is no room in which he can wait.\n\nHe has to loiter about in the verandahs or under the trees, shivering in the cold of winter and exposed to the heat of summer. wet and miserable in the rains: and then, after wasting hours and sometimes days for his turn, he is brusquely told that he must go back and come again another day. Justice strongly demands that this unfortunate section of the general public compelled to discharge public duties, usually at loss and inconvenience to themselves. should not be ignored in the over all picture of what will best serve the ends of justice and it may well be a sound exercise of discretion in a given case to refuse an adjournment and permit the plaintiff to examine the witnesses present and not allow the defendant to cross-examine them, still less to adduce his own evidence. It all depends on the particular case.\n\nBut broadly speaking, after all the various factors have been taken into consideration and carefully weighed, the endeavour should be to avoid snap decisions and to afford litigants a real opportunity of fighting out their cases fairly and squarely. Costs will be adequate compensation in many cases and in others the Court has almost unlimited discretion about the terms it can impose provided always the discretion is judicially exercised and is not arbitrary.\n\nIn the Code of 1859. there was a provision (section 119). which said that- ..\n\n. . '~No appeal shall lie from a judgment pass7, d l'Y\n\npare)ainst a defendant wh?. has not appeared :\n\nThe Privy Council held in Sahibwda Zeinulabdin Khan 1955\n\nv. Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Khan(') that this only Su11gra111 Singh applied to a defendant who had not appeared at all v. at any stage, therefore, if once an appearance was Eiec1io11 Trib1111at, entered, the right of appeal was not taken away. One Kotah, Bhurey Lal of the grounds of their decision was that- Baya\n\n'\"The general ruk is that an appeal lies to the High Court from a decision of a civil or subordinate Judge, and a defendant ought not to be deprived of the right of appeal, except by express words or necessary implication\".\n\nThe general rule, founded on principles of natural justice, that proceedings in a Court of justice should not be conducted behind the back of a party in the absence of an express provision to that effect is no less compelling. But that apart. It would be anomalous to hold that the efficacy of the so-called ex parte order expends itself in the first Court and that thereaftr a defendant can be allowed to appear in the appellate Court and can be heard and can be permitted' to urge in that Court the very matters he is shut. out from urging in the trial Court; and in the event that the appellate Court considers a remand necessary he can be permitted to do the very things he was precluded from doing in the first instance without getting the e.>;: parte order set aside under Order IX, rule 7.\n\nNow this is not a case in which the defendant with whom we are concerned did not appear at the first hearing. He did. The first hearing was on 11-12-1952 at Kotah. The appellant (the first defendant) appeared through counsel and filed a written statement. Issues were framed and the case was adjourned till the 16th March at Udaipur for the petitioner's evidence alone from the 16th to the 21st March. Therefore. Order IX, rules 6 and 7 do not apply in terms. But we have been obliged to examine this order at length because of the differing views taken in the various High Courts and because the contentiori is that Order XVII, rule 2 throws one back to the position under Order IX, rules 6 and 7. and there. according to one set of\n\n(1) 5 I.A. 233.\n\nBoeJ.\n\nIY55 views, the position is that once an ex /Hirte \"order\"\n\nS1111irr11111 Singh is \"passed\" against a defendant he cannot take fur- . v. ther part in the proceedings unless be gets that Elec1io11 Trih1111at, ''order\" set aside by showing good cause under rule Kota/I, Bl111rey Led 7. But that is by no means the case.\n\nBay a\n\nBoseJ.\n\nIf the defendant does not appear at the adjourned hearing (irrespective of whether or not he appeared at the first hearing) Order XVII, rule 2 applies and the Court is given the widest possible discretion either \"to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit\",\n\nThe point is this. The Court has a discretion which it must exercise.\n\nIts hands are not tied by the socalled ex (Hirte order; and if it thinks they are tid by Order IX, rule 7 then it is not exercising the discretion which the law says it should and, in a given case, interference may be called for. ·\n\nThe learned Judges who constituted a Full Bench of the Lucknow Chief Court (Tulsha Devi v. Sri Krishna(')) thought that if the original ex parte order did not enure throughout all future hearings it would be necessary to make a fresh ex parte order at each succeeding hearing. But this proceeds on the mistaken assumption that an ex pane order is required. The order sheet, or minutes of the proceedings, has to show which of the parties were present and if a party is absent the Court records that fact and then records whether it will proceed ex parte against him, that is to say, proceed in his absence, or whether it will adjourn the hearing; and it must necessarily record this fact at every subsequent hearing because it has to record the presence and absence of the parties at each hearing. With all due deference to the learned Judges who hold this view, we do not think this is a grave or a sound objection.\n\nA much weightier consideration is that the plaintiff may be gravely prejudiced in a given case because, as the learned Rajasthan Judges point out, and as O'Sullivan, J. thought, when a case proceeds ex parte,\n\n(1) AJ, R. 1949 Oudh 59.\n\n:t I\n\n' . .#\n\nthe plaintiff does not adduce as much evidence as he 1955 would have if it had been contested. He contents Sangram Si11gh himself with leading just enough to establish a prima v. facie case. Therefore, if he is suddenly confronted Election Trib1111al, with a contest after he has closed his case and the Kotah. Bhurey Lal defendant then comes forward with an army of wit- Baya nesses he would be taken by surprise and gravely pre- BoseJ. judiced. That objection is, however, easily met by the wide discretion that is vested in the Court. If it has reason to believe that the defendant has by his conduct misled the plaintiff into doing what these learned Judges apprehend, then. it might be a sound exercise of discretion to shut out cross-examination and the adduction of .evidence on the defendant's part and to allow him only to argue at the stage when arguments are heard. On the other hand, cases may occur when the plaintiff is not. and ought not to be, misled. If these considei; ations are to weigh. then surely the sounder rule is to leave the Court with an unfettered discretion so that it can take every circumstance into consideration and do what seems best suited to meet the ends of justice in the case before it.\n\nIn the present case, we are satisfied that the Tribunal did not exercise its discretion because it considered that it had none and thought that until the ex /Hirte order was set aside the defendant could not appear either personally or through counsel. We agree with the Tribunal, and with the High Court, that no good cause was shown and so the defendant had no right to be relegated to the position that he would have occupied if he had appeared on 17-3-J 953, b!-lt that he had a right to appear through counsel on 20-3-1953 and take part in the proceedings from the stage at which they had then reached, subject to such terms and conditions as the Tribunal might think fit to impose, is, we think, undoubted. Whether he should have been allowed to cross-examine the three witnesses who were examined after the appearance of his counsel, or whether he should have been allowed to adduce evidence, is a matter on which we express no opinion, for that has to depend on whatever view the Tribunal in a sound exercise of judicial discretion will\n\n/955\n\nSa11gra111 ..5i11{!/J\n\nEle<lion Tribunal, Kota/1, Blmrey Lat'\n\nBay a\n\nBn:eJ.\n\n20 SUPREl\\llE COURT REPORTS [ 1955]\n\nchoose to take of the circumstances of this panicular case, but we can find no justification for not at least allowing counsel to argue.\n\nNow the Tribunal said on 23-3-1953-\n\n\"The exact stage at which the case had reached before us on the 21st of March 1953 was that under the clear impression that respondent No. l had failed to appear from the very first date of the final hearing when the n parfr order was passed, the petitioner must have closed his case after offering as little evidence as he thought\" was just necessary to get his petition disposed of ex parte. Therefore, to allow the respondent No. 1 to step in now would certainly handicap the petitioner and would amount to a bit of injustice which we can neither contemplate nor condone\".\n\nBut this assumes that the petitioner was misled and closed his case \"aftei: offering as little evidence as he thought was just necessary to get his petition disposed of ex parre\". It does not decide that that was in fact the case. If the defendant's conduct really gave rise to that impression and the plaintiff would have adduced more evidence than he did, the order would be unexceptional but until that is found to be the fact a mere assumption would not be a sound basis for the kind of discretion which the Court must exercise in this class of case after carefully weighing all the relevant circumstances.\n\nWe, therefore, disagreeing with the High Court which has upheld the Tribunal's order, quash the order of the Tribunal and direct it to exercise the discretion vested in it by law along the lines we have indicated. In doing so the Tribunal will consider whether the plaintiff was in fact misled or could have been misled if he had acted with due diligence and caution. It will take into consideration the fact that. the defendant did enter an appearance and did file a written statement and that issues were framed in his presence; also that the case was fixed for the \"petitioner's\" evidence only and not for that of the appellant; and that the petitioner examined all • the witnesses he had present on the I 7th and the I 8th and did not give up any of them; that he was given\n\nan adjournment on 19-3-1943 for the examination of 1955 witnesses who did not come on that date and that he Sungram Singh examined three more on 20-3-1953 after the defendant v. had entered an appearance through counsel and Election Tribunal, claimed the right to plead; also whether, when the Kotah, Bhurey Lal appellant's only protest was against the hearings at Baya Udaipur on dates fixed for the petitioner's evidence BoseJ. alone, it would be. legitimate for. a party acting with due caution and diligence to assume that the other side had abandoned his right to adduce his own evidence should the hearing for that be fixed at some other place or at some other date in the same place.\n\nThe Tribunal will also consider and determine whether it will be proper in the .circumstances of this case to allow the appellant to adduce his own evidence.\n\nThe Tribunal will now reconsider its orders of the 20th, the 21st and the 23rd of March 1953 in the light of our observations and will proceed accordingly.\n\nThe records will be sent to the Election Commission with directions to that authority to reconstitute the Tribunal, if necessary, and to direct it to proceed with this matter along the lines indicated' above.\n\nThere will be no order about costs.\n\n4- 8(SCI ND/8Z", "total_entities": 129, "entities": [{"text": "REPORTS\n\nSANGRAM SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE SANGRAM SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ELECTION TRIBUNAL; KOTAH,\n\nBHUREY LAL BAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KOTAH, BHUREY LAL BAYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. 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"source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notwithstanding the provision in section 105 of the Representation of the People Act (Act XLill) of 1951 that every order of an Election Tribunal made under the Act shall be final and conclusive, the High Court and the Supreme Court have unfettered jurisdiction to examine whether the tribunal, in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, has acted kgally or otherwise."}}, {"text": "s 226 and 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Election Tribunal made under the Act", "statute": "Election Tribunal made under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2544, "end_char": 2555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Su11gran1 Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2573, "end_char": 2588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Supreme Court above them, n:mains to its fullest extent despite section 105\n\nMarch 22\n\n1Y55\n\nSu11gran1 Singh\n\nE/e,1iou Tribunal, Ko1uh, Bhurey Lat\n\nBay a\n\nof the Representation of the People Act."}}, {"text": "of the Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2635, "end_char": 2674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2803, "end_char": 2814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhurey Lat\n\nBay a\n\nof the Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Bhurey Lat\n\nBay a\n\nof the Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3023, "end_char": 3034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhurey Lat\n\nBay a\n\nof the Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Bhurey Lat\n\nBay a\n\nof the Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhurey Lat\n\nBay a\n\nof the Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Bhurey Lat\n\nBay a\n\nof the Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3544, "end_char": 3576, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kotah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3629, "end_char": 3634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He appeared on the first and subsequeqt hearing at Kotah."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings were then adjourned for certain hearings at Udaipur."}}, {"text": "section 90(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4086, "end_char": 4118, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order 9, rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4733, "end_char": 4748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sangram Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5848, "end_char": 5861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The laws of pro- Sangram Singh cedure are grounded on the principl~ of natural justice which rev.", "canonical_name": "Sa11gram Singh"}}, {"text": "Kotah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6077, "end_char": 6082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "quires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions Elect ion Tribunal, should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that Kotah, Bhurey Lal affect their Ii ves and property should not continue in their absence Baya and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.", "canonical_name": "Kotah"}}, {"text": "Bhurey Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6084, "end_char": 6094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "quires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions Elect ion Tribunal, should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that Kotah, Bhurey Lal affect their Ii ves and property should not continue in their absence Baya and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.", "canonical_name": "Bhurey Lal Baya"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8452, "end_char": 8472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 267", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8521, "end_char": 8540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9209, "end_char": 9226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9234, "end_char": 9255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bapna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9341, "end_char": 9346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Appeal\n\nAppeal under Article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 17th July 1953 of the High Court of Rajasthan (Bapna and Ranawat JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Ranawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9351, "end_char": 9358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Appeal\n\nAppeal under Article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 17th July 1953 of the High Court of Rajasthan (Bapna and Ranawat JJ.)"}}, {"text": "R. K. Ras1ogi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9408, "end_char": 9421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Ras1ogi and Gan pat Rai."}}, {"text": "Gan pat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9426, "end_char": 9437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Ras1ogi and Gan pat Rai."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9459, "end_char": 9471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prasad, for S.l."}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9577, "end_char": 9581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The; Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The second respondent Bhurey Lal filed an election petition under section 100 of the Representation of the People Act against the appellant Sangram Singh and two others for setting aside Sangram Singh's election.", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "Bhurey Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9607, "end_char": 9617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The; Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The second respondent Bhurey Lal filed an election petition under section 100 of the Representation of the People Act against the appellant Sangram Singh and two others for setting aside Sangram Singh's election.", "canonical_name": "Bhurey Lal Baya"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9651, "end_char": 9662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9670, "end_char": 9702, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sangram Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9725, "end_char": 9738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The; Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The second respondent Bhurey Lal filed an election petition under section 100 of the Representation of the People Act against the appellant Sangram Singh and two others for setting aside Sangram Singh's election.", "canonical_name": "Sa11gram Singh"}}, {"text": "11-12-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9888, "end_char": 9898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings commenced at Kotah and after some hearings the Tribunal made an order on 11-12-1952 that the further sittings would be at Udaipur from the 16th to the 21st March, 1953."}}, {"text": "21st March, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9966, "end_char": 9982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings commenced at Kotah and after some hearings the Tribunal made an order on 11-12-1952 that the further sittings would be at Udaipur from the 16th to the 21st March, 1953."}}, {"text": "5-1-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10050, "end_char": 10058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was discovered later that the 16th was a public holiday, so on 5-1-1953 the dates were changed to \"from the 17th March onwards\" and the parties were duly notified."}}, {"text": "Bhurey Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10340, "end_char": 10350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal examined Bhurey Lal and two witnesses .on the 17th."}}, {"text": "Bhartit Raj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10531, "end_char": 10542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"~On the\"20th one of the appellant's three counsel, Mr. 'Bhartit Raj, appeared but was not allowed to\n\n' ..\n\ntake any part in the proceedings because the Tribu- 1955 nal said that it was proceeding ex parte at that stage."}}, {"text": "Sangram Singlr", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10697, "end_char": 10711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sangram Singlr Three more witnesses were then examined."}}, {"text": "Bharatra.i had", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11478, "end_char": 11492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and it added-\n\n\"at all events, when para 10 of the affidavit makes it clear that Shri Bharatra.i had already received instructions to appear on 17-3-1953 there was nothing to justify his non-appearance on the I 8th and 19th of March."}}, {"text": "17-3-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11536, "end_char": 11545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and it added-\n\n\"at all events, when para 10 of the affidavit makes it clear that Shri Bharatra.i had already received instructions to appear on 17-3-1953 there was nothing to justify his non-appearance on the I 8th and 19th of March."}}, {"text": "19th of March. I 953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11611, "end_char": 11631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and it added-\n\n\"at all events, when para 10 of the affidavit makes it clear that Shri Bharatra.i had already received instructions to appear on 17-3-1953 there was nothing to justify his non-appearance on the I 8th and 19th of March."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11717, "end_char": 11728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11756, "end_char": 11779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan and further proceedings before the Tribunal were stayed."}}, {"text": "-7-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11880, "end_char": 11887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court rejected the petition on 17-7-1953 on two grounds- ()) \"In the first place."}}, {"text": "16-12-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12438, "end_char": 12448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 16-12-1953, the Hieb Court granted a certificate under article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution for leave to appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "article 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12493, "end_char": 12510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kotall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12832, "end_char": 12838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-8 SCI IND182\n\n1955 The only question before the High Court was whe- Sangram Singh ther the Tribunal was right in refusing to allow the v. appellant's counsel to appear and take part in the Election Tribunal, proceedings on and after the 20th of March, 1953, and Kotall, Bhnrey Lal the first question that we hve to decide is whether Baya , that is sufficient ground to give the High Court jurisdic- Bore J. ti on to entertain a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Bhnrey Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12840, "end_char": 12850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-8 SCI IND182\n\n1955 The only question before the High Court was whe- Sangram Singh ther the Tribunal was right in refusing to allow the v. appellant's counsel to appear and take part in the Election Tribunal, proceedings on and after the 20th of March, 1953, and Kotall, Bhnrey Lal the first question that we hve to decide is whether Baya , that is sufficient ground to give the High Court jurisdic- Bore J. ti on to entertain a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Bhurey Lal Baya"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13018, "end_char": 13029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13569, "end_char": 13580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13588, "end_char": 13620, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Every order of the Tribunal made under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13726, "end_char": 13773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14528, "end_char": 14539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Every order of the Tribunal made under this Act", "statute": "Every order of the Tribunal made under this Act"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14864, "end_char": 14875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15052, "end_char": 15063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15207, "end_char": 15218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15434, "end_char": 15445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15605, "end_char": 15616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15699, "end_char": 15710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15745, "end_char": 15756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 226 and 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15782, "end_char": 15802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16749, "end_char": 16761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16926, "end_char": 16937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17018, "end_char": 17029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17229, "end_char": 17238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kotah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18094, "end_char": 18099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kotah, Bhurey Lal\n\nBaya\n\nBose J.\n\nWe now turn to the decision of the Tribunal.", "canonical_name": "Kotah"}}, {"text": "Bhurey Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18101, "end_char": 18111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kotah, Bhurey Lal\n\nBaya\n\nBose J.\n\nWe now turn to the decision of the Tribunal.", "canonical_name": "Bhurey Lal Baya"}}, {"text": "Baya\n\nBose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18113, "end_char": 18123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kotah, Bhurey Lal\n\nBaya\n\nBose J.\n\nWe now turn to the decision of the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18221, "end_char": 18231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18546, "end_char": 18575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "must therefore direct our attention to that portion of the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18620, "end_char": 18699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "O'Sullivan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20159, "end_char": 20169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The existence of such a principle has been doubted, and in any event was condemned '1S unworkable and impractical by O'Sullivan, J. in Hadram\n\nv. Pribhdas(')."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20303, "end_char": 20310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He regarded it as an indeterminate term \"liable to cause misconception\" and his views were shared by Wanchoo, C. J. and Bapna, J. in Rajasthan: Sewa Ram v. Misrimal(')."}}, {"text": "Buckmaster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20783, "end_char": 20793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See the observations of the Privy Council in Balakrishna Udayar\n\nv. Vasudeva Ayyar(\"), and especially in T. M. Barret\n\nv. African Products Ltd.(') where Lord Buckmaster said \"no forms or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence\"."}}, {"text": "Hari Vishnu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20906, "end_char": 20917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Also Hari Vishnu's case which we have just quoted."}}, {"text": "Wallace", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20969, "end_char": 20976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, Wallace, J. was right in Venkatasubbiah v.\n\nLaksluninarasimham(') in holding that \"One cardinal principle to be observed in trials by a Court obviously is that a party has a right to\n\n(I) A.I.R. 19•15 Sind 98.", "canonical_name": "Wall ace"}}, {"text": "Bhurey Lal Baya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21352, "end_char": 21367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 27J.\n\nSa1tz,-am Singh v.\n\nElection Tribuna(, .Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya\n\nBoseJ.\n\nappear and plead his cause on all occasions when that cause comes on for hearing\", and that \"It follows that a party should not be deprived of that right and in fact the Court has no option to refuse that right, unless the Code of Civil Procedure deprives him of it\".", "canonical_name": "Bhurey Lal Baya"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21596, "end_char": 21623, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21725, "end_char": 21735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21866, "end_char": 21876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22107, "end_char": 22117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22190, "end_char": 22200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22293, "end_char": 22303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22650, "end_char": 22660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22675, "end_char": 22685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22690, "end_char": 22700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22762, "end_char": 22772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22848, "end_char": 22858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22942, "end_char": 22956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23197, "end_char": 23211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhurey Lal Baya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23662, "end_char": 23677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Election Tribunal, a Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya\n\nThis summons must state whether the hearing is to be for settlement of isues only or for final hearing (rule 5).", "canonical_name": "Bhurey Lal Baya"}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24236, "end_char": 24246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wall ace", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26273, "end_char": 26281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the one side is the view propounded by Wall ace, J. in Venkatasuhbiah v. Lakshminarasimham(') that ex\n\nparte merely means in the absence of the other party, and on the other side is the view of O'Sullivan, J., in Hariram v. Prihhdas(') that it means that the Court is at liberty to proceed without the defendant till the termination of the proceedings unless the defendant shows good cause for his non-appearance.", "canonical_name": "Wall ace"}}, {"text": "Sa11gram Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27513, "end_char": 27527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course the fact .that it is proceeding ex 1955 parte will be recorded in the minutes of its proceedings Sa11gram Singh but that is merely a statement of the fact and is not v. an order made against the defendant in the sense of Election Tribunal, an ex parte decree or other ex parte order which the Kotah, Bhurey L.al Court is authorised to make.", "canonical_name": "Sa11gram Singh"}}, {"text": "Kotah, Bhurey L.al Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27709, "end_char": 27733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course the fact .that it is proceeding ex 1955 parte will be recorded in the minutes of its proceedings Sa11gram Singh but that is merely a statement of the fact and is not v. an order made against the defendant in the sense of Election Tribunal, an ex parte decree or other ex parte order which the Kotah, Bhurey L.al Court is authorised to make."}}, {"text": "Koiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29792, "end_char": 29797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule l (]) empowers the v.\n\nCourt to adjourn the hearing and whenever it does so Election Tribunal, it must fix a day \"for the further hearing of the suit\", Koiah, Bhurey Lal except that once the hearing of the evidence has begun Baya it must go on from day to day till all the witnesses in Bo.<eJ. attendance have been examined unless the Court considers, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that a further adjournment is necessary."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31808, "end_char": 31811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sangram Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31876, "end_char": 31889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already seen that when a s11mrcons is 1955 issued to the defendant it must state whether the sangram Singh hearing is for the settlement of issues only or for the v. final disposal of the suit (Order V, rule 5) Jn either Election Tribunal, event, Order VIII, rule I comes into play and if the Kotah, Bhurey Lal defendant does not present a written statement of his Baya defence, the Court can insist that he shall; and if, on Bose J. being required to do so, he fails to comply-\n\n\"the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit' (Order VllL rule JO).", "canonical_name": "Sa11gram Singh"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32209, "end_char": 32213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already seen that when a s11mrcons is 1955 issued to the defendant it must state whether the sangram Singh hearing is for the settlement of issues only or for the v. final disposal of the suit (Order V, rule 5) Jn either Election Tribunal, event, Order VIII, rule I comes into play and if the Kotah, Bhurey Lal defendant does not present a written statement of his Baya defence, the Court can insist that he shall; and if, on Bose J. being required to do so, he fails to comply-\n\n\"the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit' (Order VllL rule JO).", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "section 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36019, "end_char": 36030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38369, "end_char": 38374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bay", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 38628, "end_char": 38631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bay a\n\nBoseJ.\n\nIf the defendant does not appear at the adjourned hearing (irrespective of whether or not he appeared at the first hearing) Order XVII, rule 2 applies and the Court is given the widest possible discretion either \"to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit\",\n\nThe point is this."}}, {"text": "Lucknow Chief Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39339, "end_char": 39358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges who constituted a Full Bench of the Lucknow Chief Court (Tulsha Devi v. Sri Krishna(')) thought that if the original ex parte order did not enure throughout all future hearings it would be necessary to make a fresh ex parte order at each succeeding hearing."}}, {"text": "Sangram Si11gh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40559, "end_char": 40573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He contents Sangram Si11gh himself with leading just enough to establish a prima v. facie case.", "canonical_name": "Sa11gram Singh"}}, {"text": "17-3-J 953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42132, "end_char": 42142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the Tribunal, and with the High Court, that no good cause was shown and so the defendant had no right to be relegated to the position that he would have occupied if he had appeared on 17-3-J 953, b!-lt that he had a right to appear through counsel on 20-3-1953 and take part in the proceedings from the stage at which they had then reached, subject to such terms and conditions as the Tribunal might think fit to impose, is, we think, undoubted."}}, {"text": "20-3-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42199, "end_char": 42208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the Tribunal, and with the High Court, that no good cause was shown and so the defendant had no right to be relegated to the position that he would have occupied if he had appeared on 17-3-J 953, b!-lt that he had a right to appear through counsel on 20-3-1953 and take part in the proceedings from the stage at which they had then reached, subject to such terms and conditions as the Tribunal might think fit to impose, is, we think, undoubted."}}, {"text": "23-3-1953-", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43011, "end_char": 43021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now the Tribunal said on 23-3-1953-\n\n\"The exact stage at which the case had reached before us on the 21st of March 1953 was that under the clear impression that respondent No."}}, {"text": "19-3-1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45009, "end_char": 45018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the defendant did enter an appearance and did file a written statement and that issues were framed in his presence; also that the case was fixed for the \"petitioner's\" evidence only and not for that of the appellant; and that the petitioner examined all • the witnesses he had present on the I 7th and the I 8th and did not give up any of them; that he was given\n\nan adjournment on 19-3-1943 for the examination of 1955 witnesses who did not come on that date and that he Sungram Singh examined three more on 20-3-1953 after the defendant v. had entered an appearance through counsel and Election Tribunal, claimed the right to plead; also whether, when the Kotah, Bhurey Lal appellant's only protest was against the hearings at Baya Udaipur on dates fixed for the petitioner's evidence BoseJ. alone, it would be."}}, {"text": "Sungram Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45099, "end_char": 45112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the defendant did enter an appearance and did file a written statement and that issues were framed in his presence; also that the case was fixed for the \"petitioner's\" evidence only and not for that of the appellant; and that the petitioner examined all • the witnesses he had present on the I 7th and the I 8th and did not give up any of them; that he was given\n\nan adjournment on 19-3-1943 for the examination of 1955 witnesses who did not come on that date and that he Sungram Singh examined three more on 20-3-1953 after the defendant v. had entered an appearance through counsel and Election Tribunal, claimed the right to plead; also whether, when the Kotah, Bhurey Lal appellant's only protest was against the hearings at Baya Udaipur on dates fixed for the petitioner's evidence BoseJ. alone, it would be.", "canonical_name": "Sa11gram Singh"}}, {"text": "Baya Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45356, "end_char": 45368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the defendant did enter an appearance and did file a written statement and that issues were framed in his presence; also that the case was fixed for the \"petitioner's\" evidence only and not for that of the appellant; and that the petitioner examined all • the witnesses he had present on the I 7th and the I 8th and did not give up any of them; that he was given\n\nan adjournment on 19-3-1943 for the examination of 1955 witnesses who did not come on that date and that he Sungram Singh examined three more on 20-3-1953 after the defendant v. had entered an appearance through counsel and Election Tribunal, claimed the right to plead; also whether, when the Kotah, Bhurey Lal appellant's only protest was against the hearings at Baya Udaipur on dates fixed for the petitioner's evidence BoseJ. alone, it would be."}}, {"text": "20th, the 21st and the 23rd of March 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45893, "end_char": 45934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal will now reconsider its orders of the 20th, the 21st and the 23rd of March 1953 in the light of our observations and will proceed accordingly."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_206_224_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "19S5\n\nRaf .Kali }(11er\n\n•• Ram Ratu1n\n\nPa11dey\n\nJagannadhadas.J.\n\nApril 7\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1955]\n\nthat tht: claim of the plantiff-appellant is made out and that she is entitled to succeed.\n\nThe:: discussion above. is more germane to the case of a public t\"mple wherein the idol has been Shastrically installed and consecrated and the worship is in accordance with the Shastras. There is nothing on the record to shbw whether the temple in this case falls within this category. If; however, the temple\n\ns a private one or idol therein is not one Shastri cal!y consecrated, the case in favour of the plaintiff is much stronger and her right cannot be seriotisly challenged.\n\nAt this stage, it is desirable to mention one other matter.\n\nIn the present case the emoluments attached to the office ar.e stated to be the daily and other offerings made to the deity at the worship hy the visiting devotees.\n\nBoth the parties to thi~ case have come up to Court on the common footing that it is this which constitutes the emoluments.\n\nWhether and how far such votive offerings can be appropriated by a Pujari for his emoluments if the temple is a public institution, (i.e., not a private famiiy temple) and whether any usage i'l this behalf is valid is a matter which does not arise before us in this case.\n\nIn the result, the appeal must be allowed with costs throughout and the decree of the trial court must he restored.\n\nRAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA\n\nand IMAM J.T.] .\n\nConstitution of India-Art. 145(3)-Cottstruction of-Supreme Court-Whether competent to split Up the case for he purpose of hearing and decision.\n\nHeld (Per MUKHERJEA C:T, DAS, VIVIAN HOSE. and IMAM .TJ SINHA J. dissentini:) that a Constitution Bench of five or more Judges before which a cace happrns to be posted in the first. instance\n\nis competent to split up the case by deciding the constitutional questions and leaving the rest of the case to be dealt with ai:id disposecl of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges on merits in conformity with the opinion of the Constitution Bench.\n\nThe splitting up of cases ino different stages fol' hearing and decision is not repugnant to the Constitution or the general principles of procedural law. The underlying principle of the Constitution is clear and all that it insists upon is that all Constitution questions should be heard and decided by a Bench of not less than five Judges.\n\nAs long as this requirement is fulfilled there can be no constitutional objection to the rest of the case being disposed of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges, so as to saYe the time of the Constitution Bench of five or more Judges.\n\nThere is no general rule of indivisibility of a case for the purpose of its hearing and decision : vide proviso to Article 145(3) and Article 228 of the Constitution, s. 24' and Order 18, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and ss. 350, 526, 528 and 556 of the Cod'! of Criminal Procedure.\n\nArticle 145(3) of the Constitu:ion cannot be so construed as to deprive the Supreme Court of the. inherent power of splitting up a case for the purpose of hearing and decision.\n\nPer SINHA J.-The Constitution while laying. down clause (3) of Article 145, contemplates the whole matter in controversy arising in a 1.:a, e, which may include substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Coastitution as also other questions. The main clause (3), excepting cases coming wjthin the purview of the proviso, d<'cs not contemplate a splitting up of a case into parts, one part involving substantial questions of law as to the interpretation oF the Cons; itution and another part .or parts not involving such questions.\n\nThe language ot dausc (3) of Article 145 does not warrant the hearing of a case. pie(:cmeal by different Benches unless it comes within the purview. of the proviso. The proviso is meant to cover onlv a limit('d class of cases which otherwise would have come within the purview of the main clause (3). But the proviso cnnot have a larger effect than is justified by its language. viz., that only a question of that description has to be referred for the opinion. of the larger Bench. the case itself remaining on the file of the smaller Bench. The proviso th.tis makes a clear distinction between a \"case'' and a \"question\".\n\nMaufoi Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz !L.R. 24 I.A. 22), Burrowe~ v. High Commission Court (3 Buist.\n\n48) and Hobibar Rahman v. Saidannessa Bibi (l.L.R. 51 Cal. 331), referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION.\n\nPetition No. 40 of 1955: lJnder Article 32 of the Constitution for a Writ of Ha/was Corp11s.\n\n19$5\n\nRao Shiva Bohadur Singh\n\nv.\n\nThe Stale of Vimlhya Pradesh\n\nand lllWlhr ·\n\nRao Shiva.\n\nBaltadur Si•g/t\n\nTile Stal• qf Yiodhya Prad_, h\n\nand anothf\n\nSUPRE1'1E COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nPurshottam Trikumdas, (K. B. Asthana, Syed Murtaza Faz/ Ali and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioner.\n\nM. C. Seta/vad, Attorney-General for India and C; K. Daphtary Solicitor-General for India (Porus A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dhebar, with them) for the respondents.\n\n1955. April 7. The Judgment of Mukherjea C. J., Das, Vivian Bose and Imam JJ. was delivered by Dils J. Sinha J. delivered a separate Judgment.\n\nDAs J.-This is a petition for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus calling upon the respondents to show cause why the petitioner, who is now confined in the Central Jail at Rewa, should not be set at liberty.\n\nThe petitioner's grievance is that he has been deprived of his liberty otherwise than in accordance with procedure established by law. A rule nisi ; having been issued, the respondents have filed an affidavit by way of return to the writ. The question for our decision is whether the return is good and suft1cient in law.\n\nThe facts leading up to the present petition are few and simple. In the years 1948 and 1949 the petitioner was the Minister of Industries in the Government of Yindhya Pradesh which was at that time an acceding State within the meaning of section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935 as amended in 1947.\n\nOn the 11th April, 1949 the petitioner was arrested in Delhi on the allegation that he had accepted illegal , gratification in order to show favour to fanna Diamoncl Mining Syndicate in the matter of the lease of the Diamond Mines at Panna. In December, 1949 the petitiom:r along with one Mohan Lal, who was the then sel!retary in the Ministry of Industries. was put up for trial before the Court of Special Judge, Rewa, c0nstituted under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendments (Special Courts) Ordinance No. V of\n\n1949.\n\nThe charges were under sections 120-B, 161 465 anc1 466 of the Indian Penal Code as adantecl for\n\n\\li:i,.lhva l'rJc.ksh hv the Indian Penal Corle l/\\pplicat>nn to Vindhya Pradesh) Ordinance No. XLVTH of\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 209\n\n1949. By his judgment pronounced on the 2()th July\n\n1950 the Special Judge acquitted both the accused.\n\nThe State preferred an appeal against that acquittal to the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh. By his judgment pronounced on the 10th March 1951 the Judicial Commissioner reversed the order of acquittal, convicted both the accused and sentenced them to different terms of rigorous imprisonment under the different sections in addition to the payment of certaln fines. On the application of the petitioner and his co-accused the Judicial Commissioner on the 1,2th March 1951 issued a certificate to the effect that\n\nfon~ points of law raised in the case and formulated by him in his order were fit for the consideration of this Court in appeal under article 134 of the Constitution ot India. A petition of appeal was filed in this Court on the strength of this c_ertificate of fitness and it was registered as Criminal Appe;:i.l No. 7 of 1951.\n\nAs the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, it was, in April 1953, placed before a Bench of five Judges of this Court as required by article 145t3) of the Constitution. For convenience of reference we shall call\n\n~ Bench of five or more Judges as the Constitution Bench. The validity of the convictions and sentences was challenged before the Constitution Bench 9n the ground that there had been infringements of articles 14 and 20 of the Constitution.\n\nA further point of law was raised that no appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal by the Special Judge.\n\nBy their judgment pronounced on the 22nd May 1953 the Constitution Bench rejected all these objections.\n\nThe: judgment concluded with the following direction: \"The appeal is accordingly directed to be posted for consideration whether it is to be heard on merits''.\n\nThis was evidently done in view of the fact that the certificate of fitness granted by the Judicial Commissioner was limited only to four points of law.\n\nThe constitutional points having been disposed of, the appeal was placed before a Division Bench of three Judges who on the 20th October 1953 ordered\n\nRao fihfra Bahatlur Singh\n\nv.\n\nThe State of Vindhya Pradesh and another\n\nDas .r.\n\nRao Shiva Ba/UJdur Sin6h\n\nThe State of Vindlrya Prtuksl.\n\nand D'10l/rer\n\nDusJ.\n\nSUPREJ\\1E COURT REPORTS\n\nL1955\n\nthe appeal to be heard on the merits. The appeal Was accor_dingly put up for hearing before another Division Bench consisting of three Judges.\n\nOn the 5th- March 1954 this Division Bench allowed. the appeal of Mohan Lal and acquitted him but dismissed tbe appeal of the petitioner with respect to his conviction under sections 161, 465 and 466, Indian Penal Code, as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, but set aside his conviction on the charge under section 120-B.\n\nThe sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment was mamtained but the sentence of fine was set aside.\n\nOn the 18th March 1954 a petition for review was filed on behalf of the petitioner. It was directed against the judgment of the Constitution Bench pronounced on the 22nd May 1953 repelling the constitutional points as well as against the judgment of 'the Division Bench dated the 5th March 1954 dismissing the petitioner's appeal on the merits. On objection being taken by the Registry against one applicat10n being filed for the review of two judgments one of which had been pronounced much earlier than the period allowed for tiling a review ; ipplication, the petitioner filed a second application for review of the judgment of the Constitution Bench _rnd prayed for condonation of the delay in liling the same. On the 5th April 1954 the application for review was pnt up for hearing before the same Division Bench which had pronounced the judgment on the me1:its dated the 5th March 1954. After considering the points of review relating to that judgment the Division Bench on the same day came to the conclusion that no ground hfld been made out for review of that judgment and accordingly dismissed the petition. An order was drawn up as of that date directing the petitioner who had been previously enlarged on bail to\n\n.urrender and serve out his sentence.\n\nOn the 12th April 1954 another petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner praying that the review matter relating to the judgment of the Constitution Bench delivered on the 22nd May 1953 be placed before a Constitution Bench for final disposal. That review application was put up before a Constltc1tion\n\nBench which on the 17th May 1954 declined to entertain the same.\n\nIn the meantime the petitioner had in the last week of April 1954 surrendered and has since then been confined in the Central Jail at Rewa. The present application has, therefore, been made for a writ of\n\nJwhcas corpus on the allegation that the petitioner has been and is being deprived of his liberty otherwise than in acc.ordance with procedure established by law.\n\nJn the present petition the petitioner has again urged that the Court of the Judicial CoJnmissioner of Vindliya Pradesh was not the proper forum for entertaming the appeal against the judgment of the Special Judge and consequently the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner setting aside the acquittal of the petitioner convicting and imposing sentence of imprisonment was void and inoperative. Alternatively, 1t has been urged that, assuming .that the Judicial Commissioner had jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Special Judge and his judgment was in accortiance with procedure established by law, the appeal filed by the petitioner in. this Court against the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner should have been, under article 145(3) of the Constitution. heard and completely dis!)osed of by the Comtitution Bench. As regards the first point as to the incompetency of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner to entertain the aooeal from the decision of the Special Judge the same has been fully deriit with bv the Constitution Bench and cannot bereagitflted.\n\nTncleed, learned counsel anpearing in supoort of this petition has not pressed the same.\n\nThe only point urned before us is the alternative plea mentioned above which deoends for its decision on a true construction of article 145.\n\nArticle 145 bv clause (1) authorises this Court. sub- 1ect to the provisions of anv law made bv Parliament and with the approval of fhe President, to make rule~ for r~!!nlatinQ: Q:enerally the !)ractice and procedure of the Court. 'inclnding. amongst others. rnles as to the pr0cerl11re for hearing anneals. as to the entertHinment of appeals under s11h--clause (c) of clause 0) 0f artklP\n\nRaD Shiva Baluulur Sin'h\n\nT~ State of Vinrihya Pras/J\n\n1111d another\n\nDasJ.\n\ni955\n\nRao Shifa Bahadur Sing/I\n\nV.\n\nTlte State 11f Vindhyl, l 'Pmtfi•sh\n\nim.1 another\n\nDas .f.\n\n134 and as to the conditions subject to which any judgment pronounced or order made by the Court\n\nmay be reviewed and the procedure for such review.\n\nClauses (2) and (3) of the article are in the terms following:-\n\n\"(2) Subject to the provisions of clause (3), rules made under this article may fix the minimum number of Judges who are to sit for any purpose, and may provide for the powers of single Judges and Division Courts.\n\n(31 The minimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of thi~ Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under article 143 shall be five:\n\nProvided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this Chapter other than article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of the hearing of the appeal the. Court . is satisfied that the appeal involves substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Con\"\n\nstitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court sh:ill refer the question for opinion to a Court constituted as required hy this clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on receipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion\".\n\nThe contention of the petitioner is that the question whether a particular case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is to be examined at the time when the case first comes .before. this Court. If at that stage it is found that it is a case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of. the Constitution it becomes irrevocably impressed with that charact.er and quality and the minimum number of Judges who are. to sit for the purpose of deciding suc)l case must be a Constitution Bench, that is to say, a\n\nBench of at least five Judges. The argument then proceeds to sav that once the Con9titution Bench takes seisin of the case and starts the hearing that\n\nBench and that Be; nch alone must decide the whole of 1953 such case, that is to say, decide all questions, consti- Rao Shiva. tutional or otherwise, arising in the case. Sri Pur- Balradur Sin~ shottam Trikumdas who appears in support of this 77re ateJt: petition has i:trongly relied on the language used i~ 'f'i\"::J0anZn. clause (3) and contends that \"the case\" cannot be spht up and that the clause requires the entire case to be DasJ. disposed of by the Constitution Bench. He, therefore, urges that the Division Bench had no jurisdiction to take up the case involving substantial question~ of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and consequently the judgment of that Division Bench pronounced on the 5th March, 1954 was illegal and void.\n\nAccording to him, his client's appeal, in the eye of the law, remains undisposed of and as he had been let out on bail until the disposal of his appeal, his detention in jail pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench, which is a nullity, amounts to deprivation of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with procedure established bv law and is an infringement of his fundamental right under articie 21 of the Constitution. The argument at first sight certainly appears to be plausible but on a deeper consideration of the constitutional provisions bearing on the subject and the general principles regulating the procedural powers of Courts we are unable to accept the same as sound or well-founded.\n\nIn this very case the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh had granted a certificate of fitness under article 134(1)(c). Consequently under the proviso to clause (3) of article 145 the appeal might . weJl have been placed before a Division Bench consisting of less than five Judges. In that situation, being\n\nsatisfied that the appeal involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitu~ ti on the determination of which was necessary for the disposal of the .appeal, that Division. Bench could refer the question for the opinion of a Constitution Bench and on receipt of the opinion dispose of the appt>al in. conformity with such opinion: lrut to accede to the ari:i; ument of Sri Purshottam Triknmdas will !e?d us to hold that while a Division Bench of three\n\n. 28-8 SCl'ND:82\n\nRao Shiva Bohadur Singh v.\n\nThe State of Vindhyu Pratfe sh\n\naRd another\n\nDasi.\n\nJudges could split up this very case, had it been posted before it in the first instance, by referring the constitutional questions to a Constitution Bench for its opinion and then, after receipt of that opinion, disposing of the rest of the case on merits in conformity with such opinion, a Constitution Bench of five or more Judges before which the case happened to be posted in the first instance could not split up the case by deciding the constitutional questions and leaving the rest of the case to be dealt with and disposed of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges on merits in conformity with the opinion of the Constitution Bench thus saving the time of the Constitution Bench.\n\nReference may also be made to article 228 which authorises the High Court, if satisfied that a cae pending in a Court subordinate to it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the cjisposal of the case, to withdraw the case and either to dispose of the case itself or determine the said question of law and return the case to the Court from which it has been so withdrawn so as .to enable the said Court to proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with the judgment of the High Court. Here ag11in learned counsel's argument leads us to hold that while the . High Court can split up a case involving a su \\->5tantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution a Constitution Bench of this Court cannot do so. Apart from these provisions of the Constitution thereare provisions made by procedural statutes which result in a case being partly heard by one Judge arid partly by another Judge. To cite only a few instances.- reference may be made to section 24 and Order 18. rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 350. 526. 528 and 556 of the Code of Crim111al Procedure. The argument of Sri Purshottam Trikumdas .. oushed to its logical conclusion, must amount to this that althou!l:h Courts ooerating under the ordinarv procedural code mav solit uo cases intn r!ifferent sta!l:es for the nurnose of hearin'! and <lecision. a Constitution Bench of this Court cannot do so if a case involving substantial 'que5tions of law as to\n\nthe interpretation of the Constitution happens to be posted before it in the first instance.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner recognises the incongruity that results from his argument but contends that it cannot be helped because the relevant provisions referred to above expressly sanction the splitting up of cases whereas the body of clause (3) of article 145 does not. His argument is that in the cases mentioned above splitting up of cases has to be dllowed because the special provisions of the- Constitution or other statutes provide for such splitting up in those cases. He contends that the very fact that these provisions had to be made dearly indicates that but for them there could not have been any splitting up of the case. It is said that these provisions are exceptions to the general rule of indivisibility of a case. We are unable to accept this reasoning as correct.\n\nIn the first place the proviso to article 145(3), article 228 and the other provisions of the Codes referred to above quite clearly•indicate that the splitting up of cases into different stages for hearing and decisions is not repugnant to the Constitution or the general principles of procedural law. The underlying principle of the Constitution is clear and all that it insists upon is that all constitutional questions should be heard and decided by a Bench of not Jess than five Judges. As long as this requii:ement is fulfilled there can be no constitutional objection to the rest of the case being disposed of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges. so as to save the time of the Constitution Bench of five or more Judges.\n\nIn the next place we are not aware of any such general rule of indivisibility as is being insisted upon by learned counsel. There is nothing in principle which requires that a case must always be decided in its entirety by one Judge or one set of Judges even though such a case may conveniently be dealt with in two or more stages. Indeed, in Mau/vi Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz(') the Privy Council pointed out that where a Judge had before\n\n(I) L.R. 24 I.A. 22.\n\nRao Shiva Bahadur Singh v.\n\nThe State of v; ndhya Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDasJ.\n\n1955 him a case consisting of two parts, a question of title Rao Shiva and an incidental question of account dependrng on Bahadur Sin, h title, it did not require any provision of the Civil The siate of Procedure Code to authorise him to decide the first Vindhya Prad.sh question and reserve the second for further investigaand another tion and that to treat such a proceeding as beyond DasJ. the power of the Court and as an error which barred the proceedings reserved for further decisions was a serious miscarriage of justice. Indeed, the Court often exercise its inherent power, if it thinks fit to do so, to decide questions of jurisdiction or limitation or the like as preliminary questions reserving other questions of fact for future investigation. The decision of a case at two or more stages may and often does result in the case not being decided by the same Judge, for the Judge who decided at the first stage may, by reason of death, retirement or transfer, be not available for deciding the case at the later stages.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that no argument can be founded on any supposed general rule of indivisibility of a case for the purpose of its hearing and decision.\n\nThe consideration that there is no such general rule as is relied on by learned counsel and that the split.- ting up of cases not generally repugnant to law and in particular to the Constitution, leads us to the conclusion that in construing clause (3) of article 145 no quality of indivisibility need be attributed to the words \"the case\" used therein. A case may, to begin with, involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, but it may cease to do so at a later stage, Suppose a case which involves a constitutional question is placed before a Constitution Bench but learned counsel appearing in support of the case intimates to the Bench that he does not press any constitutional point, surely he cannot, in that situation, insist that the time of a Bench of five or more Judges should be spent on the determination of a case which, by his own election, has ceased to involve any constitutional question. Likewise, when the constitutional questions involved in the case are disposed of by a Constitution Bench what\n\nremains of the case cannot properly or appropriately be described as still a \"case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution\". It should be borne in mind that when a case or appeal is properly admitted to. this Court all that the partie~ are entitled to is a decison of this Court and not of any particular Bench. So long as the minimum number of Judges which the Constitution and the rules framed by this Court prescribe are present to hear and decide the questions raised from stage to stage, they represent the Court for the purpose of giving decisions on its behalf and the parties get all that they are entitled to under the law. If a Court is entitled to decide a case in stages, as the Privy\n\nCouncil has held it can, there is no reason why article 145(3) should be so construed as to deprive this.Court of that inherent power. It will involve no violation of any principle of natural ju, stice or of any legal principle if we co11strue clause (3) of article 145 as requiring only that the minimum number of five Judges must sit for the purpose of deciding any case in so far and as long as it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution. We find nothing in the language of clause (3) of article 145 which militates against this interpretation of that clause. Indeed, it is on this interpretation that the practice has grown up in this Court for a Constitution Bench to dispose of all constitutional questions and to leave the other subsidiary questions for disposal by a Divisron Bench of less than five Judges in conformity with the opinon of the Constitution Bench.\n\nThere is nothing that we find in the body of clause (3) of article 145 which compels us to depart from the famous maxim cursus curiae est lex curiae which was laid down by Lord Coke in Burrowes v. High .Commission Court(') and which was quoted with approval in Habibar Rahman v. Saidannessa Bibi(').\n\nFor reasons stated above we consider that a good and valid return has been made by the respondents to the rule nisi issued to them and this application must be dismissed. We order accordingly.\n\n(I) 3 Buist. 48, S3.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 51 Cal. 331, 335.\n\nRao Shiva Bahadur Singh\n\nTM State of Vindhya Pmditsh\n\nand another\n\nDas J.\n\nRao .Shiva Bahadur Singh v.\n\nThe State qf Vtndhya Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT RFPORTS [1955]\n\nSINHA J.-I regret to have to differ from my learned brethren on the construction of article 145(3) of the Constitution which is the main question in controversy in this case. Clause (3) of article 145 is in these terms:-\n\n\"The 1ninimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under article 143 shall be five:\n\nProvided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this Chapter other than article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for opinion to a Court constituted as required by this clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on rece.ipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such . . \" op1111on .\n\nIt is noteworthy that the Constitution has not vested this Court with complete power to make rules as to the constitution of Benches for hearing matters coming before this Court in its Original, Appellate or Advisory Jurisdiction. Clause (2) of article 145 has invested this Court with power to make rules fixing the minimum number of Judges who are to sit for any purpose and for defining the powers of single Judges and Division Courts. But this power is expressly made subject to the limitation laid down in clause (3) quoted above; that is to say, where any -case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution (omitting the words not material for our present purpose) the minimum number of Judges prescribed by the Constitution to decide such a case is five. A case may involve questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, as also other questions. In this case we have to determine whether clause (3) contemplates the whole case or a part of a\n\ncase. In my opinion, the Constitution while laying down clause (3) of article 145 contemplates the whole matter in controversy arising in a case which may include substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution as also other questions.\n\nThe main clause (3), excepting cases coming within the purview of the proviso does not contemplate a splitting up of a case into parts, one part involving substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and another part or parts not involving such questions. My reasons for coming to this conclusion are as follows:\n\nClause (3) itself read along with the proviso makes a distinction between a \"case\" and a \"question\" of the nature indicated in the proviso to the clause. The Constitution has clearly indicated that cases coming within the purview of the proviso may be split up so as to admit of the questions of constitutional importance being determined by a Bench of at least five Judges who may be described for the sake of convenience as a \"Constitution Bench\" in contradistinction to a Division Court consisting of less than five Judges, as is contemplated in the proviso. The main clause (3) requires a case of the description therein set out to be heard and decided by a Constitution Bench, whereas the proviso contemplates that only the question of constitutional importance (using a compendious phrase) has to be decided by a Constitution Bench and the case out of which such a question arises remaining in the seisin of the Division Court before which the case was originally placed for hearing.\n\nThe Constitution has placed cases involving substantial questions of law of constitutional importance on a special footing. If the framers of the Constitution had intended that not the whole case but only particular questions of the nature indicated had to be heard by a minimum number of five Judges. they would have used words similar to those used in the proviso makin.g it permissible for the Constitution Bench to give its opinion for the decision of the case by a Division Court in conformity with that opinion.\n\nRao Shiva Bahadur Singh\n\nThe State of Vindhya Pradesh\n\nanti another\n\nSillh,, J.\n\nRao Shiva Bal; adur '6ingh\n\nV, r1ie Stateof Vi11dhya Pmdtsh\n\nand a!fotlrtr\n\nSinh• J'.\n\nA reference to the terms of article 228 of the Constitution would also show that the framers 6f the Constitution were fully alive to the difference between the decision of the \"case itself\" and a \"question of law\" of constitutional importance involved in tha~ case. It has made clear in that article that the High Court shan either decide the whole case including the question of 'law as to the interpretation of the Constitution which was necessary for the disposal of the case or determine only such a question or questions and return the case to the original court for disposal in conformity with the judgment of the High Court on such question OT questions. The Constitution made these specific provisions to emphasize that there is a distinction between determining the case itself and determining a substantial question of law of constitutional. importance. ·\n\nCan it be said that if clause (3) of article 145 had been enacted without the proviso, a case could be heard piecemeal first by a Constitution Bench which would determine only questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and then the residue of the case being heard and. determined by a Division Court? That, in my opinion, would not be in compliance with the imperative provisions of the main clause (3). The framers of the Constitution therefore enacted the proviso in the nature of an exception to the general rule laid down in the main clause (3). It has to be observed that the proviso is limited to appeals only, subject to the further exception that such appeals should not have come up to this (:ourt through the process laid down in article 132 of the Constitution. It is thus clear that not all cases contemplated in the main clause 13) but only appeals of a parti cular description would come within the qualifying provisions of the proviso.\n\nThe word \"case\" has not been defined but it may be taken as settled law that it is much wider than a \"suit\" or an \"appeal\". Hence whereas the proviso would apply to appeals brought up to this court, except those under article 132 of the Constitution. the main cluase (3) would apply to all appeals and all\n\nother matters coming up to this Court in its Original, Appellate and Advisory jurisdictions. In my upinion, there canµot be the least doubt that the main provisions of clause (3) are all-embracing, and contemplate all cases coming up to this Court.\n\nIt has not been contended that the present case comes within the purview of the proviso but it has been said that if it is open to a Division Court to refer a question of constitutional importance to a Constitution Bench, why should not a Constitution Bench be competent to refer questions other than those of constitutional importance to a Division Court?\n\nThe answer is that whereas the former is contemplated by the Constitution in terms, the latter is not. Nor are there any rules to that effect.\n\nBut it has been further observed that the splitting up of a case into parts, one involving questions of constitutional importance and the remaining part not involving questions of that kind,. is not against the provisions of the Constitution. But, in my opinion, if the Constitution has made a specific provision as to the splitting up of a case 'into parts, one cognisable by a Court of higher jurisdiction like a Constitution Bench and the rest by a court of lower jurisdiction like a Division Court, the argument is not available\n\nthat a splitting up of a case apart from those specific provisions is also permissible. In this connection reference was made to certain provisions of the Co<, le of Civil Procedure as also of the Code of Criminal Procedure to show that those Codes do contemplate hearing of the same case in part by different courts, but those are all courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction in which the question of the power of the court itself relatively to the subject-matter of the case is not in question.\n\nThe court which originally dealt with the case and the court which finally came to hear and determine the matter were each one of them competent to deal with the whole matter or any part of it. That is not the position here.\n\nIn this case the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that as admittedly his appeal involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and as it did not come\n\n29-SSnND s~\n\n. 1955\n\nRao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll\n\nThe Stat\" qf Vind/1yo P, aiks/s\n\nand anotltu\n\nSinhaJ.\n\nJ955 within the purview of the proviso to clause (3) of arti- Rao Shiva. cle 145 of the Constitution, it should have been dealt Bahadur Singh with throughout by a Constitution Bench. It was sug-\n\nTlie liaie of gested in answer to this.argument that after the ques- Vindhya Pradesh tions of law of Constitutional importance had been and another dealt with by the Constitution Bench the case ceased\n\nSinil•J. to be one involving such questions and therefore could have been heard by a Division Court. But the difficulty in accepting this argument is that once a Constitution Bench was seized of the case. it could not transfer it to another Bench for sharing the decision of that case with it. That Bench should have heard cut the whole case and it had not the power to direct. and it did not so direct, that the remaining part of the case should be heard by a Division Court. Once a Constitution Bench is seized of the case, it has to hear the case to its conclusion.\n\nThere was no process known to the rules framed under the rule-making power of this Court by which a case once it came before a Constitution Bench could get transferred from , that Bench to a Division Court either automatically or by orders of any authority. But it has been su~ gested that it may happen that a Constitution Bench may start the hearing of the case. and before the hearing is concluded one of the Judges is by reason of death or otherwise disabled from hearing out the case and in that event the Chief Justice has the power to constitute another Bench.\n\nBut that is quite a 4ifferent matter.\n\nIn that case the hearing by the previous Bench comes to nothing and the Bench constituted afresh by the. Chief Justice has to hear nut the whole case afresh.\n\nIt has also been suggested on the other side that a \"case\" may mean a part of a case. Jn my opinion. that submission is not well founded; because, if that argument were accepted and pushed to its logical conclusion, it may make the provisions of the main clause\n\n(3) of article 145 nugatory. Article 132 of the Constitution has been, as indicated above, excepted from the operation of the proviso tn clau5e (3).\n\nS11ppose an appeal is brought to this Court under article 132 of the Constitution as the case involved snbstanfr!l\n\nquestions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.\n\nThat case besides involving questions of that character, may also involve other questions. If the argument that a \"case\" includes part of a case were accepted, then it will be permissible for a Constitution Bench to hear the questions of constitutional importance and leave the rest of the case to be determined by a Division Court, though such a case is expressly excluded from the operation of the proviso and thus is directly within the terms of the main clause (3). Hence every case coming before this Court involving a question of constitutional importance may be dealt with in part in so far as it relates tp that question by a Constitution Bench and the remaining part by a Division Court. That, in my opinion, was not intended by the framers of the Constitution. The term \"case\" therefore tnust mean the whole matter in controversy before this Court. Such a matter may relate to one of several questions in controversy in the original court, if the determination of that question is sufficient to dispose of the case within the meaning of the Explanation to article 132 of the Constitution.\n\nIt was further argued by the learned Attorney- General that the whole clause (3) of article 145 along with the proviso must be read together.\n\nBut even so read, the language of clause (3) does not warrant the hearing of the case piecemeal by different Benches unless it comes within the purview of the proviso.\n\nThe proviso is meant to cover only a limited class of cases which otherwise would have come within the purview of the main clause (3). But the proviso cannot have a larger effect than is justified by its language, viz., that only a question of that description has to be referred for the opinion of the larger Bench, the case itself remaining on the file of the smaller Bench. The proviso thus makes a clear distinction between a \"case\" and a \"question\".\n\nIt has also been said there .is an inherent power in the court to transact its business according to its estahlished practice. Jn the first place. this Court is still in its formative stnges and it cannot he said to\n\nRao Shiva Buhadur Si11gli\n\nThe State of Vi11dliya Pradesh\n\nand a11ot!ier\n\nSinha J.\n\nRao Shiva Bahadllr Singh\n\nhave an \"established practice\". Secondly, it cannot establish a practice in the teeth of the provisions of the Constitution which it is pledged to uphold.\n\nThe State ef Th f t h d · f h p C Vindhya Pradesh e re erence o t e ec1s1on o. t e nvy otmand anather -cil in Moulvi Muhammad Abd1;1l Majid v. Muhammad Sinh;;:,.\n\nAbdul Aziz(') is not apt because in that case the hearing at the two stages of the trial was to be done by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction; that is to say, a court which could hear and determine the whole case or each of the two parts of the case taken separately by itself, unlike the present case in which the two parts of the hearing have been done by two courts of unequal power. Similarly the reference to the maxim \"cursus C1Jriae est lex curiae\" of Coke C.J. in Burrowes\n\nv. High Commission Court(2), referred to in Habihar Rahman v. Saidannessa Bibi(') and to the other cases all proceed on the assumption that there is nothing in the statute law against such a course being taken.\n\nBut, in my opinion, such a nebulous practice is opposed to the positive provisions of clause (3) . of article 145.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, the present case comes directly within the main clause (3) of article 145 of the Constitution and is admittedly not covered by the proviso to that clause. That being so. lhe petitioner's appeal to this court has not been heard and determined in accordance with the procedure established by this Constitution and therefore the petitioner is entitled to the benefit. of the protection afforded by article 21 of the Constitution. His appeal, therefore, has got to be heard and determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 145(3) of the Constitution. I would therefore allow the petition to this extent only that the appeal be heard by a Constitution Bench on a declaration that the judgment of the Division Court dated the 5th March 1954 is not that of a competent court.\n\nBY THE COURT: - In accordance with the judgment of the majority, the petition is dismissed.\n\n!I) L.R. 24 !A 22.\n\n(2) 3 Buist. 48, 53.\n\n(3) i.L.R. 51 Col. 331. 33,5.", "total_entities": 141, "entities": [{"text": "Raf .Kali", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 15, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19S5\n\nRaf .Kali }(11er\n\n•• Ram Ratu1n\n\nPa11dey\n\nJagannadhadas."}}, {"text": "Ram Ratu1n", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 37, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19S5\n\nRaf .Kali }(11er\n\n•• Ram Ratu1n\n\nPa11dey\n\nJagannadhadas."}}, {"text": "RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1422, "end_char": 1445, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1450, "end_char": 1491, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1510, "end_char": 1519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA\n\nand IMAM J.T.] ."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1521, "end_char": 1532, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "STNHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA\n\nand IMAM J.T.] ."}}, {"text": "IMAM J.T.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1545, "end_char": 1554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nfMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. 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B. Asthana, Syed Murtaza Faz/ Ali and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Trikumdas"}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baltadur Si•g/t\n\nTile Stal• qf Yiodhya Prad_, h\n\nand anothf\n\nSUPRE1'1E COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nPurshottam Trikumdas, (K. B. Asthana, Syed Murtaza Faz/ Ali and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Syed Murtaza Faz/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4923, "end_char": 4940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baltadur Si•g/t\n\nTile Stal• qf Yiodhya Prad_, h\n\nand anothf\n\nSUPRE1'1E COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nPurshottam Trikumdas, (K. B. Asthana, Syed Murtaza Faz/ Ali and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4949, "end_char": 4964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baltadur Si•g/t\n\nTile Stal• qf Yiodhya Prad_, h\n\nand anothf\n\nSUPRE1'1E COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nPurshottam Trikumdas, (K. B. Asthana, Syed Murtaza Faz/ Ali and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C. Seta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4997, "end_char": 5007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, Attorney-General for India and C; K. Daphtary Solicitor-General for India (Porus A.\n\nMehta and R. H. Dhebar, with them) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5047, "end_char": 5058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, Attorney-General for India and C; K. Daphtary Solicitor-General for India (Porus A.\n\nMehta and R. H. 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J., Das, Vivian Bose and Imam JJ.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA C:T"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5203, "end_char": 5206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Mukherjea C. J., Das, Vivian Bose and Imam JJ.", "canonical_name": "Das"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5208, "end_char": 5219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Mukherjea C. J., Das, Vivian Bose and Imam JJ.", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE"}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5224, "end_char": 5228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Mukherjea C. J., Das, Vivian Bose and Imam JJ."}}, {"text": "Dils J. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Dils J. Sinha J. delivered a separate Judgment."}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5299, "end_char": 5302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAs J.-This is a petition for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus calling upon the respondents to show cause why the petitioner, who is now confined in the Central Jail at Rewa, should not be set at liberty.", "canonical_name": "Das"}}, {"text": "Government of Yindhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5988, "end_char": 6017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the years 1948 and 1949 the petitioner was the Minister of Industries in the Government of Yindhya Pradesh which was at that time an acceding State within the meaning of section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935 as amended in 1947."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6081, "end_char": 6090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6098, "end_char": 6127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "11th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th April, 1949 the petitioner was arrested in Delhi on the allegation that he had accepted illegal , gratification in order to show favour to fanna Diamoncl Mining Syndicate in the matter of the lease of the Diamond Mines at Panna."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6204, "end_char": 6209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th April, 1949 the petitioner was arrested in Delhi on the allegation that he had accepted illegal , gratification in order to show favour to fanna Diamoncl Mining Syndicate in the matter of the lease of the Diamond Mines at Panna."}}, {"text": "fanna Diamoncl Mining Syndicate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6300, "end_char": 6331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th April, 1949 the petitioner was arrested in Delhi on the allegation that he had accepted illegal , gratification in order to show favour to fanna Diamoncl Mining Syndicate in the matter of the lease of the Diamond Mines at Panna."}}, {"text": "Panna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6383, "end_char": 6388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th April, 1949 the petitioner was arrested in Delhi on the allegation that he had accepted illegal , gratification in order to show favour to fanna Diamoncl Mining Syndicate in the matter of the lease of the Diamond Mines at Panna."}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6438, "end_char": 6447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December, 1949 the petitiom:r along with one Mohan Lal, who was the then sel!retary in the Ministry of Industries.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Lal"}}, {"text": "Court of Special Judge, Rewa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was put up for trial before the Court of Special Judge, Rewa, c0nstituted under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendments (Special Courts) Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "sections 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6699, "end_char": 6711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6739, "end_char": 6756, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "2()th July\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6957, "end_char": 6973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment pronounced on the 2()th July\n\n1950 the Special Judge acquitted both the accused."}}, {"text": "10th March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7157, "end_char": 7172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment pronounced on the 10th March 1951 the Judicial Commissioner reversed the order of acquittal, convicted both the accused and sentenced them to different terms of rigorous imprisonment under the different sections in addition to the payment of certaln fines."}}, {"text": "1,2th March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the petitioner and his co-accused the Judicial Commissioner on the 1,2th March 1951 issued a certificate to the effect that\n\nfon~ points of law raised in the case and formulated by him in his order were fit for the consideration of this Court in appeal under article 134 of the Constitution ot India."}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7677, "end_char": 7688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8058, "end_char": 8069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8338, "end_char": 8356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "22nd May 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8539, "end_char": 8552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By their judgment pronounced on the 22nd May 1953 the Constitution Bench rejected all these objections."}}, {"text": "20th October 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9047, "end_char": 9064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The constitutional points having been disposed of, the appeal was placed before a Division Bench of three Judges who on the 20th October 1953 ordered\n\nRao fihfra Bahatlur Singh\n\nv.\n\nThe State of Vindhya Pradesh and another\n\nDas .r."}}, {"text": "State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9109, "end_char": 9133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The constitutional points having been disposed of, the appeal was placed before a Division Bench of three Judges who on the 20th October 1953 ordered\n\nRao fihfra Bahatlur Singh\n\nv.\n\nThe State of Vindhya Pradesh and another\n\nDas .r.", "canonical_name": "State of Vi11dliya Pradesh"}}, {"text": "State of Vindlrya Prtuksl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9186, "end_char": 9211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiva Ba/UJdur Sin6h\n\nThe State of Vindlrya Prtuksl.", "canonical_name": "State of Vi11dliya Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9478, "end_char": 9487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appeal of Mohan Lal and acquitted him but dismissed tbe appeal of the petitioner with respect to his conviction under sections 161, 465 and 466, Indian Penal Code, as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, but set aside his conviction on the charge under section 120-B.\n\nThe sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment was mamtained but the sentence of fine was set aside.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Lal"}}, {"text": "sections 161, 465 and 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9586, "end_char": 9611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9613, "end_char": 9630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9712, "end_char": 9723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "5th April 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10556, "end_char": 10570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th April 1954 the application for review was pnt up for hearing before the same Division Bench which had pronounced the judgment on the me1:its dated the 5th March 1954."}}, {"text": "5th March 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10711, "end_char": 10725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th April 1954 the application for review was pnt up for hearing before the same Division Bench which had pronounced the judgment on the me1:its dated the 5th March 1954."}}, {"text": "12th April 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11106, "end_char": 11121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 12th April 1954 another petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner praying that the review matter relating to the judgment of the Constitution Bench delivered on the 22nd May 1953 be placed before a Constitution Bench for final disposal."}}, {"text": "17th May 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11426, "end_char": 11439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That review application was put up before a Constltc1tion\n\nBench which on the 17th May 1954 declined to entertain the same."}}, {"text": "Rewa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11607, "end_char": 11611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime the petitioner had in the last week of April 1954 surrendered and has since then been confined in the Central Jail at Rewa."}}, {"text": "Court of the Judicial CoJnmissioner of Vindliya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11906, "end_char": 11961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the present petition the petitioner has again urged that the Court of the Judicial CoJnmissioner of Vindliya Pradesh was not the proper forum for entertaming the appeal against the judgment of the Special Judge and consequently the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner setting aside the acquittal of the petitioner convicting and imposing sentence of imprisonment was void and inoperative."}}, {"text": "article 145(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12570, "end_char": 12584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13128, "end_char": 13139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13142, "end_char": 13153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13491, "end_char": 13494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13511, "end_char": 13519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RaD Shiva Baluulur Sin'h", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13532, "end_char": 13556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as to the entertHinment of appeals under s11h--clause (c) of clause 0) 0f artklP\n\nRaD Shiva Baluulur Sin'h\n\nT~ State of Vinrihya Pras/J\n\n1111d another\n\nDasJ.\n\ni955\n\nRao Shifa Bahadur Sing/I\n\nV.\n\nTlte State 11f Vindhyl, l 'Pmtfi•sh\n\nim.1 another\n\nDas .f."}}, {"text": "State of Vinrihya Pras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13561, "end_char": 13583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as to the entertHinment of appeals under s11h--clause (c) of clause 0) 0f artklP\n\nRaD Shiva Baluulur Sin'h\n\nT~ State of Vinrihya Pras/J\n\n1111d another\n\nDasJ.\n\ni955\n\nRao Shifa Bahadur Sing/I\n\nV.\n\nTlte State 11f Vindhyl, l 'Pmtfi•sh\n\nim.1 another\n\nDas .f.", "canonical_name": "State of Vi11dliya Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Rao Shifa Bahadur Sing", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13615, "end_char": 13637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as to the entertHinment of appeals under s11h--clause (c) of clause 0) 0f artklP\n\nRaD Shiva Baluulur Sin'h\n\nT~ State of Vinrihya Pras/J\n\n1111d another\n\nDasJ.\n\ni955\n\nRao Shifa Bahadur Sing/I\n\nV.\n\nTlte State 11f Vindhyl, l 'Pmtfi•sh\n\nim.1 another\n\nDas .f.", "canonical_name": "Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll"}}, {"text": "article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14356, "end_char": 14367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14488, "end_char": 14499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pur- Balradur Sin~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15940, "end_char": 15958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Pur- Balradur Sin~ shottam Trikumdas who appears in support of this 77re ateJt: petition has i:trongly relied on the language used i~ 'f'i\"::J0anZn."}}, {"text": "shottam Trikumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15959, "end_char": 15976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Pur- Balradur Sin~ shottam Trikumdas who appears in support of this 77re ateJt: petition has i:trongly relied on the language used i~ 'f'i\"::J0anZn."}}, {"text": "5th March, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16483, "end_char": 16498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, therefore, urges that the Division Bench had no jurisdiction to take up the case involving substantial question~ of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and consequently the judgment of that Division Bench pronounced on the 5th March, 1954 was illegal and void."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17286, "end_char": 17301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this very case the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh had granted a certificate of fitness under article 134(1)(c)."}}, {"text": "article 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17345, "end_char": 17362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17412, "end_char": 17423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Purshottam Triknmdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17954, "end_char": 17974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "conformity with such opinion: lrut to accede to the ari:i; ument of Sri Purshottam Triknmdas will !", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Trikumdas"}}, {"text": "article 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18858, "end_char": 18869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19883, "end_char": 19893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19919, "end_char": 19946, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 350", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19951, "end_char": 19963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20038, "end_char": 20058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument of Sri Purshottam Trikumdas .. oushed to its logical conclusion, must amount to this that althou!l:h Courts ooerating under the ordinarv procedural code mav solit uo cases intn r!ifferent sta!l:es for the nurnose of hearin'!", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Trikumdas"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20730, "end_char": 20741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21300, "end_char": 21314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21316, "end_char": 21327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "L.R. 24 I.A. 22", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22464, "end_char": 22479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24007, "end_char": 24018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25600, "end_char": 25614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25810, "end_char": 25821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26088, "end_char": 26099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26529, "end_char": 26540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26647, "end_char": 26651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing that we find in the body of clause (3) of article 145 which compels us to depart from the famous maxim cursus curiae est lex curiae which was laid down by Lord Coke in Burrowes v. High .Commission Court(') and which was quoted with approval in Habibar Rahman v. Saidannessa Bibi(')."}}, {"text": "S3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26982, "end_char": 26984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27017, "end_char": 27040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh\n\nTM State of Vindhya Pmditsh\n\nand another\n\nDas J.\n\nRao .Shiva Bahadur Singh v.\n\nThe State qf Vtndhya Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT RFPORTS [1955]\n\nSINHA J.-I regret to have to differ from my learned brethren on the construction of article 145(3) of the Constitution which is the main question in controversy in this case.", "canonical_name": "Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll"}}, {"text": "article 145(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27280, "end_char": 27294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27385, "end_char": 27396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27637, "end_char": 27648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27769, "end_char": 27780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28565, "end_char": 28576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29395, "end_char": 29406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31441, "end_char": 31464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh\n\nThe State of Vindhya Pradesh\n\nanti another\n\nSillh,, J.\n\nRao Shiva Bal; adur '6ingh\n\nV, r1ie Stateof Vi11dhya Pmdtsh\n\nand a!fotlrtr\n\nSinh• J'.", "canonical_name": "Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll"}}, {"text": "State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31470, "end_char": 31494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh\n\nThe State of Vindhya Pradesh\n\nanti another\n\nSillh,, J.\n\nRao Shiva Bal; adur '6ingh\n\nV, r1ie Stateof Vi11dhya Pmdtsh\n\nand a!fotlrtr\n\nSinh• J'.", "canonical_name": "State of Vi11dliya Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Stateof Vi11dhya Pmdtsh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31558, "end_char": 31581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiva Bahadur Singh\n\nThe State of Vindhya Pradesh\n\nanti another\n\nSillh,, J.\n\nRao Shiva Bal; adur '6ingh\n\nV, r1ie Stateof Vi11dhya Pmdtsh\n\nand a!fotlrtr\n\nSinh• J'."}}, {"text": "article 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31637, "end_char": 31648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32513, "end_char": 32524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33236, "end_char": 33247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33330, "end_char": 33339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33666, "end_char": 33677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure as also of the Code of Criminal Procedure to show that those Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35207, "end_char": 35288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35974, "end_char": 35998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955\n\nRao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll\n\nThe Stat\" qf Vind/1yo P, aiks/s\n\nand anotltu\n\nSinhaJ.\n\nJ955 within the purview of the proviso to clause (3) of arti- Rao Shiva.", "canonical_name": "Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38060, "end_char": 38071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38082, "end_char": 38093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38203, "end_char": 38206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38253, "end_char": 38264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39449, "end_char": 39460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39567, "end_char": 39578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Vi11dliya Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40499, "end_char": 40525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court is still in its formative stnges and it cannot he said to\n\nRao Shiva Buhadur Si11gli\n\nThe State of Vi11dliya Pradesh\n\nand a11ot!ier\n\nSinha J.\n\nRao Shiva Bahadllr Singh\n\nhave an \"established practice\".", "canonical_name": "State of Vi11dliya Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40542, "end_char": 40547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court is still in its formative stnges and it cannot he said to\n\nRao Shiva Buhadur Si11gli\n\nThe State of Vi11dliya Pradesh\n\nand a11ot!ier\n\nSinha J.\n\nRao Shiva Bahadllr Singh\n\nhave an \"established practice\".", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "Rao Shiva Bahadllr Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40552, "end_char": 40576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court is still in its formative stnges and it cannot he said to\n\nRao Shiva Buhadur Si11gli\n\nThe State of Vi11dliya Pradesh\n\nand a11ot!ier\n\nSinha J.\n\nRao Shiva Bahadllr Singh\n\nhave an \"established practice\".", "canonical_name": "Rao S!Uva Bahadur Siagll"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40738, "end_char": 40743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State ef Th f t h d · f h p C Vindhya Pradesh e re erence o t e ec1s1on o. t e nvy otmand anather -cil in Moulvi Muhammad Abd1;1l Majid v. Muhammad Sinh;;:,."}}, {"text": "Abdul Aziz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40897, "end_char": 40907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Aziz(') is not apt because in that case the hearing at the two stages of the trial was to be done by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction; that is to say, a court which could hear and determine the whole case or each of the two parts of the case taken separately by itself, unlike the present case in which the two parts of the hearing have been done by two courts of unequal power."}}, {"text": "Coke C.J.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41357, "end_char": 41366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly the reference to the maxim \"cursus C1Jriae est lex curiae\" of Coke C.J. in Burrowes\n\nv. High Commission Court(2), referred to in Habihar Rahman v. Saidannessa Bibi(') and to the other cases all proceed on the assumption that there is nothing in the statute law against such a course being taken."}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41694, "end_char": 41705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41796, "end_char": 41807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42129, "end_char": 42139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42265, "end_char": 42279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_225_243_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "' '\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAI SAHIB RAM JAWAYA KAPUR\n\nAND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB\n\n(AND CONNECTED PETITIONS).\n\n[MUKHERJEA, C.J., VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and IMAM JJ.]\n\nConstitutio11 of India, Arts. 19(/)(g), 73 and 162-Printing, publishing and selling of text books for recognised schools in the State of Punjab taken by the State Government exclusively in their own hands-Whether any fundamental right of the private publishers who were ousted from the business, contravened-Art. 19(1)\n\n(g) of the Constitution-Arts. 73 and 162-Whether contain any definition of executive function-Union executive or the State\n\nexecutive-Whether legislation by Parliament or State Legislature\n\nott certain items appertaining to their respective lists, a condition p1ecedent to the Union or State execu.tive functioning in respect to them.\n\nFor a long period of time prior to 1950 the text books for recognised schools in the State of Punjab were prepared by private publishers with their own money and under their own arrangements and they were submitted for the approval of the Government; The Government approved some books on each subject as alternative\n\ntext books. leaving it to the discretion of the Head Masters of difkrl.'nt schools to select any alternative book on each subject. In May\n\n1950books on certain subjects (like agriculture, history, social studies, etc.) were prepared and published by'the Government themelves without inviting offers from private publishers. With respect to other subjects, -0ffers were invited from \"publishers and authors\".\n\nThe alternative method was given up and only one text book on each subject was selected. The Government charged as royalty 5 % on the sale price of all the approved text books. In 1952 a notification was issued by the Government which omitted the word \"publishers\" altogether and invited only \"authors and others\" to submit books for approval by the G<>vemment. The \"authors and others\" whose books were approved, had to enter into an agreement in the form prescribed by the Government the principal term of the agreement was that tho copyright in these books would vest absolutely in Government and the 'authors and others' would get or Royalty of 5 % on the sale price of the text books. It was contended that the publishing, printing and selling of text books was thus taken by the Government exclusively into its own hands and the private publishers were altogether ousted from the business. The petitioners, who purport to carry on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text hooks for recognised schools in the Punjab, pre-\n\nApril 12\n\n1955 ferred the present petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying Rai Sahib Rum for writs of mandamus directing the Punjab Government to with- Jawaya Kapnr draw the notifications of 1950 and 1952 on the ground that they a11d others contravened the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed v. under the Constitution. _The Stale of Punj11b\n\nHeld that the action of the Government, whether it was good or bad, does not amount to an infraction of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. Jn the present case no fundamental rights of the petitioners were violated by the notifications and the acts of the executive Government of the Punjah done by them in furtherance of their policy of nationalisation of the text books for the school students.\n\nA mere chance or prospect of having particular customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to any interest or undertaking within the meaning of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and no question of payment of compensation can arise because the petitioners have been deprived of the same.\n\nArticles 73 and 162 of the Constitution do not contain any definition as to what the executive function is and what activities would legitimately come within its scope. They are concerned pri marily with the distribution of executive power between the Union on the one band and the component States on the other. They do not mean that it is only when Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items appertaining to their respective lists that the Union executive or the State executive,· as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect of them. On the other hand, the language of Art. I 62 dearly indicates that the powers of the State executhe do extend to matters upon which the State Legislature is competent to legislate and are not confined to matters over which legislation has been passed already. The same principle underlies Art. 73 of the Constitution.\n\n1\"hc Comrnottwealth and the Central Wool Commitee v. The Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (31 C.L.R. 421), Attorney-General for Victoria v. The Commonwealth, (52 C.L.R.\n\n533) and Motilal v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1951 Allahabad 257), referted to.\n\nORIGINAL .JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 652 of 1954 and 71to77 and 85 of 1955.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nG. S. Pathak, (P. N. Mehta and G. C. Mathur, with him) for the petitioners in Petition No. 652 of 1954.\n\nP.N. Mehta and G. C. Mathur, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 71 to 77 and 85 of 1955.\n\nS. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of 1955 Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhafe, with him) for Rai Sahib Ram the respondent in all petitions.\n\nJawaya Kapur and otlters\n\n1955. April 12.\n\nThe following Judgments were The Srar/~J Punja/> delivered.\n\nPETITION NO. 652 OF 1954.\n\nMuKHERJEA C. J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution, preferred by six persons, who purport to carry on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text books for different classes in the schools of Punjab, particularly for the primary and middle classes, under the name and style \"Uttar Chand Kapur & Sons\". It is alleged that the Education Department of the Punjab Government has in pursuance of their so-called policy of nationalisation of text books, issued a series of notifications since\n\n1950 regarding the printing, publication and sale of these books which have not only placed unwarrantable restrictions upon the rights of the petitioners to carry on their business but have practically ousted them and other fellow-traders from the business altogether. It is said that no restrictions could be imposed upon the petitioners' right to carry on the trade which is guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitutions by mere executive orders without proper legislation and that the legislation, if any, must conform to the requirements of clause\n\n(6) of article 19 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the petitioners pray for writs jn the nature of mandamus directing the Punjab Government to withdraw the notifications which have affected their rights.\n\nTo appreciate the contentions that have been raised by the learned counsel who appeared for the parties before us, it will be necessary to narrate certain relevant facts. ' In the State of Punjab, all recognised schools have got to follow the course of studies approved by the Education Department of the Government and the use, by the pupils, of the text books prescribed or authorised by the Department is a condition precedent to the granting of recognition to a\n\n1955 school. For a long period of time prior to 1950, the Rai Sahib Ram method adopted by the Government for selection and Jawaya Kapur approval of text books for recognised schools was and others\n\nv. commonly known as the alternative method and the The Stare of P1111jah procedure followed was shortly this: Books on relevant\n\nM11kherjea c.1. subjects, in accordance with the principles laid down by the Education Department, were prepared by the publishers with their own money and under their own arrangements and they were submitted for approval of the Government. The Education Department after proper scrutiny selected books numbering between 3 and IO or even more on each subject as alternative text books, leaving it to the discretion of the Head Masters of the different schools, to select any one cif the alternative books on a particular subject out of the approved list. The Government fixed the prices as well as the size and contents of the books and when these things were done it was left to the publishers to print, publish and sell the books to the pupils of different schools according to the choice made by their respective Head Masters. Authors, who were not publishers, could also submit books for approval and if any of their books were approved, they had to make arrangements for publishing the same and usually they used to select some one of the publishers already on the line to do the work.\n\nThis procedure, which was in vogue since 1905, was altered in material particulars on and from May 1950.\n\nBy certain resolution.s of the Government passed on or about that time, the whole of the territory of Punjab, as it remained in the Indian Union after partition, was divided into three Zones. The text books on certain subjects like agriculture, history, social studies, etc. for all the zones were prepared and published by the Government without inviting them from .the publishers. With respect to the remaining subjects, offers were still invited from \"publishers and\n\nauthors\" but the alternative system was given up and only one text book on each subject for each class in a particular zone was selected.\n\nAnother change introduced at this time was that the Government charged, as royalty, S % on the sale price of all the\n\napproved text books. The result therefore was that 1955 the Government at this time practically took upon RaiSahi/J Ram themselves the monopoly of publishing the text books 1m;:,0/ftf'::' on some of the subjects and with regard to the rest v. also, they reserved for themselves a certain royalty The Start:.. of Punjab upon the sale proceeds.\n\nMukhePJea c.J.\n\nChanges of a far more drastic character however were introduced in the year 1952 by a notification of the Education Department issued on the 9th of August 1952 and it is against this notification that the complaints of the petitioners are mainly directed. This notification omitted the word \"publishers\" altogether and invited only the \"authors and others\" to submit books for approval by the Government. These \"authors and others\", whose books were selected, had to enter into agreements in the form prescribed by the Government and the principal terms of the agreement were that the copyright in these books would vest absolutely in the Government and the \"authors\n\nand others\" would only get a royalty at the rate of 5 °:', on the sale of the text books at the price or prices specified in the list. Thus the publishing, printing and selling of the books were taken by the Government exclusively in their own hands and the private publishers were altogether ousted from this business.\n\nThe 5 °{, royalty, in substance, represents the price for the sale of the copyright and it is paid to an author or any other person who, not being the author, is the owner of the copyright and is hence competent in law to transfer the same to the Government. It is against these notifications of 1950 and 1952 that the present petition under article 32 of the Constitution is directed and the petitioners pray for withdrawal of these notifications on the ground that they contravene the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under the Constitution.\n\nThe contentions raised by Mr. Pathak, who appeared in support of the petitioners; are of a three-fold character. It is contended in the first place that the executive Government of a State is wholly incompetent. without any legislative sanction, to engage in any trade or business activity and that the acts of\n\n30 8 SCT/ND, ~2\n\nJ955 the Government in carrying out their policy of estab- Roi Sahib Itnnr lishing monopoly in the business of printing and pub- 1•::;;• .~:::_:- lishi'.1g _tet ooks fo_r school sudents is wholly. wit~- v. out Junsd1ct10n and 1Hegal. His second contention 1s, Th• State of 1'unfab that assuming that the State could create a monopoly\n\nMukherfta C.J. in its favour in respect of a particular trade or business, that could be done not by any executive act but by means of a proper legislation which should conform to the requirements of article 19(6) of the Constitution. Lastly, it is argued that it was not open to the Government to deprive the petitioners of their interest in any business or undertaking which amounts to property without authority of law and without payment of compensation as is required under article 31 of the Constitution.\n\nThe first point raised by Mr. Pathak, in substance. amounts to this, that the Government has no power in law to carry on the business of printing or selling text books for the use of school students in competition with private agencies without the sanction of the legislature. It is not argued that the functions of a modern State like the police States of old are confined to mere collection of taxes or maintenance of laws and protection of the realrri from external or intern a 1 enemies. A modern State is certainly expected to engage in all activities necessary for the promotion of the social and economic welfare of the community.\n\nWhat Mr. Pathak says, however, is, that as our Constitution clearly recognises a division of governmental functions into three categories, viz., the legislative, the judicial and the executive, the function of the executive cannot but be to executive the laws passed by the legislature or to supervise the enforcement of the same. The legislature must first enact a measure which the executive can then carry out. The learned counsel has, in support of this contention, placed considerable reliance upon articles 73 and 162 of our Constitution and also upon certain decided authorities cif the Australian High Court to which we shall. presently refer.\n\nArticle 73 of the Constitution reliltes to the executive powers of the Union, while the corresponding\n\nprovision in regard to the executive powers of a State 1955 is contained in article 162. The provisions of these.\n\nRai Sahib Ram articles are analogous to those of sections 8 and 49(2) Jawaya Kapur respectively of the Government of India Act, 1935 and :.thers and laid down the rule of distribution of executive The.State of Pmuab powers between the Union and the States, following Mukhtriea c.J. the same analogy as is provided in regard to the distribution of legislative powers between them, Article 162, with which we are directly concerned in this case, lays down:\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws:\n\nProvided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution 0T by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof\".\n\nThus under this article the executive authority of the State is exclusive in respect to matters enu.rnerated in List II of Seventh Schedule. The authority also extends to . the Concurrent List except as provided in the. Constitution itself or in any law passed by the Parliament. Similarly, article 73 provides that the executive powers of the Union shall extend to matters with respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws and to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or any agreement.\n\nThe proviso engrafted on clause\n\n(1) further lays down that although with regard to the matters in the Concurrent List the executive authority shall be ordinarily left to the State it would be open to the Parliament to provide that in exceptional cases the executive power of the Union shall extend to these matters also. Neither of these articles contain any Clefinition as to what the executive function is and what activities would legitimately come within its scope. They are concerned primarily with the distri-\n\n1955 bution of the executive power between the Union on Rai Sahib Ram the one hand and the States on the other. They do Jawaya Kapur not mean, as Mr. Pathak seems to suggest, that it is aud others v. only when the Parliament or the State Leislature has The State of PunJab legislated on certain items appertaining to their res-\n\nMuklrerfea c..r. pective lists, that the Union or the State executive, as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect to them. On the other hand, the language of article 162 clearly indicates that the powers of the State executive do extend to matters upon which the State Legislature is competent to legislate and are not confined to matters over which legislation has been passed already. The same principle underlies article 73 of the Constitution. These provisions of the Constitution therefore do not lend any support to Mr. .Pathak\"s contention.\n\nThe Australian cases upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel do not, in our opinion, appear to be of much help either. ln the first(') of these cases, the executive Government of the Commonwealth, during the continuance of the war, entered into a number of agreements with a company which was engaged in the manufacture and sale of wool-tops.\n\nThe agreements were of different types. By one class of agreements, the Commonwealth Government gave consent to the sale of wool-tops by the company in return for a share of the profits of the transactions (called by the parties \"a licence fee\"). Another class provided that the business of manufacturing wool-tops should be carried on by the company as agents for the Commonwealth in consideration of the company receiving an annual sum from the Commonwealth. The rest of the agreements were a combination of these two varieties. It was held by a Full Bench of the High Court that apart from any authority conferred by an Act of Parliament or by regulations thereunder, the executive Government of the Commonwealth had no power to make or ratify any of these agreements. The decision, it may be noticed, was based substantially upon the provision of section 61 of the Australian Constitution which is worded as follows :\n\n(1) Tlw_ C111111110111i•erif1h nnd the Cl'11fral i-v,, o/ Cm11111ii1<•(' v. Th,• Cnlnuia/ Co111hi11g. Spil111ii1g c111tf W.e111'i11g Co.Ltd., 31 C.l..R. -121.\n\n\"The executive power of the Commonwealth is 1955 vested in the Queen and is exercised by the Governor- Jr#. Sahib Ram General as the Queen's representative and extends to Ja-;;:za 0 ~\":,.~' the execution and maintenance of the Constitution v. and of the laws of the Commonwealth\".\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nIn addition to this, the King could assign other functions and powers to the Governor-General under section 2 but in this particular case no assignment of any additional powers was alleged or proved.\n\nThe court held that the agreements were not directly authorised by the Parliament or under the provisions of any statute and as they were not for the execution and maintenance of the Constitution they must be held to be void. Isacs, J., in his judgment, dealt elaborately with the two types of agreements and held that the agreements, so far as they purported to bind the company to pay to the Government money, as the price of consents, amounted to the imposition of a tax and were void without the authority of Parliament. The other kind of agreements which purported to bind the Government to pay to the company a remuneration for manufacturing wool-tops was held to be an appropriation of public revenue and being without legislative authority was also void.\n\nIt will be apparent that none of the principles indicated above could have any application to the cucumstances of the present case. There is no provision in our Constitution corresponding to section 61 of the Australian Act. The Government has not imposed anything like taxation or licence fee in the present case nor have we been told that the appropriation of public revenue involved in the so-called business in text books carried on by the Government has not been sanctioned by the legislature by proper Appr.opriation Acts.\n\nThe other casc(1) is of an altogether different character and arose in th\": following way. The Commonwealth Government had established a clothini! factory in Melbourne for the purpose of making nav; i and military uniforms for the defence forces and\n\n(1) .Vid\" Attorney General for Jlklqf\"1 v. The Commo11weal1h, 52 C'.L.R. 533.\n\nMukilerjell C.J.\n\n1955 postal employees. In times of peace the operations of Rui S'lfrib Ram the factory included the supply of uniforms for other\n\nJa:~~\"o5::':: departments of the Commonwealth and for employees v. in various public utility services. The Governor- T/re S1ute of J'uhiab General deemed such peace-time operations of the\n\nMukherjea c, J. factory necessary for the efficient defence of the Commonwealth inasmuch as the maintenance intact of the trained complement of the factory wou Id assist in meeting wartime demands.\n\nA question arose as to whether operations of the factory for such purposes-in peace-time were authorised by the Defence Act. The majority of the court answered the question in the affirmative. Starke, J. delivered a dissenting opinion upon which Mr. . Pathak mainly relied.\n\nThe learned Judge laid stress on section 61 of the Constitution Act according to which the executive power of -the Commonwealth extended to the maintenance of the Constitution and of te laws of the Commonwealth and held that there was nothing in the Constitution or any law of the Commonwealth which enabled the Commonwealth to establish and maintain clothing factories for other than Commonwealth purposes.\n\nThe opinion, whether right or wrong, turns upon the particular facts of the case and upon the provision of section 61 of the Australian Act and it cannot and does not throw any light on the question that requires decision in the present case.\n\nA question very similar to that in the present case did arise for consideration before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Motila1 v. The Guvemment of the State of Uttar Pradesh('). The point c<invassed there was whether the Government of a State has power under the Constitution to carry on the trade or business of running a bus service in the absence of a legislative enactment authorising the State Government to do so.\n\nDifferent views were expressed by different Judges on this question.\n\nChief Justice Malik was of opinion that in a written Constitution like ours the executive power may be such as is given to the executive or is implied, ancillary or inherent:\n\n(I) A.LR. 1951 Allahabad 257.\n\nIt prnst include all powers that may be needed to 19ss carry into effect the aims and objects of the Constitu- Rrsi, Sa/tib Ram tion. It must mean more than merely executing the Jal'!lldya K, af'Jur 1 A d. h Ch\" f J h S 1 °11 ott1er.< aws. ccor mg to t e 1e ust1ce t. e tate ms v. a right to hold and manage its own property and The $.tare of P1111jab carry on such trade or business as a citizen has the At1fklterjea c..1. right to carry on, so long as such activity does not encroach upon the rights of others or is not contrary to law. The running of a transport business therefore was not per se outside the ambit of the executive authority of the State. Sapru, J. held that the power to run a Government bus service was incidental to the power of acquiring property which was expressly conferred by articl~ 298 of the Constitution. Mootham and Wanchoo, JJ., who delivered a commoi1 judgment, were also of the opinion that there was no need for a specific legislative enactment to enable a State Government to run a bus service. In the opinion of these learned Judges an act would be within the executive power of the State if it is not an act which has been assigned by the Constitution of India to other authorities or bodies and is not contrary to the provisions of any law and does not encroach upon the legal rights of any member of the public. Agarwala.\n\nJ. dissented from the majority view and held that the State Government had no power to run a bus service in the absence of an Act of the legislature authorising the State to do so. The opinion of Ag:arwala, J. undoubtedly supports the contention of Mr.\n\nPathak but it appears to us to be too narrow and unsupportable.\n\nIt may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies.\n\nOrdinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away. The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute rigidity but the functions of the different parts or branches of the Government have been sufficicntlv difTerentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution does not contcmplrite\n\n1955 assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of Rai Sahib Ram functions that essentially belong to another.\n\nThe Jawa.va Kqpur, executive indeed can exercise the powers of departand others v, mental or subordinate legislation when such powers The State of Pnnjah.are delegated to it by the legislature. It can also,\n\nMukherjeb CJ. when so empowered, exercise J'udicial functions in a limited way. The executive overnment; however. can never go against the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. This is clear from the provisions of article 154 of the Constitution but, as we have already stated, it does not follow from this that in order to enable the executive to function there must be a law already in existence and that the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying out of these laws.\n\nThe limits within which the executive Gt, vernment can function under the Indian Constitution can be ascertained without much difficulty by reference to the form of the executive which our Constitution has set up. Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British Parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to have the primarv responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State. The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution. This evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order. the promotion of social and economic welfare. the diredion of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State.\n\nJn India, as in England, the executive has to act subject to the control of the legislature; but in what way is this control exercised by the legislature? Under article 53(1) of our Constitution, the execut.ive power of the Union is vested in the President but under article 75 there is to be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. The President has thus been made a formal or constitutional\n\nhead of the executive and the real executive powers 1955 are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet. The same Roi Sa/iJ'b Ram provisions obtain in regard to the Government of Jawaa~apur States; the Governor or the Rajpramukh, as the case an\n\nv. ers may be. occupies the position of the head of the exe- The State 01 Pun/ab cutive in the State but it is virtually the council of Mukhe, Jea CJ.\n\nMinisters in each State that carries on the executive Government. In the Indian Constitution, therefore, we have the same system of parliamentary executive as in England and the council of Ministers consisting, as it does, of the members of the legislature is. like the British Cabinet, \"a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the State to the executive part\". The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a majority in the legislature concentrates in itself the virtual control of both legislative and executive functions; and as the Ministers constituting the Cabinet are presumably agreed on fundamentals and act on the .principle of collective responsibility, the most important questions of policy are all formulated by them.\n\nSuppose now that the Ministry or the executive Government of a State formulates a particular policy in furtherance of which they want to start a trade or business. Is it necessary that there must be a specific legislation legalising such trade activities before they could be em barked upon? We cannot say that such legislation is always necessary. If the trade or business involves expenditure of funds, it is certainly required that Parliament should authorise such expenditure either directly or under the provisions of a statute. What is generally done in such cases is. that the sums required for carrying on the business are entered in the annual financial statement which the Ministry has to lay before the House or Houses of Legislature in respect of every financia} year under article 202 of the Constitution. So much of the estinrntes as relate to expenditure other than those charged on the consolidated fund are submitted in the form of demands for grants to the legislature and the legislature has the power to assent or refuse to assent to any such demand or assent to a demand subject to reduc-\n\n31-s SCIIND.'82\n\n1955 tion of the amount (article 203). After the grant is Rni snhib Ram sanctioned, an Appropriation Bill is introduced to\n\n'0\"~Y:rf.\"P!!' provide for the appropriation out of the consolidated 011\n\n•• '\"' fund of the State of all moneys required to meet the TheSror• 0! l'mriab grants thus made by the Assembly (article 204).\n\nAs M11kh-;:; a c,1. soon as the Appropriation Act is passed, the expenditure made under the heads covered by it would be deemed to be properly authorised by law under article .266(3) of the Constitution.\n\nIt may be, as Mr. Pathak contends, that the Appropriation Acts are no substitute for specific legislation and that they validate only the expenses out of the consolidated funds for the particular years for which they are passed; but nothing more than that may be necessary for carrying on of the trade or business. Under article 266(3) of the Constitution no moneys out of the consolidated funds of India or the consolidated fund of a State shall be appropriated except in accordance with law and for the purposes and in the manner provided in this Constitution. The expression \"law\" here obviously includes the Appropriation Acts. It is true that the Appropriation Acts cannot be said to give a direct legislative sanction to the trade activities themselves.\n\nBut so long as the trade activities are carried on in pursuance of the policy which the executive Government has formulated with the tacit support of the majority in the legislature, no objection on the score of their not being sanctioned by specific legislative provision can possibly be raised. Objections could be raised only in regard to the expenditure of public funds for carrying on of the trade or business and to these the Appropriation Acts would afford a complete answer.\n\nSpecific legislation may indeed be necessary if the Government require certain powers in addition to what they possess under ordinary law in order to carry on the particular trade or business. Thus when it is necessary to encroach upon private rights in order to enable the Government to carrv on their busines. a specific legislation sanctioning s~1ch course would have to be passed.\n\nIn the present case it is not disputed that the entire 1955 expenses necessary for carrying on the business of Rai Sahib R\"m printing and publishing the text books for recog- '\"\"'<lY\" 1'\"P\"' !lnzi 11thers nised schools in Punjab were estimated and shown in v. . the annual financial statement and that the demands Tire St!lte of P1111i!lh for grants, which were made under different heads, M11kherJe11 c .. 1. were sanctioned by the State Legislature and due Appropriation Acts were passed. For the purpose of carrying on the business the Government do not require any additional powers and whatever is necessary for their purpose, they can have by entering into contracts with authors and other people. This power of contract is expressly vested in the Government under article 298 of the Constitution. In these circumstances, we are unable to agree with Mr. Pathak that the carrying on of the business of printing and publishing text books was beyond the competence of the executive Government without a specific legislation sanctioning such course.\n\nThese discussions however are to some extent academic and are not sufficient by themselves to dispose of the petitioners' case. As we have said already, the executive Government are bound to conform not only to the law of the land but also to the provisions of the Constitution.\n\nThe Indian Constitution is a written Constitution and even the legislature cannot override the fundamental rights guaranteed by it to the citizens. Consequently, even if the acts of the executive are deemed to be sanctioned by the legislature, yet they can be declared to be void and inoperative if they infringe any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.\n\nOn the other hand, even if the acts of the executive are illegal in the sense that they are not warranted by law, but no fundamental rights of the petitioners have been infringed thereby, the latter would obviously have no right to complain under article 32 of the Constitution though they may have remedies elsewhere if other heads of rights are infringed.\n\nThe material question for consideration t hcrcfore is: What fundamental rights of the petitioners, if any, have been violated by the notifications\n\n19ss and acts of the executive Government of Punjab &1 Silltib Ram undertaken by them in furtherance of their policy of Jawaya /(Jlpur nationalisation of the text books for the school and '!/.h\"'s students? 1'11. State of Puf!iai\n\nMuklierjea c;.J.\n\nThe petitioners claim fundamental right under article l 9(1)(g) of the Constitution. which guarantees, inter alia, to all persons the right to carry on any trade or business. The business which the petitioners have been carrying on is that of printing and publishing books for sale including text books used in the primary and middle classes of the schools in Punjab.\n\nOrdinarily it is for the school authorities to prescribe the text books that are to be used by the students and if these text books are available in the market the pupils can purchase them from any book-seller they like. There is no fundamental right in the publishers that any of the books printed and published by them should be prescribed as text books by the school authorities or if they are once accepted as text books they cannot be stopped or discontinued in future.. With regard to the schools which are recognised by the Government the position of the. publishers is still worse. The recognised schools receive aids of various kinds from the Government including grants for the maintenance of the institutions, for equipment, f.urniture, scholarships and other things and the pupils of the recognised sch0<9ls are admitted to the school final examinations at lower rates. of fees than those demanded from the students of non-recognised schools. Under the school code, one of the main conditions upon which recognition is granted by Government is that th~ schpol authorities must use as text books only those which are prescribed or authorised by the Government. So far therefore as the recognised schools are concerned-and we are concerned only with these schools in the present casethe choice of text books rests entirely with the Government and it is for the Government to decide in which way the selection of these text books is to be made. The procedure hitherto followed was that t_he Government used to invite publishers and authors to submit their books for examination and approval by\n\nthe Education Department and after selection was 1955 made by the Government, the size, contents as . well Rai.Sqhib R,, m as the prices of the books were fixed and it was left Ja:a /f;,\"fr:' to. the publishers or authors to print and publish 11'h s v .. rp . h • e tllle o, 11111a them and off er them for sale to the pupils. So long __.:._ as this system was in vogue the only right which Mukherjea c.J. publishers, like the petitioners had, was to off er their books for inspection and approval by the Government. They had no right to insist on any of their books being accepted as text books. So the utmost that could be said is that there was merely a chance or prospect of any or some of their books being approved as text books by the Government. Such chances are incidental to all trades and businesses and there is no fundamental right guaranteeing them.\n\nA trader might be lucky in securing a particular market for his goods but if he loses that field because the particular customers for some reason or other do not choose to buy goods from him, it is not open to. him to say that it was his fundamental right to have his old customers for ever. On the one hand, therefore, there was nothing but a chance or prospect which the publishers had of having their books approved by the Government, on the other hand the Government had the undisputed right to adopt any method of selection they liked and if they ultimately decided that after approving the text books they would purchase the copyright in them from the authors and others provided the latter were willing to transfer the same to the Government on certain terms, we fail to see what right of the publishers to carry on their trade or rusiness .is affeGted by it. Nobody is taking away the publishers' right to print and publish any books they like and to offer them for sale but if they have no right that their books should be approved as text books by the Government it is immaterial so far as they l:'.re. concerned whether the Government .approves of text books submitted by other persons who are willing to sell their copyrights in the books to them. or choose to engage authors for the purpose of preparing the text books which they take up on themselves to print\n\n1955 and publish. We are unable to appreciate the argu- Rui Sahib Ram ment of Mr. Pathak that the Government while cxer- Jawayu Kapur cising their undoubted right of approval calmot attach und othrs ._, v. to it a condition which has no bearing on the purpose Tile State of Punjab for which the approval is made. We fail to see how\n\n.uuklrjell c.J. the petitioners' position is in any way improved thereby. The action of the Government may be gLJod or bad. It may be criticised and condemned in the Houses of the Legislature or outside but this do.es not amount to an infraction of the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution.\n\nAs in our view the petitioners have no fundamental right in the present case which can be said to have been infringed by the action of the Government, the petition is bound to fail on that ground. This being the position, the other two points raised by Mr.\n\nPathak do not require consideration at all.\n\nAs the petitioners have no fundamental right under article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution, the question whether the Government could establish a monopoly without any\n\nlcislation under article 19(6) of the Constitution is allogclher imnrntcrial. Again a mere chance or prospect of having particular customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to any interest in an undertaking within the meaning of article 3112) of the Constitution and no question of payment of compensation can arise because the petitioners have been deprived of the same. The result is that the petition is dismissed with costs.\n\nPETITIONS NOS. 71 TO 77 AND 85 OF 1955.\n\nMuKHERJEA C. J.-These 8 petitions under article 32 of the Constitution raise identically the same points for conside.i:ation as are involved in Petition No. 652 of 1954 just disposed of. The petitioners in these cases also purport to .be printers, publishers and . sellers of text-books for various classes in the schools. of Punjab and they complain .of infraction of their fundamental rights under article J 9(l)(g) of the Constitunon hv reason of the various notifications issued by the Sta.te of Punjab in pursuance of their policy\n\nof nationalisation of text books. The learned counsel 1955 appearing in these cases have adopted in their entirety Rai Sahib Ram the arguments that have been advanced by Mr. Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur amt others in Petition No. 652 of 1954 and no fresh or additional v. argument has been put forward by any one of them. The SfrJJe of Punjab This beiqg the position the decision in Petition M11k;;;;;; a c..1.\n\nNo 652 of 1954 will govern these petitions also and they will stand dismissed but we would make no order as to costs.\n\nSHIVA JUTE BALING LTD. v.\n\nHINDLEY & CO. LTD.\n\n[BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA C.J. and SUDHI\n\nRANJAN DAS J.].\n\nAppeal by Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution- Procedure to be followed on grant of such leave-Supreme Court Rules, rules 8, 9, 12 and 13 of Order Xlll--Circumstances warranting action against an Appellant for rescinding special leave--Civil Procedure Code, Order XLV, rule 8-\"Admission\" of appeal to Supreme Cowt-Applicability to appeals under article 136 of Constitution-Extent of Rule 9, Order XIII, of Supreme Court Rules- Rules and Practice of High Collrts-Formal motion in High Court for \"admission\" of appeal when special le1we was granted under article 136-Whether necessary--Calcutta High Court (Original Side) Rules, rule 9 of Chapter 32-Scope of.\n\nBy an order dated May 25, 1~54, the Supreme Court granted the petitioners in the case special leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court at Caleutta. In accordance wi:h the order, the pt'titioners furnished the security amounts directed to be deposited within the time specified in the order. The Registrar of the High Court did not iSS\\le. any notice of admission of appeal to be served by the Appellant's Solicitor on the Respondents as envisaged in rule 9 of Order. XIII, S.C.R. Nor did the Appellant following the practice of the High Court, move that C.ourt for \"admission\" of the appeal until January U, 1955. The Respondents first mo\\ed the High Co4rt complail).ing of dault on the part of the appellants in due prosecution of the appeal and latter moved the Supreme Court for action under rule 13 df Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules. The application in the High Court was therefore kept pending.\n\nHeld: Afer the grant of $pecial leave under article 136, the Registrar of the Supreme Court transmits, in accordance with the", "total_entities": 122, "entities": [{"text": "RAI SAHIB RAM JAWAYA KAPUR\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAI SAHIB RAM JAWAYA KAPUR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 203, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(/)(g), 73 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 73 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 550, "end_char": 566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "in the State of Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 940, "end_char": 962, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 12\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2641, "end_char": 2655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, who purport to carry on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text hooks for recognised schools in the Punjab, pre-\n\nApril 12\n\n1955 ferred the present petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2690, "end_char": 2697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 73 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3735, "end_char": 3754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4086, "end_char": 4096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They do not mean that it is only when Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items appertaining to their respective lists that the Union executive or the State executive,· as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect of them."}}, {"text": "Art. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4596, "end_char": 4603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1\"hc Comrnottwealth", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\"hc Comrnottwealth and the Central Wool Commitee v. The Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (31 C.L.R. 421), Attorney-General for Victoria v. The Commonwealth, (52 C.L.R.\n\n533) and Motilal v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1951 Allahabad 257), referted to."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5004, "end_char": 5014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, (P. N. Mehta and G. C. Mathur, with him) for the petitioners in Petition No."}}, {"text": "P. N. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5094, "end_char": 5105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, (P. N. Mehta and G. C. Mathur, with him) for the petitioners in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "P. N. Mehta"}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5110, "end_char": 5122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, (P. N. Mehta and G. C. Mathur, with him) for the petitioners in Petition No."}}, {"text": "P.N. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.N. Mehta and G. C. Mathur, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "P. N. Mehta"}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5277, "end_char": 5288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of 1955 Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhafe, with him) for Rai Sahib Ram the respondent in all petitions."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5337, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of 1955 Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhafe, with him) for Rai Sahib Ram the respondent in all petitions."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhafe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5352, "end_char": 5365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of 1955 Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhafe, with him) for Rai Sahib Ram the respondent in all petitions."}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of 1955 Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhafe, with him) for Rai Sahib Ram the respondent in all petitions.", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram"}}, {"text": "Jawaya Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jawaya Kapur and otlters\n\n1955.", "canonical_name": "Jawa.va Kqpur"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA C. J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution, preferred by six persons, who purport to carry on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text books for different classes in the schools of Punjab, particularly for the primary and middle classes, under the name and style \"Uttar Chand Kapur & Sons\".", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5601, "end_char": 5611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Uttar Chand Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5877, "end_char": 5894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA C. J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution, preferred by six persons, who purport to carry on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text books for different classes in the schools of Punjab, particularly for the primary and middle classes, under the name and style \"Uttar Chand Kapur & Sons\"."}}, {"text": "Education Department of the Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5927, "end_char": 5972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that the Education Department of the Punjab Government has in pursuance of their so-called policy of nationalisation of text books, issued a series of notifications since\n\n1950 regarding the printing, publication and sale of these books which have not only placed unwarrantable restrictions upon the rights of the petitioners to carry on their business but have practically ousted them and other fellow-traders from the business altogether."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6659, "end_char": 6669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6775, "end_char": 6792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the petitioners pray for writs jn the nature of mandamus directing the Punjab Government to withdraw the notifications which have affected their rights."}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7383, "end_char": 7396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For a long period of time prior to 1950, the Rai Sahib Ram method adopted by the Government for selection and Jawaya Kapur approval of text books for recognised schools was and others\n\nv. commonly known as the alternative method and the The Stare of P1111jah procedure followed was shortly this: Books on relevant\n\nM11kherjea c.1.", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram"}}, {"text": "Jawaya Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7448, "end_char": 7460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For a long period of time prior to 1950, the Rai Sahib Ram method adopted by the Government for selection and Jawaya Kapur approval of text books for recognised schools was and others\n\nv. commonly known as the alternative method and the The Stare of P1111jah procedure followed was shortly this: Books on relevant\n\nM11kherjea c.1.", "canonical_name": "Jawa.va Kqpur"}}, {"text": "RaiSahi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9685, "end_char": 9692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result therefore was that 1955 the Government at this time practically took upon RaiSahi/J Ram themselves the monopoly of publishing the text books 1m;:,0/ftf'::' on some of the subjects and with regard to the rest v. also, they reserved for themselves a certain royalty The Start:.. of Punjab upon the sale proceeds.", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram"}}, {"text": "MukhePJea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9923, "end_char": 9932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MukhePJea c.J.\n\nChanges of a far more drastic character however were introduced in the year 1952 by a notification of the Education Department issued on the 9th of August 1952 and it is against this notification that the complaints of the petitioners are mainly directed.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11270, "end_char": 11280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11519, "end_char": 11525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contentions raised by Mr. Pathak, who appeared in support of the petitioners; are of a three-fold character."}}, {"text": "Mukherfta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12153, "end_char": 12162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His second contention 1s, Th• State of 1'unfab that assuming that the State could create a monopoly\n\nMukherfta C.J. in its favour in respect of a particular trade or business, that could be done not by any executive act but by means of a proper legislation which should conform to the requirements of article 19(6) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12353, "end_char": 12366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12632, "end_char": 12642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 73 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13808, "end_char": 13827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Australian High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13898, "end_char": 13919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel has, in support of this contention, placed considerable reliance upon articles 73 and 162 of our Constitution and also upon certain decided authorities cif the Australian High Court to which we shall."}}, {"text": "Article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13957, "end_char": 13967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14136, "end_char": 14147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 49(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14224, "end_char": 14244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jawaya Kapur respectively of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14245, "end_char": 14307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukhtriea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14442, "end_char": 14451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Pmuab powers between the Union and the States, following Mukhtriea c.J. the same analogy as is provided in regard to the distribution of legislative powers between them, Article 162, with which we are directly concerned in this case, lays down:\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws:\n\nProvided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution 0T by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof\".", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14555, "end_char": 14566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jawaya Kapur respectively of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Jawaya Kapur respectively of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15260, "end_char": 15276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jawaya Kapur respectively of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Jawaya Kapur respectively of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15428, "end_char": 15438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15660, "end_char": 15679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, article 73 provides that the executive powers of the Union shall extend to matters with respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws and to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or any agreement."}}, {"text": "State of PunJab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16498, "end_char": 16513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They do Jawaya Kapur not mean, as Mr. Pathak seems to suggest, that it is aud others v. only when the Parliament or the State Leislature has The State of PunJab legislated on certain items appertaining to their res-\n\nMuklrerfea c..r. pective lists, that the Union or the State executive, as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect to them."}}, {"text": "article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16740, "end_char": 16751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16998, "end_char": 17008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18345, "end_char": 18355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sahib Ram General", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18685, "end_char": 18702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The executive power of the Commonwealth is 1955 vested in the Queen and is exercised by the Governor- Jr. Sahib Ram General as the Queen's representative and extends to Ja-;;:za 0 ~\":,.~' the execution and maintenance of the Constitution v. and of the laws of the Commonwealth\"."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18863, "end_char": 18878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Punjab\n\nIn addition to this, the King could assign other functions and powers to the Governor-General under section 2 but in this particular case no assignment of any additional powers was alleged or proved."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18980, "end_char": 18989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Isacs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19307, "end_char": 19312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isacs, J., in his judgment, dealt elaborately with the two types of agreements and held that the agreements, so far as they purported to bind the company to pay to the Government money, as the price of consents, amounted to the imposition of a tax and were void without the authority of Parliament."}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20036, "end_char": 20046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Melbourne", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20533, "end_char": 20542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "factory in Melbourne for the purpose of making nav; i and military uniforms for the defence forces and\n\n(1) .Vid\" Attorney General for Jlklqf\"1 v. The Commo11weal1h, 52 C'."}}, {"text": "Mukilerjell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20705, "end_char": 20716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukilerjell C.J.\n\n1955 postal employees.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "Rui S'lfrib Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20782, "end_char": 20797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In times of peace the operations of Rui S'lfrib Ram the factory included the supply of uniforms for other\n\nJa:~~\"o5::':: departments of the Commonwealth and for employees v. in various public utility services."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20975, "end_char": 20977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Starke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21434, "end_char": 21440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Starke, J. delivered a dissenting opinion upon which Mr. ."}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21549, "end_char": 21559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22032, "end_char": 22042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22276, "end_char": 22296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A question very similar to that in the present case did arise for consideration before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Motila1 v. The Guvemment of the State of Uttar Pradesh(')."}}, {"text": "Malik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22686, "end_char": 22691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice Malik was of opinion that in a written Constitution like ours the executive power may be such as is given to the executive or is implied, ancillary or inherent:\n\n(I) A.LR."}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23097, "end_char": 23100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sapru", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23538, "end_char": 23543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sapru, J. held that the power to run a Government bus service was incidental to the power of acquiring property which was expressly conferred by articl~ 298 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Mootham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23716, "end_char": 23723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mootham and Wanchoo, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23728, "end_char": 23735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mootham and Wanchoo, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24058, "end_char": 24079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Agarwala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24233, "end_char": 24241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agarwala."}}, {"text": "Ag", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24440, "end_char": 24442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The opinion of Ag:arwala, J. undoubtedly supports the contention of Mr.\n\nPathak but it appears to us to be too narrow and unsupportable."}}, {"text": "arwala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24443, "end_char": 24449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The opinion of Ag:arwala, J. undoubtedly supports the contention of Mr.\n\nPathak but it appears to us to be too narrow and unsupportable."}}, {"text": "Jawa.va Kqpur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25242, "end_char": 25255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jawa.va Kqpur, executive indeed can exercise the powers of departand others v, mental or subordinate legislation when such powers The State of Pnnjah.are delegated to it by the legislature.", "canonical_name": "Jawa.va Kqpur"}}, {"text": "State of Pnnjah.are", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25376, "end_char": 25395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jawa.va Kqpur, executive indeed can exercise the powers of departand others v, mental or subordinate legislation when such powers The State of Pnnjah.are delegated to it by the legislature."}}, {"text": "Mukherjeb", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25446, "end_char": 25455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It can also,\n\nMukherjeb CJ.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "article 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25668, "end_char": 25679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26892, "end_char": 26897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn India, as in England, the executive has to act subject to the control of the legislature; but in what way is this control exercised by the legislature?"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26905, "end_char": 26912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn India, as in England, the executive has to act subject to the control of the legislature; but in what way is this control exercised by the legislature?"}}, {"text": "article 53(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27050, "end_char": 27063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27156, "end_char": 27166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Jawaa~apur States", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27529, "end_char": 27560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same Roi Sa/iJ'b Ram provisions obtain in regard to the Government of Jawaa~apur States; the Governor or the Rajpramukh, as the case an\n\nv. ers may be."}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27582, "end_char": 27592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same Roi Sa/iJ'b Ram provisions obtain in regard to the Government of Jawaa~apur States; the Governor or the Rajpramukh, as the case an\n\nv. ers may be."}}, {"text": "Mukhe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27746, "end_char": 27751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "occupies the position of the head of the exe- The State 01 Pun/ab cutive in the State but it is virtually the council of Mukhe, Jea CJ.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "article 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29299, "end_char": 29310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29666, "end_char": 29677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29953, "end_char": 29964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 266(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30494, "end_char": 30508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31915, "end_char": 31924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case it is not disputed that the entire 1955 expenses necessary for carrying on the business of Rai Sahib R\"m printing and publishing the text books for recog- '\"\"'<lY\" 1'\"P\"' !", "canonical_name": "Rai Sahib Ram"}}, {"text": "article 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32575, "end_char": 32586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33794, "end_char": 33804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Silltib Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34109, "end_char": 34120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material question for consideration t hcrcfore is: What fundamental rights of the petitioners, if any, have been violated by the notifications\n\n19ss and acts of the executive Government of Punjab &1 Silltib Ram undertaken by them in furtherance of their policy of Jawaya /(Jlpur nationalisation of the text books for the school and '!"}}, {"text": "State of Puf!iai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34267, "end_char": 34283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Puf!iai\n\nMuklierjea c;.J.\n\nThe petitioners claim fundamental right under article l 9(1)(g) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Muklierjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34285, "end_char": 34295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Puf!iai\n\nMuklierjea c;.J.\n\nThe petitioners claim fundamental right under article l 9(1)(g) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36667, "end_char": 36676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as this system was in vogue the only right which Mukherjea c.J. publishers, like the petitioners had, was to off er their books for inspection and approval by the Government.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA, C.J."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38781, "end_char": 38796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. to it a condition which has no bearing on the purpose Tile State of Punjab for which the approval is made."}}, {"text": ".uuklrjell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38849, "end_char": 38859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We fail to see how\n\n.uuklrjell c.J. the petitioners' position is in any way improved thereby."}}, {"text": "article 19(1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39134, "end_char": 39151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39528, "end_char": 39544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39659, "end_char": 39672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 3112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39883, "end_char": 39895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40165, "end_char": 40175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40836, "end_char": 40855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel 1955 appearing in these cases have adopted in their entirety Rai Sahib Ram the arguments that have been advanced by Mr. Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur amt others in Petition No."}}, {"text": "SfrJJe of Punjab", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40979, "end_char": 40995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The SfrJJe of Punjab This beiqg the position the decision in Petition M11k;;;;;; a c..1."}}, {"text": "BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41232, "end_char": 41253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA C.J. and SUDHI\n\nRANJAN DAS J.]."}}, {"text": "SUDHI\n\nRANJAN DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41263, "end_char": 41280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA C.J. and SUDHI\n\nRANJAN DAS J.]."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41317, "end_char": 41328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41648, "end_char": 41659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order Xlll--Circumstances warranting action against an Appellant for rescinding special leave--Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Order Xlll--Circumstances warranting action against an 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Caleutta."}}, {"text": "High Court at Caleutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42110, "end_char": 42132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated May 25, 1~54, the Supreme Court granted the petitioners in the case special leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court at Caleutta."}}, {"text": "Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42792, "end_char": 42829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42938, "end_char": 42949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_22_47_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Morch 22\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nSAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS\n\nPANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER (and connected Appeal)\n\n(VIVIAN BOSE' B. JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.l\n\nCompromise or family arrangement-Proof of-Assumption of antecedent title of some .sort in the parties-Re'versioner's assent to an alienation-Legal effect thereof.\n\nA family arrangement can, as a matter of Jaw, be inferred from .a long course of dealings between the parties.\n\nIt is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement i3 based on the assumption tha! there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agteement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains. why no conveyance is required in thcsi..: cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving th~ property under th-: arrangement had always res!ded in him or her so far as the property\n\nalHng to his or her share is concerned and therefore no coriveyance ts necessary.\n\nBut in view of the fact that the Courts lean strongly in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do .justice to its various members and avoid, in znticioation, future disputes which might ruin them all the Supreme C0urt, carrying the principle further, upheld an arrangement under which one set of members abandons all claim to all title and interest in all the properties in dispute and acknowledges that the sole and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of their number (provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such an assertion of title) and are content to take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a Conveyance for consideration when consideration is present.\n\nThe legal position in such a case would be this. The arrangement or compromise would set out and define that the title claimed by A to all the properties in dispute was his absolute title as claimed and asserted by him and that it had always resided in him. Next, it would effect a transfer by A to B, C and D (the other members to the arrangement) of properties ~, Y and Z; and thereafter B, C •nd D would hold their respective titles under the title derived from A.\n\nBut in that event, the formalities of law about the passing of title\n\nI ••\n\n...,\n\nby transfer would have to be obser\\'ed, and unde1> the present state of law either registration or twelve year's' adverse possession woilld be necessary. But in the present case the arrangement was made in 1875 when the Transfer of Property Act was not in force and no writing was required; and as there is no writing, the Registration Act does not apply either.\n\nTherefore; the oral arrangement of 1875 would be sufficient to pass title in this way and that is what happened.\n\nOnce a reversioner has given his assent to an alienation,. whether at the time, or as a part of the transaction, or later as a. distinct and separate a'ct, he is bound though others may not be, and having given his assent he cannot go back on it to the detriment of other persons; all the more so when he himself receives a benefit.\n\nIt is settled law that an aHenation by a widow in excess of her powers is not altogether void but only voidable by the reversioners, who may either singly or as a body be precluded from exercising their right to avoid it either by express ratification or by acts which treat it as valid or bindinfi.\n\nThe principle applicable to the present case is a rule underlying many branches of the law which precludes a person who, with full knowledge of his rights, has once elected to assent to a transaction voidable at his instance and has thus elected not to exercise his right to avoid it, . from going back on that and a\\'oiding it at a later tag,~. Having made his election he is bound by it.\n\nHeld, that in the present cas\" the plaintiff who is in titulo now that the succession has opened out, had unequivocally assented to the arrangement with full knowledge of the facts and accepted benefit qnder it, so he is now precluded from avoiding it, and any attempts he made to go behi.nd that assent when 'it suited his purpose cannot render the assent once given nugatory even though it\n\nW8S given when he was not in titulo and e\\'en though the assent was to a series of gifts.\n\nMst., Hardei v. Blwgwan Szngh, (A.LR. 1919 P.C. 27); Clifton v. Cockburn ((18341 3 My. & K. 76;; William v. William ((1866] LR. 2 Ch. 294); Rani Mewa Kuwar v. Rani Hulas Kuwar ([1874] LR. 1 I.A. 157); Khunni Lal v. Pobind Krishna ((1911] LR. 38 LA. 87): Ramsumran Prasad v. Shyam Kuma.ri ((1922.] LR. 49 I.A. 348J; Raja Modhu Sudhan Singh v. Rooke ([ 1897] L.R. 24 LA. 164J; Bl]oy Gopal v. Sm. Krishna ((1906] L.R. 34 I.A. 87); Ram.ouda Annaxowda v: Bhaµsaheb ([1927] LR. 54 I.A. 396); Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore 1[1952] S.C.R. 478 at 488); Rangaywami Gounden v. Nar.hiappa Gounden ((1918] LR. 46 I.A. 72 at 86 &. 87 J, rekrrd to.\n\nC1v11 APl'U I.AT! .It RISU!Cl 10~: Civil Appeals Nus. n and 1J4 uf 1950.\n\nSahu Madho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\n1955 -- Sahu Madho Das\n\nand' others v.\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\nAppeals from the Judgments and Decrees dated the 20th March 1942 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal Nos. 154 and 152 of 1934 arising out of the Judgments and decrees dated the 25th Augµst 1932 of the Court of First Additional Subordinate Judge, and First Additional Civil Judge, 'Moradabad in Original Suit Nos. 90 and 87 of 1931 respectively.\n\nN. C. Chatterji, (S. S. Shukla with him) for the Appellants.\n\nGopi Nath Kunzru, (B. P. Maheshwari with him) for Respondent No. 1.\n\nP. C. Agarwala, for Respondent No. 2 in Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1950.\n\n1955. March 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBOSE J.-These appeals arise out of two suits which were heard together along with two other suits with which we are not now concerned. All four raised the same set of questions except for a few subsidiary matters. They were tried together and by common consent the documents and evidence in the various cases were treated as common to an. They were all governed by one common judgment, both in the first Court and on appeal. The defendants appeal here.\n\nThe plaintiff, Mukand Ram, is common to all four cases. He sues in each suit as the reversioner to one Pandit Nanak Chand who was his maternal grandfather. The family tree is as below :\n\n...\n\n.,.\n\nNanak Chand d. 23-7-56 'V: l\\Ist. Pa to .. d. Jan. 1875\n\n,-. -7---·---:-------;-.-i---- --- 1\\Ist. l\\Iaha Devi l\\Ist. Durga Devi d. 1912 I d. 1888 H: Nathmal Das H: Jwala Prasad •\n\nI l\\Ist. Har Devi . d .. 10-!J-19 H: Bhawani Shanker l\\IsL Ram Pyare\n\n: I I\n\n. . I .\n\nI I!\n\nBanwari Lal Sita! Prasad Shyam Lal Pyare Lal Bhukhan Saran (dead) (dead) (dead) (Deft. 5) . .\n\nI Brij Lal\n\n(deii)\n\nI .\n\nKanhaiya Lal (Dead)\n\nI l\\Iukand Ram\n\n(Plff. No. I)\n\n~.,, ~\n\n~ t:l §\" . ... . ...\n\n!J' \"· ....... ,~\n\n~1~~:<S:~ \"-. § t 0 • c (Ii t::r ;; ; t ti ~ 11o ..\n\nt,:) 00 9 ~\n\n00 ~ t.'rj .... ,... t.'rj .a g\n\n~ ~\n\n~ ~\n\nSahu fl, fadho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPa1uiit Muka11d Rani and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSUPRFME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nThe plaintiff's case is. that the properties in the four suits belonged to Nanak Chand who died on 23-7-1856 leaving a widow Mst. Pato and three daughters, Maha Devi, Durga Devi and Har Devi. On his death, his widow Mst: Pato succeeded. She died in January 1875 and the estate then went to the three daughters. Of them, Durga Devi died in 1888, Maha Devi in 1912 and Har Devi in 1919. The plaintiff's rights as reversioner accrued on Har Devi's death on\n\n10-9-1919.\n\nBut before this came certain alienations which the plaintiff challenges in the present suits. The suits were filed on 8-9-1931.\n\nln Civil. Appeal No. 92 of 1950, the challenge is tu a mortgage effectt; d by Durga Devi on 3-3-1887 in favour of Sahu Bitthal Das. The mortgagee sued on his mortgage, .obtained a decree and in execution purchased the properties himself. The plaintiff's case is that Durga Devi only had a life estate and, as there was no necessity, the mortgage and the subsequent auctinn purchase do not bind him.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1950, there are two alienations, 1both sales. The first, dated 23-9-1918, was by Pyare Lal (son of Durga Devi) in favour of Shyam Lal, son of M ulchand.. (This is ncit the Sh yam Lal who was Pyare Lal's brother). The vendee later sold the properties to the first and second defendants on 5-3-1927. One of the vendees, the first defendant, is yet another Shyam Lal: Shyam Lal son of Harbilas.\n\nThe other sale was by Brij Lal's guardian on behalf of Brij Lal, \"Brij Lal then being a minor. It was on 25-11-1919 in favour of Chheda Lal. The first and second defendants. pre-empted this sale after a fight in Court and took possession under the decree which they obtained.\n\nTlie plaintiff's case is that Har Devi was alive at the date of the first sale and as the reversion had not opened out Pyare Lal had no power to sell. In the case of the second sale, the reversion had opened out but Brijlal heing more remote than the plaintiff got no title, so that sale is also bad.\n\nThe defendants' case b that the properties in these\n\ntwo suits (as also in the other two suits with which we are no longer concerned) did not belong to Nanak Chand and formed no part of his estate; they belonged exclusively to Mst. Pato as part of her personal estate.\n\nOn 22-1-1864 Mst. Pato executed a doeument which she called a deed of agreement but which, if it is anything at all, is a will. There are no other parties to it and she purports thereby to dispose of her properties after her death. The defendants in Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1950 have called it a will. After sayit1g that she wiTl remain in possession and occupatidn as long as she lives, Pato says that after her death her three daughters will be the owners and will either remain 'in joint possession or will divide the estate in equal shares and, in that event, will take possession of their respective shares and will be the \"owners\" of them.\n\nBut before she died Pato made another disposition of her estate during her life time .in the year 1875 which, of course, abrogated the will. This was done orally. The defendants say that this was a family arrangement in which each of the three daughters was given certain properties absolutely so that each became the absolute owner of whatever fell to her share.\n\nPato also gave properties to each of her four grandsons who were then Uving, _namely Kanhaiya Lal, Mukand Ram, Banwari Lal and Sital Prasad. The defendants asserted that they also took separate and absolute estates _immediately and said that each has been holding and dealing with the properties. so divided, separately and as absolute owners, ever since.\n\nTolms, at the dates of the transfers now challenged, each alienor had an absolute title to the properties alienated and the plaintiff has none.\n\nThe trial Court he4l that though most of the properties in Pato's hands came from her husband Nanak Chand, the plaintiff had not shown that the properties with which his_foar suits were concerned formed part of Nanak Chand's estate.\n\nAn issue was also tramed about the family settlement and one about estoppeJ. On both those points .\n\nSahu Madho Da\n\na11d others\n\nPandit M11ka11d Ram tmd anothe\n\nBo.<e .T.\n\nSah1l Madho Da.~\n\nand others\n\nPandit Mukand Ram aQl1 another\n\nB1HeJ.\n\nthe learned Judge found against the plaintiff. result was that all four suits were dismissed.\n\n[1955]\n\nThe\n\nThe High Court reversed these findings on appeal an.d held that all the properties, including the ones in smt, formed part of Nanak Chand's estate.\n\nThe learned Judges also held that though there was a family arrangement, it was a purely voluntary settlement made by Pa to and was not made .as the result of any dispute and that in any case it did not bind the plaintiff who was not a par.ty to it and who does not claim through any of those who were. They also held that there was no estoppel. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim was decreed in each of the four suits.\n\nAppeals were filed here in all four suits by the various defendants but Civil Appeals Nos. 91 and 93 of 1950 were dismissed for want of prosecution, therefore the decree of the High Court in the two cases out of which those appeals arose will stand. We are now only concerned with Civil Appeals Nos. 92 and 94 of 1950.\n\nIn the lower Courts much of the effort was concentrated on finding out which items out of a large mass of property belonged to Nanak Chand and which did not. We do not intend to look into that because it it is unnecessary on the view we take. We will therefore assume, without deciding, that all the properties in dispute were part of Nanak Chand's estate.\n\nWe will deal first with the family arrangement.\n\nThe learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the defendants never set up a family arrangement though they have used the words \"family settlement\".\n\nHe contended that what they really pleaded was a gift out and out by Pato. It was pointed out that the defendants never suggested a dispute. neither did they suggest that any one ever questioned or doubted Pato's absol11tc title to the property. Therefore, it was argued the present case, which is based on the assumption that the property was not Pato's and that she was laying wrongful claim to it, cannot be allowed because it flies in the face of the defendants' pleadings.\n\nThere is not much in this objection. The defen-· dants did plead a family arrangement and the matter was put in issue and fought' out. The defendants' case was that all the property was Pato's. The plaintiff's case was that. it was all Nanak Chand's. The issues were-\n\n\" 4. Whether Mst. Pa to gave properties separately to each of her three daughters and to daughter's sons and put them in proprietary possessior1 and they remained absolute owners of their properties and what is its effect on the case?.\n\n5. Whether the arrangement mentioned in issue No. 4 was by way nf family settlement and what is its effect on the case?\"\n\nThese issues are broad enough to cover the present point. If the properties really belonged to Nanak Chand, as the plaintiff cla.ims, then the case for a family settlement becomes all the stronger, for it is clear that Pato laid clain1 to them as her own properties of which she could dispose by will, for that is what the document of 1864 really is.\n\nIf, on the other hand. they were her properties. as the defendants say, then she had the right either to gift them outright or to settle them as the defendants say she did by way of a family arrangement.\n\nJn either case. the matter was fully fought out and neither side was misled.\n\nThe real question we have to decide is, has the family arrangement been proved?\n\nWe think it has.\n\nThe direct evidence on this point is that of Shyam Lal (D.W. I in C.A. 94 '50) and the first defendant there. He tells us that he had money lending transactions with Har Devi. Kanhaiya Lal, Shyam Lal and Pyare Lal on unregistered bonds from 1902 till 1910 and from 1910 on registered mortgage bonds. He says that-\n\n\"They\" (tlrat is to say. Har Devi', Mukand Ram.\n\nKanhaiya Lal. Shyam Lal and Pyare Lal) \"showed one copy of a deed of will and said that Mst. Pato had given the proper.ty to her daughters and grandsons ......... I am illiterate and Kanhaiya Lal brother of Mukand Ram had the deed of will read over to me at\n\n5-8 SCT/ND/82\n\nSahu Madho Das and others v.\n\nPandit M11k1111d Ram and 01101/wr\n\nBo., e J.\n\n1955 the time of mortgaging property in 1909 or 1910. It\n\nS:i/111 Madlm Das was by means of that paper that I came to know\n\nand arhers that Mst. Pato had made her daughters and grand-\n\nPandir vMnkand sons absolute owners and I know of the property flam and another 'which was mortgaged to me\".\n\nBose}, Now it is true that the so-called will of 1864 does not make provision for the grandsons, nor does it expressly confer an absolute estate on the legatees, but the witness is illiterate and had to depend on what he was told about the contents and meaning of the document, and what we have to test is. the truth of his assertion that the plaintiff Mukand Ram and Kanhaiya Lal, and other members of the family, told him that Mst. Pato had given the property to her daughters and grandsons. If they told him this, as he says they did, then it operates as an admission against Mukand Ram and shifts the burden of proof to him because he was 011e of the persons who made the statement. The statements made by the others are not relevant except in so far as they prove the conduct of the family.\n\nThe plaintiff IP.W. 11 in C.A. 91I50) admits that Mst. Pato divided the estate but says. that it was only for convenience of management and that neither she nor her daughters had. or pretended to have. anything more than a lifo estate.\n\nHe denies that there was any gift or family arrangement. But he had to. admit that the grandsons also got properties at the same time. His explanation is that it was for the purposes of \"shradh\" and pilgrimage to Ga ya and he says that though they ere given possession they were not the \"owners\".\n\nWe now have to choose between these two witnesses and see which is telling the truth.\n\nBut before .doing that we will advert to another member of the family, Pyare Lal, who wa's examined as a witness (0.W. 17) in C.A. 92/50. He admits a series of sales made 6y him but says that he had no will of his own and that he did just what Mukand Ram told him.\n\nNow to go back to the year' 1864 when Mst. Pato rpade the so-called will of 1864. This document was\n\nconstrued by the Privy Council in Mst. Hard:'i v.\n\nBhagwan SinghC) and their Lordships said-\n\n'' In the events which happened this document did not become operative, but it is relevant as showing that at the date of its execution Pato was claiming an absolute right to dispose of the whole of the scheduled property\".\n\nMukand Ram was not a party to that litigation and the. decision does not bind him but it operates as a judicial precedent about the construction of that document, a precedent with which we respectfully agree. She says there that the property \"belongs exclusively to me without the participation of anyone else\". That assertion, coupled with the fact that she purported to dispose of the property after her death (which she could not have done as a limited owner). and taken in conjunction with the subsequent conduct of. the daughters and that of the grandsons, imports admissions by them that that was her claim and leaves us in little doubt about what she meant. We therefore reach the same conclusion as the Judicial Committee and hold that Mst. Pato claimed an absolute estate in 1864.\n\nWe will now examine the conduct of the family after Pato's death and the claims put forward by them from time to time. First. we have the statement of Mukand Ram in the witness box (P.W. 11 in C.A. 91/ 50) that on Pa to 's death her daughters took separate possession of the properties in the following villages and towns:\n\nHar Devi\n\nDurga Devi.\n\n(I) A.LR. JYIY 1'.C. 27.\n\nQutabpur Amawti.\n\nShakerpore.\n\nLalpur.\n\nBagh Alam Sarai.\n\nHouses, Shops. etc. in Bazaar Kot,\n\nSambhal.\n\nKeshopur Bhindi.\n\nTatarpor<'. Ghosi.\n\nHalf Bilalpat.\n\nQumharwala Bagh.\n\nJY55\n\nSa/111 Madho Das\n\nand other.<\n\nPandit Makand Ram and tuwthrr\n\nBoseJ.\n\nJ.955\n\nSahu .hfadlio Das\n\nand others\n\n' P1111dit Mukand &nn a11d u11otlter\n\nBos11, J.\n\nMaha Devi.\n\nShehzadi Serai.\n\nHouses, shops, etc. in Sherkhan Serai, Sam b ha l.\n\nGuretha.\n\nBehrampur Half Bilalpat.\n\nMahmud Khan Serai.\n\nHouses. etc. in Kot.\n\nGrove \"in Alam Serai\n\nThe plaintiff also admits that the grandsons got some properties but does not give details. All he says is that they were given properties \"for purposes of performance of 'shradh' and pilgrimage to Gaya\".\n\nNext, we have a Jong series of alienations by different members of the family with claims to absolute ownership which could only have sprung from titles derived either from a gift from. Pato or from a family settlement.. We say \"family settlemeJ1t\" because we know now that the bulk of the property (and according to the High Court the whole of it) was Nanak Chand's. We also know that some of it was purchased by Pato after Nanak Chand's death from the income of the estate. Pato .had the right to purchase properties for herself if she wanted instead of adding them to her husband's estate and we know she claimed title to the whole as an absokite owner in\n\n1864. This claim may have been due to a mistaken view of Hindu Jaw that in the absence of sons the widow gets an absolute estate, or it may have been due to other reasons. but that she made the claim is clear, and the subsequent conduct and statements of the family show that they either ad\"mitted the correctness of he.r claim and accepted the properties as gifts from her or they agreed to and acted on a family settlement to avoid disputes on the basis that each got an absolute title to whatever properties fell to his or her share at the time of the division:\n\nThe grandsons were minors at the time and were not parties to this arrangelncnt, whatever its origin, and of course the widow and daughters could not enlarge their limited estates so as to bind the grandsons\n\n~; ;\n\n---~· ------· 2 s.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . 33\n\n\\I ' however much they agreed among themselves.· But for the moment we are notconsideringthelegal effect of whatever the arrangement was but whether the conduct of the family gives rise to an inference that there was an arrangement in fact.\n\nA family arrangement can, as a matter of law, be implied from a long course of dealings between the parties: Clifton v.\n\nCockburn(') and William v.\n\nWilliam('); and we have such a course of dealing here.\n\nFirst, there is a lo.ng series of alienations by Har Devi stretching from 1877 down to 1916. \\Ve tabulate them below with the recitals she made .!I bout her title.\n\n17-1-77 Jiiortgage - Q17tabpur Amawti \"owned by fil0\"c--Ex~ LL-1 (C.A. 94) 11-1-78 do do Owner: \"devolved on me from my Ex. 2Jl (C.A. m) mother\". 20-3-81 do do Owner: \"right of Ex. 2Hl (C, A. 91) do do inheritance from my father\". 7-9-83 Sale.\n\nLa1pur Owner: \"\"right of\n\ninheritance\"~ - :; Ex. 2Gl (C.A. 91) 23-8-87 ]Iortgage - Qutabpur Amawti No recital Ex.L\n\n(C.A. 92) 15-7-05 do do Absolute owner with Ka.nhaiya Lal and ?iiukand\n\nEx. BB-1 (C.A. 94)\n\nRam; .. 19-11-08 do do No recital Ex. M-1(C.A.94)\n\n14-11-U do do do Ex.V\n\n(C.A. 9_•) 23-3-15 do do Owner: with Ex.X\n\n(C.A. 92) liiukand Ram 17-2-16 do do . \\Vi th Mukand Ex. N-1 (C.A. 9.1) Ram. No recital 28-3-16 do do 0\\\\-\"ller: with -1.Iukand Ram and hiS son RamGopal\n\nEx. MMl (C.A. 9')\n\n22-1-18 do Behrampur Owner: with Ex. DDD-1(C.A.91) Buzurg !IIukand Ram and Bhukan Saran 23-3-18 do do Owner: with Ex. Ml (C.A. 91) liiukand Ram and Pyare Lal It will be observed that Har Devi sometimes claimed to be absolute owner by.right of inheritance from her father and at others from her mother in respect of the same village, but whichever way it was,\n\n(1) [1834] 3 My. & K. 76. (2)·[1866] L.R. 2 Ch. 294.\n\nSahu Aiadho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPandit Aiukattd Rani and another\n\nB.oseJ.\n\nSahu Mad/to Das\n\nand others V, Pandit M11kaud Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\nthe claim to absolute. ownership was consistent throughout. This could only be referable to a family settlement where the origin of the property was in doubt but which was settled by bestowing, or purporting to bestow, an absolute estate on the daughters.\n\nIt will also be noticed that in later years Har Devi joined with Mukand Ram but still claimed an absolute .estate along with him. This was for the following reason: Soon after Mukand Ram attained majority, the mother and sons quarrelled. On 11-2-1890 they referred their dispute to arbitration, Ex. RR-1 (C.A. 94).\n\nMukand Ram became a major in 1890 and Kaqhaiya Lal in 1884. t appears from their agreement of 11-2-1890 that Har Devi claimed an absolute title while her sons said she was only a limited owner.\n\nBut the sons agreed to accept a decision to the effect that she had an absolute estate in the whole of the property in dispute between them should the arbitrator so decide.\n\nThe properties were-\n\nQutabpur Amawti, Shakerpore; Houses, shops, etc. in Mohalla Kot in Sa111bhal.\n\nAnother significant thing is that in this document both mother and sons agreed that all of Nanak Chand's grandsons then in being were in separate possession and absolutely entitled to certain other properties which they expressly agreed were not to form the subject-matter of the arbitration. Here again, these titles could only be referable to a family arrangement, for the grandsons could not have got an absolute estate in any other way; nor could Har Devi. Mukand Ram tells us as P.W. 11 (C.A. 91) that he and his brother Kanhaiya Lal got Shakerpore and some shops in Bazar Kot, Sambhal, as a result' of this arbitration, but does not say what happened to Qutabpur Amawti.\n\nBut it i~ significant that Har Devi's dealings with Qutabpur Amawti after this date were all jointly with Kanhaiya Lal and f\\:'lu~nd Ram. It may be that the arbitrator awarded 1t imntly or they agreed to hold it on that basis. We do not know. All we know is that they mortgaged it jointly.\n\nBehrampur fell to Mukand Ram's share and in the mortgage or the property in 1918 Har Devi joined with M nkand Ram and Murari Lal's son Bhukan Saran in one case and with Pyare Lal in the other.\n\nBut except for the last two mortgages of J 918 the conduct of Har Devi and her sons for 39 years from 1877 to 1916 as disclosed in these deeds is only consistent with the family arrangement which the defendants allege. for on no other hypothesis could either the mother or the sons have laid claim to an absolute estate.\n\nWe will next turn to Durga Devi. She died in 1888 but before she died she mortgaged Keshopur Bhindi which had fallen to her share on 3-3-1887 bv Ex.U-1\n\nIC.A. 93) and claimed to he the owner. -\n\nThen there is Maha Devi. The only direct evidence we have of her conduct is a written statement that she filed in O.S. 177 /97, Ex. 2BI (C.A. 91). She asserted there on 5-1-1898 that she had been in proprietary possession and occupation of her dividd share of the property obtained by her from lier mother ut1der a deed of will. The circumstances in which she made this statement are to be found in the judgment in that suit, Ex. GI IC.A. 91).\n\nThe suit was by Har Devi against her sister and a transferee who claimed title through the other sister Durga Devi. Har Devi's allegation was that Durga Devi had mortgaged Keshopur Bhindi and Tatarpore Ghosi on 3-3-87. The mortgagee sued on his deed and obtained a decree for sale. In execution of the decree he purchased the properties himself.\n\nDurga Devi died in 1888 and Har Devi claimed that Durga Devi had only a limited estate and that Maha Devi and herself were entitled to the properties by survivorship.\n\nMaha Devi refused to support her sister and took up the position that each sister, or at any rate that she, Maha Devi, got an absolute estate in the property that came to her and of which she was placed in separate possession. from Pata. On 16-12-10 Maha Devi mortgaged Behrampur Buzurg and claimed that it belonged to her. being property left to her by her mothe.r in which no one ele had any rights. The deed\n\nSalm Madho Das\n\nand otbers\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSahu Madho Das and others\n\nPandit M11ka11d Ran1 and a1101 !ter\n\nBoseJ.\n\nis Ex. BB-I (C.A. 9JJ. On 2-7-11 she sold Bilalpat and claimed to be its exclusive propretor, Ex. R-1 <C.A. 93).\n\nWe now come to two statements made tw Har Devi a11d Maha Devi as witnesses in that suit. Strong exception was taken to their admissibility because the plaintiff was not a party to the earlier litigation.\n\nIt is a moot .Point whether they would be admissible under section 32(3) of the Evidence Act, but we need not decide that because we do not intend to 11sc them as proof of the truth of the facts stated in them.\n\nBut they are, in our view, admissible to show the conduct of these two ladies. The conduct of the various members of the family is relevant to show that their actings, viewed as a whole, suggest the existence of the family arrangement on which the defendants rely.\n\nAt this distance of time gaps in evidence that would otherwise be available have to be filled in from inferences that would normallv have little but corroborative value. But circumstanced as we are, inferences from the conduct of the family is all that can reasonably be expected in proof of an arrangement said tu have been made in I ~75. The statements that Har Devi and Maha Devi made as witnesses are\" therefore as relevant as recitals made by them in deeds and statements made by them in pleadings. They do not in themselves prove the fact in issue, namely the family arrangement, because, in the absence of section 32< 3), they are not admissible for that purpose. but as their conduct is relevant these statements are admissible as evidence of that conduct.\n\nMaha Devi's statement is Ex. 2-A I IC.A. 911 and Har Devi's Ex.\n\n2-F I IC.A. 91 ).\n\nBoth speak of an arrangement effected by Pato in her life time and say .that they entered into separate possession of the properties by reason of that arrangement. Har Devi says in. addition that the grandsons were included in the arrangement and given properties too. Therefore. we know that this is the title under which each claimed to hold in O.S. No. 177197. It is proof of their a'-5crtion of this title at that early date and though it is no proof of the truth of those assertions it is proof of the\n\nfact that the assertions were made and that is all we need at the moment.\n\nWe turn next to the conduct of the grandsons, and first we will consider the plaintiff Mukand Ram and his brother Kanhaiya Lal. The plaintiff attained majority in 1890 and from that date down to 1921 we have a series of assertions of a title that can only spring from the family arrangement.\n\nFirst, we have the deed of 11-2-90. Ex. RR-I (C.A. 94) which we have alreadv considered in connection with Har Devi.\n\nThis is the agreement between his brother and himself on the one hand and Har Devi on the other to refer their dispute to arbitration. We have already commented on the fact that the two brothers asserted an absolute title to propertie5 that were in their possession and acknowledged the absolute title of Pyare Lal and Shyam Lal to the properties of which they were possessed. The only dispute they were prepared to submit to arbitration was about the properties in Har Devi's possession and there, they were prepared to accept a decision upholding Har Devi's claim to an absolute estate.\n\nAfter this came the following dealings:\n\n20-11-91 Sle Shahzadi Sarai\n\n28-7-93 S1lc Dugawar\n\n2-7-96 Mortg:ige Qntabpur\n\n30-1-00 Sale\n\nAn1awn\n\nBazar Mahmud Khan Sarai. Samrhal\n\n15-7-05 Mortgage QJabpJr ·\n\nAmawfi\n\nr,. -RSCl./ND.182\n\nProprietary pos- Ex. 2 Kl (C.A. 91) session \"devolved on us by right of\n\ninheriance from Pato\"\n\nProprietary pos- Ex. 2 El (C.A. 91) session \"by right of inheritance\".\n\n\"anc9stral and Ex.KK-1 (C.A. 94) purchased by us\". \"POS(}essed by us ..... without tlte part icipar ion of anybody else\".\n\n\"Proprietary pos- Ex. U (C.A. 92) session \"by \"right of inheritance\": \"without the participation of anyone else\".\n\no.vners:wi'h Har Ex. BB-I (C.A. 94) Dev; \"without the part; cipat ion of any one else\".\n\nSahu Madho Das and others\n\n•• Pandit Mukand Ram and anotha\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSahu Madho Dtlf\\\n\nand other.\\'\n\nPandir Mukand Ra111 and a11nr/1er\n\nnose J.\n\nKanhaiya Lal died about this time and thereafter Mukand Ram continued to make transfers claiming to do so in his own right.\n\nHe made the following along with Har Devi. We have already analysed them.\n\nThey were-·\n\n19-11-08 14-11-14 23-3- 15 17-2- 16 28-3- 16 22-1- 18 2:>-3- 18\n\nEx.MI Ex.V Ex.X Ex.N-l Ex.MM I Ex.DODI Ex.Ml\n\n(C.A.94)\n\n!C.A.92)\n\n(C.A.92)\n\n(C.A.94)\n\n(C.A.94)\n\n\\C.A.91)\n\n1C.A.91)\n\nBut in addition to these he made the following transfers on his own : 18-i-l 6 &\\le Lc\\shkarpur Absolu!c owner.\n\nEx. PP-I\n\n<C.A. 94) 24-4-22 Sale Houc:s, etc. do Ex. Y\n\n(C.A. 92) jn San1bhal 23-11-22 Sale Qu!abpur An1aw1 i do Ex.Q\n\n(C.A. 92)\n\nNext, we come to Shyam Lal. His alienations were as follows: 19-6-97 Mortgage. 9-11-07 do 17-9-09 do\n\nShops in Sambhal. Owner.\n\nEx. W-1 House in Sambhal. No rcci1al Ex. TT-J Bila/pat. do Ex. UU-1\n\n(C.A. 94)\n\n(C.A. 94)\n\n(C.A. 94)\n\nIn addition, he made the following transfers jointly with his brother Pyare Lal:\n\n18-1-06 Mortgage.\n\nBilalpat & shops No rlcitals. Ex. fEE-1\n\n(C.A. 94) in San1bhal. 21-2-10 do Bilalpat & Sabz do Ex. AA-1\n\nIC.A. 94)\n\nPyare Lal also made two transfers on his own--\n\n23-9-18 Sale llilalpat. \"Devolved on Ex. 15\n\n(C.A.94) me\" from Nanak. Chand by righ'. of inheritance 2.1.20 do do do Ex. 18.\n\n(C.A. 91)\n\nLastly, there is Bhukhan Saran, who is Maha Devi's daughter's son. He transferred as follows:\n\n26-3-18 Sale Houscs,.c:c. in Absolute and S'ln1bhal. exclusive Ex. MM-I\n\n(C.A. 92) owner. 9-1-21 RclinQuishmcnt.\n\nHilalpa! do Ex. DD-1\n\n(C.A. 93)\n\nThese documents disclose a long line of conduct on the part of the various members of the family and show that from 1877 down to 1922 each dealt with the properties in his or her possession as absolute\n\nowner and set up exclusive proprietary title to the properties transferred.\n\nIt is true the source of title was not consistently stated, sometimes it was said to be Pato and at others Nanak Chand. but the assertion to a separate, exclusive and absolute tit!(! in each is common all through.\n\nThere is only one way in which they could have got these exclusive titles and that is by a family arrangement, for whether the proparty was Nanak Chand's or whether it was Pato's in neither event could any one of the these persons have obtained an absolute estate on the dates with which we are concerned : the grandsons, because the reversion had not opened out; the daughters because, either way, they would only be limited owners under the Hindu law. But if there was a family arrangement assented to by the daughters and later accepted and acted on by the sons when they attained majority, their claim to separate and independent absolute titles is understandable.\n\nIt does not matter whether the claims were well founded in law because what we are considering at the moment is not the legal effect of the arrangement but whether there was one in fact.\n\nNow, in spite of all these dealings, the conduct of Har Devi and Mukand Ram and Kanhaiya Lal was not always consistent.\n\nThey were greedy and while insisting that they be allowed to hold on to what they had got, they wanted to snatch more if and when they could. The ball started rolling in 1890 as soon as Mukand Ram attained majority. There was the reference to arbitration in that year to settle their dispute with their mother Har Devi. But even there. there was the inconsistency regarding their own properties to which we have already referred.\n\nMukand Ram's later explanation in the witness box that they got those properties for :,/1radh purposes and for a pilgrimage to Gaya cannot be believed. ·\n\nNext, ther.e was the suit by Mukand Ram and Kanhaiya Lal against their aunt Maha Devi in 1895: S. No. 21I1895. Ex. 31 fC. A. 91). That was occasioned by two sales by Maha Devi on 19-2-83 and 20-5-85.\n\nShe stoutly maintained tli<t she had an absolute title.\n\nSahu Madho Du>\n\n<111d others ' v.\n\nPu11di1 M11ku11d Ram and wrother\n\nBoscJ.\n\n1955 The litigation had a chequered career and ultimately Sahu Madho Das the suit was dismissed as barred by time.\n\nand fl/hers\n\nV, Pundit Mukand Ra1n and another\n\nBose J.\n\nNext came suit No. 177 of 1897, Ex. GI (C.A. 91), in which Har Devi sued Maha Devi and a transferee.\n\nThis time it was to set aside an alienation by Durga Devi, Durga Devi then being dead. Her Devi clainied that the property was Nanak Chand 's and that the daughters were limited owners.\n\nBut again Maha Devi stood by the family arrangement and asserted an absolute title in all the daughters; Ex. 2B I (C.A. 91).\n\nWe have seen that Har Devi entered the box and admitted the arrangement: Ex. 2F-l IC.A. 91J.\n\nThe suit very naturally failed, but the result of the litigation is nor relevant because the plaintiff was not a party.\n\nWhat we are examining is the conduct of Har Devi.\n\nIn 1913 Har Devi tried again after Maha Devi's death, this time against alienees from Maha Devi.\n\nThis is the suit that went up to the Privy Council.\n\nMst. Hardei v. Bhagwan Singh ('). She failed again.\n\nHaving failed against Maha Devi in the 1897 litigation, Har Devi next tried her luck against Maha Devi's grandson (daughter's son) Bhukhan Saran, after Maha Devi's death. The suit is O.S. 52/ 14, Ex.\n\n78 (C.A. 94).\n\nThis time she succeeded with respect to some items and failed as regards the rest.\n\nBut again the result is irrelevant : Exs. 6 and 8 (C.A. 94).\n\nNow what we are examining at the moment is whether Shyam Lal, D.W. I in C.A. 94, is to be believed when he says that Mukand Ram, among others. told him about the family arrangement under which Pato had divided all her property between h .. r daughters and their sons. It is evident from what we have said above that Mukand Ram had been consistently asserting such a title for 3 J years from J 891 to J 922 despite his aberrations in 1890 and 1895.\n\nIn particular he did this whene.,.er he wanted to borrow money or to sell property: and he makes a si!!niflcant admission in the witness box as P.W. 11 in C.A. 91 that- -\n\n(I) A.T.R. 1919 P.C. 27.\n\n\"In the mortgage or sale of the property over which Mst. Har Devi was in possession none of her sisters or sisters' sons joined. Similarly, in the sale or transfer of the property that came to Durga Devi, none of her sisters or other sisters' sons joined\".\n\nHe also admits that there was a division and separate possession from 1876. He says that it was for convenience of management and says that it was after Pato's death, but in view of the mass of evidence that we have just analysed, we think it far more likely that he told Shyam Lal just what Shyam Lal says he did. After all, he was borrowing money from Shyam Lal on each of these occasions; so there is every reasons to believe that he would have told Shyam Lal what he had so repeatedly asserted to his other transferees. We accordingly believe Shyam Lal.\n\nThat at once shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff, and what is his explanation.? First, a division of the estate for convenience of management (but that does not explain the long chain of unchallenged transfers bar Har Devi's efforts in four cases); and second, that the grandsons got property absolutely for the purposes of shradh and pilgrimage: (n explanation which we disbelieve). We are therefore left with the plaintiff's admission to Shyam Lal and that admission, coupled with the conduct and actings of the family, firmly establishes the family arrangement. We accordingly hold that, whether the property belonged to Pato or to Nanak Chand, Pato claimed an absolute right which the daughters acknowledged, and in return they and their sons were given separate and absolute estates in separate portions of the property immediately.\n\nThis arrangement bound the daughters because they were parties to it and received good consideration. But so far as the sons are concerned, they were minors at that time and were not parties to this arrangement, for no one suggests that they were represented guardians who entered into it on their\n\n;:.1 behalf.\n\nTherefore. the properties they received were so fnr as they arc c1)11cerned, gifts pure and simple\n\nSalm Madho Das\n\nand otlrcr.1\n\nPandit M11k and Ram and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSah11 Madho Das\n\nand. ot/u:n;\n\nPa11di1 Muka11d Ra111 and Cl11other\n\nBose J.\n\n(rom Palo with the assent or her daughters. It dot:s not matter whether the properties were Palo's exclusive properties or whether they came to her from her husband because, either way, the title to the properties resided in her and she was the only person competent to pass it on to another. If her title was absolute. the sons got absolute estates. If it was the limited title of a Hindu widow. they obtained a limited title good during her life, and. as the daughters consented to the gifts and obtained properties for themselves as a result of the arrangement that resulted in these liifts, thf'y would not be permitted to question the gifts; and the Privy Council so held in Har Devi's suit against the aliences from Maha Devi: fl.1st. Hardei v.\n\nBhagwan Si11gh (').\n\nBut so far as the grandsons are concerned, !he' mere fact that each received a separ<1te gift from Pato at a time when they were not competent to assent or to dissent would not i11 itself bind them. To achieve that result, there would have to be something more; and it is to that something more that we will now direct our attention.\n\nBut before doing that, we will pause to distinguish Rani Mewa Kuwar v. Rani Hulas Kuwar ('); Klwnni Lal v. Gohind Krish11a Narain ('), and Ramsumra11 Prasad v. Shyam Kumari('). It is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person recefving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person rece1v111g the property under the arrangement hijd always_ resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his .or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is\n\n(I) A.LR. 1919P.C. 27.\n\n(2) [1874111.A.157. 166.\n\n(3) [1911) 38 I.A. 87, 102.\n\n(4) [1922.149 J.A. 3-!2, 348.\n\nnecessary.\n\nBut, in our opinon. the principle can be carried further and so strongly do the Courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all. that we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement under which one set of members d1andons all claim to all title and interest in all the properties in dispute and acknowledges that the sole and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of their number <provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such an assertion of title) and are content to take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a conveyance for consideration when consideration is present.\n\nThe legal position .in such a case would he this.\n\nThe arrangement or compnimise would set out and define that the title claimed by A to all the properties in dispute was his absolute title as claimed and asserted by him and that it had always resided in him. Next. it would effect a transfer hy A to B, C and D (the other members to the arrangement) of properties X. Y and Z; and thereafter B. C and D would hold their respective titles under the title derived from A.\n\nBut in that event. the formalities of law about the passing of title by transfer would have to be observed. and how either registration or twelve years adverse possession would be necessary. But in the present case. we are dealing with an arrangement made in 1875 at a time when the Transfer of Property Act was not in force and no writing was required; and, as there is no writing, the Registration Act does not apply either. Therefore. the oral arrangement of 1875 would be sufficient to pass title in this way and that, in our opinion. is what happened.\n\nBut these rules only apply to the parties to the settlement and to those who claim through or under them. They cannot be applied to the minor sons who were not parties either personally or through their guardians and who do not claim title either through\n\n/955\n\nSa/111 Madho Das\n\nand others\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and a11<>1/wr\n\nnose .f.\n\nSa/111 Madho Do.~\n\nand otht•rJ\n\nPandit M11ka11d Ra111 and a1101hrr\n\nBose.I.\n\nPata or her daughters. So far as they are concerned. what they received were gifts pure and simple and the only assent that could be inferred from mere acceptance of the gift and nothing more would be asset _to that particular gift and not assent to the gifts s11111larly made to others; and for this reason.\n\nWhen Mukand Ram attained majority he had two titles to choose from. One from Pata as a limited owner coupled with the assent of the daughters to her gift to him.\n\nIn that case, he would hold a limited estate till the reversion opened out. The gift would be good during Palo's life time because she had that title to convey, and thereafter, till the three daughters died, because they assented to it and obtained considerable benefit for themselves from the transaction out of which it arose.\n\nThe other title would be an absolute one on the basis that Pata ws the absolute owner of the properties.\n\nThat title could only be referable to the family arrangement, and if Mukand Ram, knowing the facts, assented to the arrangement ex post facto, he will be precluded from challenging it for reasons which we shall now explain.\n\nIf the properties were Nan.ak Chand's, which is the assumption on which we are deciding this case, then Pata was a limited owner under the Hindu law, but as such she represented the estate and any title she conveyed, whether by gift or otherwise, would not be void; it would cinly be voidable. It would be good as against all the world except the reversioner who succeeded when the reversion opened out and he is the only person who would have the right to avoid it; and it would continue to be good until he chose to avoid it. Therefore, if he does not avoid it, or is precluded from doing so, either because of the law of limitation or by his own conduct, or for any other rl'!ason, then no one else can challenge it; and the law is that once a reversioner has given his assent to an alienation, whether at the time, or as a par.t of the transaction, or later as a distinct and separate act, he is bound though others may not be, and having given his assent he cannot go back on it to the detriment of other persons; all the more so when he himself receives a\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE'\\1£ COURT REPORTS 45\n\nbenefit: see Raia /14odll// S11d1111 Singh v. Rook.('('); Bi joy 001111/ v. I\\. rish110(). ; rnd Rmngo11da A 1111ago11da\n\nv. Bhausahehc'). Lcird Sinha. delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in the l11st of these three cases, said at page 402: -·-\n\n''It is sett.led law that an alienation by a widow i11 excess of her powers is not altogether void but only voidable by the reversioners. who may either singly or as a body be precluded from exercising their right to avoid it either by express ratification or hy acts\n\nwhich treat it as rnlid or hinding\".\n\nThis was followed in Dlii_ram Singh v. fugal Kishore(')\n\nthough the ground of that decision was estoppel. \\Ve are now founding on another principle which is not grounded on estoppel and which. indeed. is not peculiar to Hindu law.\n\nEstoppel is rule of' evidence which prevents a party from alleging and proving the truth. Here the plaintiff is not shut out from asserting anything. We are assuming in his favour that Pato had only a life estate and we are examining at length his assertion that he did not assent to the family arrangement. .The principle we ar€? applying is therefore not estoppel. It is a rule underlying many branches of the law which precludes a person who, with full knowledge of his rights, has once elected to assent to a transaction voidable at his instance and has thus elected not to exercise his right to avoid it. from going back on that and avoiding it at later stage. Having made his election he is hound by it.\n\nSo far as the Hindu Law is concerned, Lord Dunedin explained in Rangaswami Gounden v. NacMappa Goundenfl. a case in which a widow gifted properties to her nephew, that thouh the reversioner is not called upon to exercise his right to avoid until the reversion falls in and so on assent can be inferred from mere inaction prior to the death or deaths of the limited owner or owners. he is not bound to wait and \"of course something might be done even before\n\n(I) [1891] 24 I.A. 164. 169.\n\n<2) [1906] 34 I.A. 87.\n\n(!!) [19271 54 LA. 396..\n\n(4) 1952 S.C.R. 478, 488.\n\n(5) [1918) 46 T. A. 72, 86, R7. 7-8 SCI/ND/Si\n\nSalm Madho Das and others v.\n\nPandit MukanN Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\n/955\n\nSahu Madho Das\n\nand others\n\nPandit Mukcuul Ra111 and another\n\nHo.e J.\n\n46 SUPREf\\IF COURT REPORTS [ l 955]\n\nthat time which amounted tn an actual election to hold the deed gpod --..\n\nRamgouda case I') is an illustration of what that something can be, for there the assent was given by the ultimate reversioner heforc he became in tiru/o to alienations by a widow. one of which was a gift.\n\nThe present case is another illustration. For the reasons we have given and which we shall now further examine, we hold that the plaintiff. who is in rirulo now that the succession has opened out. unequivocally assented to the arrangement with full knowledge of the facts and accepted benefit under it. therefore. he is now precluded from avoiding it and any attempts he made to go behind that assent when it suited his purpose cannot render the assent once given nugatory even though it was given when he was not i11 1it11lo and even though the assent was to a series of gifts.\n\nThe reai question is whether the plaintiff assented to the family arrangement. and as the plaintiff was not a party to the arrangement his assent to the arrangement itself, and not to something else. :nust be clearly established. and also his knowled!.!e of the facts. But we think they have been.\n\nJn the first place. there was the express assent in 1 ~NO to the gifts made to the other grandsons on the basis that each grandson got an absolute estate.\n\nNext. there was the long course ofdealings by Kanhaiva Lal and Mukhand Ram in which they asserted absolute titles. Mukand Ram tells us in the witness box a<; P. W. 11 IC.A. 91) that Kanhaiya Lal was the karta of the joint family to which Mukand Ram belonged. therefore Kanhaiya Lal's dealings with the properties which he and his brother held under a joint and undivided title are also relevant as thev will bind Mukand Ram. And lastly, there is Mukad Ram's representation to Shyam Lal 10.W. 1 iii C.A. 94) which leaves us in no doubt about his knowledge. The cumulative effect of this course of conduct leads to a rnasonable inference that Kanhaiya Lal and Mukhand Ram were holding. not on the basis of a separate Rnd individual gift made by a life owner with the assent of the next set of life\n\n(I) [ 1927] 54 I A 396. 402.\n\nowners, but on the basis of the family arran, sement 1955 which was one composite whole in which the several Salm Madho Das dispositions formed parts of the same transaction and others under 'which Mukand Ram himself acquired a part of Pandit M11ka11d the estate: see Ramgouda v. Bhausaheb(').\n\nWe are Ram and another therefore satisfied that the plaintiff's assent was to BoseJ. this very arrangement; and that concludes both cases.\n\nJn C.A. 94/ 50 there is, in addition, a direct personal estoppel aginst the plaintiff. The transfers that are challenged there are sales of 23-9-18 and 25-11-19 made hy fll'o of the grandsons, one personally and the other by the guardian, but the relevant dates for the purposes of the estoppel are later because the representation in this case was not made to the immediate transferees hut to the llrst defendant who obtained title to the rroperties at a later date, in one case by a sale from the immediate transferee, in the other by pre-emption. But the exact dates do not matter because the rerresentation to the first defendant was made in 1910 before the first defendant's purchases.\n\nIt was made by Kanhaiya Lal and Mukand Ram as well as by other members of the famtly. We have already referred to the first defendant's evidence. This case would therefore be governed by Dhiyan Singh v . .fugal Kishor<'i') in any event. But we need not elaborate this further because of the other principle which, in our opinion. is sufficient to dispose of both the present cases.\n\n, The result is that both appeals are allowed. The decrees of the High Court are set aside and those of the first Court dismissing the plaintiff's claims in those suits out of which Civil Appeals 92 and 94 of 1950 arise_ are restored. Costs here and in the High Court will be paid by the rlaintiff-respondent but there will be only one set of costs and they will he divided half and half between the two sets of appellants.\n\n(I 1 [ 19271 54 IA W6, 402.\n\n(2J 195~ S.C.R. 478.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 127, "entities": [{"text": "SAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE' B. JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 170, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2833, "end_char": 2857, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2936, "end_char": 2952, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "LR. 1 I.A. 157", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4785, "end_char": 4799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "LR. 49 I.A. 348", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4898, "end_char": 4913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 34 I.A. 87", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "LR. 54 I.A. 396", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5069, "end_char": 5084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "LR. 46 I.A. 72", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5194, "end_char": 5208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cl 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5263, "end_char": 5268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sahu Madho Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5310, "end_char": 5324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\n1955 -- Sahu Madho Das\n\nand' others v.\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\nAppeals from the Judgments and Decrees dated the 20th March 1942 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal Nos.", "canonical_name": "SAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Pandit Mukand Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5341, "end_char": 5358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\n1955 -- Sahu Madho Das\n\nand' others v.\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\nAppeals from the Judgments and Decrees dated the 20th March 1942 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal Nos.", "canonical_name": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterji, (S. S. Shukla with him) for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5815, "end_char": 5827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterji, (S. S. Shukla with him) for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Gopi Nath Kunzru", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5859, "end_char": 5875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopi Nath Kunzru, (B. P. Maheshwari with him) for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5878, "end_char": 5894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopi Nath Kunzru, (B. P. Maheshwari with him) for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5928, "end_char": 5942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. C. Agarwala, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6058, "end_char": 6062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBOSE J.-These appeals arise out of two suits which were heard together along with two other suits with which we are not now concerned.", "canonical_name": "BOSE"}}, {"text": "Mukand Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6527, "end_char": 6537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, Mukand Ram, is common to all four cases.", "canonical_name": "Mukhand Ram"}}, {"text": "Pandit Nanak Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6615, "end_char": 6633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He sues in each suit as the reversioner to one Pandit Nanak Chand who was his maternal grandfather."}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6709, "end_char": 6720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Chand d. 23-7-56 'V: l\\Ist.", "canonical_name": "Nan.ak Chand"}}, {"text": "Kanhaiya Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7102, "end_char": 7114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanhaiya Lal (Dead)\n\nI l\\Iukand Ram\n\n(Plff.", "canonical_name": "Kanhaiya Lal"}}, {"text": "Pa1uiit Muka11d Rani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7347, "end_char": 7367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t 0 • c (Ii t::r ;; ; t ti ~ 11o ..\n\nt,:) 00 9 ~\n\n00 ~ t.'rj .... ,... t.'rj .a g\n\n~ ~\n\n~ ~\n\nSahu fl, fadho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPa1uiit Muka11d Rani and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSUPRFME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nThe plaintiff's case is."}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7494, "end_char": 7505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the properties in the four suits belonged to Nanak Chand who died on 23-7-1856 leaving a widow Mst.", "canonical_name": "Nan.ak Chand"}}, {"text": "Maha Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7575, "end_char": 7584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato and three daughters, Maha Devi, Durga Devi and Har Devi.", "canonical_name": "Maha Devi"}}, {"text": "Durga Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7586, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato and three daughters, Maha Devi, Durga Devi and Har Devi."}}, {"text": "Har Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7601, "end_char": 7609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato and three daughters, Maha Devi, Durga Devi and Har Devi.", "canonical_name": "Har Devi"}}, {"text": "10-9-1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7874, "end_char": 7883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff's rights as reversioner accrued on Har Devi's death on\n\n10-9-1919."}}, {"text": "8-9-1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8004, "end_char": 8012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suits were filed on 8-9-1931."}}, {"text": "3-3-1887", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8107, "end_char": 8115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92 of 1950, the challenge is tu a mortgage effectt; d by Durga Devi on 3-3-1887 in favour of Sahu Bitthal Das."}}, {"text": "Sahu Bitthal Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8129, "end_char": 8145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92 of 1950, the challenge is tu a mortgage effectt; d by Durga Devi on 3-3-1887 in favour of Sahu Bitthal Das."}}, {"text": "23-9-1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8504, "end_char": 8513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first, dated 23-9-1918, was by Pyare Lal (son of Durga Devi) in favour of Shyam Lal, son of M ulchand.. (This is ncit the Sh yam Lal who was Pyare Lal's brother)."}}, {"text": "Pyare Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8522, "end_char": 8531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first, dated 23-9-1918, was by Pyare Lal (son of Durga Devi) in favour of Shyam Lal, son of M ulchand.. (This is ncit the Sh yam Lal who was Pyare Lal's brother).", "canonical_name": "Pyare Lal"}}, {"text": "Shyam Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first, dated 23-9-1918, was by Pyare Lal (son of Durga Devi) in favour of Shyam Lal, son of M ulchand.. (This is ncit the Sh yam Lal who was Pyare Lal's brother).", "canonical_name": "Sh yam Lal"}}, {"text": "M ulchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8583, "end_char": 8592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first, dated 23-9-1918, was by Pyare Lal (son of Durga Devi) in favour of Shyam Lal, son of M ulchand.. (This is ncit the Sh yam Lal who was Pyare Lal's brother)."}}, {"text": "Sh yam Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8613, "end_char": 8623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first, dated 23-9-1918, was by Pyare Lal (son of Durga Devi) in favour of Shyam Lal, son of M ulchand.. (This is ncit the Sh yam Lal who was Pyare Lal's brother).", "canonical_name": "Sh yam Lal"}}, {"text": "5-3-1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8729, "end_char": 8737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The vendee later sold the properties to the first and second defendants on 5-3-1927."}}, {"text": "Harbilas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8823, "end_char": 8831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the vendees, the first defendant, is yet another Shyam Lal: Shyam Lal son of Harbilas."}}, {"text": "Brij Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8856, "end_char": 8864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other sale was by Brij Lal's guardian on behalf of Brij Lal, \"Brij Lal then being a minor.", "canonical_name": "Brij Lal"}}, {"text": "25-11-1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8939, "end_char": 8949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on 25-11-1919 in favour of Chheda Lal."}}, {"text": "Chheda Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8963, "end_char": 8973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on 25-11-1919 in favour of Chheda Lal."}}, {"text": "Brijlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9327, "end_char": 9334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the second sale, the reversion had opened out but Brijlal heing more remote than the plaintiff got no title, so that sale is also bad.", "canonical_name": "Brij Lal"}}, {"text": "Pato", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9645, "end_char": 9649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato as part of her personal estate."}}, {"text": "22-1-1864", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9686, "end_char": 9695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22-1-1864 Mst."}}, {"text": "Kanhaiya Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10779, "end_char": 10791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato also gave properties to each of her four grandsons who were then Uving, namely Kanhaiya Lal, Mukand Ram, Banwari Lal and Sital Prasad.", "canonical_name": "Kanhaiya Lal"}}, {"text": "Mukand Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10793, "end_char": 10803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato also gave properties to each of her four grandsons who were then Uving, namely Kanhaiya Lal, Mukand Ram, Banwari Lal and Sital Prasad.", "canonical_name": "Mukhand Ram"}}, {"text": "Banwari Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10805, "end_char": 10816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato also gave properties to each of her four grandsons who were then Uving, namely Kanhaiya Lal, Mukand Ram, Banwari Lal and Sital Prasad."}}, {"text": "Sital Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10821, "end_char": 10833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato also gave properties to each of her four grandsons who were then Uving, namely Kanhaiya Lal, Mukand Ram, Banwari Lal and Sital Prasad."}}, {"text": "Sahu Madho Da", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11531, "end_char": 11544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Da\n\na11d others\n\nPandit M11ka11d Ram tmd anothe\n\nBo.<e .T.\n\nSah1l Madho Da.~\n\nand others\n\nPandit Mukand Ram aQl1 another\n\nB1HeJ.\n\nthe learned Judge found against the plaintiff.", "canonical_name": "SAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Pandit M11ka11d Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11559, "end_char": 11578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Da\n\na11d others\n\nPandit M11ka11d Ram tmd anothe\n\nBo.<e .T.\n\nSah1l Madho Da.~\n\nand others\n\nPandit Mukand Ram aQl1 another\n\nB1HeJ.\n\nthe learned Judge found against the plaintiff.", "canonical_name": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Shyam Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15116, "end_char": 15125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The direct evidence on this point is that of Shyam Lal (D.W. I in C.A. 94 '50) and the first defendant there."}}, {"text": "Pandit M11k1111d Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15739, "end_char": 15759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pato had given the proper.ty to her daughters and grandsons ......... I am illiterate and Kanhaiya Lal brother of Mukand Ram had the deed of will read over to me at\n\n5-8 SCT/ND/82\n\nSahu Madho Das and others v.\n\nPandit M11k1111d Ram and 01101/wr\n\nBo.,", "canonical_name": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kanhaiya Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16448, "end_char": 16460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the truth of his assertion that the plaintiff Mukand Ram and Kanhaiya Lal, and other members of the family, told him that Mst.", "canonical_name": "Kanhaiya Lal"}}, {"text": "Pyare Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17570, "end_char": 17579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before .doing that we will advert to another member of the family, Pyare Lal, who wa's examined as a witness (0.W. 17) in C.A. 92/50."}}, {"text": "Mukand Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19127, "end_char": 19137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we have the statement of Mukand Ram in the witness box (P.W. 11 in C.A. 91/ 50) that on Pa to 's death her daughters took separate possession of the properties in the following villages and towns:\n\nHar Devi\n\nDurga Devi."}}, {"text": "Qutabpur Amawti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19349, "end_char": 19364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qutabpur Amawti.", "canonical_name": "Qutabpur Amawti"}}, {"text": "Bos11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19677, "end_char": 19682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<\n\nPandit Makand Ram and tuwthrr\n\nBoseJ.\n\nJ.955\n\nSahu .hfadlio Das\n\nand others\n\n' P1111dit Mukand &nn a11d u11otlter\n\nBos11, J.\n\nMaha Devi."}}, {"text": "Maha Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19688, "end_char": 19697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<\n\nPandit Makand Ram and tuwthrr\n\nBoseJ.\n\nJ.955\n\nSahu .hfadlio Das\n\nand others\n\n' P1111dit Mukand &nn a11d u11otlter\n\nBos11, J.\n\nMaha Devi.", "canonical_name": "Maha Devi"}}, {"text": "Shehzadi Serai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19700, "end_char": 19714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shehzadi Serai."}}, {"text": "Mahmud Khan Serai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19805, "end_char": 19822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahmud Khan Serai."}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20067, "end_char": 20071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All he says is that they were given properties \"for purposes of performance of 'shradh' and pilgrimage to Gaya\"."}}, {"text": "Bhukan Saran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22998, "end_char": 23010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IIukand Ram and Bhukan Saran 23-3-18 do do Owner: with Ex.", "canonical_name": "Bhukhan Saran"}}, {"text": "Sahu Aiadho Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23337, "end_char": 23352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Aiadho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPandit Aiukattd Rani and another\n\nB.oseJ.\n\nSahu Mad/to Das\n\nand others V, Pandit M11kaud Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\nthe claim to absolute.", "canonical_name": "SAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Pandit Aiukattd Rani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23369, "end_char": 23389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Aiadho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPandit Aiukattd Rani and another\n\nB.oseJ.\n\nSahu Mad/to Das\n\nand others V, Pandit M11kaud Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\nthe claim to absolute."}}, {"text": "Pandit M11kaud Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23443, "end_char": 23461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Aiadho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPandit Aiukattd Rani and another\n\nB.oseJ.\n\nSahu Mad/to Das\n\nand others V, Pandit M11kaud Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\nthe claim to absolute.", "canonical_name": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23475, "end_char": 23479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Aiadho Das\n\nand others v.\n\nPandit Aiukattd Rani and another\n\nB.oseJ.\n\nSahu Mad/to Das\n\nand others V, Pandit M11kaud Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\nthe claim to absolute.", "canonical_name": "BOSE"}}, {"text": "11-2-1890", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23982, "end_char": 23991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11-2-1890 they referred their dispute to arbitration, Ex."}}, {"text": "Kaqhaiya Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24095, "end_char": 24107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukand Ram became a major in 1890 and Kaqhaiya Lal in 1884.", "canonical_name": "Kanhaiya Lal"}}, {"text": "Sa111bhal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24515, "end_char": 24524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Mohalla Kot in Sa111bhal."}}, {"text": "Sambhal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25110, "end_char": 25117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukand Ram tells us as P.W. 11 (C.A. 91) that he and his brother Kanhaiya Lal got Shakerpore and some shops in Bazar Kot, Sambhal, as a result' of this arbitration, but does not say what happened to Qutabpur Amawti."}}, {"text": "Qutabpur Amawti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25187, "end_char": 25202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukand Ram tells us as P.W. 11 (C.A. 91) that he and his brother Kanhaiya Lal got Shakerpore and some shops in Bazar Kot, Sambhal, as a result' of this arbitration, but does not say what happened to Qutabpur Amawti.", "canonical_name": "Qutabpur Amawti"}}, {"text": "Behrampur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25496, "end_char": 25505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Behrampur fell to Mukand Ram's share and in the mortgage or the property in 1918 Har Devi joined with M nkand Ram and Murari Lal's son Bhukan Saran in one case and with Pyare Lal in the other."}}, {"text": "M nkand Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25598, "end_char": 25609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Behrampur fell to Mukand Ram's share and in the mortgage or the property in 1918 Har Devi joined with M nkand Ram and Murari Lal's son Bhukan Saran in one case and with Pyare Lal in the other."}}, {"text": "Murari Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25614, "end_char": 25624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Behrampur fell to Mukand Ram's share and in the mortgage or the property in 1918 Har Devi joined with M nkand Ram and Murari Lal's son Bhukan Saran in one case and with Pyare Lal in the other."}}, {"text": "S. 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26323, "end_char": 26329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5-1-1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26376, "end_char": 26384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She asserted there on 5-1-1898 that she had been in proprietary possession and occupation of her dividd share of the property obtained by her from lier mother ut1der a deed of will."}}, {"text": "Keshopur Bhindi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26824, "end_char": 26839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Har Devi's allegation was that Durga Devi had mortgaged Keshopur Bhindi and Tatarpore Ghosi on 3-3-87."}}, {"text": "Tatarpore Ghosi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26844, "end_char": 26859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Har Devi's allegation was that Durga Devi had mortgaged Keshopur Bhindi and Tatarpore Ghosi on 3-3-87."}}, {"text": "3-3-87", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26863, "end_char": 26869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Har Devi's allegation was that Durga Devi had mortgaged Keshopur Bhindi and Tatarpore Ghosi on 3-3-87."}}, {"text": "Pata", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27399, "end_char": 27403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from Pata."}}, {"text": "16-12-10", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27408, "end_char": 27416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16-12-10 Maha Devi mortgaged Behrampur Buzurg and claimed that it belonged to her."}}, {"text": "Salm Madho Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27579, "end_char": 27593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deed\n\nSalm Madho Das\n\nand otbers\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSahu Madho Das and others\n\nPandit M11ka11d Ran1 and a1101 !", "canonical_name": "Salm Madho Das"}}, {"text": "Sahu Madho Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27646, "end_char": 27660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deed\n\nSalm Madho Das\n\nand otbers\n\nPandit Mukand Ram and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSahu Madho Das and others\n\nPandit M11ka11d Ran1 and a1101 !", "canonical_name": "SAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "7-11", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27746, "end_char": 27750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2-7-11 she sold Bilalpat and claimed to be its exclusive propretor, Ex."}}, {"text": "section 32(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28096, "end_char": 28109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Har Devi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28875, "end_char": 28883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statements that Har Devi and Maha Devi made as witnesses are\" therefore as relevant as recitals made by them in deeds and statements made by them in pleadings."}}, {"text": "Maha Devi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28888, "end_char": 28897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statements that Har Devi and Maha Devi made as witnesses are\" therefore as relevant as recitals made by them in deeds and statements made by them in pleadings."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29128, "end_char": 29138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11-2-90", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30268, "end_char": 30275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First, we have the deed of 11-2-90."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31027, "end_char": 31029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "anotha\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSahu Madho Dtlf\\", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31726, "end_char": 31758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Das and others\n\n•• Pandit Mukand Ram and anotha\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSahu Madho Dtlf\\\n\nand other.\\'\n\nPandir Mukand Ra111 and a11nr/1er\n\nnose J.\n\nKanhaiya Lal died about this time and thereafter Mukand Ram continued to make transfers claiming to do so in his own right."}}, {"text": "Pandir Mukand Ra111", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31774, "end_char": 31793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Das and others\n\n•• Pandit Mukand Ram and anotha\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSahu Madho Dtlf\\\n\nand other.\\'\n\nPandir Mukand Ra111 and a11nr/1er\n\nnose J.\n\nKanhaiya Lal died about this time and thereafter Mukand Ram continued to make transfers claiming to do so in his own right.", "canonical_name": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "nose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31809, "end_char": 31813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Das and others\n\n•• Pandit Mukand Ram and anotha\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSahu Madho Dtlf\\\n\nand other.\\'\n\nPandir Mukand Ra111 and a11nr/1er\n\nnose J.\n\nKanhaiya Lal died about this time and thereafter Mukand Ram continued to make transfers claiming to do so in his own right."}}, {"text": "Pyare Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32901, "end_char": 32910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AA-1\n\nIC.A. 94)\n\nPyare Lal also made two transfers on his own--\n\n23-9-18 Sale llilalpat. \"", "canonical_name": "Pyare Lal"}}, {"text": "Bhukhan Saran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33103, "end_char": 33116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(C.A. 91)\n\nLastly, there is Bhukhan Saran, who is Maha Devi's daughter's son.", "canonical_name": "Bhukhan Saran"}}, {"text": "19-2-83", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35567, "end_char": 35574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was occasioned by two sales by Maha Devi on 19-2-83 and 20-5-85."}}, {"text": "20-5-85", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35579, "end_char": 35586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was occasioned by two sales by Maha Devi on 19-2-83 and 20-5-85."}}, {"text": "Sahu Madho", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35646, "end_char": 35656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Du>\n\n<111d others ' v.\n\nPu11di1 M11ku11d Ram and wrother\n\nBoscJ.\n\n1955 The litigation had a chequered career and ultimately Sahu Madho Das the suit was dismissed as barred by time.", "canonical_name": "SAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Sahu Madho Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35781, "end_char": 35795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahu Madho Du>\n\n<111d others ' v.\n\nPu11di1 M11ku11d Ram and wrother\n\nBoscJ.\n\n1955 The litigation had a chequered career and ultimately Sahu Madho Das the suit was dismissed as barred by time.", "canonical_name": "SAHU MADHO DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Pundit Mukand Ra1n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35855, "end_char": 35873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and fl/hers\n\nV, Pundit Mukand Ra1n and another\n\nBose J.\n\nNext came suit No."}}, {"text": "Har Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36585, "end_char": 36593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1913 Har Devi tried again after Maha Devi's death, this time against alienees from Maha Devi.", "canonical_name": "Har Devi"}}, {"text": "Bhukhan Saran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36912, "end_char": 36925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having failed against Maha Devi in the 1897 litigation, Har Devi next tried her luck against Maha Devi's grandson (daughter's son) Bhukhan Saran, after Maha Devi's death.", "canonical_name": "Bhukhan Saran"}}, {"text": "S. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36966, "end_char": 36971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pato", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39239, "end_char": 39243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly hold that, whether the property belonged to Pato or to Nanak Chand, Pato claimed an absolute right which the daughters acknowledged, and in return they and their sons were given separate and absolute estates in separate portions of the property immediately."}}, {"text": "Madho Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39872, "end_char": 39881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the properties they received were so fnr as they arc c1)11cerned, gifts pure and simple\n\nSalm Madho Das\n\nand otlrcr.1\n\nPandit M11k and Ram and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSah11 Madho Das\n\nand."}}, {"text": "Pandit M11k", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39897, "end_char": 39908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the properties they received were so fnr as they arc c1)11cerned, gifts pure and simple\n\nSalm Madho Das\n\nand otlrcr.1\n\nPandit M11k and Ram and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSah11 Madho Das\n\nand.", "canonical_name": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39913, "end_char": 39916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the properties they received were so fnr as they arc c1)11cerned, gifts pure and simple\n\nSalm Madho Das\n\nand otlrcr.1\n\nPandit M11k and Ram and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSah11 Madho Das\n\nand.", "canonical_name": "Ram"}}, {"text": "Cl11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39995, "end_char": 39999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40107, "end_char": 40111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It dot:s not matter whether the properties were Palo's exclusive properties or whether they came to her from her husband because, either way, the title to the properties resided in her and she was the only person competent to pass it on to another."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43835, "end_char": 43859, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43939, "end_char": 43955, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pandit M11ka11d", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 44477, "end_char": 44492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sa/111 Madho Do.~\n\nand otht•rJ\n\nPandit M11ka11d Ra111 and a1101hrr\n\nBose."}}, {"text": "Pata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44522, "end_char": 44526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nPata or her daughters."}}, {"text": "s11111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44782, "end_char": 44788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nan.ak Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45679, "end_char": 45691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the properties were Nan.ak Chand's, which is the assumption on which we are deciding this case, then Pata was a limited owner under the Hindu law, but as such she represented the estate and any title she conveyed, whether by gift or otherwise, would not be void; it would cinly be voidable.", "canonical_name": "Nan.ak Chand"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46785, "end_char": 46788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lcird Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46896, "end_char": 46907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lcird Sinha."}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48305, "end_char": 48312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the Hindu Law is concerned, Lord Dunedin explained in Rangaswami Gounden v. NacMappa Goundenfl."}}, {"text": "Salm Madho Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48874, "end_char": 48888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-8 SCI/ND/Si\n\nSalm Madho Das and others v.\n\nPandit MukanN Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\n/955\n\nSahu Madho Das\n\nand others\n\nPandit Mukcuul Ra111 and another\n\nHo.e J.\n\n46 SUPREf\\IF COURT REPORTS [ l 955]\n\nthat time which amounted tn an actual election to hold the deed gpod --..\n\nRamgouda case I') is an illustration of what that something can be, for there the assent was given by the ultimate reversioner heforc he became in tiru/o to alienations by a widow.", "canonical_name": "Salm Madho Das"}}, {"text": "Pandit MukanN Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48904, "end_char": 48921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-8 SCI/ND/Si\n\nSalm Madho Das and others v.\n\nPandit MukanN Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\n/955\n\nSahu Madho Das\n\nand others\n\nPandit Mukcuul Ra111 and another\n\nHo.e J.\n\n46 SUPREf\\IF COURT REPORTS [ l 955]\n\nthat time which amounted tn an actual election to hold the deed gpod --..\n\nRamgouda case I') is an illustration of what that something can be, for there the assent was given by the ultimate reversioner heforc he became in tiru/o to alienations by a widow.", "canonical_name": "PANDIT MUKAND RAM AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Pandit Mukcuul Ra111", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48978, "end_char": 48998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-8 SCI/ND/Si\n\nSalm Madho Das and others v.\n\nPandit MukanN Ram and another\n\nBose J.\n\n/955\n\nSahu Madho Das\n\nand others\n\nPandit Mukcuul Ra111 and another\n\nHo.e J.\n\n46 SUPREf\\IF COURT REPORTS [ l 955]\n\nthat time which amounted tn an actual election to hold the deed gpod --..\n\nRamgouda case I') is an illustration of what that something can be, for there the assent was given by the ultimate reversioner heforc he became in tiru/o to alienations by a widow."}}, {"text": "Kanhaiva Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50421, "end_char": 50433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "there was the long course ofdealings by Kanhaiva Lal and Mukhand Ram in which they asserted absolute titles.", "canonical_name": "Kanhaiya Lal"}}, {"text": "Mukhand Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50438, "end_char": 50449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "there was the long course ofdealings by Kanhaiva Lal and Mukhand Ram in which they asserted absolute titles.", "canonical_name": "Mukhand Ram"}}, {"text": "Mukad Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50821, "end_char": 50830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And lastly, there is Mukad Ram's representation to Shyam Lal 10.W. 1 iii C.A. 94) which leaves us in no doubt about his knowledge.", "canonical_name": "Mukhand Ram"}}, {"text": "Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51504, "end_char": 51507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are Ram and another therefore satisfied that the plaintiff's assent was to BoseJ. this very arrangement; and that concludes both cases.", "canonical_name": "Ram"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_243_252_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 s.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 243\n\nof nationalisation of text books. The learned counsel 1955 appearing in these cases have adopted in their entirety Rai Sahib Ram the arguments that have been advanced by Mr. Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur amt others in Petition No. 652 of 1954 and no fresh or additional v. argument has been put forward by any one of them. The SfrJJe of Punjab This beiqg the position the decision in Petition M11k;;;;;; a c..1.\n\nNo 652 of 1954 will govern these petitions also and they will stand dismissed but we would make no order as to costs.\n\nSHIVA JUTE BALING LTD. v.\n\nHINDLEY & CO. LTD.\n\n[BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA C.J. and SUDHI\n\nRANJAN DAS J.].\n\nAppeal by Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution- Procedure to be followed on grant of such leave-Supreme Court Rules, rules 8, 9, 12 and 13 of Order Xlll--Circumstances warranting action against an Appellant for rescinding special leave--Civil Procedure Code, Order XLV, rule 8-\"Admission\" of appeal to Supreme Cowt-Applicability to appeals under article 136 of Constitution-Extent of Rule 9, Order XIII, of Supreme Court Rules- Rules and Practice of High Collrts-Formal motion in High Court for \"admission\" of appeal when special le1we was granted under article 136-Whether necessary--Calcutta High Court (Original Side) Rules, rule 9 of Chapter 32-Scope of.\n\nBy an order dated May 25, 1~54, the Supreme Court granted the petitioners in the case special leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court at Caleutta. In accordance wi:h the order, the pt'titioners furnished the security amounts directed to be deposited within the time specified in the order. The Registrar of the High Court did not iSS\\le. any notice of admission of appeal to be served by the Appellant's Solicitor on the Respondents as envisaged in rule 9 of Order. XIII, S.C.R. Nor did the Appellant following the practice of the High Court, move that C.ourt for \"admission\" of the appeal until January U, 1955. The Respondents first mo\\ed the High Co4rt complail).ing of dault on the part of the appellants in due prosecution of the appeal and latter moved the Supreme Court for action under rule 13 df Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules. The application in the High Court was therefore kept pending.\n\nHeld: Afer the grant of $pecial leave under article 136, the Registrar of the Supreme Court transmits, in accordance with the\n\nShiva Jafe Baling [Jti.\n\nHindle)' 11nd\n\nCo.UJ.\n\nprovisions of rule 8 of Order Xlll of the Supreme CQurt Rules, a certified copy of the Supreme O>un's order to the Court or tribunal appealed from.\n\nRule 9 of Order XIIl of the Supreme Court Rules enjoins upon rhe Court or tribunal appealed from to act, in the absence of any special directions in the order, iu accordance with the provisions contained in Order XL V of the Civil Proa:dure Code, so far as 'they are applicable. Accordingly the Coun or Tribunal to which the order is transmitted receives deposits on account•of security for the Respondents' costs, printing costs, and any other deposits if so ordered hy the Supreme Coun, and sets about preparing the record of the appeal for transmission to the Supreme Court. Therefore, action under rule 13 of Order XIlI, S.C.R. for rescinding the order granting special leave cannot be initiated unless the Court or tribunal appealed from reports to the Supreme Court that the appellant has not been diligent in taking steps to enable that Court to carry out the directions, if any, contained in the order of the Supreme Court and to act in.accordance with the.provisions of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code so far. as applicable to appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nIn view of rule 9 of Order XIIl of the Suercme Court Rules, the o.pplication of Order XLV of the Code of Civil Procedure to appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution is restricted. The. Court or tribunal appealed from, no doubt, bas to carry out the directions contained in the order granting special leave, . and to receive the security for the Respondents' costs and other necessary deposits, bui once the security is furnished and the other deposits are made, the formality of \"admission\" envisaged by rule 8 of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is nnnecessary, because in such cases the order granting special leave by itself operates as an admission of the appeal as soon as the conditions in the order relating to the furnishing of security or malcing of deposits are complied with. Appeals under Article 136 thus stand on a different foonng from appeals on grant of certificate by the High Court itself. In the latter case, the\n\nHih Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter until it admits the appeal under rule 8 of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nRuic 9 of ihe Chapter 32 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court envisages \"admission\" of appeals to the Supreme Court whether by an older of the Supreme Court or under Order XL V of the Civil Procedure Code. And when an appeal arising from an order made by the Supreme c.oart under Article 136 of the Constitution, has been. so \"admitted\", the said rule enjoins upon the Rcgisttar to issue notice 11f such admission for service by the appel- !ant on the Respondents. In cases where special leave has been granted by the Supreme Coun, it is not necessary for the appellant to move the High Court appealed fiom for the formal admission of his appeal. As the order granting special leave itself lays down the conditions to be fulfilled by the appellants, the admission will be regarded as final only when the directions are complied with and n,\n\nsoon as this is Jone it would be the duty of the Registrar to issue a notice of rhe admission of the appeal for service upon the respondents.\n\nIn default of the issue of such notice, the appellant cannot be hdu responsible for !aches in the prosecution of his appeal with\n\nregatu to the steps required to be taken after the admission of his ppeal.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATF JURISDICTION: In the matter of !Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 230 of 1953.\n\nRajinder Narain for the Respondents.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (Sukumar Ghose with him) for the Appellants.\n\n1955. April 5. The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUKHERJEA C. J.-This is an application by the respondents in Special Leave Petition No. 230 of 1953, praying for . summons to the appellants to show\n\ncaue why the special leave obtained by the latte1 should not be rescinded in accordance with the provision of Order XTTJ, rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules.\n\nThe appeal is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High C::ourt affirming, on appeal, a decision of a single Judge sitting on the Original Side of that Court. The appellants, having been refused certificate by the High Court, presented before us an application under article 136 of the Ccmstitution and special leave to appeal was granted to them by an order of this Court dated the 25th Mav 1954. By that order the appellants were required to furnish security for costs amounting to Rs. 2,500 within six weeks and the enforcement of the award. which was the subject-matter of the appeal, was stayed on condition that the appellants deposited in Court a sum of Rs. 28,000 within f.our weeks from the date of the order. On the 15th of June 1954 the Registrar of this Court transmitted to the OriJ?inal Side of the Calcutta High Court certified copies of the order granting soecial leave and also of the pecial leave netition with a request that these documents miglit he included in the orinted records of the case. It is nol disnutcrl that in -pursuance of the directions riven\n\nJ~-.'.l srr 1ND'g2\n\n]95>\n\nShiva Jute BoUnK:Ltd.\n\nHindley and Co. Ltd.\n\n195:J\n\nShiva Jute Bali11g Ltd,\n\nHi11dt, z: mid\n\nCo. td.\n\nMukherjta C. J.\n\nby this Court the appellants did deposit the amount required as security for costs and also the sum of Rs. ;28,000 within the time mentioned in the order. On the 29th November I 954 the respondents' Solicitors in Calcutta wrote a letter to the Registrar of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court complaining of delay on the part of the appellants in prosecuting the appeal. It was stated inter alia that although , six months had elapsed since special leave was granted by this Court, the respondents were not served with notice of the admission of the appeal and no steps were taken by the appellants to get the records printed or transmitted to this Court. In reply to this letter the Registrar informed the respondents' Solicitors that according to the practice of the Calcutta High Court it was incumbent on the appellants to make a formal application to the Appellate Bench of the Court for declaring the appeal finally admitted, and this was to be done on notice to the other parties under Order XL V, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code and on filing in Court a copy of the order of the Supreme Court granting special leave to appeal as well as the application upon which such order was made. Unless and until an order was made by the High Court declaring the appeal to be admitted. no action could be taken by the office in the matter.\n\nThereupon on the I Ith of January I 955 an application was filed by the appellants praying that leave might be given to them to file the certified copy of the special leave petition and also that of the order passed upon it and that the appeal might be finally admitted. This application came up for hearing bef0re the learned Chief Justice and Lahiri, J. of the Calcutta High Court and on the 20th of January 1955 the learned Judges made the following order: . \"In this matter special _leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was )l:ranted by that Court on the 25th May 1954. On the 21st June following, the Appellant furnished the necessary security. It was then the dutv of the Appellant to take the nece3sary steos\n\nfor the final admission of the aooeal in order that the nrcparation of the Paper Book might thereafter be\n\nundertaken. Under the Rules and practice of this Cou!'t the step to be taken is that the Appellant to the Supreme Court should make an application for leave to file the certified copy of the petition for Special Leave and also a certified copy of the order granting Special Leave which have been filed along with the present application .................... .\n\nWhen the matter came up for hearing on the last occasion we enquired whether the Appellants had any explanation to give for the delay which had occurred. It was said that the certified copy of the application for Special Leave had been obtained only recently. It was however not explained why when an application for a certified copy of the order was made a similar application for a certified copy of the petition also could not be made.\n\nIn all the circumstances we consider it right that the disposal of the present application should stand over for a month in ord.er that the respondents may take such steps as they desire to take before the Supreme Court\".\n\nThe above facts and order of the High Court were communicated to the Registrar of this Court by Shri\n\nRajinder Narain, Advocate for the respondents, by his letters dated the 17th and 31st of January 1955 and on the basis of the facts stated above, he requested that action should be initiated by the Registrar against the appellants for non-prosecution of the appeal. The Registrar told the learned Advocate that he had not received any report from the High Court regarding any ]aches on the part of the appellants and without any such report, it was not possible for him to take any action in the matter. The Advocate himself, it was said, was quite at liberty to make a formal application to the Court in such way as he considered proper. The views thus expressed by the Registrar of this Court were communicated by him to the Registrar of the High Court, Originai Side, Calcutta. On the 4th March 1955 Shri Rajinder Narain filed a formal petition addressed to the Registr:; r allc~!ing inordinate delay on the part of the appclLrnts in filing in the High Court certified copies of\n\nShiva Jllle Bal;,,, Lid.\n\nHindky u11d Co. l.td.\n\nNukherjea C. J.\n\nShi-va Jute lln/i#J! Ltd.\n\n\"· Hindley aud\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nMuk!terjea C.J;\n\nlbc Special Leave petition and the order made by this <'iwrt thereupon and praying that summons might be issued to the appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for non-prosecution. Before the Registrar could take any further steps in the matter, the application of the appellants for final admission of the appeal made in the High Court came up for further consideration before the Appellate Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Lahiri and on the 7th March, l 955 the learned Judges made an order directing, for the reasons given therein, adjournment of the application for admission of the :appeal before them, sine die pending orders which this Court might pass on the application of the respondents. The application of the respondents which purports to have been made under Order XTIJ. rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules was referred by the Registrar for orders to the Court and it has now come up for hearing before us.\n\nShri Rajinder Narain appearing in support of the petition has contcndcd before us that the appellants wert; guilty of serious ]aches inas111ud1 as they did nol file in' the High Court, till 8 months after the special leave was granted, 1.:opics of the special leave petition as well as of the order passed Ul'Oll it; nor did they make an application to the Appellate flcnch for admission of the appeal without which no further step& could be taken in the matter of printing and transmission of the record. As the appellants could not give any satisfactory explanation for this inordinate delay on their part, the special leave, it is arguecl, should be rescinded. Mr. Chatterjee, who appeared for the appellants, has contended on the other hand that in a case like the one before us where the appeal has come up to this Court by special leave and not by a certificate granted by the High Court. there was no duty cast upon the appellants to make a formal application in the High Court for final admission of the appeal or to file therein certified copies of the special leave petition and the o.-der made thereupon.\n\nHis argument is that under Order XXXH. n•le 9 of the Ori.l!inal Side Rules of the (\\1k11tt;1 lligh Court. ;1\n\nSupreme Court appeal must be deemed to have been 1955 admitted by the very order of this Court granting Shiva Jute special leave and as soon s the appellants have car- Dalii~ Ltd. ried out the directions of the Supreme Court regarding Hindley and furnishing of security or making of other deposits as co. Ltd. the case may be, it is incumbent upon the Registrar lluklleriea c. 1. to issue a notice of the admission of the appeal for service upon the respondents. Such notice indeed has got to be served by the appellants' attorney; but as no notice was at all issued by the Registrar in the present case as is contemplated by rule 9 of Order XXXII of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, no blame could attach to the appellants for not taking further steps in the matter. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee appears to u, s to be wellfounded and as it seems to us that doubts have arisen at times regarding the precise procedure to be followed in cases where an appeal comes to this Court by special leave granted under article 136 of' the Constitution, it is necessary to examine the provisions bearing upon it as arc contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court or of the High Court concerned read along with the relevant provisions of the Ci\"Vlil Pro- :cedurc Code.\n\nOrdinarily when a High Court grants a certificate giving leave to a party to appeal to this Court, it is that Court which retains full control and juris<liction over the subsequent proceedings relating to the prosecution of the appeal till the appeal is finally admitted.\n\nIt is for the High Court to see that its directions are carried out regarding the furnishing of security <1>r the making of deposit and when these conditions are ful- filled, it has then to declare the appeal finally admitted undet Order XLV, rule !S of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the Supreme Court begins after the appeal is finally admitted. When however the appeal comes to this Court on the strength of a special leave granted by it, the position is different. In such cases the order of the Supreme Court granting special leave by itself operates as an admission of the appeal as soon as the conditions in the ordr relating to fur-\n\nShi11t1 Jute Buliug Ltd. v.\n\nHindley and co. ltd.\n\nl\\fukllcrjca C. J.~•\n\nnishing of security or making of a deposit arc complied with. T'hat this is the true position will be clear from the procedurg1l provisions contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court as well as of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court.\n\nOrder XIII, rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules lays down:\n\n\"After the grant of special leave to appeal by the Court, the Registrar shall transmit a certified copy of the order to the court or tribunal appeaied from\"'\n\nRule 9 then says: \"On receipt of the said order, the court or tribunal appealed from shall, in the absence of any special directions in the order, act in accordance with the provisions contained in Order XL V of the Code, so far as applicable\".\n\nIt is to be noted here that although this rule does refer tc the provisions of the Order XL V of the Civil Procedure Code, these provisions l(Lre to be followed only so far as they are applicable. lt is surely the duty of the High Court to sec that security is furnished or a deposit is made in accordance with the directions of the Supreme _Court and these directions are to be found in the order of the Supreme Court .which the Registrar is bound to transmit to the High Court under Order Xlll, rule 8 of our Rules. We do not think it is necessary for the appeliants to Ille afresh a copy of the Supreme Court order or the petition upon which it was made in order that they may form part of the record of the Supreme Court appeal.\n\nThey would come in the record as soon as they arc transmitted by the Registrar in accordance with the rnlc of our Court mentioned above and would have to he included in the Paper Book when it is printed, The Registrar of the High Court undoubtedly took\n\nthes<: orders as part of the record without the appellants' filing them afresh, for he accepted the security and deposit of other moneys from the appellants on\n\nth~ basis of these orders. If there was any failure on the part of the appellants to furnish the security or to mke the deposit in the way indicated in the order r.1' the Supreme Court. it would have been the dutv nf the Registrar of the High Comt to intim;, fe these\n\nfacts to the Registrar of the Supreme C0urt and the latter thereuoon could take steps for revoking the special leave-· as is contemplated by Order XllI, rule 12 of our Rules. ln our opinion, it is also not necessary for the apoellants to make a formal application for admission of the appeal in cases where spci.:i<tl leave has been granted by the Supreme Court;\n\nand thi~ appears clear from the provisions of Order XXXIL rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calc1itta High Court which runs as follows:\n\n\"9. On the admission of an appeal to the Supreme Court whether by the order of this Court under Order XLV, rule 8 of the Code, or by an order of the Supreme Court giving the appellant Special Leave to Appeal, but subject in the latter case to the carrying out of the directions of the Supreme Court as to the security and the deposit of the amount reqt!ired by rule 5, notice of such admission shall be issued by the Registrar for service on the respondent on the record, whether he shalt have appeared on the hearing of the application for a certificate under Order XLV. rule 3 of the Code, or not. Such notice shall be , served by the attorney for the appellant and an A Jtidavit of due service thereof shall be filed by such attorney immediately after such service\"_\n\nToe opening words of this rule plainly indicate that there could be admission of , appeal either by order of the High Court under Order XLV, tule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code or by the order of the Supreme Court 1tself giving special leave to appeal. (As the order :granting special leave itself lays down the conditions to he fulfilled bv the aooellar1ts. the admission will be\n\nre_garded as finaJ only when the directions are complied \\v1th and as soon as this is done it would be the dutv of the Registrar to issue a notice of the admission o-f the appeal for service upon he respondents).\n\nThis r:otice i~ to be served by the attorney for the appellants and an affidavit of due service shall be filed bv hini immediately after the service is effected. ·\n\nTn the present case the Registrar. Original Side of\n\nth,~ Cakutta High Court should have issued a notice of\n\n!955\n\nShim .lute\n\nBaling Ltd. v.\n\nHindlev and\n\nC11. itd.\n\n¥, ukherjea C. .!.\n\nShh•a Jute Baling ltd.\n\nHindley and\n\nCo. Lrd.\n\nMukherjea C. J.\n\nApril 15\n\nthe admission of the appeal to be served upon the respondents as soon as the security for costs and other deposits of money were made by the appellants. This was not done as the procedure to be followed was not correctly appreciated. It is true that the appellants remained idle for a considerable oeriod of time even after they furnished security ancf did not take any steps towards printing of the record.\n\nBut as there was an initial irregularity in the matter of issuing a notice under Order XXXIJ, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, we are unable to hold that the appellants were guilty of any !aches for which the special leave deserves to be rescinded. The resnlt is that the application of the respondents is dismissed. The Registrar, Original Side of the Calcutta High Court, will now issue a notice under Order XXXrI. rule 9 of the Original Side Rules and prompt steps should be taken by the appellants towards nrinting and transmission of the record to this Court.\n\nWe make no order as to costs of this application.\n\nTHE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS v.\n\nASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD. [ s. R. DAS, BHAGWATI and SINHA JJ.]\n\nThe Trade Marks Act 1940 (Act V of 1940), s. 13--Meanin}? and scope of-Registration subiect to disclaimer-S. 76-Appeal to the High Court-When can the Hiflh Court interfere-Registrar, discretion of-Proper approach in such a case.\n\nThe exercise of the power conferred on the Registrar by s. 13 of the Trade Marks Act is alwavs a matter of discretion to be exercised, not capriciously or arbitrarilv but, according to sound principles laid down for the exercise of all judicial discretion.\n\nThe existence of the two jurisdictional facts referred to in clauses (a) and lb) of s. 13 and the finding that the trade mark contains pans or matters to the: exclusive use of which the proorietor is not entitled does not condude the matter and it must further be cmblished that some good !?l'OUnd exists for the imposition of n disclaimer and the tribunal will exercise the discretionary power for good cause shown.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "Rai Sahib Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel 1955 appearing in these cases have adopted in their entirety Rai Sahib Ram the arguments that have been advanced by Mr. Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur amt others in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel 1955 appearing in these cases have adopted in their entirety Rai Sahib Ram the arguments that have been advanced by Mr. Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur amt others in Petition No."}}, {"text": "SHIVA JUTE BALING LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 559, "end_char": 580, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Shiva Jute Bali11g Ltd", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HINDLEY & CO. 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"Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4822, "end_char": 4841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ruic 9 of ihe Chapter 32 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court envisages \"admission\" of appeals to the Supreme Court whether by an older of the Supreme Court or under Order XL V of the Civil Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "Supreme c.oart", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5039, "end_char": 5053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And when an appeal arising from an order made by the Supreme c.oart under Article 136 of the Constitution, has been."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5060, "end_char": 5071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6073, "end_char": 6088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajinder Narain for the Respondents.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder Narain"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6111, "end_char": 6127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (Sukumar Ghose with him) for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6129, "end_char": 6142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (Sukumar Ghose with him) for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6230, "end_char": 6239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUKHERJEA C. J.-This is an application by the respondents in Special Leave Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Muk!terjea"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6517, "end_char": 6536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "summons to the appellants to show\n\ncaue why the special leave obtained by the latte1 should not be rescinded in accordance with the provision of Order XTTJ, rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High C::ourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High C::ourt affirming, on appeal, a decision of a single Judge sitting on the Original Side of that Court."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6833, "end_char": 6844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25th Mav 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6949, "end_char": 6962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, having been refused certificate by the High Court, presented before us an application under article 136 of the Ccmstitution and special leave to appeal was granted to them by an order of this Court dated the 25th Mav 1954."}}, {"text": "15th of June 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7292, "end_char": 7309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 15th of June 1954 the Registrar of this Court transmitted to the OriJ?inal Side of the Calcutta High Court certified copies of the order granting soecial leave and also of the pecial leave netition with a request that these documents miglit he included in the orinted records of the case."}}, {"text": "Shiva Jute BoUnK:Ltd.\n\nHindley and Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7671, "end_char": 7714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is nol disnutcrl that in -pursuance of the directions riven\n\nJ~-.'.l srr 1ND'g2\n\n]95>\n\nShiva Jute BoUnK:Ltd.\n\nHindley and Co. Ltd.\n\n195:J\n\nShiva Jute Bali11g Ltd,\n\nHi11dt, z: mid\n\nCo. td."}}, {"text": "Shiva Jute Bali11g Ltd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7723, "end_char": 7745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is nol disnutcrl that in -pursuance of the directions riven\n\nJ~-.'.l srr 1ND'g2\n\n]95>\n\nShiva Jute BoUnK:Ltd.\n\nHindley and Co. Ltd.\n\n195:J\n\nShiva Jute Bali11g Ltd,\n\nHi11dt, z: mid\n\nCo. td.", "canonical_name": "Shiva Jute Bali11g Ltd"}}, {"text": "29th November I 954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7952, "end_char": 7971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th November I 954 the respondents' Solicitors in Calcutta wrote a letter to the Registrar of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court complaining of delay on the part of the appellants in prosecuting the appeal."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8003, "end_char": 8011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th November I 954 the respondents' Solicitors in Calcutta wrote a letter to the Registrar of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court complaining of delay on the part of the appellants in prosecuting the appeal."}}, {"text": "I Ith of January I 955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9157, "end_char": 9179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon on the I Ith of January I 955 an application was filed by the appellants praying that leave might be given to them to file the certified copy of the special leave petition and also that of the order passed upon it and that the appeal might be finally admitted."}}, {"text": "Lahiri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9485, "end_char": 9491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application came up for hearing bef0re the learned Chief Justice and Lahiri, J. of the Calcutta High Court and on the 20th of January 1955 the learned Judges made the following order: . \""}}, {"text": "20th of January 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9534, "end_char": 9554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application came up for hearing bef0re the learned Chief Justice and Lahiri, J. of the Calcutta High Court and on the 20th of January 1955 the learned Judges made the following order: . \""}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11090, "end_char": 11105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above facts and order of the High Court were communicated to the Registrar of this Court by Shri\n\nRajinder Narain, Advocate for the respondents, by his letters dated the 17th and 31st of January 1955 and on the basis of the facts stated above, he requested that action should be initiated by the Registrar against the appellants for non-prosecution of the appeal.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder Narain"}}, {"text": "4th March 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11878, "end_char": 11892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 4th March 1955 Shri Rajinder Narain filed a formal petition addressed to the Registr:; r allc~!ing inordinate delay on the part of the appclLrnts in filing in the High Court certified copies of\n\nShiva Jllle Bal;,,, Lid."}}, {"text": "Muk!terjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12192, "end_char": 12202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.\n\n\"· Hindley aud\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nMuk!terjea C.J;\n\nlbc Special Leave petition and the order made by this <'iwrt thereupon and praying that summons might be issued to the appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for non-prosecution.", "canonical_name": "Muk!terjea"}}, {"text": "7th March, l 955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12696, "end_char": 12712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the Registrar could take any further steps in the matter, the application of the appellants for final admission of the appeal made in the High Court came up for further consideration before the Appellate Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Lahiri and on the 7th March, l 955 the learned Judges made an order directing, for the reasons given therein, adjournment of the application for admission of the :appeal before them, sine die pending orders which this Court might pass on the application of the respondents."}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13842, "end_char": 13852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee, who appeared for the appellants, has contended on the other hand that in a case like the one before us where the appeal has come up to this Court by special leave and not by a certificate granted by the High Court."}}, {"text": "Shiva Jute", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14505, "end_char": 14515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nSupreme Court appeal must be deemed to have been 1955 admitted by the very order of this Court granting Shiva Jute special leave and as soon s the appellants have car- Dalii~ Ltd. ried out the directions of the Supreme Court regarding Hindley and furnishing of security or making of other deposits as co. Ltd. the case may be, it is incumbent upon the Registrar lluklleriea c. 1."}}, {"text": "Order XXXII of the Original Side Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15037, "end_char": 15075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15433, "end_char": 15444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XXXII of the Original Side Rules", "statute": "Order XXXII of the Original Side Rules"}}, {"text": "Order XL V of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17346, "end_char": 17368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme _Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17727, "end_char": 17741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt is surely the duty of the High Court to sec that security is furnished or a deposit is made in accordance with the directions of the Supreme _Court and these directions are to be found in the order of the Supreme Court .which the Registrar is bound to transmit to the High Court under Order Xlll, rule 8 of our Rules."}}, {"text": "Calc1itta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19275, "end_char": 19295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln our opinion, it is also not necessary for the apoellants to make a formal application for admission of the appeal in cases where spci.:i<tl leave has been granted by the Supreme Court;\n\nand thi~ appears clear from the provisions of Order XXXIL rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calc1itta High Court which runs as follows:\n\n\"9."}}, {"text": "REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22171, "end_char": 22195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS v.\n\nASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD. ["}}, {"text": "ASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22200, "end_char": 22224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS v.\n\nASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD. ["}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22239, "end_char": 22247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. R. DAS, BHAGWATI and SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22252, "end_char": 22257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. R. DAS, BHAGWATI and SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22268, "end_char": 22288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22306, "end_char": 22311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}, {"text": "S. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22370, "end_char": 22375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22550, "end_char": 22555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22563, "end_char": 22578, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22836, "end_char": 22841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_252_269_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Shh•a Jute Baling ltd.\n\nHindley and\n\nCo. Lrd.\n\nMukherjea C. J.\n\nApril 15\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1955]\n\nthe admission of the appeal to be served upon the respondents as soon as the security for costs and other deposits of money were made by the appellants. This was not done as the procedure to be followed was not correctly appreciated. It is true that the appellants remained idle for a considerable oeriod of time even after they furnished security ancf did not take any steps towards printing of the record.\n\nBut as there was an initial irregularity in the matter of issuing a notice under Order XXXIJ, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, we are unable to hold that the appellants were guilty of any !aches for which the special leave deserves to be rescinded. The resnlt is that the application of the respondents is dismissed. The Registrar, Original Side of the Calcutta High Court, will now issue a notice under Order XXXrI. rule 9 of the Original Side Rules and prompt steps should be taken by the appellants towards nrinting and transmission of the record to this Court.\n\nWe make no order as to costs of this application.\n\nTHE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS v.\n\nASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD. [ s. R. DAS, BHAGWATI and SINHA JJ.]\n\nThe Trade Marks Act 1940 (Act V of 1940), s. 13--Meanin}? and scope of-Registration subiect to disclaimer-S. 76-Appeal to the High Court-When can the Hiflh Court interfere-Registrar, discretion of-Proper approach in such a case.\n\nThe exercise of the power conferred on the Registrar by s. 13 of the Trade Marks Act is alwavs a matter of discretion to be exercised, not capriciously or arbitrarilv but, according to sound principles laid down for the exercise of all judicial discretion.\n\nThe existence of the two jurisdictional facts referred to in clauses (a) and lb) of s. 13 and the finding that the trade mark contains pans or matters to the: exclusive use of which the proorietor is not entitled does not condude the matter and it must further be cmblished that some good !?l'OUnd exists for the imposition of n disclaimer and the tribunal will exercise the discretionary power for good cause shown.\n\nPor the prorcr understanding and carrying into effect the provisions of s. 13 it is ncc.:ssary to bear in mind that rhe section confides a discretionuy power in the 'tribunal' which by vir•ue of s. 2( n) means the Registrar or, as the case may be, the Court before which the proceeding con<crned is pending.\n\nAssuming but not deciding that in dealing with an appeal under s. 76 of the Act from the\n\ndcisions of the Registrar under s. 13 of the Act the High Court is not fettered by reason of the Registrar, on the hearing before him, h:iving exercised his discretion and the High Court may exercise its own discretion, just as it could if rhe proceedings had been -taken initially before it, it must be remembered that it is the Registrar to whom in the first instance is committed the discretionary power.\n\nIf that au•hority has exercised his discretion in good faith and not in violation of any Jaw such exercise of discretion should not be interfered wi1h by the High Court merely on the ground that, in the opinion of th::: High Court it could have been exercised differently or even that the High Court would have exercised it differently, had the matter been brought before it in the first instance. The proper approach in such a cse is for the High Court to consider whether 'lie Regitrar llas really gonl' so irrong as to make it nrcessary to inter/ ere with his discretion.\n\nThe real purpose of requiring a disclaimer is to define the rights of the proprietor under registration so as to minimise, even if it •annot wholly eliminate, the possibility of extravagant and unauthorised claims being made on the score of registration of the trade marks.\n\nThe proviso to s. 13 preserves intact any right which the proprietor may otherwise under any other law have in relation to the mark or any part thereof.\n\nThe disclaimer is only for the purposes of the Act.\n\nIt does not affect the rights of the proprietor except\n\n.uch as arise out of registration. That is to say, the special advantages which the Act gives to the proprietor by reason of the registration of his trade mark do not extend to the parts or matters which he disclaims.\n\nHeld, that considering all the circumstances of the present case\n\nth~ Registrar had not gone so wrong as to make it necessary for the High Court to interfere with his discretion. If it were to be regarded as a mtter of exercise of discretion by the High Court as .to whether a ~1sclaimer should be iposed or not, it is quite clear that the attention of the High Court was no~ drawn to an important considei:ati.on, namely, the trong possibility of the respondent company ~!a1Ing a s.tnnory nght to the !ord 'Shree' by virtue of the re~1strat1on of its trade mark and sub1ect others to infringement act10ns onlv on the strenth of the registration and without proof of facts which it would have otherwise to establish in order to succeed in a passing off action or a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the High Court cannot be said to have properly exercised its discrt:'tion.\n\n33-8 SCI/ND182\n\n/955\n\nThr Registrar of Trade Marks V.\n\nAshok Chandra\n\nRakhlt Ltd.\n\n1955 Sharp v. Wakefield (L.R. 1891 A.C. 173), Albert Baker Co.'s The R 11;, rrar of Application and Aerated Bread Company's Application In re (L.R.\n\nTrad~ Marks [1908] 2 Ch. 86; 25 R.P.C. 513), In the matter of an application by v. the Diamond T. Motor Car Co, ([1921] 38 R.P.C. 373 at 379), Eno 'As/10k Chandra\n\nv. Dunn (L.R. [1890] 15 A.C. 252; 7 R.P.C. 311), In the matter of Rakhit ltd., an application by F. Reddaway & Co. Ltd. ([1926] 44 R.P.C. 27), Smokeless Powder Co.'s Trade In re (LR. [1892] 1 Ch. 590; 9 R.P.C. 109), Greers Ltd. v. Pearman and Gorder Ltd. ([ 1922] 39 R.P.C. 4-09), Cadbury Brothers' Application In re (L.R. [1915] 2 Ch. 307; 32 R.P.C. 456), De Cordova and others v. Vick Chemical Coy. ([1951] 68 R.P.C. 103), Pinto v. Badman (8 R.P.C. 181 ), Apollinaris Company's Trade Marks (L.R. [1891] 2 Ch. 186) and Clement & Cie In re (L.R. [1900] I Ch. 114), referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.\n\nI 16 of 1953.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd day of August 1951 of the High Court of Judica ture at Calcutta in Appeal No. 112 of 1950 arising out of the order dated the 24th day of March I 950 of the Registrar of Trade Marks in the matter of Registered Trade Mark No. 3815.\n\nC: K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India K. S.\n\nShavakasha and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. C. Isaacs, (P. K. Ghosh, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1955. April 15. The Judp; ment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order pronounced on the 23rd August 1951 by a Division Bench of the High Court at Calcuttil in Appeal No. 112 of 1950 reversin~ the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks dated the 24th March. 1950 whereby he had rectified the register by inserting a disclaimer of the word \"Shree\" forming part of the repondent company's registered trade mark No. 3815.\n\nThe material facts are as follows: Jn the year 1897 one Durga Charan Rakhit (since deceased) adnpted as his trade mark in respect of the <?hee produced and marketed by him a device which, with some :; light modification not materially altering its essential\n\nfeatures, was, on the application of the respondent company, registered as its trade mark No. 3815. rhat mark was and is a device consisting of the word \"Shree\" written on the top in bold Bengali character, having below it an ornamental figure with the word \"Shree\" written in the centre in small Deva :Nagri character. The word \"TRADE\" written in English in an inclined manner on the left hand side of the ornamental figure and the word \"MARK\" written in English in an inclined manner on the right hand side of the ornamental figure and the words \"Shree Durga Charan Rakhit\" written at the bottom in Bengali characters. The ornamental figure referred to above consists of a triangle over which is another inverted triangle and in the centre the word \"Shree'', in small\n\nDeva Nagri character as mentioned above, the whole of the saia ornamental figure being enclosed in a circle outside which are twelve ornamental petals. In the affidavit affirmed by Malli Nath Rakhit, a director of the respondent company and filed in these proceedings, this mark has throughout been referred to as \"the said mark SREE\". The said Durga Charan Rakhit having subsequently been adjudged insolvent all his properties including the goodwill of his ghee business and the said mark vested in the Official Assignee of Calcutta. On the 15th January 1915 the goodwill of the said business including the 'laid mark was sold by the Official Assignee by public auction and one Hem Dev Konch, a minor, was declared as the highest bidder and purchaser. A notice of the said sale wa~ advertised in the Calcutta Exchange Gazette on. the 25th January 1915 by an attorney acting on behalf of the purchaser. On the 27th January 1915 the said sale was confirmed by a Deed of assignment executed by the Official Assignee. On the 22nd August 1917 Haripriya Konch, the father and natural guardian of the minor purchaser, acting as such and on behalf of the minor. conveyed to one Ashok Chandra Rakhit, son of the said Ourga Charan Rakhit. the .goodwill of the business including the ri!!ht. title and interest in the said mark and the said\n\nAshok Chandra Rakhit carried on the said business\n\nTlzc Reginrar of\n\nTrade Marks v.\n\nAs/wk Chandra\n\nRak/1it Ltd.\n\nDasJ.\n\n1955 and marketed ghee under the said mark. On the J 5th\n\nJ\"he Registrur ef September 1926 the said Ashok Chandra Rakhit Trade Marks caused the fact of his ownership of the said mark to A1hok \"c1ia11dra be advertised in the Calcutta Exchange Gazette and llakhlt Ltd. on the 22nd December 1926 caused to he registered DasJ. with the Registrar of Assurances of Calcutta a declaration of his ownership of the said mark. In 1932 the respondent company was incorporated as a private limited company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and the said Ashok Chandra Rakhit assigned the goodwill of his said business and his right, title and interest in the said mark to the respondent company.\n\nIn 1933 the respondent company's said mark was registered in the Trade Mark Registry at Hong-Kong under the provisions of the Hong-Kong Trade Marks Ordinance, 1909 and the fact of such registration was published in the Straits Settlements Government Gazette. In 1934 two persons, Rajendra Prasad and Dilliram, were, on complaint, made on behalf of the respondent company, convicted by the Chief Presidcm.:y Magistrale of Calcutta under section 4l'6. Indian Penal Codt\\ for infringing the said mark and such conviction was uphelci by thr.\n\nCalcutta High Court.\n\nIn 1935 one Chiranjilal Sharma was, on like complaint, convicted by the Chief Presidency Magistrale for infringement of the said mark. The volume. of lhc respondent company's business in ghee done under the said mark is said to be considerable. the annual turn over varying front Rs. 10.00,000 to Rs. 15,00,000, and the annual cost of advertisement being anything between Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 39,000/-. It is also said that the ghee marketed by the respondent company and .its predecessors is well known by the said mark and\n\nis always asked for under the name \"Shree\".\n\nThe Indian Trade Marks Act, 1940 having been 1•ought intoforce in 1942 the respondent company on the 21st August 1942 filed an application for the registration of its said mark under the Act. By his letter dated the 29th November 1943 the Registrar proposed that there should be a disdaimer of the word \"Shree\". T:1e respondent company by its\n\n' • / \\\n\nagents' letter dated the 15th February 1944 intimated to the Registrar that it could not agree to the proposal as \"the trade mark Shree is very important in the device\" and \"the ghee is commonly designated by the trade mark Shree\". The respondent company also submitted an affidavit affirmed by one Bidyut Bikash Rakshit, a director of the respondent company, in support of its objection. The Registrar not having then pressed his proposal for disclaimer the respondent company's said mark was duly registered as trade mark No. 3815. •\n\nIt appears that subsequently the Registrar found that the word \"Shree\" was used by Hindus as a11 auspicious symbol and placed even on letter heads and that consequently it was not adapted to distinguish within the meaning of the Act. In course of time, therefore, a pradice became established in the\n\nRegistry whereby the word \"Shree\" was either ref use~ registration as a trade mark or a disclaimer was enforced if it were made a part of a trade mark. So infkx111k 11ad Ileen this practice that barring this particular trade mark No. 3815 there was no other trade mark containing the word ''Shrce\" which had been registered without a disclaimer of the word \"Shree\". Naturally this circumstance was bound to be regarded as an invidious discrimination and, indeed, pointed reference is said to have been made to it and it was suggested that the Registry should deal impartially and uniformly with all applications in matters relating to practice. This aspect of the matter having been pressed upon the Registrar he took steps under section 46(4) of the Trade Marks Act.\n\n1940 and on the 8th March 1947 issued a notice calling upon the respondent company to show cause why the register should not be rectified by entering a disclaimer of the exclusive right in regard to the wurd \"Shree\". The respondent company showed cause by filitH! an affidavit affirmed by Malli Nath Rakhit to which reference has been made. After hearing learned connsel for the respondent company the Re_!!istrar came to the conclusion that the word \"Shree\" was\n\nTile Registrar <!f\n\nTrade Mark>\n\nAs/10k Cluuulra\n\nRak/lit Ltd.\n\nDas J.\n\n1955 not adapted to distinguish and, for reasons slated in 1/re Registrar ,1/ his judgment delivered on the 24th March 1950, Trade Marks 'directed rectification of .the register by inserting a\n\nAs/wk 'c1wadru disclaimer of the word \"Shree' in the following Rakhit Ltd. tern1s;\n\nD, bJ. \"Registration of this Trade Mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the word 'Shree' \".\n\nFeeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the respondent company preferred an appeaJ to the High Court at Calcutta under section 76 o( the Act. The Hit!h Court also took the view that \"Shree\" was a word which had numerous meanings and that it would be impossible for any trader to contend that he had an exclusive right to the use of such a word. But the High Court went on to hold that there was no ground whatsoever for the order made by the Registrar as the respondent company had never claimed that it had any right to the exclusive use of the word\n\n\"Shree' . .In the result, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Regist rnr n:cli- !'ving the register.\n\nBeing. of the opinion that the;: point involved was a novel one in this country aud wa:. ot importance and would aliect the attitude of the Hcgistrar in future cases, the Hign Court certified that it was a fit l'asc for appeal to this Court under i\\rticlc 13311 )(c) of the Constitution. Hence the prc'<:nt appeal by the Registrar.\n\nThe order of rectification of the register by inserting n disclaimer was made by the Registrar under section 13 read with section 46(4) of the Trade Marks Act.\n\n1940. Section 13 runs as follows:\n\n\"13. Registralion subject to disclaimer: --If a trade mark containsla) any part not separately registered as a trade mark in the name of the proprietor. or for the separate registration of which no application has been made. or\n\n(b) any matter common to the trade, or otherwise of a non-distinctive character. the trih1mal. in deciding whether the tracle mark <h11l he entered or shall.remain on the register. may require. as a condition of its being on the register. that\n\nthe proprietor shall either disclaim any right to the txciusive use of such part or of all or any portion of such. matter, as the case may be, to the exclusive use of which the tribunal holds him not to be entitled, or\n\nmake such other disclaimer as the tribunal may consider necessary for the purpose of defining the rights of the proprietor under the registration:\n\nProvided that no disclaimer shall affect any rights of the proprietor of a trade mark except such as arise out of the registration of the trade mark in respect of which the disclaimer is made\".\n\nAt the outset it will be noticed that the power of the tribunal to require a disclaimer is conditioned and made dependent upon the existence of one of two things which are set out in clauses\n\n(a) and (b) and which have been called the jurisdictional facts. It is only on the establishment of one of the two jurisdictional 'facts that the Registrar's jurisdiction regarding imposition of a disclaimer arises. Before, however. he may exercise his discretion he must find and hold that there are parts or matters included in the trade mark to the exclusive use of which the proprietor is not entitled and it is only after this finding is arrived at that the Reistrar becomes entitled to exercise his discretion. In cause of the argument it was at one time contended that upon the establishment of the requisite jurisdictional fact and upon the finding that the proprietor ws not entitled to the exclusive use of any particular part or matter contained in the trade mark the Registrar became entitled, without anything more, to require a disclaimer of that oart or matter. This extreme position, however, was not mnintained in the end and it was conceded, as indeed it had to be. that the exercise of the power conferrecl on the Registrar by this section always remained a matter of discretion to be exercised. not capriciously or arbitrarilv but, according to sound princiole.s l?id down for the exercise of all judicial discretion.\n\n(See the observations of Lord Halsburv. L.C .. in Sharn\n\nv. WaT(PfiP!d (').) As the hw of Trwie M11rks adooted in onr .Act mcrdv reproduces the Frn2lih Law with\n\n(l) L.R. 1891A.C.173 at p. 179.\n\nThe Registrar a/.\n\nTrade Marks v. • Ashok Cha11dra\n\nRakhit Ltd.\n\nDas.J.\n\n195!_ onl)· slight modifications, a reference to the judicial The Regi . .-rrar of decisions on the corresponding section of the English\n\nTrade Mark• Act is apposite and must be helpful. Section 15 of A.rlwk \"c1w11dro the English Act of 1905 which later on was reproduced\n\n Rakhi1 Lid. in section 14 of the English Act of 1938 and which Dns.r. corresponds to our section 13, was considered by the High Court in England in In re Albert Baker Co.'s Application and Jn re Aerated Bread Company's Application(') which is commonly called the A.B.C. case. fn that case Eve, J. found on the evidence that Albert Baker Company were widely known as\n\n\"A.B.C.\" or \"A.B. & Co.\" but that the letters ·\"A.B.C.\" did not exclusively indicate their goods and that those letters being common to the trade they were not entitled to the exclusive use of those letters.\n\nNevertheless the learned Judge did not hold that that finding alone concluded the matter. Said the learned Judge:\n\n\"The first observation which it occurs to me to make is that the object of the Legislature was to relieve traders from the necessity of disclaiming, and I think it follows from this that the condition is one for the imposition of which some good reason ought to be established rather than one which ought to be imposed, unless some good reason to the contrary is made out. This conclusion is, I think, fortified by the frame of the section, which is in an enabling form empowering the tribunal to impose the condition-a power which, I conclude, the tribunal would only exercise for good cause shewn.\"\n\nIt follows from what has been stated above that the existence of one of the two jurisdictional facts referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of section 13 and the.finding that the trade mark contains parts or matters to the exclusive use of which the proprietor is not entitled does not conclude the matter and it must further be established that some good reason exists for the imposition of a disclaimer and the tribunal will only exercise the discretionary power for gl'od canse shown.\n\n(I) L.R [1908] 2 Ch. 86: ~5 R.P.C 51 J.\n\nThe second thing to be borne in mind, if the provisions ot section 13 are to be properly understood and carried into effect, is that the section confides a discretionary power in t:1e \"tribunal\" which, by virtue\n\nof section 2(n), means the Registrar or, as the case nuy be, the Court before which the proceeding concerned is pending. An application for the rectification of the register may, under sub-sections (1) and\n\n(2) of section 46, be made either to the Registrar or the High Court and sub-section (4) of that section, under which the present proceedings were initiated hy the Registrar, authorises both the High Court and the Registrar to take proceedings suo motu. In view of the fact that discretion is given also to the High Court under section 13 a question may be raised as to whether the observations made by P.O. Lawrence, J. in In the matter of an application by the Diamond T.\n\nMotor Car Co.0 namely, that in dealing with an appeRl from the Registrar's decision under section 8(2) of the English Act of 1919 the High Court is not fetterred by reason of the Registrar on the hearing before him having exercised his discretirm, apply to our High Court hearing appeals under section 76 of our Act from Decisions of the Registrar given under section 13 of our Act and whether in that situation our High Court may exercise its own discretion iust as it could if the proceedings had initially been taken before it. Assuming, but without deciding, that they do apply, it must, nevertheless, be remembered, adapting the language of Lord Macnaghten in Eno v. Dunn(') that it is the Registrar \"to whom in the first instance .is committed the discretionary power\". If that authority has exercised his discretion in good faith and not in violation of any law such exercise of discretion should not be interfered with by the High Court merely on the ground that, in the opinion of the High Court. it could have been exercised differentiy or even that the High Court would have exercised it differently. had the matter been brought hefore it in the first instance. The propr approach in\n\n(1) [19211 38 R.P.C. 373 nt p. :179. (21 L.R. r~8901 15 A.C. 25~ at p. 263: 7 R.P.C. 311 at p. 318.\n\nH-f, SCI•ND'82\n\n/95.~\n\nThe Regi.vtrar t•f\n\nTrad~ MarkJ ·\n\nAs/wk Chandra Rakhit Ltd.\n\nDasi.\n\n1955 such a case is for the High Court to consider, as said The Reg; sirar of by Lord Dunedin in In ihe matter of an application hy Trade Mark..\n\nF. Reddaway & Co Ltd.('), \"whether the Registrar Ashok Chandra had really gone so wrong as to make it necessary to Rakhit Ltd. interfere with his discretion\".\n\nDasJ.\n\nTht third thing to note is that the avowed purpose of the section is not to confer any direct benefit on the rival traders or the general public but to define the rights of the proprietor under the registration.\n\nThe registration of a trade mark confers substantial advantages on its proprietor as will appear from the sections grouped together in Chapter IV under the heading \"Effect of Registration\". It is, however, a notorious fact that there is a tendency on the part of some proprietors to get the operation of their trade marks expanded beyond their legitimate bounds. An illustration of an attempt .of this kind is to be found in In re Smokeless Powder Co.'s Trade Mark('). Temptation has even led some proprietors to make an exaggerated claim to the exclusive use of parts or matters contained in their trade marks in spite of the fact that the:v had expressly disclaimed the exclusive use of those parts or matters. Reference may be made to Greers Ltd. v. Pearman and Corder Ltd.(') commonly called the \"Banquet\" case. The real purpose of requiring a disclaimer is to define the rights of the proprietor under the registration so as to minimise. even if it cannot wholly eliminate, the possibility of extravagant and unauthorised claims being made on the score of registration of the trade marks.\n\n/ The last feature of the section is its proviso. That proviso preserves intact any right which the proprietor may otherwise under any other law have in relation to the mark or any part thereof. The disclaimer is only for the purposes of the Act. 1t do(!s not affect the rights of the proprietor except such as arise out of registration. That is to say, the special advanta?es which the Act gives to the proprietor by reason of the registration of his trade mark do not extend to the\n\n(I) [1926] 44 R.P.C. 27 at p. 36.\n\n(2) L.R. [1R92] 1Ch.590; 9.R.J.'.C. 109.\n\n(l) [1922] l9\"R.P.C. 406.\n\nparts or matters which he disclaims. In short, the disclaimed parts or matters are not within the protection of the statute.\n\nThat ciicumstance, however, does not mean that the proprietor's rights, if any, with respect to those parts or matters would not be protected otherwise than under the Act. If the proprietor has acquired any right by long user of those parts or matters in connection with goods manufactured or sold by him or otherwise in relation to his trade, ht may, on proof of the necessary facts, prevent an infringement of his rights by a passing off action or .a prosecution under (he Indian Penal Code. Disclaimer does not affect those rights in any way.\n\nKeeping, then, in view the meaning and scope of section 13 of our Trade Marks Act, 1940 and its underiying purpose as discussed above we proceed to consicler whether in the circumstances of the present case the Registrar had exercised his discretion properly in inserting in the register a disclaimer of the word \"Shree· It has not been disputed that the respondent company's registered trade mark No. 3815 is a distinctive device properly registrable under section 6 of tht Act. It is also a fact that it contains, as its prominent part, the word \"Shree'' which is not separately registered as a trade mark in the name of the respondent company and, indeed, no applica.tion had heen made by it for the separate registration of that Word. There can, therefore, be no doubl as to the existenct: of the jurisdictional fact referred to in clause\n\n(a) of that section. Further, the Registrar found as a fact, for reasons stated by him, that the word \"Shree\" was not adapted to distinguish, which means that it did not pass the test for registrability laid down in section 6 and in particular in sub-section (3) thereof. The High Court also unequivocally took the view that \"Shree\" is a word which had numerous meanings and that it would be impossible for any trader to contend that he had an exclusive right to the use of such a word. It, therefore. follows that the respondent company's trade mark was concurrenflv held to have contained matters of a non-distinctive character and consequently the second juris-\n\nThe Registrar of Trade Marks V.\n\nAs/wk Chandra\n\nRakhit Ltd.\n\nDas!.\n\n1955 dictional fact was also present in this case. It, never- The Registrar of theless, appeared to the High Court that there was Trade /tfarks no ground whatsoever for the order made by the\n\nAshok Chandra Registrar. The High Court read the decision of the Rak/ut Ltd.\n\nR t d 1 h d d\n\nDas J. eg1s rar as procee mg on y on w at was escnbe as an inflexible practice established in the Registry whereby the word \"Shree\" was either refused registration as a trade mark or a disclaimer was enforced if it wa' a part of a trade mark and in this view the case appeared to the High Court to be indistinguishable from the case of In re Cadbury Brothers' A pplication(1).\n\nThat case was decided under section 9 of the English Act of 1905. Clause (5) of section 9 was then expressed in language which is somewhat different from clause (5) of section 6 of our Act. Under section 9(5) of the English Act of 1905 a name, signature or word or words otherwise than such as fell within the description in the preceding paragraphs 1 to 4 could not. except by the order of the Board of Trade or by the Court, be deemed a distinctive mark: Tudor' heing a surname did not fall within clause (4) of that English Act and. therefore, the Regis1rar had no power to register it as a distinctive mark under clause (5).\n\nSuch being the position, the then Registrar of Trade Marks in England adopted a practice that wherever a mark contained a name which did not come within clause ( 4) and which he had no power to register under clause <5). there must be a disclaimer of that word without going into any investigation as to its distinctiveness. The Registrar in that case declined to register the mark only because it contained a name \\\"hich could not be registered alone by him under section 9(5), without deciding whether that word was a matter of a distinctive or non-distinctive character, in pursuance of the inflexible practice that he had adc>pted. namely, of refusing registration in the absence of a disclaimer. This decision of the Registrar wa~ overruled by Sargant, J. The learned Jud!!e. on the materials before him, came to the conclusion that the word 'Tudor' was not common to t'ie trnde\n\n(ll T-.R. [19151 2 C11. 307: 32 R.P.C. 456.\n\nand that the word as it had been used hy the applicants in relation to chocolates was not a matter of non-distinctive character and that it had denoted their goods. Consequently, the jurisdiction to impose a disclaimer did not arise under clause (b) of section 15 of the English Act of 1905. The jurisdiction, if at all, could, therefore, arise only under clause (a), namely, that the trade mark contained parts not separately registered by the properietor as trade marks.\n\nHaving come to the conclusion that the word 'Tudor' was a matter of distinctive character as it denoted the goods of the applicant's manufacture, the Court might have disposed of the cas.e on the short ground that, on that finding, the applicant was entitled to the exclusive use of that name in connection with chocolates and like goods and, therefore, no question of requiring a disclaimer could, in that situation, arise at all.\n\nTreating the matter, however, as stil! one of discretion, the learned Judge had to take into account the commercial case made on behalf of the applicants, namely, that they would, by disclaiming any right to the exclusive use of the word Tudor', practically be inviting the public to disregard such common law rights as they had acquired to the use of the name 'Tudor' and held that to impose a disclaimer of that word, in spite of the finding as to its distinctiveness in relation to the goods of the applicant0, would be to drive the applicants to take innumerable passing off actions.\n\nThe facts of that case appears to us to be cleady distinguishable from those of the case now before us.\n\nHere the concurrent finding of the Registrar and the High Court is that the word \"Shree\" is not adapted to distinguish and is not a word to the exclusive use of which any trader may claim the right. In the face of this finding the consideration of the possibility that a disclaimer may drive the respondent company to a crop of passing off actions was not so relevant or urgent as it was in the Tudor case. In view of the finding in the present case the respondent company CG\\1!0 well he left. as it was in fact left, to protect its\n\nTile Registrar of Trade Marks\n\nv Ashok Cliandra\n\nRak/iit Ltd.\n\nDasi.\n\n1955 rights by other proceedings, e.g., passing off actions The R;;;;;;; rar of or prosecutions which, by reason of the proviso, were Trade Marks open to be taken by it, if the necessary facts to As!iok ~Jumdra support such proceedings which were not before the\n\nRakhit Ltd.\n\nRegistrar could be satisfactorily established.\n\nDa:.J.\n\nFurther, it is not quite correct to say that the Registrar, like his English counterpart, had based his decision entirely on what has been called his invariable practice. It is no doubt true that the Registrar did, in this case, lay considerable stress on that aspect of the matter and may even be said to have some what over emphasized the practice of his Registry but it is not correct to say that his decision was entirely founded on that practice alone. The materials before the Registrar, appearing on the affidavit filed on beh'aif ot the respondent company, clearly indicated that the respondent company was claiming a proprietary right to the name \"Shree''. Indeed, it called its mark as \"the said mark Shree\" throiaghoqt the affidavit and claimed that the said mark \"Shree\" was well known in the market and that its ghee was asked for and sold under the said mark \"Shree\": The two prosecutions launched by it and the other facts mem\" tioned in the main aflidavit and the two supporting\n\nafildavit~ of two retail dealers and summarised at the beginning of this judgment clearly indicate that it was claiming the right to the exclusive use of. the word \"Shree\" and, indeed, in its agents' letter of the 15th February 1944 objecting to any disclaimer of that word, it was referred to \"as trade mark Shree\" and it was said to be \"very important in the devise\".\n\nIn other words, they put forward the claim that \"Shree'' itself was also its trade mark, apart from the device as a whole and that it was an important feature. of its device.\n\nIt is, therefore, not at all surprising that learned. counsel appearing for the respondent company before the Registrar, when asked as to how his client could possibly be affected by disclaiming the word \"Shree\", said frankly that it was far easier to be successful in a{I infringement action than in a passing off action. This clearly indic;11cd that the respondent company did not want any .other\n\nmerchant to use the word \"Shree\" in his trade mark in respect of ghee and that the respondent company t.houghc that the registration of its trade mark with the word \"Shree\" contained in it would, per se, give it a right also to that word and .that its intention was to launch infringement actioris under the Act against any other trader who might happen to use the word \"Shree\" either alone or as part of his trade mark in respect of ghee.\n\nFurther, the Registrar may well have thought that the fact that all other traders who had got their trade marks containing the word \"Shree\"\n\nregistered had had to submit to a disclaimer of the word \"Shree\" whereas the respondent company had got its trade mark containing the word \"Shree\" registered without a disclaimer was calculated to cause embarrassment to. other traders and might conceivably encourage tbe respqndent company to contend that the registration of its trade mark by itself and without further evidence gave it a properietary right to the exclusive use of the word \"Shree\". The respondent company may also find some encouragement from the observations of .Lord Radcliffe in DeCordova and others' v. Vick Chemical Coy.(') namely, that if a word forming part of a mark has come in trade to be used to identify the goods of the owner of the mark, it i~ an infringement of the mark itself to use that word as the mark or part of the mark of another trader, for confusion is likely to result. These considerations may reasonably have led the Registrar to require a disclaimer.\n\nNone of these considerations arose or were adverted to in the Tudor case and this circumstance quite clearly distinguishes the. present case from that case.\n\nIt is true that where a distinctive label is registered as a whole, such registration cannot possibly give any\n\nexclusive statutory right to the oroprietor of the trade mark to, the use of any particular word or name contained therein anart from the mark a.,; a whole.\n\nAs said by Lwd Esher in Pinto v. Badmanr> : ·\n\n\"The truth is that the label does not consist of\n\n(1) [19Sll 68 R.P.C.103 at p. 106.\n\n(2) 8 R.J'.C. 181 at p. 191.\n\nThe Registrar ef\n\nTrade Marks\n\n\\', Ashok Chandra\n\nRakhit Ltd.\n\nDasJ.\n\n1955 each particular part of it, but consists of the comhi-\n\nThe Re1ir.;, rar qf nation of them all\",\n\nTrade Marks\n\nAshok Chandra\n\nRakhit ltd.\n\nDas.I.\n\nObservations to the same effect will be found also in ln re Appo//inaris Company's Trade MarksC), !11 rl!\n\nSmokeless Powder Co. (supra), In re C/emem and Cid') and In re Alben Baker & Company {supra) and finally in the Tudor rnse referred to above which was decided by Sargant, .T.\n\nThis circumstance, however, does not necessarily mean that in such a case disclaimer will always be unnecessary. It is significant that one of\n\nth~ facts which give rise to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to impose disclaimer is that the trade mark ccntains parts which are not separately registered.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the section itself contemplates that there may be a disclaimer in respect of paris contained in a trade mark registered as a whole although the registration of the mark as a whole does not confer. any statutory right with respect to that part.\n\nAs we have already stated the possibility of the proprietor attempting to expand the operation of his trade mark cannot be ignored or overlooked. It ls a thing which must be taken into consideration by the tribunal-be it the Registrar or the Court--in deciding upon the way it should exercise the discretionary power conferred on it. Reference has beef) made by\n\nthe Hi!.!h Court to the observations of Eve, .T. in the A.B.c: case referred to above and the question has been posed as to whether any good cause had been shown for the necessity of disclaimer in this case. The High Court answers the question immediately by saying that it did not think that any cause had been shown beyond the desirability of having a uniform practice. This, as we have already stated, is not quite correct. for apart from the :l)ractice the Registrar did advert to the other important consideration, namelv. that on the evidence before him and the\n\nsttenient of counsel it was quite clear that the reason for resisting the disclaimer in this particular case was that the company thought. erroneously no doubt but\n\n(I) L.R. f1R91l 2C'h. 1R6.\n\n(2) L.R. [1900] 1Ch.114.\n\nquite seriously, that the registration of the trade mark as a whole world, in the circumstances of this case, give. it a right to the exclusive use of th.! word \"Shree\" as if separately and by itself it was also its registered trade mark and that it would be easier for it to be successful in an infringement action than in a passing off action.\n\nIt was precisely the possibility of such an extravagant and untenable claim that called for a disclaimer for the purpose of defining the rights of the respondent company under the registration.\n\nThis aspect of the matter does not appear to have been pressed before or adverted to by the High Court.\n\nConsidering all the circumstances discussed above, we are not of opinion that the Registrar had gone so wrong as to have made it necessary for the High Court to interfere with his discretion.\n\nIt is were to be regarded as a matter of exercise of discretion by the High Court as to whether a disclaimer should be imposed or not, it is quite clear that the attention of the High Court was not drawn to an important consideration, namely, the strong possibility of the respondent company claiming a statutory right to the word ''Shree\" by virtue of the registration of its trade mark and subject others to infringement actions only on the strength of the registration and without proof of facts which it would have otherwise to establish in order to succeed in a passing off action or a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code and. the ref ore. the Hih Court cannot be said to have properly exercised its discretion.\n\nThe result. therefore, is that this appeal must he allowed and the respondent company must pav the appellant's costs in this Court and in the High Court.\n\n3$-8 SCIINDIS2\n\nThe Registrur of\n\nTrQde Marks v.\n\nAshok Cna11dra\n\nRaklzit Ltd.\n\nDasJ.", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 649, "end_char": 668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as there was an initial irregularity in the matter of issuing a notice under Order XXXIJ, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, we are unable to hold that the appellants were guilty of any !"}}, {"text": "THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1188, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1193, "end_char": 1217, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ashok Cha11dra\n\nRakhit Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1221, "end_char": 1230, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1232, "end_char": 1240, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1245, "end_char": 1254, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1261, "end_char": 1281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1299, "end_char": 1304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}, {"text": "S. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1363, "end_char": 1368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1543, "end_char": 1548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1556, "end_char": 1571, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1829, "end_char": 1834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2235, "end_char": 2240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Trade Marks Act 1940", "statute": "The Trade Marks Act 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 2( n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2358, "end_char": 2366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2535, "end_char": 2540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2594, "end_char": 2599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3837, "end_char": 3842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5091, "end_char": 5108, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Albert Baker Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5330, "end_char": 5346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33-8 SCI/ND182\n\n/955\n\nThr Registrar of Trade Marks V.\n\nAshok Chandra\n\nRakhlt Ltd.\n\n1955 Sharp v. Wakefield (L.R. 1891 A.C. 173), Albert Baker Co.'s The R 11;, rrar of Application and Aerated Bread Company's Application In re (L.R.\n\nTrad~ Marks [1908] 2 Ch."}}, {"text": "Rakhit ltd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "86; 25 R.P.C. 513), In the matter of an application by v. the Diamond T. Motor Car Co, ([1921] 38 R.P.C. 373 at 379), Eno 'As/10k Chandra\n\nv. Dunn (L.R. [1890] 15 A.C. 252; 7 R.P.C. 311), In the matter of Rakhit ltd.,"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judica ture at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6315, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd day of August 1951 of the High Court of Judica ture at Calcutta in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C: K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India K. S.\n\nShavakasha and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. S.\n\nShavakasha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6564, "end_char": 6581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C: K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India K. S.\n\nShavakasha and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6586, "end_char": 6598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C: K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India K. S.\n\nShavakasha and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Isaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6630, "end_char": 6642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs, (P. K. Ghosh, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6645, "end_char": 6656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs, (P. K. Ghosh, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "DAS J.-This", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6752, "end_char": 6763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judp; ment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order pronounced on the 23rd August 1951 by a Division Bench of the High Court at Calcuttil in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "24th March. 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6982, "end_char": 6998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "112 of 1950 reversin~ the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks dated the 24th March."}}, {"text": "Durga Charan Rakhit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts are as follows: Jn the year 1897 one Durga Charan Rakhit (since deceased) adnpted as his trade mark in respect of the <?", "canonical_name": "Durga Charan Rakhit"}}, {"text": "Malli Nath Rakhit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8367, "end_char": 8384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit affirmed by Malli Nath Rakhit, a director of the respondent company and filed in these proceedings, this mark has throughout been referred to as \"the said mark SREE\"."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8711, "end_char": 8719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Durga Charan Rakhit having subsequently been adjudged insolvent all his properties including the goodwill of his ghee business and the said mark vested in the Official Assignee of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "15th January 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8728, "end_char": 8745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 15th January 1915 the goodwill of the said business including the 'laid mark was sold by the Official Assignee by public auction and one Hem Dev Konch, a minor, was declared as the highest bidder and purchaser."}}, {"text": "Hem Dev Konch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8865, "end_char": 8878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 15th January 1915 the goodwill of the said business including the 'laid mark was sold by the Official Assignee by public auction and one Hem Dev Konch, a minor, was declared as the highest bidder and purchaser."}}, {"text": "25th January 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9021, "end_char": 9038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 25th January 1915 by an attorney acting on behalf of the purchaser."}}, {"text": "27th January 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9096, "end_char": 9113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th January 1915 the said sale was confirmed by a Deed of assignment executed by the Official Assignee."}}, {"text": "22nd August 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9208, "end_char": 9224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 22nd August 1917 Haripriya Konch, the father and natural guardian of the minor purchaser, acting as such and on behalf of the minor."}}, {"text": "Haripriya Konch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 22nd August 1917 Haripriya Konch, the father and natural guardian of the minor purchaser, acting as such and on behalf of the minor."}}, {"text": "Ashok Chandra Rakhit", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9357, "end_char": 9377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "conveyed to one Ashok Chandra Rakhit, son of the said Ourga Charan Rakhit.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Cha11dra\n\nRakhit Ltd."}}, {"text": "Ourga Charan Rakhit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9395, "end_char": 9414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "conveyed to one Ashok Chandra Rakhit, son of the said Ourga Charan Rakhit.", "canonical_name": "Durga Charan Rakhit"}}, {"text": "Chandra\n\nRak/1it Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9609, "end_char": 9630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "title and interest in the said mark and the said\n\nAshok Chandra Rakhit carried on the said business\n\nTlzc Reginrar of\n\nTrade Marks v.\n\nAs/wk Chandra\n\nRak/1it Ltd.\n\nDasJ.\n\n1955 and marketed ghee under the said mark."}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10143, "end_char": 10169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Trade Mark Registry at Hong-Kong under the provisions of the Hong-Kong Trade Marks Ordinance, 1909", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10391, "end_char": 10489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10606, "end_char": 10621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1934 two persons, Rajendra Prasad and Dilliram, were, on complaint, made on behalf of the respondent company, convicted by the Chief Presidcm.:y Magistrale of Calcutta under section 4l'6."}}, {"text": "Dilliram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10626, "end_char": 10634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1934 two persons, Rajendra Prasad and Dilliram, were, on complaint, made on behalf of the respondent company, convicted by the Chief Presidcm.:y Magistrale of Calcutta under section 4l'6."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10762, "end_char": 10771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Mark Registry at Hong-Kong under the provisions of the Hong-Kong Trade Marks Ordinance, 1909", "statute": "the Trade Mark Registry at Hong-Kong under the provisions of the Hong-Kong Trade Marks Ordinance, 1909"}}, {"text": "Chiranjilal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10899, "end_char": 10917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1935 one Chiranjilal Sharma was, on like complaint, convicted by the Chief Presidency Magistrale for infringement of the said mark."}}, {"text": "Indian Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11462, "end_char": 11490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bidyut Bikash Rakshit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12110, "end_char": 12131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company also submitted an affidavit affirmed by one Bidyut Bikash Rakshit, a director of the respondent company, in support of its objection."}}, {"text": "section 46(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13379, "end_char": 13392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13400, "end_char": 13415, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "8th March 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13434, "end_char": 13448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1940 and on the 8th March 1947 issued a notice calling upon the respondent company to show cause why the register should not be rectified by entering a disclaimer of the exclusive right in regard to the wurd \"Shree\"."}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14431, "end_char": 14453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the respondent company preferred an appeaJ to the High Court at Calcutta under section 76 o( the Act."}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14460, "end_char": 14470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15458, "end_char": 15468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15479, "end_char": 15492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15500, "end_char": 15515, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15524, "end_char": 15534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Halsburv. L.C", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18051, "end_char": 18064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(See the observations of Lord Halsburv."}}, {"text": "Ashok Cha11dra\n\nRakhit Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18252, "end_char": 18279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Registrar a/.\n\nTrade Marks v. • Ashok Cha11dra\n\nRakhit Ltd.\n\nDas.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Cha11dra\n\nRakhit Ltd."}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18476, "end_char": 18486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18578, "end_char": 18588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18652, "end_char": 18662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18700, "end_char": 18707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "corresponds to our section 13, was considered by the High Court in England in In re Albert Baker Co.'s Application and Jn re Aerated Bread Company's Application(') which is commonly called the A.B.C. case."}}, {"text": "Albert Baker Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18717, "end_char": 18733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "corresponds to our section 13, was considered by the High Court in England in In re Albert Baker Co.'s Application and Jn re Aerated Bread Company's Application(') which is commonly called the A.B.C. case."}}, {"text": "Eve", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18852, "end_char": 18855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fn that case Eve, J. found on the evidence that Albert Baker Company were widely known as\n\n\"A.B.C.\" or \"A.B. & Co.\" but that the letters ·\"A.B.C.\" did not exclusively indicate their goods and that those letters being common to the trade they were not entitled to the exclusive use of those letters.", "canonical_name": "Eve"}}, {"text": "Albert Baker Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18887, "end_char": 18907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fn that case Eve, J. found on the evidence that Albert Baker Company were widely known as\n\n\"A.B.C.\" or \"A.B. & Co.\" but that the letters ·\"A.B.C.\" did not exclusively indicate their goods and that those letters being common to the trade they were not entitled to the exclusive use of those letters."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20441, "end_char": 20451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20598, "end_char": 20610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20809, "end_char": 20819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21130, "end_char": 21140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.O. Lawrence", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21205, "end_char": 21218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the fact that discretion is given also to the High Court under section 13 a question may be raised as to whether the observations made by P.O. Lawrence, J. in In the matter of an application by the Diamond T.\n\nMotor Car Co.0 namely, that in dealing with an appeRl from the Registrar's decision under section 8(2) of the English Act of 1919 the High Court is not fetterred by reason of the Registrar on the hearing before him having exercised his discretirm, apply to our High Court hearing appeals under section 76 of our Act from Decisions of the Registrar given under section 13 of our Act and whether in that situation our High Court may exercise its own discretion iust as it could if the proceedings had initially been taken before it."}}, {"text": "Diamond T.\n\nMotor Car Co.0", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21265, "end_char": 21291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the fact that discretion is given also to the High Court under section 13 a question may be raised as to whether the observations made by P.O. Lawrence, J. in In the matter of an application by the Diamond T.\n\nMotor Car Co.0 namely, that in dealing with an appeRl from the Registrar's decision under section 8(2) of the English Act of 1919 the High Court is not fetterred by reason of the Registrar on the hearing before him having exercised his discretirm, apply to our High Court hearing appeals under section 76 of our Act from Decisions of the Registrar given under section 13 of our Act and whether in that situation our High Court may exercise its own discretion iust as it could if the proceedings had initially been taken before it."}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21367, "end_char": 21379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21571, "end_char": 21581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21637, "end_char": 21647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21928, "end_char": 21938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming, but without deciding, that they do apply, it must, nevertheless, be remembered, adapting the language of Lord Macnaghten in Eno v. Dunn(') that it is the Registrar \"to whom in the first instance .is committed the discretionary power\"."}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22752, "end_char": 22759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 such a case is for the High Court to consider, as said The Reg; sirar of by Lord Dunedin in In ihe matter of an application hy Trade Mark..\n\nF. Reddaway & Co Ltd.('), \"whether the Registrar Ashok Chandra had really gone so wrong as to make it necessary to Rakhit Ltd. interfere with his discretion\"."}}, {"text": "Ashok Chandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22861, "end_char": 22874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 such a case is for the High Court to consider, as said The Reg; sirar of by Lord Dunedin in In ihe matter of an application hy Trade Mark..\n\nF. Reddaway & Co Ltd.('), \"whether the Registrar Ashok Chandra had really gone so wrong as to make it necessary to Rakhit Ltd. interfere with his discretion\".", "canonical_name": "Ashok Cha11dra\n\nRakhit Ltd."}}, {"text": "Rakhit Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22927, "end_char": 22938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 such a case is for the High Court to consider, as said The Reg; sirar of by Lord Dunedin in In ihe matter of an application hy Trade Mark..\n\nF. Reddaway & Co Ltd.('), \"whether the Registrar Ashok Chandra had really gone so wrong as to make it necessary to Rakhit Ltd. interfere with his discretion\"."}}, {"text": "Smokeless Powder Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23623, "end_char": 23643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An illustration of an attempt .of this kind is to be found in In re Smokeless Powder Co.'s Trade Mark(')."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25477, "end_char": 25494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25597, "end_char": 25607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25615, "end_char": 25636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26007, "end_char": 26016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26609, "end_char": 26618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Rak/ut Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27384, "end_char": 27395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court read the decision of the Rak/ut Ltd.\n\nR t d 1 h d d\n\nDas J. eg1s rar as procee mg on y on w at was escnbe as an inflexible practice established in the Registry whereby the word \"Shree\" was either refused registration as a trade mark or a disclaimer was enforced if it wa' a part of a trade mark and in this view the case appeared to the High Court to be indistinguishable from the case of In re Cadbury Brothers' A pplication(1)."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27818, "end_char": 27827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27870, "end_char": 27879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27958, "end_char": 27967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27986, "end_char": 27998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28885, "end_char": 28897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sargant", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29169, "end_char": 29176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision of the Registrar wa~ overruled by Sargant, J. The learned Jud!!e."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29603, "end_char": 29613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "As!iok ~Jumdra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31751, "end_char": 31765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 rights by other proceedings, e.g., passing off actions The R;;;;;;; rar of or prosecutions which, by reason of the proviso, were Trade Marks open to be taken by it, if the necessary facts to As!iok ~Jumdra support such proceedings which were not before the\n\nRakhit Ltd.\n\nRegistrar could be satisfactorily established."}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34950, "end_char": 34959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company may also find some encouragement from the observations of .Lord Radcliffe in DeCordova and others' v. Vick Chemical Coy.(')"}}, {"text": "Lwd Esher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35801, "end_char": 35810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As said by Lwd Esher in Pinto v. Badmanr> : ·\n\n\"The truth is that the label does not consist of\n\n(1) [19Sll 68 R.P.C.103 at p. 106."}}, {"text": "Registrar ef\n\nTrade Marks\n\n\\', Ashok Chandra\n\nRakhit Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35957, "end_char": 36014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Registrar ef\n\nTrade Marks\n\n\\', Ashok Chandra\n\nRakhit Ltd.\n\nDasJ.\n\n1955 each particular part of it, but consists of the comhi-\n\nThe Re1ir.;,"}}, {"text": "Eve", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37438, "end_char": 37441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference has beef) made by\n\nthe Hi!.!h Court to the observations of Eve, .T. in the A.B.c: case referred to above and the question has been posed as to whether any good cause had been shown for the necessity of disclaimer in this case.", "canonical_name": "Eve"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39639, "end_char": 39656, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_270_289_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "April 15\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nANTL BEHARI GHOSH\n\n[ 1955]\n\nSMT. LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS.\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS and SINHA, JJ.]\n\nIndian Succession Act, 1925 (Act XXXIX of 1925), s. 263-- Explanation cl. (a)-Expression \"defectivt in substance\"-Meaning of-Probate proceedings--Omission to issue citation to persons who should hll'De been apprised-Legal effect thereof-Revocation of grant-Whether qn absolute right irrespective of other considerations arising in the case~'Judicial discretion vested in Courts.\n\nThe expression \"defective in substance\" jn Explanation cl. (a) to s. 263 of the Indian Succession Act,-1925 means that the defect was of such a character as to substantial! y affect the regularity and correctness of the previous proceedings.\n\nThe omission to issue c.itations to persons who should have been apprised of the probate proceedings may well be in a normal case a ground by itself for revocation of the grant.\n\nBut this is not an absolute right irrespective of other considerations arising from 'the proved facts of a case. . The law has yested a judicial discretion in the court to revoke a grant where the court may have prima facie reasons to believe that it was necessary to have the will proved afresh in the presence of interested parties.\n\nThe Supreme Court was not satisfied that in all the circumstances of the present case just cause for the annulment of the grant of probate within the meaning of s. 263 of the Act had been made out.\n\nThe annulment of the grant of probate is a mal!er of substance and not of mqe form.\n\nThe court may refuse to grant. annulment in cases where there is no likelihood of proof being offered that the will admitted to probate was either not genuine or had not been validly executed.\n\nWhere, as in the present case, the validity or gem, llneness of the will bas not )>ecn challenged it would serve no useful purpose to revoke the grant and to. make the parties go through the mere formality of proving the will again. . .\n\nUnder tfie circumstances of the present case the omission of citation bas had no effect on the regularity of.the proceedings resulting in the grant of 1921.\n\nMokshadayini Dasi v. Karnadhar Mandal ((19141 19 C.W.N. 1108), Brindaban v. Sureshwar ((1909) 10 C.L.J. 263), Durgavati v.\n\nSourabini ([1906] l.L.R. 33' Cal. 1001) and .Ramanandi Kuer v.\n\nKrdowati Kuer ([19271 L.R. 55 I.A. 18), referred to.\n\n1955 C1v1L APPELLATE JuRJSDJCTJON: Civil Appeal No. 106 of 1953.\n\nAnil Befluri Gf1osh\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated the Smr. Latika Bala 4th September 1951 of the High Court of Judicature Dussiaudothers at Calcutta in Appeal from Original Order No. 131 of\n\n1950 arising out of the Order dated the 29th day of August 1950 of the High Court of Calcutta in its Testamentary Intestate Jurisdiction made in Application under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act.\n\nP. N. Sen, (A. K. Dutt and S. Chose with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setall\"ad, A 11orney-Ge11eral for India (A .N.\n\nSinha. with him) for respondent No. 1.\n\nD. N. Mukherji, for respondent No. 2\n\n1955. April 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-This i~ an appeal against the judgment and order dated the 4th September 1951 of the Calcutta High Court in its appellate jurisdictii.)n reversing those dated the 29th August 1950 of a Judge of that Court sitting on the Original Side granting the appellant's prayer for revoking and annulling the probate granted in respect of the last will and testament dated the 29th July 1912 of one Bi nod Lal\n\nGhoh. deceased, whom we shall call the testator in the cours.e of this judgment.\n\nThe testator is said to have executed a will on the 29th July 1912 which was registered on the same date at the Calcutta registry office.\n\nBy the said will the testator appointed the following five persons as executtir~ or executrices:-\n\n< O Anil Nath Basu, Attorney-at-Law\n\n(2) Brindaban Chandra Mitter (These two also figure as attesting witnesses to the will).\n\n<.31 His adopted son Charu Chandra Ghose (whon'l\n\n\\Ve shall call Charu for the sake of\n\nbrevity) a minor on his attaining majority.\n\n}955\n\n(4) His wife Haimabati Dasi, and\n\nii Beliari Ghosh\n\n(5) His brother's widow Muktakesi Dasi. v.\n\nSmt. Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix. It 1s not necessary to set out in detail the legacies created by the will except to state that he created annuities in favour of a number of persons including his wife, his brother's widow Muktakesi Dasi, his daughter-in-law, his niece-in-law aforesaid and Charu. He also made provision in his will for arinual payments in respect of the expenses of certain deities and festivals, as also for the funeral expenses of himsdf and the annuitants aforesaid.\n\nHe directed his er.r.icutors to accumulate Rs. 12,000 a year out of the balance left after meeting the annuities and the other annua I expenses aforesaid to be paid over to Charu upon the death of the said Latikabala Dasi and Sushama Bala Dasi who were to share the residue, if any, after paying the annuities and other outgoings referred to above. It would thus appear that though the testator intended Charu to be the -owner of his entire estate including the accumulations after meeting the annuities and the other annual expenses, he did not trust him to the extent of putting that estate into bis hands immediately on his attaining ma.iority. He trusted Charu's wife and the other ladies i.n his family more than Charu himself, though he specifically stated in the will-.\n\n\"Provided always that the said adopted son shall be deemed to have a vested interest in the said estate immediately on my death\".\n\nHe appointed his wife Haimabati Dasi as the guardian of the person and property of Charu and of his wife Latikabala Dasi aforesaid.\n\n, On the 5th March 1920 the testator is said to have been murdered by Charu who was placed on his trial,\n\nconvicted for murder and sentenced to transporta- 1955 tion for life. Charu served his term of imprinsonment A11il Behari Ghosh and wa& released from jail some time in 1933. v.\n\nSmt. Latika Bala On the 30th September 1921 an application for probate of the will aforesaid was made on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court on beh::tlf of Anil Nath, Muktakesi Dasi and Latikabala Dasi aforesaid.\n\nThe application stated that the testator died on the 5th March 1920 at Baranagar, leaving hirn surviving his adopted son Charu and his widow Haimabati D:tsi. The will dated the 29th July 1912 was recited and the five persons named above were said to have been appointed executors and executrices of the will. lt also stated that Brindaban Chandra Mitter, one of the executors named in the will, had died in July 1913 and his son Debi Prosad Mitter was a minor. It also recited the death of Haimabati Dasi on the 22nd\n\nMay 1921, thus explaining why out of the five executors and executrices named in the will the application had been ri1ade only on behalf of the surviving three persons. The assets of the testator's estate were stated not to exceed a sum of Rs.\n\n4,75,780/-. The prayer was \"that probate of the said wiil may be granted to your petitioners limited within the Province of Bengal reserving power of making the like grant to the said Charu Chandra Ghose a_!!d the said Debi Prosad Mitter (when he comes of age) when they will come and pray for the same''. The grant was made the same day (i.e., 30th September\n\n1921) which fell during the long vacation and the Judge in charge passed the order-\"Order as prayed\" no citations being issued.\n\nThis is material in view of what has been alleged subsequently about this grnnt, as will presently appear.\n\nNothing was heard about these proceedings until the 24th July 1933 when an application was made by Debi Prosad Mitter aforesaid for the grant of probate to him along with Anil Nath Basu and Latikabala Dasi.\n\nTn that application. the previous grant of proh~1tc <litcd the 30th September. 1921. the death of Muktakesi Dasi some time in October 1932 and the\n\nDassi and others\n\nSi11haJ.\n\n1955 facr of his attaining majority some time in January\n\nAllil 0;:,,~-;; Gliosli 1924 are recited.\n\nOn the 16th September. 1933 Debi v.\n\nPwsf!d Milter's application was granted.\n\nSnu. Latika Bala\n\nDussi m•1 others It appears that Latikabala Da5i and Sushamabala s;\"'\"' J.\n\nDasi applied to the Calcutta High Court on the 4th December 1933 for an order for discharging the\n\neecutors appointed previously and for a direction to hand over the entire estate of the testator t0 the applicants. In answer to the summons Debi Prasad Mitter made an atlida vit on the 7th Deccm ber 1933 in which he recited the previous grants of the probate made in J 921 and 1933: and stated that the testator Binod Lal Ghosh was inurdered on the 5th March 1920 by Cham and that on the death of Haimabati in May 1921, the testator's first cousin Girish Chandra Ghosh became entitled to the residue of the estate of the testator. In that affidavit he set out the genealogic11l table of the family of the testator showing how Girish Chandra Ghosh was related to the deceased.\n\nHe also made pointed reference to the fact that the wrviving grantees of the probate. Anil Nath Basu\n\nand Lalikabala Dasi, after the death of Haimabati had not filed any account of the tcst:ltor's estate in their capacity as executor and executrix respectively and that on his obtaining probate of the will those\n\nperson' had not complied with his request of furnishing a statement of accounts about their dealings with the testator's estate. He also set out the test of the letter sent by his solicitor to Anil Nath Basu and Lalikabala Dasi. The letter is elated the 4th December 1933.\n\nIt does not appear from the record as to what attitude had been taken by the executor and the executrix aforesaid in answer to the call made by Debi Prasad Mitter for submission of accounts of their dealings with the testator's estate after the grant of probate in 1921 .as aforesaid.\n\nUltimately, on the 16th May, J 1)34 th~ High Court dismissed the appiication for discharging the persons who had been granted the probate.\n\nGirish Chandra Ghosh aforesaid died in Dcccmhcr. 19.40 without having , taken any steps in court clahning his rights, whatever they were, in the\n\ntestator's estate.\n\nAnil Nath Basu also died in July, 1955 1948.\n\nHe does not appear from the record to have Anil Behari Ghnsh rendered any accounts in respect of his dealings as the s L v:k B . . f h 11 f h d d mt. ati a ma managing executor 0 t e WI 0 t e ecease .\n\nDn.ui and others\n\nIt was not until the 17th September, I 949 that the appellant, who is one of the four sons of the said Girish Chandra Ghosh, made an application to the Calcutta High Court on the Original Side praying that the probates dated the 30th September, 1921, and the 16th September, 1933 in respect of the will dated the 29th Ju!y, 1912 be revoked, annulled and/or set aside and that an administrator pendente lite be appointed. The petition runs into about twenty printed pages setting out the petitioner's relationship with the testator, the will and the grant of the probates as aforesaid, the murder of the testator by Charu, his trial, conviction and sentence for that murder. It was also averred that the testator had \"intended to revoke his said will of 29th July, 1912\". Then follows a long recital of facts tending to that conclusion. Then follows para.\n\n19 which is in these terms:~\n\n\"From the said correspondence and papers it is absoiutely clear that the said testator revoked his will of 2C)th July, 1912. Your petitioner submits that arrangements were being made for handing over the estate of the said Binod Lal Ghosh, deceased, in the hands of the Administrator-General of Bengal for the purpose of charity but the said purpose did not mature and under the circumstances your petitioner submits that the said will of 29th July, 1912 ha\" been revoked bv the said testator and no further will was executed in its place or stead\".\n\nPara. 23 is a statement of the grounds on which the case for revocation of the grants is founded.\n\nThat paragraph is in these terms:-\n\n\"Your petitioner submits that the probates herein should be revoked as a just cause for doing so exists inter alia, on the following grounds:\n\n(a) That no notice of either application for probate was served on your petitioner's father, although he was the nearest male relative alive at the time when the said Binod Lal r.hosh was murdered;\n\nSinha.!.\n\nAnil Beltari G!10sh\n\nSnit. latika Bala\n\nDa.<;.r; f and others\n\nSinha J.\n\n(b) That the grants were obtained fraudulently; le) That the grants were obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential to justify the grant;\n\n(d) That the grants were obtained by making a false declaration that the property was valued only at Rs. 4,75,780/-. although the High Court in its Criminal .Jurisdiction had stated in 1920 that the estate of the said Binod Lal Ghosh was over Rs. 40,00,000/-;\n\nle) That the grants in any event. are useless and inoperative;\n\n(f) That there was no filing of accounts; lg) That the grants were issued hy concealing the fact~ of the intention of the said testator to revoke the will;\n\n(h) That the deceased never lived within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court\".\n\nThe application was opposed by Latikabala Dasi chiefly on the ground that no citation to Girish Chandra Ghosh was necessary, that in any event, he was cognisant of the probate proceedings and of the estate being administered by the executors and that he stood by. It was denied by her that the said Girish Chandra Ghosh was the nearest inale relative of the testator or thflt Charu had murdered his adoptive father. It was also denied that the testator had revoked hts will and that he died intestate as a result of which the petitioner and his three brothers became entitled to succeed to his estate. Achintva Nath Basu took similar grounds in opposition to the application for revocation. Debi Prosad Mitter by an affidavit of his own denied that there had been any just cause for revoking the probate but added that he had been discharged on his own application from further acting as one of the executors of the testator's will.\n\nThough no issues were framed. the m1in grounds for revocation or annulment of the probates were as stated in para. 23 set out above.\n\nMr. Justice P. B.\n\nMukherjee who dealt with the case on the Original\n\nSide, after an elaborate consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case. passed orders revokin~\n\nand annulling the grants aforesaid and directing \"that 1955 the will be proved in solemn form on notice to the AnilBehari Ghosh applicant 11, nd the other sons of Girish and also after s L v: l\n\nI · II d . h mt. at1ka Ba a a genera c1tat10n to er persons mtereste m t e Dassi and others estate\".\n\nHe also appointed the applicant, the appellant before us, as an administrator pendente lite with usual powers to take charge of the estate, with costs to the applicant to be paid out of the estate. He directed the other opponents-respondents to bear their\n\nown costs. On the points in controversy he came to the conclusion that Girish was related to the testator as a cousin, that there was no acquiescence on the part of Girish barring the appellant from pursuing his remedy. that the non-citation of Girish was by itself not sufficient to invalidate the grant, but that circumstance in conjunction with other facts, viz., of material concealment of the fact that Cham had murdered the testator and that the testator had entertained an intention to revoke the will, though it had not actually been revoked, was sufficient ground for revoking the grant. He held further, on the authority of the decision in Mokshadayini v. Karnadhar(') that the question whether the will had as a matter of fact been revoked would form the subject matter for final determination after the revocation of the grants when fresh proceedings will be taken after due citation.\n\nHe also held that in the circumstances of this case, though there was no averment of wilful default in exhibiting an inventory and accounts 0f the testator~ est::itc. the executors were actually guilty of such a default and there was thus just cause for revoking the grant. He did not hold the other grounds of attack against the grant made out by the applicant; that is to S(IV, he did not find it established that the estate was vorth over Rs. 40,00,000 and that the declaration of the value of the testator's estate at Rs. 4,75,780 war; false or fraudulent or that the grant had become useless or inoperative otherwise. or that the case could not be heard by the Calcutta High Court, on the Original Side.\n\nOn appeal by latikabala Dasi, the Appellate Bench . . m 19 rw. N. t 10&.\n\n36-8 SCI/ND/82\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955 consisting of Sir Trevor Harries, C.J. and Banerjee, J ., A11il Belwri Ghosh allowed the appeal and dismissed the application for\n\nSmt. Laika Bala revocation of the probate with costs of both the Dassi and others courts.\n\nThey held that the will in question was\n\nSinha J. genuine and valid in view of the evidence and of the fact that its genuineness or validity had not been questioned specifically in the pleadings. They also held that there was no revocation of the will or even an intention on the part of the testator to revoke the will.\n\nThey also held that Girish was entitled t0 citation but that the non-citation did not materially affect the grant of the probate and that at any rate, Girish being fully aware of the grant stood by, and therefore acquiesced in the grant, and did not take any steps at the right time t0 question the grant.\n\nThey therefore did not think it just and expedient to reopen the proceedings when they were satisfied that there was no real and substantial attack against the genuineness and validity of the will itself.\n\nJn this appeal it has been argued on behalf of the appellant on the authority of the decision in Mokshadayini v. Karnadhar(') that the Appeal Court should have agreed with the Judge on the Original Side in holding that there was material concealment of facts which considered along with the admitted position that no citation had been taken against Girish Chandra Ghosh had vitiated the proceedings for the grant of probate and that the question of the genuineness or validity of the will should have been left over for determination at a later stage of the proceedings.\n\nIt was also argued that the omission to exhibit the accounts was in the circumstances of this case wilful default without reasonable cause within the meaning of the Jaw and was sufficient by itself to entitle the applicant to a revocation.\n\nIt was also argued that no grounds had been made out in fact to support the legal conclusion drawn by the Appeal Court that there had been an acquiescence on the part of Girih. On behalf of the 1st respondent the conclusion of the Appeal Bench has been supported on all the grouT)ds.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent Debi Prasad Mitter. it\n\n(I) 19 C. W. N.1108.\n\nwas contended that he had been unnecessarily im- 1955 pleaded at all the stages and that he should have been Anil Behari Ghosh 2ranted his costs out of the estate of the deceased. s L v:k B l mt. all a a a The grant of probate was made under the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act V of (1881); but the Indian Succession Act (XXXIX of\n\n1925) consolidated the law relating to intestate and testamentary succession and thus incorporated the other Acts relating to the same subject1 including Act V of 1881. In order to be entitled to a revocation or annulment of the grant aforesaid the appellant has to bring his case within the purview of section 263 of the Indian Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925), which Nill hereinafter be referred to as the Act).\n\nSection 263 of t-he Act is substantiallv in the same terms as section 50 of Act V of 188 ( Section 263 provides that \"The grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just cause\" Under the Explanation-\n\n\"Just cause shall be deemed to exist where--\n\n(a1 the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance, or\n\n(.b) the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion, or by concealing from the court something material to the case, or\n\n(c) the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point o( law to .iustify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently, or\n\n(d) the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances, or\n\n(e) the person to whom the grant was made has wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhihit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of this Part, or has exhibited under that Chapter an inventory or account which is untrue in a material respect\".\n\nAfter the explanation. there are eight illustrations of the grounds on which a grant of probate may be revoked. of which the first three are material. They are as follows:-\n\nDassi and others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955 \"(i) The court by which the grant was made had Anil .Behari Ghosh no jurisdictfon.\n\nsm1. 1:-arika Bala\n\n(ii) The grant was made without citing parties Dam and others who ought to have been cited.\n\nSinha J.\n\n(iii) fhe will of which probate was obtained was forged or revoked\".\n\nIn this case the appellant tried to take advantage of the first illustration also, by suggesting in one of the grounds set out in para. 23 of his petition quoted above that the testator never lived within the Ordinary OnginaJ Civil Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court in exercise of which the grant in question had been made.\n\nBut that ground was negatived by the trial Judge and as it was not pressed before us, no more need be said about it.\n\nIt was vehemently argued at all stages oi the case including the appeal before us that admittedly no citation was issued against Girish Chandra Ghosh aforesaid and as he was the person most interested iri the testator's estate besides the. legatees named in the will, the case came directly within the purview of clause (a) of the Explanation and Illustration (ii) quoted above. Girish Chandra Ghosh has been found by the Judge in the first instance to have been the\n\nperon most vitally interested in the estate of the testator, whether he died intestate or leaving a will, in the events which had happened. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent suggested that it had not been found by the lower Appellate Court as a fact upon the evidence adduced in this case, that Girish was the nearest agnate of the testator or that Cham had murdered his adoptive father, though these matters had been assumed as facts. The courts below have referred to good and reliable evidence in support of the finding that Girish was the nearest reversioner to the estate of the testator. If the will is a vaJid and genuine will, there is intestacy in respect of the interest created in favour of Charu, if he was the murderer of the testator.\n\nOn this question the courts below have assumed on the basis of the judgment of conviction and sentence passed hy the Hfoh Conrt in the sessions trial that Cham was the\n\nmurderer. Though that judgment is relevant only to 1955 show that there was such a trial resulting in the con- A11il Behari Ghosh\n\nviction and .sentence of Charu to transportation for smi. La7ika Bala life, it is not evidence of the fact that Cham was the Dassi and others murderer.\n\nThat question has to be decided on evi- Sin/ta J. dence. However, for purposes of this case we shall assume in favour of the appellant that Charu was the murderer. The result of such an assumption is that Girish being the nearest reversioner to the estate of the testator, in case of intestacy after the death of the testator's widow in 1921; or in case of testamentary succession after the death of the t\\yo legatees, the testator's daughter-in-law and the nephew's wife aforesaid, and the failure of the legacy in favour of Charu on account of the murder would, in either event, have sufficient interest in the estate of the testator to entitle him to challenge the grant and to obtain revocation.\n\nBut it is noteworthy that Gidsh who died in 1940, lived for about 19 years after the grant and took no steps in that direction. There may be some doubt as to Girish's knowledge of the probate proceedings and of the grant until 1933; but, in om opinion, there is ample evidence 1!1 support of the finding arrived at by the Court of Appeal below that Girish was aware of the grant at the latest in 1933 when Debi Prasad Mitter took proceedings to obtain a grant in his own favour also. In his application, as indicated above, he clearly stated that Charu was the murderer of his adoptive father and that Girish would succeed to his estate, which otherwise would have gone to Charu. If Girish had initiated proceedings for revocation of the grant and had insisted on the will being proved in his presence, the courts would have had no difficulty in having all the necessary evidence before it because the chief person who had played the most leading part in. the execu-\n\n:tion of the will, in its registration and in its being admitted to probate, viz., Anil Nath Basu, was then alive and could have been examined. But for reasons 'not made clear in these proceedings Girish did .. ot think it worth his while to take any steps in court to\n\n1955 challenge the will or the grant. The estate was worth\n\n411il Beliari Glwsli anything between five to forty lakhs, perhaps nearer\n\nsmi Laika Bala ve lakhs than forty lakhs.\n\nGirish was a mere pen- Dassi and others s10ner belonging to a middle class family. Either he\n\nSinha J. did not think it worth his while to embark on a liti- _gation with all its uncertainties or he had not the wherewithal to do so.\n\nThe record as it stands does not satisfactorily explain the reasons why Girish refrained from making any attempts to get this large estate. If the will was not genuine or valid, Girish would take the reversionary estate at once because the testator's widow died in 1921 and there was no other impediment in his way, except to get rid of the will. If, on the other hand, the will was genuine and valid, even then he would stand to gain all the interest which had been bequeathed in favour of Charu.\n\nThe fact that Girish did not take advantage of his position as the nearest reversioner as on partial intestacy goes a long way to support the great probability of the will being valid and genuine, especially :as it had been probated and because the appellant in his long petition for revoking the grant has not made the least suggestion casting any doubt on the genuineness and validity of the will.\n\nBut it was argued on behalf of the appellant that that stage had not yet arrived and that it would be open to the appellant after obtaining an order of revocation of the grant to show that the will was either not genuine or had not been validly executed. Great reliance 'Nas placed in this connection on the judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Mokshadayini Dasi v.\n\nKarnadhar Manda[(') where the following observations have been made:-\n\n\"No question of the genuineness of the will arises for consideration till the court has decided that the pr0bate must be revoked on one or more of the grounds specified in section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act. The only matter for consideration at this stage is, whether the appellants have made out a just cause for revocation of the probate which was granted without notice to them: Brindahan v. Suresh-\n\n(1) 19 C.W.N. 1108.\n\nwar(').\n\nThe question of genuineness cannot be con- 1955 sidered till a case for revocation is made out: Durga- A11il Behari Ghosh vati v.\n\nSourabini!')\". v.\n\nSmt. Latika Bala The observations relied upon by the appellant were Dassi and Olhers\n\nmade with reference to the facts of that case and Sinha .1. were not intended to be of universal application. As pointed out above, section 263 of the Act also contemplates a case for revocation based on the single ground that the will in respect of which the grant in question was obtained was a forged one. In such a case, whether or not the will was a forged one would .. be the only question to be canvassed before the court before the order of revocation could be made.\n\nIt was further argued on behalf of the appellant that the appeal should be allowed and the grant revoked on the simple ground, apart from any other considerations, that there had been no citation issued to Girish.\n\nJn our opinion, this proposition also is much too widely stated. Section 263 of the Act vests a judicial discretion in the court to revoke or annul a grant for just cause.\n\nThe explanation has indicated the circumstances in which the court can come to the conclusion that \"just cause\" had been made out. In this connection the appellant relied upon clause (a) quoted above which requires that the proceedings resulting in the grant squght to be revoked should have been \"defective in substance\".\n\nWe are not inclined to hold that they were \"defective in substance\". \"Defective in substance\" must mean that the defect was of such a character as to substantially affect the regularity and correctness of the previous proceedings. If there were any suggestions in the present proceedings or any circumstances were pointed out to show that if Girish had been cited he would have been able to enter a caveat, the absence of citation would have rendered those proceedings \"defective in\n\n.,; ubstance''. It may be that Girish having been found to have been the next reversioner to the testator's estate in case of intestacy and on the assumption that Charu had murdered the testator, Girish might h:1ve been entitled to a revocation of the grant if he\n\n(1) 10 C.L.1. 263 at p. 273.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 33-C.I. 1001.\n\n1955 had moved shortly after the grant of the probate on Anil Behari Ghosh the simple ground that no citation had been issued v. to him. The omission to issue citations to persons Snu. Latika Bala Dassi and others who should have been apprised of the probate pro-\n\nSinha!. ceedings may well be in a normal case a ground by itself for revocation of the grant. But this is not an absolute right irrespective of other considerations arising from the proved facts of a case. The law has vested a judicial discretion in the Court to revoke a grant where the court may have prima facie reasons to believe that it was necessary to have the will proved afresh in the presence of interested parties.\n\nBut in the present case we are not satisfied in all the circumstances of the case that just cause within the meaning of section 263 had been made out. \\Ve cannot ignore the facts that about 27 years had elapsed after the grant of probate in 1921, that Girish in spite of the ki; iowldge of the grant at the latest in 1933 did not take any steps in his lifetime to have the grant revoked, that there was no suggestion that the will was a forgery or was otherwise invalid and that the will was a registered one and had been executed eight ye1rs before the testator's unnatural death. Hence the omission of citations to Girish which ordinarily may have been sufficient for a revocation of the grant was not in the special circumstances of this case sufficient to justify the court to revoke the grant.\n\nLearned Counsel for the appeilant made pointed reference to the deeision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ramanandi Kuer v. Kalawati Kuer('). But that case is ;1n !authority for the proposition that where two grounds :are taken for revocation of a grant, viz., (I) that persons who ought to have been cited were not cited. and (2\\ that the will was a forgery, if the first ground is esta hlished. the onus is upon the opponents to prove that the will is genuine. That case is no authority for the proposition that in every case where there is a defect in citation. the court must order a revocation or annulment of the grant. The annulment is a matter of substance and not of mere form. The court\n\n(I) L.R. SS I.A. 18.\n\n!may refuse to grant annulment in cases where there 1955 is no likelihod of proof being offered that the will Anil Behari Gho!h !admitted to probate was either not genuine or had s L v:k 8 1 b I \"di d . h 1 . t d mt. at1 a a a not een v~ I y execute . But, as ng t y pom e Dassi and others out by the lower Appellate Court, in the present case where the validity or genuineness of the will has not been challenged. it would serve no useful purpose to revoke the grant and to make the parties go through the mere formality of proving the will over again.\n\nIn our opinion. therefore, the omission of citation has had no effect on the regularity of the proceedings resulting in the grant of 1921.\n\nIt was next contended that there had been fraudulent concealment of material facts from the court in the proceedings of 1921, and that therefore the case came within the purview of clause (b) of the Explanation quoted above. It was said in this connection that the petition for the grant of probate made in 1921 did not disclose the following material faots:\n\n1. That Charu was the murderer of the testator;\n\n2. That the testator had revoked the will or had at least intended to revoke the will; and\n\n~. That a false declaration as regards the value of the property constituting the estate of the deceased kstator had been made, that is to say, the applicants for probate had concealed from the court the true valne of the property which was forty lakhs of rupees !and not only Rs. 4,75,780/- as stated by them.\n\nIt is true that -in para. 4 of the petition for probate it was only stated that Charu had been found guilty of murder by the High Court and was sentenced to transportation for life and had not till then been released from iail. Our attention was also called to the prayer portion of the petition in which the right of Charu to make an application for probate had been\n\n?reserved. We can easily dispose of the last su£!gestion bv observing that it was a mere formal reservation. It has no such sinister significance as is attrihuted to it.\n\nTt is also true that there is no statement in the aoolication that Charu had murdered the testr.tor.\n\nWhile agreeing with the Judge' in the first ronrt thnt this was rather disingenuous: we must also\n\n17-R fI!Nf 182\n\nSinha J.\n\nAnil Behar/ Ghosh\n\nStnt. Larika Bala\n\nDa.'isi and others\n\nSJ11!ta J.\n\nhold that that concealment, if it was deliberate, was not material to the case. Even if that statement had been made in the petition, that would have had no effect on the grant of probate to the petitioners who were before the court. The fact of the murder is relevant only to this extent, that it would affect the legacies in favour of Charu, but the other legacies would stand and the will would still be open to probate.\n\nThe last allegation relating to concealment is on th;: question of the value of the property left by the testator by his will. It is not necessary to consider whether if such a concealment had been made out it would have been sufficient to revoke the grant. It is encugh to point out that neither of the courts below has found that the property was really worth anything like forty lakhs of rupees. This ground has not ibeen pressed before us either. It must therefore be held that the appellant has failed to bring his case within the rule of material concealment.\n\nThe most serious allegation which c0uld have a determining effect on the grant. if made out, is that the testator had revoked the will. Such an allegation would directly come within the third illustration quoted above. But unfortunately for the appellant he made no attempt to prove hisallegation that there was any such revocation. Apart from showing that in or about the year 1917 the testator had entertained the intention either of materially altering his will or of altogether revoking it, there is absolutely no evidence in support of the allegation that the testator actually revoked the registered will in question. For proving that the will had been revoked, it had to be -shown that the testator had made another will or codicil or by some writing declared his intention to revoke the will. Such a document. is required by section 70 of the Act to be executed in the same manner as a will. Such a revocation could also have been proved. as the section Jays down, by l:iurning, tearing or otherwise destroying the will by the testator\n\nhimelf ot by some other person in his presence and by his direction, thus clearly indicating his intention\n\nof revoking the will. No such proof has been offered 1955 in this case.\n\nBut it was argued that the appellant A11il Betuiri Gliosli would have offered such proof after the order of revo-\n\n51111. Laika Bala cation was made by the court. That would be to put D11.,,; and 01/im\n\nthe cart before the horse. If an applicant for revoca- Sinlza J. tion of a grant alleges as a ground for such revocation that the testator had revoked the will, he has got to prove that alleged fact at least prima facie before he can be entitled to an order of revocation.\n\nThere may be cases where such a proof may be offered at a later stage where the revocation is founded upon other grounds, for example, where the court is satisfied that there was substantial defect in the previous proceedings resulting in the grant, or that the grantee had wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account; or some such other ground recognized by section 263 as just cause for annulling the grant has been established.\n\nIt was also argued on behalf of the appellant that even though he may not have proved that the testator had as a matter of fact revoked the will, he is still entitled to an order of revocation on the ground that he had entertained the intention of revoking the will. No authority had been cited before us in support of this contention. _It is open to a person who has made a will at any lime to alter or to revoke it; but if he has died leaving a registered will and has not taken any tangible steps to revoke such a wilL it is not enough to allege that the testator had at one time entertained the intention of doing so, because such an intention without being translated into action has no effect on the will actually left by him which must be treated as the last will and testament.\n\nIt remains to consider the last point. viz., whether the case is within clause (e) of the explanation to section 263.\n\nIn this connection ground (f) in paragraph 23 of the petition quoted above is the\n\nmly allegation.\n\nThe omission to submit accounts is not always synonymous with \"wilfully and without reaornble cause\" omitting to exhihit accounts.\n\nTn certain circumstances omission to submit accounts\n\nAnil Behari Ghosh\n\nSmt. Latika Bala Dassi and others\n\nSinha J.\n\nmay bring the case within the purview of clause (e)\n\naforesid because the circumstances may tend to' show that the omission was wilful and without -reasonable cause. We have therefore to consider whether in the circumstances of this case the omission to file accounts has the effect of entitling the appellant to an order. of revocation.\n\nUnder. the will the testator intended that Anil Nath Basu should function as the managing executor during his lifetime, as will appear from the relevant portion of paragraph 17 of the will which is as follows:\n\n\"I direct that my executor Babu Anil Nath Basu shall act alone without interference of my other executors in drawing money from or depositing money to any bank, courts or any other place or places and also in drawing interest of Government Promissory Note, debentures, etc. and in collecting rents of the houses and also in defending and instituting all suits relating to my estate and for the purpose above to sign cheques, rent bills and all papers relating to any suit in connection with my estate\".\n\nIt would thus appear that Anil Nath Basu was not only the most competent man being a trained lawyi!r to administer the estate but had also been in terms vested with the power to handle the cash and the a\"ccounts by himself without interference by the other executors. He must therefore have hanulcd the incomings and the outgoings and been respimsible for keeping true and proper accounts. Whether or not he did so we do not know, because Girish, as already indicated, never made any attempt to question the will or the grant or to call. him to account. We have already made reference to Debi Prasad M itter's correspondence with Anil Nath Basu, the managing executor, bearing on the question of accounts. There is nothing on the record to show what happened on that demand for accounts by Debi Prasad Mitter. The managing executor was alive up till July I 948 and unfortunately for the appellant, he initiated the revocation proceedings more than a year after his death. 1f these proceedings had hcen started in Anil Nath Basu's lifetime. he would have been the best person\n\nto inform the court as to how matters stood with 1955 reference to the accounts. The fact remains that no Auil n;;;;;;; Ghosh accounts appear from the record of this case to have Smt. La; ika Bala been submitted by the executors. An application Dassi aud others was made before us to take notice of the fact that accounts had been submitted up to date by the l st respondent who is in charge of the testator's estate.\n\nBut whether or not the respondent has filed accounts during the pendency of this appeal is wholly irrelevant. We have to determine whether the omission to submit accounts in the circumstances of this case entitles the appellant to have an order of revocation.\n\nIn the first place, no proper pleading had been made on this part of the case. It has not been alleged that there has been a wilful default without any reasonable cause. Hence no proper foundation was laid in the pleadings for reception of evidence either way.\n\nOn that ground alone, in our opinion, the appellant must fail on this part of the case. It may also be pointed out that in all the circumstances of this case referred to above, particularly in view of the fact that it was never suggested that the will in question was not genuine or had not been validly executed, it must be held that the proceedings leading up to this appeal have been misconceived. If the appellant has any locus standi, his remedy lay not against the will or against the grant of probate, but under the will. But it is not for this court to advise what the appellant should have done.\n\nAs, in our opinion, all the grounds raised on behalf of the appellant for revoking the grant have failed, it is not necessary to go into the question whether Girish had acquiesced in the grant in question and had therefore barred the door against the appellant from raising any further questions about it.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid we uphold the decision of the court below and dismiss the appeal with costs to the contesting respondent No. 1. There wili be no order as to costs in respect of the other respondent.\n\nSi11/ia J.", "total_entities": 112, "entities": [{"text": "ANTL BEHARI GHOSH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Anil .Behari Ghosh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SINHA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "Indian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 588, "end_char": 594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "Indian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 602, "end_char": 623, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1284, "end_char": 1297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court was not satisfied that in all the circumstances of the present case just cause for the annulment of the grant of probate within the meaning of s. 263 of the Act had been made out."}}, {"text": "s. 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1441, "end_char": 1447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 55 I.A. 18", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2364, "end_char": 2379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anil Befluri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2462, "end_char": 2474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Befluri Gf1osh\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated the Smr.", "canonical_name": "Anil Befluri"}}, {"text": "Section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2828, "end_char": 2839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2847, "end_char": 2868, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. N. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2871, "end_char": 2880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N. Sen, (A. K. Dutt and S. Chose with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. K. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2883, "end_char": 2893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N. Sen, (A. K. Dutt and S. Chose with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Chose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2898, "end_char": 2906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N. Sen, (A. K. Dutt and S. Chose with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setall\"ad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2937, "end_char": 2952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setall\"ad, A 11orney-Ge11eral for India (A .N.\n\nSinha."}}, {"text": "A .N.\n\nSinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2984, "end_char": 2996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setall\"ad, A 11orney-Ge11eral for India (A .N.\n\nSinha."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3031, "end_char": 3045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherji, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bi nod Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-This i~ an appeal against the judgment and order dated the 4th September 1951 of the Calcutta High Court in its appellate jurisdictii.)n reversing those dated the 29th August 1950 of a Judge of that Court sitting on the Original Side granting the appellant's prayer for revoking and annulling the probate granted in respect of the last will and testament dated the 29th July 1912 of one Bi nod Lal\n\nGhoh.", "canonical_name": "Binod Lal Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The testator is said to have executed a will on the 29th July 1912 which was registered on the same date at the Calcutta registry office."}}, {"text": "O Anil Nath Basu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the said will the testator appointed the following five persons as executtir~ or executrices:-\n\n< O Anil Nath Basu, Attorney-at-Law\n\n(2) Brindaban Chandra Mitter (These two also figure as attesting witnesses to the will)."}}, {"text": "Brindaban Chandra Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3898, "end_char": 3922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the said will the testator appointed the following five persons as executtir~ or executrices:-\n\n< O Anil Nath Basu, Attorney-at-Law\n\n(2) Brindaban Chandra Mitter (These two also figure as attesting witnesses to the will).", "canonical_name": ".Brindaban Chandra Mitter"}}, {"text": "Charu Chandra Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4005, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<.31 His adopted son Charu Chandra Ghose (whon'l\n\n\\Ve shall call Charu for the sake of\n\nbrevity) a minor on his attaining majority."}}, {"text": "ii Beliari Ghosh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4157, "end_char": 4173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "}955\n\n(4) His wife Haimabati Dasi, and\n\nii Beliari Ghosh\n\n(5) His brother's widow Muktakesi Dasi."}}, {"text": "Latika Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4224, "end_char": 4235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix.", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4309, "end_char": 4314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix.", "canonical_name": "SINHA, JJ."}}, {"text": "Nath Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4319, "end_char": 4328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix."}}, {"text": ".Brindaban Chandra Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4378, "end_char": 4403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix.", "canonical_name": ".Brindaban Chandra Mitter"}}, {"text": "Debi Prosad Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4413, "end_char": 4431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix.", "canonical_name": "Debi Prasad M itter"}}, {"text": "Haimabati Dasi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4511, "end_char": 4525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix.", "canonical_name": "Haimabati Dasi"}}, {"text": "Charu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4527, "end_char": 4532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix."}}, {"text": "Latikabala Dasi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4541, "end_char": 4556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix.", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Muktakesi Dasi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4578, "end_char": 4592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix."}}, {"text": "Sushamabala pasi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4612, "end_char": 4628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDa.<si and others He also directed that on the death of the said .Anil\n\nSinha J.\n\nNath Basu, his son Achintya Nath Basu, and on the death of .Brindaban Chandra Mitter, his son Debi Prosad Mitter will take their places respectively as executors; and on the death of his wife Haimabati Dasi, Charu's wife, Latikabala Dasi, and on the death of Muktakesi Dasi, his nephew's wife Sushamabala pasi, will take her place respectively as executrix.", "canonical_name": "Sushama Bala Dasi"}}, {"text": "Sushama Bala Dasi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5358, "end_char": 5375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,000 a year out of the balance left after meeting the annuities and the other annua I expenses aforesaid to be paid over to Charu upon the death of the said Latikabala Dasi and Sushama Bala Dasi who were to share the residue, if any, after paying the annuities and other outgoings referred to above.", "canonical_name": "Sushama Bala Dasi"}}, {"text": "5th March 1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6183, "end_char": 6197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", On the 5th March 1920 the testator is said to have been murdered by Charu who was placed on his trial,\n\nconvicted for murder and sentenced to transporta- 1955 tion for life."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6588, "end_char": 6607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala On the 30th September 1921 an application for probate of the will aforesaid was made on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court on beh::tlf of Anil Nath, Muktakesi Dasi and Latikabala Dasi aforesaid."}}, {"text": "Anil Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6623, "end_char": 6632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala On the 30th September 1921 an application for probate of the will aforesaid was made on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court on beh::tlf of Anil Nath, Muktakesi Dasi and Latikabala Dasi aforesaid.", "canonical_name": "Anil Nath Basu"}}, {"text": "Baranagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6752, "end_char": 6761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application stated that the testator died on the 5th March 1920 at Baranagar, leaving hirn surviving his adopted son Charu and his widow Haimabati D:tsi."}}, {"text": "29th July 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6858, "end_char": 6872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will dated the 29th July 1912 was recited and the five persons named above were said to have been appointed executors and executrices of the will."}}, {"text": "Brindaban Chandra Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7010, "end_char": 7034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt also stated that Brindaban Chandra Mitter, one of the executors named in the will, had died in July 1913 and his son Debi Prosad Mitter was a minor.", "canonical_name": ".Brindaban Chandra Mitter"}}, {"text": "22nd\n\nMay 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7193, "end_char": 7207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also recited the death of Haimabati Dasi on the 22nd\n\nMay 1921, thus explaining why out of the five executors and executrices named in the will the application had been ri1ade only on behalf of the surviving three persons."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7568, "end_char": 7574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prayer was \"that probate of the said wiil may be granted to your petitioners limited within the Province of Bengal reserving power of making the like grant to the said Charu Chandra Ghose a_!!d the said Debi Prosad Mitter (when he comes of age) when they will come and pray for the same''."}}, {"text": "30th September\n\n1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grant was made the same day (i.e., 30th September\n\n1921) which fell during the long vacation and the Judge in charge passed the order-\"Order as prayed\" no citations being issued."}}, {"text": "24th July 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8094, "end_char": 8108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nothing was heard about these proceedings until the 24th July 1933 when an application was made by Debi Prosad Mitter aforesaid for the grant of probate to him along with Anil Nath Basu and Latikabala Dasi."}}, {"text": "Anil Nath Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8213, "end_char": 8227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nothing was heard about these proceedings until the 24th July 1933 when an application was made by Debi Prosad Mitter aforesaid for the grant of probate to him along with Anil Nath Basu and Latikabala Dasi.", "canonical_name": "Anil Nath Basu"}}, {"text": "Latika Bala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8611, "end_char": 8622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDussi m•1 others It appears that Latikabala Da5i and Sushamabala s;\"'\"' J.\n\nDasi applied to the Calcutta High Court on the 4th December 1933 for an order for discharging the\n\neecutors appointed previously and for a direction to hand over the entire estate of the testator t0 the applicants."}}, {"text": "Latikabala Da5i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8657, "end_char": 8672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDussi m•1 others It appears that Latikabala Da5i and Sushamabala s;\"'\"' J.\n\nDasi applied to the Calcutta High Court on the 4th December 1933 for an order for discharging the\n\neecutors appointed previously and for a direction to hand over the entire estate of the testator t0 the applicants.", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Sushamabala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8677, "end_char": 8688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala\n\nDussi m•1 others It appears that Latikabala Da5i and Sushamabala s;\"'\"' J.\n\nDasi applied to the Calcutta High Court on the 4th December 1933 for an order for discharging the\n\neecutors appointed previously and for a direction to hand over the entire estate of the testator t0 the applicants.", "canonical_name": "Sushama Bala Dasi"}}, {"text": "Debi Prasad Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8940, "end_char": 8958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to the summons Debi Prasad Mitter made an atlida vit on the 7th Deccm ber 1933 in which he recited the previous grants of the probate made in J 921 and 1933: and stated that the testator Binod Lal Ghosh was inurdered on the 5th March 1920 by Cham and that on the death of Haimabati in May 1921, the testator's first cousin Girish Chandra Ghosh became entitled to the residue of the estate of the testator.", "canonical_name": "Debi Prasad M itter"}}, {"text": "Binod Lal Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9112, "end_char": 9127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to the summons Debi Prasad Mitter made an atlida vit on the 7th Deccm ber 1933 in which he recited the previous grants of the probate made in J 921 and 1933: and stated that the testator Binod Lal Ghosh was inurdered on the 5th March 1920 by Cham and that on the death of Haimabati in May 1921, the testator's first cousin Girish Chandra Ghosh became entitled to the residue of the estate of the testator.", "canonical_name": "Binod Lal Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Cham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9167, "end_char": 9171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to the summons Debi Prasad Mitter made an atlida vit on the 7th Deccm ber 1933 in which he recited the previous grants of the probate made in J 921 and 1933: and stated that the testator Binod Lal Ghosh was inurdered on the 5th March 1920 by Cham and that on the death of Haimabati in May 1921, the testator's first cousin Girish Chandra Ghosh became entitled to the residue of the estate of the testator."}}, {"text": "Haimabati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9197, "end_char": 9206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to the summons Debi Prasad Mitter made an atlida vit on the 7th Deccm ber 1933 in which he recited the previous grants of the probate made in J 921 and 1933: and stated that the testator Binod Lal Ghosh was inurdered on the 5th March 1920 by Cham and that on the death of Haimabati in May 1921, the testator's first cousin Girish Chandra Ghosh became entitled to the residue of the estate of the testator.", "canonical_name": "Haimabati Dasi"}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9248, "end_char": 9268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to the summons Debi Prasad Mitter made an atlida vit on the 7th Deccm ber 1933 in which he recited the previous grants of the probate made in J 921 and 1933: and stated that the testator Binod Lal Ghosh was inurdered on the 5th March 1920 by Cham and that on the death of Haimabati in May 1921, the testator's first cousin Girish Chandra Ghosh became entitled to the residue of the estate of the testator."}}, {"text": "Lalikabala Dasi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9583, "end_char": 9598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Nath Basu\n\nand Lalikabala Dasi, after the death of Haimabati had not filed any account of the tcst:ltor's estate in their capacity as executor and executrix respectively and that on his obtaining probate of the will those\n\nperson' had not complied with his request of furnishing a statement of accounts about their dealings with the testator's estate.", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "4th December 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10045, "end_char": 10062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter is elated the 4th December 1933."}}, {"text": "Anil Behari Ghnsh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10746, "end_char": 10763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He does not appear from the record to have Anil Behari Ghnsh rendered any accounts in respect of his dealings as the s L v:k B . .", "canonical_name": "Anil .Behari Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Dn.ui", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10905, "end_char": 10910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dn.ui and others\n\nIt was not until the 17th September, I 949 that the appellant, who is one of the four sons of the said Girish Chandra Ghosh, made an application to the Calcutta High Court on the Original Side praying that the probates dated the 30th September, 1921, and the 16th September, 1933 in respect of the will dated the 29th Ju!y, 1912 be revoked, annulled and/or set aside and that an administrator pendente lite be appointed."}}, {"text": "17th September, I 949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10944, "end_char": 10965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dn.ui and others\n\nIt was not until the 17th September, I 949 that the appellant, who is one of the four sons of the said Girish Chandra Ghosh, made an application to the Calcutta High Court on the Original Side praying that the probates dated the 30th September, 1921, and the 16th September, 1933 in respect of the will dated the 29th Ju!y, 1912 be revoked, annulled and/or set aside and that an administrator pendente lite be appointed."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11152, "end_char": 11172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dn.ui and others\n\nIt was not until the 17th September, I 949 that the appellant, who is one of the four sons of the said Girish Chandra Ghosh, made an application to the Calcutta High Court on the Original Side praying that the probates dated the 30th September, 1921, and the 16th September, 1933 in respect of the will dated the 29th Ju!y, 1912 be revoked, annulled and/or set aside and that an administrator pendente lite be appointed."}}, {"text": "16th September, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11182, "end_char": 11202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dn.ui and others\n\nIt was not until the 17th September, I 949 that the appellant, who is one of the four sons of the said Girish Chandra Ghosh, made an application to the Calcutta High Court on the Original Side praying that the probates dated the 30th September, 1921, and the 16th September, 1933 in respect of the will dated the 29th Ju!y, 1912 be revoked, annulled and/or set aside and that an administrator pendente lite be appointed."}}, {"text": "29th Ju!y, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11236, "end_char": 11251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dn.ui and others\n\nIt was not until the 17th September, I 949 that the appellant, who is one of the four sons of the said Girish Chandra Ghosh, made an application to the Calcutta High Court on the Original Side praying that the probates dated the 30th September, 1921, and the 16th September, 1933 in respect of the will dated the 29th Ju!y, 1912 be revoked, annulled and/or set aside and that an administrator pendente lite be appointed."}}, {"text": "29th July, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12248, "end_char": 12263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Your petitioner submits that arrangements were being made for handing over the estate of the said Binod Lal Ghosh, deceased, in the hands of the Administrator-General of Bengal for the purpose of charity but the said purpose did not mature and under the circumstances your petitioner submits that the said will of 29th July, 1912 ha\" been revoked bv the said testator and no further will was executed in its place or stead\"."}}, {"text": "Binod Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12805, "end_char": 12814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That paragraph is in these terms:-\n\n\"Your petitioner submits that the probates herein should be revoked as a just cause for doing so exists inter alia, on the following grounds:\n\n(a) That no notice of either application for probate was served on your petitioner's father, although he was the nearest male relative alive at the time when the said Binod Lal r.hosh was murdered;\n\nSinha.!.", "canonical_name": "Binod Lal Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Anil Beltari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12847, "end_char": 12859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Beltari G!10sh\n\nSnit.", "canonical_name": "Anil Befluri"}}, {"text": "latika Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12874, "end_char": 12885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "latika Bala\n\nDa.<;.r; f and others\n\nSinha J.\n\n(b) That the grants were obtained fraudulently; le) That the grants were obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential to justify the grant;\n\n(d) That the grants were obtained by making a false declaration that the property was valued only at Rs.", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Achintva Nath Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14269, "end_char": 14287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achintva Nath Basu took similar grounds in opposition to the application for revocation."}}, {"text": "P. B.\n\nMukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14747, "end_char": 14763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice P. B.\n\nMukherjee who dealt with the case on the Original\n\nSide, after an elaborate consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case."}}, {"text": "AnilBehari Ghosh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15023, "end_char": 15039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "passed orders revokin~\n\nand annulling the grants aforesaid and directing \"that 1955 the will be proved in solemn form on notice to the AnilBehari Ghosh applicant 11, nd the other sons of Girish and also after s L v: l\n\nI · II d .", "canonical_name": "Anil .Behari Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Girish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15075, "end_char": 15081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "passed orders revokin~\n\nand annulling the grants aforesaid and directing \"that 1955 the will be proved in solemn form on notice to the AnilBehari Ghosh applicant 11, nd the other sons of Girish and also after s L v: l\n\nI · II d .", "canonical_name": "Girish"}}, {"text": "latikabala Dasi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17087, "end_char": 17102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by latikabala Dasi, the Appellate Bench . .", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Trevor Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17197, "end_char": 17211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36-8 SCI/ND/82\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955 consisting of Sir Trevor Harries, C.J. and Banerjee, J .,"}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17222, "end_char": 17230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36-8 SCI/ND/82\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955 consisting of Sir Trevor Harries, C.J. and Banerjee, J .,"}}, {"text": "A11il Belwri Ghosh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17237, "end_char": 17255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A11il Belwri Ghosh allowed the appeal and dismissed the application for\n\nSmt."}}, {"text": "Laika Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17315, "end_char": 17325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laika Bala revocation of the probate with costs of both the Dassi and others courts.", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Dassi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17375, "end_char": 17380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laika Bala revocation of the probate with costs of both the Dassi and others courts.", "canonical_name": "Dassi"}}, {"text": "Girih", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19219, "end_char": 19224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also argued that no grounds had been made out in fact to support the legal conclusion drawn by the Appeal Court that there had been an acquiescence on the part of Girih.", "canonical_name": "Girish"}}, {"text": "Debi Prasad Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19362, "end_char": 19380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent Debi Prasad Mitter.", "canonical_name": "Debi Prasad M itter"}}, {"text": "Anil Behari Ghosh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19517, "end_char": 19534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was contended that he had been unnecessarily im- 1955 pleaded at all the stages and that he should have been Anil Behari Ghosh 2ranted his costs out of the estate of the deceased.", "canonical_name": "Anil .Behari Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19724, "end_char": 19745, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20060, "end_char": 20071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20079, "end_char": 20100, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20124, "end_char": 20128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to be entitled to a revocation or annulment of the grant aforesaid the appellant has to bring his case within the purview of section 263 of the Indian Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925), which Nill hereinafter be referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "Section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20170, "end_char": 20181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20232, "end_char": 20242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20261, "end_char": 20272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dassi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21390, "end_char": 21395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are as follows:-\n\nDassi and others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955 \"(i) The court by which the grant was made had Anil .Behari Ghosh no jurisdictfon.", "canonical_name": "Dassi"}}, {"text": "Anil .Behari Ghosh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21470, "end_char": 21488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are as follows:-\n\nDassi and others\n\nSinha J.\n\n1955 \"(i) The court by which the grant was made had Anil .Behari Ghosh no jurisdictfon.", "canonical_name": "Anil .Behari Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Gidsh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24563, "end_char": 24568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is noteworthy that Gidsh who died in 1940, lived for about 19 years after the grant and took no steps in that direction."}}, {"text": "Girish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25953, "end_char": 25959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girish was a mere pen- Dassi and others s10ner belonging to a middle class family.", "canonical_name": "Girish"}}, {"text": "s10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25993, "end_char": 25996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27718, "end_char": 27728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28280, "end_char": 28285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala The observations relied upon by the appellant were Dassi and Olhers\n\nmade with reference to the facts of that case and Sinha .1.", "canonical_name": "SINHA, JJ."}}, {"text": "section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28362, "end_char": 28373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28986, "end_char": 28997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Latika Bala Dassi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30408, "end_char": 30425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala Dassi and others who should have been apprised of the probate pro-\n\nSinha!.", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31035, "end_char": 31046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anil Behari Gho!h", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32581, "end_char": 32598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "may refuse to grant annulment in cases where there 1955 is no likelihod of proof being offered that the will Anil Behari Gho!h !", "canonical_name": "Anil .Behari Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Dassi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32744, "end_char": 32749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, as ng t y pom e Dassi and others out by the lower Appellate Court, in the present case where the validity or genuineness of the will has not been challenged."}}, {"text": "Anil Behar/", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34746, "end_char": 34757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While agreeing with the Judge' in the first ronrt thnt this was rather disingenuous: we must also\n\n17-R fI!Nf 182\n\nSinha J.\n\nAnil Behar/ Ghosh\n\nStnt.", "canonical_name": "Anil Befluri"}}, {"text": "SJ11!ta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34804, "end_char": 34811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'isi and others\n\nSJ11!ta J.\n\nhold that that concealment, if it was deliberate, was not material to the case."}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36641, "end_char": 36651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A11il Betuiri Gliosli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37071, "end_char": 37092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it was argued that the appellant A11il Betuiri Gliosli would have offered such proof after the order of revo-\n\n51111."}}, {"text": "section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37907, "end_char": 37918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38872, "end_char": 38883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anil Behari Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39172, "end_char": 39189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn certain circumstances omission to submit accounts\n\nAnil Behari Ghosh\n\nSmt.", "canonical_name": "Anil .Behari Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Latika Bala Dassi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39196, "end_char": 39213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latika Bala Dassi and others\n\nSinha J.\n\nmay bring the case within the purview of clause (e)\n\naforesid because the circumstances may tend to' show that the omission was wilful and without -reasonable cause.", "canonical_name": "LATIKA BALA DASSI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Babu Anil Nath Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39813, "end_char": 39832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the will the testator intended that Anil Nath Basu should function as the managing executor during his lifetime, as will appear from the relevant portion of paragraph 17 of the will which is as follows:\n\n\"I direct that my executor Babu Anil Nath Basu shall act alone without interference of my other executors in drawing money from or depositing money to any bank, courts or any other place or places and also in drawing interest of Government Promissory Note, debentures, etc."}}, {"text": "Debi Prasad M itter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40878, "end_char": 40897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already made reference to Debi Prasad M itter's correspondence with Anil Nath Basu, the managing executor, bearing on the question of accounts.", "canonical_name": "Debi Prasad M itter"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_290_302_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Aµrif 18\n\n29G\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nMESSRS CHATTURAM HORILRAM LTD. v.\n\nCOMMISSIONI;:R OF INCOME TAX. BIHAR\n\nAND ORISSA.\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS and SINHA JJ.]\n\nIndian IHcorne Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI of 1922), s. 34--Assessn-tcn/ set a...1:ide ozving to Indian I•inance Act of 1939 not being in\n\nforce during the assessment year-Indian Finance Act of 1939 b, ought into force retrospectively by Bihar Regulation IV of 1942- Fresh notice under s. 34 issued-Whether such fresh no-lice valid.\n\nThe appellant in this appeal had been assessed to Income Tax which was reduced on appeal but that assessn1ent was set aside by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on the ground that the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was not in force during the asscssr11ent yar in Chota Nagpur.\n\nOn a reference by the Tribunal the High Court confirmed the setting aside of this assessment.\n\nBy the promulgation of Bihar Regulation IV of 1942 by the Governor of Bihar (which wa. a5'ented to by the Governor-General) the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was brought into force in Chota, Nagpur retrospectively as from the 30th March 1939.\n\nOn the 8th \"February 1944 the Income\n\nlax Officer passed an order in pursuance of which a fresh notice was issued under s. 34 which resulted in the assessment of the ap-. p:.:llant to incon1~ tax. 1'he question for detcrn1ination in this ap· peal. \\Vas \\Vhl'.ther the notice under s. 34 was validly issl1ed.\n\nHeld (i) that for the purposes of s. 34 of the !\\ct the income, profits or g:Jins sought to be assessed were <.:hargcable to jncorne tax according tu the schcnc of the Act and the provisions of \"' 3 and 4 of the Act;\n\n(ii) that it was a cac of chargeable inco1nc escaping ascssn11.\"llt within thL' 1nc<.111ing of s. 34 and was not a case of mere non-asscss- 1ncnt of i<1comc tax because the earlier assesment proceedings in the\n\npresent case had in 'fact been taken but failed to result in a valid assessment owing to some lacuna which \\V, as not attributable to the assessing authorities.\n\nC.l. T. Bombay v. Sir Ma/wn:ed Yusuf Ismail ([1944] 12 l.T.R. 8), Fazal Dhala v. C./.T., B & 0. ([1944] 12 l.T.R. 341), Raghavalu Naidu & Sons v. C.I.T., Mddras ([1945] 13 l.T.R. 194), Raia Benoy K11mar Sahas Roy v. C.l.T.. West Bengal [(1953] 24 !.T.R. 70), Chatturam v. C.I.T., Bihar ([19471 F.C.R. 116), Whitney v. Commissioners of hland Revem.e r[l926] AC. 37), C.l. T. Bombay &\n\nAdm; '\" lOum1d1and Ramdas ([1938] 6 !.T.R. 414 Jt 428). Sir Rajendranath Mukheriee v. C.I.T., Bengal ((1934] 2 l.T.R. 71), Madan Mahan Lal v. C.l.T., P11niab ([1935] 3 !.T.R. 438), C.I.T., llmnhav v. l'irnjbai N. r:ontractnr ([19:171 5 l.T.R . .138), I<unwar\n\nBishwanath Singh v. C.l.T., C.P.\n\n([1942) 10 I.T.R. 322), Raia 1955 Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Sin.gh Y C.l.T.; B., & 0. ([1946) 14 Messrs Chatturam I.T.R. 683) and Cbatturam \\\". C..1.1 ., B. & 0 1.[1946] 14 I.T.R.\n\nHori/ram Ltd. 695 ), referred to. v.\n\nCommissio11er of CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. I11come'!f;;· Bihar 38 of 1954. alld ssa\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 14th day of March 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in M.J.C. No. 230 of 1949.\n\nMahabir Prasad, Advocate-Genernl for the State of Bihar (R.J. Bahadur and S. P. Varma. with him), for the appellant.\n\nC.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P.G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent.\n\n1955. April 18. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by the assessee on leave granted under section 66-A of the Indian Income-Tax Act. The assessee by name Chatturam Horilram Ltd., who is the appellant before us, is a private limited company carrying on in Chota Nagpur the business of exporting mica for sale to foreign countries. The assessment in question is for the year 1939-40 and the accounting year is the calendar year 1938. These proceedings were initiated on a notice issued to the assessee under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, (Act XI of 1922) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is the apolicability of this section to the facts of this case that is the sole matter for consideration in this appeal.\n\nThe circumstances under which the above mentioned notice under section 34 was issued are as follows. The appellant had nreviously been assessed to tax on an income of Rs. 1.09,200 for the same year 1939-40 by an order dated the 22nd December, i 939. which was rednced on appeal by Rs. 31J15. That assessment was set aside by the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal on the 28th March, 1942. on the ground that the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was not in force during\n\n1955 the assessment year 1939-40 in Chota Nagpur, which Me.ms .c1ia1111ram was a partially-excluded area. On a reference by the Hori/ram Ltd.\n\nTribunal at the instance of the Income-tax authoricommisioner of ties. the High Court of Patna agreed wfrh this \\iew Jwomr 111.;. Bi11ar and pronounced on the 30th September. 1943, its anti ?:•ssa judgment confirming the setting aside of the assess- JacamradhadasJ. ment. Meanwhile, the Governor of Bihar promulgated Bihar Regulation IV of 1942, which was assented to by the Governor-General on the 30th June. 1942.\n\nBy this Regulation, the Indian Finance Act of 1939 (along with Finance Acts of other years with which we are not concerned) was brought into force in Chota Nagpur retrospectively as from the 30th March\n\n1939. The relevant portion of the Regulation was in the following terms. 'The Indian Finance Act, 1939, shall be deemed to have come into fore in the area to which this Regulation extends on the 30th day of March, 1939\".\n\nOn the 8th February, 1944, the Income-tax Officer passed an order as follows :\n\n\"Due to recent judgment of the High Court the assessment under section 23(3) stands cancelled and with it the notice under section 34 issued in this case becomes ineffective and is withdrawn. Assessee derives income from mica mining and dealing, moneylending, mining rents and non-agricultural sources of zamindary, and this has escaped assessment in its entirety. Issue notice under section 22(2) read with section 34 again to file a return of income in the prescribed form and within the prescribed time, and inform the assessee that the original notice under section 34 has been cancelled\".\n\nIt. may be mentioned, in passing, that the notice under section 34 which is referred to in the above order as having become ineffective and as, therefore, withdrawn was a prior one which was issued on the 8th July, 1941, i.e., during the pendency of the assessee's appeal relating to the earlier assessment before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It is not quite clear from the record in what circumstances that notice came to be issued. But it looks probable tJiat it retires to certain items appearin~ in the nrrounts ns\n\ncash•credits to the tune of four lakhs which, as will 1955 appear presently, were treated in the later proceed- Messrs -C''- . 1 d · h b f r1attura111 mgs as concea e mcome m t e a sence o any pro- Horilram Ltd. per explanation by assessee.\n\nThis prior notice Comm v: ,, . 34 h . b . hd h b tsstoner o1 under section , avmg een wit rawn, as no ear- Income tax, Bihar ing on the question at issue before US in this appeal and Orissa and has not been relied on by either side. In pursu- JagannadhaJ/ts J. ance of the order dated the 8th February, 1944, quoted above, a fresh notice under section 34 of the Act was issued to the appellant on the 12th February, 1944.\n\nThe income of the assessee-company was thereupon determined at a sum of Rs. 4,86,351, which on appeal tO the Assistant Commissioner, was reduced by Rs. 11,187. Out of this amount a sum of Rs. 4,04,618 related to two items of cash-credits appearing in the name of the partners of the Company which in the absence of any satisfactory explanation, was treated by the Income-tax authorities as secreted profits of the Company. Before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal two points were raised. ( 1) Whether the notice dated the 12th February, 1944, under section 34 of the Act was validly issued. (2) Whether the Incometax authorities were right in holding that the cashcredit items were secret profits. 'Both the points were decided against the assessee. On the assessee's application to refer both the points for the decision of the High Court, the Tribunal declined to make a reference as regards the second point but referred the first for the opinion of the Court in the following terms:\n\n\"Whether in the circumstances of the case, the notice issued on 12-2-1944 under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act was validly issued for the assessment year 1939-40?\"\n\nThe question was answered against the assessee by the High Court arid hence this appeal before us.\n\nThe assessee attempted to reopen the second question relating to secret profits before the High Court but the learned Judges declined to allow it to be canvassed, since the Tribunal did not refer the question to them.\n\nW are, therefore, concerned in this appeal only with the question relating to the validity of the notice\n\n38-q SCJ/ND/32\n\n1955 issued on the 12th February, 1944, under section 34 Messrs chatt•ram of the Act. It is obvious that if this notice is found Hori/ram Ltd. to be invalid the assessee would get relief for the en- Commis; ioner of tire amount including the amount of secret profits.\n\nIncome tax, Bjhar and Orissa\n\nJag, n ladhadas J.\n\nThe answer to the question which arises for consideration in this appeal depends on a correct appreciation of the requirements of section 34 of the Act. Now, it has to be mentioned that section 34 of the Act, as it originally stood in the Act of 1922, was amended by Act VII of 1939 and this was in turn amended by Act XLVIII of 1948. At the relevant date, i.e., for the assessment year 1939-40, section 34\n\n(1) as amended by Act VII of 1939 (and before its amendment in 1948) was in force. It was as follows:\n\n\"If in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the Income-tax Officer discovers that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year, (or have been under-asessed, or have been. assessed at too low a rate. or have been the subject of excessive relief under this Act) the Income-tax Officer may, (in any case in which he has reason to believe that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars thereof, at any time within eight years and) in any other case at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the person liable to pay tax on such income, profits or gains, or, in the case of a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included iµ a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22, and ma v proceed to assess or re-assess such income, . profits or gains. and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section\". ·\n\nOmitting from the above sub-section those portions which are inapplicable to the facts of the present case -marked out within brackets-it may be seen that the facts which require to be established for the validity of the notice under this sub-section are (J) the income, profits or gains sought to be assessed should be chargeable to income-tax and have escaped assessment in any year, and\n\n(2) the Income-tax Officer 1955 should have discovered it in consequence of definite Messrs Ch 11 information which has come into his possession.\n\nHori/ram °£, d.am The contention of the learned counsel for the appelcommlsion 1 lant is that, with reference to the facts of this case, Income tax .• ihr none of these conditions can be said to have been andOrissa satisfied. It is urged that the income sought to be Jacannadhadas J. assessed under these proceedings was not, as a fact, chargeable to income-tax during the assessment year 1939-40. It is said that in any case there can be no question of the income having escaped assessment because, as a fact, the income-tax authorities did proceed to assess the income and that what happened is that the proceedings became infructuous by reason of the High Court having pronounced them to be void.\n\nIt is also contended that there is no question of discovery of any relevant fact or information, because the non-assessment of the income of the ass'essee fot the period in question was in spite of all the information relating to the income of the assessee having been previously furnished and being in the possession of tl_ie Income-tax Officer as would appear from the order of the Officer dated the .22nd December, 1939.\n\nIt is convenient to deal with this last objection in the first instance.\n\nIt may be true that all the information relating to the relevant income of the assessee which is now sought to be taxed was in the possession of the Income-tax Officer in the year 1939 itself when the return was submitted in compliance with the notice under section 22(2) of the Act then issued. But what was required under section 340) was not merely fresh information as to the income that escaped assessment but information as to the fact of escapement from assessment of the chargeable income. In the present case the income-tax authorities proceeded to assess the appellant in the normal way during the assessment vear 1930-40 itself. Those proceedings became infructuous, by virtue of the decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the decision of the High Court confirming it, which disclosed that the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was not in operation in\n\n39-8 SCI{ND/S2\n\n1955 the relevant area at the relevant period and that in\n\nMessrs c1w1turam the absence thereof no valid assessment could be Harif, o \"Ltd. made. The fact therefore that the income of the \\' ' ' . . cam1111.nio11er \"! appellant for the relevant year remamed without any I11comc wx: Biko valid assessment emerged only on the High Court\n\n\"\"'1 Onssa finally giving its decision that the assessment pro- .Tagmmadtuulas .1. ceedings previously taken were invalid. If. in the circumstances, there was \"escapement of chargeable income from assessment\"-a question to be dealt with presently-there can be no doubt that this fact can be reasonably said to have been discovered by the Income-tax Officer only when he got definite information as to (I) the passing of the Bihar Regulation IV of 1942 applying the Indian Finance Act of 1939 retrospectively for the relevant accounting period. and (2) the judgment of the High Court pronouncing prior proceedings to be invalid.\n\nIt is knowledge of both these facts, together, that would, with reference to the circumstances of the present case. constitute the discovery of the relevant fact in consequence of definite information received by the Income-tax Officer. The information as to both these facts taken together could only be after the decision of the High Court on the 30th September, 1943. As already stated, the notice under section 34(1), whose validity is in question, was based on the order of the Income-tax Officer dated the '8th February, 1944, after the judgment of the High Court was pronounced. That order which has been extracted above, shows clearly that it was in consequence of the judgment of the High Court in the background of the promulgation of Regula-. ti on IV of 1942 that fresh action under section 34( I) was being initiated.\n\nA number of cases IC.l.T. Bombay v. Sir Mahomed Yusuf Ismail('); Faw/ Dhala v. C.l.T., B & 0. I'); Raglwvalu Naidu & Sons v. C.l.T .. Madras<'); and Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy v. C.l.T .. West Hengall')) have been cited before us to show how the phrase \"definite information\" and the word \"discovery\" used in this section have been interpreted by the various\n\n(I) [1944J 12 l-T.R. R.\n\n(31 [1945 13 1.T.R. 194.\n\n(2) f1944] 12 I.TR. 341.\n\n(4) [1953] 14 1.T.R. 70.\n\nHigh Courts. It is unnecessary to deal with these\n\nIY55 cases at any length. There is here no question as to ,\\f,,,,.1rs c1ia1111ram any new subjective facts such as change of opinion Horilr11111 Ltd. . . \"· consequent on a correct appreciation of law by the Co111111i.11io11cr qf very same. or another. or higher officer that is pressad 11\"'0111'' tax. Bi!uir. . , . . ' \"\"' and 01'!ssa lllto service as bringing about ''definite information\" --- and \"discovery\". We are quite clear that the pro- Jatwuradizadas J. mulgation of the Regulation and the decision of the High Court are objective facts, information regarding which became available to the Income-tax Oflicer when he passed the order dated the 8th February. 1944, and it is only when these facts came to l'; is knowledge, that the Income-tax Officer can be said to have discovered that chargeable income escaped assessment in the relevant year.\n\nThe main question that requires consideration in this case is whether. on the facts, it can be said that \"income chargeable to income-tax has escaped assessment in the relevant year\". The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that during the relevant year 1939-40 the income was not chargeable to tax as a [act and that the retrospective operation of the Finance Act for the relevant year by virtue of a later legislation does not make a difference for this purpose. To decide this question it is necessary to have a clear idea of the scheme of the Income-tax Act and its correlation to the Finance Act of each year.\n\nThe Income-tax Act is a standing piece of legislation which provides the entire machinery for the levy of income-tax. The Finance Act of each year imposes the obligation for the payment of a determinate sum for each such year calculated with reference to that machinery. As has been pointed out by the Federal Court in Chatturam v. C./.T., Bihar(') quoting from the judgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') \"there are three stages in the imposition of a tax. There is the declaration of liability, that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are\n\nell [1947] F.C.R ll6a1 126.\n\n(2) [1926) A.C 37.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] !955 liable. Next, there is tht;) assessment.\n\nLiability does Messrs Cllatturam not depend on assessment. That, eX hypothesi, has Hori/ram Ltd. already been fixed. But assessment particularises the Commis;!o11er. ef exact sum which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, 111<;;::', f 'J:;,_!har come the methods of recovery if the person taxed - does not voluntarily pay\". The same idea has been Jagannadhadas 1 expressed in slightly different language by Lord Romer in the judgment of the Privy Council reported in C./.T., Bombay & Aden v. Khemchand Ramdas(').\n\nChapter III of the Income-tax Act headed \"Taxable Inc0me\" contains the various provisions with reference to which taxable income is determined. The tax is leviable under section 3 and is in respect of the total income of an assessee in the previous year. The total income is defined in section 2, sub-section (15).\n\nThe application of the Act to the total income in the hands of an assessee is governed by sections 4, 4-A and 4-B and is determined with reference to concepts relating to residence, receipt and accrual, as indicated therein. Section 3, under which the actual charge of income-tax arises, is as follows :\n\n\"Where any Central Act ena1.:ts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every firm and other association of persons or the partners of the firm or the members of the association individually''.\n\nIt is by virtue of this setion that the actual levy of the tax and the rates at which the tax has to be computed is determined each year by the annual Finance Acts. Thus, under the scheme of the Incometax Act, the income of an assessee attracts the quality of taxability with reference to the standing provisions of the Act but the payability and the quantification of the tax depend on the passing and applica-, tion of the annual Finance Act. Thus, income is chargeable to tax independent of the passing of the\n\n(I) (1938) 6 I.T.R. 414 at 428.\n\nFinance Act but until the Finance Act is passed no\n\nJY55 tax can be actually levied. A comparison of sections Messrs c11111111ram 3 and 6 of the Act shows that the Act recognises the Hori/ram Ltd. distinction between chargeability and the actual Con11nissio11er of operation of the charge Section 6 says \"save as Income tax: Bihar . and Orissa otherwise provided by this Act, the following heads - of income, profits and gains, shall be chargeable to Jagannadhadas 1 income-tax in the manner hereinafter appearing, etc.\"\n\nwhile section 3, as already quoted above, says that \"where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates, shall be charged for that year, etc.\" Though, no doubt, sections 3 and 4 are the charging sections in the Act as pointed out in Chatturam v. C./.T., Bihar(') at page 125, the wording of section 3 assumes the pre-existence of chargeable income as indicated in section 6.\n\nHence, according to fhe scheme of the Act the quality of chargeability of any income is independent of the passing of the Finance Act.\n\nIn this view, therefore, though, as a fact, on account of the Finance Act not having been extended to the relevant area during the year 1939-40, legal authority was then lacking for the quantilication of the tax and impositio11 of the liability therefor, the income of the assessee for the relevant year was nonetheless chargeable to tax at the time. in the sense explained above. Indeed, it, can also be sc:id that the very fact of Regulation IV of 1942, having brought the Finance Act of 1939 into operation retrospectively, in this area, has factually brought about. in any case, the chargeability of the tax during that very year. The relevant portion of the Regula ti on says that \"the Indian Finance Act of 1939 shall be deemed to have come into force in the area to which this Regulation extends .on the 30th day of March, 1939\".\n\nBy virtue of this deeming provision the Indian Finance Act of 1939 must be c:ssumed even factually to have come into operation on the date specified and the tax must be taken to have become chargeable in that very year, though the actual\n\nliability for payment could not arise until proper and\n\nl) [1947) F.C.R. 116.\n\n1955 valid steps are taken for quantification of the tax.\n\nMessrs -Chatturam The contention, therefore, of the appellant that the Hori/ram Ltd. income was not chargeable to tax in the year l 93\"9-40\n\nCommis; ioner r cannot be accepted.\n\nJ11come tax, Bih(Jr\n\nand Orissa\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe next question that arises is whether the income, though chargeable to tax in the year, can be said to have scaped assessment in the relevant year.\n\nThe argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since assessment proceedings had in fact been taken during the year 1939-40 by an order of assessment dated the 22nd December, 1939, it cannot be said that the income \"escaped\" assessment.\n\nHe urges that what happened was that, in spite of assessment having been made, the assessment proceedings became infructuous on account of the decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal setting aside the same and High Court agreeing with it. He contends that, in the circumstances, this is no more than a failure of the assessment proceedings but that it is not an escapement from assessment. He relied upon the Privy Council case in Sir Raje11dranath Mukherjee v. C.l.T., Bengal('), where their Lordships say that \"the expression 'has' escaped assessment\" cannot be read as equivalent to 'has not been assessed\"' and that \"such a reading gives too narrow a meaning to the word 'assessment' and too wide a meaning to the word 'escaped\"'.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent relies on a number of subsequent cases of the various High Courts (Madan Mohan Lal v. C.l.T..\n\nPunjab('); C.l.T., Bombay v.\n\nPirojbai N. Contractor(\"); and Kunwar Bishwanath Singh v.\n\nC.l.T., C.P.(')) which have explained this decision of the Privy Council anu pointed out that the particular passage in that judgment which is relied. upon had reference to the facts of that case, viz., the proceedings by way of initial assessment being still pending.\n\nWhile no doubt the Privy Council case is thus distinguishable, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the escapement from assessment is not to be equated to\n\n(1) [1934] 21.T.R. 71 at 77.\n\n(3) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 338.\n\n(2) [19.15] 3 1.T.R. 438.\n\n(4) [1942] 10 I.T.R. 322.\n\nnon-assessment simpliciter is not without force. Here 1955 again, it is unnecessary to lay down what exactly Me.1srs ·---c,; a11ma111 constitutes \"escapement from assessment\". Fot the Horilrm Ltd. purpose of the present case it appe1rs to us sufficient Co111111issio11er_ of_ to say that, where earlier assessment proceedings had li 11;,;;/' ;),';:,~' 1 \"\" in fact been taken but failed to result in a valid as- • - -- / / sessment owing to some lacuna other than that attrib- .tac.\"\"w.ti\"''\"\" ·\n\nutable to the assessing authorities, notwithstanding the chargeability of income to the tax, it would be a case of chargeable income escaping assessment and not a case of mere non-assessment of income-tax. The proceedings for assessment in the present case have failed to result in a valid assessment by virtue of a legal lacuna, viz., the fact of the Indian Finance Act of 1939 not liaving been extended to the relevant area for the relevant assessment year. Learned counsel for the appellant suggests that the failure of the assessment proceedings in this case must be taken to have been due to the lapse of the income-tax authorities.\n\nIt is said that inasmuch as Regulation IV of 1942 was actually passed during the pendency of the reference in the High Court in respect of the prior proceedings, the result would have been different, if the Regulation had been brought to the notice of the High Court.\n\nThere is, however, no reason to think so. The High Court's jurisdiction was only to answer the particular question that was referred to it by the Income-tax\n\nApp~Jlate Tribunal and it is extremely doubtful whether they could have taken notice of a subsequent legislation and answered a different question. Learned coun.<:el for the appellant also urged that in any case the deeming provision enacted in Regulation IV of 1942, may be taken to have validated the assessment proceedings previously taken in the year 1939 r, nd at hest to have restored the assessment order passed by the Income-tax Officer on the 22nd December, 1939. and confirmed by the Assistant Commissioner.\n\nBut\n\nthi~ overlooks the fact that the order had in fact been set aside hy the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and th; it the setting aside was confirmed hy the High Ccmt on the reference made to it.\n\nAdmittedly the\n\nRc.wb!ion w::is passed after the decision of the\n\n1955 Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Notwithstanding that Mes.m ·-c:;,11, wam the Regulation IV of 1942 purported to be retrospec-\n\nHor; Jr,011 Ltd. live, it cannot have the effect of effacing the result\n\ncam1111 , iooer of brought about by the decisin of the Income-tax Jwome 10.r. 1wwr Appellate Tribunal and the High Court on reference,\n\nand nm\"' unless there are clear and express words to tha\\ '\n\n.laga1111adiiad11s .1. effect. It might have been quite a different matter, if by the date of the Regulation the assessment proceedings themselves were still pending, as in fact happened with reference to assessment proceedings in this area, in respect of a number of assessees for the subsequent assessment year, 1940-41, which were pending by the date of the relevant Regulation and were continued up to their termination. They were held to be valid both by the High Court and by the Federal Court when challenged by the assessees: (See Raja Ba!iadur Kamakshya Narain Singh v. C./.T, R & 0. ('); Chatturam v. C.l.T., R & 0. ('): as also Chatturnm v. C.l.T., Bihm ('). It follows. therefore, that, in our view, the income of the assessee chargeable to income-tax escaped assessment in the relevant vcar 1939-40. The High Court was, therefore, ri!(ht in answering as it did the question referred to it.\n\nThr appeal accordingly fails and is, dismissed with costs.\n\n(11(1946)14 l.T.R G83. i2) (1946) 14 l.T.R. G95.\n\n(3) 1947 F.C.R. 116a11'.Y;.\n\nMG!PCBE-S -!-& llC!/ND/82-20-6·83-IOOO.", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "CHATTURAM HORILRAM LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHATTURAM HORILRAM LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONI;:R OF INCOME TAX. BIHAR\n\nAND ORISSA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BIHAR AND ORISSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JacamradhadasJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian IHcorne Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian IHcorne Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian IHcorne Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Indian Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 633, "end_char": 662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in this appeal had been assessed to Income Tax which was reduced on appeal but that assessn1ent was set aside by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on the ground that the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was not in force during the asscssr11ent yar in Chota Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Chota Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 761, "end_char": 773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in this appeal had been assessed to Income Tax which was reduced on appeal but that assessn1ent was set aside by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on the ground that the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was not in force during the asscssr11ent yar in Chota Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 894, "end_char": 899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the promulgation of Bihar Regulation IV of 1942 by the Governor of Bihar (which wa."}}, {"text": "Chota", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1052, "end_char": 1057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a5'ented to by the Governor-General) the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was brought into force in Chota, Nagpur retrospectively as from the 30th March 1939."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1059, "end_char": 1065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a5'ented to by the Governor-General) the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was brought into force in Chota, Nagpur retrospectively as from the 30th March 1939."}}, {"text": "30th March 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1094, "end_char": 1109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a5'ented to by the Governor-General) the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was brought into force in Chota, Nagpur retrospectively as from the 30th March 1939."}}, {"text": "8th \"February 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1119, "end_char": 1137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th \"February 1944 the Income\n\nlax Officer passed an order in pursuance of which a fresh notice was issued under s. 34 which resulted in the assessment of the ap-."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1232, "end_char": 1237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Indian Finance Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1393, "end_char": 1398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1455, "end_char": 1460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1734, "end_char": 1739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-Genernl for the State of Bihar (R.J. Bahadur and S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "R.J. Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3209, "end_char": 3221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-Genernl for the State of Bihar (R.J. Bahadur and S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3226, "end_char": 3237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-Genernl for the State of Bihar (R.J. Bahadur and S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "C.K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3270, "end_char": 3283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P.G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3314, "end_char": 3328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P.G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P.G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P.G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3513, "end_char": 3523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3540, "end_char": 3554, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chatturam Horilram Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3577, "end_char": 3600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee by name Chatturam Horilram Ltd., who is the appellant before us, is a private limited company carrying on in Chota Nagpur the business of exporting mica for sale to foreign countries."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3929, "end_char": 3939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3947, "end_char": 3974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4219, "end_char": 4229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "22nd December, i 939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4384, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1.09,200 for the same year 1939-40 by an order dated the 22nd December, i 939."}}, {"text": "Hori/ram Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4743, "end_char": 4756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a reference by the Hori/ram Ltd.\n\nTribunal at the instance of the Income-tax authoricommisioner of ties."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4833, "end_char": 4852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court of Patna agreed wfrh this \\iew Jwomr 111.;."}}, {"text": "JacamradhadasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5008, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•ssa judgment confirming the setting aside of the assess- JacamradhadasJ. ment.", "canonical_name": "JacamradhadasJ."}}, {"text": "30th March\n\n1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5366, "end_char": 5382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this Regulation, the Indian Finance Act of 1939 (along with Finance Acts of other years with which we are not concerned) was brought into force in Chota Nagpur retrospectively as from the 30th March\n\n1939."}}, {"text": "Indian Finance Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th day of March, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5573, "end_char": 5596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939, shall be deemed to have come into fore in the area to which this Regulation extends on the 30th day of March, 1939\"."}}, {"text": "8th February, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th February, 1944, the Income-tax Officer passed an order as follows :\n\n\"Due to recent judgment of the High Court the assessment under section 23(3) stands cancelled and with it the notice under section 34 issued in this case becomes ineffective and is withdrawn."}}, {"text": "section 23(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5743, "end_char": 5756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939", "statute": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5803, "end_char": 5813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939", "statute": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6064, "end_char": 6077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939", "statute": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6088, "end_char": 6098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939", "statute": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6242, "end_char": 6252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939", "statute": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6331, "end_char": 6341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939", "statute": "The Indian Finance Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "8th July, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "may be mentioned, in passing, that the notice under section 34 which is referred to in the above order as having become ineffective and as, therefore, withdrawn was a prior one which was issued on the 8th July, 1941, i.e., during the pendency of the assessee's appeal relating to the earlier assessment before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "JagannadhaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7286, "end_char": 7297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursu- JagannadhaJ/ts J. ance of the order dated the 8th February, 1944, quoted above, a fresh notice under section 34 of the Act was issued to the appellant on the 12th February, 1944.", "canonical_name": "JacamradhadasJ."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7387, "end_char": 7397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th February, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7444, "end_char": 7463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursu- JagannadhaJ/ts J. ance of the order dated the 8th February, 1944, quoted above, a fresh notice under section 34 of the Act was issued to the appellant on the 12th February, 1944."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8015, "end_char": 8025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12-2-1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8518, "end_char": 8527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the assessee's application to refer both the points for the decision of the High Court, the Tribunal declined to make a reference as regards the second point but referred the first for the opinion of the Court in the following terms:\n\n\"Whether in the circumstances of the case, the notice issued on 12-2-1944 under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act was validly issued for the assessment year 1939-40?\""}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8534, "end_char": 8544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8559, "end_char": 8573, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9115, "end_char": 9125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9518, "end_char": 9528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9574, "end_char": 9584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9784, "end_char": 9794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10784, "end_char": 10794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jacannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11814, "end_char": 11827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged that the income sought to be Jacannadhadas J. assessed under these proceedings was not, as a fact, chargeable to income-tax during the assessment year 1939-40.", "canonical_name": "JacamradhadasJ."}}, {"text": ".22nd December, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12650, "end_char": 12670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also contended that there is no question of discovery of any relevant fact or information, because the non-assessment of the income of the ass'essee fot the period in question was in spite of all the information relating to the income of the assessee having been previously furnished and being in the possession of tl_ie Income-tax Officer as would appear from the order of the Officer dated the .22nd December, 1939."}}, {"text": "section 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13005, "end_char": 13018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 340", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13071, "end_char": 13082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13627, "end_char": 13629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th September, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14945, "end_char": 14965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The information as to both these facts taken together could only be after the decision of the High Court on the 30th September, 1943."}}, {"text": "section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15003, "end_char": 15016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15391, "end_char": 15405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th February.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16597, "end_char": 16610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are quite clear that the pro- Jatwuradizadas J. mulgation of the Regulation and the decision of the High Court are objective facts, information regarding which became available to the Income-tax Oflicer when he passed the order dated the 8th February."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17365, "end_char": 17379, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17438, "end_char": 17452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17817, "end_char": 17824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been pointed out by the Federal Court in Chatturam v. C./.T., Bihar(') quoting from the judgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') \"there are three stages in the imposition of a tax."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18531, "end_char": 18544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same idea has been Jagannadhadas 1 expressed in slightly different language by Lord Romer in the judgment of the Privy Council reported in C./.T., Bombay & Aden v. Khemchand Ramdas(').", "canonical_name": "JacamradhadasJ."}}, {"text": "Romer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18596, "end_char": 18601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same idea has been Jagannadhadas 1 expressed in slightly different language by Lord Romer in the judgment of the Privy Council reported in C./.T., Bombay & Aden v. Khemchand Ramdas(')."}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18698, "end_char": 18731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18868, "end_char": 18877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18984, "end_char": 18993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "sections 4, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19104, "end_char": 19117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19239, "end_char": 19248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20348, "end_char": 20385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20637, "end_char": 20646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act", "statute": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20876, "end_char": 20885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act", "statute": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21109, "end_char": 21125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act", "statute": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21239, "end_char": 21248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act", "statute": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21312, "end_char": 21321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act", "statute": "Finance Act but until the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "[1947) F.C.R. 116", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22596, "end_char": 22613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa\n\nJagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22878, "end_char": 22899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J11come tax, Bih(Jr\n\nand Orissa\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe next question that arises is whether the income, though chargeable to tax in the year, can be said to have scaped assessment in the relevant year."}}, {"text": "1947 F.C.R. 116", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28594, "end_char": 28609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_303_374_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "' Ii\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHAKUR AMAR SINGHJI v.\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\n(AND OTHER PETITIONS)\n\n[MUKHERJEA c. ]., s. R. DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATA-\n\nRAMA AYYAR AND ]AFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nRajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of /agirs Act (Rajasthan Act VI of 1952)-Validity-Rajpramukh-Competence to enact the law-Covenant of the United State of Rafasthan, arts. Vil (3), X (3)-\"0rdinance\", meaning of-Bill, whether prepared by the Rafpramukh as required by the Constitution-Resumption of jagir lands -Legislative competence-Pith and substance of legislation-Acquisition or resumption-/agir, meaning of-Legislative practice-Implied grant-Legislative , grants-Constitutions of India, Arts. 14, 31-A, 31(2), 212-A(2), 385, Sch. Vil, List II, entries 18, 36-Marwar Land Revenue Act (XL of 1949), s. 169-Mewar Governmenl Kanoon Mal Act (V of 1947), s. 106-Bhomicharas, Bhomias Tikanadars, Subeguzars, Marsubdars holders of other tenures.\n\nThe Bill which came to be enacted as the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act was prepared in the Ministerial Department of the Government of Rajasthan. It was approved by the Rajpramukh on 8-2-1952, and reserved for the consideration of the President, who gave his assent to it on 13-2-1952.\n\nBy notification issued on 16-2-1952, the Act came into force on 18-2-1952. In pursuance of s. 21 ( 1) of the Act, the State of Rajasthan issued notifications resuming the jagirs specified therein, whereupon petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution were filed by the persons aggrieved challenging the validity of the Act before the Rajasthan High Court. The petitions were dismissed and thereupon they filed petitions before the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India, impugning the Act.\n\nThey contended inter alia that the Rajpramukh had no competence to enact the law that the Bill was not prepared by the Rajpramukh as required by Art. 212-A(2), that resumption was not one of the topics of legislation enumerated either in the State List or in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and that the Act was therefore ultra vires the powers of the State, that the Act did not provide for adquate compensation nor was there any public purpose involved in it and therefore it contravened Art. 31(2), and that as the Act was discriminatory it contravened Art. 14. There were some special contentions that the Act was not saved by Art. 31-A, because the lands resumed were neither estates nor jagirs nor grants similar to jagirs, inams or muafi and that some of the properties sought to be resumed were not jagirs as defined in the Act and therefore the notifications under s. 21 of the Act in so far as they related to them were illegal.\n\nTAal; ur AMM\n\nSinf/fii\n\n\"· ,,.,, of /IJj<UtMn\n\nHeld that, (i) the Rajpramukh was competent to enact the im pugned law (under Art. 385 as he was the authority functioning immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the legislature of Rajasthan under art. X (3) of the Covenant of the United State of Rajasthan. The expression \"Ordinance\" in art. X\n\n(3) must be construed as meaning \"Law\".\n\nArticle VII (3) of the Covenant has reference to the executive power which the Rulers had to resume jagirs and does not operate as a restric_tion on the legisla tive powers under art. X (3).\n\nThe Legislature of the corresponding State mentioned in Art. 385 refers not to the legislature under the Constitution, but to the body or the authority which was function ing as the legislature of the State before the commencement of the Constitution and under Art. X (3) of the Covenant of the United State of Rajasthan, that authority was the Rajpramukh.\n\nArticle 385 does not require that that authority should have had absolute and unlimited powers of legislation. If it was functioning as the legislative authority before the Constitution, it would, under the article, have all the powers conferred by the Constitution on the House or Houses of legislature of the States.\n\n(ii) Article 212A(2) which provides that the Rajpramukh should prepare the Bill, does not require that he should himself draft it. It is sufficient if he decides questions of policy which arc of the essence of the legislation. It is open to the Rajpramukh to adopt a Bill prepared by his ministers and the only matter that will have to be considered is whether in fact he did so. There is no provision in Art. 212-A(2) for the Rajpramukh approving of a Bill and an endorsement of approval on the Bill prepared in the ministerial department mu.<t therefore signify its adoption by him. When the Bill is produced with an endorsement of approval under his signature the que<tion must be held to be concluded and any further discussion about the legislative or executive state of mind of the Rajpramukh must be ruled out as inadmissible.\n\n(iii) The impugned Act is not ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature as the subject-matter of the legislation is in subs.-\n\ntance acquisition of properties falling under entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Resumption and acquisition connote two different concepts, but whether the impugned Act is one for acquisition of jagirs or for their resumption must be determined with reference to the pith and substance of the legislation, the name given to it by the legislature not being decisive of the matter. The resumption for which the Act provides is not in enforcement of the rights which the Rulers had to resume jagirs in accordance with the terms of the grant or the law applicable to it, but in exercise of the sovereign rights of eminent domain possessed by the State. Under the circumstances, the taking of the properties is in substance acquisition notwithstanding that it is labelled as resumption.\n\nThe payment of compensation to the Jagirdars is consistent only with the taking being an acquisition and not resumption in\n\naccordance with the terms of the grant or the law applicable to it.\n\nThough the legislation also falls under entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Sched1de, there being an entry 36 dealing with acquisition, it must be held that the Act falls under that entry and is valid.\n\n(iv) The word 'jagir' connoted originally grants made by Raj put Rulers to their clansmen for military services rendered or to be rendered.\n\nLater on grants made for religious and charitable purposes and even to non-Rajputs were called jagirs, and both in its popular sense and legislative practice, the word jagir came to be used as connoting all grants which conferred on the grantees rights in respect of land revenue, and that is the sense in which the word jagir should be construed in Art. 31-A.\n\nThe object of Art. 31-A as to save legislation which was directed to the abolition of intermediaries so as to establish direct relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil. Construing the word in that sense which would achieve that object in full measure, it must be held that jagir was meant to cover all grants under which the grantec!s had only rights in respect of revenue and were not tillers of the soil. Maintenance grants in favour of persons who were not cultivators such as members of the ruling family would be jagirs for purposes of Art. 31-A.\n\n( v) Bhomicharas. The Bhomicharas arc the representatives of Rajput Rulers who conquered the country and established their sovereignty over it in the thirteenth century. Later on the Ruler of Jodhpur imposed his oovereignty over the territory but permitted the previous rulers to continue in possession of the lands on payment of an annual sum.\n\nThe question was whether they held the lands as jagirs.\n\nHeld that, there could be a jagir only by grant by the Ruling power but that such a grant need not be express, and could be implied and when the Ruler of Jodhpur imposed his sovereignty over the territory of the Bhomicharas but recognised their possession of the lands, it is as if there was annexation by him and re-grant to them of these lands.\n\nVajesinghji /oravar Singhji and Others v. Secretary of State [ (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357] and Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam KhatJ [(1941) L.R. 68 I.A. 109], referred to.\n\nThough the Bhomicharas enjoyed large powers, their status was only that of subjects. The status of a person must be either that of a sovereign or a subject. There is no tertium quid. The law does not recognise an intermediate status of a person being partly a sovereign and partly a subject. And when once it is admitted that the Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sovereignty of Jodhpur their status can only be that of a subject.\n\nEven if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act XL of 1949 hold the lands as grantees\n\nTMkwA-\n\nSingfiii ...\n\nSlcll of RajiutMll\n\nTiullalr Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nv. ' of Rajasthan\n\nfrom the State, they must be deemed to have become such grantees by force of s. 169 of the Act which provides that all lands in the State vest in the Maharajah and all proprietary interests therein are deemed to be held under a grant from him. The Bhomicharas had by long usage and recognition and by the legislative practice of the State come tO be recognised as jagirdars and their tenure is a jagir within the intendment of s. 169.\n\nFor the purposes of Art. 31-A, it would make no difference whether the grant is made by the sovereign in the exercise of his prerogative right or by the legislature in the exercise of its sovereign rights. Grants whih are the creatures of statutes called legislative grants are equally within the operation of that article.\n\nBhomicharas are, accordingly, within the operation of Art.\n\n31-A.\n\n(vi) The position of Bhumias in Mewar is similar to that of Bhomicharas in Marwar and in addition it was a condition of the terms on which their title to the lands was recognised by the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur, that they had to render military service when called upon and also pay quit rent. Their title to the lands therefore rested on an implied grant and their tenure would be jagir even in its stricter sense.\n\nSection 27 of the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act {V of\n\n1947) enacts that all lands belong to His Highness and that no person has authority to take possession of any lands unless the right is granted by His Highness.\n\nSection 106( I) of the Act declares that a \"Tikanadar, Jagir<lar, Muafidar or Bhumia shall have all such revenue rights in the lands comprised in his )agir, muafi, or Bhom under this Act, as are granted to him by His Highness\". The effect of these provisions \\Vas to impress on the Bhom tenure the characteristics of a grant.\n\nArticle 13, Clause (1) of the Constitution of Mewar provided that, \"no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law within the territories of Mewar\".\n\nIt was contended for the petitioners that the impugned Act was void as contravening the above provisions. Held that, as the authority whirh enacted the Constitution of Mewar was His Highness, it could be repealed or modified by the same authority, and the impugned Act must be held to have repealed the Constitution to the extent that it was inconsistent with it.\n\n(vii) The Tikanadars of Shekwati got into possession of lands as ijaradars or lessees and were subsequently treated as jagirdars~ Their tenure was; if not jagirs, at least other usimilar grants\" within Art. 31-A. It is included in Schedule I to the impugned Act as item 6.\n\nThe nature of the tenures of lands held by Subeguzars, Mansubdars, maintenance holders (Lawazma and Kothrikarch), Tikanadars and of Naqdirazan, Sansan grants, etc., considered.\n\n(viii) The Khandela estate was granted in 1836 on a permanent lease.\n\nThe definition of jagir in s. 2(h) includes the tenures mentioned in Schedule I to the Act and Istimrari tenure is item 2 therein. The question was whether the Istimrar-ijara was within item 2.\n\nHeld that, the essential features of lstimrari .tenure are that the lands are assessed to a nominal quit rent, and that it is permanent.\n\nThe amount of Rs. 80,001 fixed as assessment under the deed of 1836 cannot be said to be nominal. The grant is, therefore, not an Istimrari tenure, but a permanent Izara.\n\n{ix) Objections raised as to the validity of the Act on the ground that it did not provide for payment of compensation, that there was no public purpose involved in the resumption and that therefore it contravenes Art. 31(2) or that the provisions of the Act offend Art. 14, are barred by the provisions of Art. 31-A of the ConstitutW, n.\n\nEven apart from Art . .31-A, the impugned Act must be held to be supported by public purpose and is not in contravention of Art. 31(2). Nor is there a contravention of Art. 14, as under the Act all jagirs are liable to be resumed, on power having been conferred on the Government to grant exemption.\n\nState of Bihar v. Maharaiadhiraia Sir Ka\"!_eshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others [(1952) S.C.R. 889] and Biswambhar Singh v.\n\nThe State of Orissa and Others ((1954) S.C.R. 842], referred to.\n\nThe true scope of the rule of eiusdem generis is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified and not its reverse, that specific words which precede are controlled by the general words which follow.\n\nORIGINAL\n\nJURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 354 to 359, 362, 370 to 385, 387 to 469, 471 to 475, 477 to 479, 482 to 486, 488, 490, 491, 493 to 497, 502, 503, 510, 511 to 521, 525, 527 to 529, 535 to 563, 570, 572 to 575, 577 to 584, 586 to 588, 592 to 595, 597, 600 602, 603, 606 to 610, 613 to 619, 624, 026 to 634, 637 to 645, 653, 654, 656 to 659, 661, 662, 668, 672, 675, 679, 684 to 688 of 1954 and 1 to 14, 17, 20, 21, 25 to 27, 35 to \"37, 45, 47, 49 52, 55 to 57 and 61 to 66 of 1955.\n\nPetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nDr. Bakshi Tek Chand (O C. Chatterjee and K. L. Mehta, with him) for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 354, 362, 382 to 385, 511 to 516, 519, 537,\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji v.\n\nSlall of Rajasthan\n\nTM.twA.-\n\nSilqlfji ...\n\nSia# qf &, jlulMa\n\n541, 543 to 547, 550, 553, 556, 558 to 562, 570, 573 to 575, 582 to 584, 587, 588, 593 to 595, 597, 602, 603, 607 to 609, 613, 614, 616 to 619, 626, 628, 631 to 633, 637, 640 to 642, '44, 645, 653, 657 to 659, 661, 662, 679, 684 to 688 of 1954 and 2 to 7, 9 to 14, 21, 25 to 27, 35, 37, 45, 47, 49, 52, 55, 57, 63 and 65 of 1955.\n\nH. L. Mordia and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 55 and 65 of 1955.\n\nFrank Anthony and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 56 and 64 of 1955.\n\nU. M. Trivedi, (K. L. Mehta, with him),- for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 615 of 1954 d 20 of 1955.\n\nR. K. Rastogi and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioner in Petition No. 634 of 1954.\n\nK. L. Mehta, for the Petitioner in Petition No. 36 of 1955.\n\nDr. Bakshi Tek Chand (0. C.\n\nChatterjee and Naunit Lal, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 356 to 359, 370, 372, 373, 374, 376 to 378, 380, 389, 390, 393 to 400, 415, 417, 463, 469, 482, 484, 521, 563, 577, 578, 586, 592, 606, 610, 627 and 656 of 1954.\n\nAchhru Ram, (Naunit Lal, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No. 391 of 1954.\n\nNaunit Lal, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 355, 371, 375, 379, 416, 455, 468, 483, 485, 488, 491, 493 to 497, 517, 525, 529, 538, 540, 542 and 551 of 1954.\n\nDr. Bakshi Tek Chand, (Ganpat Rai with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 381, 387, 388, 402 to 410, 412, 413, 418 to 423, 425, 426, 428 to 454, 456 to 459, 464 to 466, 477, 478, 486, 503, 510, 520, 548, 552, 557, 572, 580, 600, 624, 639, 668 of 1954 and 8 and 17 of 1955.\n\nN. C. Cliatterjee, ( Ganpat Rai and S. K.. Kapur,\n\n2 $.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT llEPOR.TS\n\nwith him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 462, 536, 549, 579, 630, 638 and 654 of 1954.\n\nTW.A-\n\nS'111t/tii U. M. Trivedi, (Ganpat Rai, with him), for the St.,, d4i6petitioners in Petitions No. 629, 643, 672 of 1954 and (J6 of 1955.\n\nAchhru Ram, (Ganpat Rai, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No. 424 of 1954.\n\nFrank Anthony and Ganpat Rai, for the Pctition7rs in Petitions Nos. 401, 460, 502, 518, 53' and 539 of 1954.\n\nS. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 411 and 675 of 1954.\n\nR. K. Pastogi and Ganpat Rai, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 427 and 461 of 1954.\n\n0. C. Chatterji and Ganpat Rai, for the Petitioner in Petition No. 62 of 1955.\n\n/. B. Dadachanii and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 473, 479, 490, 527, 528, 554 and 581 of 1954 and Nos. 1 and 61 of 1955.\n\nC. L. Aggarwal and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 471, 472, 474 and 475 of 1954.\n\nK. P. Gupta, for the Petitioners, in Petitions Nos. 467 and 555 of 1954.\n\nS. C. ltaacs (S. D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No. 392 of 1954.\n\nK. S. Hajela, Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan and G. S. Pathak, (Dau/at Ram Bhandari, Porus A. Mehta, P. G. Gokhale and Kan Singh, with them), for the Respondent (State of Rajasthan) in all the petitions. .\n\n1955. April 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAit J.-These are applications under Article 32 of the Constitution impugning the validity of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act No. VI of 1952, hereinafter referred\n\nThakwA-\n\nSinghji .,,, Sl•ll of Rajasllum\n\nY 111l; ataram11\n\nApar J.\n\nto as the Act. The history of this legislation may be briefly stated. On 20-8-1949 the Government of India appointed a Committee presided over by Sri C. S .\n\nVenkatachar to examine and report on the jagirdari and land tenures in Rajputana and Madhya Bharat the object avowedly being to effect land reforms so as to establish direct .relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil and to eliminate all intermediaries between them. By its report dated 18-12-1949 the Committee recommended inter alia the resumption of j agirs and payment of rehabilitation grants in certain cases. (Vide report, page 62).\n\nThe question of legislation on the subject was taken up by the Government of Rajasthan in 1951, and eventually a Bill called the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill was prepared, and on 31-12-1951 it was approved by the Rajpramukh and reserved for the consideration of the President.\n\nOn 21-1-1952 the President withheld his assent from the Bill, and in communicating this decision, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India informed the Rajasthan Government that if certain amendments wete made in the Bill as presented and a fresh Bill submitted, the President would be willing to reconsider the matter. In accordance with these suggestions, a fresh Bill was prepared in the Ministerial Department incorporating certain amendments, and it was approved by the Rajpramukh on 8-2-1952, and reserved for the consideration of the President, who gave his assent to it on 13-2-1952. By notification issued on 16-2-1952 the Act came into force on 18-2-1952.\n\nSection 21(1) of the Act provides that :\n\n\"As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the Government may by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption of any class of jagir lands and different dates may be appointed for different classes of jagir lands\".\n\nActing under this provision, the State of Rajasthan issued notifications resuming the jagirs specified therein, whereupon petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were filed by the persons aggrieved challenging the validity of the Act. These petitions were\n\nhead by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, which held overruling the contentions of the petitioners, that the Act was valid. (Vide Amarsingh ·· v.\n\nState of Rajasthan (1 ).\n\nThe present applications have been filed under article 32 impugning the Act on the following grounds: I. The Rajpramukh had no competence to enact law, and the Act in question is therefore not a valid piece of legislation.\n\nII. The Bill was not prepared by the Rajpramukh as required by article 212-A(Z), and therefore the law was not validly enacted.\n\nIII. Resumption is not one of the topics of legislation enumerated either in the State List or in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and the Act is therefore ultra vires the powers of the State.\n\nIV. The Act does not provide for adequate compensation; nor is there any public purpose involved in it, and so it contravenes article 31(2).\n\nIt is discriminatory, and therefore contravenes article 14.\n\nAnd the legislation is not saved by article 31-A, because the lands resumed arc neither estates nor jagirs nor grants similar to jagirs, inams or muafi.\n\nThis contention is special to some of the petitioners, and has reference to the specific properties held by them.\n\nV. The properties sought to be resumed arc not jagirs as defined in the Act, and the notifications under section 21 in so far as they relate to them arc illegal. This again is a special contention urged in some of the petitions.\n\nThese contentions will now be considered seriatim.\n\nI. On the first question as to the competence of the Rajpramukh to enact the law, it is necessary to notice the events which led up to the formation of the State of Rajasthan and the constitution of the Rajpramukh as. its head. During the 12th and 13th Centuries, the Rajput rulers who were then reigning\n\n( 1) A.I.R. 1854 Rajasthan ~91.\n\nTlta/wr btlJt\n\nSing/iii\n\nStat1 of Rajasthan.\n\nJ'mkatarama\n\n\"\"-\".1\"' J.\n\nTlflllatTA-\n\nSingfiji\n\nSlilll of Rqj011/um\n\nYm.tatMamd\n\nA.UM]·\n\nover various parts of Hindusthan were compelled by pressure from the victorious Muhammadan invaders to retreat to the regions to the southwest guarded by the Aravali Hills and interspersed with deserts which if less hospitable were also less vulnerable, and there established several independent kingdoms. The period which followed the foundation of these States was marked by incessant wars, the powerful Sultans of Delhi making determined efforts to subjugate the Rajput princes and the latter offering stubborn and more or less successful resistance thereto.\n\nThe annals of Rajputana especially of this period, present a story of heroic deeds of men and women and are among the most inspiring and fascinating chapters in the history of this country.\n\nThe Moghul Emperors who established themselves later saw the wisdom of conciliating the Rajput rulers, and recognised their position as Chiefs getting in return an acknowledgement of their suzerainty from them, and a promise to send troops in support of the Imperial arms whenever required.\n\nWhen the power of the great Moghul waned and the British established themselves as masters o£ this country, they in their turn recognised the Rajput princes as Sovereigns, and entered into treaties with them during the period between 1803 to 1818. (Vide Aitchison's Treaties, Volume III).\n\nBy these treaties, the British Government accepted their status as independent rulers reserving to themselves Defence, External Relations and Communications and such other matters as might be agreed upon. The relationship thus created was one of \"subordinate union\" as it was termed by Mr. Lee Warner, the princes being recognised as Sovereigns and they acknowledging the suzerainty of the British. (Vide Protected Princes of India, Chapter VI).\n\nOn 15-8-1947 India became independent, and the paramountcy of the British Crown over the States ceased.\n\nThe question then arose as to the status of the ruling Chiefs.\n\nIt was soon realised by them that in the larger interests of the country and in their own, they could not afford to keep out of the Indian Union and must throw ID their lot with it.\n\nThe\n\n...\n\nproblem of fitting them within the framework of the Indian Constitution was beset with considerable difficulties. The number of States which had been recognised as independent prior to 15-8-1947 was 552 excluding Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. While a few of them were sufficiently large to be able to function as separate State, many of them were too small to be administered as distinct units. While some of them had representative forms of Government, others had not, the rulers being the sole authority, executive, legislative and judicial. The solution which was adopted by the Government of India was that while the bigger States were continued as independent units of the Union, the smaller States were, where they formed islets within a Province, merged within that Province, and where they were contiguous, integrated together so as to form a new State called the Union.\n\nOne of the Unions thus newly formed was Rajasthan.\n\nThere were at that time 18 independent rulers functioning over different parts of Rajasthan.\n\nNine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan.\n\nThe ruler of Mewar joined this Union on 18-4-1948, and the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmere on 30-3-1949.\n\nThe rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949. With that, the full strength of the State of Rajasthan was made up.\n\nThe constitution of the United State of Rajasthan as it finally emerged is to be found in the Covenant entered into by the 14 rulers on 30-3-1949.\n\nAs the authority of the Rajpramukh to enact the impugned legislation was founded on this Covenant, it is necessary to refer to the material provisions thereof bearing on the question.\n\nUnder Article II, the Covenanting States agreed \"to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a common executive legisla- 2-83 S, C. India/59\n\nThakur Amar\n\n/higkji\n\nStot1 of Rajasthan\n\nVenlcaJarama\n\nA)'J'ar J.\n\nT /r4l; ur Amat\n\n5U.ghji\n\nState of Rajast/urn\n\nVmkatardma\n\nA\"•r J.\n\nture and judiciary, by the name of the United State of Rajasthan\".\n\nArticle VI(2) provides that the ruler of each Covenanting State shall \"make over the administration of his State to the Rajpramukh, and thereupon all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the ruler which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting States shall vest in the United State and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder. Article VII\n\n(3) provides :\n\n\"Unless other provision is made by the Act of the Legislature of the United State, the right to resume J agirs or to recognise succession, according to law and custom, to the rights and titles of the jagirdars shall vest exclusively in the Rajpramc:kh\".\n\nThem comes article X(3) which is as follows:\n\n\"Until a Constitution so framed comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Rajpramukh, the legislative authority of the United State shall vest in the Rajpramukh, who may make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of the State or any part thereof, and any Ordinance so ma.de shall have the like force of law as an Act passed by the legislature of the United State\".\n\nArticle X(3) was subsequently modified by substituting for the words \"Until a Constitution so framed comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Rajpramukh\", the words \"Until the Legislative Assembly of Rajasthan has been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of the Constitution of India\". This modifi. cation was necessitated by the fact that the idea of conven.ing a Constituent Assembly for framing a Constitution for the State as contemplated in article X(l) was dropped, and the Constitution as enacted for the\n\nUnion of India was adopted. This amendment, however, is of a formal character, and does not affect the substane of the matter.\n\nThen, there is article XIX under which the Rajasthan Government was to act \"under the general control of and comply with such particular directions,\n\nif any, as may from time to time, be given by the Government of India\". These are the material provisions of the Constitution which was in force in the United State of Rajasthan before the Constitution of India came into operation on 26-1-1950.\n\nArticle 385 of the Constitution enacts:\n\n\"Until the House or Houses of the Legislature of a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule has or have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the body or authority functioning immediately before the commencement of this Constitution as the legislature of the corresponding Indian States shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on the House or Houses of the Legislature of the\n\nState so specified\".\n\nIt is the contention of the respondent that the Rajpramukh was by reason of article X(3) of the Covenant \"the authority functioning immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the Legislature\" of Rajasthan, and that he could under article 385 exercise the powers which the Legislature of the State could. It is conceded by the petitioners that at the time of the impugned legislation no House of Legislature had been constituted and summoned, and that to that extent the requirements of that Article are satisfied; but their contention is that on a true construction of the articles of the Covenant the Rajpramukh was not an authority functioning as Legislature within the meaning of article 385, and further that article VII(3) of the Covenant imposed a prohibition on his power to enact a law of the kind now under challenge, and that the prohibition had not been abrogated by the Constitution.\n\nThe question then is which was the body or authority which was functioning as the Legislature of the United State of Rajasthan under the terms of the Covenant Article X (3) expressly provides that the legislative authority of the State shall vest in the Rajpramukh.\n\nThe meaning of this provision is clear and unambigu-\n\nThakur .A-\n\nSing/ifi\n\n\"· SlaJ• of Rajulba\n\nYmkatarama\n\n.War].\n\nThakur.A.,..,\n\nSinghji\n\nSiok of Rqjastlurn\n\nY1nkal'11'ama\n\nA>.Par j.\n\nous; but it is argued for the petitioners that it is controlled and cut down by the expression \"Ordinance\" in article X(3) and by the terms of article VII(3) and of article XIX. It is contended by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that the legislative authority of the Rajpramukh was only to \"make and promulgate Ordinance'', that it is a limited power conferred on him to be exercised in case of emergency pending the constitution of popular legislature, and that accordingly he was not a \"legislative authority\" for the purpose of article 385.\n\nBut this is to import into the word \"Ordinance\" what it connotes under the Government of India Act, 1935 or the Constitution of India.\n\nSections 42 and 88 of the Government of India Act conferred on the Governor-General and the Governor respectively power to promulgate ordinances when the Legislature was not in session. Similar power is conferred on the President and the Governors by articles 123 and 213 of the Constitution.\n\nThat is a legislative power exercisable by the head of the State, when it is not possible for the Legislature to exercise it. But the United State of Rajasthan had then no Legislature, which had yet to be constituted, and therefore in its context, the word \"Ordinance\" in article .X(3) cannot bear the meaning which it has under the Government of India Act or the Constitution. It should be remembered that before the formation of the United State, the . Covenanting rulers enjoyed sovereign rights of legislation in their respective territories; and under article VI(2) (a), they agreed to surrender those rights and vest them in the United State.\n\nIt was therefore plainly intended that the State of Rajasthan should have plenary legislative authority such as was formerly exercised by the rulers; and where was it lodged, if not in the Rajpramukh If we are to construe article X(3) in the manner contended for by the petitioners, then the anomalom result will follow that there was in that State no authority in which the legislative power was vested.\n\nThis anomaly would disappear if we are to construe \"Ordinance\" as meaning law.\n\nThat indeed is its etymological meaning.\n\nAccording to the Concise Ox-\n\n...\n\nford Dictionary \"to ordain\" means \"to decree, enact\"; and \"Ordinance\" would therefore mean \"decree, enact ment''.\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume XI, page 183, para 327 it is stated that when the Governor of a colony which has no representative assembly enacts legislation with the advice and consent of the State council, it is designated ordinance or law. That clearly is the sense in which the word is used in arti de X(3), and that is placed beyond doubt by the words which follow, that the Ordinance is to have \"the like force of law, as an Act passed by the Legislature of the United State\". lt was next urged that under article VIl(3) the Rajpramukh was given authority to resume jagirs only in accordance with law and custom, that he had no authority to enact a law for the resumption of jagirs on grounds other than those recognised by law and custom, that section 22 of the Act provided that the resumption was to take effect notwithstanding any jagir law which as defined in section 2( d) includes also custom, that such a law was directly opposed to what was authorised by article VII(3), that the legis lative powers conferred under article X(3) must be exercised subject to the restrictions under article VIl(3), and that the Act was therefore beyond his competence.\n\nThis contention is, in our opinion, un tenable.\n\nThe words \"according to law and custom\". cannot be held to qualify the words right to resume jagirs\", because they are wedged in between the words \"right to recognise succession\" and the words \"to the rights and titles of Jagirdars\", and must be construed as qualifying only \"the right to recognise succession to the rights and titles of Jagirdars\". But this may not, by itself, be of much consequence, as the power to resume provided in this article is what the grantor possesses under law and custom.\n\nThe real difficulty in the way of the petitioners is that article VIl(3) has reference to the power which rulers of States had as rulers to resume jagirs, and what it provides is that it should thereafter be exercised by the Rajpramukh.\n\nThat power is purely an executive one, and has nothing to do with the legislative power of the ruler, which\n\nTluzkurAmat\n\nSinghji\n\n\"4 State of RqjaJt!ian\n\nVmkatar111M\n\n., War J.\n\nT\"\"\"'6 A-\n\nSing/Ui ...\n\nStall of Rajast/uin\n\nY mkalorama\n\n..War :J.\n\nL specially provided for in article X(3)..\n\nThe fields covered by the two articles are distinct and separate and there can be no question of article VII(3) operating as a restriction on the legislative power under article X(3). Indeed, article VII(3) expressly provides that it is subject to any legislation on the subject, whereas article X(3) is not made subject to article VII(3).\n\nEven if the petitioners are right in their contention that article VII(3) imposes a limitation on the powers of the Rajpramukh, that would not, in view of article 385, derogate from the power of the Rajpramukh to enact the present law. The scope of that article is that the body or authority which was functioning before the commencement of the Constitution as the Legislature of the State has first to be ascertained, and when once that has been done and the body or . .authority identified, the Constitution confides to that body or authority all the powers conferred by the provisions of the Constitution on the House or Houses of Legislature of the State. These powers might be wider than what the body or authority previously possessed or they might be narrower.\n\nBut they arc the powers which are allowed to it under article 385, and the extent of the previous authority is wholly immaterial.\n\nThe contention that the Act is incompetent by reason of article VII(3) of the Covenant must accordingly fail.\n\nIt was next argued that the powers of the Rajpramukh under article X(3) were subject to the general control of the Government of India under article XIX, and that he could not therefore be regarded as legislative authority for the purpose of article 385 We see no force in this contention. Article 385 provides that the authority which was to exercise legislative powers in the interim period under that Article should be the authority which was functioning as the Legislature of the State before the commencement of the Constitution. It does not further require that that authority should have possessed absolute and unlimited powers of legislation.\n\nIt could not be, and it was not, contended that the effect of article XIX\n\nwas to vest the legislative authority of the State in the Government of India, and that being so, the Rajpramukh was the legislative authority of the State, whatever the limitations on that authority.\n\nIt was finally contended that article 385 has no application to the present case, because under article 168 the Legislature is to consist of both the Governor and one or more Houses, that article 238(7) extends article 168 to Part B States substituting the Rajpramukh in the place of the Governor that accordingly the Rajpramukh cannot by himself constitute the Legislature, and that when article 385 refers to the body or authority functioning as Legislature, it could only refer to both the Rajpramukh and the House functioning in conjunction.\n\nSupport for this contention was sought in the terms of article 212-A(l) of the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No.\n\nII, which excluded in relation to Part B States only the first proviso to article 200, but not the body of it.\n\nIf this contention is sound, then article 385 must be treated as a dead letter as regards such of the Part B States as had no House of Legislature. But, in our opinion, this contention is untenable, because article 385 refers not to Legislatures under th.e Constitution but to the body or authority which was functioning as the Legislature of the State before the commencement of the Constitution, and article 238(7) is, under the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order sub. ject to article 385. Nor can any argument be founded on the exclusion of the first proviso to article 200 but not of the body of that article under article 212-A(l), because it lays down the procedure to be followed when a Bill has been passed by a Legislative Assembly. or Legislative Council of a State, and is by its very terms inapplicable when there is no House of Legislature.\n\nThe contention of Mr. Frank Anthony that the non-inclusion of the body of article 200 among the articles excluded from application to Part B States under article 212-A(l) imposes by implication a limitation on the power of the Rajpramukh to enact laws unless they are passed by Legislative Assemblies is\n\nT,_,,,~J\n\nSitlP, ii ,,.\n\nS\"\"4 of Rajtutha\n\nVmA:atanmia\n\n.4)!1111' J.\n\nThalalrbw\n\nSing/iii ...,. 8144 of Rajastb\n\nYmkalaramo\n\n4u•1\n\nnot supported by anything in the article, and must be rejected.\n\nWe must accordingly hold that the Rajpramukh had legislative competence to enact the law under challenge.\n\nII. The second contention that has been pressed by the petitioners is tha.t the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill was not prepared by the Rajpramukh as required by article 212-A(2), and that the Act was therefore not validly enacted. The facts material for the purpose of this contention arc that the Bill was first prepared in the Ministerial Department in accordance with the rules framed under article !66(3) for the \"convenient transaction of the business of the State\". It was approved by the. Council of Ministers on 27-12-1951 and sent to the Rajpramukh with the following note by the Secretary:\n\n\"The Bill is submitted for gracious approval and signature and for reserving it for the consideration of the President\".\n\nThen there is firstly an endorsement \"approved\" signed by the Rajpramukh and dated 31-12-1951, and then follows another endorsement, \"I hereby reserve this Bill for the consideration of the President\" similarly signed and dated. On 21-1-1952 the President endorsed on the Bill, \"I withhold my assent from the Bill\".\n\nThereafter, a fresh Bill was prepared and submitted to the Rajpramukh on 6-2-1952 with the following note by the Chief Secretary:\n\n\"The Bill as finally agreed to is now submitted to His Highness the Rajpramukh for his approval and for reserving the same for the consideration of the President\".\n\nThe Rajpramukh gave his approval on 8-2-1952, and by a further order he reserved the Bill for the consideration of the President who gave his assent on 13-2-1952.\n\nNow, the question is whether on these facts the requirements of article 212-A(2) have been complied with.\n\nArticle 212-A(2) was enacted by the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II, and is as follows:\n\n\"The Rajpramukh or other authority exercising th(! legislative powers in any such State as aforesaid under article 385 shall prepare such Bills as may be deemed necessary, and the Rajpramukh shall declare as respects any Bill so prepared either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves it for the consideration of the President\".\n\nThe contention of the petitioners is that as the Bill was prepared by the Ministers and not the Rajpramukh, article 212-A(2) had been contravened, and that, in consequence, the law had not been properly enacted.\n\nIt is conceded that under this article the Rajpramukh has not himself to draft the Bill, and that he might delegate that work to others. But they insist-and in our opinion, rightly-that questions of policy which are of the essence of the legislation should at least be decided by him, and that even that had not been done in the present case. They rely strongly on the statements in t.he affidavit of Sri Joshi, the Jagir Commissioner, that the Bill was drafted in the Ministerial Department in accordance with the rules framed under article 166(3), approved by the Council of Ministers and sent on to the Rajpramukh for his assent.\n\nThese allegations, they contend, preclude any supposition that the Rajpramukh had any part or lot in the settlement of the policies underlying the Act, and the Bill must be held therefore not to have been prepared by him.\n\nTaking it that such are the facts, what follows?\n\nOnly that at the inception the Bill was not prepared by the Rajpramukh. But that does not conclude the question whether there had been compliance with article 212-A(2), unless we hold that it was not open to the Rajpramukh to adopt a Bill prepar('d by the Ministers as his own, or if it was open, he did not, in fact, do so. It cannot be disputed that whether a Bill is in the first instance prepared by the Rajpramukh or whether he adopts what had been prepared by the Ministers as his own, the position in law is the same. That has not been disputed by the petitioners.\n\nTheir contention ts that such adoption\n\n195S\n\nThahx Amor\n\nSingh ii\n\nV• Stale of RajastluiR\n\nV enkatt1ramo\n\nA.1.7\"' J.\n\nTlubrAmar\n\nSinglifi ...\n\nSt.II of Raj\"\"\"\"3\n\nshould be clearly and unequivocally established, and that the records do not establish it. It was argued that when the Bill was sent to the Rajpramukh, he was not called upon to apply his legislative mind to it but to merely assent to it on the executive side; that when the Rajpramukh endorsed his approval he was, as admitted by Sri Joshi, merely assenting to it, that assent implied that the Act assented to was not that of the person assenting, and that therefore there was nothing to indicate that the Rajpramukh had adopted the Bill prepared by the Ministers as his own.\n\nIt was argued by Mr. Agarwala that when the word \"approve\" was used in the Constitution as in articles 146 and 147, it signified that there were two authorities, one of which was authorised to confirm or sanction what the other had authority to do, and that when the latter was not authorised to do the act, there could be no approval of it by the former; and he also relied on the statement of the law in Corpus Juris, Volume I, page 1365 that the word 'approve' does not mean the same thing as 'adopt'.\n\nThe fallacy in this argument lies in isolating the word \"approved\" from out of is setting and context and interpreting it narrowly.\n\nIt will be noticed that under article 212-A (2) the Rajpramukh has to do two distinct acts.\n\nFirstly he has to prepare the Bill, and secondly-leaving out of consideration the first two alternatives, namely, . assenting to, or withholding assent from, the Bill as not material for the present discussion-he has to reserve it for the consideration of the President. When he himself prepares the Bill, he has, in order to comply with article 212-A(2) merely to reserve it for the consideration of the President.\n\nIn such a case, no question of approval to the Bill by him can arise, but when the Bill has not been prepared by him, he has firstly, if he thinks fit, to adopt it before he could pass on to the second stage and reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President; and the very purpose of his endorsing his approval on the Bill is to show that he has thought fit to adopt it. There is no provision in article 212-A (2) for the Rajpramukh approving of a Bill. and in\n\nthe context, therefore, an endorsement of approval on the Bill must signify its adoption by him.\n\nWe are unable to follow the subtle distinction sought to be made by Mr. Frank Anthony between the legislative mind of the Rajpramukh and his executive mind.\n\nIf it is open to the Rajpramukh to adopt a Bill prepared by his Ministers, the only matter that will have to be considered is whether, in fact, he did so.\n\nAnd when the Bi'll is produced with an endorsement of approval under his signature, the question must be held to be concluded, and any further discussion about the legislative or executive state of mind of the Rajpramukh must be ruled out as inadmissible.\n\nIt must be mentioned in this connection that Mr.\n\nPathak for the respondent took up the position that the function of the Rajpramukh at the stage of preparation of the Bill was purely executive, and that it became legislative only when he had to decide whether he would assent to the Bill or withhold his assent therefrom, or reserve it for the consideration of the President, and that by leaving it to the Ministers to prepare the Bill there had been no violation of article\n\n212-A(2).\n\nWe are unable to agree with this contention. When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State, article 200 enacts that it shall be presented to the Governor who is to declare whether he assents to it or withholds his assent therefrom, or reserves it for the consideration of the President.\n\nWhen there i§ no Legislative Assembly in a State, the matter is governed by article 212-A(2), and there is substituted under that article in the place of the passing of the Bill by the Legislature, the preparation thereof by the Rajpramukh, and then follows the provision that he has to. declare whether he assents to or withholds his assent from the Bill or reserves it for the consideration of tile President.\n\nThe position under article 212-A(2) has thus been assimilated to that under article 200, the preparation of the Bill by the Rajpramukh taking the place of the passing of the Bill by the Legislative Assembly, and the one is as much a legislative function as the other.\n\nOne other contention attacking the Act on the\n\nThakurAmllf\n\nSingh;\n\nSlau of Rajaslhan\n\n..,.. .. - V mkattJTama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nThakuT.A.\"\"\"\n\nSU.ghji ...\n\nStall of Raja.rtkan\n\nV lftkataramG\n\n.War].\n\nground of procedural defect may now be considered.\n\nIt was argued by Mr. Trivedi that under the proviso to article 201, the President had no power to return a Money Bill for further consideration by a House of Legislature, that his order dated 21-1-1952 returning the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill for further consideration was ultra vires as it was a .Money Bill, that the subsequent presentation of the Bill to him on 8-2-1952 was unauthorised, and that the impugned Act had therefore not been duly passed.\n\nThis argument is clearly erroneous.\n\nUnder article 212-A(l), the proviso to article 201 has no application to those Part B States where there was no House of the Legislature; and we are unable to follow the argument of the learned counsel that even so, the limitation imposed by the proviso is implicit in the body of the article itself.\n\nMoreover, the order of the President dated 21-1-1952 is not one returning the Bill for further consideration by the House but one refusing assent. It is true that the Deputy Secretary sent a communication to the Rajasthan Government suggesting some amendments. But this does not alter the character of the order of the President as one withholdiii.g assent. And finally the Bill which was submitted again to the President for consideration on 6-2-1952 was a fresh Bill, the previous Bill having been modified as regards the, scales of compensation.\n\nThe contention, therefore, that the Act is bad for non-compliance with article 212-A(2) or for other procedural defects must be rejected.\n\nIII. We may now consider the third contention of the petitioners that the Act in so far as it provides for resumption of jagir lands is ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature, as it is not one of the topics mentioned either in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nThe contention of the respondent .is that the Act is in substance a law relating to acquisition, and is covered by Entry No. 36 in the State List.\n\nOn the other hand, the petitioners maintain that the subject-matter of the legislation is what it avows itself to be, viz., resumption of jagirs, that resumption is in law totally different from\n\nacqws1uon, and that the Act is therefore not covered by Entry No. 36.\n\nw_ . agree with the pefitJ.oners that resumption and acqws1uon connote two different legal concepts.\n\nWhile resumption implies that the person or authority which resumes the property has pre-existing rights over it, acquisition carries no such implication, and in general, while the effect of resumption is to extinguish the interests of the person whose property is resumed, that of acauisition is to vest that interest in the acquirer. But -the question still remains whether the impugned Act is one for acquisition of jagirs or for their resumption; and to determine that, we must see what the pith and substance of the legislation is, the name given to it by the Legislature not being decisive of the matter.\n\nThe provisions of the Act relating to resumption may now be noticed. Chapter V deals with resumption of jagir lands.\n\nSection 21 authorises the State to issue notifications for resumption of jagirs, and section 22(1) enacts:\n\n\"As from the date of resumption of any jagir lands, notwithstanding anything contained m any existing jagir legislation applicable thereto but save as otherwise provided in this Act,- ( a) the right, title and interest of the jagirdar and of every other person claiming through him ...... in his jagir lands including fore8ts, etc ............ shall stand resumed to the Government free from all encumbrances\".\n\nSection 22(1) (g) is as follows: \"the right, title and interest of the jagirdar in all buildings on jagir lands used for schools and hospitals not within residential compounds shall stand extinguished, and such buildings shall be deemed to have been transferred to the Government\".\n\nSection 23 exempts certain properties from the operation of section 22, and provides tilltt they are to continue to belong to the jagirdars or to be held by them Chapter VI deals with compensation.\n\nSection 26(1) enacts:\n\nThakur AllllW\n\nSing/Ui\n\nY. !;141t of RajaJl/um\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA)IJ'ar].\n\nTliolcur A.mar\n\nSingh ft • v.\n\nSlall of Rajasl,_\n\nY enkalarama\n\n41JllT J.\n\n\"Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Government shall be liable to pay every jagirdar whose Jagir lands are resumed under section 21 such compensation as shall be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in the second schedule\".\n\nChapter VII prescribes the procedure for the determination of compensation and for payment of the same.\n\nThe second Schedule to the Act contains the principles on which compensation is to be determined. That was the scope of the Act as it was passed in 1952. In 1954 certain amendments were introduced by Act No. XIII of 1954, the most important of which was the provision for payment of rehabilitation grant in accordance with the principles enacted in Schedule III to the Act.\n\nNow, the contention of the petitioners is that the basic assumption on which the Act is framed is that jagirdars have no right of property in the lands themselves, but that they possess some ancillary rights in relation . thereto, that the State is therefore entitled to resume the lands without compensation, and that it is sufficient to pay for the ancillary rights. These, it is argued, were the views expressed by the Venkatachar Committee in its Report on Land Tenures in Rajasthan, and they formed the basis of the impugned Act. Thus, it is pointed out that the Committee had held that \"jagirs are not the property of the jagirdars\" ( vide page 47, para 5), that \"if the jagir system is abolished, jagirdars would not be entitled to any compensation on the ground of the jagirs being private property'', and that \"even though jagirs are not proproperty ........ those rights which have in many cases been enjoyed for centuries have acquired around them an accretion of rights by long custom and prescri ption which are entitlec to due recognition\", and that a rehabilitation grant mignt be given to the jagirdars.\n\n(Page 47, para 6).\n\nIt is contended that it is these views that have been adopted in section 22 of the Act, and that when section 22(1) (a) declares that the right, title and interest of the jagirdars shall stand resumed, it could not mean that these rights are acquired by the State, because acquisition implies that the\n\nproperties acquired belong to the person from whom they are acquired, whereas the basis of the legislation was that the jagirdars had no property in the lands, and there could be no acquisition of what did not belong to them. Reference is made by way of contrast to the language of section 22(1)\n\n(g) under which certain buildings standing on jagir lands presumably constructed by jagirdars should stand transferred to the Government and not resumed as under section 22(l)(a).\n\nThis argument proceeds on an inadequate appreciation of the true nature and scope of the right of resumption. under the general law and of the power of resumption which is conferred on the State by the impugned Act.\n\nFnder the law, a jagir could be resumed only under certain circumstances.\n\nIt can be resumed for breach of the terms of the grant, such as failure to render services or perform the obligations imposed by the grant. It can be resumed for rebellion or dislovalty or for the commission of serious crimes.\n\nAnd ag;::in, jagir was originally only a life grant and when the holder died, it reverted back to the State and suw:ssion to the estate was under a-fresh grant from the State and not by inheritance, even when the successor was the heir of the deceased holder. The right to resume jagirs within the limits aforesaid was founded on grant and regulated by general law. To exercise that right, there was no need to enact any legislation.\n\nIt was a right which every ruler of the Covenanting State had as a grantor, and that right had become vested in the Rajpramukh under article VII (3) of the Covenant.\n\nThe contention of the petitioners that resumption was not an acquisition would strictly be accurate, if the resumption was in exercise of the power conferred by that article.\n\nBut the resumption for which the Act provides is something different from the resumption which is authorised by article VII(3). It was a resumption not in accordance with the terms of the grant or the law applicable to jagirs but contrary to it, or in the words of section 21 \"notwithstanding anything contained in\n\nTWw~\n\nSinglfii\n\nStall of RajastluM\n\nYmkatar-\n\n.d.yyar].\n\nThakur.A.mar\n\nSinghji\n\nVo Stat. of Raja.sthan\n\nYmkatarama\n\nAJJ•r J.\n\nany existing jagir law applicable thereto\".\n\nIt was a resumption made not in enforcement of the rights which the rulers had as grantors but in excrci.c of the sovereign rights of eminent domain possessed by the State.\n\nThe taking of properties is under the circumstances, in substance, acquisition notwithstanding that it is labelled as resumption. And this conclusion becomes irresistable when regard is had to the provisions for payment of compensation.\n\nSection 26(1) imposes on the Government a liability to pay compensation in accordance with the principles laid down in the Second Schedule, and as will be presently shown, it is not illusory.\n\nThe award of compensation is consistent only with the taking being an acquisition and not with its being a resumption in accord- .ance with the terms of the grant or the law applicable to it, for in such cases, there is no question of any liability to pay compensation.\n\nIt was argued for the petition_ers that the provision for the payment of rehabilitation grant was an indication that what was paid as compensation was in reality ex gratia.\n\nBut the rehabilitation, grant was in addition to the compensation amount, and it was provided by the amendment Act No. XIII of 1954.\n\nNor are we impressed by t:I'.e contention that the Act had adopted the .findings of the Venkatachar Committee that the jagirs were not the properties of the jagirdars, and fr 't no compensation need be paid for them.\n\nUnder section 22(l)(a), what is resumed is expressly the right, title and interest of the jagirdar in his jagir lands, and provision is made for payment of compensation therefor. Moreover, the opinions Jn the report of the Venkatachar Committee on the rights of the jagirdars are clearly inadmissible for the purppse of deciding what the pith and substance ot the impugned legislation is. That must be decided on an interpretation of the provisions of the statute, and that decision cannot be controlled or guided by the opinions expressed in the report. Reading the provisions of the Act as a whole, it is abundantly plain that what was meant by resumption was only acqui- 5ition.\n\nIndeed, if the Act purported to be one foe\n\nacqws1tton of jagirs, its provisions could not have been different from what they are.\n\nSuch being the true character of the legislation, not much significance could be attached to the use of the word \"resumption\" in the Act.\n\nIt should be remembered that the State has a reversion in Jagir lands, and when it takes them back in accordance with the terms of the grant or the law applicable\n\nthereto, its action is properly termed resumption.\n\nWhen the statute enacted a law authorising the taking of jagir lands, it is natural that it should have adopted the same term, though the resumption was not made on any of the grounds previously recognised as valid.\n\nIn view of the peculiar relationship between the jagirdar and the State, it cannot be said that the word \"resumption\" is inadmissible to signify acquisi tion. Section 22(1) (a) further enacts that the lands shall stand resumed \"to the Government\", which words are more appropriate for acquisition by the Government than resumption simpliciter.\n\nIt was also contended for the respondent that the Act is one relating to land and land tenures, and that it would fall under Entry No. 18 in the State List:\n\n\"Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization\".\n\nIt was argued that the heads of legislation mentioned in the Entries should req; ive a liberal construction, and the decision in The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (1 ) was quoted in support of it. The position is well settled and in accordance therewith, it could rightly be held that the legislation falls also under Entry No. 18. But there being an Entry No. 36 specifically dealing with acquisition, and in view of our conclusion as to the nature of the legislation, we hold that it falls under that Entry.\n\nIV.\n\nNow we come to the contentions special to some of the petitioners that with reference to the\n\n.(I) [1940] F.C.R.110, 134.\n\n~-83 s. c. Indiaf-!?\n\nThalcw .Amar\n\nSing/iii ..\n\nState ef Rajasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\n.A_l!)'OT J.\n\n1950'\n\nThakur A\"\"\"\n\nSin.t; hJi\n\nSlate of RajaJthan\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nproperties held by them the impugned Act is not saved by article 31-A, and that it is void as being in contravention of articles 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution.\n\nOn this contention, two questions arise for determination: (A) Is the impugned Act in so far as it relates to the properties of the petitioners within the protection afforded by article 31-A? (B) And is the Act bad as infringing articles 14 and 31 (2) of the Constitution?\n\nIV (A).\n\nOn the first question, the contention of the petitioners is that the properties held by the them are neither 'estates' nor 'Jagirs' nor 'other similar grants' within article 31-A, and that therefore the impugned A.ct falls, quoad hoc, outside the ambit of that article.\n\nAt the threshold of the discussion lies the question as to the precise connotation of the words \"jagir or other similar grant\" in article 31-A, and to determine it, it is necessary to trace in broad outline the origin and evolution of the jagir tenure in Rajasthan.\n\nIt has been already mentioned that during the period of the Muhammadan invasion the Rajput princes of Hindusthan migrated to Rajputana and founded new kingdoms.\n\nThe system of land tenure adopted by them was that they divided the conquered territories into two parts, reserved one for themselves and distributed the other in blocks or estates among their followers.\n\nIn general, the grantees were the leaders of the clan which had followed tl1e King and assisted him in the establishment of the kingdom or his Ministers. Sometimes, die grant was made as a reward for past services. The lands reserved for the King were called Khalsa, and the revenue dierefrom was collected by him directly through his officials.\n\nThe lands distributed among his followers were called jagirs, and they were generally granted on condition that the grantee should render military service to the rulers such as maintaining militia of the specified strengdi or guarding the passes or the marches and the like. The extent of die grant would depend on the extent of die obligations imposed on the grantee, and it would be such as would enable the grantee to maintain himself and the troops from out of the\n\nrevenues from the jagir. It was stated by Mr. Pathak that the grants would in general specify the amount of revenue that was expected to be reeived from the jagir, and that if the jagirdar received more, he was under an obligation to account. to the State for the excess. And the quoted the following passage in Baden- Powell on Land Systems of British India, Volume I, page 257 as supporting him:\n\n\"While a strict control lasted, the jagirdar was bound to take no more than the sum assigned ; and if more came into his hands, he had rigidly to account for the surplus to the State treasury\".\n\nThis statement has value only as throwing light on the jural relationship between the State and the jagirdar, for it does not appear that it was ever observed in practice.\n\nIt may be deduced from the foregoing that all the lands of the State must fall within one or the other of the two categories, Khalsa or jagir, and that the essential features of a jagir are that it is held under a grant from the ruler, and that the grant is of the land revenue.\n\nSome of the incidents of the jagir tenure have been already touched upon. It was a life grant and succession to it depended on recognition by the ruler.\n\nIt was impartible, and inalienable. But in course of time, however, grants came to be made with incidents annexed to them different from those of the jagirs.\n\nSome of them were heritable, though impartible; a few of them were both heritable and partible. While originally the jagirs were granted to the Rajput clansmen for military service, the later grants were made even to non-Rajputs and for religious and charitable purposes.\n\nThese grants were also known as jagirs. \"The term 'jagir' is used\", it is observed in the Report of the Venkatachar Committee, page 18, para 2, \"both in a generic and specific sense. In its generic sense it connotes all non-khalsa area\". The stand taken by the petitioners in their argument was also that the word 'jagir' had both a wider and a narrower connotation.\n\nThus, after quoting from the Rajputana Gazetteer the passage that \"the rest of\n\n19~5\n\nTliakul-. Atnlll'\n\nSing/fii\n\nY• Slate of Rqjasllum\n\nV mkatarama\n\nAJyor ].\n\nT /rab8 A.,,.,,.\n\nSinghJi\n\nSl<>ll of RajaJlhan\n\nV nA:.ataroma\n\nA.yy..-J.\n\nthe territory is held on one of the following tenures,\n\nviz, Jagir, Jivka, Sansan, Doli, Bhum, Inam, Pasaita and Nankar\" (Vide Erskine's Rajputana Gazetteers, Volume III-A, Chapter\n\nXIII Land Revenue and Tenures), Sri Amar Singh who presented the case of his father Zorawar Singh, a leading Bhoomichara of Mallani, with conspicuous ability, argued that jagir was used in the passage in its specific sense, and that in its generic sense, it would comprise all the other tenures mentioned above. In the impugned Act also, jagir land is defined in section 2(h) as meaning \"any land in which or in relation to which a jagirdar has rights in respect of land revenue or any other kind of revenue and includes any land held on any of the tenures specified in the First Schedule'', and in the Schedule, jagir is mentioned as the first of the items.\n\nIt also appears that in the laws enacted in the States of Rajputana to which our attention has been drawn, the word 'jagir' is generally used in its extended meaning.\n\nThus, both in its popular sense and legislative practice, the word 'jagir' is used as connoting State grants which conferred on the grantees rights \"in respect of land revenue\". (See section 2(h) of the Act.) It was argued that though the extended definition of jagirs in section 2(h) of the impugned Act might govern questions arising under that Act, the word 'jagir' in article 31-A must be construed as limited to its original and primary meaning of a grant made for military service rendered or to be rendered, and that according! y other grants such as maintenance grants made in favour of near relations and dependents would not be covered by it.\n\nWe do not find any sufficient ground for putting a restricted meaning on the word 'jagir' in article 31-A. At the time of the enactment of that article, the word had acquired both in popular usage and legislative practice a wide connotation, and it will be in accord with sound canons of interpretation to ascribe that connotation to that word rather than an archaic meaning to be gathered from a study of ancient tenures. Moreover, the object of article 31-A was to save legislation which was directed to the abolition of intermediaries so as to\n\nestablish direct relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil, and construing the word in that sense which would achieve that object i:- a full measure, we must hold that jagir was meant to cover all grant under which the grantees had only rights in respect of revenue and were not the tillers of the soil.\n\nMaintenance grants in favour of persons who were not cultivators such as members of the ruling family would be jagirs for purposes of article 31-A.\n\nWe may now proceed to consider the contentions of the several petitioners with reference to the specific properties held by them, and they may be grouped under two categories: ( 1) those relating to the tenures on which the properties are held, and (2) those relating to particular properties.\n\nUnder category\n\n(1) fall the estates held by (a) Bhomicharas of Marwar, (b) Bhomats of Mewar, (c) Tikanadars of Shekhwati, and ( d) Subeguzars of Jaipur.\n\n(1) (a) Bhomicharas: This is the subject-matter of Petitions Nos. 462, 579, 630, 638 and 654 of 1954.\n\nThe Bhomichara tenure is to be found in Jaisalmere, in Shekhawati in Jaipur and in Marwar. (Vide Report of the Venkatachar Committee, page 19, para 13).\n\nBut we are concerned here only with the Bhomichara tenure in the State of Marwar.\n\nIts history goes back to the year 1212 A.D. when the clan of Rathors led by Rao Siaji, grandson of King Jayachander of Kanouj ihvaded Rajputana, subjugated the territories now known as Mallani, Y eshwantpura and Sanchora and established itself there.\n\nSome two centuries later, a section of the Rathors headed by Biram Deo who was the younger brother of Mallinath, the ruling prince of Mallani, expanded eastwards, and established the kingdom of Jodhpur.\n\nThe elder branch which continued in Mallani, Yeshwantpura and Sanchora gradually sank in power. The descendants of Mallinath went on partitioning the lands treating them as their personal properties and the principality thus came to be broken up into fragments, and its holders became weak and disunited.\n\nTheir internecine disputes led to the intervention of Jodhpur which had grown to\n\nThalur AlftU'\n\nSinghji ....\n\nStat1 of Rajo'llt•11\n\nY1nkatara\"\"'\n\nA7; u J.\n\nThahzrAm4r\n\nSing/Ui\n\nSl4le of Rajasthan\n\nVtnkatMama\n\nAyyarj.\n\n334 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [1955]\n\nbe a powerful kingdom, and they were compelled to accept its ruler as their .suzerain and to pay him an annual tribute of Rs. 10,000 called \"Foujbal\" Thereafter, they continued to hold lands subject to the payment of this tribute, and came to be known as Bhomicharas.\n\nThe area continued to be 'distracted by disputes and dissensions among its leaders, and fell into so much anarchy and confusion that in 1835 the British had to intervene to restore order.\n\nIt should be remembered that they had entered into a treaty of alliance with Jodhpur in 1818, and their intervention was presumably by virtue of their obligations under the treaty. Thereafter, the territory was put under the charge of a British superintendent and latterly of the Resident at Jodhpur.\n\nThe annual tribute was, during this period, collected by the British and paid to the J odhpur State. Writing on the status of the Bhomicharas during this period, Major Malcolm remarked in his report dated 1849 thus:\n\n\" .... though the British Government had established a claim to the District themselves, consequent on having reduced them to order and obedience, it was willing, out of kindness and consideration to His Highness, to waive its just rights and to acknoUJ!edge His Highness as entitled to sovereignty over those districts, and the tribute they might yield ...... \" In 1891 the British withdrew from the administration of the Province, and handed it over to the Maharajah of Jodhpur who thereafter continued to govern it as part of his Dominions.\n\nOn these facts, it is contended by Mr. N. C.\n\nChatterjee and Shri Amar Singh that Bhomicharas are not holders of jagirs or other similar grants within the meaning of article 31-A, because a jagir could be created only by grant by the ruler, and that the petitioners could not be said to hold under a grant from J odhpur, because they had obtained the terri• tory by right of conquest long before Jodhpur established its suzerainty, and even prior to its foundation as a State, and that though they lost their political independence when Jodhpur established its overlordship, they had not lost their right to property, that their status was that of semi-independent chiefs, not jagirdars, and that \"Foujbal\" was paid by them not on account of land revenue but by way of tribute.\n\nWe agree with the petitioners that a jagir can be created only by a grant, and that if it is established that Bhomichara tenure is not held under a grant, it cannot be classed as a jagir. We do not base this conclusion on the ground put forward by Mr. Achhru Ram that the word 'jagir' in article 31-A should be read e; usdem generis with 'other similar grants' because the true scope of the rule of e; usdem generis is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to thir.gs which are of the same nature as those specified and not its reverse, that specific words which precede are controlled by the general words which follow. But we are of opinion that it is inherent in the very conception of jagir that it should have been granted by the ruling power, and that where there is no grant, there could be no jagir.\n\nThis, however, does not mean th,!lt the grant must be express.\n\nIt may be implied, and the question for decision is whether on the facts of this case a grant could be implied.\n\nWhat then are the facts? We start with this that the ancestors of the petitioners acquired the lands in question by conquest and held them as sovereigns.\n\nThen Jodhpur came on the scene, imposed its sovereignty over them, and exacted annual payments from them.\n\nWhat was their status thereafter?\n\nIn Vajesing; i foravar Sing; i and others v. Secretary of State (1) Lord Dunedin observed :\n\n\"When a territory is acquired by a sovereign State for the first time that is an act of State. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought about.\n\nIt may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler. !nail cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of\n\n(I) (1924] L. R.51 I. A. 357, 360.\n\nThalcUf' Amat\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\n4J?yar].\n\nTftakurAmar\n\nSing/iii\n\n' Siau of 114jastloM\n\nv tnktllar'arNd\n\nAyyar J.\n\nthe territory can make good in the municipal Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights, as that sovereign has, through his officers recognised.\n\nSuch rights as he _had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing\".\n\nVide also the judgment of the Privy Council in Secretary of State. v. Sardar Rustdm Khan(').\n\nApplying these principles when Jodhpur as a sovereign State imposed its sovereignty over the territory, and permitted the ex-rulers to continue in possession of their lands on payment of an annual sum, the position is that there was, in effect a conquest of the territory and a re-grant of the same to the ex-rulers, whose title to the lands should thereafter be held to rest on the recognition of it by the ruler of Jodhpur. It may be noted that both in Vajesingji Joravar Singji and others v. Secretary of State( 2 ) and Secretary of State v.\n\nSardar Rustam Khan(') the question was whether a subject of the former State could enforce against the new sovereign the right which he had against the former ruler, and it was held that he could not. But here, the claimants are the representatives of the former rulers themselves, and as against them, the above conclusion must follow a fortiori.\n\nAs already stated, it is as if the Maharajah of Jodhpur annexed all the territories and re-granted them to the former rulers.\n\nThey must accordingly be held to derive their title under an implied grant.\n\nIt is argued that notwithstanding that the Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sovereignty of the ruler of Jodhpur, his hold over the country was slight and ineffective, and even the payment of \"Foujbal\" was irregular, and that in substance therefore they enjoyed semi-sovereign status, and that their relationship to the J odhpur ruler resembled that of the rulers of Native States to the British Crown. We arc unable to accept this argument. The status of a person must be either that of a sovereign or a subject.\n\nThere is no tertium quid.\n\nThe law does not recognise an in termediate status of a person being partly a sovereign\n\n(I) [19411 L. R. 68 I.A. 109.\n\n(2) [0924] L. R. 51 I. A. 357, 360.\n\n' ..\n\nand partly a subject, and when once it is admitted that the Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sov- <!reignty of Jodhpur their status can only be that of a subject.\n\nA subject might occupy an exalted position d enjoY' special privileges, but he is nonetheless a , subject; and even if the status of Bhoniicharas might be considered superior to that of ordinary jagirdars, they were also subjects. The contention that the relationship between Bhomicharas and Jodhpur was of the same kind as that which subsisted between the rulers of Native States and the British Crown is untenable.\n\nWhether those States could be recognised as sovereign on the well accepted principles of international law was itself a question on which juristic <>pinion was adverse to such recognition. (See Mr.\n\nLee Warner, Protected Princes of India, 1894 Edn., Chapter XIII, sec. 150, pages 373-376).\n\nBut those States at least had each a distinct persona with a ruler who possessed executive, legislative and judicial power of a sovereign character; but the Bhomicharas had ceased to have a distinct persona. There was no State with a ruler acknowledged as its head, but a number of persons holding lands independently of each other.\n\nThis is what Major Malcolm remarked of them in his report in 1849:\n\n\"It is uncertain how long the Rawats of Kher continued to exercise any control over the rest of the Chiefs, or to be considered as the head of a principality; but at the period when we first become acquainteg with them, all traces of such power had long ceased and each Chief of the principal families into which the tribe is divided, claimed to be independent\".\n\nWhen the British handed over the administration of the territory to the State of Jodhpur in 1891, it was in recognition of itsrights as sovereign, and on the footing that Bhomicharas were its subjects.\n\nIt is true that in the agreement by which the British handed over the administration they inserted a condition that the appointment of the chief officers for Mallani and imposition of any new tax or cess other than Foujbal by the State of Jodhpur should be made\n\nThakr.r Ama\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Raj1Ul1-\n\nY 1nkalar1JtTU1\n\n..4yy411' J.\n\nThalcur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nSlate of Raja•tlum\n\nYtnkatarama\n\n..War J.\n\nwith the approval of the. Resident or Agent to the Governor-General of Rajputana, .but that was a matter between the high contracting parties, and did not affect the status of the Bhomicharas.\n\nOn the other hand, it emphasises that they were themselves without any semblance of independence .\n\nThat the status of the Bhomicharas was that of subjects will also be clear from the subsequent course of legislation in Marwar. . In 1922 an Excise Act was passed for the whole of Marwar including this area.\n\nOn 24-11-1922 \"The Marwar Court of Wards Act, 1923\". was passed, and that applied to the estates of Bhomicharas.\n\nIn 1937 rules were framed for the maintenance of the wives of jagirdars, and Bhomicharas also were subject to that Act.\n\nIn 1938 the Marwar Customs Act was passed, and that applied to these territories.\n\nIn 1947 rules for assessment of rents on iagrr estates were passed and they applied to lands held on Bhomichara tenure. There was again a Customs Act in 1948, and it applied to the whole of Marwar including this area.\n\nIn 1949 a Tenancy Act was passed, and that applied to tlie Bhomicharas.\n\nIt is thus plain that the State of Marwar was exercising full legislative control over the Bhomichara area.\n\nThis alone is sufficient to differentiate the position of the petitioners from that of the rulers of the Native States.\n\nThe British Government never exercised legislative authority over those States.\n\nIn the argument before us, Sri Amar Singh conceded the authority of the State of Marwar to legislate for Mallani.\n\nBut he contended that the definition of jagirdars as including Bhomicharas in the several Acts referred to above was only for the purpose of those Acts, and had no bearing on their true status, and referred to the provisions of the Marwar Encumbered Estates Act, . 1922, where the word 'jagir' is defined as excluding Bhomicharas.\n\nBut the question is not whether the petitioners are jagirdars by force of the definition in those Acts, but whether their status is that of subjects of, Jodhpur and the only inference that. could be drawn from the course of legislation above noticed is that ' their status was that of\n\nsubjects, and if that is their position, and if d1ey ne allowed to continue in possession of lands held by their ancestors as sovereigns, it could only be on the basis of an implied grant, and that is sufficient to attract the operation of article 31-A to their estates.\n\nIt was also contended for the respondent that even if on the facts aforesaid a grant from the State could not be implied and the status of the petitioners was different from that of jagirdars, that status had at least been modified by section 169 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act No. XL of 1949, which had the effect of putting them in the same position as State grantees, and that therefore their tenure fell within the operation of article 31-A either as a jagir or other similar grant.\n\nSection 169 runs as follows :\n\n\"The ownership of all land vests in His Highness and all Jagirs, Bhoms, Sasans, Dolis or similar proprietary interests are held and shall be deemed to be held as grants from His Highness\".\n\nUnder this section, all lands in the State vest in the Maharajah and all proprietary interests therein are deemed to be held under a grant from him.\n\nIt can- . not be disputed that it is within the competence of the Legislature in the exercise of its sovereign powers to alter and abridge rights of its subjects in such manner as it may decide, subject of course to any conti tutional prohibition.\n\nIn Thakur /agannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces(1 ) which was cited by Mr.\n\nPathak as authority in support of the above proposition, it was held by the Privy Council that a law of the State curtailing the rights which a talukdar held under a sanad trom the Crown was intra vires. This decision was followed by this Court in Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another( 1). But these cases are not exactly in point, because the present contention of the respondent arises only on the hypothesis that the petitioners did not hold under a Crown grant express or implied. But the proposition for which Mr. Pathak contends is itself not open to exception, and it must be held that it was competent\n\n(I) [1945] F. C. R. Ill.\n\n(2) [1952] S. C. R. 1056.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState ef Rajastluzn\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJvar\n\nTMhr~\n\nSinghfi ...\n\nSlatl of Rajasthon\n\nV tnAotarama\n\n.fJ'J\"•r J.\n\nfor the legislative authority of Marwar to define and limit the rights which the petitioners possessed in Bhomichara lands.\n\nIt was also contended by Mr • Pathak . that if the effect of the legislation was to im press on the tenure the character of a grant, that would be sufficient to attract article 31-A, the argument being that a grant like a contract could be not merely express or implied but also constructive.\n\nHe quoted the following statement of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume VII, page 261, para 361:\n\n\"Contracts may be either express or implied, and of the latter there are two broad divisions, the term 'implied contract' in English law being applied not only to contracts which are inferred from the conduct or presumed intention of the parties, of which examples ha<ve already been given, but also to obligations imposed by implication of law, quite apart from and without regard to the probable intention of the parties, and sometimes even in opposition to their expresed or presumed intention.\n\nStrictly speaking, the latter class, or construstive contracts, as they are sometimes called, are not true contracts at all, since the clement of consent is absent, but by a fiction of law, invented for the purposes of pleading, they are regarded as contracts, and will be treated here as such\".\n\nIt must be observed that the Indian law does not recognise . constructive contracts, and what are classed under that category in the statement of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England would be known as quasicontracts under the Indian Contract Act. It will be more appropriate to term grants which are the creatures of statutes as legislative grants.\n\nWe, however, agree with the respondent that for the purpose of article 31-A, it would make no difference whether 4'be grant is made by the sovereign in the exercise of his prerogative right or by the Legislature in the exercise of its sovereign rights.\n\nThey were both of them equally within the operation of that article.\n\nThe question then is, assuming that the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of Marwar Act No. XL of\n\n1949 hold the lands as grantees from the State, whether they must be deemed to hold as State grantees by force of section 169 of that Act; and that will depend on whether they fall within the purview of tht\n\nsection.\n\nThe language of the section, it will be aamitted, is general and unqualified in its terms, and would in its natural sense include them.\n\nBut it is argued for the petitioners that they are outside its scope, because 'jagir' in that article must be interpreted in a specific sense as otherwise there was no need to mention tenures like Bhom, Sasan and Dolis, which would be jagirs in a generic sense, and that further Bhomicharas could not be brought within the category of similar proprietary interests, because in the context 'similar interests' must mean interests held under a grant.\n\nHaving considered the matter carefully, we are not satisfied that there is any ground for cutting down the scope of the section in the manner contended for by the petitioners.\n\nWe are of opinion that by long usage and recognition and by the legislative practice of the State Bhomicharas had come to be regarded as jagirdars, and that their tenure is a jagir within the intendment of section 169. In the Gazetteci:. of Mallani by Major Walter published prior to 1891 the Bhomicharas arc referred to as jagirdars. (Vide page 94).\n\nIn the official publication called Brief Account of Mallani, the title given to the history of Bhomicharas is \"Brief history of the iagirdars\". In Sir Drake Brockman's Report of the Settlement Operations, 1921 to 1924, he refers to the Bhomichara jagir as \"survival from a time antecedent to the establishment of the Raj\". Turning next to legislation in Marwar, its general trend was to include Bhomicharas in the definition of jagirdars.\n\nVide section 3(1) of the Marwar Court of Wards Act, 1923; rule 4 of rules regulating claims for maintenance by ladies against jagirdars, 1937.\n\nIn the Customs Act, 1938, section 64 and Appendix E refer to the Bhomicharas as jagirdars of Mallani. In Marwar Tenancy Act No. XXXIX\n\n0£ 1949, section 3(9) defines landlord as including a \"Bhomichara jagirdar\", and in view of the fact that\n\nT \"4kur A\"\"\"\n\nSinghji\n\nSlate of Rajaslhon\n\nVenkatar11111/.\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nTh\"\"\"' A\"'°' Singhji\n\nS-tau of Rajasthan\n\nYaskataramo\n\n<l\"ar].\n\nboth this Act and Act No. XL of 1949 were part of a comprehensive scheme of legislation, that both of them came into force on 6-4-1949 and that section 4(11) of Act No. XL of 1949 enacts that the words and expressions used therein are to have the same meaning as in Act No. XXXIX of 1949, it would be safe to assume that the word 'jagir' was used in section 169 as including Bhomichara tenures.\n\nIt was argued that section 171 classifies jagirs as listed jagirs and scheduled jagirs, that there is an enumeration thereof in schedules I and II of the Act, and that no estate held on Rhomichara tenure was mentioned therein, .arid that that was an indication that it was not intended to be included in section 169.\n\nBut section 171 does not exhaust all the jagirs or similar proprietary interests falling within section 169.\n\nThe scheme of the Act is that for purposes of succession and partition, jagirs are divided into three groups, scheduled jagirs, listed jagirs and other jagirs.\n\nScheduled jagirs are those which are governed by the rule of primogeniture.\n\nSection 188 and the following sections lay down the procedure for settling succession to them.\n\nListed jagirs are those which are held by co-heirs but are impartible, and section 131 provides that they should not be partitioned but that the income therefrom should. be divided among the co-sharers.\n\nThen there is the third category of jagirs which devolve on heirs under the ordinary Hindu law, and are partible.\n\nSection 172 applies to these jagirs.\n\nAs the Bhomichara tenure descends like personal property and is divisible among the heirs, it will be governed by section 172, and cannot find a place in the schedule of listed or scheduled jagirs.\n\nIt was contended that the Act was one to declare and consolidate the law, and that such an Act should not be construed as altel'ing the existing law; further that clear and unambiguous language was necessary before a subject could be deprivd of his vested rights, and that in case Gf doubt the statute should be construed so as not to interfere with the existing rights; and the statements of law from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 20 and 2'i\n\n-and Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, pages 106, 107 ~~ 111 were quoted in support of the above propos1t10ns.\n\nThese rules of construction are well settled, but recourse to them would be necessary only when a statute is capable of two interpretations. But where, as here, the language is clear and the meaning plain, effect must be given to it.\n\nIt must also be added that the Act is one not merely to consolidate the law on the subject but also to amend it.\n\nOn the language of the section , therefore, we must hold that Bhomichara tenure is comprehended within the 'term 'jagir' in section 169.\n\nWe are also of opinion that it will, in any event, be \"similar proprietary interests\" within the language <>f the section.\n\nIt is argued that the only feature {; Omrnon to jagirs, Bhoms, Sasan and Dolis is that they are held under grant, and that therefore \"similar\n\nproprietary interests\" must mean interests acquired under a grant.\n\nIt is true that Bhom, Sasan and Doli :a, re held under grant from the State. (Vide Rajasthan Gazetteer, Volume III-A, Chapter XIII); but section 169 enacts that the proprietary interests to which it applies, shall b(: held or deemed to be held as grant from His Highness.\n\nThe word \"deemed\" imports that in fact there was no grant, and therefore interests which were held otherwise than under a. grant were obviously intended to be included.\n\nTherefore, if Bhomichara is a proprietary interest, it cannot be taken out of the section because its origin was not in grant.\n\nIn the result, it must be held to fall within section 169, and therefore within the operation of article 31-A.\n\nThe respondent further contended that Bhomichara tenure was also an estate as defined in section 4(iii) of Act No. XL of 1949 and that therefore it fell within the purview of article 31-A.\n\nUnder section 4(iii), \"estate\" means a mahal or mahals held by the same landlord. Section 4(v) defines mahal as any area not being a survey number which has been separately assessed to land revenue; and 'land revenue' is defined in section 4(iv) as \"any sum payable to the Govern~\n\nThakur Amar\n\nS'Ulg/ifi\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\n V enkatarama A\"ar ]. :\n\n1955 TWwA-\n\nSinghfi\n\nSilk •f Rajastha•\n\nV l'Rkalarama\n\nAuar ].\n\nment on :account of an estate or survey number and includes rekh, chakri and bhombab\". It is common ground that the annual payment which . is made by the Bhomicharas to the estate is the sum of Rs. 10,000 called \"Foujbal\".\n\nThe petitioners contend that this amount is really in the nature of tribute and not land tax. If it is a military cess, it is difficult to say that it is revenue paid on account of land.\n\nIt is argued for the respondent that Bhomicharas are allowed to\n\nconti\\rne in possession of the land only on condition that they pay this amount annually and that it is therefore payment made in respect of lands held by them. If this contention is right, every tribute must per se be held to be !and revenue, and that appears to us to be too wide a proposition. Mr. Pathak relied on the description of this amount in the Administration Report of 1883-1884 in Hindi as \"Kar\" \"Tax\", but that is not decisive of the true character of the payment.\n\nThe petitioners also contend that even if Foujbal is revenue, there has been no separate assessment of the mahals to it, as what is paid is a consolidated sum of Rs. 10,000 for an area of the extent of 36,000 sq. miles comprised in 550 villages and held by different holders.\n\nIt appears from the Gazetteer of Mallani by Major Walter at page 94 that the Foujbal amount has been apportioned among the several holders, and it is contended for the respondent that as this apportionment has been communicated to the Jodhpur Durbar and accepted by it and acted upon, there has been separate assessment of revenue.\n\nIn the view taken by us that Bhomichara is a jagir or other similar grant within the meaning of article 31-A, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the above contentions, especially as the materials placed before us are meagre.\n\nIn the result, it must be held that the legislation in so far as it relates to Bhomichara tenure is protected by article 31-A.\n\n(1) (b) Bhomats: This tenure is to be found in Mewar, and of this, the Report of the Venkatachar Committee has the following :\n\n\"In Mewar those holdmg orr the Bhom tenure\n\nmay be classed under two groups, namely, the Bholllats who pay a small tribute to the State and arc liable to be called for local service and Bhumias who pay a n.ormal quit-rent (Bhum-Barar) and perform such services as watch and ward of their villages, guarding the roads, etc.\" (vide page 19, para 10).\n\nEarlier, the Report had stated that Bhom tenure was to be found in Jodhpur, Mewar and Bundi, and that its holders were always Rajputs. The origin of Bhom tenure is thus stated by Tod in his Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan :\n\n\"It is stated in the historical annals of this countrv that the ancient clans .... had ceased on the rising g; eatness of the subsequent new divisions of clans, to hold the higher grades of rank; and had, in fact, merged into the general military landed proprietors of this country under the term bhumiq,, a most expressive and comprehensive name, importing absolute identity with the soil: bhum meaning 'land' .... These Bhumias, the scions of .the earliest princes, are to be met with .in yarious parts of Mewar ...... These, the allodial tenantry of our feudal system, form a considerable body in many districts, armed with matchlock, sword, and shield .... All this feudal militia pay a quit-rent to the crown, and perform local but limited service on the; frontier garrison; and upon invasion, when the Kher is called out, the whole are at the disposaJ of the prince on furnishing rations only.\n\nThey assert that they ought not to pay this quit-rent and perform .service also; . but this may be doubted, since the sum is so small\". (Vol. I, .PP 195-197). lt would .appear from this account that the position of the Bhumias in Mewar is in many respects similar to that of Bhomichara~ in Marwar. They represent presumably a section which had occupied the territory by conquest at an earlier stage and when later the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur established their sovereignty over Mewar, they were allowed to continue in possession of their lands as subjects of the new State, Their position is not even as strong as that of the Bhomicharas of Marwar, because it was a condition of the tenure under which they held that 4 -83 S. C. India/59\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\ntat1 of RqjMthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThakur :4.mar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rqjaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya, J.\n\nthey had to render military service when called upon and also to pay quit rent.\n\nTheir title to the lands is thus referable to an implied gran~ from the State, and their tenure would be jagir even in its stricter connotation.\n\nIt was further contended by Mr. Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act No. V of 1947, the effect of that enactment was to modify it and to reduce them to the position of grantees from the State in respect of those tenures, and that article 31-A would accordingly apply.\n\nThe relevant provisions of this Act are sections 27, 106(1) and 116.\n\nSection 27 enacts that all lands belong to His Highness, and t\\iat no person has authority to , take possession of any land unless the right is granted by His Highness.\n\nSection 106(1) occurs in Chapter XI which is headed: \"The rights of jagirdars, Muafidar, :ind Ehumias in Tikana jagir, muafi and Ehorn lands\", and enacts that a \"Tikanadar jagirdar, muafidar or Ehumia shall have all such revenue rights in the lands comprised .in his jagir, muafi or Ehorn under this Act, as are granted to him by His Highness\".\n\nThen follow provisions relating to succession and transfer of their tenures by jagirdars, muafidars or Ehumias.\n\nSection 116 provides that the jagir or bhom is liable to be forfeited in the events specified therein.\n\nThe argument of the respondent is that under these provisions the ownership of the lands vests in the Maharajah and the. tenures mentioned therein including the Ehorn are held as grants under him.\n\nIt was argued by Mr. Frank Anthony that under section 4(2) of the Act the lands are divided into two categories, one category comprising jagirs, muafi and Ehorn and the other Khalsa lands, that section 27 applies only to Khalsa lands, and . that section 106(1) applies to grants which may thereafter be made by the State, and that the rights of the persons who held jagirs, muafi or Ehorn before this Act were unaffected by it. We are unable to accede to this contention.\n\nNo statute was needed to declare the rights of the sovereign over Khalsa lands. Nor was resort to kgis-- :\n\nlation necessary to define the rights of the future grantees of those lands, because that could be done by inserting appropriate terms in the grants. The language of the enactment read as a whole leaves no doubt in our mind as to what the legislature intended to do.\n\nIt declared the State ownership of lands, both Khalsa and non-Khalsa lands, and defined the rights of the holders of the non-Khalsa lands; and the result of that law was clearly to impress on the Bhom tenure the characteristics of grant.\n\nIt must accordingly fall within the operation of article 31-A either as jagir or as other similar grant.\n\nIt was next contended by the petitioners that the Kanoon Mal Act No. V of 1947 was void, because on 23-5-1947 a Constitution had been established in Mewar which prnvided that \"no person shall be <leprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law within the territories of Mewar\".\n\n(Article XIII, Clause 1), and that Act No. V of 1947 which came into force on 15-11-1947 was void as being repugnant thereto.\n\nArticle\n\nJT ( 1) of the Constitution itself provides that the Maharajah shall exercise \"all rights, authority and jurisdiction which appertain to or are incidental to such sovereignty except in so far as may be otherwise provided for by or under this Constitution or as may be otherwise be directed by Shriji'', and when Shriji (the Maharajah) enacted Act No. V of 1947, it must be taken that he had in the exercise of sovereign authority abrogated the Constitutional provisions enacted earlier.\n\nThe authority .which enacted the Consritution on 23-5-1947 being His Highness himself, any Act passed subsequently by the same authority must be taken to have repealed or modified the earlier enactment to the extent that it is inconsistent with the later.\n\nIt does not also appear that the Constitution was ever put into force.\n\nIt is not known whether :my Leg!lature was constituted under the Constitution, or any other step taken pursuant thereto; and though acquiescence is not a ground for giving effect to a law which is ultra t 1ires, it is not without significance that the validity of Act\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji v.\n\nState of Rajas than\n\nV ankatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nThakur J'Jmar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nNo. V of 1947 was not challenged on the ground that it was repugnant to the Constitution dated 23-5-1947 until the present petitions were filed.\n\nThere is no substance in this belated contention, and it must bcrejected.\n\nMr. Frank Anthony appearing for some of the Mewar petitioners contended that their status was that of Chiefs with semi-sovereign powers, and that it could not be said that they held the lands under grants from the State. He referred to certain kow ls and agreements brought about by the British Government between their ancestors described therein as Chiefs and the Maharajah of Udaipur, providing for their jointly drawing up a code of law subject to approval by the Political Agent and for the settlement in future of all civil and criminal cases in accordance therewith, (vide Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. III, pp. 33 and 35) and for compensation being awarded to them for taking over their right to manufacture salt ( vide Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. III, pp. 38 to 42). He argued that the payments made by them to the State were not revenue but their contribution for purposes of common defence, and that that had not the effect of reducing their status as feudatory chiefs to that of subordinate tenure holders.\n\nCertain observations in Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and others(' ) were relied on as supporting this contention.\n\nWe have had considerable difficulty in following this argument, as it was general in character and unrelated to specific tenures or the claims of individual petitioners.\n\nThe kowls which were relied on as showing that their status was not that of subordinates are not conclusive of the matter, . because the value to be attached to them would depend on the previous status of the Chiefs with whom they were entered into, and no materials have beeri placed before us as to what that was.\n\nTwo hypotheses are possible: they were the successors, either of the conquerors who had occuoied the territory earlier than the foundation of the Udaipur Raj in which case they would be Bhoms and their rights would be identical with those of\n\n(1) [1954] s. c. R. 842, 870.\n\nBhomats, or of the Rajput clansmen who followed the ruling dynasty of Mewar and obtained estates as rewards for their service in the establishment of the kingdom, in which case the grants would clearly be jagirs.\n\nThe facts forming the background of the agreements as narrated in Aitchison's Treaties, Vol.\n\nIII, pp. 10 to 13 are that for sometime prior to the treaty which was entered into by the Maharajah of Udaipur with the British in 1818, the authority of the Government of Mewar was rather low. Taking advantage of it, the neighbouring States had occupied most of its territories, and the Chiefs had also become lax in the performance of their obligations to the Durbar. This led to considerable friction between the Maharajah and the Chiefs and after the conclusion of the treaty in 1818, the Political Agent Mr. Tod, with a view to restore good relationship between the Maharajah and his Chiefs, prevailed upon them to settle their differences, and the kowls relied on by Mr. Anthony are the outcome of his efforts. These kowls read in the bacRground of the facts stated above unmistakably establish that the position of the Chiefs had preYiously been that of grantees from the State. subject to certain obligations. If so, the agreements did not bring about a change in that status.\n\nThey merely provided for the carrying out of the obligations arising out of that status.\n\nOn this basis, the properties held by them would be jagirs even according to the original and narrow sense of that word; and in fact, they are so described in the very kowls relied on by Mr. Frank Anthony. (Vide Aitchison's Treaties, Volume\n\nIII, page 35, article 29).\n\nThey are clearly within article\n\n31-A.\n\nThe respondent also contended that the pr~ perties held by the Chiefs would be estates as defined in article 31-A. That would prima facie appear to be so; but it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the question, as the resumption would be protected by article 31-A on the ground that it related to jagirs or other similar grants.\n\n(1) (c) Tikanadars of Shekhwati: The northern section of Jaipur forming the trans-Aravali region of the State is known as Shekhwati. It consists of large\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStal1 of Rajaslhan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState ef Rajasthan\n\nV1nkatarama\n\n.Ay; ar ].\n\nestates known as Panchpana Singhana, Sikar, Udaipurwati, Khandela nd others.\n\nThese estates are known as Tikanas and their holders as Tikanadars.\n\nThe petitioner in Petition No. 424 of 1954 is one of them, his estate being the Tikana of Malsisar and Mandrela in Panchpana Singhana.\n\nHis contention is that he is a ruler with semi-sovereign status sub-· ject only to the obligation to render military service and to pay tribute called Maumla to the State of Jaipur, that he is accordingly a Maumlaguzar and not jagirdar, and that he is not grantee from the State.\n\nThe history of these estates is narrated in great detail by Mr. Wills in his report on \"The Land Tenures and Special Powers of Certain Tikanadars of Jaipur State, 1933\".\n\nTo state it briefly, these estates originally formed part of the Khalsa lands of the Moghuls.\n\nDuring the period of their decline, King Sawai Jai Singh who ruled over Jaipur from 1700-1743 with great distinction acquired them from the Moghul Emperors on izara, and in his turn granted them on sub-leases or izaras to various persons mostly his clansmen, on condition that in addition to the payment of izara amount fixed they should render military service to the rulers.\n\nSubject to these obligations they were entitled to collect revenues from the villages comprised in the izara and maintain themselves.\n\nIn course of time, when tbe hold of the Moghul Empire on the outlying territories became weak, the Jaipur rulers assumed practically sovereign powers over the izara lands, which came to be . regarded as part of the royal domain.\n\nThere was a corresponding rise in the status of the sub-lessees who continued in possession of the estate as permanent grantees.\n\nTowards the end of the 18th Century when the power of Jaipur waned and it& authority weakened, the holders of these estates in Shekhwati attempted in their turn to shake off their allegiance to Jaipur, asserted . an independent status in themselves, and began to seize the territories belonging to the State.\n\nBefore their . plan succeeded, Jaipur concluded a treaty with the British which re-- cognised its position as sovereign of the whole State\n\nincluding Shekhwati. \"The first duty urged on the Maharaja after the conclusion of the treaty was the resumption of the lands usurped by the nobles and the reduction of the nobles to their proper relation of subordination to the Maharaja. Through the mediation of Sir David Ochterlo11y Agreements were entered into in 1819 similar to those made at Udaipur. The usurped lands were restored to the Maharajah and t.he nobles were guaranteed in their legitimate rights and possession\". (Aitchison's Treaties, Vol.\n\nIII, p. 55).\n\nEven after the conclusion of the agreement of 1819 there were disputes between the Maharajah and the Chiefs in respect of various matters, such as the right of the ruler to revise the amount payable by the Tikanadars and the right of the latter to minerals and to customs; but this did not affect the nature of the relationship established between them under the agreement of 1819.\n\nThus, the true position of the Tikanadars is that they got into possession of the properties as izaradars under the rulers of Jaipur, improved that\n\nposition latterly and became permanent holders of the eStates and were eventually recognised as chiefs subordinate to the Maharajah.\n\nThey were not like the Bhomicharas of Marwar or the Bhumias of Mewar the previous conquerors and occupants of the territory before they were subjugated by Jaipur, as erroneously supposed by Col. Tod; nor were they the clansmen of the ruling dynasty who assisted in the establishment of the Raj.\n\nThey derived their title to the properties only under grants made by the rulers of Jaipur, and evc_n if their estates could not be considered, as they shaped themselves, as jagirs, they were at least \"other similar grants\" within article 31-A. That was the view which the State took of their position. Section 4(15) of the Jaipur State-Grants Land Tenures Act No. I of 1947 defines \"State grant\" as including a jagir, muamla, etc. Muamla is, already stated, the amount payable by the Tikanadars of Shekhwati to the ruler of Jaipur. Section 4(7) defines an estate as meaning \"land comprised in a State grant\".\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinglifi\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyar J•\n\nThakur A...,\n\nSinghji\n\nS'at1 of Rqjasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA)'Jar J.\n\nAccording to this definition, the properties in question would be 'estate' as defined in article 31-A of the Constitution.\n\nThe Matmi Rules of 1945 provide for recognising succession to State grants, and they include Muamlaguzars. (Vide Part III in Appendix A)- Describing the tenures in the non-Khalsa area, the Administration Report of Jaipur 1947-1948 stares that \"Muamla is the grant of an interest in land' for which a fixed amount s payable under a settlement: arrived :it with the State\": (Vide page 35). The position taken up by the petitioner both in the petition and in the opening argument that his stattJS is that of an independent Chieftain holding the properties by right of conquest and not under grant cannot therefore be maintained~ In his reply, however, Mr.\n\nAchhru Ram shifted the ground, and contended that the ancestors of the petitioner having come in a~' izaradars, the impugned Act had no application to him, as izara is not one of the tenures mentioned in the first schedule to the Act. But Muamla is mentioned as item 6 in the schedule, and that is the name under which the tenure of the petitioner is known. It must accordingly be held that his lands are within the purview or article 31-A.\n\n(1) ( d) Subeguzars : The question as to the statm of subeguzar is raised in Petitions Nos. 471, 472 and 473 of 1954.\n\nThe petitioner in Petition No. 473 of 1954 is the holder of the . estate of Isarda in Jaipur_ It is stated that in the beginning of the 18th Century his ancestor Mohansinghj i migrated from Bagri, settled in the hilly regions at Sarsop, built a fortress at Isarda and , established an independent principality_ In 1751 the ruler of Isarda acknowledged the suz~ rainty of the Maharaja of Jaipur who, in turn, ''recognised the ancestor of the petitioner as Subcguzar\", subject to a liability to pay tribute every year to Jaipur. (Vide . para 2 of th~ petition).\n\nThe result of this arrangement was, as in the case of Bhomich; iras. to put the Chieftain in the position of a grantee from the State, and that is also the position under the Jaipur State-Grants Land Tenures Act No. I of 1947.\n\nSection 4(15) includes within the definition of 'grant'\n\n\"suba\" tenure, and the Matmi Rules of 1945 also apply to this tenure. (Vide Appendix A, Part III).\n\nWhile the tenure is called 'Sube', its holder is caUed not Subedar which has a different meaning but Subeguz:u.\n\nIn the Administration Report of Jaipur 1947-48, Sube is described as follows : \"Suba is a tenure peculiar to Nizamat Sawai Madh0pur.\n\nIt is analogous to the istimrar tenure in other p;, irts of the State. The subeguzars pay a fixed annual amount for the grant held by them\". (Vi de p. 35).\n\nThe position therefore is that the petitioner who is admittedly a subeguzar holds under a grant from the State and falls within article 31-A. It was argued that the family of the petitioners had always enjoyed a special distinction in that the adoption of the ruling house of Jaipur was always made from among the members in this family.\n\nThat, however, would not affect the status of subeguzars who must be held to be grantees from the State.\n\nA special contention was raised with reference to 12 villages which are stated to have been purchased in 1730 by Raja Jaisingh the then holder of Isarda for a sum of Rs. 20,000; and it was argued that these villages at least could not be treated as held under grant from the State. Isarda was a new State founded by Mohansinghji, and its area was extended from time to time by incorporation of fresh villages, and when in 1751 the Chief acknowledged the suzerainty of J:i.ipur and held the estate as subeguzar under him, that title must have related to the entire estate including these villages, and there is therefore no ground for treating them differently from the rest.\n\nIt must be mentioned that this contention was raised only in the reply statement.\n\nIt must be overruled.\n\nPetitiom Nos. 471 and 472 of 1954: The petitioner in Petition No. 471 of 1954 is the Tikanadar of Jhalai.\n\nIn para 2 he admits that he is styled as a subaguzar, and for the reasons given in Petition No. 473 of 1954 his estate must be held to fall within article 31-A.\n\nBut it is argued that the Tikana consists of 18 villages, and that only two of them are held as 'Sube'.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajas than:\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA'!)'ar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nBut what is the case put forward in the petitions as regards the other villages? The schedule to the petition mentions that four of them are held as maintenance grants, and two as muafi.\n\nThey are clearly within article 31-A.\n\nAs regards the others, there is no specific case put forward as to the nature of their tenure.\n\nBut it is admitted that the Tikana is a permanently settled estate paying a fixed annual revenue of Rs. 1,681, and it is therefore an estate hoth under section 4(7) of the Jaipur State-Grants Land Tenures Act No. I of 1947 and article 31-A.\n\nThis decision will also govern Petition No. 472 of 1954 in which the petitioner owns the village of Bagina as \"Subeguzar\" and the village of Siras as jagirdar.\n\n(2) We now come to the second category of cases wherein the contention is that the particular properties held by the petitioners do no fall within the purview of article 31-A.\n\n(a) Petitions Nos. 391 and 417 of 1954 : Petition No. 391 of 1954 relates to the estate of Yeshwantgarh in the State of Alwar.\n\nIt was settled on 11-8-1941 by its then ruler on his son for maintenance.\n\nThe grant is described in the deed as jagir, and the Gazette Notification dated 25-8-1941 publishing it states :\n\n\"\"' e are also faced with the problem of arranging for our second Maharaj Kumar, a Jagir, which in the matter of size and powers, should be on a much higher fonting than the existing Jagirs.\n\nAccordingly with the object of creating a new J agir for him, we have today gifted to him in perpetuity and from genera ti on to generation, all the villages included in the Thikana of Thana together with ali other properties enjoyed by the deceased Raja Sahib during his lifetime.\n\nThis new Jagir shall remain free from liability for rates and cesses for all time, and shall also never be required to maintain any horses\"· In 1944 some more villages were added to this grant, and the resumption relates to all these properties.\n\nThe contention of Mr. Achhru Ram for the petitioner is that the grant is not an estate under the law relating to land tenures in Alwar, and that it is outside article 31-A Under section 2(a) of the Alwar\n\nState Revenue Code, 'estate' means \"an area for which there is a separate record of rights or which is treated as such under orders of His Highness' Government\".\n\nIt is stated by the petitioners that there has been no separate record of rights in the State of Alwar and that therefore there could not be an estate as defined in the Code.\n\nThe respondent, however, does not admit this, and contends that, in any event, the grants are jagirs and are therefore within article\n\n31-A.\n\nThe question is whether the grant is a jagir.\n\nThe deed dated 11-8-1941 describes it as a jagir, and so does the Gazette Notification publishing it; and that is also how the estate is described by the petitioner himself.\n\nSection 3(3) of the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939 defines jagir as meaning . \"grant of land or money granted as such by His Highness or recognised as such by His Highness\". Section 2(k) of the Alwar Revenue Code defines \"assignee of land revenue\" as meaning \"a Muafidar or a Jagirdar\". Thus, all the requirements of a Jagir are satisfied, and the grant would fall within the scope of article 31-A.\n\nIt was next argued that even if the grant was a jagir within article 31-A, the rights of the petitioner in it could not be resumed under section 22(1)\n\n(a) of the Act, inasmuch as what could be resumed under that section was not the jagir lands, but the right, title and interest of the jagirdars therein, and that the petitioner was not a jagirdar as defined in section 2(g) of the Act, as he had not been recognised as a jagirdar as required therein.\n\nThis contention was also raised by the petitioners, whooe p;-cpc; l.:s wouki not be jagirs in the specific sense of the word, but would fall within the extended definition of that word under section 2(h) as including the several tenures mentioned in the first schedule to the Act.\n\nThe contention is that while their estates would be jagirs within the inclusive portion of the definition, they themselves would not be jagirdars as defined in the Act, . because they were recognised not as jagirdars but as holders of the specific tenures enumerated in that schedule, and that therefore their interests could not be resumed under section 22(1) (a) even\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState qf Rajasthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\nA;:i-ar .].\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v. • State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nthough their estates might be notified as jagirs.\n\nIn other words, for the section to apply, there must not merely be an estate which is a jagir but also a holder who is a jagirdar .\n\nIt is conceded that this contention, if accepted, would render Chapter V providing for resumption inoperative except as regards jagirs in the specific sense and mentioned as item 1 in the first schedule to the .\n\nAct. But it is argued that it is a case of casus omissus, and that it is not within the province of this Court to supply it.\n\nBut the definition of jagir in section 2(h) is, as provided therein, subject to any contrary intention which the context might disclose; and when section 22(1) (a) enacts that on the resumption of jagir lands the rights of the jagirdar in the lands should cease, it clearly means that the holders of jagirs are jagirdars for the purpose of the section. There cannot be jagirs without there being jagirdars, and therefore the word 'jagirdar' in section 22(1)(a) must mean all holders of jagirs including the tenures mentioned in the schedule to the Act.\n\nSection 20 exempts from the operation of the Chapter properties whose incomes are utilised for religious purposes.\n\nThose properties would be held on tenures such as Sasan, Doli and so forth which are enumerated in the schedule.\n\nThere was no need for exempting them under section 20 if the Legislature did not understand them as falling within th~ operation of section 22(1) (a), and they would fall under that section only if the word 'jagirdar' is interpreted as meaning all persons who hold rror>erties which are jagirs as defined in the Act. Iii the result, the resumption must be held to be valid.\n\nPetition No. 417 of 1954 relates to properties in . Alwar, and the contention raised therein is the same as in Petition No. 391 of 1954 that they are not an estate within article 31-A.\n\nBut the petitioner describes himself in the petition as the \"proprietor jagirdar of the jagir known as Garhi\", and states in para\n\n(9) that his jagir is unsettled and pays neither revenue nor tribute, and the prayer in para 21 (3) is that the State should be restrained by an injunction from interfering with the rights of the petitioner as jagirdar .\n\nIn view of these allegations, it is idle for him now co\n\ncontend that the properties do not fall within article\n\n31-A.\n\n(b) Petitions Nos. 401, 414, 518, 535 and 539 of 1954: The properties comprised in these petitions are situated wholly or in part in the former State of Bikaner, and the contention raised with reference to them is that they are not estates according to the law of Bikaner, and are therefore outside aricle 31-A.\n\nSection 3(1) of the Bikaner State Land Revenue Act No.\n\nIV of 1945 defines 'estate' as meaning an area (a) for which a separate record of rights has been made, or\n\n(b) which has been separately assessed to land revenue or would have been assessed if the land revenue had not been released, compounded for or redeemed. Section 28 of the Act provides for record of rights, and section 45 enacts that \"all land, to whatever purposes applied and wherever situated, is liable to the payment of land revenue to His Highness' Government\".\n\nThen there are provisions for assessment of land revenue.\n\nIt is argued for the petitioners that the record of right as contemplated by section 28 has not been made, and that the lands have not been assessed to revenue, nor has it been released, compounded for or redeemed, and that therefore the properties are not estates within section 3 ( 1) of the Bikaner Act No. IV of 1945. The contention of the respondent is that they are, at any rate, jagirs, and so fall within article 31-A. The preamble to the Act proceeds on the basis that whatever is not Khalsa is jagir land.\n\nIn three of the Petitions Nos. 414, 518 and 535 of 1954, the properties are described in the schedule as jagirs and the petitioners as jagirdars.\n\nIn Petitions Nos. 401 and 539 of 1954 there are no such admissions, there being no schedules to the petitions. But in the petitions for stay of notification filed in all the above petitions, it is alleged that \"notification under the impugned Act with respect to the jagir , of the petitioners has not yet been made\". (Vide para\n\n(16). In view of these admissions, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Frank Anthony based on the narration in Tod's Annals of Rajasthan,\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVenkata ,,, 1Yya1 •\n\nThak\"Mr Amar Singh1i v.\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nV enkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nVolume II, pp. 25, 26, 140 an~ 41 that the properties of the petitioners are not pgm.\n\n(c) Petition No. 634 of 1954: In this petition there are 192 petitioners, some of whom are from Kishangarh.\n\nThe special contention urged as regards the petitioners from Kishangarh is that their properties are not estates according to the law of Kishangarh, and that they are therefore outside article 31-A.\n\nRule 4(1) of the Jagir Rules for the Kishangarh State, 1945, defines a 'jagirdar' as a person who has been granted a village or land as jagir by the Durbar in consideration of his past and future services, and Rule 5 classifies jagirdars into five categories. The argument of the petitioners is that they have not been shown to fall within any of these categories.\n\nNot merely is this contention not distinctly raised in the petitions, but it is admitted in para 1 that \"the petitioners' properties are known as Jagirs, Bhoms, Muafi, etc.\" which will clearly bring them within the operation of article 31-A.\n\nIn the schedule to the petition also, the petitioners are described as jagirdars, and the particular villages held by them are noted as jagir villages. The contention that they do not fall within article 31-A must be rejected.\n\nIt. is stated that the 128 petitioner, Pratap Singh, does not make any payment in respect of his estate, and that it is not a jagir.\n\nIf that is so, then on the admission extracted above, it must be muafi, and will be within article 31-A.\n\n(d) Petition No. 536 of 1954: The petitioner is the holder of an estate in Mewar known as Bhaisrodgarh Tikana, and he alleges that there was a dispute between Rawat Himmat Singhji the then holder of the estate, and the Maharajah of Udaipur, and that it was settled in March 1855 through the mediation of the then Agent to the Government, Sir M. Montgomery, and that under the terms of the settlement, the Tikana was recognised as the exclusive property of the holder.\n\nThe agreement itself has not been produced, and it could not, even on the allegations in the petition, have had the effect of destroying the character of the estate as a jagir grant. Moreover,\n\nthis estate is mentioned as item 8 in the list of jagirs mentioned in the schedule under section H7 in Mewar Act. No. V of 1947, and that by itself is sufficient to bring it within article 31-A. ( e) Petition No. 672 of 1954 : The petitioner is a 13humia holding an estate called \"Jawas\". Its history is given \"Chiefs and Leading Families of Rajputana\", page 36, and the argument of Mr. Trivedi based on it is that the Chiefs of Jawas occupied a special position as feudatories, and that they could not be considered as grantees. But their position is not different from that of the other Bhomats, and indeed it is admitted in para 14 that the lands are comprised in the Bhomat area. This estate is expressly included in the schedule under section 117 in Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act No. V of 1947 being item No. 25 and is within article 31-A.\n\n(f) Petitions Nos. 483, 527, 528 and 675 of 1954 .and 1 and 61 of 1955: The question that is raised in these petitions is whether grants made for maintenance are 'jagirs or other similar grants' falling within the purview of article 31-A. In Petition No. 483 of 1954 the grant was made by the ruler of Uniaara, and in Petition No. 528 of 1954 by the then ruler of Katauli before it was merged in the State of Kotah.\n\nWe have held that maintem.nce grants would be jagirs according to their extended connotation, and thy are therefore within article 31-A.\n\nIn Petition No. 527 of 1954 the grant was made in favour of certain members of the Ruling House of Jaipur.\n\nAccording to the respondent, they were illegitimate issue called Laljis, and the grants were made for Lawazma and Kothrikharch, which . expressions mean maintenance of paraphernalia and household expenses. (Vide the Administration Report of Jaipur 1947-1948, page 36).\n\nThe grant in favour of the 33rd petitioner in Petition No. 1 of 1955 and the 17th petitioner in Petition No. 61 Qf 1955 are similar in character. Apart from the general contention that maintenance grants are not within article 31-A, the further argument of Mr. Dadachanji on behalf of these\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghj\n\nv State of Rajastha11!\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStale of Rajaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA_yyar J.\n\npetitioners is that Lawazma and Kothrikharch are tenures no! mentioned in the first schedule to the Act, and that the resumption of these lands was therefore without the authority of law.\n\nBut these expressions meaning maintenance expenses are indicative of the purpose of the grant and are not descriptive of the tenure. A gtant can both be a jagir and a maintenance grant, and the fact that it was granted for Lawazma and Kothrikharch does not militate against its being a jagir.\n\nIt was suggested that the question whether Lawazma and Kothrikharch are tenures different from those mentioned in the schedule to the Act might be left open and that the right of the petitioners to establish their contention in other proceedings may be reserved. That would undoubtedly be the proper course to adopt when the point for determination is not whether the Act itself is unconstitutional and void, but whether the action taken under it was authorised by its pro\\'isions.\n\nBut then, there are no allegations in the petition that. the properties were hdd under a tenure, which i• outside the schedule to the Act.\n\nOn the other hand, some at least of the petitions proceed on the footing that the estates tire jagirs.\n\nIn Petition No. 675 of 195~ the petitioner is the Raj Mata of the ruler of T cink. She was receiving a monthly allowance of Rs. 762/- for her maintenance and in lieu of it, the village of Bagri with its hamlets, Anwarpura and Ismailpura, was granted to her by resolution dated 6-3-1948. Being a maintenance grant it will be a jagir, and that is the footing on which the petition is drafted.\n\nMr. S. K. Kapur who appeared for the petitioner put forward a special contention that the Government was cstopped from resuming the lands.\n\nThe facts on which this plea is founded arc that on 28-11-1953 the Secretary to the Government wrote to the Collector of Tonk that the pet1t1oner was not to be disturbed in her enjoyment of the jagir for her lifetime.\n\nIn a later communication dated 24-11-1954, however, addressed to the petitioner, the Government expressed its inability to stay resumption, and the argument is that the respondent is estopped from going back on the assurance and undertaking given in the letter dated 28-11-1953.\n\nWe are unable on these facts to see any basis for a plea of estoppel.\n\nThe letter dated 28-11-1953 was not addressed to the petitioner; nor does it amount to an assurance or undertaking not to resume the jagir.\n\nAnd even if such assurance had been given, it would certainly not have been binding on the Government, because its powers of resumption are regulated by the statute, and must be exercised in accordance with its provlSlons.\n\nThe Act confers no authority on the Government to grant exemption from resumption, and an undertaking not to resume will be invalid, and there can be no estoppel against a statute.\n\nOne other contention advanced with reference to this petition might be noticed. It was argued that under rule 2(f) in schedule II, no compensation is awarded in respect of the abadi lands, which remain in the possession of the jagirdar, whereas, if they are sold, the income from the sale proceeds is taken into account.\n\nThis, it was argued, is discriminatory. The principle underlying this provision is that compensation is to be fixed on the basis of the income which the properties produce, and that while abadi lands in the hands of the jagirdar yield no income, if they are sold the sale proceeds are income-producing assets.\n\nWhether this principle of assessing compensation is open to attack is another question, and that will be considered in its due place.\n\n(g) Petitions Nos. 371, 375, 379, 416, 455 and 461 of 1954 : These petitions raise in general terms the contention that tl:ie properties to which they relate are not estates as defined in article 31-A.\n\nPetition No. 371 of 1954 relates to the estate of Doongri in Jaipur, and it is contended that it is not an estate because the liability of the holder is only to pay Naqdirazan, and it is argued that this is not revenue.\n\nNaqdirazan is money commutation for the obligation of maintaining a specified number of horses.\n\nThis is clearly a grant for military servi':~, :; od will be a jagir, and that is admitted in para l where the 5-83 S. C. India/59\n\nThakurAr\n\nSinghji\n\nStale of )ajastlratr\n\nVenkatalama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSingl, ji\n\nStat' of Rajasthan\n\nYenkatarama\n\nAJ.?\"'r ].\n\n362 SlJPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\npetitioner is described as the jagirdar of Doongri and in para 9 where it is stated that the jagir is unsettled.\n\nThe prayer is that an injunction might be issued restraining t.'ie State from interfering with the rights of the petitioner as jagirdar.\n\nIt is also alleged in para 19 of the stay petition that \"the whole family is to be supported from this jagir\". Article 31-A clearly applies.\n\nPetition No. 375 of 1954 relates to the estate of Renwal, and the special contention raised is that the petitioner pays no revenue but only Naqdirazan. But he describes himself in para 1 as jagirdar of Renwal, admits in para 9 that it is a jagir, and claims relief in para 21 (3) on that footing. The properties are clearly jagirs within article 31-A.\n\nThe petitioner in Petition No. 379 of 1954 is also stated to be holding the estate on payment of Naqdirazan.\n\nHe describes himself as owner of the properties in Khera as jagirdai-, admits in paras 9, 14, 16 and 19 that the estate is a jagir, and prays for an injunction restraining the State from interfering with his rights as jagirdar.\n\nHis estate is clearly within article 31-A.\n\nPetition No. 416 of , J954 relates to an estate called Sanderao. The payment made by the holder is called Rekchakri, and the contention is that this is not revenue.\n\nBut it is admitted in paras 1, 2, 9 and 21 (3) of the petition that the properties are jagir lands.\n\nPetition No. 455 of 1954 relates to properties in Mewar.\n\nThere are 13 petitioners, and it is argued that the payments made by them called chakri chatund and Bhom-barad are not revenue, and their properties are not estates. But they admit that they are \"owners as petty jagirdars\" of the properties. mentioned .in the schedule, and this statement is followed by others which also contain clear admissions that the estates are jagirs. (Vide paras 12, 17(e), 19 and 21(3) of the petition and paras 16 and 19 of the stay petition), In Petition No. 461 of 1954 the petitioner adinits that he holds ten villages as jagirs, seventeen as istimrar and two as muafi.\n\nIstimrar is one of the tenures mentioned in the first schedule to the Act, and is item No. 2 therein, and that would be \"other similar grant\"\n\n2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME CCURT REPORTS 363\n\nwithin .article 31-A, while jagir and muafi arc expressly included therein.\n\nIn conclusion, we must hold that the petitioners have failed to establish that the impugned Act, in so far as it relates to properties held by them, is not within the proection of article 31-A.\n\nIV. (B) V.le may now consider the contention of the petitioners that the Act is bad on the ground that the compensation provided therein is inadequate.\n\nThe provisions of the Act bearing on this matter may now be reviewed.\n\nThe second schedule to the Act lays down the principles on which compensation has to be assessed.\n\nRule 2 enacts how the gross income is to be ascertained, and enumerates the several heads of income which are to be included therein, and rule 4 mentions the deductions which are admissible.\n\nRule 4(3) provides that 25 per cent. of the gross income may be deducted for \"administrative charges inclusive of the cost of collection, maintenance of land records, management of jagir lands and irrecoverable arrears of rent\"; and there is a proviso to that rule that \"in no case shall the net income be computed at a figure less than 50 per cent. of the gross income\".\n\nUnder rule 5 compensation payable is seven times the net income calculated under rule 4. Rule 6 provides that any compensation paid to the jagirdar for customs duties during the basic year shall contirme to be payable.\n\nUnder section 26(2) the compensation amount carries interest at 2! per cent. from the date of resumption, and under section 35 it is payable in instalments.\n\nUnder section 35(A) the payment may be made in cash or in bond or partly in cash and partly in bond.\n\nIn addition to this, there is provision for the payment of rehabilitation grant on the scale mentioned in schedule III.\n\nThe complaint of the petitioner is that the compensation provided by the rules is inadequate, being far less than the market value of the estate, that rule 2 takes into account only the income which was being actually received from the properties and omits altogether potential income which might arise in future, as for example, from vacant house sites and unopened\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStat• of Rqjasthan\n\nY1nkatara111J1\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\nState of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nmines; and reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjea( 1 ) where it was held that the compensation guaranteed under article 31(2) was just compensation, equivalent of what the owner had been deprived of. But we have held that the impugnecl Act is protected by article 31-A, and that article enacts that no law providing for acquisiti'on of properties falling within its purview is open to attack on the ground that it violates any of the provisions of Part Ill.\n\nIt was held by this Court in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhira1a Sir Kameslnuar Singh( 2 ) and Visveshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(\") that an objection to the validity of an Act relating to acquisition of property on the ground that it did not provide for payment of compensation was an objection based on article 31 (2), and that it was barred when the impugned legislation fell within articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B.\n\nIt was further held in Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') that when the acquisition was of the whole estate, it was not a valid objection to it that the compensation was awarded on the basis of the income actually received, and that nothing was paid on account of properties which did not yield an income.\n\nIt is argued that the compensation payable under the rules is so inadequate as to be illusory, and that the Act must be held to amount to a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nWe are un:ible to agree with this contention.\n\nUnder the Act, the jagirdar is entitlcJ to compensation equal to seven years' net income, and in addition to it he is awarded rehabilitation grant which may vary from 2 to 11 times the net income.\n\nUnder section 18 of the Act he will also be allotted a portion of the khudkhast lands in the jagir, the extent of the allotment being proportionate to the . total extent thereof.\n\nHe is also to get compensation for loss of customs.\n\nThe utmost that can be said of these provisions is that the compensation provided thereunder is inadequate, if that is calculated on the basis of the market value of the properties.\n\nBut that\n\n(I) [1954] S. C.R. 558.\n\n(.1) [19.>2] S. C.R. 1020.\n\n(2) (1952] S. C.R. 889.\n\n(4) [19.52] S. C. R. 10\"6.\n\nis not a ground on which an Act protected by article 31-A could be impugned. Before such an Act could be struck down, it must be shown that ti, e true intention of the Jaw was to take properties without making any payment, that the provisions relating to compensation are merely veils concealing that intention, and that the compensation payable is so illusory as to be no compensation at all. (Vide State of Bi.liar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwai Singh of Darbhanga and others (')). We are clear that this cannot be said of the provisions of the impugned Act, and the contention that it is a fraud on the Constitution must, in consequence, fail.\n\nIt was argued by Mr Achhru Ram that the impugned Act suffered from a fundamental defect in that it treated all the 41 tenures classed as jagirs in the schedule as of the same character, and on that basis laid down the same principles of compensation for all of them.\n\nIt is argued that these tenures differ widely from one another as regards several incidents such as heritability, partibilitv and alienability, :md that different scales of compensation should have been provided suitably to the nature and quality of the tenure.\n\nThere is considerable force in this contention.\n\nBut this is an objection to the quantum of compensation, and that is not justiciable under article 31-A.\n\nWe may add that even if it was open to the petitioners to go behind article 31-A and to assail the legislation on the ground that the compensation awarded was not just, they have failed to place any materials before us for substantiating that contention, and on this ground also, the objection must fail.\n\nIt was also argued that there was no public purpose involved in the resumption, and that therefore article 31(2) had been contravened.\n\nThis again is an objection which is barred by article 31-A; and even on the merits, .the question is concluded against the petitioners by the decision of this Court in State of Bihar\n\nv. Maharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga\n\n(I) [1952] S. C.R. 889, 946-948.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStale of Rajaslhan\n\nV enkatarama\n\nA_yyar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSi.ngfUi\n\nSlate of Rajasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand ot/2ers(') that legislation of the character of the present is supported by public purpose.\n\nIt was next urged that the provisions of the Act offend article 14 and are therefore bad. Even apart from article 31-A which renders such an objection inadmissible, we are satisfied that it is without substance.\n\nThe contention of the petitioners is that the Act according to its title is one to provide for resumption of jagir lands, not all of them; that section 21 provides that _ the Government \"may appoint a date for the resumption of any class of jagir lands\", which means that under this section it is not obligatory on it to resume all jagirs, and that it would be within its powers in resuming some of them while leaving others untouched, and thus the Act is discriminatory. Th<: prov1S1ons of this Act bearing on this questi;, n are sections 20 and 4.\n\nSection 20 enacts that \"the provisions of this Chapter apply to all jagirs except jagirs the income of which is utilised for the maintenance of any place of religious worship or for the performance of any religious service\". We have held that the Act confers no power on the Government to grant exemption.\n\nAll the jagirs therefore are liable to be resumed under section 20, no option being left with the Government in the matter.\n\nSection 4 of the Act enacts that all jagir lands become liable to pay assessment from the commencement of the Act, and the liability of the jagirdar to pay tribute also ceases as from that date. There cannot therefore be any doubt that it was the intention of the Legislature that all jagir lands should be resumed under section 21.\n\nIt was also urged that under section 21 the State is authorised to resume different classes of jagir lands on different dates, a.nd that must result in the law operating unequallv.\n\nThis provmon was obviously dictated by practical considerations such as administrative convenience and facilities for payment of compensation, and onnot be held to be discriminatory. It was held by this Court in Biswamblzar Singh\n\nv. T lze State of Orissa and others(') that a similar\n\n(l) [1952] S. C.R. 889.\n\n(2) [1954] S. C.R. 842, 855.\n\n...\n\n' . '\n\nprovision in the Orissa Estates Abolition Act No . .1 of 1952 was not obnoxious to article 14. The obi\"ec-\n\n· 1955\n\nThaku,. Amar tion must accordingly be overruled. Singhji Petitions Nos. 629 and 643 of 1954: These are petiv. tions by jagirdars of J\\Iewar, and the special con ten- State of Rajasthan tion urged on their behalf by J\\Ir. Trivedi is that their jagirs had been taken possession of by. the State in 1949 under section S(A) of the Rajasthan Ordinance No. 27 of 1948, that by its judgment dated 11-12-1951 the High Court of Rajasthan had held that. that enactment was void under article 14, that that judgment had been affirmed by this court in The State of Rajasthan v. Rao JJianohar Singhji('), thatthe present Act came into force on 8-2-1952, and that. the Government having wrongly taken possession of the jagirs in 1949 under the provisions of the Ordinance, instead of returning. them to the petitioners notifie<j. them first under section 21 of the Act, and thus managed to continue in possession, and that in the result, these jagirdars had been treated differently from the jagirdars in other States of Rajputana to whom section S(A) did not apply and article 14 had been contravened. There is no substance in . this contention.\n\nThe l\\Iewar jagirdars having lost possession under a legislation which has been held to be void, the rights which they had over the jagirs until the date of the present notifications would remain.unaffected; and no unequal treatment could result therefrom. And, moreover, the present Act makes no discrimination in the matter, as it applies to all the jagirs in Raja- . sthan .. There is no ground, therefore,. for holding that the Act in any manner contravenes articleJ4.\n\nv. It now remains to deal with \"the contention . of some of the petitioners that even if the impugned - Act is valid, their estates do not fall within its mischief; and that their resumption is therefore miauthorised. . . . . . . . (a) Petition No. 392 of 1954: The subject:matter of this petition is the estate of Khandela in the former State of Jaipur. By.a deed of the year 1836, it\n\n(1) [195!] S.C.R. 996.\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThakur .Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rqjaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya; J.\n\nwas settled by the Maharajah of Jaipur on Raja Abayasingh and Raja Lakshmansingh on izara i•timrar on an annual assessment of Rs. 80,001.\n\nThe present petitioner 1s the successor-in-interest of Raja Abayasingh, and is entitled to three-fifths share in the estate.\n\nThe contention that is urged on his behalf by Mr. Isaacs is that the Act does not apply to him, because he is neither a J agirdar nor a holder of any of the tenures mentioned in schedule I to the Act.\n\nThe history of this estate is set out in Mr. Wills's Report at pp. 75-79.\n\nKhandela was an ancient principality held by the members of the Raisalot family as Mansubdars under the Moghul Emperor.\n\nIn 1725 Sawai J aisingh of Amber obtained an izara of Khandela from the Moghul Emperor, and the Raisalot-holders became subordinate to him.\n\nIn 1797 the Raisalot family lost possession of the estate, which became incorporated in the Khalsa lands of Jaipur, and administered as such till 1812. Thereafter, it was leased to .the Chieftain of Sikar and others on short term leases till 1836 when the grant under which the petitioner claims was made.\n\nThe occasion for the grant was that there were negotiations for marrying a princess of the Bikaner royal family to the ruler of Jaipur, and the Bikaner Durbar insisted that the Khandela estate should be restorec! to the Raisalot family.\n\nThough the marriage itself did not eventually materialise, <he princess having in the meantime died, the negotiations which had been going on with the Jaipur State for , the handing over of the Khandela estate to its old holders resulted in the izara of 1836.\n\nNow the question is whether the grant of 1836 was that of a jagir. It was clearly not a grant for services renderd or to be rendered, nor was there an assignment of any right to collect revenue.\n\nThe grantees were to enjoy the income from the lands and pay a fixed annual amount to the Durbar.\n\nIt is true that the estate had some of the incidents of a jagir tenure attached to it.\n\nIt was impartible, it was inalienable, and in matters of succession it was governed by the Matmi Rules.\n\nAll this did not affect the true character of the grant which was both in name and in\n\nsubstance a permanent lease and not a jagir.\n\nMr. Pathak contends that even if what was granted under the deed was not a jagir, it was at least a grant of istimrari tenure, which is item 2 in schedule I to the Act. This argument is mainly founded on certain proceedings which were taken with reference to the Khandela estate during the years 1932 to 1939. The occasion for these proceedings was a dii\\J'Ute between the Thikanadars of Shekhwati and the Durbar with reference to their respective rights, and the status of the lzaradars of Khandela also came up for investigation.\n\nThere was an enquiry and report by Mr. Wills in 1933, and on that report the matter was gain investigated by a Committee which submitted its report in 1935.\n\nTherein, it was held on an examination of .all the materials that the status of the holders of Khandela differed from that of other Thikanadars, who paid Muamla and claimed semi-independent status as \"Muamlaguzars\", that they held merely as istimrar Izaradars uncer a \"permanent and specific izar\" and not as istimrar Muamlaguzars, that the grant of Mal, Sayer, Bhom and Kuli habubayat under the deed did not add to their status as lzaradars. (Vide para 5).\n\nThis report was accepted by the Maharajah of Jaipur on 14-4-1939.\n\nMr. Pathak contends that the effect of the finding of the Committee that the grantees held as istimrar lzaradars was to bring them within item 2 of schedule I to the Act, and that therefore the resumption is within the Act.\n\nBut the report emphasises that the grantee held as \"istimrar Izaradar\" and not as . \"is.timrar Muamlaguzar'', and in the context the word \"istimrar\" has reference not to the character of the tenure but its duration as permanent. The precise nature of the tenure called 'istimrari' is thus set out in Venkatachar's Report:-\n\n\"Permanently q14it-rented estates and lands- These are denoted by various terms as Dumba, Chukota, Suba and . Istimrari.\n\nOf these the Istimrari tenure merits some attention.\n\nThe largest number of lstimarari estates in Rajasthan lies in Ajmer-Merwara\n\nThakur ..t.ar\n\nSinghji\n\nStall of Rajaslhan\n\ny mtkal<lrlftllll\n\nA_gar J.\n\nThakur Atnar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nSUPREME. COURT REPORTS (1955] ' which area is outside the scope of this report. The original tenure. of the Istimrari estate in Ajmer is exactly like the Jagirs in Rajasthan. None of the - Ajmer estates ever pa.id revenue till 1755, but were held on condition of military service ................ Under British rule, the estate holders were made liable to Venkatarama pay an annual fixed and permanent quit-rent and AyyarJ; ·\" - were converted into Istimrari tenure holders\". (Page\n\n22, para 24).\n\n\"This quit rent or fixed revenue is a nominal assessment, not related to the income from the holding, but with the condition of confirmation of grant; the amount is invariable. This class oL persons are known as 'Istimrardars' \". (Page 24, para 36).\n\nIt is clear from the above that the essential features of istimrari tenure are that the lands are assessed to a nominal quit rent and that is permanent.\n\nThe amount of Rs. 80,001 fixed as assessment under the deed of 1836 cannot be said to be a nominal amount, and as found in the report of the 1933 Committee, it was not a permanent assessment.\n\nIt cannot therefore be held that what was created by thedeed of 1836 was istimrari tenure. It was argued for the respondent that Khandela was clearly an estate as defined in article 31-A, that the policy of the law was to abolish all intermediaries, and that section 2(h) should be so construed as to comprehend all holders of intermediate tenures. The answer t\" this is that whatever the legislature intended, effect can be given only to its expressed intention, and that the definition of \"jagir\" in section 2(h) is not sufficiently wide to catch the petitioner. The notification under section 21 in so far as it relates to the pro-· perties held by the petitioner under the izara of 1836 must be held to be not within the purview of the Act and therefore unauthorised. _\n\n(b) Petition No. 427 of 1954: Three villages, Haripura, Khata and Niradun, are comprised in this peti- tion; Lands in Haripura belonged to certain Bhumias of Jaipur.\n\nThe petitioner acquired them under a number of purchases, the last of them being in 1915. _ :Bhom ti; inure is item 17 in schedule I to the Act1 and\n\n--~ __ .:,_ ___ --·---·\n\nthee lands would therefore be within the purview of 1955 the Act. It is argued by l\\Ir. Rastogi that as the peti- Thakur Amar tioner had acquired lands from the Bhomias long prior Singhfi to the Act his rights in them could not retrospectively v. be affected by subsequent legislation. \\Ve are unable Stateof Rafasthan to see where the question of retrospective operation comes in. If Bhom. is a tenure-and that is what it Venkatarama is under the first schedule to the Act, andif the inten- AyyarJ. tion of the Legislatnre was to bring it within the operation of the Act, then the only .question to be considered is whether the particular properties noti- . fied under the Act are held under that tenure.\n\nAnd if that is answered in the affirmative, the Act_ would clearly apply, and it would make no difference ill-the result that the holder derived title to them by purchase and not by inheritance.\n\nOn the admission of the petitioner that the lands notified belonged to his vendors as Bhom, the Act will dearly apply.\n\nWith reference to the lands in the village of Kha ta, the contention of the petitioner is that it is held on izara tenure, and that it is therefore outside schedule I to the Act. This village is a Thikana in Shekhwati, and though the estates in that area were originally held on izara, they had, as already stated, risen to the status of jagirs and had been recognised as such. This village is stated to have been granted formaintaining horses, and is really a Mansab jagir and must be held . to be covered by item I in schedule I. . . The village of Niradun is stated to be held as Javad, and the contention is that it is not one of the tenures mentioned in schedule I to the Act. The respondent contends that Javad is not the name of any tenure, and that it means only. a sub-grant. In the petition it is not stated that Javad is a tenure; nor is there a mention of its incidents. . The word 'javad' is not noticed either in \\Vilson's Glossary or in Ramanatha lyer's Law Lexicon.\n\nIn the Jagir Rules of Kisban~ garh, section 4(xiii) defines 'javad' as \"a jagir confiscated by or reverted to the State\", and that has reference to the practice of making a grant of a small portion of the jagir to the jagirdar when it is contiscated1 or to the mt; lmbers of the family when it\n\nTh'\"akur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\n'Fl Slate of Rajasthan\n\nV tnkalarama\n\nA.Yy•r J.\n\nreverts back to the State. We are satisfied that there is no tenure called Javad, and it will not assist the pet1t10ner whether Javad is a sub-grant or a grant of jagir of the nature mentioned in section 4(xiii) of the Kishangarh Rules. We may add that this contention was raised by the petitioner in a supplemental statement. ( c) Petition No. 468 of 1954 : The petitioner is the holder of an estate known as Jobner.\n\nHe contends that he is a Mansubdar and not a jagirdar, and that his tenure is not included in schedule I to the Act.\n\nDuring the Moghul administration persons to whom assignments of land revenue were made subject to an obligation to maintain horses for Imperial service were called Mansubdars.\n\nThe petitioner states that Akbar the Great granted three paraganas, Narayana, Kolak and Jobner, to his ancestors as Mansub for maintaining 1000 horses, that in 1727 they came under \"the subordination of the Amber Durbar\"-which was the name of the State prior to the foundation of Jaipur in 1728, and that they had continued to hold the estate thereafter as Mansubdars and not as jagirdars.\n\nBut the grant will clearly be a jagir as there is an assignment of land revenue for the rendering of military service, and Mansub is only another name for a jagir.\n\nIt is classified as a jagir in the Jaipur Administration Report 1947-1948, page 35, and even though the Report has not the force of legislation, it is valuable as showing that Mansub is recognised as a jagir.\n\nThe estate is therefore covered by item 1 in schedule I.\n\nWith reference to one of the villages forming part of this estate, Jorpura, a special contention was put forward by Mr. Naunit Lal that it was dedicated for worship of the Devi, and was therefore within the exemption enacted in section 20.\n\nA document is also produced in support of this claim. The respondent claims that under this . deed the grant is not in its entirety in favour of the Deity, but the petitioner disputes it.\n\nThis is not a question which can be determined in this petition.\n\nIt will be open to the petitioner to establish in appropriate proceedings that the\n\nvillage or any portion thereof is within the exemption of section 20 of the Act. ( d) Petitions Nos. 474 and 475 of 1954: In 1948 the Maharajah of Jaipur granted to the petitioners, who are his sons, the Thikanas of Bhagwatgarh and Mangarh consisting of 20 villages revenue-free. Now the contention that has been urged before us in these and other similar petitions is that in the first schedules to the Act, only Thikanas of Dholpur are mentioned, being item II, and that therefore Thikanas in other States are excluded. But the expression 'Thikanadar' is a honorific and 'Thikana' does not, except in Dholpur, mean anything more than an estate and that estate can as well be a jagir. The petitioners, in fact, admit in their petitions that they are jagirdars.\n\nThe grant is clearly a jagir, and falls within item 1 in the schedule. ( e) Petition No. 488 of 1954 : The petitioners are interested in two of the villages, Dadia Rampur and Tapiplya comprised in the izara of Khandela of the year 1836, which forms the subject-matter of Petition No. 392 of 1954, and their title rests on Chhut Bhayas or sub-grant from the izaradar.\n\nTheir - rights are therefore precisely those of the izaradars, and for the reasons given in Petition No. 392 of 1954 these petitioners must succeed.\n\n(f) Petition No. 36 of 1955 : The properties to which this petition relates are held as \"Sansan\" which is one of the tenures mentioned in the first schedule being item 25, arid would therefore fall within the operation of section 21.\n\nThe contention of the petitioner is that they are dedicated for the worship of Lord Shiva and Goddess Shakti, and that he is a\n\nBrahmacharan utilising the income from the lands for the above religious service.\n\nThe properties comprised in the grant are sai<l to be of a small extent, and the dedication is not improbable.\n\nThere has been no denial by the respondent of the allegation in the petition, and on the materials placed before us, we have come to the conclusion that the dedication pleaded by the petitioner has been established, and that the\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSing.yi\n\nState of'., Rajas than\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v. 'State of Rajasth•n\n\nVenkataram• Ayyar J.\n\nApril 20\n\nproperties are within the exemption enacted in section 20.\n\nTo sum up: The impugned Act is not open to attack either on the ground that the Rajpramukh had no legislative competence to enact it, or that the pr<>- cedure prescribed in article 212-A for enactment of laws had not been followed. The Act is, in substance, one for acquisition of property, and is within the legislatiYc competence of the State, and it is protected by article 31-A.\n\nBut the notification is bad as regards properties comprised in Petitions Nos. 392 and 488 of 1954, as izoras are not within the impugned Act.\n\nThe properties mentioned in Petition No: 36 of 1955 are declicatcJ for religious services, and are exempt tmdcr section 20 of the Act.\n\nAppropriate writs will issue in these three petitions.\n\nIn Petition No. 468 of 1954 the right of the peritioner to c!oim cxem ption under section 20 for the villa!ic of Jorpur:1 on the ground that it is dedicated for worship of the Deity is reserved, and the petition is otiHr\\vise dis1nis.sed.\n\nAll the other !JCt1t1ons will stand dismissed.\n\nThe parties wiil b(ar their own costs m ali the petitions.\n\nC\\f. K. RANGANATHAN AND ANOTHER\n\nti.\n\nGOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, RHAC'NATJ and SJNHA JJ.]\n\nIndian Companies Act, (Act VII of 1913), s. 232(1) as amended by Act XXll oj l936-'F/1e iuords \"or any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the propc; tit\"-s of the Co1npa11y\" added in the section-FVhethcr lef!islaturc intended to 1nake alteration £n the !atu as respects sales effected by secured creditor-Secured creditor-TVhcther ouiside the toinding up--Construction_:Presumption against i111plied r1fteratict1 of law.\n\nThe secured creditor is outside the winding up and can realise his securir:v \\vithout the ieave of the winding up Court, though if he files a suit or takes other legal proceedings for the realisation of his security he is bound under s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act to obtain the leave of the winding up Court before he can do so although such leave \\V1uld alinost automatically be granted.", "total_entities": 555, "entities": [{"text": "THAKUR AMAR SINGHJI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 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{"in_sentence": "In pursuance of s. 21 ( 1) of the Act, the State of Rajasthan issued notifications resuming the jagirs specified therein, whereupon petitions under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1467, "end_char": 1475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mewar Governmenl Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Mewar Governmenl Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1579, "end_char": 1599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution were filed by the persons aggrieved challenging the validity of the Act before the Rajasthan High Court."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1676, "end_char": 1689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were dismissed and thereupon they filed petitions before the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1696, "end_char": 1703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mewar Governmenl Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Mewar Governmenl Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1711, "end_char": 1732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1899, "end_char": 1907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2040, "end_char": 2056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2276, "end_char": 2286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2342, "end_char": 2349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2417, "end_char": 2424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2660, "end_char": 2665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2851, "end_char": 2859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3378, "end_char": 3386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X (3) of the Covenant of the United State of Rajasthan, that authority was the Rajpramukh."}}, {"text": "Article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 212A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4005, "end_char": 4020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4405, "end_char": 4413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5041, "end_char": 5057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6647, "end_char": 6654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7218, "end_char": 7225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jodhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7422, "end_char": 7429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on the Ruler of Jodhpur imposed his oovereignty over the territory but permitted the previous rulers to continue in possession of the lands on payment of an annual sum."}}, {"text": "(1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8044, "end_char": 8067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1941) L.R. 68 I.A. 109", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8116, "end_char": 8139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhomicharas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8486, "end_char": 8497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And when once it is admitted that the Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sovereignty of Jodhpur their status can only be that of a subject.", "canonical_name": "Bhoniicharas"}}, {"text": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8587, "end_char": 8672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8874, "end_char": 8880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "s. 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9224, "end_char": 9230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9253, "end_char": 9260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9612, "end_char": 9620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Even if the Bhomicharas did not prior to the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Bhumias", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9646, "end_char": 9653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31-A.\n\n(vi) The position of Bhumias in Mewar is similar to that of Bhomicharas in Marwar and in addition it was a condition of the terms on which their title to the lands was recognised by the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur, that they had to render military service when called upon and also pay quit rent.", "canonical_name": "Bhumias"}}, {"text": "Mewar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9657, "end_char": 9662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31-A.\n\n(vi) The position of Bhumias in Mewar is similar to that of Bhomicharas in Marwar and in addition it was a condition of the terms on which their title to the lands was recognised by the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur, that they had to render military service when called upon and also pay quit rent."}}, {"text": "Bhomicharas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9685, "end_char": 9696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31-A.\n\n(vi) The position of Bhumias in Mewar is similar to that of Bhomicharas in Marwar and in addition it was a condition of the terms on which their title to the lands was recognised by the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur, that they had to render military service when called upon and also pay quit rent.", "canonical_name": "Bhoniicharas"}}, {"text": "Marwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9700, "end_char": 9706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31-A.\n\n(vi) The position of Bhumias in Mewar is similar to that of Bhomicharas in Marwar and in addition it was a condition of the terms on which their title to the lands was recognised by the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur, that they had to render military service when called upon and also pay quit rent."}}, {"text": "Chittoor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9821, "end_char": 9829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31-A.\n\n(vi) The position of Bhumias in Mewar is similar to that of Bhomicharas in Marwar and in addition it was a condition of the terms on which their title to the lands was recognised by the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur, that they had to render military service when called upon and also pay quit rent."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9834, "end_char": 9841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31-A.\n\n(vi) The position of Bhumias in Mewar is similar to that of Bhomicharas in Marwar and in addition it was a condition of the terms on which their title to the lands was recognised by the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur, that they had to render military service when called upon and also pay quit rent."}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10048, "end_char": 10058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 106( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10267, "end_char": 10282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10297, "end_char": 10300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 106( I) of the Act declares that a \"Tikanadar, Jagir<lar, Muafidar or Bhumia shall have all such revenue rights in the lands comprised in his )agir, muafi, or Bhom under this Act, as are granted to him by His Highness\"."}}, {"text": "Bhumia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10345, "end_char": 10351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 106( I) of the Act declares that a \"Tikanadar, Jagir<lar, Muafidar or Bhumia shall have all such revenue rights in the lands comprised in his )agir, muafi, or Bhom under this Act, as are granted to him by His Highness\".", "canonical_name": "Bhumias"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10594, "end_char": 10604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shekwati", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11230, "end_char": 11238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(vii) The Tikanadars of Shekwati got into possession of lands as ijaradars or lessees and were subsequently treated as jagirdars~ Their tenure was; if not jagirs, at least other usimilar grants\" within Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11408, "end_char": 11415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11437, "end_char": 11447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11755, "end_char": 11762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11797, "end_char": 11818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12447, "end_char": 12457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12499, "end_char": 12506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12540, "end_char": 12547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12697, "end_char": 12707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12741, "end_char": 12748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13885, "end_char": 13895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13964, "end_char": 13980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand (O C. Chatterjee and K. L. Mehta, with him) for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Bakshi Tek Chand"}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14002, "end_char": 14013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand (O C. Chatterjee and K. L. Mehta, with him) for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Silqlfji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14163, "end_char": 14171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "354, 362, 382 to 385, 511 to 516, 519, 537,\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji v.\n\nSlall of Rajasthan\n\nTM.twA.-\n\nSilqlfji ...\n\nSiaqf &, jlulMa\n\n541, 543 to 547, 550, 553, 556, 558 to 562, 570, 573 to 575, 582 to 584, 587, 588, 593 to 595, 597, 602, 603, 607 to 609, 613, 614, 616 to 619, 626, 628, 631 to 633, 637, 640 to 642, '44, 645, 653, 657 to 659, 661, 662, 679, 684 to 688 of 1954 and 2 to 7, 9 to 14, 21, 25 to 27, 35, 37, 45, 47, 49, 52, 55, 57, 63 and 65 of 1955."}}, {"text": "H. L. Mordia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14527, "end_char": 14539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Mordia and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14615, "end_char": 14628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "U. M. Trivedi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14704, "end_char": 14717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. M. Trivedi, (K. L. Mehta, with him),- for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "R. K. Rastogi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14810, "end_char": 14823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Rastogi and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Rastogi"}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14995, "end_char": 15005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nChatterjee and Naunit Lal, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Naunit Lal"}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15219, "end_char": 15229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram, (Naunit Lal, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Achhru Ram"}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15232, "end_char": 15242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram, (Naunit Lal, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Naunit Lal"}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15471, "end_char": 15487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand, (Ganpat Rai with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Bakshi Tek Chand"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15490, "end_char": 15500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand, (Ganpat Rai with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Rai"}}, {"text": "N. C. Cliatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15750, "end_char": 15767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Cliatterjee, ( Ganpat Rai and S. K.. Kapur,\n\n2 $.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT llEPOR.TS\n\nwith him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Cliatterjee"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15771, "end_char": 15781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Cliatterjee, ( Ganpat Rai and S. K.. Kapur,\n\n2 $.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT llEPOR.TS\n\nwith him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Rai"}}, {"text": "S. K.. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15786, "end_char": 15798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Cliatterjee, ( Ganpat Rai and S. K.. Kapur,\n\n2 $.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT llEPOR.TS\n\nwith him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. K.. Kapur"}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16076, "end_char": 16086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram, (Ganpat Rai, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Achhru Ram"}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16271, "end_char": 16282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. K.. Kapur"}}, {"text": "R. K. Pastogi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16359, "end_char": 16372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Pastogi and Ganpat Rai, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Rastogi"}}, {"text": "C. Chatterji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16452, "end_char": 16464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Chatterji and Ganpat Rai, for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanii", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16532, "end_char": 16545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/. B. Dadachanii and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16550, "end_char": 16565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/. B. Dadachanii and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder Narain"}}, {"text": "C. L. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16678, "end_char": 16692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. L. Aggarwal and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16697, "end_char": 16712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. L. Aggarwal and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder Narain"}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16784, "end_char": 16795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. Gupta, for the Petitioners, in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "S. C. ltaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16858, "end_char": 16870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. ltaacs (S. D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "S. D. Sekhri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16872, "end_char": 16884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. ltaacs (S. D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "K. S. Hajela", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16946, "end_char": 16958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan and G. S. Pathak, (Dau/at Ram Bhandari, Porus A. Mehta, P. G. Gokhale and Kan Singh, with them), for the Respondent (State of Rajasthan) in all the petitions. ."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17008, "end_char": 17020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan and G. S. Pathak, (Dau/at Ram Bhandari, Porus A. Mehta, P. G. Gokhale and Kan Singh, with them), for the Respondent (State of Rajasthan) in all the petitions. ."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17044, "end_char": 17058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan and G. S. Pathak, (Dau/at Ram Bhandari, Porus A. Mehta, P. G. Gokhale and Kan Singh, with them), for the Respondent (State of Rajasthan) in all the petitions. ."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17060, "end_char": 17073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan and G. S. Pathak, (Dau/at Ram Bhandari, Porus A. Mehta, P. G. Gokhale and Kan Singh, with them), for the Respondent (State of Rajasthan) in all the petitions. ."}}, {"text": "Kan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17078, "end_char": 17087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan and G. S. Pathak, (Dau/at Ram Bhandari, Porus A. Mehta, P. G. Gokhale and Kan Singh, with them), for the Respondent (State of Rajasthan) in all the petitions. ."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17226, "end_char": 17244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAit J.-These are applications under Article 32 of the Constitution impugning the validity of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act No.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAit"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17277, "end_char": 17287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Apar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17488, "end_char": 17492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sl•ll of Rajasllum\n\nY 111l; ataram11\n\nApar J.\n\nto as the Act."}}, {"text": "20-8-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17570, "end_char": 17579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20-8-1949 the Government of India appointed a Committee presided over by Sri C. S ."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17584, "end_char": 17603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20-8-1949 the Government of India appointed a Committee presided over by Sri C. S ."}}, {"text": "C. S .\n\nVenkatachar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17647, "end_char": 17666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20-8-1949 the Government of India appointed a Committee presided over by Sri C. S ."}}, {"text": "Rajputana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17726, "end_char": 17735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatachar to examine and report on the jagirdari and land tenures in Rajputana and Madhya Bharat the object avowedly being to effect land reforms so as to establish direct .relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil and to eliminate all intermediaries between them."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17740, "end_char": 17753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatachar to examine and report on the jagirdari and land tenures in Rajputana and Madhya Bharat the object avowedly being to effect land reforms so as to establish direct .relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil and to eliminate all intermediaries between them."}}, {"text": "18-12-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17959, "end_char": 17969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its report dated 18-12-1949 the Committee recommended inter alia the resumption of j agirs and payment of rehabilitation grants in certain cases. ("}}, {"text": "Government of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18176, "end_char": 18199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question of legislation on the subject was taken up by the Government of Rajasthan in 1951, and eventually a Bill called the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill was prepared, and on 31-12-1951 it was approved by the Rajpramukh and reserved for the consideration of the President."}}, {"text": "31-12-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18316, "end_char": 18326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question of legislation on the subject was taken up by the Government of Rajasthan in 1951, and eventually a Bill called the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill was prepared, and on 31-12-1951 it was approved by the Rajpramukh and reserved for the consideration of the President."}}, {"text": "21-1-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18418, "end_char": 18427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21-1-1952 the President withheld his assent from the Bill, and in communicating this decision, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India informed the Rajasthan Government that if certain amendments wete made in the Bill as presented and a fresh Bill submitted, the President would be willing to reconsider the matter."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18574, "end_char": 18594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21-1-1952 the President withheld his assent from the Bill, and in communicating this decision, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India informed the Rajasthan Government that if certain amendments wete made in the Bill as presented and a fresh Bill submitted, the President would be willing to reconsider the matter."}}, {"text": "Section 21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19089, "end_char": 19102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19524, "end_char": 19535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19879, "end_char": 19889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20119, "end_char": 20130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20310, "end_char": 20326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20537, "end_char": 20550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20601, "end_char": 20611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20650, "end_char": 20660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20988, "end_char": 20998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J'mkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21550, "end_char": 21561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J'mkatarama\n\n\"\"-\".1\"' J.\n\nTlflllatTA-\n\nSingfiji\n\nSlilll of Rqj011/um\n\nYm.tatMamd\n\nA.UM]·\n\nover various parts of Hindusthan were compelled by pressure from the victorious Muhammadan invaders to retreat to the regions to the southwest guarded by the Aravali Hills and interspersed with deserts which if less hospitable were also less vulnerable, and there established several independent kingdoms."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22057, "end_char": 22062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period which followed the foundation of these States was marked by incessant wars, the powerful Sultans of Delhi making determined efforts to subjugate the Rajput princes and the latter offering stubborn and more or less successful resistance thereto."}}, {"text": "Vide Aitchison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22935, "end_char": 22949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Aitchison's Treaties, Volume III)."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22999, "end_char": 23017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By these treaties, the British Government accepted their status as independent rulers reserving to themselves Defence, External Relations and Communications and such other matters as might be agreed upon."}}, {"text": "Lee Warner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23266, "end_char": 23276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relationship thus created was one of \"subordinate union\" as it was termed by Mr. Lee Warner, the princes being recognised as Sovereigns and they acknowledging the suzerainty of the British. ("}}, {"text": "15-8-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23426, "end_char": 23435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-8-1947 India became independent, and the paramountcy of the British Crown over the States ceased."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23436, "end_char": 23441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-8-1947 India became independent, and the paramountcy of the British Crown over the States ceased."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23998, "end_char": 24007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The number of States which had been recognised as independent prior to 15-8-1947 was 552 excluding Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Junagadh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24009, "end_char": 24017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The number of States which had been recognised as independent prior to 15-8-1947 was 552 excluding Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24022, "end_char": 24029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The number of States which had been recognised as independent prior to 15-8-1947 was 552 excluding Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24708, "end_char": 24717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the Unions thus newly formed was Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Banswara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24838, "end_char": 24846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Bundi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24848, "end_char": 24853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Dungarpur Jhalawar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24855, "end_char": 24873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Kishengarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24875, "end_char": 24885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Kotah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24887, "end_char": 24892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Pratapgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24894, "end_char": 24904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Shahpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24906, "end_char": 24914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Tonk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24919, "end_char": 24923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine of them, rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk-entered into an agreement in March 1948 merging their States in a single unit called the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "18-4-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25081, "end_char": 25090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ruler of Mewar joined this Union on 18-4-1948, and the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmere on 30-3-1949."}}, {"text": "Jaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25110, "end_char": 25116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ruler of Mewar joined this Union on 18-4-1948, and the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmere on 30-3-1949."}}, {"text": "Bikaner", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25127, "end_char": 25134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ruler of Mewar joined this Union on 18-4-1948, and the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmere on 30-3-1949."}}, {"text": "Jaisalmere", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25139, "end_char": 25149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ruler of Mewar joined this Union on 18-4-1948, and the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmere on 30-3-1949."}}, {"text": "30-3-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25153, "end_char": 25162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ruler of Mewar joined this Union on 18-4-1948, and the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmere on 30-3-1949."}}, {"text": "Alwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25179, "end_char": 25184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949."}}, {"text": "Bharatpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25186, "end_char": 25195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949."}}, {"text": "Dholpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25197, "end_char": 25204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949."}}, {"text": "Karauli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25209, "end_char": 25216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949."}}, {"text": "18-3-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25246, "end_char": 25255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25312, "end_char": 25327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949."}}, {"text": "15-5-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25331, "end_char": 25340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli who had formed themselves on 18-3-1948 as Matsya Union dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25435, "end_char": 25460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The constitution of the United State of Rajasthan as it finally emerged is to be found in the Covenant entered into by the 14 rulers on 30-3-1949."}}, {"text": "VenlcaJarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25943, "end_char": 25955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Article II, the Covenanting States agreed \"to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a common executive legisla- 2-83 S, C. India/59\n\nThakur Amar\n\n/higkji\n\nStot1 of Rajasthan\n\nVenlcaJarama\n\nA)'J'ar J.\n\nT /r4l; ur Amat\n\n5U.ghji\n\nState of Rajast/urn\n\nVmkatardma\n\nA\"•r J.\n\nture and judiciary, by the name of the United State of Rajasthan\"."}}, {"text": "State of Rajast", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25995, "end_char": 26010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Article II, the Covenanting States agreed \"to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a common executive legisla- 2-83 S, C. India/59\n\nThakur Amar\n\n/higkji\n\nStot1 of Rajasthan\n\nVenlcaJarama\n\nA)'J'ar J.\n\nT /r4l; ur Amat\n\n5U.ghji\n\nState of Rajast/urn\n\nVmkatardma\n\nA\"•r J.\n\nture and judiciary, by the name of the United State of Rajasthan\".", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "United State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26409, "end_char": 26421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article VI(2) provides that the ruler of each Covenanting State shall \"make over the administration of his State to the Rajpramukh, and thereupon all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the ruler which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting States shall vest in the United State and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder."}}, {"text": "Legislative Assembly of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27461, "end_char": 27494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article X(3) was subsequently modified by substituting for the words \"Until a Constitution so framed comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Rajpramukh\", the words \"Until the Legislative Assembly of Rajasthan has been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of the Constitution of India\"."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27592, "end_char": 27613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28310, "end_char": 28331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26-1-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28355, "end_char": 28364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are the material provisions of the Constitution which was in force in the United State of Rajasthan before the Constitution of India came into operation on 26-1-1950."}}, {"text": "Article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28367, "end_char": 28378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28492, "end_char": 28506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29188, "end_char": 29199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29641, "end_char": 29652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30510, "end_char": 30526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that the legislative authority of the Rajpramukh was only to \"make and promulgate Ordinance'', that it is a limited power conferred on him to be exercised in case of emergency pending the constitution of popular legislature, and that accordingly he was not a \"legislative authority\" for the purpose of article 385.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Cliatterjee"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30829, "end_char": 30840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30918, "end_char": 30947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30955, "end_char": 30976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 42 and 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30979, "end_char": 30997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 123 and 213", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31230, "end_char": 31250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33359, "end_char": 33369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33479, "end_char": 33492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of RqjaJt!ian", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34700, "end_char": 34719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That power is purely an executive one, and has nothing to do with the legislative power of the ruler, which\n\nTluzkurAmat\n\nSinghji\n\n\"4 State of RqjaJt!ian\n\nVmkatar111M\n\n.,", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35354, "end_char": 35365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36022, "end_char": 36033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36452, "end_char": 36463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36500, "end_char": 36511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37169, "end_char": 37180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37235, "end_char": 37246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 238(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37327, "end_char": 37341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37350, "end_char": 37361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37528, "end_char": 37539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37741, "end_char": 37752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37889, "end_char": 37900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37961, "end_char": 37972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38134, "end_char": 38145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 238(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38329, "end_char": 38343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38416, "end_char": 38427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38502, "end_char": 38513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38556, "end_char": 38567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38814, "end_char": 38827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of Mr. Frank Anthony that the non-inclusion of the body of article 200 among the articles excluded from application to Part B States under article 212-A(l) imposes by implication a limitation on the power of the Rajpramukh to enact laws unless they are passed by Legislative Assemblies is\n\nT,_,,,~J\n\nSitlP, ii ,,.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38866, "end_char": 38877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38946, "end_char": 38957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39327, "end_char": 39337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must accordingly hold that the Rajpramukh had legislative competence to enact the law under challenge.", "canonical_name": "Rajpramukh"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39583, "end_char": 39594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "27-12-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39942, "end_char": 39952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Council of Ministers on 27-12-1951 and sent to the Rajpramukh with the following note by the Secretary:\n\n\"The Bill is submitted for gracious approval and signature and for reserving it for the consideration of the President\"."}}, {"text": "6-2-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40535, "end_char": 40543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, a fresh Bill was prepared and submitted to the Rajpramukh on 6-2-1952 with the following note by the Chief Secretary:\n\n\"The Bill as finally agreed to is now submitted to His Highness the Rajpramukh for his approval and for reserving the same for the consideration of the President\"."}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40986, "end_char": 40997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41029, "end_char": 41040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41245, "end_char": 41256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41622, "end_char": 41633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42132, "end_char": 42137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They rely strongly on the statements in t.he affidavit of Sri Joshi, the Jagir Commissioner, that the Bill was drafted in the Ministerial Department in accordance with the rules framed under article 166(3), approved by the Council of Ministers and sent on to the Rajpramukh for his assent."}}, {"text": "article 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42261, "end_char": 42275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42785, "end_char": 42796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43969, "end_char": 43977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued by Mr. Agarwala that when the word \"approve\" was used in the Constitution as in articles 146 and 147, it signified that there were two authorities, one of which was authorised to confirm or sanction what the other had authority to do, and that when the latter was not authorised to do the act, there could be no approval of it by the former; and he also relied on the statement of the law in Corpus Juris, Volume I, page 1365 that the word 'approve' does not mean the same thing as 'adopt'."}}, {"text": "articles 146 and 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44042, "end_char": 44062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44617, "end_char": 44628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45018, "end_char": 45029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45502, "end_char": 45513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46287, "end_char": 46293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be mentioned in this connection that Mr.\n\nPathak for the respondent took up the position that the function of the Rajpramukh at the stage of preparation of the Bill was purely executive, and that it became legislative only when he had to decide whether he would assent to the Bill or withhold his assent therefrom, or reserve it for the consideration of the President, and that by leaving it to the Ministers to prepare the Bill there had been no violation of article\n\n212-A(2)."}}, {"text": "article\n\n212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46705, "end_char": 46717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46838, "end_char": 46849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47110, "end_char": 47121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47466, "end_char": 47477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47523, "end_char": 47534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Trivedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47981, "end_char": 47988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued by Mr. Trivedi that under the proviso to article 201, the President had no power to return a Money Bill for further consideration by a House of Legislature, that his order dated 21-1-1952 returning the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill for further consideration was ultra vires as it was a .Money Bill, that the subsequent presentation of the Bill to him on 8-2-1952 was unauthorised, and that the impugned Act had therefore not been duly passed."}}, {"text": "article 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48015, "end_char": 48026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48484, "end_char": 48495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48517, "end_char": 48528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49401, "end_char": 49412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49732, "end_char": 49748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51018, "end_char": 51028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51103, "end_char": 51116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51538, "end_char": 51551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51821, "end_char": 51831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51881, "end_char": 51891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52020, "end_char": 52033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thakur AllllW", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52043, "end_char": 52056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 26(1) enacts:\n\nThakur AllllW\n\nSing/Ui\n\nY. !;"}}, {"text": "Slall of Rajasl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52146, "end_char": 52161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tliolcur A.mar\n\nSingh ft • v.\n\nSlall of Rajasl,_\n\nY enkalarama\n\n41JllT J.\n\n\"Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Government shall be liable to pay every jagirdar whose Jagir lands are resumed under section 21 such compensation as shall be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in the second schedule\"."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52325, "end_char": 52335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule III to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52901, "end_char": 52924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Venkatachar Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53349, "end_char": 53370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These, it is argued, were the views expressed by the Venkatachar Committee in its Report on Land Tenures in Rajasthan, and they formed the basis of the impugned Act."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54133, "end_char": 54143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54170, "end_char": 54183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54653, "end_char": 54666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54830, "end_char": 54846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56412, "end_char": 56422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57046, "end_char": 57059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57169, "end_char": 57184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58042, "end_char": 58058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59582, "end_char": 59595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State ef Rajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60855, "end_char": 60873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thalcw .Amar\n\nSing/iii ..\n\nState ef Rajasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\n.A_l!)'OT J.\n\n1950'\n\nThakur A\"\"\"\n\nSin.t; hJi\n\nSlate of RajaJthan\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nproperties held by them the impugned Act is not saved by article 31-A, and that it is void as being in contravention of articles 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61033, "end_char": 61043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61096, "end_char": 61117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61318, "end_char": 61328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61369, "end_char": 61387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61589, "end_char": 61599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61824, "end_char": 61834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hindusthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 62063, "end_char": 62073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been already mentioned that during the period of the Muhammadan invasion the Rajput princes of Hindusthan migrated to Rajputana and founded new kingdoms."}}, {"text": "Baden- Powell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63457, "end_char": 63470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And the quoted the following passage in Baden- Powell on Land Systems of British India, Volume I, page 257 as supporting him:\n\n\"While a strict control lasted, the jagirdar was bound to take no more than the sum assigned ; and if more came into his hands, he had rigidly to account for the surplus to the State treasury\"."}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65599, "end_char": 65609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SinghJi\n\nSl<>ll of RajaJlhan\n\nV nA:.ataroma\n\nA.yy..-J.\n\nthe territory is held on one of the following tenures,\n\nviz, Jagir, Jivka, Sansan, Doli, Bhum, Inam, Pasaita and Nankar\" (Vide Erskine's Rajputana Gazetteers, Volume III-A, Chapter\n\nXIII Land Revenue and Tenures), Sri Amar Singh who presented the case of his father Zorawar Singh, a leading Bhoomichara of Mallani, with conspicuous ability, argued that jagir was used in the passage in its specific sense, and that in its generic sense, it would comprise all the other tenures mentioned above."}}, {"text": "Zorawar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65647, "end_char": 65660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SinghJi\n\nSl<>ll of RajaJlhan\n\nV nA:.ataroma\n\nA.yy..-J.\n\nthe territory is held on one of the following tenures,\n\nviz, Jagir, Jivka, Sansan, Doli, Bhum, Inam, Pasaita and Nankar\" (Vide Erskine's Rajputana Gazetteers, Volume III-A, Chapter\n\nXIII Land Revenue and Tenures), Sri Amar Singh who presented the case of his father Zorawar Singh, a leading Bhoomichara of Mallani, with conspicuous ability, argued that jagir was used in the passage in its specific sense, and that in its generic sense, it would comprise all the other tenures mentioned above."}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65926, "end_char": 65938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66137, "end_char": 66151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66574, "end_char": 66586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66663, "end_char": 66675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66763, "end_char": 66773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67138, "end_char": 67148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67492, "end_char": 67502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68049, "end_char": 68059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shekhwati", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68471, "end_char": 68480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under category\n\n(1) fall the estates held by (a) Bhomicharas of Marwar, (b) Bhomats of Mewar, (c) Tikanadars of Shekhwati, and ( d) Subeguzars of Jaipur."}}, {"text": "Shekhawati", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68672, "end_char": 68682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bhomichara tenure is to be found in Jaisalmere, in Shekhawati in Jaipur and in Marwar. ("}}, {"text": "Rao Siaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68930, "end_char": 68939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its history goes back to the year 1212 A.D. when the clan of Rathors led by Rao Siaji, grandson of King Jayachander of Kanouj ihvaded Rajputana, subjugated the territories now known as Mallani, Y eshwantpura and Sanchora and established itself there."}}, {"text": "Biram Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69167, "end_char": 69176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some two centuries later, a section of the Rathors headed by Biram Deo who was the younger brother of Mallinath, the ruling prince of Mallani, expanded eastwards, and established the kingdom of Jodhpur."}}, {"text": "Mallinath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69208, "end_char": 69217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some two centuries later, a section of the Rathors headed by Biram Deo who was the younger brother of Mallinath, the ruling prince of Mallani, expanded eastwards, and established the kingdom of Jodhpur.", "canonical_name": "Mallinath"}}, {"text": "Mallani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69240, "end_char": 69247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some two centuries later, a section of the Rathors headed by Biram Deo who was the younger brother of Mallinath, the ruling prince of Mallani, expanded eastwards, and established the kingdom of Jodhpur.", "canonical_name": "Mallinath"}}, {"text": "Mallani", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 69346, "end_char": 69353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The elder branch which continued in Mallani, Yeshwantpura and Sanchora gradually sank in power."}}, {"text": "Yeshwantpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 69355, "end_char": 69367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The elder branch which continued in Mallani, Yeshwantpura and Sanchora gradually sank in power."}}, {"text": "Sanchora", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 69372, "end_char": 69380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The elder branch which continued in Mallani, Yeshwantpura and Sanchora gradually sank in power."}}, {"text": "odhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70717, "end_char": 70723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The annual tribute was, during this period, collected by the British and paid to the J odhpur State."}}, {"text": "Malcolm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70798, "end_char": 70805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Writing on the status of the Bhomicharas during this period, Major Malcolm remarked in his report dated 1849 thus:\n\n\" .... though the British Government had established a claim to the District themselves, consequent on having reduced them to order and obedience, it was willing, out of kindness and consideration to His Highness, to waive its just rights and to acknoUJ!edge His Highness as entitled to sovereignty over those districts, and the tribute they might yield ...... \" In 1891 the British withdrew from the administration of the Province, and handed it over to the Maharajah of Jodhpur who thereafter continued to govern it as part of his Dominions."}}, {"text": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71431, "end_char": 71448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts, it is contended by Mr. N. C.\n\nChatterjee and Shri Amar Singh that Bhomicharas are not holders of jagirs or other similar grants within the meaning of article 31-A, because a jagir could be created only by grant by the ruler, and that the petitioners could not be said to hold under a grant from J odhpur, because they had obtained the terri• tory by right of conquest long before Jodhpur established its suzerainty, and even prior to its foundation as a State, and that though they lost their political independence when Jodhpur established its overlordship, they had not lost their right to property, that their status was that of semi-independent chiefs, not jagirdars, and that \"Foujbal\" was paid by them not on account of land revenue but by way of tribute.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Cliatterjee"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71558, "end_char": 71568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J odhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 71703, "end_char": 71711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts, it is contended by Mr. N. C.\n\nChatterjee and Shri Amar Singh that Bhomicharas are not holders of jagirs or other similar grants within the meaning of article 31-A, because a jagir could be created only by grant by the ruler, and that the petitioners could not be said to hold under a grant from J odhpur, because they had obtained the terri• tory by right of conquest long before Jodhpur established its suzerainty, and even prior to its foundation as a State, and that though they lost their political independence when Jodhpur established its overlordship, they had not lost their right to property, that their status was that of semi-independent chiefs, not jagirdars, and that \"Foujbal\" was paid by them not on account of land revenue but by way of tribute."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72459, "end_char": 72469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73591, "end_char": 73598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Vajesing; i foravar Sing; i and others v. Secretary of State (1) Lord Dunedin observed :\n\n\"When a territory is acquired by a sovereign State for the first time that is an act of State."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 74026, "end_char": 74044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ThalcUf' Amat\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\n4J?yar].", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "L. R. 68 I.A. 109", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 76211, "end_char": 76228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L. R. 51 I. A. 357", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 76242, "end_char": 76260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhoniicharas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76571, "end_char": 76583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A subject might occupy an exalted position d enjoY' special privileges, but he is nonetheless a , subject; and even if the status of Bhoniicharas might be considered superior to that of ordinary jagirdars, they were also subjects.", "canonical_name": "Bhoniicharas"}}, {"text": "sec. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77120, "end_char": 77128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Raj1Ul1-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78401, "end_char": 78418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that in the agreement by which the British handed over the administration they inserted a condition that the appointment of the chief officers for Mallani and imposition of any new tax or cess other than Foujbal by the State of Jodhpur should be made\n\nThakr.r Ama\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Raj1Ul1-\n\nY 1nkalar1JtTU1\n\n..4yy411' J.\n\nThalcur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nSlate of Raja•tlum\n\nYtnkatarama\n\n..War J.\n\nwith the approval of the.", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "24-11-1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79023, "end_char": 79033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 24-11-1922 \"The Marwar Court of Wards Act, 1923\"."}}, {"text": "Marwar Court of Wards Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79039, "end_char": 79070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79274, "end_char": 79285, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "was again a Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79464, "end_char": 79487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Marwar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 79656, "end_char": 79671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is thus plain that the State of Marwar was exercising full legislative control over the Bhomichara area."}}, {"text": "Bhomichara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 79721, "end_char": 79731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is thus plain that the State of Marwar was exercising full legislative control over the Bhomichara area."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80914, "end_char": 80924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But he contended that the definition of jagirdars as including Bhomicharas in the several Acts referred to above was only for the purpose of those Act", "statute": "But he contended that the definition of jagirdars as including Bhomicharas in the several Acts referred to above was only for the purpose of those Act"}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81181, "end_char": 81192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But he contended that the definition of jagirdars as including Bhomicharas in the several Acts referred to above was only for the purpose of those Act", "statute": "But he contended that the definition of jagirdars as including Bhomicharas in the several Acts referred to above was only for the purpose of those Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81378, "end_char": 81388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81434, "end_char": 81445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 82817, "end_char": 82837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState ef Rajastluzn\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJvar\n\nTMhr~\n\nSinghfi ...\n\nSlatl of Rajasthon\n\nV tnAotarama\n\n.fJ'J\"•r J.\n\nfor the legislative authority of Marwar to define and limit the rights which the petitioners possessed in Bhomichara lands.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 82839, "end_char": 82844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState ef Rajastluzn\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJvar\n\nTMhr~\n\nSinghfi ...\n\nSlatl of Rajasthon\n\nV tnAotarama\n\n.fJ'J\"•r J.\n\nfor the legislative authority of Marwar to define and limit the rights which the petitioners possessed in Bhomichara lands."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83241, "end_char": 83251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Laws of England would be known as quasicontracts under the Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84439, "end_char": 84517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84685, "end_char": 84695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Laws of England would be known as quasicontracts under the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Laws of England would be known as quasicontracts under the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85168, "end_char": 85179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Laws of England would be known as quasicontracts under the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Laws of England would be known as quasicontracts under the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86242, "end_char": 86253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Drake Brockman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86539, "end_char": 86553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sir Drake Brockman's Report of the Settlement Operations, 1921 to 1924, he refers to the Bhomichara jagir as \"survival from a time antecedent to the establishment of the Raj\"."}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86833, "end_char": 86845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Marwar Court of Wards Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86853, "end_char": 86884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86979, "end_char": 86996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86998, "end_char": 87008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the Customs Act, 1938", "statute": "In the Customs Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 3(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87116, "end_char": 87128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the Customs Act, 1938", "statute": "In the Customs Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "6-4-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87473, "end_char": 87481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XL of 1949 were part of a comprehensive scheme of legislation, that both of them came into force on 6-4-1949 and that section 4(11) of Act No."}}, {"text": "section 4(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87491, "end_char": 87504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the Customs Act, 1938", "statute": "In the Customs Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87697, "end_char": 87708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the Customs Act, 1938", "statute": "In the Customs Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87762, "end_char": 87773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the Customs Act, 1938", "statute": "In the Customs Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88047, "end_char": 88058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88065, "end_char": 88076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88157, "end_char": 88168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88409, "end_char": 88420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88580, "end_char": 88591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88824, "end_char": 88835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88976, "end_char": 88987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 89463, "end_char": 89470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that the Act was one to declare and consolidate the law, and that such an Act should not be construed as altel'ing the existing law; further that clear and unambiguous language was necessary before a subject could be deprivd of his vested rights, and that in case Gf doubt the statute should be construed so as not to interfere with the existing rights; and the statements of law from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 20 and 2'i\nand Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, pages 106, 107 ~~ 111 were quoted in support of the above propos1t10ns."}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90121, "end_char": 90132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhom", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 90486, "end_char": 90490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that Bhom, Sasan and Doli :a, re held under grant from the State. (", "canonical_name": "Bhoniicharas"}}, {"text": "Sasan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 90492, "end_char": 90497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that Bhom, Sasan and Doli :a, re held under grant from the State. ("}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90607, "end_char": 90618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91087, "end_char": 91098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91138, "end_char": 91148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91242, "end_char": 91256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91328, "end_char": 91338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91349, "end_char": 91363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91425, "end_char": 91437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91575, "end_char": 91588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Walter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93042, "end_char": 93048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the Gazetteer of Mallani by Major Walter at page 94 that the Foujbal amount has been apportioned among the several holders, and it is contended for the respondent that as this apportionment has been communicated to the Jodhpur Durbar and accepted by it and acted upon, there has been separate assessment of revenue."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93421, "end_char": 93431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93684, "end_char": 93694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tod", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94356, "end_char": 94359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The origin of Bhom tenure is thus stated by Tod in his Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan :\n\n\"It is stated in the historical annals of this countrv that the ancient clans .... had ceased on the rising g; eatness of the subsequent new divisions of clans, to hold the higher grades of rank; and had, in fact, merged into the general military landed proprietors of this country under the term bhumiq,, a most expressive and comprehensive name, importing absolute identity with the soil: bhum meaning 'land' .... These Bhumias, the scions of .the earliest princes, are to be met with .in yarious parts of Mewar ...... These, the allodial tenantry of our feudal system, form a considerable body in many districts, armed with matchlock, sword, and shield .... All this feudal militia pay a quit-rent to the crown, and perform local but limited service on the; frontier garrison; and upon invasion, when the Kher is called out, the whole are at the disposaJ of the prince on furnishing rations only."}}, {"text": "Bhomichara~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 95582, "end_char": 95593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt would .appear from this account that the position of the Bhumias in Mewar is in many respects similar to that of Bhomichara~ in Marwar.", "canonical_name": "Bhoniicharas"}}, {"text": "Thakur Amar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 96052, "end_char": 96063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They represent presumably a section which had occupied the territory by conquest at an earlier stage and when later the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur established their sovereignty over Mewar, they were allowed to continue in possession of their lands as subjects of the new State, Their position is not even as strong as that of the Bhomicharas of Marwar, because it was a condition of the tenure under which they held that 4 -83 S. C. India/59\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\ntat1 of RqjMthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThakur :4.mar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rqjaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya, J.\n\nthey had to render military service when called upon and also to pay quit rent.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96108, "end_char": 96113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They represent presumably a section which had occupied the territory by conquest at an earlier stage and when later the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur established their sovereignty over Mewar, they were allowed to continue in possession of their lands as subjects of the new State, Their position is not even as strong as that of the Bhomicharas of Marwar, because it was a condition of the tenure under which they held that 4 -83 S. C. India/59\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\ntat1 of RqjMthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThakur :4.mar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rqjaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya, J.\n\nthey had to render military service when called upon and also to pay quit rent.", "canonical_name": "A_yyar"}}, {"text": "State of Rqjaslhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96142, "end_char": 96160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They represent presumably a section which had occupied the territory by conquest at an earlier stage and when later the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur established their sovereignty over Mewar, they were allowed to continue in possession of their lands as subjects of the new State, Their position is not even as strong as that of the Bhomicharas of Marwar, because it was a condition of the tenure under which they held that 4 -83 S. C. India/59\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\ntat1 of RqjMthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThakur :4.mar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rqjaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya, J.\n\nthey had to render military service when called upon and also to pay quit rent.", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama\n\nAyya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96162, "end_char": 96179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They represent presumably a section which had occupied the territory by conquest at an earlier stage and when later the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur established their sovereignty over Mewar, they were allowed to continue in possession of their lands as subjects of the new State, Their position is not even as strong as that of the Bhomicharas of Marwar, because it was a condition of the tenure under which they held that 4 -83 S. C. India/59\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\ntat1 of RqjMthan\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThakur :4.mar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rqjaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya, J.\n\nthey had to render military service when called upon and also to pay quit rent.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAit"}}, {"text": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96444, "end_char": 96544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96706, "end_char": 96716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "sections 27, 106(1) and 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96785, "end_char": 96812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96815, "end_char": 96825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "Section 106(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96985, "end_char": 96999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97444, "end_char": 97455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Pathak that whatev-er status the Ehomats might have had prior to the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97792, "end_char": 97804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97940, "end_char": 97950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97992, "end_char": 98006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98883, "end_char": 98893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "23-5-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 99040, "end_char": 99049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V of 1947 was void, because on 23-5-1947 a Constitution had been established in Mewar which prnvided that \"no person shall be <leprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law within the territories of Mewar\"."}}, {"text": "Clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99312, "end_char": 99320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15-11-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 99375, "end_char": 99385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V of 1947 which came into force on 15-11-1947 was void as being repugnant thereto."}}, {"text": "Aitchison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103062, "end_char": 103071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts forming the background of the agreements as narrated in Aitchison's Treaties, Vol."}}, {"text": "Government of Mewar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 103248, "end_char": 103267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 to 13 are that for sometime prior to the treaty which was entered into by the Maharajah of Udaipur with the British in 1818, the authority of the Government of Mewar was rather low."}}, {"text": "Maharajah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103506, "end_char": 103515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This led to considerable friction between the Maharajah and the Chiefs and after the conclusion of the treaty in 1818, the Political Agent Mr. Tod, with a view to restore good relationship between the Maharajah and his Chiefs, prevailed upon them to settle their differences, and the kowls relied on by Mr. Anthony are the outcome of his efforts.", "canonical_name": "Maharaj Kumar"}}, {"text": "Anthony", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103767, "end_char": 103774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This led to considerable friction between the Maharajah and the Chiefs and after the conclusion of the treaty in 1818, the Political Agent Mr. Tod, with a view to restore good relationship between the Maharajah and his Chiefs, prevailed upon them to settle their differences, and the kowls relied on by Mr. Anthony are the outcome of his efforts."}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104422, "end_char": 104432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104460, "end_char": 104471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104577, "end_char": 104587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104733, "end_char": 104743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Jaipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 105545, "end_char": 105560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His contention is that he is a ruler with semi-sovereign status sub-· ject only to the obligation to render military service and to pay tribute called Maumla to the State of Jaipur, that he is accordingly a Maumlaguzar and not jagirdar, and that he is not grantee from the State."}}, {"text": "Wills", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105725, "end_char": 105730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The history of these estates is narrated in great detail by Mr. Wills in his report on \"The Land Tenures and Special Powers of Certain Tikanadars of Jaipur State, 1933\"."}}, {"text": "Jaipur State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105810, "end_char": 105822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The history of these estates is narrated in great detail by Mr. Wills in his report on \"The Land Tenures and Special Powers of Certain Tikanadars of Jaipur State, 1933\"."}}, {"text": "Sawai Jai Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105968, "end_char": 105983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the period of their decline, King Sawai Jai Singh who ruled over Jaipur from 1700-1743 with great distinction acquired them from the Moghul Emperors on izara, and in his turn granted them on sub-leases or izaras to various persons mostly his clansmen, on condition that in addition to the payment of izara amount fixed they should render military service to the rulers.", "canonical_name": "Sawai Jai Singh"}}, {"text": "Moghul Empire", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 106480, "end_char": 106493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In course of time, when tbe hold of the Moghul Empire on the outlying territories became weak, the Jaipur rulers assumed practically sovereign powers over the izara lands, which came to be ."}}, {"text": "Jaipur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 106539, "end_char": 106545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In course of time, when tbe hold of the Moghul Empire on the outlying territories became weak, the Jaipur rulers assumed practically sovereign powers over the izara lands, which came to be ."}}, {"text": "Shekhwati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107260, "end_char": 107269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "plan succeeded, Jaipur concluded a treaty with the British which re-- cognised its position as sovereign of the whole State\n\nincluding Shekhwati. \""}}, {"text": "Maharaja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107300, "end_char": 107308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first duty urged on the Maharaja after the conclusion of the treaty was the resumption of the lands usurped by the nobles and the reduction of the nobles to their proper relation of subordination to the Maharaja.", "canonical_name": "Maharaj Kumar"}}, {"text": "David Ochterlo11y", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107518, "end_char": 107535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Through the mediation of Sir David Ochterlo11y Agreements were entered into in 1819 similar to those made at Udaipur."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108967, "end_char": 108977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 4(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109039, "end_char": 109052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109269, "end_char": 109281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 109370, "end_char": 109388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinglifi\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyar J•\n\nThakur A...,\n\nSinghji\n\nS'at1 of Rqjasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA)'Jar J.\n\nAccording to this definition, the properties in question would be 'estate' as defined in article 31-A of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109567, "end_char": 109577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110683, "end_char": 110693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Isarda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 111074, "end_char": 111080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "estate of Isarda in Jaipur It is stated that in the beginning of the 18th Century his ancestor Mohansinghj i migrated from Bagri, settled in the hilly regions at Sarsop, built a fortress at Isarda and , established an independent principality In 1751 the ruler of Isarda acknowledged the suz~ rainty of the Maharaja of Jaipur who, in turn, ''recognised the ancestor of the petitioner as Subcguzar\", subject to a liability to pay tribute every year to Jaipur. ("}}, {"text": "Bhomich", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 111432, "end_char": 111439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of this arrangement was, as in the case of Bhomich; iras.", "canonical_name": "Bhoniicharas"}}, {"text": "Section 4(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111606, "end_char": 111619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nizamat Sawai Madh0pur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111985, "end_char": 112007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the tenure is called 'Sube', its holder is caUed not Subedar which has a different meaning but Subeguz:u.\n\nIn the Administration Report of Jaipur 1947-48, Sube is described as follows : \"Suba is a tenure peculiar to Nizamat Sawai Madh0pur."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112295, "end_char": 112305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raja Jaisingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112725, "end_char": 112738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A special contention was raised with reference to 12 villages which are stated to have been purchased in 1730 by Raja Jaisingh the then holder of Isarda for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mohansinghji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112928, "end_char": 112940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isarda was a new State founded by Mohansinghji, and its area was extended from time to time by incorporation of fresh villages, and when in 1751 the Chief acknowledged the suzerainty of J:i.ipur and held the estate as subeguzar under him, that title must have related to the entire estate including these villages, and there is therefore no ground for treating them differently from the rest."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113648, "end_char": 113658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113768, "end_char": 113788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajas than:\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA'!)'ar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nBut what is the case put forward in the petitions as regards the other villages?", "canonical_name": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji"}}, {"text": "State of Rajas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 113790, "end_char": 113804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajas than:\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA'!)'ar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nBut what is the case put forward in the petitions as regards the other villages?", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama\n\nA'!)'ar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113812, "end_char": 113857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajas than:\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA'!)'ar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nBut what is the case put forward in the petitions as regards the other villages?"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113879, "end_char": 113896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajas than:\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA'!)'ar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nBut what is the case put forward in the petitions as regards the other villages?", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAit"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114113, "end_char": 114123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114376, "end_char": 114388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114451, "end_char": 114461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bagina", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 114566, "end_char": 114572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "472 of 1954 in which the petitioner owns the village of Bagina as \"Subeguzar\" and the village of Siras as jagirdar."}}, {"text": "Siras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 114607, "end_char": 114612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "472 of 1954 in which the petitioner owns the village of Bagina as \"Subeguzar\" and the village of Siras as jagirdar."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114789, "end_char": 114799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Yeshwantgarh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114895, "end_char": 114907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "391 of 1954 relates to the estate of Yeshwantgarh in the State of Alwar."}}, {"text": "11-8-1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 114950, "end_char": 114959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was settled on 11-8-1941 by its then ruler on his son for maintenance."}}, {"text": "25-8-1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 115087, "end_char": 115096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grant is described in the deed as jagir, and the Gazette Notification dated 25-8-1941 publishing it states :\n\n\"\"' e are also faced with the problem of arranging for our second Maharaj Kumar, a Jagir, which in the matter of size and powers, should be on a much higher fonting than the existing Jagirs."}}, {"text": "Maharaj Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115187, "end_char": 115200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grant is described in the deed as jagir, and the Gazette Notification dated 25-8-1941 publishing it states :\n\n\"\"' e are also faced with the problem of arranging for our second Maharaj Kumar, a Jagir, which in the matter of size and powers, should be on a much higher fonting than the existing Jagirs.", "canonical_name": "Maharaj Kumar"}}, {"text": "Raja Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115563, "end_char": 115573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly with the object of creating a new J agir for him, we have today gifted to him in perpetuity and from genera ti on to generation, all the villages included in the Thikana of Thana together with ali other properties enjoyed by the deceased Raja Sahib during his lifetime."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116002, "end_char": 116012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116021, "end_char": 116033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116513, "end_char": 116524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116751, "end_char": 116763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116771, "end_char": 116800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116924, "end_char": 116936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939", "statute": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117135, "end_char": 117145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939", "statute": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117211, "end_char": 117221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939", "statute": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117287, "end_char": 117300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939", "statute": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117513, "end_char": 117525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939", "statute": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117795, "end_char": 117807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939", "statute": "the Alwar State Jagir Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118233, "end_char": 118246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118948, "end_char": 118960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119063, "end_char": 119076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119361, "end_char": 119377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119471, "end_char": 119481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119744, "end_char": 119754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119833, "end_char": 119846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120247, "end_char": 120257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120719, "end_char": 120730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121048, "end_char": 121060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121366, "end_char": 121376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121423, "end_char": 121433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121717, "end_char": 121727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121912, "end_char": 121921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122053, "end_char": 122063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan\n\nVenkata", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 122807, "end_char": 122834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these admissions, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Frank Anthony based on the narration in Tod's Annals of Rajasthan,\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nVenkata ,,, 1Yya1 •\n\nThak\"Mr Amar Singh1i v.\n\nState of Rajasthan\n\nV enkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nVolume II, pp.", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "Kishangarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 123099, "end_char": 123109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "634 of 1954: In this petition there are 192 petitioners, some of whom are from Kishangarh."}}, {"text": "Kishangarh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 123173, "end_char": 123183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special contention urged as regards the petitioners from Kishangarh is that their properties are not estates according to the law of Kishangarh, and that they are therefore outside article 31-A.\n\nRule 4(1) of the Jagir Rules for the Kishangarh State, 1945, defines a 'jagirdar' as a person who has been granted a village or land as jagir by the Durbar in consideration of his past and future services, and Rule 5 classifies jagirdars into five categories."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123297, "end_char": 123307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123906, "end_char": 123916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124117, "end_char": 124127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pratap Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 124188, "end_char": 124200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is stated that the 128 petitioner, Pratap Singh, does not make any payment in respect of his estate, and that it is not a jagir."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124374, "end_char": 124384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rawat Himmat Singhji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124548, "end_char": 124568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "536 of 1954: The petitioner is the holder of an estate in Mewar known as Bhaisrodgarh Tikana, and he alleges that there was a dispute between Rawat Himmat Singhji the then holder of the estate, and the Maharajah of Udaipur, and that it was settled in March 1855 through the mediation of the then Agent to the Government, Sir M. Montgomery, and that under the terms of the settlement, the Tikana was recognised as the exclusive property of the holder."}}, {"text": "M. Montgomery", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124731, "end_char": 124744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "536 of 1954: The petitioner is the holder of an estate in Mewar known as Bhaisrodgarh Tikana, and he alleges that there was a dispute between Rawat Himmat Singhji the then holder of the estate, and the Maharajah of Udaipur, and that it was settled in March 1855 through the mediation of the then Agent to the Government, Sir M. Montgomery, and that under the terms of the settlement, the Tikana was recognised as the exclusive property of the holder."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125233, "end_char": 125243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125792, "end_char": 125803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125807, "end_char": 125838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125885, "end_char": 125895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126125, "end_char": 126135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "Uniaara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 126202, "end_char": 126209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "483 of 1954 the grant was made by the ruler of Uniaara, and in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Katauli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 126264, "end_char": 126271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "528 of 1954 by the then ruler of Katauli before it was merged in the State of Kotah."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126440, "end_char": 126450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act", "statute": "Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127052, "end_char": 127062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 127094, "end_char": 127104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the general contention that maintenance grants are not within article 31-A, the further argument of Mr. Dadachanji on behalf of these\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghj\n\nv State of Rajastha11!"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 127170, "end_char": 127181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStale of Rajaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA_yyar J.\n\npetitioners is that Lawazma and Kothrikharch are tenures no!", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAit"}}, {"text": "A_yyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127247, "end_char": 127253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStale of Rajaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA_yyar J.\n\npetitioners is that Lawazma and Kothrikharch are tenures no!", "canonical_name": "A_yyar"}}, {"text": "Lawazma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 127278, "end_char": 127285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStale of Rajaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA_yyar J.\n\npetitioners is that Lawazma and Kothrikharch are tenures no!", "canonical_name": "Lawazma"}}, {"text": "Kothrikharch", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 127290, "end_char": 127302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStale of Rajaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA_yyar J.\n\npetitioners is that Lawazma and Kothrikharch are tenures no!", "canonical_name": "Kothrikharch"}}, {"text": "Lawazma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 127670, "end_char": 127677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A gtant can both be a jagir and a maintenance grant, and the fact that it was granted for Lawazma and Kothrikharch does not militate against its being a jagir.", "canonical_name": "Lawazma"}}, {"text": "Kothrikharch", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 127682, "end_char": 127694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A gtant can both be a jagir and a maintenance grant, and the fact that it was granted for Lawazma and Kothrikharch does not militate against its being a jagir.", "canonical_name": "Kothrikharch"}}, {"text": "Kothrikharch", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 127796, "end_char": 127808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was suggested that the question whether Lawazma and Kothrikharch are tenures different from those mentioned in the schedule to the Act might be left open and that the right of the petitioners to establish their contention in other proceedings may be reserved.", "canonical_name": "Kothrikharch"}}, {"text": "Bagri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 128656, "end_char": 128661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "762/- for her maintenance and in lieu of it, the village of Bagri with its hamlets, Anwarpura and Ismailpura, was granted to her by resolution dated 6-3-1948."}}, {"text": "6-3-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 128745, "end_char": 128753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "762/- for her maintenance and in lieu of it, the village of Bagri with its hamlets, Anwarpura and Ismailpura, was granted to her by resolution dated 6-3-1948."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 128864, "end_char": 128875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. K. Kapur who appeared for the petitioner put forward a special contention that the Government was cstopped from resuming the lands.", "canonical_name": "S. K.. Kapur"}}, {"text": "28-11-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 129052, "end_char": 129062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts on which this plea is founded arc that on 28-11-1953 the Secretary to the Government wrote to the Collector of Tonk that the pet1t1oner was not to be disturbed in her enjoyment of the jagir for her lifetime."}}, {"text": "24-11-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 129250, "end_char": 129260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a later communication dated 24-11-1954, however, addressed to the petitioner, the Government expressed its inability to stay resumption, and the argument is that the respondent is estopped from going back on the assurance and undertaking given in the letter dated 28-11-1953."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131073, "end_char": 131083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Doongri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 131138, "end_char": 131145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "371 of 1954 relates to the estate of Doongri in Jaipur, and it is contended that it is not an estate because the liability of the holder is only to pay Naqdirazan, and it is argued that this is not revenue."}}, {"text": "Naqdirazan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 131253, "end_char": 131263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "371 of 1954 relates to the estate of Doongri in Jaipur, and it is contended that it is not an estate because the liability of the holder is only to pay Naqdirazan, and it is argued that this is not revenue."}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132069, "end_char": 132079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Renwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 132150, "end_char": 132156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "375 of 1954 relates to the estate of Renwal, and the special contention raised is that the petitioner pays no revenue but only Naqdirazan."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132438, "end_char": 132448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Khera", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 132614, "end_char": 132619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He describes himself as owner of the properties in Khera as jagirdai-, admits in paras 9, 14, 16 and 19 that the estate is a jagir, and prays for an injunction restraining the State from interfering with his rights as jagirdar."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132821, "end_char": 132831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133949, "end_char": 133959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134198, "end_char": 134208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135327, "end_char": 135340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135437, "end_char": 135447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135485, "end_char": 135498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 136162, "end_char": 136202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint of the petitioner is that the compensation provided by the rules is inadequate, being far less than the market value of the estate, that rule 2 takes into account only the income which was being actually received from the properties and omits altogether potential income which might arise in future, as for example, from vacant house sites and unopened\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nStat• of Rqjasthan\n\nY1nkatara111J1\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThakur Amar Singhji v.\n\nState of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136369, "end_char": 136382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136513, "end_char": 136523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137030, "end_char": 137040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31(4), 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137111, "end_char": 137129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137889, "end_char": 137899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138460, "end_char": 138470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139737, "end_char": 139747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139820, "end_char": 139830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140157, "end_char": 140170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140240, "end_char": 140250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140750, "end_char": 140760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140800, "end_char": 140810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141051, "end_char": 141061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 20 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141438, "end_char": 141455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141458, "end_char": 141468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141821, "end_char": 141831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141890, "end_char": 141899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142211, "end_char": 142221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142253, "end_char": 142263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142842, "end_char": 142852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "11-12-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 143265, "end_char": 143275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27 of 1948, that by its judgment dated 11-12-1951 the High Court of Rajasthan had held that."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 143280, "end_char": 143303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27 of 1948, that by its judgment dated 11-12-1951 the High Court of Rajasthan had held that."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143349, "end_char": 143359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143708, "end_char": 143718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143931, "end_char": 143941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Khandela", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 144798, "end_char": 144806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "392 of 1954: The subject:matter of this petition is the estate of Khandela in the former State of Jaipur."}}, {"text": "Raja Lakshmansingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145044, "end_char": 145062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThakur .Amar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rqjaslhan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya; J.\n\nwas settled by the Maharajah of Jaipur on Raja Abayasingh and Raja Lakshmansingh on izara i•timrar on an annual assessment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145297, "end_char": 145303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention that is urged on his behalf by Mr. Isaacs is that the Act does not apply to him, because he is neither a J agirdar nor a holder of any of the tenures mentioned in schedule I to the Act."}}, {"text": "Sawai J aisingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145653, "end_char": 145668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1725 Sawai J aisingh of Amber obtained an izara of Khandela from the Moghul Emperor, and the Raisalot-holders became subordinate to him.", "canonical_name": "Sawai Jai Singh"}}, {"text": "Raisalot family", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 145798, "end_char": 145813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1797 the Raisalot family lost possession of the estate, which became incorporated in the Khalsa lands of Jaipur, and administered as such till 1812.", "canonical_name": "Raisalot family"}}, {"text": "Sikar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145985, "end_char": 145990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, it was leased to .the Chieftain of Sikar and others on short term leases till 1836 when the grant under which the petitioner claims was made."}}, {"text": "Bikaner Durbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 146237, "end_char": 146251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The occasion for the grant was that there were negotiations for marrying a princess of the Bikaner royal family to the ruler of Jaipur, and the Bikaner Durbar insisted that the Khandela estate should be restorec!"}}, {"text": "Raisalot", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 146313, "end_char": 146321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Raisalot family.", "canonical_name": "Raisalot family"}}, {"text": "Jaipur State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 146482, "end_char": 146494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the marriage itself did not eventually materialise, <he princess having in the meantime died, the negotiations which had been going on with the Jaipur State for , the handing over of the Khandela estate to its old holders resulted in the izara of 1836."}}, {"text": "Mal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 148254, "end_char": 148257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therein, it was held on an examination of .all the materials that the status of the holders of Khandela differed from that of other Thikanadars, who paid Muamla and claimed semi-independent status as \"Muamlaguzars\", that they held merely as istimrar Izaradars uncer a \"permanent and specific izar\" and not as istimrar Muamlaguzars, that the grant of Mal, Sayer, Bhom and Kuli habubayat under the deed did not add to their status as lzaradars. ("}}, {"text": "Sayer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 148259, "end_char": 148264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therein, it was held on an examination of .all the materials that the status of the holders of Khandela differed from that of other Thikanadars, who paid Muamla and claimed semi-independent status as \"Muamlaguzars\", that they held merely as istimrar Izaradars uncer a \"permanent and specific izar\" and not as istimrar Muamlaguzars, that the grant of Mal, Sayer, Bhom and Kuli habubayat under the deed did not add to their status as lzaradars. ("}}, {"text": "Bhom", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 148266, "end_char": 148270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therein, it was held on an examination of .all the materials that the status of the holders of Khandela differed from that of other Thikanadars, who paid Muamla and claimed semi-independent status as \"Muamlaguzars\", that they held merely as istimrar Izaradars uncer a \"permanent and specific izar\" and not as istimrar Muamlaguzars, that the grant of Mal, Sayer, Bhom and Kuli habubayat under the deed did not add to their status as lzaradars. (", "canonical_name": "Bhoniicharas"}}, {"text": "Kuli habubayat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 148275, "end_char": 148289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therein, it was held on an examination of .all the materials that the status of the holders of Khandela differed from that of other Thikanadars, who paid Muamla and claimed semi-independent status as \"Muamlaguzars\", that they held merely as istimrar Izaradars uncer a \"permanent and specific izar\" and not as istimrar Muamlaguzars, that the grant of Mal, Sayer, Bhom and Kuli habubayat under the deed did not add to their status as lzaradars. ("}}, {"text": "14-4-1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 148418, "end_char": 148427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This report was accepted by the Maharajah of Jaipur on 14-4-1939."}}, {"text": "Venkatachar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148955, "end_char": 148966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The precise nature of the tenure called 'istimrari' is thus set out in Venkatachar's Report:-\n\n\"Permanently q14it-rented estates and lands- These are denoted by various terms as Dumba, Chukota, Suba and .", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAit"}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 149328, "end_char": 149346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The largest number of lstimarari estates in Rajasthan lies in Ajmer-Merwara\n\nThakur ..t.ar\n\nSinghji\n\nStall of Rajaslhan\n\ny mtkal<lrlftllll\n\nA_gar J.\n\nThakur Atnar\n\nSinghji\n\nState of Rajasthan"}}, {"text": "SUPREME. COURT REPORTS (1955]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 149348, "end_char": 149377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME."}}, {"text": "Ajmer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 149476, "end_char": 149481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Istimrari estate in Ajmer is exactly like the Jagirs in Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150618, "end_char": 150628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150703, "end_char": 150715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150946, "end_char": 150958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151032, "end_char": 151042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haripura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 151265, "end_char": 151273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "427 of 1954: Three villages, Haripura, Khata and Niradun, are comprised in this peti- tion; Lands in Haripura belonged to certain Bhumias of Jaipur."}}, {"text": "Khata", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 151275, "end_char": 151280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "427 of 1954: Three villages, Haripura, Khata and Niradun, are comprised in this peti- tion; Lands in Haripura belonged to certain Bhumias of Jaipur."}}, {"text": "Niradun", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 151285, "end_char": 151292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "427 of 1954: Three villages, Haripura, Khata and Niradun, are comprised in this peti- tion; Lands in Haripura belonged to certain Bhumias of Jaipur."}}, {"text": "Kha ta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 152630, "end_char": 152636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With reference to the lands in the village of Kha ta, the contention of the petitioner is that it is held on izara tenure, and that it is therefore outside schedule I to the Act."}}, {"text": "Ramanatha lyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 153536, "end_char": 153550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The word 'javad' is not noticed either in \\Vilson's Glossary or in Ramanatha lyer's Law Lexicon."}}, {"text": "section 4(xiii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153603, "end_char": 153618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(xiii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154131, "end_char": 154146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Akbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 154676, "end_char": 154681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner states that Akbar the Great granted three paraganas, Narayana, Kolak and Jobner, to his ancestors as Mansub for maintaining 1000 horses, that in 1727 they came under \"the subordination of the Amber Durbar\"-which was the name of the State prior to the foundation of Jaipur in 1728, and that they had continued to hold the estate thereafter as Mansubdars and not as jagirdars."}}, {"text": "Kolak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 154727, "end_char": 154732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner states that Akbar the Great granted three paraganas, Narayana, Kolak and Jobner, to his ancestors as Mansub for maintaining 1000 horses, that in 1727 they came under \"the subordination of the Amber Durbar\"-which was the name of the State prior to the foundation of Jaipur in 1728, and that they had continued to hold the estate thereafter as Mansubdars and not as jagirdars."}}, {"text": "Jobner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 154737, "end_char": 154743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner states that Akbar the Great granted three paraganas, Narayana, Kolak and Jobner, to his ancestors as Mansub for maintaining 1000 horses, that in 1727 they came under \"the subordination of the Amber Durbar\"-which was the name of the State prior to the foundation of Jaipur in 1728, and that they had continued to hold the estate thereafter as Mansubdars and not as jagirdars."}}, {"text": "Jaipur Administration Report 1947-1948", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 155240, "end_char": 155278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is classified as a jagir in the Jaipur Administration Report 1947-1948, page 35, and even though the Report has not the force of legislation, it is valuable as showing that Mansub is recognised as a jagir."}}, {"text": "Jorpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 155540, "end_char": 155547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The estate is therefore covered by item 1 in schedule I.\n\nWith reference to one of the villages forming part of this estate, Jorpura, a special contention was put forward by Mr. Naunit Lal that it was dedicated for worship of the Devi, and was therefore within the exemption enacted in section 20."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155701, "end_char": 155711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156111, "end_char": 156121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwatgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 156269, "end_char": 156280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "474 and 475 of 1954: In 1948 the Maharajah of Jaipur granted to the petitioners, who are his sons, the Thikanas of Bhagwatgarh and Mangarh consisting of 20 villages revenue-free."}}, {"text": "Mangarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 156285, "end_char": 156292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "474 and 475 of 1954: In 1948 the Maharajah of Jaipur granted to the petitioners, who are his sons, the Thikanas of Bhagwatgarh and Mangarh consisting of 20 villages revenue-free."}}, {"text": "Dadia Rampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 156974, "end_char": 156986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "488 of 1954 : The petitioners are interested in two of the villages, Dadia Rampur and Tapiplya comprised in the izara of Khandela of the year 1836, which forms the subject-matter of Petition No."}}, {"text": "Tapiplya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 156991, "end_char": 156999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "488 of 1954 : The petitioners are interested in two of the villages, Dadia Rampur and Tapiplya comprised in the izara of Khandela of the year 1836, which forms the subject-matter of Petition No."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157556, "end_char": 157566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shiva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 157653, "end_char": 157658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the petitioner is that they are dedicated for the worship of Lord Shiva and Goddess Shakti, and that he is a\n\nBrahmacharan utilising the income from the lands for the above religious service."}}, {"text": "Shakti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 157671, "end_char": 157677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the petitioner is that they are dedicated for the worship of Lord Shiva and Goddess Shakti, and that he is a\n\nBrahmacharan utilising the income from the lands for the above religious service."}}, {"text": "Thakur Amar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158122, "end_char": 158133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There has been no denial by the respondent of the allegation in the petition, and on the materials placed before us, we have come to the conclusion that the dedication pleaded by the petitioner has been established, and that the\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSing.yi\n\nState of'.,", "canonical_name": "Thakur Amar\n\nSinghji"}}, {"text": "State of'., Rajas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 158144, "end_char": 158161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There has been no denial by the respondent of the allegation in the petition, and on the materials placed before us, we have come to the conclusion that the dedication pleaded by the petitioner has been established, and that the\n\nThakur Amar\n\nSing.yi\n\nState of'.,", "canonical_name": "State of RajaJthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ]"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158313, "end_char": 158323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158499, "end_char": 158510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158695, "end_char": 158705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158965, "end_char": 158975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159127, "end_char": 159137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. RANGANATHAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159398, "end_char": 159412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. RANGANATHAN AND ANOTHER\n\nti."}}, {"text": "GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 159431, "end_char": 159451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159466, "end_char": 159475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, RHAC'NATJ and SJNHA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "s. R. DAS"}}, {"text": "RHAC'NATJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159477, "end_char": 159486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, RHAC'NATJ and SJNHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SJNHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159491, "end_char": 159496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, RHAC'NATJ and SJNHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159503, "end_char": 159523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159544, "end_char": 159553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160171, "end_char": 160177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 160192, "end_char": 160205, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_374_391_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Thakur Amar Singhji v. 'State of Rajasth•n\n\nVenkataram• Ayyar J.\n\nApril 20\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nproperties are within the exemption enacted in section 20.\n\nTo sum up: The impugned Act is not open to attack either on the ground that the Rajpramukh had no legislative competence to enact it, or that the pr<>- cedure prescribed in article 212-A for enactment of laws had not been followed. The Act is, in substance, one for acquisition of property, and is within the legislatiYc competence of the State, and it is protected by article 31-A.\n\nBut the notification is bad as regards properties comprised in Petitions Nos. 392 and 488 of 1954, as izoras are not within the impugned Act.\n\nThe properties mentioned in Petition No: 36 of 1955 are declicatcJ for religious services, and are exempt tmdcr section 20 of the Act.\n\nAppropriate writs will issue in these three petitions.\n\nIn Petition No. 468 of 1954 the right of the peritioner to c!oim cxem ption under section 20 for the villa!ic of Jorpur:1 on the ground that it is dedicated for worship of the Deity is reserved, and the petition is otiHr\\vise dis1nis.sed.\n\nAll the other !JCt1t1ons will stand dismissed.\n\nThe parties wiil b(ar their own costs m ali the petitions.\n\nC\\f. K. RANGANATHAN AND ANOTHER\n\nti.\n\nGOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, RHAC'NATJ and SJNHA JJ.]\n\nIndian Companies Act, (Act VII of 1913), s. 232(1) as amended by Act XXll oj l936-'F/1e iuords \"or any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the propc; tit\"-s of the Co1npa11y\" added in the section-FVhethcr lef!islaturc intended to 1nake alteration £n the !atu as respects sales effected by secured creditor-Secured creditor-TVhcther ouiside the toinding up--Construction_:Presumption against i111plied r1fteratict1 of law.\n\nThe secured creditor is outside the winding up and can realise his securir:v \\vithout the ieave of the winding up Court, though if he files a suit or takes other legal proceedings for the realisation of his security he is bound under s. 171 of the Indian Companies Act to obtain the leave of the winding up Court before he can do so although such leave \\V1uld alinost automatically be granted.\n\nIt is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act oi Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. It is also a well-recognized rule of construction that the legisbture does not intend to make a substantial alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares either in express words or by ckar implication and that the general words of the Act are not to be so construed as to alter the previous policy of the law, unless no sense or meani'1g can be applied to those words consistently with the intention of. p:eserving the existing policy untouched.\n\nHeld therefore that having regard to the context in which the words \"any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties\" added in s. 232( 1) bv the amending Act XXII of 1936 have been used in juxtapos; tion witn \"any attachment, distress or execution put into force without leave of the Court against the estate or effects\" it would be a icgitimate construction to be put upon them that they refer only to sales held through the intervention of the Court and not to sales effected by the secured creditor outside the winding up and without the intervention of the Court, and that the amendment was not intended to bring within the >Weep of the general words saks effected by the secured creditor outside the winding up.\n\nHeld accordingly that in the present case the sale effected by respondent No. 2 as the receiwr of the trustees of the debentureholders in July 1954 was valid and binding on all parties concerned and could not be challenged as it was sought to be done by the Official Receiver.\n\nFood Controller v. Cork (1923 A.C. 647), Kayastha Training and Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Sat Narain Singh (f 1921] I.L.R. 43 All. 433), Baldeo Narain Sfrigh\n\nv. The United India Bank Ltd. ([1915] 38 J.C. 91), State of West Rengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and others ( 1954 S.C.R. 587), Angus Robertson and others v. George Day (L.R. [1879] 5 A. C. 63), Murugian, P. v. fainudeen, C. L. ([1954] 3 W.L.R. 682), National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson ([ 1952] 2 Q.B. 648), Vasudeva Mudaliar and others v. Srinivasa Pillai and another ([1907] l.L.R. 30 Mad. 426) and The Governor-General in Council v.\n\nShiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. (In Liquidation) (1946 F.C.R. 40), referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : No. 20 of 1955.\n\nCivil Appeal\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 29th day of September 1954 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Original Side Appeal No. l.13 )f 1954 arising out of the order dated the 9th dav of <\\ugust !954 cf t'ie said High Court in its Ordiary Original Civil Jurisdiction in Application No. 3542 of 1954. 48\n\n,\\1. K. Ranganath••\n\nand another\n\nGovernment of Madras and othtrs\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nand anothlr\n\nGoverntntnl of Madras and otk1rs.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for Umrigar, Mohan Kumaramangalam Narain, with him) for the appellants.\n\nR. H. Dhebar and P. G. Gokhale No. 1.\n\nIndia (H. /. and Rajinder\n\nfor respondent\n\nSamarendra Nath Mukherjee and B. N. Chose for respondent No. 2.\n\nN. P. Engineer, (B. Moropant and V. f. Taraporewala, with him) for respondent No. 3.\n\n1955. April 20.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J .-This appeal with a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution is directed against the Judgment of the High Court of J udicaturc at Madras dismissing the appeal of the Appellants and refusing to set aside a sale effected by Respondent 2 of certain properties belonging to the Madras' Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. hereinafter called the Company, above the ground at V epery, Madras and Mylaporc, including the machinery cars, etc. and buildings as scrap to Respondent 3 in his capacity as the Receiver of the trustees of the debenture holders of the Company.\n\nThe Appellants are the Secretary and President respectively of the Madras Tramways Workers Association (Registered No. 1_253) a Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act. The workmen employed by the Company are entitled under the award of the Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras in I. D. No. 9 of 1953 published in the Fort St. George Gazette, dated the 8th July, 1953 being G. 0. Ms. No. 3024/53 to a payment of nearly Rs. 7,00,000 out of which the workers belonging to the Madras Tramways Workers Association alone would be entitled nearly to a sum of Rs. 4,35,000 and are thus the major creditors of the Company. The Company was incorporated in England with its principal office situated at No. 1, Rundalls Road, Vepery, Madras-7 and was running the Tramway Service in Madras with_ licence issued to it by the Government under the Tramwayi Act. It had issued\n\n1300 First Debentures of £100 each and the debenture-holders had appointed the Beawar Trust Ltd., England as trustees.\n\nBy an Indenture made in England on the 13th October 1924 the Company charged by way of first charge in favour of the trustees all its undertaking properties and assets for the time being both present and future including its uncalled capital with the payment of all moneys for the time being owing on the security of the debentures and such charge was to rank as a floating charge. By two subsequent deeds made at Madras dated the 26th March, 1925 and 6th July, 1950 certain immovable properties belonging to the company were mortgaged in favour of the said trustees.\n\nThe said Trustees appointed Respondent 2, the Managing Director of the Company and day to day management of the Tramway Service and of the business of the Compay, as their Receiver~ He took possession as such Receiver, from the midnight of 11th April, 1953 of all the assets of the Company including moneys in the bank to the credit of the Company and after that date the Tramways Service was suspended and still remains suspended.\n\nOne J. B. Beardsdl, one of the Directors of the Company filed 0. P. No. 419 of 1953 as the duly constituted Attorney of the Company for winding up the Company on the ground that it was unable to pay its debts and that it had ceased to carry on its business ..\n\nAn order for the winding up of the Company was made bv the Court on the 20th January, 1954 and the Official Receiver, High Court, Madras, was appointed the Official Liquidator. Since all the assets including the moneys of the Company were in possession of Respondent 2, the Official Receiver was unable to take charge of anything except the records of the Company.\n\nSoon after the order for winding up the Respondent 2 advertised in the newspapers on the 23rd January, 1954 for the sale of the properties and assets of the Company. At the end of the conditions of sale he stated in paragraph 7 that \"the sales are for the time being subject to the approval of the High Court 6-83 SC India/59\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nanti anotlur\n\nGovemmtnt of MatirOJ and otherl\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nM. K. RanganaJ/um\n\naad anotM\n\nGovemmmt of M adra.s and others - ...\n\nBhagwati J.-\n\nat Madras and it will be for the undersigned to obtain such approval for accepted offers free of all costs to the purchaser\".\n\nAt the time of the order of winding up, two suits were pending in the High Court, C.S. No. 191 of 1952 filed by the Company against the State of Madras for Rs. 1,33,204-9-0 and interest thereon being electric charges alleged to have Leen collected by the State of Madras in excess of those payable by the Company and paid by the company under protest and C.S.\n\nNo. 368 of 1953 filed by the State of Madras against the Company for the recovery of Rs. 9,26,123-2-3 with interest thereon, being the diflerence alleged to be due in respect of the electric charges under the old rates and the revised rates applicable to the Company.\n\nDuring the pendency of the said suits Respondent 2 gave an undertaking in Application No. 4533 of 1953 in Civil Suit No. 368 of 1953 that he would not without the orders of the High Court dispose of any of the assets of the Company which were in his possession till the disposal of the suit C.S.\n\nNo 368 of 1953.\n\nThe two suits aforesaid were tried to gether and were disposed of by a common judgment on the 16th Man:'.h 1954.\n\nOn the 16th July 1954 Respondent 2 agreed to sell and Respondent 3 agreed to buy the movable properties of the Company the particulars of which were set out in the agreement entered into on that date, for a price of Rs. 4,01,658 of which half was paid on the s; gning of the agreement and the other half was agreed to be paid out of the proceeds of sale to be made by the purchasers of the assets as scrap.\n\nOn he 23rd July 1954 the Official Receiver, High Court, Madras (Respondent 5 herein) filed an application No. 3542 of 1954 for setting aside the said 'sale of the assets of the Company on the grounds, inter alia, that it was prejudicial to the interests of the General body of unsecured creditors, that the same had been concluded with undue haste and without adequate publicity and in violation of Respondent 2' s said undertaking to the Court. It also asked for an injunction restraining the Respondent 2 from\n\nhanding over and the Respondent 3 from either taking over or breaking up the assets purchased by him pending the disposal of the said application.\n\nThis application was based on a report of the Official Receiver in which after setting out the relevant facts he submitted that even though under section 729 of the Indian Companies Act the Company which was admittedly insolvent was governed by rules prevailing with regard to the respective rights of the secured and unsecured creditors and to debts provable and valuation of annuities governing the administration in insolvency and secured creditors generally stood outside the liquidation and were entitled to have the remedy of realising the security and proving before him for the deficiency, if the properties of the Company could be sold for a price higher than the amount due to the Trustees of the debentureholders there was a possibility of a surplus coming into his hands for the benefit of the unsecured creditors.\n\nIf the Respondent 2 proved before him for any deficiency due to the secured creditors, it would certainly affect the rights of unsecured creditors, and moreover though the secured creditors might realise the security, it will be in the interests of the unsecured creditors to see that a fair and proper pncc was obtained. He therefore submitted that in the interests of the unsecured creditors it was just and necessary to have a fair valuation ascertained and an enquiry held to ascertain whether the sale by the Respondent 2 in favour of Respondent 3 was bona fide and for a proper price. Respondent 2 filed an affidaYit in reply in August 1954 contending inter alia, ( 1) that the offer by the Respondent 3 was the highest, that he had received and that this had been accepted bona fide, (2) that in the advertisement the condition as to the previous sanction of the Court was inserted because of the undertaking that he had given to the Court in C.S. No. 368 of 1953 and that this undertaking lapsed with the dismissal of the said suit on the 16th March 1954, (3) that he had been advised by the Solicitors in England for the debenure trustees that it was unnecessary for him to obtain\n\nM. K. RanganaJhan\n\nand another\n\nGovnnmmt of Madras and others\n\nl1hagwati J.\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nand another\n\nGovernment of Madras and others\n\n Bhagwati ].\n\nthe sanction of the Court and that he had been instructed not to apply for such sanction and ( 4) that the sale was bona fide and he had secured as good a price as could be obtained.\n\nBy its judgment and order dated the 9th August 1954 Mr.\n\nJustice Balkrishna Ayyar (in Chambers) dismissed the said application with costs.\n\nThe learned Judge held that the question whether Respondent 2 had violated the undertaking given by him was not germane to the application before him, that undoubtedly the Respondent 2 did give wide publicity of his intention to sell the assets of the Company, that it could not be said that the sale was sub rosa on the ground of want of wide publicity to the intended sale of the Company's assets and that the Respondent 3's offer was the best offer received by the Respondent 2 looking both to the abstract of offers appended to the affidavit of the Respondent 2 in the said application, and looking to the other offers pointed out to him by Respondent 5.\n\nThe learned Judge further referred to the offer of the Corporation of Madras and said that the said Corporation had not made any firm offer at all and that the offer of one A. Chettiar ot Rs. 4,25,000 made on 5th August 1954 during the hearing of the application was an offer made by a person who did not appear to him to be of a man of sound financial status.\n\nThe learned Judge in his judgment also recorded the fact that during the hearing of the application the Respondent 3 offered to sell to the Madras Municipal Corporation the entire assets he had purchased at the same price which he paid for it but the Corporation were not prepared to accept the offer.\n\nThe Respondent 5 accepted the said judgment and decision and did not prefer any appeal against the same.\n\nBut the Appellants who were not parties to the proceedings applied for and obtained from the High Court leave to appeal from the said decision.\n\nThis appeal also was \"dismissed by the High Court with wsts. on the 24th September 1954.\n\nThe High Court differed. from the finding of the Trial Court and held that due pt1blicity had not . been given to the\n\nintended sale and observed that if the matter rested merely on a decision of that point they would have allowed the appeal and set aside the sale. They however held that in the absence of fraud or want of bonafides on the part of the seller along with that of the buyer the sale in favour. of the Respondent 3 could not be set aside.\n\nThe High Court further considered the question whether the said sale was void as being without the leave of the Court in view of section 232 of the Indian Companies Act and answered that question in the negative.\n\nThe High Court further held that a secured creditor had a right to realise his security without seeking the assistance of the court and remaining outside the winding up.\n\nBeing aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the High Court the Appellants applied for leave to appeal to this Court and such leave was granted by the High Court on the 24th September 1954.\n\nThe bona fides of the Respondent 2 in the matter of the sale were not chal!tnged either in the Courts below or before: us and there were concurrent findings of fact that the price obtained by Respondent 2 was the best price available under the circumstances.\n\nIt was however urged by the learned Solicitor-General for the Appellants:-(1) that the High Court, having found that due publicity had not been given to the intended sale, ought not to have allowed the Respondent 3 at that stage to raise the question as to whether the Court had any power or jurisdiction to set aside the sale except on the ground that it was vitiated by fraud or for want of bona fides and (2) that the sale by Respondent 2 being a sale held without leave of the winding up Court was void under section 232(1) of the Indian Companies Act.\n\nThe High Court had allowed the Repondent 3 to raise the question even at that late stage inasmuch as it was a pure question of law and the learned Solicitor-General therefore rightly did not press the first contention before us.\n\nThe main argument centered round the second contention, viz., whether the sale effected by the Respondent 2 wihout leave of the winding up Court was void and hee liable to be set aside.\n\n1!155\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nand another\n\nGovernintnl of Madras and others\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nM.K. Ecanganathan\n\nand onotkr\n\nGoDcrnmmt of Madras and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe decision of this question turns upon the true construction of section 232 of the Indian Companies Act, which runs as under:-\n\n\"(l) Where any company is being wound up by or subject to the supervision of the Court, any attachment, distress or execution put in force without leave of the Court against the estate or effects or any rale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties of the company after the commencement of the winding up shall be void. (2) Nothing in this section applies to proceedings by the Government\".\n\nIt may be noted that the words \"or any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties\" underlined above were inserted by Act XXII of 1936.\n\nBefore this amendment section 232 ( 1) was almost in identical terms with section 228(1) of the English Companies Act of 1948.\n\nTwo other section~ of the Indian Companies Act may be noted in this context, viz. section 171 :-\n\n\"When a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed no suit or other legal proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court, and subject to such terms as the Court may impose.\" and Section 229 :-\n\n\"In the winding up of an insolvent company the same rules shall prevail and be observed with regard to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors and to debts provable and to the. valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency with respect to the estates of persons adjudged insolvent; and all persons who in any such case would be entitled to prove for and received dividends out of the assets of the company may come in under the winding up, and make such claims against the company as they respectively are entitled to by virtue of this section;\" which correspond respectively to sections 231 and 317 of the English Companies Act of 1948.\n\nThe position of a secured creditor m the winding up of a company has been thus stated by Lord Wrenbury in Food Controller v. Cor!\\(1):\n\n\"The phrase 'outside the winding up' is an intelligible phrase if used, as it often is, with reference to a secured creditor, say a mortgagee. The mortgagee of a company in liquidation is in a position to say \"the mortgaged property is to the extent of the mortgage my property.\n\nIt is immaterial to me whether my mortgage is in winding up or not.\n\nI remain outside the 'winding up' and shall enforce my rights as mortgagee\".\n\nThis is to be contrasted with the case in which such a creditor prefers to assert his right, not as a mortgagee, but as a creditor. He may say 'I will prove in respect of my debt'. If so, he comes into the winding up\".\n\nIt is also summarised in Palmer's Company Precedents Vol. II, page 415:\n\n\"Sometimes the mortgagee sells, with or without the concurrence of the liquidator, in exercise of a power of sale vested in him by the mortgage. It is not necessary to obtain liberty to exercise the power of -; ale, although orders giving such liberty have sometimes been made\".\n\nThe secured creditor is thus outside the winding up and can realise his security without the leave of the winding up Court, though if he files a suit or takes other legal proceedings for the realisation of his security he is bound under section 231 (corresponding with section 171 of the Indian Companies Act) to obtain the leave of the winding up Court before he can do so although such leave would almost automatically be granted.\n\nSection 231 has been read together with section 228(1) and the attachment, sequestration, distress or execution referred to in the latter have reference to proceedings taken through the Court and if the creditor has resort to those proceedings he cannot put them in force against the estate or effects of the Company aL;· the commencement of the winding up without the leave of the winding up Court. The\n\n(1) 1953 Appeal Cases 647.\n\nM.K. Ranganathatr\n\nand another v.\n\nGovemmmt of Madras and others\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nM.K. RanganatlilJn\n\nand anolher v.\n\nGovtrnmlnl of Madra.s and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nprovisions in section 317 are also supplementary to the provisions of section 231 and emphasise the position of the secured creditor as one outside the winding up, the secured creditor being, in regard to the exercise of those rights and privileges, in the same position as he would be under the Bankruptcy Act.\n\nThe corresponding provisions of the Indian Companies Act have been almost bodily incorporated from those of the English Companies Act and if there was nothing more, the position of the secured creditor_ here also would be the same as that obtaining in England and he would also be outside the winding up and a sale by him without the intervention of the Court would be valid and could not be challenged as void under section 232(1) of the Indian Companies Act.\n\nIt was however urged that the addition of the words \"or any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties\" had changed the position of the secured creditor and even though the secured creditor realised the security without the intervention of the Court such sale, if effected by him without the leave of the winding up Court, was void.\n\nIt was pointed out that these words did not find their place in the corresponding section 228(1) of the English Companies Act and therefore even though any attachment, distress or execution put in force without leave of the Court against the estate or effects of the company after the commencement of the winding up was void under the terms of the section 232 ( 1) as it originally stood, the words \"or any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties\" of the company were wide enough to include not only a sale , held through the intervention of the Court but also a sale effected by the secured creditor without the intervention of the Court whether the sale was by private treaty or by public auction.\n\nIt was contended on the other hand on behalf of the contesting Respondent, Respondent 3, that the amendment was made in order to get over the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kayasth~ Trading and Banking Corporation Ltd. v.\n\nSat Narain Singh(1 ) and that in any event on a true construction of section 232(1} as amended the words \"any sale held\" had reference in the context . only to. sales held by or effected through the intervention of the Court and not sales effected by the secured creditor without the intervention of the Court.\n\nThe decision of the Allahabad High Court ahove referred to ha<l hel<l on a construction of section232(1) as it then stood, that an execution was not put in force merely when the property of the judgment- <lebtor was sold in pursuance thereof, but it was pur in force when the property was attached and hence where the property of an insolvent company was attached prior to the <late of the commencement of the winding up but was actually sold subsequent to such· date, the sale was not voi<l and could be upheld. There was an earlier decision of the Patna High Court in Baldeo Narain Singh v. The United India Bank Ltd. () in which a contrary decision had been reached exactly under simiiar circumstances.\n\nIt is well-known that this .conflict was resolved and the decision of the Allahabad High Court was got over by inserting this ' amendment by Act XXII of 1936.\n\nThe statement of objects and reasons is certainly not admissible as an aid to the construction of a statute.\n\nBut it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil which he sought to remedy.\n\nState of West Bengal v.\n\nSubodh Gopal Bose and Others( 3 ) The amendment of section 232( 1) inserted by Act XXII of 1936 was designed to prevent such sales as were upheld by the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kayastha Trading and Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Sat Narain Singh(1) and it would be permissible to refer to that portion of the statement of objects and reasons for the purpose of ascertaining the extent and urgency of the evil which was sought to be remedied by introducing the amendment. It follows therefore that the\n\n(1) [1921] T.L.R. f3 Allahabad 433.\n\n(2) (1915] 38 Indian Case$ 91.\n\n(3) (1954] S.C.R. 587, 628.\n\nM.K. Ranganathan and another v.\n\nGovernment of Madras and.others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n. \\ 1955. amendment could. not have been intended . to .bring M - within the sweep of the-general words\"or any sale held\n\ni:::t;!~~~:an without the leave of the Court of any of the properv. ties\" sales effected by the secured. creditor outside Government of the Winding up. _ . ' l!Iadrasandothers Even apart from this intendment there are certain canons of construction which also tend to support the Bhagwati J • -· same conchision. Prior to the amendment the law was\n\n. well-settled both in England and in India .that the secured creditor.was outside the .winding up and he could realise his security without the intervention of the. Court by effecting a sale of the mortgaged pre~ . mises by private treaty or by public auction.: It was only when the intervention of the Court was sought either by_ putting in force any attachment, distress or execution within the meaning of section 232(1) as it stood before the amendment or proceeding with or ·, commencing a suit or other legal proceedings_against the company within the meaning of section 171 that leave of the Court was necessary and if no such leave was obtained the remedy could not be availed of by the secured creditor. The sale of the mortgaged premises was also brought by the amendment on .a par with the attachment, distress orexecution putin force at the insfarice of the secured credifoi .. and ha virig regard to the context such sale . could orily be construed to be a sale held through the intervention of the Court and not one effected by. the secured creditor outside the winding up and without the intervention of the Court. ' .. _It is a well-recognised rule . of construction that . \"when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together. noscunter a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colciur from each -- other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less_. general. (Maxwell ou Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edition, p. 332).\n\nThe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also · expressed itself in similar terms in Angus Robertson & Others v. George Day(1):-\n\n(1) [1879) L, R. 5 A.O. 63, 69.\n\n\"It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them\".\n\nHaving regard therefore to the context in which these words \"any sale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties\" have been used in juxtaposition with \"any attachment, distress or execution put into force without leave of the Court against the\n\netate or effects\" it would be a legitimate construction to be put upon them that they refer only to sales held through the intervention of the Court and not\n\n10 sales effected by the secured creditor outside the winding up and without the intervention of the Court.\n\nThere is also a presumption against implicit alteration of law and that is enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, at page 81 in the following terms:-\n\n\"One of these presumptions is that the legislature does not intend to make any substantial alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either in express terms or by clear implication, or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute.\n\nIn all general matters outside those limits the law remains undisturbed.\n\nIt is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistrble clearness ................ \" This passage from Maxwell was approved of by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Murugian, P. v.\n\nJainudeen; C. L. (1) and Their Lordships agreed that the law. was correctly stated in the passage just cited. To the same effect are also the observations of the Court of Appeal in National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson (2) where it was held that the Statute is not to be taken as affecting a fundamental alteration in the general law unless it uses words pointing u11mistakably to that conclusion.\n\nIn that case at page 658 Lord Goddard, C. J. observed :-\n\n\\ l) [1954] 3 Weekly Law Reports 682, 687.\n\n(2) [1952] 2 Q. B. 648.\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nand anothn\n\nGovmimmt of Madras and other.r\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nAl. K. J?anganathafi\n\nand another ·\n\nGovtrnmtnl of Madras and other$\n\nBhagu; ali 'J~\n\n.• ,. \"But it 1nar be presumed that the legislature does not' intebd to make a substantial alteration m the law beyond what it expressly declares.\n\nIn Mi11et V. Leman('), Sir John Romilly, M. R. stated as a principle ' ofrc-0ristruction which could not be disputed that 'thergeneral' words of the Act are not to be so construed as.·· to alter the previous policy of the law, unless n-o sense• or meaning can be applied to those words consistently: with the \"intention of preserving the: existing policy ·untouched' \". ' '· 'IC the construction sought to be put upon the words \"or'' any\"s:fre held without ieave of the Court of any of the 'properties\" by the Appellants were accepted it would effect a fundamental alteration in t!l'e law as it stoodbefore the amendment was inserted in section 232(1)' by Act XXII of 1936: Whereas before the' amendment the secured creditor stood outside the winding up and could if the mortgage deed so' provided, realiSe his security without the intervention ofthe Court by effecting a sale either by private treaty\" or by public auction, rio such sale could be effected 1by him after the amendment and that was certainly a fondament:il alteration in the law which could not be effected unless one found words used which pointed unmistakably to that conclusion or unless such intention was expressed with irresistible clearness.\n\nHavirig regard to the circumstances under which the amendment was inserted in section 232(1) by Act XXII of 1936 and also having regard to the context we are not''prepared to hold that the Legislature in inserting that amendment intended to effect a fundamental alteration in law with irresistible clearness. -Such -agreat and sudden change of policy could not •be attributed to the Legislature and i'. wou !d 'he legitimate therefore to adopt the narrower interpretation of those words of the amendment rathfr than an interpretation -which would have the - contrary effect. (Vide the observations of the Privy Council \"iii Vasude11a Mudaliar & Others v. Srinivasa Pillai & another(').\n\n(I) [1855] 20 Beav. 269. .• ' - ,\n\n(2) \\l 907) L L. R. 30 Madras 426, 433. '\n\nIt may be observed in this connection that section 171 enacts a general provision with regard to suits or other legal procee<lings to be proceeded with or commenced against the company after a winding up order has been made and lays down that no suit or other legal proceedings shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company excern by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose.\n\nThis general provision is supplemented by the\n\n1 supplemental provisions to be found respectively in sections 229 and 232(1) of the Act.\n\nSection 229 speaks of the application of insolvency rules in winding up of insolvent companies and . section 232(1) speaks of the avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc., put into force without the leave of the Court against the estate and effects of the . company and also of any sale . held without the leave of the Cour.t of any of t!1e properties of the company after the '.commencement of the winding up.\n\nSection 229 recognises the position of the secured creditor generally, as outside the winding up but enables him in the event of his desiring to take the benefit of the winding up proceedings to prove his debt, to value the 'same and share in the distribution pro rata of the assets of thf' company just in the same way as he would be able to do in the case of insolvency under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act or the Provincial Insolvency Act. Section 232(1) also has reference to legal proceedings in much the same way as legal proceedings envisaged by section 171 of the Act and the attachment, distress or execution put in force or the sale held are all of them legal proceedings which can only be resorted to through .the intervention of the Court.\n\nThe word \"held\". in connection with the sales contemplated within the terms of the amended section also lends support to this conclusion and this conclusion is further fortified by the terms of section 232(2) which says that nothing in this section . applies to proceedings by the Government, thus in effect indicating that wbat are referred to in section 232(1) are proceedings within the meaning of that term as. 11seJ in section 171 of the Act.\n\nM. K. Ranganatho11\n\nand another\n\nGovernmtn/ nf Madras ani otki•s\n\n•· Bhagwati ].\n\n\"1955\n\nM. K. Rangaruzt/u111\n\nand another\n\n•• Governmmt of Madras and others\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe Federal Court also put a similar construction on the provisions of section 171 read with section 232(') of the Act in The Governor-General in Council\n\nv. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. (In Liquidation)('):\n\n\"Section 171 must, in our judgment, . be construed with reference to other sections of the Act and the general scheme of administration of the assets of a company in liquidation laid down by the Act. In particular, we would refer to section 232. Section 232 appears to us to be supplementary to section 171 by providing that any creditor (other than Government) who goes ahead, notwithstanding a winding-up order or in ignorance of it, with any attachment, distress, execution or sale, without the previous leave of the Court, will find that such steps are void. The reference to \"distress\" indicates that leave of the Court is required for more than the initiation of original proceedings in the nature of a suit in an ordinary Court of law.\n\nMoreover, the scheme of the application of the company's property in the pari passu satisfaction of its liabilities, envisaged in section 211 and other sections of the Act, cannot be made to work in co-ordination, unless all creditors (except such secured creditors as are \"outside the winding-up\" in the sense indicated bv Lord W renbury in his speech in Food .Controller v. Cork( ) at page 671) are subjected as to their actions against the property of the company to the control of the Court.\n\nAccordingly, in our judgment, no narrow construction should be placed upon the words \"or other legal proceedings\" in section 171.\n\nIn our judgment, the words can and should be held to cover distress and execution proceedings in the ordinary Courts. In our view, such proceedings are other legal proceedings against the company, as contrasted with ordinary suits against the company\".\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that the sale effected by Respondent 2 \"' the Receiver of the Trustees of the debenture-holders on the 16th July 1954 was valid and binding on all parties concerned and could not be challenged as it was sought to be done by the •\n\n(I) [1946] F. C. R. 40, 55.\n\n(2) 1923 A.G. 647.\n\nOfficial Receiver.\n\nThe position was rightly summed up by the High Court as under:-\n\n\"W e thus reach the position that no leave of Court was needed before the Receiver appointed by the mortgagee debenture-holders exercised the power of sale and that as there is no allegation of want of bona ft.des or recklessness or fraud against the Receiver in exercising such a power, it would follow that the sale held by the Receiver is valid and effectual to convey title to the purchaser and that such a sale cannot be avoided on the ground either of want of due notice given by the Receiver before effecting the sale or on the ground of undervalue\".\n\nThe result therefore is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs of the contesting Respondent 3.\n\nThe other Respondents who have appeared before us will bear and pay their own costs of the appeal.\n\nOM PRAKASH GUPTA\n\nti.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF UTT AR PRADESH.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S1NHA and IMAM, JJ.]\n\nGovernment servant-Order of dismissal-Suit fOt\" declaration that order dismissing the appellant from service was. illegal-Court\n\nfee paid on an alte.-native claim fol\" damages which was subsequently given up-Refund of-Whether could be granted-Arrears of pay-- Claim for-LApse of suspension order after order of dismissal.\n\nThe appellant, a member of the United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service, was suspended from service with effect from the 24th August, 1944, pending aP enquiry into his conduct.\n\nAs a result of enquiry and report by the Commissioner, the Government passed an order on the 25th November, 1944, dismissing the appellant from service, which order was served on the appellant on the !st December, 1944.\n\nThe appellant instituted a suit for a declaration that the order of dismissal passed against him was wrongful, illegal and inoperative, and that he continued to be in service and was entitled to a decree for recovery of arrears of his sal:rry. The plaint included an alternative prayer for a declaration that the order of dismissal was\n\nM. K. RangQll/Jthan \"\"' ,,,,,,, Mr ....\n\nG~•f Madns ad oth6rs\n\ni].\n\n4jlril :u\n\n~·. l ., ..\n\n. .", "total_entities": 141, "entities": [{"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 535, "end_char": 545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 805, "end_char": 815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 967, "end_char": 977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. RANGANATHAN AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1238, "end_char": 1264, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.K.RANGANATHAN AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1271, "end_char": 1302, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1306, "end_char": 1315, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1343, "end_char": 1363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1384, "end_char": 1393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2011, "end_char": 2017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2032, "end_char": 2045, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2243, "end_char": 2253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act oi Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them."}}, {"text": "s. 232( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1946 F.C.R. 40", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4432, "end_char": 4447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Ranganath••", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Ranganath••\n\nand another\n\nGovernment of Madras and othtrs\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nand anothlr\n\nGoverntntnl of Madras and otk1rs."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ranganathan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4913, "end_char": 4930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Ranganath••\n\nand another\n\nGovernment of Madras and othtrs\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nand anothlr\n\nGoverntntnl of Madras and otk1rs.", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4980, "end_char": 4994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for Umrigar, Mohan Kumaramangalam Narain, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Mohan Kumaramangalam Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5027, "end_char": 5054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for Umrigar, Mohan Kumaramangalam Narain, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5087, "end_char": 5099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar and P. G. Gokhale No."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5104, "end_char": 5117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar and P. G. Gokhale No."}}, {"text": "Samarendra Nath Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India (H. /. and Rajinder\n\nfor respondent\n\nSamarendra Nath Mukherjee and B. N. Chose for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. N. Chose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5199, "end_char": 5210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India (H. /. and Rajinder\n\nfor respondent\n\nSamarendra Nath Mukherjee and B. N. Chose for respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. P. Engineer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5234, "end_char": 5248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Engineer, (B. Moropant and V. f. Taraporewala, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. Moropant", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5251, "end_char": 5262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Engineer, (B. Moropant and V. f. Taraporewala, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. f. Taraporewala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5267, "end_char": 5285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Engineer, (B. Moropant and V. f. Taraporewala, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J .-This appeal with a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution is directed against the Judgment of the High Court of J udicaturc at Madras dismissing the appeal of the Appellants and refusing to set aside a sale effected by Respondent 2 of certain properties belonging to the Madras' Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. hereinafter called the Company, above the ground at V epery, Madras and Mylaporc, including the machinery cars, etc.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5431, "end_char": 5442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of J udicaturc at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5513, "end_char": 5548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J .-This appeal with a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution is directed against the Judgment of the High Court of J udicaturc at Madras dismissing the appeal of the Appellants and refusing to set aside a sale effected by Respondent 2 of certain properties belonging to the Madras' Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. hereinafter called the Company, above the ground at V epery, Madras and Mylaporc, including the machinery cars, etc."}}, {"text": "Madras' Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5686, "end_char": 5723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J .-This appeal with a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution is directed against the Judgment of the High Court of J udicaturc at Madras dismissing the appeal of the Appellants and refusing to set aside a sale effected by Respondent 2 of certain properties belonging to the Madras' Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. hereinafter called the Company, above the ground at V epery, Madras and Mylaporc, including the machinery cars, etc."}}, {"text": "Mylaporc", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5796, "end_char": 5804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J .-This appeal with a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution is directed against the Judgment of the High Court of J udicaturc at Madras dismissing the appeal of the Appellants and refusing to set aside a sale effected by Respondent 2 of certain properties belonging to the Madras' Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. hereinafter called the Company, above the ground at V epery, Madras and Mylaporc, including the machinery cars, etc."}}, {"text": "Madras Tramways Workers Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6037, "end_char": 6072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellants are the Secretary and President respectively of the Madras Tramways Workers Association (Registered No."}}, {"text": "Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6098, "end_char": 6147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6221, "end_char": 6256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen employed by the Company are entitled under the award of the Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras in I. D. No."}}, {"text": "8th July, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 of 1953 published in the Fort St. George Gazette, dated the 8th July, 1953 being G. 0."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6626, "end_char": 6633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company was incorporated in England with its principal office situated at No."}}, {"text": "Vepery", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6694, "end_char": 6700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Rundalls Road, Vepery, Madras-7 and was running the Tramway Service in Madras with licence issued to it by the Government under the Tramwayi Act."}}, {"text": "Madras-7", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6702, "end_char": 6710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Rundalls Road, Vepery, Madras-7 and was running the Tramway Service in Madras with licence issued to it by the Government under the Tramwayi Act."}}, {"text": "Beawar Trust Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6920, "end_char": 6937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had issued\n\n1300 First Debentures of £100 each and the debenture-holders had appointed the Beawar Trust Ltd., England as trustees."}}, {"text": "13th October 1924", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7000, "end_char": 7017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an Indenture made in England on the 13th October 1924 the Company charged by way of first charge in favour of the trustees all its undertaking properties and assets for the time being both present and future including its uncalled capital with the payment of all moneys for the time being owing on the security of the debentures and such charge was to rank as a floating charge."}}, {"text": "26th March, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7392, "end_char": 7408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By two subsequent deeds made at Madras dated the 26th March, 1925 and 6th July, 1950 certain immovable properties belonging to the company were mortgaged in favour of the said trustees."}}, {"text": "6th July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7413, "end_char": 7427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By two subsequent deeds made at Madras dated the 26th March, 1925 and 6th July, 1950 certain immovable properties belonging to the company were mortgaged in favour of the said trustees."}}, {"text": "11th April, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7770, "end_char": 7786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Trustees appointed Respondent 2, the Managing Director of the Company and day to day management of the Tramway Service and of the business of the Compay, as their Receiver~ He took possession as such Receiver, from the midnight of 11th April, 1953 of all the assets of the Company including moneys in the bank to the credit of the Company and after that date the Tramways Service was suspended and still remains suspended."}}, {"text": "J. B. Beardsdl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7967, "end_char": 7981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One J. B. Beardsdl, one of the Directors of the Company filed 0."}}, {"text": "20th January, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8296, "end_char": 8314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "419 of 1953 as the duly constituted Attorney of the Company for winding up the Company on the ground that it was unable to pay its debts and that it had ceased to carry on its business ..\n\nAn order for the winding up of the Company was made bv the Court on the 20th January, 1954 and the Official Receiver, High Court, Madras, was appointed the Official Liquidator."}}, {"text": "High Court, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8342, "end_char": 8360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "419 of 1953 as the duly constituted Attorney of the Company for winding up the Company on the ground that it was unable to pay its debts and that it had ceased to carry on its business ..\n\nAn order for the winding up of the Company was made bv the Court on the 20th January, 1954 and the Official Receiver, High Court, Madras, was appointed the Official Liquidator."}}, {"text": "23rd January, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8679, "end_char": 8697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the order for winding up the Respondent 2 advertised in the newspapers on the 23rd January, 1954 for the sale of the properties and assets of the Company."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ranganathan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8917, "end_char": 8934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the end of the conditions of sale he stated in paragraph 7 that \"the sales are for the time being subject to the approval of the High Court 6-83 SC India/59\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nanti anotlur\n\nGovemmtnt of MatirOJ and otherl\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nM. K. RanganaJ/um\n\naad anotM\n\nGovemmmt of M adra.s and others - ...\n\nBhagwati J.-\n\nat Madras and it will be for the undersigned to obtain such approval for accepted offers free of all costs to the purchaser\".", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8983, "end_char": 8991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the end of the conditions of sale he stated in paragraph 7 that \"the sales are for the time being subject to the approval of the High Court 6-83 SC India/59\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nanti anotlur\n\nGovemmtnt of MatirOJ and otherl\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nM. K. RanganaJ/um\n\naad anotM\n\nGovemmmt of M adra.s and others - ...\n\nBhagwati J.-\n\nat Madras and it will be for the undersigned to obtain such approval for accepted offers free of all costs to the purchaser\".", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "M. K. RanganaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8995, "end_char": 9009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the end of the conditions of sale he stated in paragraph 7 that \"the sales are for the time being subject to the approval of the High Court 6-83 SC India/59\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nanti anotlur\n\nGovemmtnt of MatirOJ and otherl\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nM. K. RanganaJ/um\n\naad anotM\n\nGovemmmt of M adra.s and others - ...\n\nBhagwati J.-\n\nat Madras and it will be for the undersigned to obtain such approval for accepted offers free of all costs to the purchaser\".", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9341, "end_char": 9356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "191 of 1952 filed by the Company against the State of Madras for Rs."}}, {"text": "16th July 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10270, "end_char": 10284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 16th July 1954 Respondent 2 agreed to sell and Respondent 3 agreed to buy the movable properties of the Company the particulars of which were set out in the agreement entered into on that date, for a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "23rd July 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10677, "end_char": 10691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On he 23rd July 1954 the Official Receiver, High Court, Madras (Respondent 5 herein) filed an application No."}}, {"text": "section 729", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11478, "end_char": 11489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11504, "end_char": 11517, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. K. RanganaJhan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13351, "end_char": 13368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "368 of 1953 and that this undertaking lapsed with the dismissal of the said suit on the 16th March 1954, (3) that he had been advised by the Solicitors in England for the debenure trustees that it was unnecessary for him to obtain\n\nM. K. RanganaJhan\n\nand another\n\nGovnnmmt of Madras and others\n\nl1hagwati J.\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nand another\n\nGovernment of Madras and others\n\n Bhagwati ].", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "9th August 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13727, "end_char": 13742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment and order dated the 9th August 1954 Mr.\n\nJustice Balkrishna Ayyar (in Chambers) dismissed the said application with costs."}}, {"text": "Balkrishna Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13756, "end_char": 13772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment and order dated the 9th August 1954 Mr.\n\nJustice Balkrishna Ayyar (in Chambers) dismissed the said application with costs."}}, {"text": "Corporation of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14546, "end_char": 14567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge further referred to the offer of the Corporation of Madras and said that the said Corporation had not made any firm offer at all and that the offer of one A. Chettiar ot Rs."}}, {"text": "A. Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14664, "end_char": 14675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge further referred to the offer of the Corporation of Madras and said that the said Corporation had not made any firm offer at all and that the offer of one A. Chettiar ot Rs."}}, {"text": "5th August 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14700, "end_char": 14715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,25,000 made on 5th August 1954 during the hearing of the application was an offer made by a person who did not appear to him to be of a man of sound financial status."}}, {"text": "Madras Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14993, "end_char": 15021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge in his judgment also recorded the fact that during the hearing of the application the Respondent 3 offered to sell to the Madras Municipal Corporation the entire assets he had purchased at the same price which he paid for it but the Corporation were not prepared to accept the offer."}}, {"text": "24th September 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15475, "end_char": 15494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the 24th September 1954."}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16080, "end_char": 16091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16106, "end_char": 16119, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17306, "end_char": 17320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17335, "end_char": 17348, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Governintnl of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17807, "end_char": 17828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1!155\n\nM. K. Ranganathan\n\nand another\n\nGovernintnl of Madras and others\n\nBhagwati ].", "canonical_name": "GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "M.K. Ecanganathan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17854, "end_char": 17871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ecanganathan\n\nand onotkr\n\nGoDcrnmmt of Madras and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe decision of this question turns upon the true construction of section 232 of the Indian Companies Act, which runs as under:-\n\n\"(l) Where any company is being wound up by or subject to the supervision of the Court, any attachment, distress or execution put in force without leave of the Court against the estate or effects or any rale held without leave of the Court of any of the properties of the company after the commencement of the winding up shall be void. (", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17996, "end_char": 18007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18022, "end_char": 18035, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18645, "end_char": 18656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 228(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18697, "end_char": 18711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18727, "end_char": 18740, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18784, "end_char": 18797, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18833, "end_char": 18844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19112, "end_char": 19123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 231 and 317", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19802, "end_char": 19822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19838, "end_char": 19851, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wrenbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19956, "end_char": 19964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position of a secured creditor m the winding up of a company has been thus stated by Lord Wrenbury in Food Controller v. Cor!\\(1):\n\n\"The phrase 'outside the winding up' is an intelligible phrase if used, as it often is, with reference to a secured creditor, say a mortgagee.", "canonical_name": "W renbury"}}, {"text": "Palmer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20670, "end_char": 20676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also summarised in Palmer's Company Precedents Vol."}}, {"text": "section 231", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21235, "end_char": 21246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21267, "end_char": 21278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21293, "end_char": 21306, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 231", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21432, "end_char": 21443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 228(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21472, "end_char": 21486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.K. Ranganathatr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21865, "end_char": 21882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ranganathatr\n\nand another v.\n\nGovemmmt of Madras and others\n\nBhagwati ].", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "Govemmmt of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21900, "end_char": 21918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ranganathatr\n\nand another v.\n\nGovemmmt of Madras and others\n\nBhagwati ].", "canonical_name": "GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "M.K. RanganatlilJn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21944, "end_char": 21962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. RanganatlilJn\n\nand anolher v.\n\nGovtrnmlnl of Madra.s and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nprovisions in section 317 are also supplementary to the provisions of section 231 and emphasise the position of the secured creditor as one outside the winding up, the secured creditor being, in regard to the exercise of those rights and privileges, in the same position as he would be under the Bankruptcy Act.", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "section 317", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22041, "end_char": 22052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 231", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22097, "end_char": 22108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22383, "end_char": 22396, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22460, "end_char": 22473, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22757, "end_char": 22771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22786, "end_char": 22799, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 228(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23237, "end_char": 23251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23267, "end_char": 23280, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23503, "end_char": 23514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24036, "end_char": 24056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on the other hand on behalf of the contesting Respondent, Respondent 3, that the amendment was made in order to get over the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kayasth~ Trading and Banking Corporation Ltd. v.\n\nSat Narain Singh(1 ) and that in any event on a true construction of section 232(1} as amended the words \"any sale held\" had reference in the context ."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24972, "end_char": 24988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was an earlier decision of the Patna High Court in Baldeo Narain Singh v. The United India Bank Ltd. () in which a contrary decision had been reached exactly under simiiar circumstances."}}, {"text": "section 232( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25707, "end_char": 25722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.K. Ranganathan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26269, "end_char": 26285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ranganathan and another v.\n\nGovernment of Madras and.others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n. \\", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26302, "end_char": 26322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ranganathan and another v.\n\nGovernment of Madras and.others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n. \\", "canonical_name": "GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26857, "end_char": 26862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "well-settled both in England and in India .that the secured creditor.was outside the .winding up and he could realise his security without the intervention of the."}}, {"text": "section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27228, "end_char": 27242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27388, "end_char": 27399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29310, "end_char": 29317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also a presumption against implicit alteration of law and that is enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, at page 81 in the following terms:-\n\n\"One of these presumptions is that the legislature does not intend to make any substantial alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either in express terms or by clear implication, or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute."}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30515, "end_char": 30522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case at page 658 Lord Goddard, C. J. observed :-\n\n\\ l) [1954] 3 Weekly Law Reports 682, 687."}}, {"text": "John Romilly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30949, "end_char": 30961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mi11et V. Leman('), Sir John Romilly, M. R. stated as a principle ' ofrc-0ristruction which could not be disputed that 'thergeneral' words of the Act are not to be so construed as.··"}}, {"text": "section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31559, "end_char": 31573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32216, "end_char": 32230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32946, "end_char": 32957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 229 and 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33420, "end_char": 33443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33457, "end_char": 33468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33558, "end_char": 33572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 229", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33879, "end_char": 33890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34327, "end_char": 34341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34437, "end_char": 34448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34831, "end_char": 34845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34985, "end_char": 34999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35061, "end_char": 35072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. K. Ranganatho11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35086, "end_char": 35104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ranganatho11\n\nand another\n\nGovernmtn/ nf Madras ani otki•s\n\n•· Bhagwati ].", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "M. K. Rangaruzt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35175, "end_char": 35190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"1955\n\nM. K. Rangaruzt/u111\n\nand another\n\n•• Governmmt of Madras and others\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe Federal Court also put a similar construction on the provisions of section 171 read with section 232(') of the Act in The Governor-General in Council\n\nv. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. (In Liquidation)('):\n\n\"Section 171 must, in our judgment, .", "canonical_name": "M.K. RanganatlilJn"}}, {"text": "BhagwaJi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35245, "end_char": 35253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"1955\n\nM. K. Rangaruzt/u111\n\nand another\n\n•• Governmmt of Madras and others\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe Federal Court also put a similar construction on the provisions of section 171 read with section 232(') of the Act in The Governor-General in Council\n\nv. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. (In Liquidation)('):\n\n\"Section 171 must, in our judgment, .", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35329, "end_char": 35340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232(')", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35351, "end_char": 35365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35466, "end_char": 35477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35698, "end_char": 35709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35711, "end_char": 35722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35760, "end_char": 35771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36339, "end_char": 36350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "W renbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36538, "end_char": 36547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, the scheme of the application of the company's property in the pari passu satisfaction of its liabilities, envisaged in section 211 and other sections of the Act, cannot be made to work in co-ordination, unless all creditors (except such secured creditors as are \"outside the winding-up\" in the sense indicated bv Lord W renbury in his speech in Food .Controller v. Cork( ) at page 671) are subjected as to their actions against the property of the company to the control of the Court.", "canonical_name": "W renbury"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36823, "end_char": 36834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1946] F. C. R. 40", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37358, "end_char": 37376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38314, "end_char": 38325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S1NHA and IMAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38337, "end_char": 38350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S1NHA and IMAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38352, "end_char": 38369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S1NHA and IMAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S1N", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38371, "end_char": 38374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38381, "end_char": 38385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S1NHA and IMAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "25th November, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38989, "end_char": 39008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of enquiry and report by the Commissioner, the Government passed an order on the 25th November, 1944, dismissing the appellant from service, which order was served on the appellant on the !"}}, {"text": "M. K. RangQll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39454, "end_char": 39467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaint included an alternative prayer for a declaration that the order of dismissal was\n\nM. K. RangQll/Jthan \"\"' ,,,,,,, Mr ....\n\nG~•f Madns ad oth6rs\n\ni]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_391_402_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 391\n\nOfficial Receiver.\n\nThe position was rightly summed up by the High Court as under:-\n\n\"W e thus reach the position that no leave of Court was needed before the Receiver appointed by the mortgagee debenture-holders exercised the power of sale and that as there is no allegation of want of bona ft.des or recklessness or fraud against the Receiver in exercising such a power, it would follow that the sale held by the Receiver is valid and effectual to convey title to the purchaser and that such a sale cannot be avoided on the ground either of want of due notice given by the Receiver before effecting the sale or on the ground of undervalue\".\n\nThe result therefore is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs of the contesting Respondent 3.\n\nThe other Respondents who have appeared before us will bear and pay their own costs of the appeal.\n\nOM PRAKASH GUPTA\n\nti.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF UTT AR PRADESH.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S1NHA and IMAM, JJ.]\n\nGovernment servant-Order of dismissal-Suit fOt\" declaration that order dismissing the appellant from service was. illegal-Court\n\nfee paid on an alte.-native claim fol\" damages which was subsequently given up-Refund of-Whether could be granted-Arrears of pay-- Claim for-LApse of suspension order after order of dismissal.\n\nThe appellant, a member of the United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service, was suspended from service with effect from the 24th August, 1944, pending aP enquiry into his conduct.\n\nAs a result of enquiry and report by the Commissioner, the Government passed an order on the 25th November, 1944, dismissing the appellant from service, which order was served on the appellant on the !st December, 1944.\n\nThe appellant instituted a suit for a declaration that the order of dismissal passed against him was wrongful, illegal and inoperative, and that he continued to be in service and was entitled to a decree for recovery of arrears of his sal:rry. The plaint included an alternative prayer for a declaration that the order of dismissal was\n\nM. K. RangQll/Jthan \"\"' ,,,,,,, Mr ....\n\nG~•f Madns ad oth6rs\n\ni].\n\n4jlril :u\n\n~·. l ., ..\n\n. .\n\n' 1955\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nwrongful 'and. for a decree for Rs. 1,20,000/- by way of damages being passed in his favour. .The requisite. court-fee on the valuation of Rs. ),20,000 /- .. was paid. The claim for damages was later on\n\nal>andon~<:f iii' view of \"the decision of the Privy Council in High Commissionir for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. /. M •\n\nTiu Staie of Uttar . Prsh ·.,\n\nLi/{1 ) and:'fonsequentlal amendments were made in the plaint. The Civil J udgc granted a declaration that the order of dismissal was illegal and that the appellant continued to be in service in spite of th:µ: order. . But he declined to grant a decree for arrears of salary on the groui:id that a suit therefore was not maintainable. A prayer .for the refund of 'the additional court-fee paid in respect of the claim for damages was 'also refused.\n\nThe respondent did not appeal against the decision that the order of dismiisal was illegal. But the appellant took the matter in appeal to the High Court which, affirming the decision of the Civil Judge, negatived his claim for arrears of salary and also r_cfused refund of Court-fee.\n\nLeave was, however, granted to dppeal to thi:: Supreme Court.\n\n\"-·\" \"l\n\n- :.:'' ' lf.,1. .d ' ' .. dn view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Siate of Bihar v., Abdu/'Majid('), the respondent did not dispute the right of-'ilic 'appellant to recover arrears of pay. But he sought to support the decision on the ground that the order of dismissal dated the 25th November, 1944, having been declared to be illegal and void, the order of suspension dated the 24th August, 1944, became revived and that would bar the claim for arrears of salary.\n\nHeld that the order of suspension made against the appellant being one pending an enquiry, it lapsed with the order of dismissal and the subsequent declaration by the Civil Court that the order of dismissal Was illegal. could not revive an order_ which. had ceased to exist. ·. i. ·\n\n- ·· ·\n\nt'~·l:.. Theque\"tioil whether the order of suspension dated the 24th August, 1944, . was valid . and whether it was passed after due en- . quiry; woold be material only with reference to the claim for salary .for the period between the 24th August, 1944 and the. !st December, 1944, arid as the appellant did not press the claim for that period there was no need to direct an enquiry on that point, . . \"\") . ·• Heid ·£U, ther 'tliat the claim for refund of extra court-fee could . not be. gianted illasmuch as the decision of. the Privy Council dari- . lying the. pi>si\\ion eould not be a ground for the refund of xcess rou_rtf\": -whCQ at the time it was _paid it was in accordance with. the :}i_w. as i~, thcii ~~ The State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid ([1954) S.C.R. 786), Sh\"\"um\n\nv. ,.Smith.([188~] .A.C. 229), R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for 'Jnilia. 'in CounCii (r.;.R. 64 I.A. 55), M. Gopal Krishna Naid,. v. s- ; f, fMadhf.a:Pr1idesh (A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 17), Provincial Government, \"i::'1itrti1 Pt/vi.\"cei , and Berar through Collector, Amraoti v. Shams/Jiil\n\n;!fps~'4n Sirifi H.uss'ain (I.LR. [1948] Nag. 576), referred ID.\n\n(I) [1948] L.R. 75 I.A. 225.\n\n(2) [1954] S.C.R. 786.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 85 .of 1954. ,,\n\ni Appeal under Article 133( 1) ( c) of the Constitution from the Judgment and Decree dated the 6th November, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in F. A. No. 141 of 1949.\n\nS. Ramaswamy Iyer (K. R. Clioudhry, with him) for th~ appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( C. P.\n\nLal, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1955.\n\nApril 21.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-This is an appeal against the decision of the Allahabad High Court affirming the decision of the Civil Judge of Allahabad.\n\nThe appellant was appointed to the United Pri>- vinces Civil (Executive) Service in 1940 and in due course was confirmed.\n\nHe was posted to various stations and in 1944 he was posted to Lakhimpur Kheri, where he joined n July,\n\n1944. On the 23rd August, 1944, the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur Kheri received a telegram from Government informing him that the appellant was suspended forthwith pending inquiry into his conduct and that a copy of the telegram was forwarded to the appellant for information.\n\nOn the 26th August, 1944, the Deputy Commissioner wrote to the appellant that he was required to appear before the Commissioner of the Lucknow Division on the 28th August, 1944. to answer the charges, a copy of which would be forwarded to him. He further informed the appellant that he could treat his case under rule 55 of the Civil Services {Classification Control and Appeal) Rules of 1930, published in the United Provinces Gazette of June 28, 1930.\n\nThe appellant was further informed that in view of his suspension his leave application was cancelled.\n\nOn the 28th August, 1944, the appellant appeared before the Commissioner at Lucknow and protested against the pri>- cedure adopted by him for the inquiry. The Commis- \" 7-83 S. C. India/59.\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nThe State of Ullar\n\nPrat/uh\n\nOm FTakash G•Pta\n\nv, The State of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nImam J,\n\nsioner having completed the inquiry on the 1st September, 1944, submitted his report to Government.\n\nThe Commissioner, however, recommenced the inquiry on September 11, 1944, and after completing the inquiry submitted the papers to Government on the 30th September, 1944.\n\nThe Government of the United Provinces by an order dated the 25th November, 1944, dismissed the appellant from the United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service.\n\nThis order was served on the appellant on the 1st December, 1944, and he submitted a memorial to the Governor on August 7, 1945, which was rejected on the 28th May, 1947.\n\nDuring the period of suspension the appellant was paid subsistence allowance at the rate of one-fourth of his salary which was then Rs. 310 per month.\n\nThe appellant gave notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure of h.is intention to bring a suit and on the 2nd Januay, 1948, he filed his suit.\n\nHe asked for a declaration that the order of dismissal was wrongful, illegal, void and inoperative nd that he still continued to be a member of the Civil Service ontitled to full pay with all increments as they fell due.\n\nHe prayed for a decree for , recovery of arrears of salary amounting to Rs. 16,810-8-0 less subsistence allowance already drawn from August 24, 1944, to December 31, 1947.\n\nIn the alternative he prayed for a declaration that the order of dismissal was wrongful and that a decree to the extent of Rs. 1,20,000 with interest by way of damages may be passed in his favour.\n\nHe paid the requisite court fee on the valuation of Rs. 1,20,000.\n\nThis alternative claim was deleted from the plaint as a result of an amendment, having regard to a rnbsequent decision of the Privy Council* which held that a person illegally dismissed from Government service could only get a declaration that the order was inoperative and that he still continued to be a member of the Service.\n\nThe appellant asked for refund of the extra court fee paid which was rejected by the Civil Judge by a separate order.\n\nThe Civil Judge, however, decreed\n\n*High CommiJJiorttr for India and H;, gh Commissioner for PakistaN Y.\n\nJ. ,\\f. Lal-. [1948] L.R. 75 I.A .. ~~·\"·\n\nts.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nthe appellant's suit in part declaring that the order dismissing him from service was illegal and that he still continued to be a member of the United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service.\n\nThe Civil Judge, however, declined to pass a decree for arrears of salary.\n\nAgainst the decision of the Civil Judge the appellant appealed to the High Court and his appeal was dismissed.\n\nThe respondent did not appeal against the decision of the Civil Judge or file a cross-objection.\n\nThe appeal in the High Court proceeded on the basis that the order of dismissal made against the appellant was illegal and that it was rightly declared that he continued to be a member of the service of the United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service. The only two questions which were considered and decided by the High Court were as to whether the appellant was entitled to a decree for arrears of salary and a refund of the excess court fee paid by him.\n\nBoth these questions were decided against the appellant by the High Court which subsequently gave him a certificate for leave to appeal to this court.\n\nIt may be stated at once that in view of the dedsion of this court in The State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid(1) there can be no question now that the appellant had the right to institute a suit for recovery of arrears of salary as he was dismissed illegally.· It is unnecessary, therefore, to refer to the elaborate discussion of the law in this respect to be found in the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court.\n\nWhen this appeal came on for hearing before this court and the appellant had been heard, the Attorney- General in the course of his argument had contended that the order of suspension of August 1944 subsisted although the order of dismissal had been declared illegal by the Civil Judge and all that the appellant was entitled to was subsistence allowance and not salary so long as the order of suspension remained effective.\n\nThis plea was not taken in the written statement filed in the trial court, nor was there any issue framed in this respect.\n\nThe Attorney-General\n\n(ll [1954] S.C.R. 786.\n\nOm Prakash Gupla\n\nTM State of Utlar\n\nPradesh\n\nImam].\n\n!955\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nThi SlaU of Uttar\n\nPrad<sh\n\nImam J.\n\nasked for time to file an additional written statement on behalf of.' the respondent. This court allowed time for the respondent to <lo So and the appellant was also given time to reply to . any additional written statement filed 'on behalf of the respondent. The respondent filed the additional written statement and the appellant filed his reply to it. Thereafter the appeal came on for hearing again and the learned Advocate for the appellant made his submissions on the addi- 0tional written statement and the Attorney-General replied to the same.\n\nSo far as the . payment of excess court fee is concerned, the learned. Advocate for the appellant did riot urge this point in his opening argument but urged it in reply after the Attorney-General had concluded his argument.\n\nApart from the question as to whether the Advocate can be allowed to urge a point like this in reply when no submission had been made by him in his opening, it seems there is no merit in the submission made by the Advocate.\n\nThe court fee had been paid on Rs. 1,20,000 which was claimed as damages. At the time the suit was instituted\" the law as then understood permitted such .a claim to be made.\n\nThe decision of the Privy Council, however, made it clear that no such claim could be made and all that a Government servant could ask for was a declaration that the order of dismissal was illegal and that he still continued to he a member of • the Civil Service.\n\nThe decision of the Privy Council clarifying the position could not be a ground for re- . fund of court fee when at the time it was paid it was in accordance .with the law as then understood. Indeed the appellant did .. not appeal or file an application 'against the order of the Civil Judge refusing to pass Lan order.of 'refund. In the' High Court he did not i ask 1•foi this relief on 'the basis of any statutory provision.\n\n; lHe invoked ·. the inherent powers of the High Court. bThe: .. Court Fees. Act contains,, certain provisions for\n\nirefund of court fee paid by a party but admittedly the present case is not covered by any of those provi-\n\n1 sions. It seems, therefore, that the High Court in the circumstances of the present case rightly refused\n\nto order a refund of the excess court fee paid by the appellant. .Jt also does not appear that the Civil_ Judge acted illegally in refusing to order a refund.\n\nOn the additional written statement filed in this Court by the respondent a question has arisen whether the order of suspension was valid and during the period it was in force the appellant could recover arrears of salary.\n\nThe learned Advocate for the appellant contended that an order of suspension is a penalty under rule 49 of the Classification Rules and it was against all sense of natural justice to impose a penalty upon a Government servant pending an inquiry against him under rule 55 of the said rules.\n\nAn order imposing the penalty of suspension was an appealable order under rule 56 of the Classification Rules and under rule 59 of the said rules, an appellate authority was bound to consider whether the facts on which the penalty was imposed had been established and whether those facts disclosed sufficient grounds for imposing such a penalty.\n\nRule 54 of the Fundamental Rules authorises a rev1smg or an appellate authority, when it finds that the penalty of suspension was unjustified or not wholly justified, to make an order granting to the Government servant his full pay and any allowance to which he was entitled if he was honourably acquitted and in other cases such proportion of pay and allowances as it may prescribe. The penalty of suspension, it was urged involved serious loss in the matter of salary and allowances and to impose this penalty pending an inquiry was to prejudge the case against a Governme9-t servant and in effect to make his right of appeal a meaningless remedy.\n\nIt was pointed out that in some of the rules framed by a Government or quasi- Government authority the penalty of suspension pending an inquiry was specifically provided for, such as rule 95 of the Bihar and Orissa Service Code referred to in Abdul Majid's case and rule 1711 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant reference was also made to certain decisions to the effect that as between master and servant, the master had no power of suspension unless\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nTill State of Uttar\n\nPraduh\n\nImam].\n\n!955\n\nOm PrakashGupaJ .v.\n\nThe Stat, of UUar\n\nhad<sh\n\nlmam J.\n\n398 SUPREME COURT REPo; R.TS 119.55]\n\nthere was an e; rrpress term to that effect in the contract between them.\n\nThe Attorney-General conceded that apart from the Classification Rules and the Fundamental Rules he was not aware of any other rules under which the penalty of suspension could be imposed upon a Government servant.\n\nHe also conceded that under the Classification Rules an order of suspension was a penalty.\n\nHe further conceded that as between master and servant the former had no power of suspension unless the terms of the contract between them permitted it or a statute or a rule provided for it but his principle, he said, did not apply to a person in the service of the Crown in India. He, however, contended that under rule 49 of the Classification Rules a penalty of suspension could be imposed pending an inquiry.\n\nThere was nothing in the rule itself which enjoined that a penalty could only be imposed at the conclusion of an inquiry.\n\nThe penalty could be imposed for good and sufficient reasons which may be based on materials already existing pending an inquiry.\n\nAfter the inquiry there may be the imposition of a severer penalty or a definite period of suspension may be fixed or there may be cancellation of the order of suspension.\n\nNo doubt there was a right of appeal against an order imposing a penalty of smpension pending an inquiry but the provisions of rule ~4 of the Fundamental Rules did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the penalty of suspension could only be imposed after an inquiry.\n\nClause (a) of the said rule might contemplate a case where the penalty had been impo\".rl after an inquiry but clause (b) could cover a case where the penalty had been imposed pending an inquiry.\n\nIn the present case, he said, the1e was no contravention of any principle of natural jnstice as the appellant had an opportunity of explaining the accusation marle against him. The letter of the Commissioner of Lucknow Division with its annexure, marked Exhibit A in the trial court, clearly showed that the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur Kheri had recorded statements of persons with reference to three cases and the appellant saw him in\n\nconnection therewith.\n\nHe admitted the facts but tried to explain them. He, however, declined to give his tatement in writing.\n\nThe order of suspension made against him was based on materials of which he was fully aware.\n\nIn the alternative the Attorney-General urged that in the year 1944 the appellant was a member of the\n\nCivil Service of the Crown in India holding office during the pleasure of the Crown. There was, therefore, inherent power in the Crown and its representative to pass an order of suspension against the appellant pending an inquiry.\n\nThe Classification Rules and Fundam_s:ntal Rules were merely directions for general guidance and they did not constitute a contract between the Crown and its servants. For this propositi_on he referred to the observations of Lord Hobhouse in the case of Shenton v. Smith( 1 ).\n\nHe also relied upon the following observations of Lord Roche in the case of R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India in Council('). \"Section 96-B in express terms states that office is held during pleasure.\n\nThere is, therefore, no need for the implication of this i:erm and no room for its exclusion.\n\nThe argument for a limited and special kind of employment . during pleasure but with an added contractual term that the rules are to be observed is at once too artificial and too far-reaching to commend itself for acceptance.\n\nThe rules are manifold in number and most minute in particularity, and are all capable of change .................. Inconvenience is not a final consid4'.ration in a matter of construction, but it is at least worthy of consideration, and it can hardly be doubted that the suggested. procedure of control by the Courts over Government in the most detailed work of managing its services would cause not merely inconvenience but confusion\".\n\nIn the courts below the principal question for consideration was whether the appellant could recover arrears of salary having been illegally dismissed.\n\nIt was not pleaded that the order of suspension V.'as\n\n(1) (18951 A.C. 22~.\n\n('' J •. R. li4 I .A. 55\n\nOm Prakash Guf11a\n\nThe State of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nImam].\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nTk Stal• of Uttar\n\nPraduh•\n\nImam f\n\nvalid and during the period it was in force the appellant could not recover arrears of salary and no specific issue was framed in this respect. '- If the decision of this court in Abdttl Majid's case had been available to the courts below, they would have held that the appellant was entitled to recover arrears of salary when he had been illegally dismissed and they would have had further to decide whether the order of suspension was valid and during 'the period it was in force the appellant could recover arrears of salary. On the additional written statement filed , by the respondent in this court, the submissions of the Advocate for the appellant _ and. the Attorney General would require examination and_ it might have been necessary to consider whether the case should 'not be remanded to the court of trial. It is unnecessary, however,. to record a decision on.these' submissions having regard to the atti- ' . . . . tude adopted by the Advocate for the appellant.\n\nHe objected to the case being ' remanded as such a course would involve the appellant in heavy expenditure. and harassment.\n\nThe appellant preferred to give up his claim for arrears of salary less subsistence allowance paid to him from the date of the order of suspension until the date of the order of dismissal.\n\nHe, however, contended that the '. order of, suspension continued to be in force only until the 25th November, 1944, the date of the order of dismissal. On that date the order of suspension ceased . to exist and the appellant was entitled to recover arrears of salary from the 25th November, 1944, to -the 31st December, 1947, inclusive.\n\nThe Attorney-General strongly contended that _it continued to be in force and that it was not at all affected by the declaration of the- Civil Judge that the order of dismissal was illegal.\n\nIn view of that decision the order of dismissal must. be regarded as a nullity and non-existent in the eye of law. The inquiry, the outcome of which was ·-the order of dismissal, had not therfore ended.\n\nIt could only end with a valid order which wouldreplace the order of suspension.\n\nUntil that happened the accusation against the appellant remained and the inquiry had not ended.\n\nHe referred to the case of M. Copa! Krishna' Naid11 v.\n\n.2 .S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPdRTS 401\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh(1). On behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on the case of Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar through Collector, Amraoti v. Shamshul Hussain Sirai Hussain(2). The order of suspension made against the appellant was clearly one made pending an inquiry.\n\nIt certainly was not a penalty imposed after an enquiry.\n\nAs the result of the inquiry an order of dismissal by way of penalty had been passed against the appellant. With that order, the order of suspension lapsed.\n\nThe order of dismissal replaced the order of suspensio-9which then ceased to exist. That clearly was the position between the Government of the United Provinces and the appellant. The subsequent declaration by a Civil Court that the order of dismissal was illegal could not revive an order of suspension which did not exist.\n\nThe case referred to by the Attorney-General is not directly in point and that decision does not conflict with the case relied upon by the appellant.\n\nThe appellant is, therefore, entiled to recover arrears of salary from the 25th of November, 1944, to 31st J)ecember, 1947.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed in palt with costs throughout and th~ decree of the courts below is set aside. The , plaintiff's suit is decreed for arrears of salary from the 25th of November, 1944, to the 31st of J)ecember, 1947, inclusive.\n\nThe appellant had claimed Rs. 16,810-8-0 less subsistence allowance already drawn as arrears of pay from the 24th of August, 1944, to the 31st J)ecember, 1947.\n\nAs his claim for arrears of salary from the 24th of August 1944, to the 25th of November, 1944, is given up, the total salary payable to him during thi$ period less subsistence allowance already drawn, must be deducted from the sum of Rs. 16,810-8-0.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court as well as the additional written statement filed by the respondent in this court show that subsequent to the decree passed by the Civil Judge the appellant was treated as under suspension until he was dismissed by a fresh order of\n\n( 1) A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 170.\n\n(1) I.L.R.1948 Nag. 576; A.I.R. (36) 194r1 :Sag. 118.\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nThe State of Utlar\n\nPradtsh\n\nImam].\n\nOm Prakash Gu1ta\n\nTlie Stale of Ufla,\n\nPrtkhsh\n\nImam].\n\nApril 21\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1955)\n\ndismissal and that he has been paid subsistence allowance for the entire period. Such . subsistence allowance as has been paid to the appellant from the 25th of November, 1944, to the 31st December, 1947, inclusive, must, thertfore, be credited to the respondent and the same must be adjusted against the salary claimed by the appellant.\n\nA decree will accordingly be prepared stating the amount recoverable by the appellant.\n\nThe appellant was permitted to appeal in forma pauperis.\n\nAs he has succeeded in the appeal, the Registrar shall calculate the amount of court fee which would have been paid by the appellant ; f he had not been allowed to appeal as a pauper and incorporate it in the decree.\n\nThe court fee shall be paid by the appellant and the same will be recoverable by the Government of India from him and shall be the first charge on the amount decreed to him.\n\nUnder Rule 7 of Order XIV of the Rules of this Court, the appellant will be allowed the fees paid by him to his Advocates, in the taxation of costs.\n\nTHE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS\n\nCO., LTD.\n\nti.\n\nHARNAM SINGH AND OTHERS.\n\n(VMAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and BHUVANESHWAR\n\nPRASAD SINHA, JJ.)\n\nPriv11te International Law-Law applic11ble to contractual obligations-English and Continental schools of thought-Lex situs and uProper I.Au/' of contract-Partition of India-Post partition debt -Action for recovery where lies-Analogy of banking transactions and insurance claims-Place of primary obligatio11-Debt, whether property-Sections 3 and 130 of Transfer of Property Act-Evacuee property laws-Pakistan (Protection of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1948 (XV/ll of 1948)-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Pro\n\nperty) Ordinance (XV) 1949-Whether confiscatory in nature\n\nDuring the years in question cloth was rationed at Lyallpur, then a part of the Punjab in undivided T ndia, and sales could only be made to government nominees and other authorised persons. The plaintiffs rcsii!cnt in Lyallpur, were the government nominees. 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RangQll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2088, "end_char": 2101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaint included an alternative prayer for a declaration that the order of dismissal was\n\nM. K. RangQll/Jthan \"\"' ,,,,,,, Mr ....\n\nG~•f Madns ad oth6rs\n\ni]."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2193, "end_char": 2209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' 1955\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nwrongful 'and.", "canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH GUPTA"}}, {"text": "High Commissionir for India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2479, "end_char": 2506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim for damages was later on\n\nal>andon~<:f iii' view of \"the decision of the Privy Council in High Commissionir for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. /. M •\n\nTiu Staie of Uttar ."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leave was, however, granted to dppeal to thi:: Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "24th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he sought to support the decision on the ground that the order of dismissal dated the 25th November, 1944, having been declared to be illegal and void, the order of suspension dated the 24th August, 1944, became revived and that would bar the claim for arrears of salary."}}, {"text": "Provincial Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5144, "end_char": 5165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17), Provincial Government, \"i::'1itrti1 Pt/vi."}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I.A. 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5322, "end_char": 5338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 133( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5552, "end_char": 5589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i Appeal under Article 133( 1) ( c) of the Constitution from the Judgment and Decree dated the 6th November, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in F. A. No."}}, {"text": "S. Ramaswamy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ramaswamy Iyer (K. R. Clioudhry, with him) for th~ appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Clioudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5636, "end_char": 5651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ramaswamy Iyer (K. R. Clioudhry, with him) for th~ appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5683, "end_char": 5697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( C. P.\n\nLal, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. P.\n\nLal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5728, "end_char": 5738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( C. P.\n\nLal, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-This is an appeal against the decision of the Allahabad High Court affirming the decision of the Civil Judge of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Lakhimpur Kheri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6252, "end_char": 6267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd August, 1944, the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur Kheri received a telegram from Government informing him that the appellant was suspended forthwith pending inquiry into his conduct and that a copy of the telegram was forwarded to the appellant for information."}}, {"text": "26th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6482, "end_char": 6499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th August, 1944, the Deputy Commissioner wrote to the appellant that he was required to appear before the Commissioner of the Lucknow Division on the 28th August, 1944."}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6610, "end_char": 6617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th August, 1944, the Deputy Commissioner wrote to the appellant that he was required to appear before the Commissioner of the Lucknow Division on the 28th August, 1944."}}, {"text": "28th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6634, "end_char": 6651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th August, 1944, the Deputy Commissioner wrote to the appellant that he was required to appear before the Commissioner of the Lucknow Division on the 28th August, 1944."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6914, "end_char": 6927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further informed the appellant that he could treat his case under rule 55 of the Civil Services {Classification Control and Appeal) Rules of 1930, published in the United Provinces Gazette of June 28, 1930."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7225, "end_char": 7241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Gupta\n\nThe State of Ullar\n\nPrat/uh\n\nOm FTakash G•Pta\n\nv, The State of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nImam J,\n\nsioner having completed the inquiry on the 1st September, 1944, submitted his report to Government.", "canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH GUPTA"}}, {"text": "State of Ullar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7247, "end_char": 7261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Gupta\n\nThe State of Ullar\n\nPrat/uh\n\nOm FTakash G•Pta\n\nv, The State of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nImam J,\n\nsioner having completed the inquiry on the 1st September, 1944, submitted his report to Government.", "canonical_name": "State of Ullar"}}, {"text": "Imam J", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Gupta\n\nThe State of Ullar\n\nPrat/uh\n\nOm FTakash G•Pta\n\nv, The State of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nImam J,\n\nsioner having completed the inquiry on the 1st September, 1944, submitted his report to Government.", "canonical_name": "IMAM, JJ."}}, {"text": "Government of the United Provinces", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7608, "end_char": 7642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the United Provinces by an order dated the 25th November, 1944, dismissed the appellant from the United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service."}}, {"text": "United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7719, "end_char": 7761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the United Provinces by an order dated the 25th November, 1944, dismissed the appellant from the United Provinces Civil (Executive) Service."}}, {"text": "1st December, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7810, "end_char": 7828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was served on the appellant on the 1st December, 1944, and he submitted a memorial to the Governor on August 7, 1945, which was rejected on the 28th May, 1947."}}, {"text": "August 7, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7877, "end_char": 7891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was served on the appellant on the 1st December, 1944, and he submitted a memorial to the Governor on August 7, 1945, which was rejected on the 28th May, 1947."}}, {"text": "28th May, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7919, "end_char": 7933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was served on the appellant on the 1st December, 1944, and he submitted a memorial to the Governor on August 7, 1945, which was rejected on the 28th May, 1947."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8120, "end_char": 8130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8134, "end_char": 8161, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "2nd Januay, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8207, "end_char": 8223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant gave notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure of h.is intention to bring a suit and on the 2nd Januay, 1948, he filed his suit."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8600, "end_char": 8615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16,810-8-0 less subsistence allowance already drawn from August 24, 1944, to December 31, 1947."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8620, "end_char": 8637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16,810-8-0 less subsistence allowance already drawn from August 24, 1944, to December 31, 1947."}}, {"text": "High CommiJJiorttr for India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9390, "end_char": 9418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Civil Judge, however, decreed\nHigh CommiJJiorttr for India and H;, gh Commissioner for PakistaN Y.\n\nJ. ,\\f."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Gupla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11634, "end_char": 11650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Gupla\n\nTM State of Utlar\n\nPradesh\n\nImam].", "canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11740, "end_char": 11744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nThi SlaU of Uttar\n\nPrad<sh\n\nImam J.\n\nasked for time to file an additional written statement on behalf of.'", "canonical_name": "IMAM, JJ."}}, {"text": "Abdul Majid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15868, "end_char": 15879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out that in some of the rules framed by a Government or quasi- Government authority the penalty of suspension pending an inquiry was specifically provided for, such as rule 95 of the Bihar and Orissa Service Code referred to in Abdul Majid's case and rule 1711 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code.", "canonical_name": "Abdttl Majid"}}, {"text": "Om PrakashGupaJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16173, "end_char": 16188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nOm PrakashGupaJ .v.", "canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH GUPTA"}}, {"text": "also conceded that under the Classification Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16562, "end_char": 16611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16927, "end_char": 16932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further conceded that as between master and servant the former had no power of suspension unless the terms of the contract between them permitted it or a statute or a rule provided for it but his principle, he said, did not apply to a person in the service of the Crown in India."}}, {"text": "Hobhouse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19191, "end_char": 19199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this proposition he referred to the observations of Lord Hobhouse in the case of Shenton v. Smith( 1 )."}}, {"text": "Roche", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19294, "end_char": 19299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also relied upon the following observations of Lord Roche in the case of R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India in Council('). \""}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19378, "end_char": 19388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar\n\nPradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20493, "end_char": 20516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not pleaded that the order of suspension V.'as\n\n(1) (18951 A.C. 22~.\n\n('' J •. R. li4 I .A. 55\n\nOm Prakash Guf11a\n\nThe State of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nImam]."}}, {"text": "Abdttl Majid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20760, "end_char": 20772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the decision of this court in Abdttl Majid's case had been available to the courts below, they would have held that the appellant was entitled to recover arrears of salary when he had been illegally dismissed and they would have had further to decide whether the order of suspension was valid and during 'the period it was in force the appellant could recover arrears of salary.", "canonical_name": "Abdttl Majid"}}, {"text": "31st December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22179, "end_char": 22198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to exist and the appellant was entitled to recover arrears of salary from the 25th November, 1944, to -the 31st December, 1947, inclusive."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh(1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22882, "end_char": 22907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna' Naid11 v.\n\n.2 .S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPdRTS 401\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh(1)."}}, {"text": "31st of J)ecember, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24208, "end_char": 24231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The , plaintiff's suit is decreed for arrears of salary from the 25th of November, 1944, to the 31st of J)ecember, 1947, inclusive."}}, {"text": "State of Utlar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25027, "end_char": 25041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Gupta\n\nThe State of Utlar\n\nPradtsh\n\nImam].", "canonical_name": "State of Ullar"}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Gu1ta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25060, "end_char": 25076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Gu1ta\n\nTlie Stale of Ufla,\n\nPrtkhsh\n\nImam].", "canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25944, "end_char": 25963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court fee shall be paid by the appellant and the same will be recoverable by the Government of India from him and shall be the first charge on the amount decreed to him."}}, {"text": "Order XIV of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26050, "end_char": 26072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS\n\nCO., LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26188, "end_char": 26227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS\n\nCO.,"}}, {"text": "HARNAM SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26235, "end_char": 26247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARNAM SINGH AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "VMAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26262, "end_char": 26271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(VMAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and BHUVANESHWAR\n\nPRASAD SINHA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "BHUVANESHWAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26291, "end_char": 26303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(VMAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and BHUVANESHWAR\n\nPRASAD SINHA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "PRASAD SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26305, "end_char": 26317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(VMAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and BHUVANESHWAR\n\nPRASAD SINHA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26655, "end_char": 26673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XIV of the Rules", "statute": "Order XIV of the Rules"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26677, "end_char": 26701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Lyallpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26949, "end_char": 26957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Priv11te International Law-Law applic11ble to contractual obligations-English and Continental schools of thought-Lex situs and uProper I.Au/' of contract-Partition of India-Post partition debt -Action for recovery where lies-Analogy of banking transactions and insurance claims-Place of primary obligatio11-Debt, whether property-Sections 3 and 130 of Transfer of Property Act-Evacuee property laws-Pakistan (Protection of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1948 (XV/ll of 1948)-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Pro\n\nperty) Ordinance (XV) 1949-Whether confiscatory in nature\n\nDuring the years in question cloth was rationed at Lyallpur, then a part of the Punjab in undivided T ndia, and sales could only be made to government nominees and other authorised persons."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26978, "end_char": 26984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Priv11te International Law-Law applic11ble to contractual obligations-English and Continental schools of thought-Lex situs and uProper I.Au/' of contract-Partition of India-Post partition debt -Action for recovery where lies-Analogy of banking transactions and insurance claims-Place of primary obligatio11-Debt, whether property-Sections 3 and 130 of Transfer of Property Act-Evacuee property laws-Pakistan (Protection of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1948 (XV/ll of 1948)-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Pro\n\nperty) Ordinance (XV) 1949-Whether confiscatory in nature\n\nDuring the years in question cloth was rationed at Lyallpur, then a part of the Punjab in undivided T ndia, and sales could only be made to government nominees and other authorised persons."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_402_427_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Om Prakash Gu1ta\n\nTlie Stale of Ufla,\n\nPrtkhsh\n\nImam].\n\nApril 21\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1955)\n\ndismissal and that he has been paid subsistence allowance for the entire period. Such . subsistence allowance as has been paid to the appellant from the 25th of November, 1944, to the 31st December, 1947, inclusive, must, thertfore, be credited to the respondent and the same must be adjusted against the salary claimed by the appellant.\n\nA decree will accordingly be prepared stating the amount recoverable by the appellant.\n\nThe appellant was permitted to appeal in forma pauperis.\n\nAs he has succeeded in the appeal, the Registrar shall calculate the amount of court fee which would have been paid by the appellant ; f he had not been allowed to appeal as a pauper and incorporate it in the decree.\n\nThe court fee shall be paid by the appellant and the same will be recoverable by the Government of India from him and shall be the first charge on the amount decreed to him.\n\nUnder Rule 7 of Order XIV of the Rules of this Court, the appellant will be allowed the fees paid by him to his Advocates, in the taxation of costs.\n\nTHE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS\n\nCO., LTD.\n\nti.\n\nHARNAM SINGH AND OTHERS.\n\n(VMAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and BHUVANESHWAR\n\nPRASAD SINHA, JJ.)\n\nPriv11te International Law-Law applic11ble to contractual obligations-English and Continental schools of thought-Lex situs and uProper I.Au/' of contract-Partition of India-Post partition debt -Action for recovery where lies-Analogy of banking transactions and insurance claims-Place of primary obligatio11-Debt, whether property-Sections 3 and 130 of Transfer of Property Act-Evacuee property laws-Pakistan (Protection of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1948 (XV/ll of 1948)-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Pro\n\nperty) Ordinance (XV) 1949-Whether confiscatory in nature\n\nDuring the years in question cloth was rationed at Lyallpur, then a part of the Punjab in undivided T ndia, and sales could only be made to government nominees and other authorised persons. The plaintiffs rcsii!cnt in Lyallpur, were the government nominees. The\n\ndefendant company with its. head office at . Delhi, had a branch office and mills at Lyallpur, and supplied the plaintiffs with cloth from time to time in accordance with the government quota through its branch manager at Lyallpur. Their dealings lasted some 4 or 5 years prior to 1947.\n\nIn. accordance with their ontract the plaintiffs left a security deposit of Rs. 1,000 with the defendant's branch manager at Lyallpu1, aud deposited further sums of money with him from time to time at Lyallpur. The defendant supplied the plaintiffs with their quota of doth against those deposits.\n\nThere was thus a running account between the parties in which the balance was sometimes in the plaintiffs' favour and sometimes against them; when against, they paid the defendant interest on the \"overdraft\". The goods had to be supplied at Lyallpur and all moneys were paid there. The ac.· counts were kept at Lyallpur though copies were sent to the defendant's head office at Delhi.\n\nIn 1947, when India was partitic.ned, Lyallpur was assigned to\n\nPakitan. The plaintiffs thereupon Red the country and entered India as refugees. They settled in Delhi and thus became \"evacuees\" according to a Pakistan ordinance. At that time there was a balance of Rs. 11,496-6-6 in the plaintiffs favour. They accordingly made a\n\ndemand at Delhi for repayment of this sum and for return of their security deposit.\n\nIn the meanwhile the Pakistan Government issued an Ordinance\n\n(1) vesting all evacuee property in the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Pakistan ; (2) prohibiting the payment of money to evacuees; and (3) requiring all moneys payable to, or claimable by, evacuees to be paid to the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property in\n\nPakistan. Payments so made were to operate as a discharge from further liability to the extent of the payment. Breach of this law was punishable as an offence.\n\nThe Deputy Custodian demanded payment from the defendant of the moneys owing to the plaintiff. After some correspondence and demur, the payment was made as required. Thedefendant pleaded this as a defence to the action.\n\n1I dd : (I) Lyallpur was the place of primary obligation because under the contract the balance remaining at its termination was to be paid there and not elsewhere, accordingly the demand for payment made at Delhi before a demand and refusal at Lyallpur \\\\'a'; inelfocti\\e;\n\n(2) That the elements out of which the .contract to py arose were most densely grouped at Lyallpur, so Lyallpur was tne natural scat of the contract and the place with which it had its closest and most real connection. Accordingly, the \"proper law of the contract\" was the Lyallpur Law;\n\n(3) Under the English doctrine also the situs of the debt was Lyallpur; and so\n\nTire Dtlhi Cloth and GtnMal Mills\n\nCo. [Jd.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nand other1\n\nTh• D, lhi Cloth anJ GtNTal Mills\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nand otMrJ\n\n(4) either way, the Lyallpur law applied ( 5) as it obtained at Lyallpur at the time when performance 'vas due because a upropcr law\" intended as a whole to govern a contract is administcrCd as a \"living and changing body of law\", accordingly, effect is given to any changes occurring in it before pcrformancse is due;\n\n( 6) a \"debt\" being a chose in action is \"property\" within the meaning of the Pakistan Ordinance and so,\n\n(7) the money was rightly paid to the Deputy Custodian and that operated as a good discharge and exonerated the defendant from further liability.\n\nBut quaere whether different conditions would not, arise in a case where no payment is made and the defendant has no garnishable assets in Pakistan out of which the West Punjab Government could realise the debt out of the defendant's property there. ( 8) The provisions of the Pakistan ordinance relevant to the case al!' not opposed to the public policy of India and so can be relied on as a defence to an action of this nature.\n\nAppeal Allowed.\n\nMount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance, etc. (1938 A.C. 224), Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia (1951 A.C. 201 at 219), Bank of Travancore v. Dhirt Ram (69 I.A. I at 8), New\n\nYork Life [nsurance v. Public Trustee ([1924] 2 Ch. IOI at 119), Rex v. Lovitt (1912 A.C. 212), /oachinsons v. Swiss Bank Corporation ([1921] 3. K.B. 110), Arab Bank v. Barclays Bank (1954 A.C. 4~5 at 531), Fouad Bishara v.\n\nState of Israel ([1954]\n\nI A.E.R. 145), Re Chesterman's Trusts ((1923] 2 Ch. 466 at 478), Re Banque Des Marchands De Moscou ([1954] 2 A.E.R. 746), Odwin v. Forbes (1817 Buck 57) and Re. Munster ([1920] I Ch. 268), rcterred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1954.\n\nUnder Article 133 of the Constitution and section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure from the Judgment and decree date<l the 6th December 1952, of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi (Weston C.J. and Bhandari ).) in Regular First Appeal No. 72 of 1952, arising out of the ) udgment and Decree dated the 14th Day of April 1952, of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Delhi in Suit No. 657 of 1950.\n\nChatterjee, (Tarachand Brijmohan/al and B. 1'.\n\nMaheshwari, with him) for the Appellant.\n\nR. S. Naru/a, for the Respondent.\n\n1955.\n\nApril 21.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bos}. J .-The defendant appeals.\n\nThe plaintiffs were the partners of a firm known as Harnam Singh Jagat Singh.\n\nBefore the partition of India they carried on the business of cotton cloth dealers at Lyallpur which is now in Pakistan.\n\nThe defendant is the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.\n\nIt is a registered company carrying on business at Delhi and other places and has its head office at Delhi.\n\nOne of the places at which it carried on business before the partition was Lyallpur.\n\nThe plaintiffs' case is that they carried on business with the defendant company for some three or £om years before 1947 and purchased cloth from the company from time to time. In the course of their business they used to make lump sum payments to the defendant against their purchases.\n\nSometimes these were advance payments and at others the balance was against them.\n\nWhen there was an adverse balance the plaintiffs paid the defendant interest: see the plaintiff Sardari Lal as P. W. 3.\n\nOn 28-7-1947 the account stood in the plaintiffs' favour. There was a balance of Rs. 79-6-6 lying to their credit plus a deposit of Rs. 1,000 as security. On\n\ntha~ day they deposited a further Rs. 55,000 bringing the balance in their favour up to Rs. 56,079-6-6.\n\nThe defendant company delivered cloth worth Rs. 43583-0-0 to the plaintiffs against this amount at or about that time. That left a balance of Rs. 11,496-6-6.\n\nThe suit is to recover this balance plus interest.\n\nThe claim was decreed for Rs. 12,496-6-6 and this was uoheld on appeal to the High Court.\n\nThe defendant appeals here.\n\nThe defendant admits the facts set out above but defends the action on the following ground. It contends that when India was partitioned on 15-8-1947, Lyallpur, where these transactions took place and where the money is situate, was assigned to Pakistan.\n\nThe plaintiffs fled to India at this time and thus\n\nT/16 Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.\n\nHamamSingh\n\nand others\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and Gmeral Mills\n\nCo. l.Jd.\n\nHtm1am Singh\n\nand others\n\nBost].\n\nbecame evacuees and the Pakistan Government froze all evacuee assets and later compelled the defendant to hand them over to the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Pakistan.\n\nThe defendant is ready and willing to pay the money if the Pakistan Government will release it but until it does so the defendant contends that it is unable to pay and is not liable.\n\nThe only question is, what are the rights and liabilities of the parties in those circumstances? The amount involved in this suit, though substantial, is not large when compared with the number of claims by and against persons in similar plight.\n\nThe defendant itself is involved in many simllar transactions. A list of them appears in Ex. D-11.\n\nMohd Bashir Khan, D. W. I, says that the total comes to Rs. 1,46,209-1-9.\n\nThe defendant has accordingly chosen to defend this action as a test case.\n\nThe further facts are as follows. At the relevant period, before the partition, cloth was retained and its distribution controlled in, among other places, the Punjab where Lyallpur is situate. According to the scheme, quotas were allotted to different areas and the manufacturers and suppliers of cloth could only distribute their cloth to retailers in accordance with those quotas, and dealers in those areas could only import cloth up to and in accordance with the quotas allotted to them.\n\nIf the suppliers themselves had a retail shop or business in a given area, then the qurita for that area was divided between the supplier and a Government quota-holder or quota-holders called the nominated importer or importers. The local agency of the suppliers was permitted to import up to the portion of the quota allotted to it in that area and the suppliers were obliged to give the balance of the quota to the Government quota-holder or holclers.\n\nThe plaintiffs were the Government quota-holders for Lyallpur and the defendant company also carried on business there through the General Manager of the Lyallpur Mills.\n\nIt is admitted that the defendant owns these mills but it is a matter of dispute before us whether the mills are a branch of the defendant company; but\n\nwhatever the exact status of the Lyallpur mills may be, it is clear from the evidence and the documents that the General Manager of these mills conducted the defendant's cotton business at Lyallpur.\n\nIt seems that the deails of the cloth distribution scheme for Punjab, in so far as it affected the defendant company, were contained in a letter of the 24th October 1945 from the Secretary, Civil Supplies Department, Punjab.\n\nThat letter has not been filed and so we do not know its exact contents but reference to it is found in a series of letters written by the defendant company from Delhi to the District Magistrate at Lyallpur.\n\nThose letters range in date from 3-1-1946 to 19-4-1947: (Exs. P-5 to P-12).\n\nThey are all in the same form, only the figures' and dates differ.\n\nIt wiil be enough to quote the first, Ex. P-5.\n\nIt is dated 3-1-1946 and is from the Central Marketing Organisation of the defendant company, the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. It is written from Delhi to the District Magistrate, Lyallpur, and is as follows:\n\n\"The District Magistrate, Lyallpur.\n\nRe: Cloth Distribution Scheme.\n\nDear Sir Ref: Letttr No. 15841-CL-(D)-45/8342 of 24th Oct. 1945 from Secretary, Civil Supplies Deptt., Punjab Govt., Lahore.\n\nKindly note that we have allotted 28 bales for your district for the month of January 1946.\n\nOut of this a quantity of 18 bales will be despatched to our Retail stores in your district/State and the balance of 10 bales will be available for delivery to your nominated importer.\n\nWe shall be. obliged if you kindly issue instructions to your nominated importer to collect these goods from us within 15 <lays of the two dates for delivery fixed, namely by the 20th of January and 5th of February 1946 respectively. It may be noted that th~ first half quota will lapse in case delivery is\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nCo. I.Jc!.\n\nHamam Sing;,\n\nand others\n\nBose].\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. lid.\n\nHarnam Sin, gh\n\nand olhers\n\nBose].\n\nnot taken by you by the former date and the second half will lapse if not taken by the latter date.\n\nYours faithfully, , D.C. & Gen. Mills Co., Ltd.\" In each case a copy was sent to the plaintiffs marked as follows:\n\n\"Copy to nominated imported:- Jagat Singh Harnam Singh, Cloth Merchants, Lyallpur\".\n\nThe Indian Independence Act, 1947 was passed on 18-7-1947 and the disrict of Lyallpur was assigned to Pakistan subject to the award of the Boundary Commission. Then followed the partition on 15-8-1947 and at or about that time the plaintiffs fled to India.\n\nThis made them evacuees according to a later Ordinance.\n\nBut before that Ordinance was promulgated the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies, who was also an Under Secretary to the West Punjab Government, wrote to the defendant's General Manager at Lyallpur (the General Manager of the Lyallpur Cloth Mills) on 17-2-1948 and told him that-\n\n\"The amount deposited by the non-Muslim dealers should not be refunded to them till further orders\".\n\n(Ex. D-1).\n\nThe defendant did all it could, short of litigation, to protest this order and to try and get it set aside. Its General Manager at Lyallpur wrote letters to the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies on 14-4-48, 9-8-48 (Exs. D-2 and D-4), 23-4-49 (Ex. D-7) and 6-6-49 (Ex- D-8), but the replies were unfavourable.\n\nOn 30-4-48 the Assistant Director said that \"in no case\" should the sums be refunded (Ex. D-3) and on 1-11-48 directed that these amounts should be deposited with the Custodian of Evacuee Property (Ex. D-5).\n\nThis was in accordance with an Ordinance which was then in force.\n\nLater, on 8-11-48, the General Manager received orders from the Deputy Custodian that the moneys should be deposited with the Deputy Custodian (Ex. D-6) and on 23-6-49 these orders were repeated by the Custodian (Ex. D-9).\n\nMeanwhile, the plaintiffs, who by thm had shifted\n\nto Delhi, made a series of demands on the defendant in Delhi for payment.\n\nThese are dated 3-1-49 (Ex.\n\nP. W. 4/4), 27-1-49 (Ex. P.W. 4/1), 11-3-49 (Ex. P.W. 4/3) and 26-3-49 (Ex. P. W. 4/2).\n\nThe defendant's attitude i> summed up in its letter to the plaintiffs dated 12-2-49 (Ex. P-3).\n\nThe defendant said that it had received orders from the West Punjab Government, through the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies, not to make any refunds without the orders of the West Punjab Government.\n\nOn 15-10-1949 the Ordinance of 1948 was replaced by • Ordinance No. XV of 1949 (Ex. D-26) but that made no difference to the law about evacuee funds and properties.\n\nOn 4-7-1950 the plaintiffs served the defendant with notice of suit (Ex. P-14). This notice was forwarded to the defendant's General Manager at Lyallpur by the defendant's Managing Director in Delhi urging the General Manager to try and obtain the sanction of the West Punjab Government for payment of the money to the plaintiffs; and on 27-7-1950 the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs saying-\n\n\"We confirm that the sum of Rs. 11,496-6-6 and Rs 1,000 are due to you on account of your advance deposit and security deposit respectively with our Lyallpur Cotton Mills, Lyallpur, and the sum will be refunded to you by the said Mills as soon as order of prohibition to refund such deposits issued by the West Punjab Government and served upon the said Mills is withdrawn or cancelled, and that your claim shall not be prejudiced by the usual time limit of three years having been exceeded\". (Ex. P-4).\n\nThe defendant's reply did not satisfy the plaintiffs, so they instituted the present suit on 16-12-1950.\n\nAfter the suit, the defendant's Managing Director wrote personally to the Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan on 2-4-1951 but was told on 21-4-1951 that the matter had been carefully examined and that the money must be deposited with the Custodian (Ex. D-25).\n\nA second attempt was made on 30-4-1951 (Ex.\n\nD-24) and the Joint Secretary was again approached.\n\nSoon after, an Extraordinary 8-83 S. C. India/59\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nOJ. Ltd. v.\n\nHamamSingh and others\n\nBm].\n\nTh< Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nand others\n\nOrdinance was promulgated on 9-5-1951 (Ex. D-27) exempting \"cash deposits of individuals in banks\" from the operation of the main Ordinance.\n\nBut the Joint Secretary wrote on 2-6-1951 that this did not apply to private debts and deposits and again asked the defendant to deposit the money with the Custodian (Ex. D-23).\n\nFinally, the Custodian issued a.n order on 6-11-1951 directing that the deposits be made by the 15th of that month, \"failing which legal action will have to be taken against you\". (Ex. D-10). The money was deposited on 15-11-1951 on the last day of grace (Ex D-12).\n\nThe first question that we must determine is the exact nature of the contract from which the obligation which the plaintiffs seek to enforce arises.\n\nThe sum claimed in the suit, aside from the interest, is made up of three items : ( 1) Rs. 79-6-6 outstanding from a prev10us account;\n\n(2) Rs. 11,496-6-6 being the balance of a sum of Rs. 55,000 deposited on 28-7-1947; and\n\n(3) Rs. 1,000 as security.\n\nThe three items appear to be linked up but we will, for the moment, concentrate on the largest, the deposit of Rs. 55,000.\n\nBoth sides have spoken of it as a \"deposit\" throughout but we will have to examine its exact nature because deposits are of various kinds and it will be necessary to know which sort this was before we can apply the law.\n\nUnfortunately, the evidence is meagre and scrappy, so we have been obliged to piece much disjointed mattrial together to form an intelligible pattern.\n\nIt is admitted that the distribution of cloth in this area was controlled by the Government of Punjab (in undivided India) at all material times.\n\nIt is also admitted that the plaintiffs were, what were called \"Government nominees\" for Lyallpur.\n\nIn the plaint the plaintiffs also called themselves the \"reserve dealer\".\n\nThis term has not been explained but the use of these words and the words \"nominated importer'', indicates that the plaintiffs occupied a privileged position.\n\nThe letters (Exs. P-5 to P-12), on\n\nwhich the plaintiffs relied very strongly, also point to that; Ex. P-5, for example, shows that the defendant was obliged to give 10 bales out of a quota of 28 for that area to the plaintiffs under the orders of the Punjab Government and could only keep 18 for its own retail stores in the month of January\n\n1946. In April the defendant was allowed to keep all 28 but in July the distribution was 35 : 25 in the plaintiff's favour.\n\nIn September, November (1946) and April 1947 it was half and half.\n\nIn February and March 1947 it was 10 : 26 and 29 : 26 for the plaintiffs and the defendant's stores respectively.\n\nNow, ordinarily, a privilege has to be paid for and it seems that the price of this privilege was (1) payment of a security deposit of Rs. 1,000 and (2) payment of a second deposit against which cloth was issued from time to time in much the same way as a banker hands out money to a customer against deposits of money in a current account, only here the payments were issues of cloth instead of sums of money. We draw this inference from what we have said abovt and from the following facts:\n\n(1) Both sides have called the payment a \"deposit\" in their pleadings;\n\n(2) The plaintiffs speak of receiving goods \"against this deposit\" (paragraph 3 of the plaint) and Mohd.\n\nBashir Khan (D. W. 1) of delivery being made \"against this advance\";\n\n(3) The plaintiff Sardari Lal (P. W. 3) says that the parties have been carrying on dealings for 3 or 4 years and that \"advances used to be macie to the mills from time to time. Sometimes our balance stood at credit\";\n\n(4) Sardari Lal says that when their balance was on the debit side, they paid the defendant's interest but defendant paid no interest when the balance was in the plaintiffs' favour. (This is the position when there is an overdraft in a bank) ;\n\n(5) There was a balance of Rs. 79-6-6 standing in the plaintiffs' favour when the deposit of Rs. 55,000 was made;\n\n(6) The plaintiffs said in their letter (Ex. P. W. 4/1)\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and Genlral Mills Co. Ltd. v.\n\nHamamSingh\n\nand olhtrl\n\nThe D1lhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Lid.\n\nHamamSingh\n\nand othlrs\n\n&se].\n\nto the defendant that they had a \"current account\" with the defendant in which a sum of Rs. 11,496-6-6 was in \"reserve account\".\n\nThis figure of Rs. 11,496-6-6 is made up by including the old balance of Rs. 79-6-6 in this account;\n\n(7) In their letter Ex. P-14 the plaintiffs said that they had \"deposited\" money in the plaintiffs' account at Lyallpur \"as reserve dealers\", against that they received goods leaving a balance of Rs. 11,496-6-6.\n\nAgain, this figure includes Rs. 79-6-6.\n\nAll tJiis shows that the payment of Rs. 55,000 was not just an advance payment for a specified quantity of goods but was a running account very like a customer's current account in a bank.\n\nThe only matter that can be said to indicate the contrary is the fact that the defendant has listed this 1 money in Ex.\n\nD 11 under the head \"Purchaser's\\:._ advance\"~-:- But the . -mere use; o£. this term cannot alter the substace of the trarisaons - any more than the mere use of the. word \"deposit\". The fact that the parties choose to call it this or that is; of course, relevant but is not conclusive, and in order to determine the true nature of a transaction it is necessary to view it as a whole .and to consider other factors.\n\nBut in this case we need not speculate because the plaintiffs have themselves ' \"!<plained the sense in which the term \"Purchasers advance account\" is used. In their statement of the case whieh they filed here, they say-\n\n\"The defendants maintained a 'Purchasers advance account' in their books at Delhi. The plaintiffs used to pay the defendants advance amounts against which cloth was supplied and the balance had to be adjusted periodically\".\n\nBut the banking analogy must not be pushed too far.\n\nThe stress laid by the parties on the terms \"Government nominees'', \"nominated importer'' and \"reserve dealer\", both in the correspondence and in the pleadings and evidence, suggests that the defendant was dealing with the plaintiffs in their capacity of \"Government nominees\" and that, in . its turn, imports the condition that the dealings would stop the moment the plaintiffs ceased to occupy that privileged position.\n\nAs we have seen, the import of cloth was controlled by the Punjab Government at all relevant times with the result that the defendant could not sell to anybody it pleased.\n\nThe salr.s had to be to the Government nominees.\n\nTherefore, if Government withdrew their recognition, the defendant would not have been able to sell to the plaintiffs any longer and it is fair to assume that the parties did not contemplate a continuance of their relationship in such an eventuality.\n\nBut, as this was not a definite contract for the supply of a given quantity of goods which were to be delivered in instalments but a course of dealings with a running account, it is also reasonable to infer that the parties were at liberty to put an end to their business relationship at any time they pleased by giving due notice to the other side and in that event whichever side owed money to the other Would have to pay. But, either way, the place of performance would, in these circumstances, be Lyallpur.\n\nWe say this because all the known factors were situate in Lyallpur. The plaintiffs were the Government nominees for Lyallpur and they were resident there. The defendant carried oh business there and the goods had to be delivered at Lyallpur and could not be delivered elsewhere, and so performance was to be there. The accounts were kept at Lyallpur, and though copies appear to have been forwarded to Delhi from time to time, the books were situate there and the Lyallpur office would be the only place to know the up-tothe minute state of the accounts.\n\nIn the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume, as in the case of banking and insurance (matters we shall deal with presently), that on the termination of the contract the balance was to be paid at Lyallpur and not elsewhere.\n\nThat localises the place of primary obligation.\n\nThis also, in our opinion, imports another factor.\n\nThe defendant in Delhi would not necessarily know of any change of recognition by the Lyallpur authorities.\n\nThe correspondence with the Collector indicates that the Government nominee cleared the goods from the defendant's Lyallpur godowns under the < orders of the District Magistrate.\n\nIf, therefore, the\n\nThi Delhi Cloth and Gaural Milli\n\nCo. l.Jd.\n\nHatn1Jm Singh\n\nand othtts\n\nBOii J.\n\nThe Iklhi Cloth and Genr.al Mills Co. Lid.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nanti othtrJ\n\nBose].\n\nnominee was suddenly changed, intimation of this fact would have to be given to the defendant at Lyallpur and not at Delhi, otherwise there would be a time lag in which the defendant's Lyallpur office might easily deliver the goods to the plaintiffs as usual despite withdrawal of the recognition.\n\nEverything therefore points to the fact that the notice of termination would have to be given at Lyallpur and the obligation to return the balance would not arise until this notice of termination was received.\n\nThat obligation would therefore necessarily arise at Lyallpur.\n\nThe plaintiff's learned counsel argued very strongly that the defendant's Lyallpur business was carried on from Delhi and that the accounts were kept there, that there was no branch office at Lyallpur and that Lyallpur had no independent local control of the business. He relied on the letters written by the defendant to the District Magistrate, Lyallpur, about the allotments of quotas (Exs. P-5 to P-12) and also on Ex. D7, a letter written by the defendant's General Manager at Lyallpur to the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property at Lyallpur in which he say that a\n\n\"complete list showing' the list of all non-Muslims falling under item (3) with the amount to be paid has been asked for from our Head Office and will be submitted as soon as received\".\n\nCounsel contended that the Lyallpur people had so little to do with the accounts that they were not able to supply even a list of the persons who dealt with them. They had to find that out from Delhi.\n\nThese matters should have been put to the defendant's witnesses.\n\nEx. D-7 was written in reply to a letter from the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property.\n\nThat letter is Ex. D-6 and in it the Deputy Custodian refers to some earlier correspondence with the Under Secretary to the West Punjab Government, Lahore, which has not been filed. When we turn ro the list that was eventually supplied from Delhi (Ex.\n\nD-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar. Obviously, a local office like the Lyallpur office would not be in\n\na pos11:1on to supply that sort of information.\n\nThe defendant's accountant at Lyallpur, Sewa Ram (P. W. 4), says that--\n\n\"Purchasers' deposits at Lyallpur were not recorded in the books of the defendant at Delhi but statements used to be despatched from there to Delhi.\n\nAn account book was prepared from statements received from Lyallpur.\n\nThat book is known as 'Reference Book'\".\n\nPresumably, that would also be the practice of the other branch offices, so the head office would be the only place from where a general overall picture (which appears to be what was asked for) could be obtained.\n\nNow, the plaintiffs resided at Lyallpur at all relevant times and the defendant carried on business there through a local General Manager. We do not know where the contract was made but we do know that the plaintiff's contracted in a special capacity that was localised at Lyallpur, namely as the Government nominees for Lyallpur.\n\nWe know that the goods were to be delivered at Lyallpur and could not be delivered anywhere else. We know that there was a running account and that that accom;1t was kept at Lyallpur, and we have held that the \"debt\" did not become due till the defendant was given notice at Lyallpur that the business relationship between the parties had terminated. The termination came about because of acts that arose at Lyallpur, namely the assignment of Lyallpur to the newly created State of Pakistan and the flight of the plaintiffs from Lyallpur which made further performance of the primary contract impossible.\n\nThe only factors that do not concern Lyallpur are the defendant's residence in India and the demands for payment made in Delhi.\n\nThe fact of demand is not material because the obligation to pay arose at the date of termination and arose at Lyallpur, but if a demand for payment is essential then it would, along the lines of the banking and insurance cases to which we shall refer later, have to be made at Lyallpur and a demand made elsewhere would be ineffective.\n\nOn these facts we hold that the clements of this contract, that is to say, the contract\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nand others\n\nBose].\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.\n\nHarnam Sinz'i\n\nand otherJ\n\nBose].\n\nout of which the obligation to pay arose, were most densely grouped at Lyallpur and that that was its natural seat and the place with which the transaction had its closest and most real connection.\n\nIt follows from this that the \"proper law of the contract\", in so far as that is material, was the Lyallpur law.\n\nWe have next to see when notice to close the account and a demand for return of the balance was made and where. The plaintiff Jagat Singh (P. W. 5) says that he made a written demand in October 1947.\n\nBut the earliest demand we have on record is Ex.\n\nP.W. 4/4 dated 3-1-1949.\n\nIt is understandable that the plaintiffs, who had to flee for their lives would have no copies of their correspondence, but it is a matter for comment that the demand which is filed (Ex. P.W. 4/4) does not refer to an earlier demand or demands. The defendant was asked to produce all the correspondence because the plaintiffs had lost their own files.\n\nThe defendant produced all we have on record and no suggestion was made that anything had been suppressed. Consequently we are not prepared to accept the plaintiffs' statement and we hold that there was no demand before 3-1-1949.\n\nAnother point is that the earlier demand, even if made, could not have been made at Lyallpur. The plaintiff Jagat Singh says he made the demand to the defendant's Managing Director.\n\nHe resides in Delhi and the plaintiffs had by then fled from Pakistan.\n\nTherefore, Jhe demand could not have been made at l yallpur, and \"apart frqm those demands, there is no other notice of termination, so technically, the defendant would have been justified in declining to pay on the strength of a demand made in Delhi. The same 'defect attaches to Ex. P.W. 4/4.\n\nHowever, we are fortunately absolved from the need to base on so technic!al a ground.\n\nNow at the date Qf the demand the Pakistan Ordinance (Ex. D-26) was in force and under it the defendant was prohibited from paying the money to the plaintiffs who were evacuees according to Pakistan laws. The defendant was directed, instead, to deposit the money with the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee\n\nProperty.\n\nThis was done on 15-11-1951 (Ex. D-12) and the deposit was made along with other similar deposits.\n\nWe now have to determine the legal liabilities which arise out of these facts.· This raises complex questions of private international law, and two distinct lines of thought emerge. One is that applied by the English Courts, namely, the lex situs; the other is the one favoured by Cheshire in. his book on Private\n\nInternational Law, namely, the \"proper law of the contract\".\n\nThe English approach is to treat the debt as property and determine its situs and then, in general, to apply the law that obtains there at the date when payment is due.\n\nBut the difficulty of the English view is that they have different sets of rules for ascertaining' the situs, with the result that the situs shifts from place to place for different purposes, also that it is determined by intention.\n\nThus, it can be in one place for purposes of jurisdiction and in others for those of banking, insurance, death duties and probate.\n\nThe situs also varies in the cases of simple contract debts and those of speciality.\n\nThat a debt is property is, we think, clear. It is a chose in action and is heritable and assignable and it is treated as property in India under the Transfer of Property Act which, calls it an \"actionable claim\":\n\nsection 3 and 130.\n\nBut to give it position in space is not easy because it is intangible and so cannot have location except notionally and in order to give it notional position rules have to be framed along arbitrary lines.\n\nCheshire points out in his book on Private International Law, 4th edition, pages 449 to 451 that the situs rule is not logical and leads to practical difficulties when there is a succession of assignments because it is not possible to fix the situation of a debt under the situs rule in one place and only one place.\n\nSpeaking of that Cheshire, quoting Foote, where Foote says that the assignment of a chose in action arising out of a contract is governed by the \"proper law of the contract\" paraphrases Foote thus at page 450-\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.\n\nHamamSfogh\n\nand oths\n\nBoseJ.\n\nTM Delhi a.th and C-aJ Mills\n\nCo. lid.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nand others\n\nBose].\n\n\"If we understand him correctly, the appropriate law is not the 'proper law' (using that expression in its contractual sense) of the assignment, but the proper law of the original transaction out of which the chose in action arose. It is reasonable and logical to refer most questions relating to a debt to the transaction in which it has its source and to the legal system which governs that transaction ... . One undeniable merit of this is that, where there have been assignments m different countries, no confusion can arise from a conflict of laws, since all questions are referred to a single legal system\".\n\nThe expression the \"proper law of the contract\" has been carefully analysed by Cheshire in Cha pt er VIII of his book. In Mount Albert Borough Council v.\n\nAustralasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society (1 ) Lord Wright defined it at page 240 as\n\n\"that law which the English or other Court is to apply m determining the obligations under the contract\", that is. to say, obligation as contrasted with performance.\n\nLord Wright drew the distinction between obligation and performance at page 240. In a later case. Lord Simonds described it as\n\n\"the system of law by reference to which the contract was made or that with which the transaction has it~ closest and most real connexion\". Bonython v.\n\nCommonwealth of Australia(').\n\nCheshire sets out the definition given by some American Courts at page 203 and adopts it:\n\n\"It is submitted that, at any rate with regard to the question of valid creation, the proper law is the law of the country in which the contract is localized.\n\nIts localization will be indicated by what may be called the grouping of its elements as reflected in its formation and in its terms. The country in which its elements are most densely grouped will represent its natural seat .... the country with which the contract is in fact most substantially associated and in which lies its natural seat or centre of gravity\".\n\n(I) 1938 A. C. 224.\n\n(2) 1951 A. C. 201, 219.\n\nThis involves two considerations. The first is whether the proper law is to be ascertained objectively or whether parties are free to fix it subjectively by ranging over the world and picking out whatever laws they like from any part of the globe and agreeing that those laws shall govern their contract.\n\nCheshire points out at page 202 that \"the subjective theory may produce strangely unrealistic results.\" It is also obvious that difficulties will arise if the contract is illegal or against public policy according to the laws of the country in which it is sought to be enforced though lawful according to the laws . of the country which the parties choose: see Lord Wright in Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance, etc.\n\nSociety( 1 ) at page 240.\n\nCheshire prefers the view of an American Judge which he quotes at page 203--\n\n\"Some law must impose the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatsoever to do with that, no more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes\".\n\nThe contract we are considering is silent about these matters.\n\nThere is no express provision either about the law that is to obtain or about the .situs.\n\nWe have therefore to examine the rules that obtain when that is the case.\n\nThe most usual way .of expressing the law in that class of case is to say that an intention must be implied or imputed. In the Bank of Travancore v. Dhrit Ram( 1 ), Lord Atkin said that when no intention is expressed in the contract the Courts are left to infer one by reference to considerations where the contract was made and how and where it was to be performed and by the nature of the business or transaction to which it refers.\n\nIn the Mount Albert Borough Council case(1 ), Lord Wright put it this way at page 24{}.o-\n\n\"The parties may not have thought of the matter at all. Then the Court has to impute an intention, or to determine for the parties what is the proper law which, as just and reasonable persons, they ought or would have intended if they had thought about the question when they made the contract\".\n\n(1) 1938 A. C. 1111+\n\n(11) 6g I. A. 1, 8.\n\nT Ill Dtlhi Clot!t and Gmeral Mills\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nY1 HamamSingh\n\nand otlwrs\n\nBose].\n\nThi Delhi Cloth and C-al Mills\n\nCo. Lid.\n\n, y • . Harnam Singh\n\nand others\n\nBost J.\n\nBut, to us, it seems unnecessarily artificial to impute an intention when we know there was none, especially in a type of case where the parties would never have contracted at all if t\\ley had contemplated the possibility of events turning out as they did.\n\nIn our opinion, what the Courts really do, when there is no express provision, is to apply an objective test, though they appear to regard the intention subjectively, and that is also Cheshire's conclusion at page 201 where, after reviewing the English decisions, he says-\n\n\"In other words, the truth may be that the judges, though emphasising .in unrestricted terms the omnipotence of intention, in fact do nothing more than impute to the parties an intention to submit their contract to the law of the country with which factually it is most closely connected\".\n\nIf driven to a choice, we would prefer this way of stating the law but we need not deCide this because, so far as the present case is concerned, the result is the same whether we apply the proper law of the contract or the English rules about the lex situs.\n\nIt may be that in some future case this Court will have to choose between these two views but the question bristles with difficulties and it is not necessary for us to make the choice here.\n\nAll we wish to do here is to indicate that we have considered both and have envisaged case> where perhaps a choice will have to be made.\n\nWe gather that English judges fall back on the lex situs and make rules for determining the position of a debt for historical reasons. Atkin, L. J. said in Netu Yark Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee(') that the rules laid down in England are derived from the practice of ecclesiastical authorities in granting ad ministration because their jurisdiction was limited territorially.\n\n\"The ordinary had only a jurisdiction within a particular territory, and the question whether he \\'lhould issue letters of administration depended upon whether or not assets were to be found within his\n\n(1) [1924] 2 Ch. 101, 11g.\n\njurisdiction, and the test in respect of simple contracts was: Where was the debtor residing? ...... the reason why the residence of the debtor was adopted as that which determined where the debt was situate was because it was in that place where the debtor was that the creditor could, in fact, enforce payment of the debt\".\n\n(See also Dicey's Conflict of Laws, 6th edition, page 303). The rules, therefore, appear to have been arbitrarily selected for practical purposes and because they were found to be convenient.\n\nBut despite that the English Courts have never treated them as rigid~ They have only regarded them as prima f acie presumptions in the absence of anything express in the contract itself: see Lord Wright's speech in Mount Albert Borough Council case(t) at page\n\n240. Also, many exceptions have been engrafted to meet modern conditions.\n\nAktin, L. J. draws attention to one in New York Life Insurance Company v.\n\nPublic Trustee(2) at page 120 where he says--\n\n. 'therefore, cases do arise where a debt may be enforced in one jurisdiction, and the debtor, being an: ordinary living person, resides elsewhere\".\n\nSo also Lord Wright in Mount Albert Borough Cottnci! case( 1 ) at page 240---\n\n\"lt is true that, when stating this general rule, there are qualifications to be borne in mind, as tor instance, that the law of the place of performance will prima facie govern the incidents or mode of performance, that is, performance as contrasted with obligation\".\n\nand at page 241 he says-\n\n\"Again, different considerations may arise in particular cases, as, for instance, where the stipulated performance is illegal by the law of the place of performance\".\n\nAnd so also Lord Robson in Rex v. Lovitt(8 ) at page 220--\n\n\"lt cannot mean that for all purposes the actual situation of the property of a deceased owner is to be\n\n(1) 1938 A. C. 2~.\n\n(2) [11924) 2Cb. 101, 119.\n\n(3) 1912 /'.. c. 212.\n\nT!d D1/hi Clolh atld Gmeral Milli\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nHarnamrsingh\n\nand others\n\nBose].\n\nT 1u Delhi Cloth dlld G•newal MiU1\n\nCo. Lid.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nand Dl/i4rl\n\nJJ4UJ.\n\nignored and regard had only to the testator's domicil, for executors find themselves obliged in order to get the property at all to take out ancillary probate according to the locality where such property is properly recoverable, and no leg! fiction as to its 'following the owner' so as to be theoretically situate elsewhere will avail them\".\n\nAnd he says at page 221 that these rules are only \"for certain limited purposes\".\n\nIn banking transactions the following rules are now settled: ( 1) the obligation of a bank to pay the cheques of a customer rests primarily on the branch at which he keeps his account and the bank can rightly refuse to cash a cheque at any other branch: Rex v. Lovitt (1 ) at 219, Bank of Travancore v. Dhn't 'R.am( ') and New York Life Insurance Company v.\n\nPublic Trustee(') at page 117; (2) a customer must make a demand for payment at the branch where his current account is kept before he has a cause of action against the bank: /oachimson v. Swiss Bank\n\nCorporation(•) quoted with approval by Lord Reid in Arab Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank(\").\n\nThe rule is the same whether the account is a current account or whether it is a case of deposit.\n\nThe last two cases refer to a current account; the Privy Council case (Bank of Travancore v. Dhrit Ram( 1 )) was a case of deposit.\n\nEither way, there must be a demand by the customer at the branch where the current account is kept, or where . .the deposit is made and kept, before the bank need pay, and for these reasons the English Courts hold that the situs of the debt is at the place where the current account is kept and where the demand must be made.\n\nThis class of case form~ an exception to the rule that a debtor must seek his creditor because, though that is the general rule, there is nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing, if they wish, that that shall not be the duty of the debtor and, as Lord Ried explains in the Arab Bank case(6 ) at page .531, a contract of current account necessarily implies an (•l [1912] A.G. 212.\n\n(2) 69 I. A. 1, 8 and q. (3 [1924] 2 Ch. 101, 110. .\n\n(4) [1921] 3 K.B. 119.\n\n(5) 1954A.C.49s, 531.\n\nagreement that that shall not be the bank's duty, otherwise the whole object of the contract would be frustrated.\n\nWe have stressed the word \"primarily\" because the rules we have set out relate to the primary obligation.\n\nIf the bank wronglyrefuses to pay when a demand is made at the proper place and time, then it could be sued at its head office as well as at its branch office and, possibly, wherever it could be found, though we do not decide that.\n\nBut the reason is that the action is then, not on the debt, but on the breach of the contract to pay at the place specified in the agreement: see Warrington, L. J. at page 116 and Atkin, L. J. at page 121 of New York Life Insurance\n\nCo. v. Public Trustee(1).\n\nNow the rules set out above are not confined to the business of banking.\n\nThey are of wider application and have also been applied in insurance cases: Fouad Bishara Jabbour v. State of Israel( 1 ) and New York Life Insurance Co. v. Public Trustee( 1. ).\n\nSimilar considerations obtain in England when an involuntary assignment of a debt is effected by garnishment.\n\nCheshire has collected a list of English cases at pages 460 to 463 of his Private International Law from which we have quoted above. He sums up the position at page 461 thus-\n\n\"It is difficult to state the rule with exactitude, but it is probably true to say that a debt is properly garnishable in the country where, according to the ordinary usages of business, it would normally be regarded as payable\".\n\nBut when all is said and done, we find that in every one of these cases the proper law of the contract was applied, that is , to say, the law of the country in which its elements were most densely grouped and with which factually the contract was most closely connected.\n\nIt is true the judges purport to apply thC! lex situs but in determining the situs they apply rules (and modify them where necessary to suit changing modern conditions) which in fact are the very rules\n\n(2) [1954] I A. E. R. 145.\n\nThi D•lhi Cloth and General Milli\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nHamamSingh\n\nand othus\n\nBo11].\n\nTh• Delhi Cloth anti G11Mral Mills\n\nCo. IJd.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nand olMrs\n\nBos1].\n\nwhich in practice would beused to determine the proper law of the contract.\n\nThe English Judges say that whn the intention is not express one must be inferred and the rules they have made come to this: that as reasonable men they must be taken to have intended that the proper law of the contract should obtain.· The other view is that the intention does not govern even when express and that the proper law must be applied objectively. But either way, t'ie result is the same when there is no express term. The \"proper law\" is in fact applied and for present purposes it does not matter whether that is done for the reasons given by Cheshire or because the fluid English rules that centre round the lex situs lead to the same - conclusion in this class of case.\n\nThat, however, raises a further question. Which is the proper law? The law that obtains when the contract was made and the obligation fashioned or the law in force at the time when performance is due?\n\nHere again, we think the answer is correctly given by Cheshire at page 210, quoting Wolff's Private International law, page 424, and Re.\n\nChesterrhan's Trusts( 1 ) :\n\n\"A proper law intended as a whole to govern a contract is administered as 'a living and changing body of law' and effect is given to any changes occurring in it before performance falls due\".\n\nThis is what the English Courts did in New York Insurance Co. v. Public Trustee(\"), Re. Banque Des Marchands De Moscou( 8 ), Fouad Bishara Jabbour v.\n\nState of Israel('), and Arab Bank Ld. v.\n\nBarclays Bank(')· They were all cases in which the law changed because of the outbreak of war and where performance became impossible because of local legislation.\n\nIn the last two cases, the debts vested in the Custodian because of local legislation and payment by the debtor to the Custodian was regarded as a good dis- Charge of the debt.\n\nThe position in those two cases was just what it is here.\n\n(1) [1923) •Ch. 466, 478.\n\n(o) f19•4) • Ch. 101.\n\n(3) [1954) • A. E. R. 746.\n\n(4) 1954) 1 A. E. R. 14?;-\n\n(5) [1954) A. c. 495, 509.\n\nCounsel argued that as Lyallpur was part of India, when the contract was made, the Indian law must be applied and that no different intention can be.imputed to the parties.\n\nBut that is not the law, as we understand it, whether we apply the \"proper law\" or the situs rules.\n\nThe proper law will be the law at Lyallpur applied as a living and changing whole, and this would have been the case even if India had not been divided, because each State had the right to make different local laws even in undivided India, as witness the different money lending laws and the cloth and grain control orders : indeed this very case is an illustration of that, for the controls which gave rise to this very contract were not uniform throughout India.\n\nBut even apart from the \"proper law\" the decision of the Privy Council in Arab Bank Ld. v.\n\nBarclays Bank._(1) and of the Queens Bench Division in Fouad Bishara Jabbour v. State of lsrael(2) negatives this contention when .an intention has to be imputed or a clause in the contract implied.\n\nIt is necessary however, to bear in mind that,. under modern conditions, choses in action arising out of contract have two aspects : ( 1) as property and\n\n(2) as involving a contractual obligation for performance.\n\nThe property aspect is relevant for purposes of assignment, administration, taxation and the like ; the contractual aspect for performance.\n\nIn the present case, we are primarily concerned with the property aspect because the Pakistan Ordinance regards debts as property and vests all evacuee property in the Custodian and requires every person holding such property to surrender it to the Custodian on pain of penalties prescribed by the Ordinance, and section 11 (2) states that- \" Any person who makes a payment under subsection ( 1) shall be discharged from further liability to pay to the extent of the payment made\".\n\nThe payment was made and that, in our opinion, exonerated the defendant from further liability. Such payment would operate as a good discharge even under the English rules : see Fouad Bishara fflbbour. v.\n\n(1) [1954) A. C. 495, 529.\n\n(2) [1954] 1 A. E. R. 1~5- 9-83 S. C. India/59\n\nThi Dtlhi Cloth and G1116ral Mills\n\nCo.Ud. ....\n\nHomtlfli Singh\n\nandotltns\n\nBou].\n\nT Ir< Delhi Clolh and Genesal Mills\n\nCo. !Jd.\n\nti HomamSingh\n\nand other•\n\nBose],\n\nState of Israel(') at page 154 where a number of English authorities are cited, including a decision of the Privy Council in Odwin v. Forbes,(2).\n\nThat was also the result of the decisions in the following English cases, which are similar to this, though the basis of the decisions was the situs of the debt and the multiple residence of corporations: Fouad Bishara Jabbour\n\nv. State of Israel('), Re. Banque Des Marchands De Moscou(•) and Arab Bank Ld. v. Barclays Bank(').\n\nThe same result follows from the decision of the Judicial Committee in the Bank of Travancore Ltd. v.\n\nDhrit Ram(\") where Lord Atkin said-\n\n\"When consideration is being given to the question, what law did the parties intend to govern the contract? It seems proper to bear in mind that the promisor is a bank incorporated under Travancore law with, apparently, some connection with the State of Travancore, and governed as to its business by any law of Travancore that may affect banking .... \".\n\nThe only difference between that case and this is that at the date of the deposit in this case there was no difference between the laws of Punjab and Delhi on the present point. But they could have differed even if India had not been divided, as we have just pointed out.\n\nThe English cases are, however, in point , and we can see little in principle to distinguish them from this case.\n\nThe learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents argued ' that even if the law is what we have said, the Pakistan Ordinance does not apply to this case be-1 cause \" a cash deposit in a bank\" is excluded.\n\nThe argument was basec1 on the definition of \"property\" in section 2(5) of the Ordinance. But this is not a cash depo.sit in a bank as between the plaintiffs and the defendant. It is a debt which the defendant owes, or ower', to the plaintiffs, and the same definition states that \"property\" means, among other things, \"any debt or actionable claim\". The portion of the definition which speaks of a \"cash deposit in a bank\" meam that such a deposit is not to be treated as\n\n(1) [1954l 1 A. E. R. 145.\n\n(2) i817 Buck. 57.\n\n(3) [1954 2 A. E. R. 746.\n\n(4) 1954 A. C. 495, 529.\n\n(5) 69 I. A. 1, 9\n\n\"property\" for the purposes of the Ordinance as between the bank and the customer who owns or controls the deposit.\n\nWe hold, therefore, that whether the proper law of the contract applies, or the English law -0f situs in a case of this kind, the defendant is exonerated because, the debt being \"property\", the Ordinance ivested the plaintiffs of ownership in it and vested the debt in the Custodian and at the same time interfered with the obligation for performance by providing that payment to the Custodian shall operate as a discharge of the obligation.\n\nBut we wish to emphasize that we decide this because payment was in fact made to the Custodian and that we express no opinion about what would happen in a case where there is no payment and the defendant has no garnishable assets in Pakistan out of which the West Punjab Government could realise the debt by attachment of the defendant's property.\n\nDifferent conclusions might possibly arise in such a case.\n\nLastly, it was urged that the Pakistan Ordinance is a penal law and is confiscato;-y in character, therefore, no domestic tribunal will recognise it or give effect to it.\n\nThat proposition is, in any event, too widely stated, but we are. unable to condemn this law as opposed to the public policy of this country because we have exactly the same kind of laws here, as do other civilised countries which find themselves in flimilar predicament or at the outbreak of war; see Arab Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank(1) and also Fouad Bishara fabbour v. State of Israel(2) and Re. Munster(8) where a like argument was repelled.\n\nWe hold that this legislation is not confiscatory.\n\nThe same rules apply to the item of Rs. 79-0-6 and to the deposit of Rs. 1,000 as security.\n\nThe appeal succeeds.\n\nThe decrees of the lower Courts are set aside.\n\nA decree will now be passed dismissing the plaintiffs' claim, but in the special circumstances of this case the parties will bear their own costs throughout.\n\n(2) [1954] 1 A.E.R. 145, 157,\n\n(3) [1920] I Ch. 268.\n\nTM DdAf\"clatla and General MiUs\n\nCo.[)d.\n\n\"· HamtJm Singh\n\nand olhm\n\nBo11J.", "total_entities": 108, "entities": [{"text": "Om Prakash Gu1ta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Gu1ta\n\nTlie Stale of Ufla,\n\nPrtkhsh\n\nImam]."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 884, "end_char": 903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court fee shall be paid by the appellant and the same will be recoverable by the Government of India from him and shall be the first charge on the amount decreed to him."}}, {"text": "Order XIV of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 1012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS\n\nCO., LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1124, "end_char": 1167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO., LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARNAM SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1175, "end_char": 1198, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Harnam Singh Jagat Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VMAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1202, "end_char": 1211, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1213, "end_char": 1226, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRASAD SINHA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1245, "end_char": 1262, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1595, "end_char": 1613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XIV of the Rules", "statute": "Order XIV of the Rules"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1617, "end_char": 1641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Lyallpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1889, "end_char": 1897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Priv11te International Law-Law applic11ble to contractual obligations-English and Continental schools of thought-Lex situs and uProper I.Au/' of contract-Partition of India-Post partition debt -Action for recovery where lies-Analogy of banking transactions and insurance claims-Place of primary obligatio11-Debt, whether property-Sections 3 and 130 of Transfer of Property Act-Evacuee property laws-Pakistan (Protection of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1948 (XV/ll of 1948)-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Pro\n\nperty) Ordinance (XV) 1949-Whether confiscatory in nature\n\nDuring the years in question cloth was rationed at Lyallpur, then a part of the Punjab in undivided T ndia, and sales could only be made to government nominees and other authorised persons."}}, {"text": "Lyallpu1", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2514, "end_char": 2522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 with the defendant's branch manager at Lyallpu1, aud deposited further sums of money with him from time to time at Lyallpur."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3066, "end_char": 3071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "counts were kept at Lyallpur though copies were sent to the defendant's head office at Delhi."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3088, "end_char": 3093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1947, when India was partitic.ned, Lyallpur was assigned to\n\nPakitan."}}, {"text": "Pakistan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3511, "end_char": 3530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile the Pakistan Government issued an Ordinance\n\n(1) vesting all evacuee property in the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Pakistan ; (2) prohibiting the payment of money to evacuees; and (3) requiring all moneys payable to, or claimable by, evacuees to be paid to the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property in\n\nPakistan."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3625, "end_char": 3633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile the Pakistan Government issued an Ordinance\n\n(1) vesting all evacuee property in the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Pakistan ; (2) prohibiting the payment of money to evacuees; and (3) requiring all moneys payable to, or claimable by, evacuees to be paid to the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property in\n\nPakistan."}}, {"text": "West Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5716, "end_char": 5738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But quaere whether different conditions would not, arise in a case where no payment is made and the defendant has no garnishable assets in Pakistan out of which the West Punjab Government could realise the debt out of the defendant's property there. ("}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6718, "end_char": 6729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6754, "end_char": 6765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6769, "end_char": 6796, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7122, "end_char": 7132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee, (Tarachand Brijmohan/al and B. 1'."}}, {"text": "Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7170, "end_char": 7180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maheshwari, with him) for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. S. Naru", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. Naru/a, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Bos", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7308, "end_char": 7311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bos}.", "canonical_name": "Bost"}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh Jagat Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7394, "end_char": 7418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs were the partners of a firm known as Harnam Singh Jagat Singh.", "canonical_name": "Harnam Singh Jagat Singh"}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7564, "end_char": 7602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant is the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.\n\nIt is a registered company carrying on business at Delhi and other places and has its head office at Delhi."}}, {"text": "Sardari Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8266, "end_char": 8277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When there was an adverse balance the plaintiffs paid the defendant interest: see the plaintiff Sardari Lal as P. W. 3."}}, {"text": "28-7-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8294, "end_char": 8303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 28-7-1947 the account stood in the plaintiffs' favour."}}, {"text": "15-8-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9026, "end_char": 9035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It contends that when India was partitioned on 15-8-1947, Lyallpur, where these transactions took place and where the money is situate, was assigned to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Mohd Bashir Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10048, "end_char": 10064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohd Bashir Khan, D. W. I, says that the total comes to Rs."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10358, "end_char": 10364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the relevant period, before the partition, cloth was retained and its distribution controlled in, among other places, the Punjab where Lyallpur is situate."}}, {"text": "Lyallpur Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11301, "end_char": 11315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs were the Government quota-holders for Lyallpur and the defendant company also carried on business there through the General Manager of the Lyallpur Mills."}}, {"text": "Lyallpur mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11504, "end_char": 11518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is admitted that the defendant owns these mills but it is a matter of dispute before us whether the mills are a branch of the defendant company; but\n\nwhatever the exact status of the Lyallpur mills may be, it is clear from the evidence and the documents that the General Manager of these mills conducted the defendant's cotton business at Lyallpur."}}, {"text": "24th October 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11823, "end_char": 11840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems that the deails of the cloth distribution scheme for Punjab, in so far as it affected the defendant company, were contained in a letter of the 24th October 1945 from the Secretary, Civil Supplies Department, Punjab."}}, {"text": "3-1-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12139, "end_char": 12147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those letters range in date from 3-1-1946 to 19-4-1947: (Exs."}}, {"text": "-4-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12153, "end_char": 12160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those letters range in date from 3-1-1946 to 19-4-1947: (Exs."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Lyallpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12468, "end_char": 12497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is dated 3-1-1946 and is from the Central Marketing Organisation of the defendant company, the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. It is written from Delhi to the District Magistrate, Lyallpur, and is as follows:\n\n\"The District Magistrate, Lyallpur."}}, {"text": "20th of January and 5th of February 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13172, "end_char": 13212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "obliged if you kindly issue instructions to your nominated importer to collect these goods from us within 15 <lays of the two dates for delivery fixed, namely by the 20th of January and 5th of February 1946 respectively."}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nCo. I.Jc!", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13305, "end_char": 13345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that th~ first half quota will lapse in case delivery is\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nCo. I.Jc!.", "canonical_name": "Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nCo. I.Jc!"}}, {"text": "Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13386, "end_char": 13419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. lid.", "canonical_name": "Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nCo. I.Jc!"}}, {"text": "D.C. & Gen. Mills Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13583, "end_char": 13610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours faithfully, , D.C. & Gen. Mills Co., Ltd.\" In each case a copy was sent to the plaintiffs marked as follows:\n\n\"Copy to nominated imported:- Jagat Singh Harnam Singh, Cloth Merchants, Lyallpur\"."}}, {"text": "Jagat Singh Harnam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13709, "end_char": 13733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours faithfully, , D.C. & Gen. Mills Co., Ltd.\" In each case a copy was sent to the plaintiffs marked as follows:\n\n\"Copy to nominated imported:- Jagat Singh Harnam Singh, Cloth Merchants, Lyallpur\"."}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13768, "end_char": 13797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "18-7-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13812, "end_char": 13821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Independence Act, 1947 was passed on 18-7-1947 and the disrict of Lyallpur was assigned to Pakistan subject to the award of the Boundary Commission."}}, {"text": "17-2-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14332, "end_char": 14341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before that Ordinance was promulgated the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies, who was also an Under Secretary to the West Punjab Government, wrote to the defendant's General Manager at Lyallpur (the General Manager of the Lyallpur Cloth Mills) on 17-2-1948 and told him that-\n\n\"The amount deposited by the non-Muslim dealers should not be refunded to them till further orders\"."}}, {"text": "14-4-48", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14677, "end_char": 14684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its General Manager at Lyallpur wrote letters to the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies on 14-4-48, 9-8-48 (Exs."}}, {"text": "6-6-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14735, "end_char": 14741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-7) and 6-6-49 (Ex- D-8), but the replies were unfavourable."}}, {"text": "30-4-48", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14792, "end_char": 14799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30-4-48 the Assistant Director said that \"in no case\" should the sums be refunded (Ex."}}, {"text": "1-11-48", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14891, "end_char": 14898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-3) and on 1-11-48 directed that these amounts should be deposited with the Custodian of Evacuee Property (Ex."}}, {"text": "-11-48", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15076, "end_char": 15082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, on 8-11-48, the General Manager received orders from the Deputy Custodian that the moneys should be deposited with the Deputy Custodian (Ex."}}, {"text": "23-6-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15225, "end_char": 15232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-6) and on 23-6-49 these orders were repeated by the Custodian (Ex."}}, {"text": "3-1-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15431, "end_char": 15437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are dated 3-1-49 (Ex."}}, {"text": "11-3-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15480, "end_char": 15487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 4/1), 11-3-49 (Ex."}}, {"text": "26-3-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15507, "end_char": 15514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 4/3) and 26-3-49 (Ex."}}, {"text": "12-2-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15609, "end_char": 15616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant's attitude i> summed up in its letter to the plaintiffs dated 12-2-49 (Ex."}}, {"text": "15-10-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15837, "end_char": 15847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15-10-1949 the Ordinance of 1948 was replaced by • Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "4-7-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16003, "end_char": 16011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4-7-1950 the plaintiffs served the defendant with notice of suit (Ex."}}, {"text": "27-7-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16338, "end_char": 16347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This notice was forwarded to the defendant's General Manager at Lyallpur by the defendant's Managing Director in Delhi urging the General Manager to try and obtain the sanction of the West Punjab Government for payment of the money to the plaintiffs; and on 27-7-1950 the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs saying-\n\n\"We confirm that the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "16-12-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16993, "end_char": 17003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant's reply did not satisfy the plaintiffs, so they instituted the present suit on 16-12-1950."}}, {"text": "Government of Pakistan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17103, "end_char": 17125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the suit, the defendant's Managing Director wrote personally to the Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan on 2-4-1951 but was told on 21-4-1951 that the matter had been carefully examined and that the money must be deposited with the Custodian (Ex."}}, {"text": "2-4-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17129, "end_char": 17137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the suit, the defendant's Managing Director wrote personally to the Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan on 2-4-1951 but was told on 21-4-1951 that the matter had been carefully examined and that the money must be deposited with the Custodian (Ex."}}, {"text": "21-4-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17154, "end_char": 17163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the suit, the defendant's Managing Director wrote personally to the Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan on 2-4-1951 but was told on 21-4-1951 that the matter had been carefully examined and that the money must be deposited with the Custodian (Ex."}}, {"text": "30-4-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17306, "end_char": 17315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second attempt was made on 30-4-1951 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh\n\nand others\n\nOrdinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17550, "end_char": 17585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2-6-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17751, "end_char": 17759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Joint Secretary wrote on 2-6-1951 that this did not apply to private debts and deposits and again asked the defendant to deposit the money with the Custodian (Ex."}}, {"text": "6-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17940, "end_char": 17949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, the Custodian issued a.n order on 6-11-1951 directing that the deposits be made by the 15th of that month, \"failing which legal action will have to be taken against you\". ("}}, {"text": "15-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18116, "end_char": 18126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The money was deposited on 15-11-1951 on the last day of grace (Ex D-12)."}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19145, "end_char": 19165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is admitted that the distribution of cloth in this area was controlled by the Government of Punjab (in undivided India) at all material times."}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19798, "end_char": 19815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-5, for example, shows that the defendant was obliged to give 10 bales out of a quota of 28 for that area to the plaintiffs under the orders of the Punjab Government and could only keep 18 for its own retail stores in the month of January\n\n1946."}}, {"text": "Mohd.\n\nBashir Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20863, "end_char": 20881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We draw this inference from what we have said abovt and from the following facts:\n\n(1) Both sides have called the payment a \"deposit\" in their pleadings;\n\n(2) The plaintiffs speak of receiving goods \"against this deposit\" (paragraph 3 of the plaint) and Mohd."}}, {"text": "D1lhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Lid.\n\nHamamSingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21651, "end_char": 21701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 4/1)\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and Genlral Mills Co. Ltd. v.\n\nHamamSingh\n\nand olhtrl\n\nThe D1lhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Lid."}}, {"text": "Iklhi Cloth and Genr.al Mills Co. Lid.\n\nHarnam Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26125, "end_char": 26177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hatn1Jm Singh\n\nand othtts\n\nBOii J.\n\nThe Iklhi Cloth and Genr.al Mills Co. Lid."}}, {"text": "Multan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28218, "end_char": 28224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar."}}, {"text": "Peshawar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28226, "end_char": 28234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar."}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28236, "end_char": 28242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar."}}, {"text": "Sialkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28244, "end_char": 28251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar."}}, {"text": "Rawalpindi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28253, "end_char": 28263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar."}}, {"text": "Karachi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28273, "end_char": 28280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar."}}, {"text": "Sukkar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28285, "end_char": 28291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-11) we fin• t that it relates to accounts from all over Pakistan such as, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and even Karachi and Sukkar."}}, {"text": "Sewa Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28450, "end_char": 28458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant's accountant at Lyallpur, Sewa Ram (P. W. 4), says that--\n\n\"Purchasers' deposits at Lyallpur were not recorded in the books of the defendant at Delhi but statements used to be despatched from there to Delhi."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30498, "end_char": 30510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts we hold that the clements of this contract, that is to say, the contract\n\nThe Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nHarnam Singh\n\nand others\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "Harnam Singh Jagat Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagat Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31053, "end_char": 31064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff Jagat Singh (P. W. 5) says that he made a written demand in October 1947."}}, {"text": "3-1-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31193, "end_char": 31201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 4/4 dated 3-1-1949."}}, {"text": "Jagat Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31896, "end_char": 31907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff Jagat Singh says he made the demand to the defendant's Managing Director."}}, {"text": "Now at the date Qf the demand the Pakistan Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32426, "end_char": 32478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cheshire", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33119, "end_char": 33127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One is that applied by the English Courts, namely, the lex situs; the other is the one favoured by Cheshire in."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33987, "end_char": 34011, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3 and 130", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34052, "end_char": 34069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35804, "end_char": 35810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mount Albert Borough Council v.\n\nAustralasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society (1 ) Lord Wright defined it at page 240 as\n\n\"that law which the English or other Court is to apply m determining the obligations under the contract\", that is."}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36108, "end_char": 36115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Simonds described it as\n\n\"the system of law by reference to which the contract was made or that with which the transaction has it~ closest and most real connexion\"."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38386, "end_char": 38391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Bank of Travancore v. Dhrit Ram( 1 ), Lord Atkin said that when no intention is expressed in the contract the Courts are left to infer one by reference to considerations where the contract was made and how and where it was to be performed and by the nature of the business or transaction to which it refers.", "canonical_name": "Atkin"}}, {"text": "HamamSingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39133, "end_char": 39143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T Ill Dtlhi Clot!t and Gmeral Mills\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nY1 HamamSingh\n\nand otlwrs\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "HamtJm Singh"}}, {"text": "Bost", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39241, "end_char": 39245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh\n\nand others\n\nBost J.\n\nBut, to us, it seems unnecessarily artificial to impute an intention when we know there was none, especially in a type of case where the parties would never have contracted at all if t\\ley had contemplated the possibility of events turning out as they did.", "canonical_name": "Bost"}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40796, "end_char": 40801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atkin, L. J. said in Netu Yark Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee(') that the rules laid down in England are derived from the practice of ecclesiastical authorities in granting ad ministration because their jurisdiction was limited territorially.", "canonical_name": "Atkin"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40899, "end_char": 40906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atkin, L. J. said in Netu Yark Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee(') that the rules laid down in England are derived from the practice of ecclesiastical authorities in granting ad ministration because their jurisdiction was limited territorially."}}, {"text": "Aktin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42137, "end_char": 42142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aktin, L. J. draws attention to one in New York Life Insurance Company v.\n\nPublic Trustee(2) at page 120 where he says--\n\n. '", "canonical_name": "Atkin"}}, {"text": "Robson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42969, "end_char": 42975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And so also Lord Robson in Rex v. Lovitt(8 ) at page 220--\n\n\"lt cannot mean that for all purposes the actual situation of the property of a deceased owner is to be\n\n(1) 1938 A. C. 2~.\n\n(2) [11924) 2Cb."}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44383, "end_char": 44387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In banking transactions the following rules are now settled: ( 1) the obligation of a bank to pay the cheques of a customer rests primarily on the branch at which he keeps his account and the bank can rightly refuse to cash a cheque at any other branch: Rex v. Lovitt (1 ) at 219, Bank of Travancore v. Dhn't 'R.am( ') and New York Life Insurance Company v.\n\nPublic Trustee(') at page 117; (2) a customer must make a demand for payment at the branch where his current account is kept before he has a cause of action against the bank: /oachimson v. Swiss Bank\n\nCorporation(•) quoted with approval by Lord Reid in Arab Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank(\").", "canonical_name": "Reid"}}, {"text": "Ried", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45244, "end_char": 45248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This class of case form~ an exception to the rule that a debtor must seek his creditor because, though that is the general rule, there is nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing, if they wish, that that shall not be the duty of the debtor and, as Lord Ried explains in the Arab Bank case(6 ) at page .531, a contract of current account necessarily implies an (•l [1912] A.G. 212.", "canonical_name": "Reid"}}, {"text": "Arab Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45265, "end_char": 45274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This class of case form~ an exception to the rule that a debtor must seek his creditor because, though that is the general rule, there is nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing, if they wish, that that shall not be the duty of the debtor and, as Lord Ried explains in the Arab Bank case(6 ) at page .531, a contract of current account necessarily implies an (•l [1912] A.G. 212."}}, {"text": "Warrington", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46075, "end_char": 46085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the reason is that the action is then, not on the debt, but on the breach of the contract to pay at the place specified in the agreement: see Warrington, L. J. at page 116 and Atkin, L. J. at page 121 of New York Life Insurance\n\nCo. v. Public Trustee(1)."}}, {"text": "Wolff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48673, "end_char": 48678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here again, we think the answer is correctly given by Cheshire at page 210, quoting Wolff's Private International law, page 424, and Re."}}, {"text": "Chesterrhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48727, "end_char": 48738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chesterrhan's Trusts( 1 ) :\n\n\"A proper law intended as a whole to govern a contract is administered as 'a living and changing body of law' and effect is given to any changes occurring in it before performance falls due\"."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51380, "end_char": 51390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Travancore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52858, "end_char": 52877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems proper to bear in mind that the promisor is a bank incorporated under Travancore law with, apparently, some connection with the State of Travancore, and governed as to its business by any law of Travancore that may affect banking .... \"."}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52925, "end_char": 52935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems proper to bear in mind that the promisor is a bank incorporated under Travancore law with, apparently, some connection with the State of Travancore, and governed as to its business by any law of Travancore that may affect banking .... \"."}}, {"text": "section 2(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53623, "end_char": 53635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HamtJm Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56218, "end_char": 56230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"· HamtJm Singh\n\nand olhm\n\nBo11J.", "canonical_name": "HamtJm Singh"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_428_449_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "i955.\n\nMl!!' a\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1955 J\n\nBHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHER\n\nBRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS.\n\n[MuKHER.JEA C. J.,\n\nVIVIAN BosE, ]AGANNADHADAs, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and fAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nRepresentation of the People Act (Act XLTII) 1951, proviso to Section 85-Section 90( 4)-Reconsideration of question of limitation by Tribunal-Section 82-N01J-compliance with provisions-Omission to include a party in list of respondents-Defect whether fatal-Section 83(1)-Code of Civil Procedure, Order 6, rules 15(2) and (3)- Effect o, f-Section 83(2)-\"Full Particulars\"-Duties of Tribunal when particulars filed are vague-Serious allegations of corrupt practiees-Duty of Tribunal to inquire into.\n\nThe appellants, two of the electors of the Akola Constituency of the Madhya Pradesh State Assembly, filed an Election Petition against Respondent No. I, the successful candidate in the election held on December 13, 1951, and the three other respondents who having been validly nominated went to the polls but were defeated.\n\nThe Election Petition, under Section 80 of the Representation of the People Act of 1951, was admittedly time-barred by one day.\n\nThe Election Commission condone-d the delay under the proviso to Section 85 of the Act and cOnstituted a Tribunal for the trial of the petition. On pleadings of the parties, nine issues were framed by the Tribunal which are covered by the following questions:\n\n(1) Whether the election petition was presented by a properly authorised person.\n\n(2) Whether there was sufficient cause for presentation of the petition' one day ouf o_f time. ( 3) Whether the petition was defective for non-joinder of certain parties as respondents. ( 4) Whether the petition was defective for want of proper verification.\n\n(5) Whether the petition was defective for vagueness of the particulars relating to the corrupt practices set out in Schedule A thereto.\n\nThe Tribunal found only the first of the above points in favour ofthe petitioners by a majority.\n\nBut in respect of the other four points, it held against the petitioners unanimously.\n\nAs a result of the adverse findings on these four points, the petition was dismissed without any trial on the merits.\n\nIt is against this dismissal that the appellants have now come up to this Court on obtaining special leave.\n\nWhen the delay in submitting an election petition is condoned\n\nby the Election Commi, Ssion in exc; rcise of its power under the proviso to Section 85 of the Representation of the People Act (Act XLIII of 1951 ), it is not open to the Election Tribunal, under Section 90( 4) of the Act, to reconsider the question of limitation. Even if, according to the requirement of Section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, any of the necessary parties other than the returned candidate has not been impleaded, the petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine on that sole ground; but it is a matter to be taken into consideration at the appropriate stage with reference to the final result of the case.\n\nSection 83( 1) of the Act provides that an election petition has to be verified in the manner provided for verification of pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure. Clauses (2) and '(3) of rule 15 in Order VI of the Code lay down the procedure for verification of pleadings.\n\nApart from those cases where the date of the pleading and the verification may be relevant and important, it would be a wrong exercise of discretionary power to dismiss an application on the sole ground of the absence of the date of verification.\n\nIn such a case the applicant should normally be called upon to remove the lacuna by adding a supplementary verification indicating the date of the original verification and the reason for the earlier omission.\n\nThe requirement of \"full particulars\" of corrupt practices in Section 83(2) of the Act, is one that has got to be complied with, with sufficient fullness and clarification, so as to enable the opposite party to meet the allegations against him fairly, and so as to prevent the enquiry from being turned into a rambling and roving inquisition.\n\nThe primary responsibility for furnishing full particulars of alleged currupt practices and for filing a petition in full compliance with Section 83(2) of the Act is that of the petitioners. If they fail to do so initially it is their duty and responsibility to remove the defects when opportunity is available.\n\nTribunals, however, should not take an all too narrow view of their function in dealing with the various alleged defects in. the petition and dismiss it on the ground of want of particulars. They should call for better particulars and if that order was not complied with strike out such of the charges as arc vague.\n\nThe petitioners also alleged that the returned candidate was disqualified to stand because he had interest in contracts with the Government.\n\nBut the Tribunal ignored these allegations and without enquiring into their truth dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations relating to the charge of corrupt practices were vague.\n\nHeld that it was not in the interest of purity of elections that such allegations of disqualification should be ignored and 'that it was a matter which called for enquiry.\n\nCase remitted for enquiry with reference to the allegations that the returned candidate was disqualified and the charge of corrupt practice, which was held to be not vague.\n\nDinabandhu v.\n\nJadumoni ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 140) and Jagan Nath v. Jaswant ([1954] S.C.R. 892), followed.\n\nB~Kuhao ]Olhi and'aMl/wr w B \"lal .Mwllal Bi'll 'and 11an1 olhm.\n\nBhik'!ii T\"sluzo 7oshi aNl anothtt-\n\nVi JBrijlal Nandlal\n\nRfyani and others\n\nCML\n\nAPPELLATE JUR1so1CTION : Civil Appeal No. 158 of 1954.\n\nVeda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the appellants.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (M. N.\n\nPhadke and Naunit Lal, with him), for respondent No. 1. 1955.\n\nMay 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the Election Tribunal, Akola, Madhya Pradesh, dated the 1st May, 1953, dismissing the election petition filed by the appellants.\n\nIt relates to the election for the Akola Constituency of the State Assembly of Madhya Pradesh which was held on the 13th December, 1951, and the result of which was notified in the Gazette on the 4th April, 1952.\n\nThe two appellants are the electors of the said constituency.\n\nThe first respondent was the successful candidate at the election. Respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were the other three candidates who, having been validly nominated went to the polls but were defeated.\n\nThe appellants filed the election petition under section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for setting aside the election on various allegations.\n\nTh~ petition was filed on the 19th April, 1952, before the Election Commission at Delhi and was admittedly one day beyond the prescribed time.\n\nThe Election Comµllssion admitted the petition after condoning the delay under the proviso to section 85 of the Act and thereupon constituted a Tribunal for the trial of the petition at Akofa by notifications dated the 30th July, 1952, and 22nd September, 1952.\n\nIn due course respondent No. 1 appeared and filed his written statement on the 6th October, 1952, and the petitioners filed their reply thereto on the 16th October, 1952. With reference to these pleadings, the Tribunal was of the opinion that it was advisable to frame certain preliminary issues and to dispose of the same before entering on the\n\ntrial of the case on its merits.\n\nAccordingly, nine preliminary issues were framed.\n\nThese nine issues substantially cover the following questions: (1) Whether the election petition was presented by a properly authorised person. (2) Whether there was sufficient cause for presentation of the petition one day out of time.\n\n(3) Whether the petition was defective for non-joinder of certain parties as respondents. ( 4) Whether the petition is defective for want of proper verification.\n\n(5) Whether the petition was defective for vagueness of the particulars relating to the corrupt practices set out in Schedule A thereto. The Tribunal found only the first of the above points in favour of the petitioners by a majority. But in respect of the other four points, it held against the petitioners unanimously.\n\nAs a result of the adverse findings on these four points, the petition was dismissed without any trial on the merits. It is against this dismissal that the appellants have now come up to this Court on obtaining special leave.\n\nBefore dealing with the merits of the appeal, it may be mentioned that at an early stage of these proceedings before the Tribunal, an objection was taken to the composition of the Tribunal on the allegation that one of the Members, Shri A. S. Athalye was not competent to be a Member thereof on account of his alleged bias in favour of the first respondent.\n\nThe bias was sought to be made out by showing that shortly before the election, Shri Athalye had written a letter to the 1st respondent offering to assist him in his election campaign. On objection being taken, the Tri'.mnal stayed its hands for a preliminary decision of that question.\n\nMeanwhile, the petitioners took proceedings in the High Court for the quashing of the constitution of the Tribunal on the above ground by means of an application under article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThat application was dismissed after hearing both sides. Thereupon the petitioners moved this Court for special leave against the order of the High Court.\n\nBut this Court declined to grant leave.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants attempted to\n\nBhikaji Kuhao Joshi and 1J11Dthlr\n\n\"' Brijlal Nanti/al B!1ani and ot\"4r1\n\nJagannall1uldas J.\n\nB/Jlkqji Ktshao ]oslil and \"\"\"'\"\" ...\n\nBrijlal Nondlal Bi.Jani and others\n\nattack the validity of the decision of the Tribunal now under appeal on the same ground.\n\nBut this having been already determined against the petitioners in the previous proceedings, we declined to allow the matter to be reopened. On the other side, the .learned Attorney-General for the 1st respondent attempted to reopen before us the question :ls to whether the petition was presented to the Election Commission by an authorised person, which as stated above, was found against him by a majority of the Tribunal.\n\nThe ground on which he attempted to reopen this question was that the finding was based on a wrong view as to the burden of proof. We were not prepared, .. however, to permit this finding of fact to be reopened • in this appeal on special leave, irrespective of the question whether the burden of proof was rightly laid on the petitioners.\n\nThe only points, therefore, that have been argued before us are whether the view taken by the Tribunal with reference to the following questions, viz. ( 1) limitation, (2) joinder of parties, (3) verification, and ( 4) specification of particulars of corrupt practices in Schedule A attached to the petition, is correct, and if so, whether the same entailed dismissal of the petition. The questions may be taken up one after the other.\n\nLIMITATION: As stated above, the petition was -filed on the 19th April, 1952, admittedly one day beyond time.\n\nOn the 28th April, 1952, the petitioners filed also an application for condonation of delay setting out the reasons for the . same.\n\nIn paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 threof the circumstances under which the delay is said to have occurred were set out as follows:\n\n\"3. The applicants were under the belief that Notice under Rule 113 of the Rules framed under the above Act was published on 5th April, 1952, in the official Gazette of the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThey felt therefore that their petition was duly presented within 14 days as prescribed by Rule 119. Applicants, however, learn that actually the Notice under Rule 113 was published in the Official Gazette of 4th April, 1952.\n\nIt therefore appears that there was a delay of\n\none day in the representation of the election ptition.\n\nThis delay occurred under the following circumstances:-\n\n4. The applicants prepared their election petition on the 17th April, 1952.\n\nThey sent the said petition with Shri P. B. Gole, Senior Advocate, Akola, with a written authority to present the petition through any person of his choice at Nagpur on the 18th April.\n\nThey also sent with Shri Gole Rs. 1,000 for being deposited in the Government Treasury at Nagpur as required by section 117 of the Act and to obtain Treasury receipt for security of costs to be filed with the petition.\n\nThe applicants were under the belief that an officer must have been appointed by the Election Commission under section 81 of the Act to whom election petitions could be represented for the State of Madhya Pradesh at Nagpur.\n\nAccordingly Shri Gole left Akola for Nagpur by the 1 Down Nagpur Mail, reaching Nagpur at about 9-30 A. M. on 18th April, 1952.\n\n5. Mr.\n\nGole caused the deposit of Rs. 1,000 security for costs to be made in the Government Treasury at Nagpur through Mr. Sidhaye, Advocate, Nagpur, and obtained the necessary Government Treasury receipt on the 18th April, 1952.\n\nHe then made enquiries about the officer who may have been appointed to receive the election petitions.\n\nHe consulted R. S. Rangole, who was attached to the Election Office at Nagpur.\n\nOn enquiries Shri Gole learnt that there was none at Nagpur, who was authorised to receive election petition under the Act.\n\nUnder these circumstances Shri Gole booked a seat in the Night Plane for Delhi and flew to Delhi on the 18th and reached there on the morning on 19th April, 1952.\n\nOn 19th April Shri Gole caused the petition to be presented to the Secretary to the Eelection Commission\".\n\nThe explanation thus furnished was accepted by the Election Commission as appears from the intimatibn to the petitioners by letter dated the 30th July, 1952.\n\nThe Tribunal was of the opinion that notwithstanding the order of the Election Commission condoning the delay and admitting the petition, it was free to\n\nBhikoji X11/i11a ]Ol/ii Olld Ollal/rn\n\nBrijlal N andlal Bi;, oni and al/wrs\n\nBhikaji XtJhao Joshi and anollur\n\nBrijlal N andlal B!Jiani and others\n\nJagannadhada, ].\n\nreconsider the question by virtue of the powers vested in it under section 90( 4) of the Act.\n\nIn this view it went into the merits of the explanation furnished and came to the conclusion that the petitioners were negligent and that the delay, even of one day, could not be condoned.\n\nIt accordingly held that the petition was liable to be dismissed as barred by time. Now, apart from the merits of the sufficiency of the cause for delay, the question as to whether, notwithstanding the condonation of the delay by the Election Commission, it was open to a Tribunal to reconsider the matter by virtue of section 90( 4) of the Act, is now covered by the decision of this Court reported in Dinabandhtt v. fadttmoni(').\n\nIt was therein heid that it was not open to the Tribunal to reconsider the matter in such a case.\n\nThe conclusion of the Tribunal, therefore, on this point cannot be maintained.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General attempted to argue that the decision of this Court referred to above was obiter as regards the legal point and required further consideration.\n\nBut we were not prepared to permit that question to be reopened.\n\nWe were also not satisfied that there was any adequate reason for the Tribunal to interfere wiih the view taken by the Election Commission condoning the delay of one day on the explanation furnished to it.\n\nThis explanation has not been found, even by the Tribunal, to be false.\n\nJOINDER OF PARTIES: The objection as to joinder of parties arises as follows. Three persons by name Shri Sohom, Shri Kulkarni, and Shri Kothkar were nominated as candidates at the election. Their nominations were found to be in order on scmtiny by the Returning Officer. But within the time allowed,. these three withdrew from the elections under section 37 of the Act.\n\nThe petitioners, while they impleaded as respondents the three unsuccessfuI candidates who went to the polls, did not implead these three persons.\n\nThe view taken by the Tribunal was that these were also necessary parties and that their non-joinder rendered the petition liable for\n\n(1) [1955] l S. C.R. 140.\n\ndismissal.\n\nIn support of their view, the Tribunal\n\nelied upon section 82 of the Act which is as follows: \"A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition all the candidates who were duly nominated at the election other than himself if he was so nominated\".\n\nIt has been argued before us that this view is erroneous and that persons who filed their nominations and who '}'ithdrew from the contest within the prescribed time in spite of their nominations having been found to be in order on scrutiny by the Returning Officer,. cannot be said to fall within the category of \"candidates duly nominated at the election\".\n\nIn support of this contention two decisions Sitaram v. Yograjsing(1) and Shea Kumar v. V. G. Oak(2) have been cited. On the other side the case in Mohammad Umair\n\nv. Ram Charan Singh(3) was brought to our notice in support of the view taken by the Tribunal. These three decisions have treated the decision of the question as depending on a construction of the phrase \"at the election\" in section 82 of the Act.\n\nThe Bombay and Allahabad cases hold that this phrase confines the necessary parties under this section to those who were candidates for the actual poll, while the Patna High -Court takes the view that the phrase \"at the election\" has no such limiting significance. It appears to us to be unnecessary and academic to go into thi~ judicial controversy having regard to the decision of this Court in /agan Nath v. Jaswant Singh('). If we were called upon to settle this controversy, we would prefer to base the decision not on any meticulous construction of the phrase \"at the election\" but on a comprehensive consideration of the relevant provi sions of the Act and of the rules framed thereunder and of the purpose, if any, of the requirement under section 82 as to the joinder of parties other than the returned candidate. we are, however, relieved from this, since it has been decided in /agan. Nath v. /aswant Singh( ) that even if any of the necessary parties other than the returned candidate has not been\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1953 Bombay 293.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1954 Patna 225.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1953 All. 633.\n\n(4) [1954] S.C.R. 892.\n\nBhilcaji Keshao Joshi and anvtMr'\n\nBrijlal Nandlal BiJani and olhzrs\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nBhikaji K1sltao :Jo, hi and anol/ur\n\nB.jjlal N andlal B!Yat1i and ot/wrs\n\nimpleaded, the petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine on that sole ground but that it is a matter to be taken into consideration at the appropriate stage with reference to the final result of the case. In view of this ruling the decision of the Tribunal on this point also cannot be maintained.\n\nVERIFICATION: The view taken by the Tribunal on this question is based on section 83(1) of the Act which is as follows :\n\n\"An election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings\".\n\nI The relevant provision in the Civil Procedure Code referred to herein is Order VI, rule 15, clauses (2) and (3), which are as follows :\n\n\"(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the . pleading, what he verifies of his. own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.\n\n(3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed\".\n\nIn the present case the verification of the petition as well as the schedule of particulars of corrupt practices are each signed by both the petitioners and there is now no dispute about it.\n\nThe verification clause in the petition is as follows :\n\n\"The above-named applicants hereby affirm that the contents of the above petition are true to information received from the press reports and several other electors and believed by them to be true.\n\nSigned and verified at Akola on \".\n\nThe verification clause relating . to the particulars of corrupt practices in Schedule A is as follows :\n\n\"The above-named applicants aflirm that the contents in this schedule are true to information received and believed by us to be true.\n\nSigned and verified at Akola on \"\n\nIn the view of the Tribunal there were two defects in these verifications.\n\nThey do not refer to any numbered paragraphs nor do they bear the dates on which they were signed. In the view of the Tribunal\n\nthe petition was liable to dismissal for non-compliance ·~ the specific provision in the Act in this behalf.\n\nTht the verification neither in the petition nor in the schedule of particulars bears any date is not disputed.\n\nBut it is contended that the view taken by the Tribunal in so far as it was of the opinion that the verifications do not refer to any numbered paragraphs is unsustainable.\n\nIt is pointed out that the statements in the verification were clearly meant to convey that the various allegations in the petition and schedule were, in their entirety, based on information and belief.\n\nIt is urged, therefore, that there was no scope and hence no need to specify which were based on personal knowledge and which upon information.\n\nWe agree with this contention.\n\nIt is to be noticed that a verified pleading is different from an affidavit which, by virtue of Order XIX, rule 3, is specifically required to ' be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove (except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted, provided that the grounds thereof are stated.\n\nBut there is notand in the nature of things there cannot be-any such limitation for pleadings. Hence it became necessary in the verification of a pleading to demarcate clearly between the two. The allegations in the petition in this case purport to be based only on information. Since the verification clauses refer to the entirety of the petition and the attached schedule, absence of enumeration of the various paragraphs therein as having been based on information cannot be considered to be a defect.\n\nThe verifications are accordingly defective only as regards the requirement of the dates thereof.\n\nThe question is whether the petition is liable to dismissal on this ground.\n\nThough there may be cases where the date of the pleading and the verification may be relevant and important, it would be a wrong exercise of discretionary power to dismi~\n\nBhilcaji Kesllao Joshi and anothn\n\nBrijlal Nandlal BiYani and otMrs\n\njagaMadhadas J.\n\n.iBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another v.\n\nBrij/a/ Nandlal , Bi)ani and others\n\nJagaMadhadas ].\n\nan application on the sole ground of absence of date of verification.\n\nIn such a ease the applicants should normally be called upon to remove the lacuna by adding a supplementary verification indicating the date of the original verification and the reason for the earlier omission.\n\nPARTICULARS OF CORRUPT PRACTICES: The objection is based on section 83(2) of the Act which is as follows : ''The pet1t10n shall be accompanied by a list signed and verified in like manner setting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice which the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible as to the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt or illegal practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice\".\n\nThe objection is that the particulars of the instances furnished in Schedule A to the petition are all of them vague and not in compliance with .the above provision. The list of particulars is as follows:\n\nSCHEDULE \"A\".\n\nList of particulars of instances referred in the accompanying petition.\n\n1. That in the month of December, 1951, respondent No. 1 has been to the premises of Akola Shree Gurudwara, where the Local Sikh Community had assembled to listen to the recitation of the holy book 'Granth Saheb' on the 7th day of the death of daughter of one Sardar Suratsingh.\n\nAt this meeting respondent No. 1 canvassed for votes for himself and paid Rs. 201/-, apparently as donation to the Gurudwara, but really as gift for inducing the Sikh Community in the Akola Constituency in general and the Sikhs assembled in particular to induce them to vote for himself at the ensuing election.\n\nRespondent No. 1 was guilty of bribery within the meaning of that term in section 123 of the Representation of the People Act.\n\nSimilar instances of giving illegal gratifications for securing votes of respective groups arc-\n\n(a) Donation to Hariharpeth Akhada ;\n\n(b) Payment to Panch-bungalow Committee of Bhangis of Old City. ( c) Donation to Bhaji Bazar Association. ( d) Distribtion of blankets and sanes and money to voters.\n\n2. At the instance of respondent No. 1 a meeting of workers in Berar Oil Industries-a concern of Birla, was called by its manager on the eve of the dection and they were threatened to vote for respondent No. 1 on pain of losing their service or suffer pecuniary loss, in case they did not vote for respondent No. 1. The poster of the rival candidate affixed , on the post-office within the premises of the Berar Oil Industries was removed and stolen away.\n\n3. Respondent No. 1 caused groups and sections of castes and communities, such as Bohara, Lohars, Marwaries, Muslims, Rajasthanies, Bhangies, to issue appeals stating that resolutions were passed for voting for respondent No. 1, coercing the voters by threats, , etc., to vote for respondent No. 1 and openly canvassing on communal and caste lines and using undue influence.\n\n4. Issuing pamphlets and handbills without names of printer or publisher.\n\n5. At the time of counting votes in Polling Station No. 53, several folded bundles amounting to -about 20 in number, of ballot papers were found in the ballot box of respondent No. 1, when it was opened for counting votes. This was noted by the Returning Officer.\n\nEach bundle consisted three or more than three ballot papers, folded to gether.\n\nObviously each of the bundl.! of these. ballot papers were put in the ballot box by one person, as the ballot papers put in the ballot box by different voters could not automatically fold themselves into a compact bundle in the ballot box.\n\nThe ballot papers issued to voters were not put in the box by the voters themselves, but were illegally brought back by the voters and handed over to persons working for and on behalf or respondent No. 1 on payment of illegal gratification. These ballot papers thus collected were bundled together ,56\n\nBhikaji KeJhao Joshi and another\n\n•• Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and ot!rtrl\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another\n\nBrijlal Nartdlal Biyani and olhtrs\n\nand put in the ballot box by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No. 1 by taking illegal gratifications.\n\nThis was done on 31st December, 1951, at Chandur by persons with the connivance of respondent No. 1.\n\n6. False personation of several dead voters and voters absent in Pakistan has taken place, in Ward No. 12 and 15.\n\n7. The respondent No. 1 resorted to false propaganda.\n\nHis man announced on loud speakers from place to place that rival candidate Dr. Joglekar was of the caste and party of Godse, the murderer of M.\n\nGandhi and a vote for him was a vote for Gandhi's Murderer.\n\nAnother false propaganda was that Dr.\n\nJoglekar was Mishra's man, supported by Mishra's money.\n\nLectures for respondent No. 1 in public meetings, including respondent No. 1 have freely made these false defamatory and malicious statements against Dr. Joglekar, the rival candidate and thus prejudiced the prospects of Dr.\n\nJoglekar's election.\n\nPersonal character and conduct of Dr. Joglekar was also falsely attacked, thus prejudicing his prospects of election.\n\n8. Voters were carried in hired carts at many polling stations, particularly at Kapshi Polling Station.\n\nThis was arranged by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No. 1 at his expense and connivance.\n\nA written objection for police enquiry was given at Kapshi and one in Rifle Range area.\n\n9. Respondent No. 1 spent lacs of rupees over his election transgressing the prescribed limit of Rs. 6,000.\n\nHe has given a totally untrue .return of election expenses.\n\nThis is in contravention of law. 10.\n\nMohota Mills released workers and paid them for canvassing work for respondent No. 1 on polling day.\n\nSubstitutes for these workers were engaged by the mills and they were also paid. This was done at .the instance of respondent No. l\".\n\nThere can be no doubt that almost all the instances herein-above set out are extremely vague and lack sufficient particulars.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants invited our attention to the fact that the Tribunal, while considering the question of vagueness dealt only with the instances of corrupt practices specified in paragraphs l(a), l(b), l(c), l(d), 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and not others.\n\nHe accordingly contended that, by implication, the Tribunal was not prepared to hold that items mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 9 and 10 were vague.\n\nHe urged that at least these four items must be taken not to be vague and that there is no reason why the petitioners should not have been called upon to amend the schedule by furnishing better particulars as to the rest.\n\nHe further urged that, at any rate, they were entitled to a trial in respect of those four items of corrupt practices.\n\nWe cannot agree with learned counsel for the appellants that the items set out in paragraphs 3, 9 and 10 are not vague.\n\nThere is no specification therein of the requisite details which the Act in terms requires. Section 83(2) requires not only what may reasonably be considered \"full particulars\" having regard to the nature of each allegation, but enjoins in terms that the following particulars should also be given.\n\n(1) Names of the parties alleged to have committed the corrupt or illegal practice.\n\n(2) The date of the commission of each such corrupt or illegal practice.\n\n(3) The place of commission of each such corrupt or illegal practice.\n\nThere can be no reasonable doubt that the requirement of \"full particulars\" is one that has got to be complied with, with sufficient fullness and clarification so as to enable the opposite-party fairly to meet them and that they must be such as not to turn the enquiry before the Tribunal into a rambling and roving inquisition.\n\nOn a careful scrutiny of the list in Schedule A we are satisfied that none of the items except that which is set out in paragraph 1 of item No. 1 can be said to comply with the requirements of section 83(2).\n\nIn this view of -the contents of Schedule A, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that even so the Tribunal should have called upon the petitioners to furnish better particulars as regards all the other items, by virtue of the powers conferred on it under section 83(3), and in the 10-83 S.C. lndia/59\n\nB'\"\"4ji K11hoo ]Olm atuJ _,,,,.. .,..\n\nBrijlal N aMlal I Bi1oni ottd olhm\n\nJ\"gotinodhadu J.\n\nBhikaji Kesh4o ]Dlhi and another\n\nv, Brijlal }fandlal Biyani and olher1\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nalternative, it should have at least called upon them to substantiate the allegation in paragraph 1 in item No. 1, which was sufficiently specific and which, if made out, might have resulted in the election being set aside.\n\nOn the question whether or not the Tribunal should have called upon the petitioners to amend the schedule by furnishing better particulars, the learned Attorney-General for the 1st respondent has invited our attention to the objection taken in the written statement as regards the vagueness of the, particulars and to the various orders made by the Tribunal as appears from the order-sheet of the, .case.\n\nIn the written statement of the 1st respondent-: paragraph 9 is as follows :\n\n\"9. (a) It is, further, submitted that the petition ought to be dismissed as it does not contain concise statement of material facts on which the petitioners rely.\n\nSimilarly the list of particulars given in the schedule or in the petition are not in compliance with section 83(2).\n\n(b) Without prejt.dice to the generality of this objection, it is further submitted that para V of petition read with para VI ( e) will show that the particulars given in Schedule relate to corrupt and illegal practices alleged to have been committed by respondent No. 1 and by his agents and persons working on behalf of respondent No. 1 with his connivance. Such particulars are bad in law. The applicants are bound to state the names of the persons who are alleged to have actually committed the corrupt or illegal practice. ( c) Paras 1 and 2 of the petition allege that there was no free election by reason of general bribery and undue influence exercised by and on behalf of respondent No. 1.\n\nSimilarly the allegation in para 2 is that the coercion was the result of manipulation by or at the instance of respondent No. 1.\n\nThus these allegations must be supported by giving the necessary particulars regarding the names, date and place of commission of corrupt or illegal practice alleged. The allegations in paras 1 and 2 of the petition are allegatior.s of corrupt and illegal practice within the meaning of sections 123, 124 and 125 of the Act, and are not allegations of a general charactj:r which do not implicate the candidate personally. ( d) Further by way of example, para 1 of the schedule, no names, date of the alleged practices are given.\n\nSame is the case with the allegations in paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 . ( e) It is for the petitioners to satisfy the Election Commission and the Tribunal that the particulars given are according to law. This has not been done and the petition, therefore, ought to be dismissed on this ground\".\n\nNow the order-sheet of the proceedings before the Tribunal discloses the following.\n\nBy order dated the 16th October, 1952, the Tribunal decided that the case was in the first instance to be taken up for decision on the preliminary issues.\n\nHaving so decided it passed the following order:\n\n\"We call upon the parties whether they want to add by way of amendment to the pleadings on facts which they have already made, as in some of the preliminary points the question of fact is involved.\n\nThe respondents do not want to add to their pleadings on facts in respect of the above preliminary issues.\n\nThe petitioners have made an application under Order\n\nVI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code for striking out spmc i}ortion in paras 3-b and para 4-(d)\n\n(2) of the written statement of the respondent No. 1\".\n\nOn. the 17th January, 1953, the Tribunal passed the following order:\n\n\"The respondent No. 1. prays for time to amend his written-statement and to ask for particulars.\n\nIn the interests of justice the time is granted .... The application for amendment and for particulars to be filed five days before the date of hearing and copies thereof given to the petitioners. The petitioners shall be ready with their replies on the date of hearing\".\n\nOn the 27th January, 1953, the order is\n\n\"The petitioners have filed their reply to the amendment application of the respondent No. 1. The\n\nBJ.ikaji Kesh.a Joshi aN/ anollllr\n\nBrijlal Nandltd Bi1atti and olhert\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nll/rikqji Kn/tao\n\n]DJ/ri \"\"\" - v.\n\nBrjjlol NllllllW Bi1alli and olhns\n\nJllplrl1ltldWas ].\n\nlatter has amended his application, to which there was no objecion\".\n\nOn the 29th January, 1953, the order is \"The petitioners do not want to amend their pleadings in view of the amendment of the written statement\".\n\nIn view of the specific objection taken in the written statement and the opportunities which the petitioners had for amending the petition which the above orders disclose, there is considerable force in the contention of the learned Attorney-General that the pet1ttoners, for some reasons best known to themselves, have come forward with a somewhat irresponsible petition and that while the Court has undoubtedly the power to permit amendment of the schedule of corrupt practices by permitting the furnishing of better particulars as regards the items therein specified, there was no duty cast upon the Tribunal to direct suo motu the furnishi.ng of the better particulars.\n\nIt is true that the petitioners in the reply that they filed to the written statement of the 1st respondent and in answer to the objection that the particulars as to the alleged corrupt practices were vague, said as follows :\n\n\"The petitioners are prepared to give further particulars if the Tribunal is pleased to permit under section 83(3) of the Representation of the People Act\".\n\nThis reply was filed on the 16th October, 1952, which is the very date on which the first of the above orders extracted from the order-sheet was passed. It is also true that the order dated the 17th January, 1953, shows that the respondent No. I at one stage, indicated an intention .. himself. to ask for particulars. But\n\n':i a matter of/this kind the primary responsibility for furnishing full particulars of the alleged corrupt practices and to file a petition in full compliance with section 83(2) of the Act was on the petitioners.\n\nWhile undoubtedly the Tribunal has, in our opinion, taken all too narrow a view of their function in deal- ; ng with the various alleged defects in the petition and in treating them as sufficient for dismissal, the petitioners are not absolved from their duty to\n\ncomply, of their own accord, with the requirements of section 83(2) of the Act and to remove the defects when opportunity was available.\n\nThey cannot take shelter behind the fact that neither the Tribunal nor the respondent No. 1 has, in terms, called upon them to furnish better particulars.\n\nThe position, therefore, on the question of compliance or otherwise of the requirements of section 83 of the Act is that (1) the verifications in the petition and schedule are defective inasmuch as the dates thereof are not specified, and (2) the schedule of particulars consists of a number of items of which only one at best could have been taken up for inquiry by the Tribunal. But all the rest were not only extremely vague but no amendment was applied for nor was an opportunity for amendment of pleadings in general, open on two occasions, availed of. Learned counsel for the appellants urges that however this may be, there Was no justification for the Tribunal dismissing the petition in toto and that it was bound to have called upon the petitioners to substantiate the first allegation by evidence after striking out, if need be, the rest of the particulars, under the powers vested in it under Order VI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nOn the other hand the learned Attorney-General for the respondent No. 1 urges that in such a situation it was open to the Tribunal to consider whether, taking the petition as a whole and in its total effect, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of section 83.\n\nHe contends that if, in exercise _ of its judgment, it thought that there was substantial non-compliance, notwithstanding that one out of the various items may have been specific, it was not bound to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioners by ordering a striking out of the various items and to direct the trial of the petition to be confined to one single item which may be in order. The learned Attorney-General urgues that this would be really making out for the petitioners a different petition from what they brought up before the Election Commission and that in this class of case$ the Tribunal had the right and the duty to exercise great strictness\n\n\"--\n\nJ55 '\n\nB/tikqji Ka!IM Joshi and anolhlr\n\nv. 11'ijlal N and14l Bipi and OIMn\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n.1955 in order that the machinery for setting aside elections might not be abused for the purpose of maligning the Bhikajf Keshao Joshi and another successful candidate _by levelling vague and irresponv. sible. charges against him. _ \\Vhile there is consider- . Bdjlal Nandlal able force in this argument,. we think that in a case Biyani and others of this kind the Tribunal when dealing with the\n\n1 -;;: d J matter .in the early stages should riot have dismissed aganna a as • th'e application~ It should have exerCised its powers and called for better particulars. On non-compliance therewith, it should have ordered a striking out of such of the.'charges which remained vague and called upon the petitioners to substantiate the allegations in respect-of those which were reasoncibly specific. \\Ve are, therefore, of the opinion that the order of the .tribunal in dismissing the petition outright was clearly erroneous. : Notwithstanding this opinionwe -\\vould, in the normal course,. not have felt called upon to interfere fo this case under article 136 after this lapse of time arid at the instance of persons like the appellants before us who are mere voters having no direct personal interest in the result of the election.·\n\nBut there is one other circumstance .in this case which we.have noticed and which we feel 'we ought not to overlook, though in the course of, the arguments the same was riot brought to our notice. Para~ graphs 6(a), (b) and (c) _of the application for setting aside the election sets out certain_ grounds of alleged disqualification of the returned candidate to stand for the election. It is also stated therein that objections in this _behalf were taken at the. time of scrutiny of the nomination papers bufthat they were summarily , ov:erruled by the Returning Officer. without any enquiry and that accordingly the objections to the ._. _ disqualification have been raised in the , application. ·\n\nThe objections are as follows: - ... 6. The material facts in support of the grounds are as follows:~ . ' . ' ' . . \" · (a) The .election of candidate for the Madhya Pradesh State Assembly in the single member Akola Constituency was announced to be held on31-12-1951.\n\nN:ominations were to be filed qn or before 15-11-1951; - . . .\n\nand scrutiny of nomination was due on 17-11-1951.\n\nAt this time of scrutiny objection was taken to the nomination paper of respondent No. 1 on several grounds but the material grounds were that respondent No. 1 was disqualified for being chosen as and for being a Member of Madhya Pradesh State Assembly under Chapter III, section 7 ( d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951). That the respondent No. 1 is disqualified to fill the seat under the Act, because he is the Managing Agent or Managing Director of Rajasthan Printing and (Litho Works -private limited company under the Indian Companies Act.\n\nHe has, as a share-holder and director, interest, in contracts for supply of goods, viz. stationery, paper and printing materials, etc., to the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. He has also interest in contracts for the execution of works or performance of services, such as printing; etc., undertaken by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe respondent No. 1 gets a share by way of commission on sales effected by the Limited Company He has, therefore, by himself interest in the contracts of the company with the State Government of Madhya Pradesh.\n\n(b) The respondent No. 1 is a partner in the firm Berar General Agency.\n\nThe said firm has entered into a contract for the performance of cloth distribution on behalf of the State Government to retailers and holds a licence for the same.\n\nThe respondent No. 1, therefore, has interest by himself in the said contract for the performance of services unpertaken bv the Government.\n\n ( c) The respondent No. 1 is the proprietor of the monthly Journal \"Prawaha\" and a by-weekly paper \"Matru-bhumi\" These publications print Government advertisements on contract basis.\n\nThe respondent No. 1 has, therefore, interest in the said contract for the performance of services undertaken by the State Government Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe income derived from these contracts by the respondent No. 1 are noted in the private accounts of\n\nBltikaji K.sliao Juhi and anotlrlr\n\nBrjjlal N and/al Biyani and ot/rlrs\n\nJazannadhadas J.\n\n...\n\nBltiiqji K1Moo .]ol/ti \"\"\"~ ... /hiflal NOIUll4l BIJOni and otlrlrs\n\nj111j.\n\nthe respondent No. 1 and their details are shown in the profit and loss . statements filed with income-tax return of the respondent No. 1 for the relevant year and current year.\n\nThe sales and other details of the \"Matru-bhumi\" concern are noted in the private accounts of the respondent No. L\n\nThese objections were summarily overruled by the Returning Officer, without any inquiry or any reason\".\n\nThese allegations, if made out with such further details as may be necessary, might well prove serious and bring about the setting aside of the election of the returned candidate .\n\nThe 1st respondent in answer to these allegations states as follows:\n\n\"It is denied that there was any improper acceptance of the nomination paper of respondent No. 1 and in particular it is denied that any of the allegations made in paragraph 6(a), (b) & (c) of the petition constitute in law a disqualifications of section 7 of the Representation of the People Act. Without prejudice to this it is submitted that the respondent No. 1 was not suffering from any of these disqualifications in fact on the date of the submission of the nomination paper\".\n\nHaving regard to the nature of the alleged disqualification, which is substantially to the effect that the returned candidate had interest in contracts with the Government at the relevant dates, it was very necessary that the matters should have been cleared up in the enquiry before th~ Election Tribunal.\n\nIt is not in the interest of purity of elections that such allegations oi disqualification should be completely ignored without cnqufry and it appears rather surprising that\n\nthe Tribunal should have ignored them and exercised its powcc to dismiss the petition. However reluctant we might be to interfere in a matter like this after the lapse of three years and four months and with only an year and eight months before the general elections, we feel constrained to send this matter back for due aiquicy. But bc£\"e doing so and in view of the delay and other circumstances that have already happened,\n\nwe, in exercise of the powers which the Tribunal in •he normal course might itself have exercised, direct the striking out of all the items of alleged corrupt practices set out in Schedule A excepting the one covered by paragraph 1 of item 1, i.e., as follows:\n\n\"That in the month of December, 1951, respondent No. 1 had been to the premises of Akola Shree Gurdwara, where the Local Sikh Community had assembled to listen to the recitation of the holy book 'Granth Saheb' on the 7th day of the death of daughter of one Sardar Suratsingh.\n\nAt this meeting respondent No. 1 canvassed for votes for himself and paid Rs. 201, apparently as donation to the Gurudwara, but realy as gift for inducing the Sikh Community in the Akola constituency in general and the Sikhs assembled in particular to induce them to vote for himself at the ensuing election. Respondent No. 1 was guilty of bribery within the meaning of that term in section 123 of the Representation of the People Act\".\n\nThe case will, therefore, go back for enquiry and trial with reference only to (1) the allegations in paragraphs 6(a), (b) and (c) of tbe application for setting aside the election, and (2) the allegations in paragraph 1 of item 1, in Schedule A attached to the application as set out above.\n\nThe Election Commissioner will now reconstitute an appropriate Tribunal for the purpose. The Tribunal when constituted and before proceeding to trial will call upon the petitioners to rectify the lacuna as to dates in the verification clauses in the petition and the schedule.\n\nIt is to be hoped that the fresh proceedings before the Tribunal will be disposed of at a very early date.\n\nThe appeal is allowed as stated above but in the circumstances without costs.\n\nBhikaji Keshao Joshi and anolhu\n\nBrijlal N andlal Bi1ani and others\n\nJagannadharlas ].", "total_entities": 148, "entities": [{"text": "J\n\nBHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "fAFER IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 188, "end_char": 202, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 205, "end_char": 237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 267, "end_char": 277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Section 90( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Section 83(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 462, "end_char": 475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 476, "end_char": 499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order 6, rules 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 501, "end_char": 521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543, "end_char": 556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of 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"metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order VI of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3222, "end_char": 3242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3819, "end_char": 3832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order VI of the Code", "statute": "Order VI of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order VI of the Code", "statute": "Order VI of the Code"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 140", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5442, "end_char": 5461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rfyani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5645, "end_char": 5651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhik'!ii T\"sluzo 7oshi aNl anothtt-\n\nVi JBrijlal Nandlal\n\nRfyani and others\n\nCML\n\nAPPELLATE JUR1so1CTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5737, "end_char": 5748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5753, "end_char": 5763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (M. N.\n\nPhadke and Naunit Lal, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. N.\n\nPhadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5841, "end_char": 5854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (M. N.\n\nPhadke and Naunit Lal, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5859, "end_char": 5869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (M. N.\n\nPhadke and Naunit Lal, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5964, "end_char": 5977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the Election Tribunal, Akola, Madhya Pradesh, dated the 1st May, 1953, dismissing the election petition filed by the appellants.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6706, "end_char": 6716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6724, "end_char": 6762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "19th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6906, "end_char": 6922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ petition was filed on the 19th April, 1952, before the Election Commission at Delhi and was admittedly one day beyond the prescribed time."}}, {"text": "Election Commission at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6935, "end_char": 6963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ petition was filed on the 19th April, 1952, before the Election Commission at Delhi and was admittedly one day beyond the prescribed time."}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7114, "end_char": 7124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Akofa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7206, "end_char": 7211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Election Comµllssion admitted the petition after condoning the delay under the proviso to section 85 of the Act and thereupon constituted a Tribunal for the trial of the petition at Akofa by notifications dated the 30th July, 1952, and 22nd September, 1952."}}, {"text": "6th October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7362, "end_char": 7379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 appeared and filed his written statement on the 6th October, 1952, and the petitioners filed their reply thereto on the 16th October, 1952."}}, {"text": "16th October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7434, "end_char": 7452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 appeared and filed his written statement on the 6th October, 1952, and the petitioners filed their reply thereto on the 16th October, 1952."}}, {"text": "A. S. Athalye", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8902, "end_char": 8915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before dealing with the merits of the appeal, it may be mentioned that at an early stage of these proceedings before the Tribunal, an objection was taken to the composition of the Tribunal on the allegation that one of the Members, Shri A. S. Athalye was not competent to be a Member thereof on account of his alleged bias in favour of the first respondent."}}, {"text": "Athalye", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9109, "end_char": 9116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bias was sought to be made out by showing that shortly before the election, Shri Athalye had written a letter to the 1st respondent offering to assist him in his election campaign."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9480, "end_char": 9491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhikaji Kuhao Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9760, "end_char": 9779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellants attempted to\n\nBhikaji Kuhao Joshi and 1J11Dthlr\n\n\"' Brijlal Nanti/al B!1ani and ot\"4r1\n\nJagannall1uldas J.\n\nB/Jlkqji Ktshao ]oslil and \"\"\"'\"\" ...\n\nBrijlal Nondlal Bi.", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "Jagannall1uldas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9834, "end_char": 9849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellants attempted to\n\nBhikaji Kuhao Joshi and 1J11Dthlr\n\n\"' Brijlal Nanti/al B!1ani and ot\"4r1\n\nJagannall1uldas J.\n\nB/Jlkqji Ktshao ]oslil and \"\"\"'\"\" ...\n\nBrijlal Nondlal Bi."}}, {"text": "Brijlal Nondlal Bi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9893, "end_char": 9911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellants attempted to\n\nBhikaji Kuhao Joshi and 1J11Dthlr\n\n\"' Brijlal Nanti/al B!1ani and ot\"4r1\n\nJagannall1uldas J.\n\nB/Jlkqji Ktshao ]oslil and \"\"\"'\"\" ...\n\nBrijlal Nondlal Bi.", "canonical_name": "BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "28th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11342, "end_char": 11358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th April, 1952, the petitioners filed also an application for condonation of delay setting out the reasons for the ."}}, {"text": "5th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11716, "end_char": 11731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applicants were under the belief that Notice under Rule 113 of the Rules framed under the above Act was published on 5th April, 1952, in the official Gazette of the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "17th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12236, "end_char": 12252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applicants prepared their election petition on the 17th April, 1952."}}, {"text": "P. B. Gole", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12293, "end_char": 12303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They sent the said petition with Shri P. B. Gole, Senior Advocate, Akola, with a written authority to present the petition through any person of his choice at Nagpur on the 18th April."}}, {"text": "Akola", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12322, "end_char": 12327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They sent the said petition with Shri P. B. Gole, Senior Advocate, Akola, with a written authority to present the petition through any person of his choice at Nagpur on the 18th April."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12414, "end_char": 12420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They sent the said petition with Shri P. B. Gole, Senior Advocate, Akola, with a written authority to present the petition through any person of his choice at Nagpur on the 18th April."}}, {"text": "Gole", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12466, "end_char": 12470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also sent with Shri Gole Rs."}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12553, "end_char": 12564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12772, "end_char": 12782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12850, "end_char": 12873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applicants were under the belief that an officer must have been appointed by the Election Commission under section 81 of the Act to whom election petitions could be represented for the State of Madhya Pradesh at Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Sidhaye", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13139, "end_char": 13146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 security for costs to be made in the Government Treasury at Nagpur through Mr. Sidhaye, Advocate, Nagpur, and obtained the necessary Government Treasury receipt on the 18th April, 1952."}}, {"text": "R. S. Rangole", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13365, "end_char": 13378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He consulted R. S. Rangole, who was attached to the Election Office at Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13630, "end_char": 13635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under these circumstances Shri Gole booked a seat in the Night Plane for Delhi and flew to Delhi on the 18th and reached there on the morning on 19th April, 1952."}}, {"text": "30th July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13970, "end_char": 13985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The explanation thus furnished was accepted by the Election Commission as appears from the intimatibn to the petitioners by letter dated the 30th July, 1952."}}, {"text": "Bhikoji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14142, "end_char": 14149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal was of the opinion that notwithstanding the order of the Election Commission condoning the delay and admitting the petition, it was free to\n\nBhikoji X11/i11a ]Ol/ii Olld Ollal/rn\n\nBrijlal N andlal Bi;, oni and al/wrs\n\nBhikaji XtJhao Joshi and anollur\n\nBrijlal N andlal B!Jiani and others\n\nJagannadhada, ]."}}, {"text": "Bhikaji XtJhao Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14219, "end_char": 14239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal was of the opinion that notwithstanding the order of the Election Commission condoning the delay and admitting the petition, it was free to\n\nBhikoji X11/i11a ]Ol/ii Olld Ollal/rn\n\nBrijlal N andlal Bi;, oni and al/wrs\n\nBhikaji XtJhao Joshi and anollur\n\nBrijlal N andlal B!Jiani and others\n\nJagannadhada, ].", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "section 90( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14375, "end_char": 14389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 90( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14912, "end_char": 14926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sohom", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15829, "end_char": 15834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three persons by name Shri Sohom, Shri Kulkarni, and Shri Kothkar were nominated as candidates at the election."}}, {"text": "Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15841, "end_char": 15849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three persons by name Shri Sohom, Shri Kulkarni, and Shri Kothkar were nominated as candidates at the election."}}, {"text": "Kothkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15860, "end_char": 15867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three persons by name Shri Sohom, Shri Kulkarni, and Shri Kothkar were nominated as candidates at the election."}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16071, "end_char": 16081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16468, "end_char": 16478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17418, "end_char": 17428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17446, "end_char": 17452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay and Allahabad cases hold that this phrase confines the necessary parties under this section to those who were candidates for the actual poll, while the Patna High -Court takes the view that the phrase \"at the election\" has no such limiting significance."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17457, "end_char": 17466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay and Allahabad cases hold that this phrase confines the necessary parties under this section to those who were candidates for the actual poll, while the Patna High -Court takes the view that the phrase \"at the election\" has no such limiting significance."}}, {"text": "Patna High -Court takes", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17605, "end_char": 17628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay and Allahabad cases hold that this phrase confines the necessary parties under this section to those who were candidates for the actual poll, while the Patna High -Court takes the view that the phrase \"at the election\" has no such limiting significance."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18190, "end_char": 18200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhilcaji Keshao Joshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18561, "end_char": 18582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhilcaji Keshao Joshi and anvtMr'\n\nBrijlal Nandlal BiJani and olhzrs\n\nJagannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "Brijlal Nandlal BiJani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18596, "end_char": 18618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhilcaji Keshao Joshi and anvtMr'\n\nBrijlal Nandlal BiJani and olhzrs\n\nJagannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Bhikaji K1sltao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18649, "end_char": 18664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikaji K1sltao :Jo, hi and anol/ur\n\nB.jjlal N andlal B!Yat1i and ot/wrs\n\nimpleaded, the petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine on that sole ground but that it is a matter to be taken into consideration at the appropriate stage with reference to the final result of the case."}}, {"text": "B.jjlal N andlal B!Yat1i", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18686, "end_char": 18710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikaji K1sltao :Jo, hi and anol/ur\n\nB.jjlal N andlal B!Yat1i and ot/wrs\n\nimpleaded, the petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine on that sole ground but that it is a matter to be taken into consideration at the appropriate stage with reference to the final result of the case."}}, {"text": "section 83(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19103, "end_char": 19116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19342, "end_char": 19371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22853, "end_char": 22875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though there may be cases where the date of the pleading and the verification may be relevant and important, it would be a wrong exercise of discretionary power to dismi~\n\nBhilcaji Kesllao Joshi and anothn\n\nBrijlal Nandlal BiYani and otMrs\n\njagaMadhadas J.\n\n.iBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another v.\n\nBrij/a/ Nandlal , Bi)ani and others\n\nJagaMadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "Brijlal Nandlal BiYani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22888, "end_char": 22910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though there may be cases where the date of the pleading and the verification may be relevant and important, it would be a wrong exercise of discretionary power to dismi~\n\nBhilcaji Kesllao Joshi and anothn\n\nBrijlal Nandlal BiYani and otMrs\n\njagaMadhadas J.\n\n.iBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another v.\n\nBrij/a/ Nandlal , Bi)ani and others\n\nJagaMadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "jagaMadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22922, "end_char": 22934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though there may be cases where the date of the pleading and the verification may be relevant and important, it would be a wrong exercise of discretionary power to dismi~\n\nBhilcaji Kesllao Joshi and anothn\n\nBrijlal Nandlal BiYani and otMrs\n\njagaMadhadas J.\n\n.iBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another v.\n\nBrij/a/ Nandlal , Bi)ani and others\n\nJagaMadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": ".iBhikaji Keshao Joshi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22939, "end_char": 22961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though there may be cases where the date of the pleading and the verification may be relevant and important, it would be a wrong exercise of discretionary power to dismi~\n\nBhilcaji Kesllao Joshi and anothn\n\nBrijlal Nandlal BiYani and otMrs\n\njagaMadhadas J.\n\n.iBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another v.\n\nBrij/a/ Nandlal , Bi)ani and others\n\nJagaMadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23375, "end_char": 23388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sardar Suratsingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24351, "end_char": 24368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 has been to the premises of Akola Shree Gurudwara, where the Local Sikh Community had assembled to listen to the recitation of the holy book 'Granth Saheb' on the 7th day of the death of daughter of one Sardar Suratsingh."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24758, "end_char": 24769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24777, "end_char": 24809, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hariharpeth Akhada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24925, "end_char": 24943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar instances of giving illegal gratifications for securing votes of respective groups arc-\n\n(a) Donation to Hariharpeth Akhada ;\n\n(b) Payment to Panch-bungalow Committee of Bhangis of Old City. ("}}, {"text": "Bhaji Bazar Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25028, "end_char": 25051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c) Donation to Bhaji Bazar Association. ("}}, {"text": "Berar Oil Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25177, "end_char": 25197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 a meeting of workers in Berar Oil Industries-a concern of Birla, was called by its manager on the eve of the dection and they were threatened to vote for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Birla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25211, "end_char": 25216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 a meeting of workers in Berar Oil Industries-a concern of Birla, was called by its manager on the eve of the dection and they were threatened to vote for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bhikaji KeJhao Joshi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26912, "end_char": 26932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ballot papers thus collected were bundled together ,56\n\nBhikaji KeJhao Joshi and another\n\n•• Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and ot!rtrl\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another\n\nBrijlal Nartdlal Biyani and olhtrs\n\nand put in the ballot box by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26985, "end_char": 26998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ballot papers thus collected were bundled together ,56\n\nBhikaji KeJhao Joshi and another\n\n•• Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and ot!rtrl\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another\n\nBrijlal Nartdlal Biyani and olhtrs\n\nand put in the ballot box by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Bhikaji Keshao Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27003, "end_char": 27023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ballot papers thus collected were bundled together ,56\n\nBhikaji KeJhao Joshi and another\n\n•• Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and ot!rtrl\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another\n\nBrijlal Nartdlal Biyani and olhtrs\n\nand put in the ballot box by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "Brijlal Nartdlal Biyani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27037, "end_char": 27060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ballot papers thus collected were bundled together ,56\n\nBhikaji KeJhao Joshi and another\n\n•• Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and ot!rtrl\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nBhikaji Keshao Joshi and another\n\nBrijlal Nartdlal Biyani and olhtrs\n\nand put in the ballot box by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No.", "canonical_name": "BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "31st December, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27208, "end_char": 27227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was done on 31st December, 1951, at Chandur by persons with the connivance of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Chandur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27232, "end_char": 27239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was done on 31st December, 1951, at Chandur by persons with the connivance of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27358, "end_char": 27366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "False personation of several dead voters and voters absent in Pakistan has taken place, in Ward No."}}, {"text": "Joglekar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27543, "end_char": 27551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His man announced on loud speakers from place to place that rival candidate Dr. Joglekar was of the caste and party of Godse, the murderer of M.\n\nGandhi and a vote for him was a vote for Gandhi's Murderer."}}, {"text": "Godse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27582, "end_char": 27587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His man announced on loud speakers from place to place that rival candidate Dr. Joglekar was of the caste and party of Godse, the murderer of M.\n\nGandhi and a vote for him was a vote for Gandhi's Murderer."}}, {"text": "M.\n\nGandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27605, "end_char": 27615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His man announced on loud speakers from place to place that rival candidate Dr. Joglekar was of the caste and party of Godse, the murderer of M.\n\nGandhi and a vote for him was a vote for Gandhi's Murderer."}}, {"text": "Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27722, "end_char": 27728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another false propaganda was that Dr.\n\nJoglekar was Mishra's man, supported by Mishra's money."}}, {"text": "Kapshi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28397, "end_char": 28403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A written objection for police enquiry was given at Kapshi and one in Rifle Range area."}}, {"text": "Mohota Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28642, "end_char": 28654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohota Mills released workers and paid them for canvassing work for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29978, "end_char": 29991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30939, "end_char": 30952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31234, "end_char": 31247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J\"gotinodhadu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31356, "end_char": 31369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brijlal N aMlal I Bi1oni ottd olhm\n\nJ\"gotinodhadu J.\n\nBhikaji Kesh4o ]Dlhi and another\n\nv, Brijlal }fandlal Biyani and olher1\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nalternative, it should have at least called upon them to substantiate the allegation in paragraph 1 in item No."}}, {"text": "Bhikaji Kesh4o ]Dlhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31374, "end_char": 31394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brijlal N aMlal I Bi1oni ottd olhm\n\nJ\"gotinodhadu J.\n\nBhikaji Kesh4o ]Dlhi and another\n\nv, Brijlal }fandlal Biyani and olher1\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nalternative, it should have at least called upon them to substantiate the allegation in paragraph 1 in item No.", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32441, "end_char": 32454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 123, 124 and 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33575, "end_char": 33600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34784, "end_char": 34804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17th January, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34929, "end_char": 34947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 17th January, 1953, the Tribunal passed the following order:\n\n\"The respondent No."}}, {"text": "BJ.ikaji Kesh.a Joshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35502, "end_char": 35523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nBJ.ikaji Kesh.a Joshi aN/ anollllr\n\nBrijlal Nandltd Bi1atti and olhert\n\nJagannadhadas ]."}}, {"text": "Brjjlol NllllllW Bi1alli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35627, "end_char": 35651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll/rikqji Kn/tao\n\n]DJ/ri \"\"\" - v.\n\nBrjjlol NllllllW Bi1alli and olhns\n\nJllplrl1ltldWas ]."}}, {"text": "latter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35683, "end_char": 35689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "latter has amended his application, to which there was no objecion\"."}}, {"text": "section 83(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36903, "end_char": 36916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36924, "end_char": 36956, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37449, "end_char": 37462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37817, "end_char": 37830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38148, "end_char": 38158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38981, "end_char": 39001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39270, "end_char": 39280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Bhikajf Keshao Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40169, "end_char": 40189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General urgues that this would be really making out for the petitioners a different petition from what they brought up before the Election Commission and that in this class of case$ the Tribunal had the right and the duty to exercise great strictness\n\n\"--\n\nJ55 '\n\nB/tikqji Ka!IM Joshi and anolhlr\n\nv. 11'ijlal N and14l Bipi and OIMn\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n.1955 in order that the machinery for setting aside elections might not be abused for the purpose of maligning the Bhikajf Keshao Joshi and another successful candidate by levelling vague and irresponv.", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "Bdjlal Nandlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40316, "end_char": 40330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bdjlal Nandlal able force in this argument,."}}, {"text": "Biyani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40385, "end_char": 40391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we think that in a case Biyani and others of this kind the Tribunal when dealing with the\n\n1 -;;: d J matter .in the early stages should riot have dismissed aganna a as • th'e application~ It should have exerCised its powers and called for better particulars."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41099, "end_char": 41110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42298, "end_char": 42308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N:ominations were to be filed qn or before 15-11-1951; - . . ."}}, {"text": "17-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42357, "end_char": 42367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and scrutiny of nomination was due on 17-11-1951."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh State Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42593, "end_char": 42622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was disqualified for being chosen as and for being a Member of Madhya Pradesh State Assembly under Chapter III, section 7 ( d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951)."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42642, "end_char": 42651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42664, "end_char": 42702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Litho Works -private limited company under the Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42879, "end_char": 42946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43113, "end_char": 43127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the State Government of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Berar General Agency", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43560, "end_char": 43580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 is a partner in the firm Berar General Agency."}}, {"text": "Bltikaji K.sliao Juhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44328, "end_char": 44349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 are noted in the private accounts of\n\nBltikaji K.sliao Juhi and anotlrlr\n\nBrjjlal N and/al Biyani and ot/rlrs\n\nJazannadhadas J.\n\n...\n\nBltiiqji K1Moo .]ol/ti \"\"\"~ ... /hiflal NOIUll4l BIJOni and otlrlrs\n\nj111j."}}, {"text": "Jazannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44401, "end_char": 44414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 are noted in the private accounts of\n\nBltikaji K.sliao Juhi and anotlrlr\n\nBrjjlal N and/al Biyani and ot/rlrs\n\nJazannadhadas J.\n\n...\n\nBltiiqji K1Moo .]ol/ti \"\"\"~ ... /hiflal NOIUll4l BIJOni and otlrlrs\n\nj111j.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45400, "end_char": 45409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45417, "end_char": 45449, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Akola constituency", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47268, "end_char": 47286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "201, apparently as donation to the Gurudwara, but realy as gift for inducing the Sikh Community in the Akola constituency in general and the Sikhs assembled in particular to induce them to vote for himself at the ensuing election."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47470, "end_char": 47481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47489, "end_char": 47521, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhikaji Keshao Joshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48283, "end_char": 48303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and anolhu\n\nBrijlal N andlal Bi1ani and others\n\nJagannadharlas ].", "canonical_name": "Bhilcaji Kesllao Joshi"}}, {"text": "anolhu\n\nBrijlal N andlal Bi1ani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48308, "end_char": 48339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and anolhu\n\nBrijlal N andlal Bi1ani and others\n\nJagannadharlas ]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_450_457_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Stpttmbr 6\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nSHRI S.\n\nELECTION\n\nSUCHETA KRIPALANI\n\nti.\n\nDULAT, I.C.S., CHAIRMAN OF THE\n\nTRIBUNAL, DELHI AND OTHERS.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE,\n\nBHAGWATI,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS,\n\nB. P.\n\nSINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nElection Dispute-Election petition by unsuccessful rival-A/legations of r12ajo1 co\"upt practices and falsity in the return of election expenses against the returned candidate-Return of election expenses\n\nfound defective and returned candidate disqualified by the Election Commission-Removal of such disqualification on lodging of fresh return-furisdiction of Election Tribuna/_:_If competent to inquire into identical allegations of falsity against the second return-Repre sentation of the People Act (XL/II of 1951), s. 143-The Representa tion of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, rule 114(4), (5) and (6).\n\nThe provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the Rules framed thereunder assign distinct and different jurisdictions to the Election Commission and an Election Tribunal so far as a Re.turn of election expenses is concerned.\n\nWhere there are allegations of major corrupt practices and a Tribunal constituted is in lawful seisin Of the dispute, s. 143 of the Act gives it the sole jurisdiction and makes it incumbent on it to inquire into the falsity of any particulars mentioned in the return where such falsity is alleged and brought into issue and is reasonably connected with the major corrupt practices.\n\nWhat the Election Commission has to do under Rule 114( 4) is to satisfy itself that the return is in the prescribed form.\n\nIt is no part of its function to inquire into the correctness of any particulars mentioned therein.\n\nThat question can only arise when some one raises a dispute and brings the matter into issue.\n\nConsequently, in a case where, as in the present, the Election Commission removed the disqualification it had imposed on the returned candidate for lodging a defective return of election expenses on the lodging of a fresh return; Held, that the decision of the Election Commission removing the disqualification attaching to the first return in no way precluded the Tribunal from inquiring into the falsity of the particulars in the second return although they were identical with those challenged in the first return;\n\nthat the removal of the disqualification only meant that the accepted return was the only valid return, being the first to be correct in form, and the Tribunal had only that return before it.\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1955. - . suC11efa- Kri'plani Appeal under Articles 132and 133 of the Constitution of India against the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd December 1953 of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Prinjab, in Civil \\Vrit Application No. 24 of 1953.L_____ ·;- 0 • \"·. . • • ' ' . ~: 1-tl -. . . . . - ; .\n\nN. 0. Chatterjee, (R. S. N!irula, with him) for the appellant. . . . . . . ·. a:s. Pathak and Veda Vyds',-(Ganpat :Ri, ith them), for respondent No. 5 \"\" . -~- ·- .. i955.\n\nSepteber, 6.' The Judgment _of the Court was delivered by • ,. · ·,\n\nBosE J.-· The proceedings that have given rise fo this appeal arise out of aneJection petition liefore the Election Tribunal; Delhi. ' . . .. ' The appellant Shrimati SuchetaKripalani together with the contesting respondent Shrimati Manmohirii Sahgal and others were candidates for election to the House of the People from the Parliamentary , Con- . stituency of New Delhi.\n\nThe polling took place on - 14th January, 1952, and when the' votes.were counted on 18th January, 1952; it was found that the appellant had secured the largest number of votes an_d that the contesting respondent 1\\Ianmohlni came next; The appellant '.was accordingly notified as the returned candidate on 24th January, 1952. · .· . On 6th larch, 1952, the appellant filed her return\n\nof election expenses. This was found to be defective, and on .17th April, 1952, tlie Election Commission published a notification in the Gazette of India dis-· qualifying the appellant under Rulell4(5) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Electio_ns and Election Petitioris) Rules, 1951, ori the ground that she had · . . · '•-\" • : · _ . : \"failed to lodge the rel urn' of election expenses in the manner required\" and that she had thereby \"incurred the disqualifications under clause (c) of section 7 and section 143 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951':, _ --\n\nv.\n\nShi S.S.- Duiat~ I.C.S., Chairman\n\nOf the Eiection\n\nTribunal~ Delhi\n\nand others\n\nSru; hlta Jrripalairi\n\n•• Sht'i S. S. Dulal, J.C.S., Chairman\n\nof the El<di°\" T ribunol, Ddhi\n\nand oth\"s\n\nBose].\n\nIn view of this the appellant submitted a fresh return with an explanation under Rule 114(6) on 30th April, 1952.\n\nThis was accepted . by the Commission and on 7th May, 1952, it published a notification in the Gazette of India under Rule 114(7) stating that the disqualification had been removed.\n\nIn the meanwhile, on 7th April, 1952, the contesting respondent Manmohini filed an election petition praying that the appellant's election be declared void and that she (the petitioner) be declared to have been duly elected.\n\nIt will be noticed that this was before 17th April, 1952, the date on which the Election Commission disqualified the appellant.\n\nThe validity of the election was attacked on many grounds.\n\nA number of major corrupt practices were alleged and the return which the appellant had filed on 6th March, 1952, of her election expenses' was challenged as a minor corrupt practice on two grounds :\n\n(1) that the return was false in material particulars and (2) that it was not in accordance with the rules and so was no return at all in the eye of the law.\n\nParticulars of the instances in which the return was challenged as false were then set out.\n\nThe appellant filed her written statement in reply on 7th October, 1952.\n\nIt will be noticed that this was after she had put in her second return and after the Election Commission had removed the disqualification due to the first return.\n\nHer reply was as follows : (I) That as the disqualification with respect to the return of her election expenses had been removed by the Election Commission under section 144 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, this question could not be reopened;\n\n(2) That a minor corrupt practice which cannot vitiate an election and which is not capable of materially affecting an election is wholly outside the scope of a proper election petition and so no cognisance of. it can be taken by the Election Tribunal;\n\n(3) That only such matters can be put in issue as arc necessary to decide whether the election of the returned candidate fo liable to be set aside within the meaning of section 100(2) of the Act.\n\nThe contesting respondent Manmohini filed a replication on 15th October, 1952. In it she said:-\n\n(1) that the Election Commission did hot and could not decide whether the return was or was not false in material particulars and so the question was still open. (This had reference to the first return dated 6th March, 1952.) ;\n\n(2) that in any event \"even the revised return is false in material particulars and the objections with regard to the original return also apply exactly with regard to the revised return\".\n\nThe broad propositions of law raised by points (2) and (3) in the appellant's written statement were also. denied.\n\nThen followed an item by item reply to the allegations made by the appellant in the list which she had appended to her written statement.\n\nThat lisc was a reply to the particulars of false return and corrupt practices furnished by the contesting respondeilt Manmohini. It is evident then that Manmohini attacked the second return on exactly the same grounds as the first and furnished the same particulars.\n\nNow we have spoken of these returns as the first and the second.\n\nBut counsel on both sides agreed before us that the first return was in fact no return at all in the eye of the law and that therefore the contesting respondent's real attack was on the second return which must be regarded as the only return wi1ich the law will recognise as a valid return. It was agreed\n\nthat there cannot be two returns of expenses: either the one originally filed is amended or it is treated as a nullity so far as it purports to be a return.\n\nIn view of this agreement, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the matter and we will concentrate our attention on what, for convenience, we will continue to call the second return.\n\nThe first point that now arises is whether the decision of the Election Commission to remove the disqualification attaching to the first return precludes an enquiry into the falsity of the second return simply because the respondent Manmohini alleged that the\n\n1955\n\nSue hi ta K ripalart\n\nShri S. S. Dulat, I.C.S., Chairmart\n\nof lire Ek&tion Tribunal, Delhi\n\nand others\n\nBose].\n\nllwhtla Kripal<uii\n\nSlwi S. S. Dulal, 1.c.s., Ch.airman\n\nof '\"' Ellai.,. 1\" ri/Junal Delhi\n\nand others\n\nparticulars of the falsity are exactly the same as before.\n\nOur answer to that is No. If the first return is no return in the eye of the law, then the only return we are concerned with is the second and that must be treated in the same way as it would have been if it had been the only return made.\n\nIf there had been no other return and this return had been challenged on the grounds now raised, it is clear that the truth of the allegations made would have to be enquired into.\n\nThat enquiry cannot be shut out simply because the allegations against the second return .. happen to be exactly the same in the matter of its falsity as in the case of the first return.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to enquire into these matters was not ousted on that account. Opr reasons for this are these.\n\nSection 76 of the Act requires every candidate to file a return of election expenses in a particular form containing certain prescribed particulars.\n\nThe form and particulars are set out in the Rules.\n\nSection 143 prescribes the penalty for failure to observe those requirements.\n\nIt is disqualification.\n\nThis ensues if there is a \"default\" in making the return.\n\nIt also ensues:-\n\n\"if such a return is found ........ upon the trial of an election petition under Part VI ........ to be false in any material particular\".\n\nThat places the matter beyond doubt.\n\nThe trial of an election petition is conducted by an Election Tribunal and this section makes it incumbent on the Tribunal to enquire into the falsity of a return when that is a matter raised and placed in issue and the allegations are reasonably connected with other allegations about a major corrupt practice.\n\nThe jurisdiction is that of the Tribunal and not of the Election Commission. The duty of the Election Commission is merely to decide under Rule 114(4) whther any candidate has, among other things,\n\n\"failed to lodge the return of election expenses .... m the manner required by the Act and these rules''.\n\nIt is a question of form and not of substance. lf\n\nthe return is in proper form no question of falsity can arise unless somebody raises the issue. If it is raised, the allegations will be made in some other document by some other person and the charges so preferred will be enquired into by the Tribunal.\n\nIf the return is not in proper form, disqualification ensues but the Election Commission is invested with the power to remove the disqualification under Rule 114(6).\n\nIf it does, the position becomes the same as it would have been had the Election Commission decided that the form was proper in the first instance.\n\nThat would still leave the question of falsity for determination by the Tribunal in cases where the issue is properly raised.\n\nMr. Chatterjee contended on behalf of the appellant that we were not concerned with the second return in this appeal and strongly protested against Mr. Pathak being allowed to argue this point. But that has been the main bone of contention almost from the start.\n\nWhen the election petition was filed, there was only one return to attack.\n\nThe second had not been put in. Later, when it was put in, the contesting respondent, Manmohini, attacked both and the appellant herself said that questions about the falsity of the return could not be gone into because of the Election Commission's order removing the disqualification.\n\nThat argument applies as much to the second as to the first return and raises an issue about the respective jurisdictions of the Election Commission and the Election Tribunal on this point.\n\nThe Tribunal decided against the appellant on this point and held, as we do, that the Election Commission was not concerned with the issue of fact about the falsity of the return.\n\nThe appellant then filed a petition under article 226 to the High Court and questioned the Tribunal's jurisdiction to enquire into the issue of falsity.\n\nThe High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision and the appellant pursued the matter here both in her grounds of appeal and in her statement of the case.\n\nShe cannot at this stage ask us to leave\n\nSuto Kripalani ,,.\n\nSltri S. S. Du/al, 1.c.s., C/iainun\n\noftlwEUdittti T mllllal, Dllhi\n\n4lld olhm\n\nBm].\n\nSueheta Kripalani\n\nYo Slwi S. S. Dulat, l.C.S., Chairman\n\n°\"' tht Election T ribMnal, Dtlhi\n\nand others\n\nBose J.\n\nthe matter open so that she can come here again and re-agitate this question.\n\nWe accordingly overrule Mr. Chatterjee's objection.\n\nThe next question argued was whether an Election Tribunal can enquire into a minor corrupt practice if it is of such a nature that, standing by itself, it could not have been made the basis of an election . petition because it could not materially affect the result of the election.\n\nWe need not go into that because the question is purely academic in this case.\n\nThe allegation about the minor corrupt practice does not stand by itself.\n\nThere are also allegations about major corrupt practices which require investigation and the minor corrupt practices alleged are reasonably connected with them. Section 143 of the Act is a complete answer to the question of the Tribunal's jurisdiction on this point when it is properly seised of the trial of an election petition on other grounds. Whether it could be properly seised of such a trial if this had been the only allegation, or if the minor corrupt practice alleged was not reasonably connected with the other allegations about major corrupt practices, doe> not therefore arise.\n\nAs the trial is proceeding on the other matters the' Tribunal is bound under section 143, now that the issue has been raised, also to enquire into the question of the falsity of the return. Without such an enquiry it cannot reach the finding which section 143 contemplates.\n\nWe need not look into the other sections which were touched upon in the arguments and in the Courts below because section 143 is clear and confers the requisite jurisdiction when a trial is properly in progress.\n\nThe appellant has failed on every question of substance that she raised.\n\nThere was some vagueness in the Election Tribunal's order about which of the two returns formed the basis of the enquiry on this point but even if the Tribunal intended to treat the first return as the basis that did not really affect the substance because exactly the same allegations are made about the second return and the issue of fact would therefore have to be tried in any event. The appellant's whole enc!-eavour was to circumvent such an enquiry and oust the Tribunal's jurisdiction.\n\nIn that she has failed, so she will pay the contesting rcspondent' s costs throughout.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs all through.\n\nTIRATH SINGH\n\nti.\n\nBACHITT AR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.]\n\nElection Dispute-Election petition-Contents alleged to be vague and wanting in particulars-Mainu1inability-Naming of persons for disqualification-Recommendation for exemption from disqualification-Notice-Jurisdiction of the Tribunal-The Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951), ss. 83, 99(1)(a) proviso.\n\nWhere the respondent in an election petition contended that the allegations in the election petition were vague and wanting in particulars, but did not call for any particulars which it was open to him to do and was not found to have been misled or in any way prejudiced in his defence, it \\Vas not open to him to contend that the petition was liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 83 of the Act.\n\nClauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to s. 99 of the Representation of the People Act read together leave no scope for doubt that clause\n\n(a) contemplates notice only to such persons as were not parties to the election petition and it is, therefore, not obligatory on the Tribunal under cl. (a) to issue notices on such persons as were parties in order that it may name them for disqualification under sub-clause (ii) of s. 99(l)(a) of the Act. Clause (b) to the proviso obviously has the effect of excluding such persons as have already had the opportunity of cross-examining witnesses, calling evidence and of being heard, which the clause seeks to afford.\n\nThe Indian and the English Law on the matter arc substantially the same.\n\nKe.rho Ram v. Hazura Singh, [1953] 8 Election Law Reports 320, overruled.\n\nThe jurisdiction that sub-clause (ii) of s. 99(1)(a) of the Act confers on the Tribunal for making recommendation for exemption 11-83 S. C, India/59.\n\nSw:lrda Kripalani v.\n\nShri S. S. Dulat,\n\nI.C.S., Chairman\n\n4 the Ekction T ribunaJ, Delhi\n\nand others\n\nBose].\n\n<; tpkmb1r 15", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "SUCHETA KRIPALANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUCHETA KRIPALANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DULAT, I.C.S., CHAIRMAN OF THE\n\nTRIBUNAL, DELHI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.S. 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S. N!irula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2903, "end_char": 2916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee, (R. S. N!irula, with him) for the appellant. . . . . . . ·."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyds',-(Ganpat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2978, "end_char": 2997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a:s. Pathak and Veda Vyds',-(Ganpat :Ri, ith them), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shrimati SuchetaKripalani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3284, "end_char": 3309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Shrimati SuchetaKripalani together with the contesting respondent Shrimati Manmohirii Sahgal and others were candidates for election to the House of the People from the Parliamentary , Con- ."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Manmohirii Sahgal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Shrimati SuchetaKripalani together with the contesting respondent Shrimati Manmohirii Sahgal and others were candidates for election to the House of the People from the Parliamentary , Con- ."}}, {"text": "1\\Ianmohlni", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3713, "end_char": 3724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The polling took place on - 14th January, 1952, and when the' votes.were counted on 18th January, 1952; it was found that the appellant had secured the largest number of votes an_d that the contesting respondent 1\\Ianmohlni came next; The appellant '.was accordingly notified as the returned candidate on 24th January, 1952. · .· ."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4033, "end_char": 4038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was found to be defective, and on .17th April, 1952, tlie Election Commission published a notification in the Gazette of India dis-· qualifying the appellant under Rulell4(5) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitioris) Rules, 1951, ori the ground that she had · . . · '•-\" • : ·"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4403, "end_char": 4414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4422, "end_char": 4460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S.S.- Duiat~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4478, "end_char": 4490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "failed to lodge the rel urn' of election expenses in the manner required\" and that she had thereby \"incurred the disqualifications under clause (c) of section 7 and section 143 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951':, _ --\n\nv.\n\nShi S.S.- Duiat~ I.C.S., Chairman\n\nOf the Eiection\n\nTribunal~ Delhi\n\nand others\n\nSru; hlta Jrripalairi\n\n•• Sht'i S. S. Dulal, J.C.S., Chairman\n\nof the El<di°\" T ribunol, Ddhi\n\nand oth\"s\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "S. S. Dulal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "failed to lodge the rel urn' of election expenses in the manner required\" and that she had thereby \"incurred the disqualifications under clause (c) of section 7 and section 143 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951':, _ --\n\nv.\n\nShi S.S.- Duiat~ I.C.S., Chairman\n\nOf the Eiection\n\nTribunal~ Delhi\n\nand others\n\nSru; hlta Jrripalairi\n\n•• Sht'i S. S. Dulal, J.C.S., Chairman\n\nof the El<di°\" T ribunol, Ddhi\n\nand oth\"s\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "S. S. Dulal"}}, {"text": "7th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4988, "end_char": 5003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on 7th April, 1952, the contesting respondent Manmohini filed an election petition praying that the appellant's election be declared void and that she (the petitioner) be declared to have been duly elected."}}, {"text": "Manmohini", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5031, "end_char": 5040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on 7th April, 1952, the contesting respondent Manmohini filed an election petition praying that the appellant's election be declared void and that she (the petitioner) be declared to have been duly elected.", "canonical_name": "Manmohini"}}, {"text": "17th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5233, "end_char": 5249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be noticed that this was before 17th April, 1952, the date on which the Election Commission disqualified the appellant."}}, {"text": "6th March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5479, "end_char": 5494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of major corrupt practices were alleged and the return which the appellant had filed on 6th March, 1952, of her election expenses' was challenged as a minor corrupt practice on two grounds :\n\n(1) that the return was false in material particulars and (2) that it was not in accordance with the rules and so was no return at all in the eye of the law."}}, {"text": "7th October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5889, "end_char": 5906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed her written statement in reply on 7th October, 1952."}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6236, "end_char": 6247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6255, "end_char": 6293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 100(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6756, "end_char": 6770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "15th October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6843, "end_char": 6861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contesting respondent Manmohini filed a replication on 15th October, 1952."}}, {"text": "Manmohini", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7674, "end_char": 7683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That lisc was a reply to the particulars of false return and corrupt practices furnished by the contesting respondeilt Manmohini.", "canonical_name": "Manmohini"}}, {"text": "S. S. Dulat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8848, "end_char": 8859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first point that now arises is whether the decision of the Election Commission to remove the disqualification attaching to the first return precludes an enquiry into the falsity of the second return simply because the respondent Manmohini alleged that the\n\n1955\n\nSue hi ta K ripalart\n\nShri S. S. Dulat, I.C.S., Chairmart\n\nof lire Ek&tion Tribunal, Delhi\n\nand others\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "S. S. Dulal"}}, {"text": "Section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9867, "end_char": 9877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10069, "end_char": 10080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11799, "end_char": 11809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee contended on behalf of the appellant that we were not concerned with the second return in this appeal and strongly protested against Mr. Pathak being allowed to argue this point."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11947, "end_char": 11953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee contended on behalf of the appellant that we were not concerned with the second return in this appeal and strongly protested against Mr. Pathak being allowed to argue this point."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12836, "end_char": 12847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Suto Kripalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13143, "end_char": 13157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She cannot at this stage ask us to leave\n\nSuto Kripalani ,,."}}, {"text": "Sueheta Kripalani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13249, "end_char": 13266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sueheta Kripalani\n\nYo Slwi S. S. Dulat, l.C.S., Chairman\n\n°\"' tht Election T ribMnal, Dtlhi\n\nand others\n\nBose J.\n\nthe matter open so that she can come here again and re-agitate this question.", "canonical_name": "SUCHETA KRIPALANI"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13354, "end_char": 13358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sueheta Kripalani\n\nYo Slwi S. S. Dulat, l.C.S., Chairman\n\n°\"' tht Election T ribMnal, Dtlhi\n\nand others\n\nBose J.\n\nthe matter open so that she can come here again and re-agitate this question."}}, {"text": "Section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14095, "end_char": 14106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14604, "end_char": 14615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14775, "end_char": 14786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14916, "end_char": 14927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "TIRATH SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15731, "end_char": 15743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TIRATH SINGH\n\nti."}}, {"text": "BACHITT AR SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15750, "end_char": 15766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BACHITT AR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.]\n\nElection Dispute-Election petition-Contents alleged to be vague and wanting in particulars-Mainu1inability-Naming of persons for disqualification-Recommendation for exemption from disqualification-Notice-Jurisdiction of the Tribunal-The Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951), ss."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15780, "end_char": 15789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BACHITT AR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.]\n\nElection Dispute-Election petition-Contents alleged to be vague and wanting in particulars-Mainu1inability-Naming of persons for disqualification-Recommendation for exemption from disqualification-Notice-Jurisdiction of the Tribunal-The Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951), ss."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15808, "end_char": 15826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BACHITT AR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.]\n\nElection Dispute-Election petition-Contents alleged to be vague and wanting in particulars-Mainu1inability-Naming of persons for disqualification-Recommendation for exemption from disqualification-Notice-Jurisdiction of the Tribunal-The Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951), ss."}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16069, "end_char": 16101, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 83, 99(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16119, "end_char": 16135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16555, "end_char": 16560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16612, "end_char": 16617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16625, "end_char": 16657, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 99(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16993, "end_char": 17004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17422, "end_char": 17433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ekction T ribunaJ, Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17597, "end_char": 17621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sw:lrda Kripalani v.\n\nShri S. S. Dulat,\n\nI.C.S., Chairman\n\n4 the Ekction T ribunaJ, Delhi\n\nand others\n\nBose]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_457_468_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 457\n\nlant's whole enc!-eavour was to circumvent such an enquiry and oust the Tribunal's jurisdiction.\n\nIn that she has failed, so she will pay the contesting rcspondent' s costs throughout.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs all through.\n\nTIRATH SINGH\n\nti.\n\nBACHITT AR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.]\n\nElection Dispute-Election petition-Contents alleged to be vague and wanting in particulars-Mainu1inability-Naming of persons for disqualification-Recommendation for exemption from disqualification-Notice-Jurisdiction of the Tribunal-The Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951), ss. 83, 99(1)(a) proviso.\n\nWhere the respondent in an election petition contended that the allegations in the election petition were vague and wanting in particulars, but did not call for any particulars which it was open to him to do and was not found to have been misled or in any way prejudiced in his defence, it \\Vas not open to him to contend that the petition was liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 83 of the Act.\n\nClauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to s. 99 of the Representation of the People Act read together leave no scope for doubt that clause\n\n(a) contemplates notice only to such persons as were not parties to the election petition and it is, therefore, not obligatory on the Tribunal under cl. (a) to issue notices on such persons as were parties in order that it may name them for disqualification under sub-clause (ii) of s. 99(l)(a) of the Act. Clause (b) to the proviso obviously has the effect of excluding such persons as have already had the opportunity of cross-examining witnesses, calling evidence and of being heard, which the clause seeks to afford.\n\nThe Indian and the English Law on the matter arc substantially the same.\n\nKe.rho Ram v. Hazura Singh, [1953] 8 Election Law Reports 320, overruled.\n\nThe jurisdiction that sub-clause (ii) of s. 99(1)(a) of the Act confers on the Tribunal for making recommendation for exemption 11-83 S. C, India/59.\n\nSw:lrda Kripalani v.\n\nShri S. S. Dulat,\n\nI.C.S., Chairman\n\n4 the Ekction T ribunaJ, Delhi\n\nand others\n\nBose].\n\n<; tpkmb1r 15\n\nTit-at/a SU.gh ...\n\nBaehittar Singh\n\nand ol/urs\n\nfrom disqualifications mentioned in ss. 141 to 143 is purely advisory.\n\nWhere it omits to do so, aggrieved parties have access to the Election Commission which under s. 144 has the power to act suo motu. No person, be he a party or a stranger, has a right to be heard by the Tribunal on the question of such exemption and, therefore, no question of any service of notice under the proviso in this regard can arise.\n\nEven supposing that the proviso requires notice on a party to the dection petition, the noti.:e to him of the election petition itself can be treated as a notice under the proviso.\n\nC1VIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1955.\n\nAppeal under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution of India against the Judgment and Order dated the 12th January 1954 of the Pepsu High Court in Civil Misc. No. 182 of 1953.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, Veda Vyas and /agannath Kaushal, (Natmit Lal, with them), for the appellant.\n\nThe respondents did not appear. 1955.\n\nSeptember 15.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant was a candidate for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of PEPSU from the Dhuri Constituency, and having secured the largest number / of votes was declared duly elected.\n\nThe first respondent who is one of the electors in the Constituency filed the petition out of which the present appeal arises, for setting aside the election on the grounds, . inter alia,\n\n(1) that the nomination of one Mali Singh had been wrongly rejected by the returning officer, and (2) that the appellant was guilty of the corrupt practice of bribery.\n\nThe Tribunal held that both these grounds were made out, and accordingly set aside the election. It further recorded a finding in terms of section 99(1) (a) of the Representation of the People Act No. XLIII of 1951 that the appellant was proved to have committed the corrupt practice of bribery as mentioned in section 123(1) of the Act. The Appellant thereupon filed in the High Court of Patiala and East Punjab States\n\nUnion an application under Article 227 attacking the finding of the Tribunal that he was guilty of bribery.\n\nThe order of the Tribunal in so far as it set aside his election was not challenged.\n\nBy der dated 12-1-1954 the High Court upheld the findings of the Tribunal, and dismissed the application, and by order dated 7-6-1954 granted a certificate for appeal to this Court under Article 133(1)(c).\n\nThat is how the appeal .comes before us.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant, the learned Attorney- General raised two contentions : ( 1) The finding that the appellant was guilty of bribery was reached in disregard of the mandatory provisions of section 83, and that it was besides open to other legal objections; and (2) the finding recorded under section 99 of the Act was bad, because no notice was given to the appellant, and no enquiry held as required by the proviso to section 99.\n\nThis point was not taken in the application under Article 227, and was sought to be raised at the time of the argument in the High Court ; but the leo.rned Judges declined to entertain it. ( 1) On the first question, the complaint of the appellant is that in the election petit;:.n the allegations relating to bribery were ·:ague and wanting in particulars, and that the petition should accordingly have been dismissed under sections 83 and 85 of the Act; that the charge that was sought to be proved at the hearing was at variance with the charge as alleged in the petition, and that the Tribun:\\l had erred in giving a finding of bribery on the basis not of the allegations in the petition but of the evidence addur'!d at the trial.\n\nThe allegations in the petition relating to this charge are as follows:\n\n\"The sweepers of Small Town Committee, Dhuri were each granted good work allowance at Rs. 5 p.m. for three months only during Election days, simply because they happened to be voters in the said Constituency, vide letter No. ST/1(4)/52/20702 dated 7th December, 1951.\n\nAll this was done to induce these sweepers to vote for the respondent No. 1. The allowance was against the Rules\".\n\nBaehitlar Singh\n\nand ollurs\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyJar J.\n\nTirath Singh\n\nBacbiuar Singh\n\nand olhen\n\nThe reply follows: of the appellant to this charge\n\n[1955]\n\nwas as\n\n\"The sweepers of Small . Town Committee represented to me in writing that their pays should be increased, and they also quoted the pays that the employees of other Small Town Committees and Municipal Committees were getting.\n\nThe representation was forwarded to the Secretariat.\n\nThe Secretariat examined it on merits, passed legal orders. Such concessions were also shown to other employees of the various Small Tmvn Committees and Municipal Committees in Pepsu before and after this case. This was an official act done in the routine and not to induce the sweepers to vote for respondent No. 1\".\n\nOn these averments, the following issue was framed: \"5. Whether the sweepers of Small Town Committee, Dhuri, were granted good work allowance at Rs. 5 p.m. for three months only during the election days in order to induce them to vote for the Respondent No. 1 ?\"\n\nAt the trial, the petitioner examined the Darogha of the Small Town Committee (P. W. 28), and five sweepers, P. W s. 12, 13, 14, 39 and 40, and their evidence was that sometime in November 1951 the appellant came to Dhuri, enquired about the number of sweepers in the service of the Committee, and offered to raise their pay if they would vote for him, that the sweepers thereupon held a meeting and considered the suggestion of the appellant, and then decided to vote for him, if the pay was increased. It must be stated that the appellant was then Minister for Health, and was in charge of Local Administration.\n\nOn 28-11-1951 he passed an order on a memorial sent by the sweepers that their pay would be increased by Rs. 5 per mensem. Objection to the order was taken by the Department, and thereupon, the appellant passed the modified order dated 7-12-1951 granting good work allowance for a period of three months from December 1951 to February 1952. The Tribunal accepted the evidence on the side of the petitioner that the appellant offered to increase the salary of the sweepers in 1951, and held that the order dated\n\n7-12-1951, granting good work allowance for the election period was the outcome of the bargain come to in November 1951, and that the charge of bribery had been established.\n\nIt is contended for the appellant that in the petition there was no mention of the bargain on which the finding of bribery by the Tribunal was based, that the charge in the petition related only to the order dated 7-12-1951, and that accordingly it was not open to the petitioner to travel beyond the petition and adduce evidence in proof of a bargain which had not been pleaded.\n\nThis is to put too technical and narrow a construction on the averments. The charge in the petition was not merely that the appellant had passed the order dated 7-12-1951 but that he had passed it with a view to induce the sweepers to . vote for him.\n\nThat clearly raised the question as to the circumstances under which the order came to be passed, whether it was in the course of official routine as the appellant pleaded, or under circumstances which were calculated to influence the voters.\n\nIssue 5 put the matter beyond doubt, when it pointedly raised the question whether the grant was \"for three months only during the election days in order to induce them (the sweepers) to vote for the respondent No. l\". Under the circumstances, the compiaint that the evidence and the finding as to the bargain went beyond the pleadings and should be ignored appears to be without any substance.\n\nIt may be that the allegations in the petition are not as full as they might have been; but if the appellant was really embarrassed by the vagueness of the charge, it was open to him to have called for particulars; but he did not do so.\n\nAt the trial, the petitioner first adduced evidence, and his witnesses spoke to the bargain in November, 1951.\n\nIt is stated on behalf of the appellant that he objected to the reception of the evidence on the question of bargain, as it was not pleaded.\n\nBut this is denied by the petitioner in his affidavit filed in the High Court dated 3-12-1953.\n\nEven apart from this, the witnesses on behalf of the petitioner gave evidence on this point on the 8th and 11th\n\nT irath Singh v.\n\nBachittar Singh\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!)'arJ.\n\nBaehittar Singh\n\nalfd others\n\nNovember, 15th and 16th December, 1952, and on the 2nd February, 1953.\n\nThen the appellant entered on his defence.\n\nOn 26-2.1951 he examined R.W. 4, a member of the Small Town Committee, to rebut the evidence on the side of the petitioner, and himself went into the box and deposed to the circumstances. under which the order came to be passed.\n\nHaving regard to the above facts, there is and can be no complaint that the appellant was misled, or was prejudiced by the alleged defect in the pleadings.\n\nThe contention that is urged for him Is that the petition should have been dismissed under section 83 for wan: of particulars. This was rightly rejected by the High Court as without force, and we are in agreement with it.\n\n' It is next contended that there is no evidence or finding that the sweepers were entitled to vote in the Constituency, or that the appellant was a candidate as defined in section 79(2) at the time when the bargain was made.\n\nBut the allegation in the petition is clear that the order dated 7-12-1951 was made with a view \"to induce the sweepers to vote for the appellant\".\n\nThe reply of the appellant to this was that the order was made in the course of official routine and \"not to induce the sweepers to . vote\" for him.\n\nFar from there being any specific denial that the sweepers were electors, the r{!ply of the appellant proceeds on the basis that they were entitled to vote.\n\nThis objection was not raised before the Tribunal, and, as pointed out by the High Court, P. W. 12 does say in his evidence that he is a voter.\n\nThis contention must accordingly be overruled.\n\nNor is there any substance in the contention that there is no proof that the appellant was a candidate at the time of the bargain.\n\nThis again is an objection which was not taken before the Tribunal, and on the evidence of the witnesses examined on the side of, the petitioner which was accepted by the Tribunal, the appellant would be a prospective candidate as aefined in section 79(b) of the Act.\n\nThe finding that the appellant is guilty of bribery is therefore not open to attack.\n\n(2) It is next contended that the order of the\n\nTribunal in .so far as it recorded a finding that' the appellant had committeed the corrupt practice specified in section 123(1) is bad, as no notice was given to him as required by the proviso to section 99 and no opportunity to show cause against it.\n\nSection 99 runs as follows:\n\n\"99. (1) At the time of making an order under section 98 the Tribunal shall also make an order- ( a) whether any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt or illegal practice having been committed at the election, recording-\n\n(i) a finding whether any corrupt or illegal . practice has or has not been proved to have been committed by, or with the connivance of, any candidate or his agent at the election, and the nature of that corrupt or illegal practice; and\n\n(ii) the ilames of all persons, if any who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice and the nature of that practice, together with any such recommendations as the Tribunal may think proper to make for the exemption of any persons from any disqualifications which they may have incurred in this connection under sections 141 to 143.\n\nProvided that no person shall be named in the order under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) unless- ( a) he has been given notice to appear before the Tribunal and to show cause why he should not be so named; and\n\n(b) if he appears in pursuance of the notice, he has been given an opportunity of cross-examining any witness who has already been examined by the Tribunal and has given evidence against him, of calling evidence in his defence and of being heard ...... \" The point for detision is whether it was obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to issue notice under the above proviso to parties to the election petition before recording a finding under section 99(1)(a). The contention of the ppellant is that under section 99(1)(a) the Tribunal has to record the names of all persons\n\nBachittar Sinh\n\nend others\n\nY tnkatarama\n\nAJyar J.\n\nwho are proved to have been guilty . of corrupt or illegal practice, that that would include both parties to the petition as well as non-parties, that the proviso requires that notice should be given to all persons who are to be named under section 99(1) (a), subclause (ii), and that the appellant was accordingly entitled to fresh notice under the proviso.\n\nIt is argued that if the language of the enactment is interpreted in its literal and grammatical sense, there could be no escape from the conclusion that parties to the petition are also entitled to notice under rhe proviso.\n\nBut it is a rule of interpretation well-established that, \"Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence\". (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 229).\n\nReading the proviso along with clause (b) thereto, and construing it in its set ting in the section, we are of opinion that notwithstanding the wideness of the language used, the proviso contemplates notice only to persons who are not parties to the petition.\n\nThe object of giving notice to a person under the proviso is obviously to give him an opportunity to be heard before a finding is given under section 99(l)(a)\n\n(i) that he has committed a corrupt or illegal practice.\n\nThis clearly appears from clause (b) of the proviso, which enacts that the person to whom notice is to be given should have an opportunity of crossexamining witnesses who had been examined before and given evidence against him, of calling his own evidence and of being heard.\n\nThis is in accordance with the rule of natural justice which requires that no one should be condemned without being given an opportunity to be heard.\n\nThe reason of the rule, therefore, requirs that notice should be given to persons who had had no previous opportunity in respect of the matters mentioned in sub-clause (b) to the proviso. Such for example would be witnesses and possibly agents of the parties, as observed in Nyalchand Virchand v. Election Tribuna/( 1), though it is i10t necessary to decide that point, but it cannot refer to parties to the petition who have had every opportunity of taking part in the trial and presenting their case.\n\nWhere an election petition is founded on a charge of corrupt practice on the part of the candidate, that becomes the subject-matter of enquiry in the petition itself.\n\nIf at the trial the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the charge had been proved, then it has to hold under section 100(2) (b) that the election is void, and pass an order to that effect under section 98(d). Section 99(1) enacts that the finding of corrupt practice under section 99(1)(a)(i) or naming a person under section 99(1) (a)(ii) should be at the time of making an order under section 98.\n\nIf the contention of the appellant is to be accepted, then the result will be that even though there was a full trial of the charges set out in the petition, if the Tribunal is disposed to hold them proved it has first to give notice of the finding which it proposes to give, to the parties, and hold a fresh trial of the very matters that had been already tried.\n\nThat is an extraordinary result, for which it is difficult to discover any reason or justification. It was argued by the learned Attorney.\n\nGeneral that the giving to a party to a proceeding a second opportunity to be heard was not unknown to law, and he cited the instance of an accused in a warrant case being given a further opportunity to recall and cross-examine prosecution witnesses after charge is framed, and of a civil servant being given an opportunity under article 311 to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. In a warrant case, the accused is not bound to cross- <:xamine the prosecution witnesses before charge is framed, and in the case of civil servants, the decision that they arc entitled to a second opportunity was based on the peculiar language of sections 240(2) and (3) of the Government of India Act, 1235, and Article 311 of the Constitution.\n\nThey arc\n\n(I) [1953] 8 Electiou Law Reporta 417, 421.\n\nTiralh Singh\n\nBaehillar Singh\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY.)'ar ].\n\nTirath Singh\n\nBachiltar Singh\n\nand othtr1\n\nV1nkatarama\n\n.dy)'ar ].\n\nexceptional cases, and do not furnish any safe or useful guidance in the interpretation of section 99.\n\nThe appellant also sought support for his contention that notice should be given under the proviso even to persons who are parties to the election petition, in the provision in section 99(l)(a)(ii) that the Tribunal might make such recommendations as it thinks proper for exemption of any persons from any disqualifications which may have been incurred under sections 141 to 143.\n\nThe argument is that the disqualifications mentioned in section 143 could only be with reference to candidates, as they relate to default in filing return of election expenses or in filing false returns, that before the Tribunal could take action under this provision it would have to give notice to the persons affected thereby who must necessarily be parties to the petition, and that if the proviso applies when action is to be taken under section 143, there is no reason why it should not apply when action is to be taken under the other sections of the Act as well.\n\nThe fallacy m this argument is in thinking that notice to a person is requisite for making a recommendation under section 9(1) (a) (ii)· Section 99(1) (a)(ii) deals with two distinct matters-naming persons who are proved to have been guilty of corrupt and illegal practices, and recommending whether there should be any exemption in respect of the disqualifications mentioned in sections 141 to 143, and the proviso, properly construed, requires notice only in the former case and not the latter. It will be noticed that while in cases falling within sections 139 and 140 the disqualification is automatic and immutable, in cases falling within sections 141 to 143 the Election Commission has power to grant exemption under section 144 of the Act.\n\nIt is to guide the Commission in exercising its powers under section 144, that the Tribunal is directed in section 99(l)(a)(ii) to make any recommendations with reference thereto.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of this matter is purely advisory.\n\nThere is nothing to prevent the Commission from taking up the question of exemption under section .144 suo motu, even though the\n\nTribunal has made no recommendation.\n\nIndeed, there . is nothing to prevent the person adversely affected from applying directly to the Commission for exemption.\n\nWhile, therefore, there is compelling reason why a person should have an opportunity of showing cause before he is named there is none such when the question is one of recommendation.\n\nAs we construe the proviso, it confers no right on any person, party or stranger, to be heard on the question whether he should be recommended for exemption from the disqualifications under section 141 to 143.\n\nThe provision for exemption in section 99 (l)(a)(ii) therefore does not lend any support to the contention of the appellant that notice should be given to parties to the petition under the proviso before they are named.\n\nReliance was also placed by the appellant on thedecision of the Election Tribunal in Kesho Ram v.\n\nHazura Singh(1), wherein it was held by a majority that notice under the proviso to section 99 should be given to the parties to the petition also. For the reasons given above, we do not agree with the decision of the majority.\n\nOur conclusion is that while the persons to bcnamed under section 99(1) (a)(ii) would include both parties to the petition as well as non-parties, the proviso thereto applies only to persons who had no opportunity of taking part in the trial, and that, therefore, whether notice should issue under the proviso will depend on whether the person had an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who had given evidence against him and to adduce his own evidence.\n\nThis conclusion is in accord with the law in England.\n\nUnder section 140, sub-clause (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, an election Court has to state in its report the names of all persons who are found guilty of corrupt and illegal practice but \"in the case of some one who is not a party to the petition nor a candidate on behalf of whom the seat or office is claimed by the petition\", the court has to issue notice to him, give him an opportunity of being\n\n(I) [19,53] 8 Election Law Reports 320.\n\nTirath Singh\n\nBaehittar Singf,\n\nand ot/wt\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nTiralh Singh\n\nIJaehiltarSmgh\n\nondolhm\n\nheard by himself, and calling evidence in his defence.\n\nIt was suggested for the appellant that the law as enacted in section 99 makes a deliberate departure from that under section 140( l) of the English Act.\n\nThe difference in the wording between the two sections is due to the difference in the arrangement of the topics of the two statutes, and there is no reason to hold that with reference to the substance of the matter, there was any intention to depart from the English law on the subject; nor is there any reason therefor.\n\nIn the present case, the appellant was a party to the petition, and it was his election that was being questioned therein.\n\nHe had ample opportunity of being heard, and was, in fact, heard, and therefore there was no need to issue a notice to him under the proviso to section 99 before recording a finding under section 99(1)(a) (ii). Further, even if we agree with the contention of the appellant that notice under the proviso should be given to a party to the petition, seeing that the reliefs which could be claimed in the election petition under section 84 are those mentioned in section 98, and that action under section 99(1) (a) is to be taken at the time when the order under section 98 is pronounced, there is no insuperable difficulty in treating the notice to the party in the election petition as notice for purposes of the proviso to section 99( l) (a) as well.\n\nThis reasoning will not apply to persons who are not parties to the petition, and a notice to them will be necessary under the proviso, before they are named.\n\nIn the result, all the contentions urged in support of the appeal fail, which must accordingly be rejected.\n\nAs the respondent has not appeared to contest the appeal, there will be no order as to costs.", "total_entities": 108, "entities": [{"text": "TIRATH SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 281, "end_char": 293, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TIRATH SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BACHITT AR SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 300, "end_char": 327, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BACHITTAR SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 330, "end_char": 339, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 619, "end_char": 651, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 83, 99(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1105, "end_char": 1110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1162, "end_char": 1167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1175, "end_char": 1207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 99(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1543, "end_char": 1554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1972, "end_char": 1983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lrda Kripalani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2085, "end_char": 2099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sw:lrda Kripalani v.\n\nShri S. S. Dulat,\n\nI.C.S., Chairman\n\n4 the Ekction T ribunaJ, Delhi\n\nand others\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "S. S. Dulat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sw:lrda Kripalani v.\n\nShri S. S. Dulat,\n\nI.C.S., Chairman\n\n4 the Ekction T ribunaJ, Delhi\n\nand others\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "Ekction T ribunaJ, Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2147, "end_char": 2171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sw:lrda Kripalani v.\n\nShri S. S. Dulat,\n\nI.C.S., Chairman\n\n4 the Ekction T ribunaJ, Delhi\n\nand others\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "ss. 141 to 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2293, "end_char": 2307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2423, "end_char": 2429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2930, "end_char": 2944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2956, "end_char": 2977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pepsu High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3044, "end_char": 3060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution of India against the Judgment and Order dated the 12th January 1954 of the Pepsu High Court in Civil Misc."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3094, "end_char": 3108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, Veda Vyas and /agannath Kaushal, (Natmit Lal, with them), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3137, "end_char": 3146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, Veda Vyas and /agannath Kaushal, (Natmit Lal, with them), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "/agannath Kaushal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3151, "end_char": 3168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, Veda Vyas and /agannath Kaushal, (Natmit Lal, with them), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Natmit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, Veda Vyas and /agannath Kaushal, (Natmit Lal, with them), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3313, "end_char": 3330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant was a candidate for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of PEPSU from the Dhuri Constituency, and having secured the largest number / of votes was declared duly elected.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR"}}, {"text": "Dhuri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3436, "end_char": 3441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant was a candidate for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of PEPSU from the Dhuri Constituency, and having secured the largest number / of votes was declared duly elected."}}, {"text": "Mali Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3753, "end_char": 3763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "inter alia,\n\n(1) that the nomination of one Mali Singh had been wrongly rejected by the returning officer, and (2) that the appellant was guilty of the corrupt practice of bribery."}}, {"text": "section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4055, "end_char": 4087, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 123(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4202, "end_char": 4216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Patiala and East Punjab States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant thereupon filed in the High Court of Patiala and East Punjab States\n\nUnion an application under Article 227 attacking the finding of the Tribunal that he was guilty of bribery."}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4339, "end_char": 4350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "12-1-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By der dated 12-1-1954 the High Court upheld the findings of the Tribunal, and dismissed the application, and by order dated 7-6-1954 granted a certificate for appeal to this Court under Article 133(1)(c)."}}, {"text": "7-6-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4632, "end_char": 4640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By der dated 12-1-1954 the High Court upheld the findings of the Tribunal, and dismissed the application, and by order dated 7-6-1954 granted a certificate for appeal to this Court under Article 133(1)(c)."}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4694, "end_char": 4711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4953, "end_char": 4963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5056, "end_char": 5066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5183, "end_char": 5193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5246, "end_char": 5257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 83 and 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5621, "end_char": 5639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baehitlar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6390, "end_char": 6405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baehitlar Singh\n\nand ollurs\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyJar J.\n\nTirath Singh\n\nBacbiuar Singh\n\nand olhen\n\nThe reply follows: of the appellant to this charge\n\n[1955]\n\nwas as\n\n\"The sweepers of Small .", "canonical_name": "Baehitlar Singh"}}, {"text": "AyJar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6431, "end_char": 6436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baehitlar Singh\n\nand ollurs\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyJar J.\n\nTirath Singh\n\nBacbiuar Singh\n\nand olhen\n\nThe reply follows: of the appellant to this charge\n\n[1955]\n\nwas as\n\n\"The sweepers of Small .", "canonical_name": "AyJar"}}, {"text": "Bacbiuar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6455, "end_char": 6469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baehitlar Singh\n\nand ollurs\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyJar J.\n\nTirath Singh\n\nBacbiuar Singh\n\nand olhen\n\nThe reply follows: of the appellant to this charge\n\n[1955]\n\nwas as\n\n\"The sweepers of Small .", "canonical_name": "Baehitlar Singh"}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such concessions were also shown to other employees of the various Small Tmvn Committees and Municipal Committees in Pepsu before and after this case."}}, {"text": "s. 12, 13, 14, 39 and 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7527, "end_char": 7551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8031, "end_char": 8041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 28-11-1951 he passed an order on a memorial sent by the sweepers that their pay would be increased by Rs."}}, {"text": "7-12-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8264, "end_char": 8273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Objection to the order was taken by the Department, and thereupon, the appellant passed the modified order dated 7-12-1951 granting good work allowance for a period of three months from December 1951 to February 1952."}}, {"text": "3-12-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10564, "end_char": 10573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this is denied by the petitioner in his affidavit filed in the High Court dated 3-12-1953."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10736, "end_char": 10747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even apart from this, the witnesses on behalf of the petitioner gave evidence on this point on the 8th and 11th\n\nT irath Singh v.\n\nBachittar Singh\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!)'arJ.\n\nBaehittar Singh\n\nalfd others\n\nNovember, 15th and 16th December, 1952, and on the 2nd February, 1953.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR"}}, {"text": "Baehittar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10760, "end_char": 10775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even apart from this, the witnesses on behalf of the petitioner gave evidence on this point on the 8th and 11th\n\nT irath Singh v.\n\nBachittar Singh\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!)'arJ.\n\nBaehittar Singh\n\nalfd others\n\nNovember, 15th and 16th December, 1952, and on the 2nd February, 1953.", "canonical_name": "Baehitlar Singh"}}, {"text": "26-2.1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10909, "end_char": 10918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26-2.1951 he examined R.W. 4, a member of the Small Town Committee, to rebut the evidence on the side of the petitioner, and himself went into the box and deposed to the circumstances."}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11384, "end_char": 11394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11689, "end_char": 11702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12767, "end_char": 12780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13042, "end_char": 13056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13125, "end_char": 13135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13182, "end_char": 13192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13257, "end_char": 13267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 141 to 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14034, "end_char": 14053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14710, "end_char": 14726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bachittar Sinh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14843, "end_char": 14857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the ppellant is that under section 99(1)(a) the Tribunal has to record the names of all persons\n\nBachittar Sinh\n\nend others\n\nY tnkatarama\n\nAJyar J.\n\nwho are proved to have been guilty .", "canonical_name": "Baehitlar Singh"}}, {"text": "AJyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14885, "end_char": 14890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the ppellant is that under section 99(1)(a) the Tribunal has to record the names of all persons\n\nBachittar Sinh\n\nend others\n\nY tnkatarama\n\nAJyar J.\n\nwho are proved to have been guilty .", "canonical_name": "AyJar"}}, {"text": "section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15136, "end_char": 15149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15907, "end_char": 15914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 229)."}}, {"text": "section 99(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16374, "end_char": 16390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17661, "end_char": 17675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 98(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17746, "end_char": 17759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17761, "end_char": 17774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99(1)(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17825, "end_char": 17844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17870, "end_char": 17883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17939, "end_char": 17949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18787, "end_char": 18798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 240(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19113, "end_char": 19128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1235", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19144, "end_char": 19173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19179, "end_char": 19190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1235", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1235"}}, {"text": "Tiralh Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19268, "end_char": 19280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tiralh Singh\n\nBaehillar Singh\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY.)'ar ].", "canonical_name": "TIRATH SINGH"}}, {"text": "Baehillar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19282, "end_char": 19297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tiralh Singh\n\nBaehillar Singh\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY.)'ar ].", "canonical_name": "Baehitlar Singh"}}, {"text": "Bachiltar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19351, "end_char": 19366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tirath Singh\n\nBachiltar Singh\n\nand othtr1\n\nV1nkatarama\n\n.dy)'ar ].", "canonical_name": "Baehitlar Singh"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19496, "end_char": 19506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1235", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1235"}}, {"text": "section 99(l)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19686, "end_char": 19706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1235", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1235"}}, {"text": "sections 141 to 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19868, "end_char": 19887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1235", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1235"}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19946, "end_char": 19957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1235", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1235"}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20333, "end_char": 20344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20576, "end_char": 20588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20599, "end_char": 20612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 141 to 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20841, "end_char": 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{"document_id": "1955_2_469_477_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 469\n\nS. KHADER SHERIFF\n\nMUNNUSWAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.]\n\nElection Dispute-Non-disclosure by returned candidate of sums paid to party funtis in his return of elet;_tion expenses-Such sums, if' spent for purposes of election-Commencement of candidature- Expense in excess of the prescribed limit-Election declared void by Tribunal-Resulting disqualification-Finding, if must be after notice-Representation of the People Act (No. XLIII of 1951), ss. 79(b), 99 proviso, 123(7), 140.\n\nThe appellant, who fought and won the election as a Congress candidate, had applied to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee on 12-9-51 for party nomination stating his desire \"to contest as a Congress candidate in the forthcoming election\" and paid a sum of Rs. 500 of which Rs. 100 was subscription for membership and Rs. 400 a deposit, liable to be r.efunded in case the application was refused. On 23-9-51 he paid another sum of Rs. 500 as donation to the District Congress Committee. On 13-11-51 he was adopted by the Congress as its candidate.\n\nHis nomination paper for the election was filed on 16-11-51.\n\nThe charge against him in the election petition was that he had failed to include these two sums in his return of election expenses and with the addition of these sums the maximum limit of election expenses prescribed for the constituency would be exceeded. The Tribunal found that both these sums were paid for election purposes and the maximum prescribed had been exceeded and, therefore, s. 123(7) had been contravened and declared the election void under s. 100(2)(b) of the Act.\n\nThe Tribunal also recorded a finding that the appellant was liable to the disqualifications specified in s. 140, clauses (l)(a) and (2).\n\nHeld, affirming the decision of the Tribunal, that the exact point of time from which a person must be deemed to be a candidate within the meaning of s. 79(b) of the Representation of the People Act is the time when, with the election in prospect, he himself decides to stand as a candidate and communicates such decision to others leaving no manner of doubt as to his intention.\n\nThis must be an act of his own volition and no.t that of other persons or bodies adopting him as their candidate.\n\nThe Lichfield case, [1895] 5 O'M. & H. 1, referred to.\n\nThat the applicant was a candidate from the date of his application to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee and the two sums were election expenses incurred by him and should have been shown in his return.\n\nS. Khadar Sheri.ff\n\nMunnuswami Coundn and othlrs\n\nThat the con1mencement of candidature in a particular case is a question of fact to be determined by the Tribunal and its decision in this regard is not liable to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in an appeal by special leave.\n\nThat whether a particular sum paid at the time or on the eve of the election was a donation, an act of charity or an election ex~ pense must depend on whether or not such payment was open to the charge of having been made in order to induce the voters to vote in favour of the donor. This again is a question of fact to be decided by the Tribunal.\n\nThe Wigan case, [1881] 4 O\"M. & H. 1, and The Kingston case [1911] 6 O' M. & H. 274, relied on.\n\nThe Kennington case, (1886] 4 O'M. & H. 93, held inapplicable. 1\"hat it was not necessary for the Tribunal to serve a notice under the proviso to s. 99 of the Act on the appellant, a party to the election petition, to enable the Tribunal to record his liability to disqualification under s. 140 of the Act in respect of the charge levelled against him.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJ URISDIC1'ION : Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1955.\n\nAppeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of .India from the Judgment and Order dated the 28th February, 1953, of the Election Tribunal, Vellore, in Election Petition No. 84 of 1954.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him), for the appellant.\n\nN aunit Lal, for respondent No. 1.\n\n1955.\n\nSeptember, 15.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-This is an appeal by\n\npecial leave against the order of the Election Tribunal, Vellore, declaring - the election of appellant to the Legislative Assembly void on the ground that there had been a violation of section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act No. XLIII of 1951.\n\nUnder that section, it is a major corrupt practice for a candidate or his agent to incur or authorise the incurring of expenditure in contravention of the Act or any rule made thereunder.\n\nRule 117 provides that: \"No expense shall be incurred or authorised by a\n\ncandidate or his election agent on account of or in respect of the conduct and management of an election in any one constituency in a State in excess of the maximum amount specified in respect of that Constituency in Schedule V.\"\n\nUnder Schedule V, the maximum expenses specified for election to the Madras State Legisfature from a single-member constituency, such as Ranipct, is Rs. 8,000.\n\nThe return of the expenses lodged by the appellant showed that he had spent in all Rs. 7, fXl3 for the election, and that was within the limit allowed.\n\nThe charge against him in the petition was that he had failed to disclose in his return two sums of Rs. 500 each, spent for election purposes, and that with the aadition of those amounts, the maximum specified had been exceeded. As regards the first amount, the facts found are that on 12-9-1951 the appellant applied to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee for permission to contest the election as a Congress candidate, and along with his application he paid Rs. 500 out of which Rs. 100 was subscription for membership and Rs. 400 deposit, which was liable to be returned under the rules, in case the applicant was not adopted. as the candidate, but not otherwise. In fact. the appellant was adopted as the Congress candidate, and it was on that ticket that he fought and won the election.\n\nThe second payment of Rs. 500 was on 23-9-1951 to the North Arcot District Congress Committee, which was in charge of the Ranipet Constituency.\n\nThe Tribunal held that both these sums were paid for purposes of election and should have been included in the return made by the appellant, that if they were so included, the maximum prescribed was exceeded, and that therefore section 123(7) had been contravened, and accorqingly declared the election void under section 100(2) (b) of the Act. The appellant disputes the correctness of this order. The Tribunal also recorded as part of the order a finding that the appellant had become subject to the disqualifications specified in section 140, sub-clauses ( 1) (a) and (2). The appellant attacks this finding on\n\nS. Eluzthr S'\"'i/f ,,.\n\nM-111ami G-4n and olltm\n\nYnikalarama\n\n.d.uar J.\n\nS. K/ilukr S\"\"if!\n\nMunnunoami G=uler and othm\n\nthe ground that it was given without notice to him, as required by the proviso to section 99.\n\nThe points that arise for decision in this appeal arc ( 1) whether on the facts found, there was a contravention of section 123(7) of Act No. XLIII of 1951 ; and (2) whether the finding that the appellant had become disqualified under section 140 is bad for want of notice under the proviso to section 99 of the Act. ( 1) Taking first the sum of Rs. 500 paid by the appellant to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee on 12-9-1951, the contention of the appellant is that section 123(7) and Rule 117 have reference only to expenses incurred by a candidate or his agent, that the appellant was nominated as a candidate only on 16-11-1951, and that as the payment in question was made long prior to the filing of the nomination paper, the provisions aforesaid had no application.\n\nThat raises the question as to when the appellant became a 'candidate' for purposes of section 123(7).\n\nSection 79(b) of Act No. XLIII of 1951 defines a candidate thus:\n\n\"Candidate\" means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election, and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in prospect, he bagan to hold himself out as a prospective candidate\".\n\nUnder this definition which applies to section 123(7), all election expenses incurred by a candidate from the time when, with the election in prospect, he holds himself out as a prospective candidate and not merely from the date when he is nominated, will have to enter into the reckoning under Rule 117 read with Schedule V. That the election was in prospect when the amount of Rs. 500 was paid is clear from the very application of the appellant dated 12-9-1951 wherein he states that he desires \"to contest as a Congress candidate in the forthcoming election\".\n\nThat is not disputed by the appellant. What he contends is that though the election was in prospect, he had not become a prospective candidate at that time, and that he became so only when the Congress\n\nadopted him as its candidate on 13-11-1951.\n\nIt was argued that it was open to the Congress Committee either to adopt him as its candidate or not, that if it did not adopt him, he could not, under the rules to which he had subscribed, stand for election at all, that until he was actually adopted therefor, his candidature was nebulaus and uncertain, and that the application w:is consequently nothing more than a preliminary step-in-aid of his becoming a prospective candidate.\n\nThe question when a person becomes a candidate must be decided on the language of section 79(b ).\n\nUnder that section, the candidature commences when the pe1son begins to hold himself out as a prospective candidate.\n\nThe determining factor therefore is the decision of the candidate himself, no the act of other persons or bodie~ adopting him as their candidate.\n\nIn The Lich field case(1) at page 36, Baron Pollock observed:\n\n\"I think the proper mode of judging a question of this kind is to take it from the point of view of the candidate himself.\n\nEvery man must judge when he wi!l throw himself into the arena .... But it is his own choice when he throws down the glove and commences his candidature\".\n\nWhen, therefore, a question arises under section 79(b) whether a person had become a candidate at a given point of time, what has to be seen is whether at that time, he had clearly and unambiguously deciared his intention to stand as a candidate, so that' it could be said of him that he held himself out as a prospective candidate.\n\nThat he has merely formed an intention to stand for election is not sufficient to make him a prospective candidate, because it is of the essence of the matter that he should hold himself out as a prospective candidate.\n\nThat can only be if he communicates that intention to the outside world by declaration or conduct from which it could be inferred that he intends to stand as a candidate.\n\nHas that been established in this case ?\n\nWhen the appellant made the payment of Rs. 500 to\n\n11)5 0.' M. & H. l. 12-83 S. C. India/59\n\n1955 s. Khaur Shniff\n\nMunnuswa•i Goundtr and olhws.\n\nV tnktttarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nS. lfluldw SMtjf/\n\nM- G-mr atul .,,,,,,\n\nthe Tamil Nad Congress Committee, did he merely evince an intention to stand as a candidate, or did he hold himself out as a prospective candidate? The application contains a clear declaration of his intention to contest the election, and that declaration is backed by the solemn act of payment of Rs. 500.\n\nThe appellant had thus clearly and unambiguously conveyed to the Committee his intention to stand as a candidate, and he thereby became a prospective candidate within the meaning of section 79(b). The possibility that the Congress might not adopt him as its candidate does not, as already mentioned, affect the position, as the section has regard only to the volition and conduct of the candidate.\n\nIt is true that if the Congress did not adopt him, the appellant might not b, e able to stand for election.\n\nBut such a result is implicit in the very notion of a prospective candidate, and does not militate against his becoming one from the date of his application.\n\nIt was also urged for the appellant that the declaration was made nor to the constituency in the North Arcot District but to the Central Committee at Madras, and that unless there was proof of holding out to the electorate, the requirements of section 79 (b) were not satisfied.\n\nIt may be that the holding out which is conte; nplated by that section is to the Constituency; but if it is the Central Committee that has to decide who shall be adopted for election from the concerned constituency, any declaration made to the Committee is, in effect, addressed to the constituency through its accredited representative.\n\nThe question when a candidature commences is, as has, been held over and over again, one of fact, and a decision of the Tribunal on that question is not liable to be reviewed by this Court in special appeal.\n\nIn the present case, the Tribunal has, in a well-considered judgment, formulated the correct principles to be applied in determining when a candidature commences, examined the evidence in the light of those principles, and recorded a finding that the appellant was a prospective candidate when he made the payment of\n\nRs. 500 on 12-9-1951, and we do. not find any ground for differing from it.\n\nThen, there is the payment of Rs. 500 made to the North Arcot District Congress Committee on 23-9-1951.\n\nThe contention of Mr. Chatterjee with ref- .crence to this payment is that unlike the payment dated 12-9-1951, this was not spent for purposes of dection but was donation made to the Committee out of µi-iilanthropic motives.\n\nIt has been frequently pointed out that while it is meritorious to make a <lonation for charitable purposes, if that is made at the time or on the eve of an election, it is open to the charge that its real object was to induce the electors to vote in favour of the particular candidate,, and that it should therefore be treated as election expense.\n\nIn The Wigan Case(1), Bowen, J. observed :\n\n\" ...... I wish to answer the suggestion that this was merely charity.\n\nCharity at election times ought to be kept by politicians in the background ...... In truth, I think, it will generally be found that the feeling which distributes relief to the poor at election time, though those who are the distributors may not be aware of it, is really not charity, but party feeling following in the steps of charity, wearing the dress of charity, and mimicking her gait\".\n\nIn The Kingston Case(2), Ridley, J. said:\n\n\"Now assume for the moment that a man forms a design, which at the time is in prospect, for that is the point; yet if circumstances alter, and an election becomes imminent, he will go on with that design at his risk\".\n\nft would again be a question of fact whether the payment of Rs. 500 by the appellant on 23-9-1951 was a pure act of charity or was expense incurred for election purposes.\n\nIt was admitted by the Secretary of the North Arcot District Congress Committee that it was usual for the Tamil Nad Congress Committee to consult the local Committee in the matter of adoption of candidates, and that at the time the payment \\_'\\'as made, it was known that the appellant had applied to be adopted by the Congress. Exhibit A(7)\n\n(') 4 0.'M & H. I.\n\n(1) 6 O'M. & H. 374.\n\nS. Khader Sheriff\n\nMunnuswami GOUflder and other\n\nV enkatarama\n\ni{yyar J.\n\nS. Khader Sheriff\n\nMunnuJwami Gowukr and oJhrs\n\nVtnkatarama\n\nA~J!Yar ].\n\nwhich 1s a statement of receipts and payments of the North Arcot District Congress Committee for the period 24-9-1951 to 24-5-1952 shows that the Committee started with an opening balance of Rs. 7-12-2, and that various amounts were collected including the sum of Rs. 500 paid by the appellant and utilised for election expenses.\n\nThe Tribunal held on a consideration of these facts that the payment in question could not be regarded as innocent, and \"not motivated by the desire to obtain the recommendations of the North Arcot District Congress Committee for candidature of the first respondent\".\n\nNo ground has bcCll shown for differing from this conclusion.\n\nIt was finally contended for the appellant that the two payments dated 12-9-1951 and 23-9-1951 could not be said to be expenses incurred on account of the conduct and management of an election, and reliance was placed on the decision in The Kennington Case('), where it was held that payments made for the running of a newspaper started for supporting a candidate were not expenses incurred in the conduct and management of an election.\n\nThe facts of the present case have no resemblance to those found in that case, and the following comment on that decision in Parker's Election Agent and Returning Officer, Fifth Edition, page 241 is instructive:\n\n\"But this decision could not be safely followed except where the facts are precisely similar\".\n\nOn the findings recorded above, the expenses incurred by the appellant come to Rs. 8,06.3, and the corrupt practice specified in section 123(7) has been committed.\n\nThe election was therefore rightly set aside under section 100(2) (b) of Act No. XLIII of 1951.\n\n(2) It is next contended for the appellant that the Tribunal was in error in recording as part of the order a finding that by reason of the contravention of section 123(7), the appellant had become subject to the disqualification specified in section 140, without giving notice to him as required by the proviso to section\n\n(') 4 0' M. & H. 93.\n\n2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RE.l'ORTS 477\n\n91. The question whether a party to an election pet~\n\ntion is entitled to a notice under the proviso in respect of the very charges w!Hch were the subject-matter of enquiry in the petition itself, has been considered by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1955, and it has been held therein that if the party had opportunity given to him in the hearing of the petition to meet the very charge in respect of which a finding is to be re- -corded under section 99( 1) (a), then he is not entitled to a further notice in respect of the same matter, under the proviso.\n\nIn the present case, the finding under section 99(1)(a) relates to the very payments which were the subject-matter of enquiry in the election petition, and therefore no notice was required to be given to the appellant under the pro1iso. This objection also fails, and the appeal must accordingly be dismissed.\n\nThe respondent has stated through his counsel Shri Naunit Lal that he does not propose to contest the appeal.\n\nThere will accordingly be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCHATTANATHA KARAYALAR\n\n\"· RAMACf{A.NDRA\n\nIYER\n\nAND\n\nANOTHER.\n\n{V1v1AN BnsE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nElection Dispute-Returned candidate alleged to be disqualified for being chosen as a member-Hindu fathe1 entering into Government conttact, if does so en behalf of the undivided family-Presumption ef Hindu Law-Finding of benami, if liable to be intei'fered with in\n\nSpecial appeal-Representation of the People Act (XL!Il of 1951),\n\nSS. 7(d), 9(2}.\n\nThere is no presumption in Hindu Law that a business standing in the name of a member of the Hindu joint family is joint family business, even when that member is the manager or the father.\n\nThere is this difference between the position of the father starting new business and a mere manager doing so that while the debts r.ontracted by the father in such business are binding on the sons on the theory of a son's pious obligation to pay his father's debt, those contracted by the latter are not binding on the other\n\nS. Khat/er S/tn'il\n\nv. , .\\funnruwami Gounder and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY, var J.\n\nS1ptemb11 19", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "469\n\nS. KHADER SHERIFF", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. KHADER SHERIFF", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUNNUSWAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNNUSWAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 472, "end_char": 504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 79(b), 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 526, "end_char": 539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nad Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 654, "end_char": 682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, who fought and won the election as a Congress candidate, had applied to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee on 12-9-51 for party nomination stating his desire \"to contest as a Congress candidate in the forthcoming election\" and paid a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "12-9-51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 686, "end_char": 693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, who fought and won the election as a Congress candidate, had applied to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee on 12-9-51 for party nomination stating his desire \"to contest as a Congress candidate in the forthcoming election\" and paid a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "23-9-51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 960, "end_char": 967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23-9-51 he paid another sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "District Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1018, "end_char": 1045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 as donation to the District Congress Committee."}}, {"text": "13-11-51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1050, "end_char": 1058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13-11-51 he was adopted by the Congress as its candidate."}}, {"text": "Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1081, "end_char": 1089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13-11-51 he was adopted by the Congress as its candidate."}}, {"text": "16-11-51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His nomination paper for the election was filed on 16-11-51."}}, {"text": "s. 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1562, "end_char": 1571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1761, "end_char": 1767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1960, "end_char": 1992, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lichfield", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lichfield case, [1895] 5 O'M. & H. 1, referred to."}}, {"text": "S. Khadar Sheri.ff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2549, "end_char": 2567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Khadar Sheri.ff\n\nMunnuswami Coundn and othlrs\n\nThat the con1mencement of candidature in a particular case is a question of fact to be determined by the Tribunal and its decision in this regard is not liable to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in an appeal by special leave."}}, {"text": "Munnuswami Coundn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2569, "end_char": 2586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Khadar Sheri.ff\n\nMunnuswami Coundn and othlrs\n\nThat the con1mencement of candidature in a particular case is a question of fact to be determined by the Tribunal and its decision in this regard is not liable to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in an appeal by special leave.", "canonical_name": "Munnuswami GOUflder"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2781, "end_char": 2794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Khadar Sheri.ff\n\nMunnuswami Coundn and othlrs\n\nThat the con1mencement of candidature in a particular case is a question of fact to be determined by the Tribunal and its decision in this regard is not liable to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in an appeal by special leave."}}, {"text": "Wigan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3180, "end_char": 3185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Wigan case, [1881] 4 O\"M. & H. 1, and The Kingston case [1911] 6 O' M. & H. 274, relied on."}}, {"text": "Kingston", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3222, "end_char": 3230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Wigan case, [1881] 4 O\"M. & H. 1, and The Kingston case [1911] 6 O' M. & H. 274, relied on."}}, {"text": "Kennington", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3277, "end_char": 3287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kennington case, (1886] 4 O'M. & H. 93, held inapplicable."}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3419, "end_char": 3424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3561, "end_char": 3567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3705, "end_char": 3716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3879, "end_char": 3895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3898, "end_char": 3915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N aunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3948, "end_char": 3959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N aunit Lal, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "N aunit Lal"}}, {"text": "section 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4281, "end_char": 4295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4303, "end_char": 4335, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4836, "end_char": 4846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4856, "end_char": 4866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4919, "end_char": 4925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 117 provides that: \"No expense shall be incurred or authorised by a\n\ncandidate or his election agent on account of or in respect of the conduct and management of an election in any one constituency in a State in excess of the maximum amount specified in respect of that Constituency in Schedule V.\"\n\nUnder Schedule V, the maximum expenses specified for election to the Madras State Legisfature from a single-member constituency, such as Ranipct, is Rs."}}, {"text": "Ranipct", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4987, "end_char": 4994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 117 provides that: \"No expense shall be incurred or authorised by a\n\ncandidate or his election agent on account of or in respect of the conduct and management of an election in any one constituency in a State in excess of the maximum amount specified in respect of that Constituency in Schedule V.\"\n\nUnder Schedule V, the maximum expenses specified for election to the Madras State Legisfature from a single-member constituency, such as Ranipct, is Rs."}}, {"text": "12-9-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5450, "end_char": 5459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the first amount, the facts found are that on 12-9-1951 the appellant applied to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee for permission to contest the election as a Congress candidate, and along with his application he paid Rs."}}, {"text": "23-9-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 6000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 was on 23-9-1951 to the North Arcot District Congress Committee, which was in charge of the Ranipet Constituency."}}, {"text": "North Arcot District Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 was on 23-9-1951 to the North Arcot District Congress Committee, which was in charge of the Ranipet Constituency."}}, {"text": "Ranipet", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6076, "end_char": 6083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 was on 23-9-1951 to the North Arcot District Congress Committee, which was in charge of the Ranipet Constituency."}}, {"text": "section 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6327, "end_char": 6341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6632, "end_char": 6643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Eluzthr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6714, "end_char": 6724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant attacks this finding on\n\nS. Eluzthr S'\"'i/f ,,."}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6916, "end_char": 6926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7045, "end_char": 7059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7164, "end_char": 7175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7223, "end_char": 7233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7395, "end_char": 7409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7549, "end_char": 7559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 paid by the appellant to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee on 12-9-1951, the contention of the appellant is that section 123(7) and Rule 117 have reference only to expenses incurred by a candidate or his agent, that the appellant was nominated as a candidate only on 16-11-1951, and that as the payment in question was made long prior to the filing of the nomination paper, the provisions aforesaid had no application."}}, {"text": "section 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 79(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7806, "end_char": 7819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8195, "end_char": 8209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8470, "end_char": 8480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What he contends is that though the election was in prospect, he had not become a prospective candidate at that time, and that he became so only when the Congress\n\nadopted him as its candidate on 13-11-1951."}}, {"text": "section 79(b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9486, "end_char": 9500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9812, "end_char": 9819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Lich field case(1) at page 36, Baron Pollock observed:\n\n\"I think the proper mode of judging a question of this kind is to take it from the point of view of the candidate himself."}}, {"text": "section 79(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10152, "end_char": 10165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11040, "end_char": 11045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V tnktttarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nS. lfluldw SMtjf/\n\nM- G-mr atul .,,,,,,"}}, {"text": "section 79(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11581, "end_char": 11594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arcot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12169, "end_char": 12174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also urged for the appellant that the declaration was made nor to the constituency in the North Arcot District but to the Central Committee at Madras, and that unless there was proof of holding out to the electorate, the requirements of section 79 (b) were not satisfied."}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12310, "end_char": 12320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13416, "end_char": 13426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of Mr. Chatterjee with ref- .crence to this payment is that unlike the payment dated 12-9-1951, this was not spent for purposes of dection but was donation made to the Committee out of µi-iilanthropic motives."}}, {"text": "Bowen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13992, "end_char": 13997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Wigan Case(1), Bowen, J. observed :\n\n\" ...... I wish to answer the suggestion that this was merely charity."}}, {"text": "Ridley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14506, "end_char": 14512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Kingston Case(2), Ridley, J. said:\n\n\"Now assume for the moment that a man forms a design, which at the time is in prospect, for that is the point; yet if circumstances alter, and an election becomes imminent, he will go on with that design at his risk\"."}}, {"text": "S. Khader", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15300, "end_char": 15309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Khader Sheriff\n\nMunnuswami GOUflder and other\n\nV enkatarama\n\ni{yyar J.\n\nS. Khader Sheriff\n\nMunnuJwami Gowukr and oJhrs\n\nVtnkatarama\n\nA~J!Yar ].", "canonical_name": "S. Khader"}}, {"text": "Munnuswami GOUflder", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15319, "end_char": 15338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Khader Sheriff\n\nMunnuswami GOUflder and other\n\nV enkatarama\n\ni{yyar J.\n\nS. Khader Sheriff\n\nMunnuJwami Gowukr and oJhrs\n\nVtnkatarama\n\nA~J!Yar ].", "canonical_name": "Munnuswami GOUflder"}}, {"text": "MunnuJwami Gowukr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15394, "end_char": 15411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Khader Sheriff\n\nMunnuswami GOUflder and other\n\nV enkatarama\n\ni{yyar J.\n\nS. Khader Sheriff\n\nMunnuJwami Gowukr and oJhrs\n\nVtnkatarama\n\nA~J!Yar ].", "canonical_name": "Munnuswami GOUflder"}}, {"text": "Parker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16674, "end_char": 16680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the present case have no resemblance to those found in that case, and the following comment on that decision in Parker's Election Agent and Returning Officer, Fifth Edition, page 241 is instructive:\n\n\"But this decision could not be safely followed except where the facts are precisely similar\"."}}, {"text": "section 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16987, "end_char": 17001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17074, "end_char": 17088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17277, "end_char": 17291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17363, "end_char": 17374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17955, "end_char": 17969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18109, "end_char": 18125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18432, "end_char": 18442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent has stated through his counsel Shri Naunit Lal that he does not propose to contest the appeal.", "canonical_name": "N aunit Lal"}}, {"text": "CHATTANATHA KARAYALAR", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18560, "end_char": 18581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHATTANATHA KARAYALAR\n\n\"· RAMACf{A.NDRA\n\nIYER\n\nAND\n\nANOTHER."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18636, "end_char": 18653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "{V1v1AN BnsE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18658, "end_char": 18669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "{V1v1AN BnsE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Special appeal-Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18942, "end_char": 18989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SS. 7(d), 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19008, "end_char": 19019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special appeal-Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Special appeal-Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": ".\\funnruwami Gounder", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19568, "end_char": 19588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is this difference between the position of the father starting new business and a mere manager doing so that while the debts r.ontracted by the father in such business are binding on the sons on the theory of a son's pious obligation to pay his father's debt, those contracted by the latter are not binding on the other\n\nS. Khat/er S/tn'il\n\nv. , .\\funnruwami Gounder and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY, var J.\n\nS1ptemb11 19"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19627, "end_char": 19629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special appeal-Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Special appeal-Representation of the People Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_477_483_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RE.l'ORTS 477\n\n91. The question whether a party to an election pet~\n\ntion is entitled to a notice under the proviso in respect of the very charges w!Hch were the subject-matter of enquiry in the petition itself, has been considered by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1955, and it has been held therein that if the party had opportunity given to him in the hearing of the petition to meet the very charge in respect of which a finding is to be re- -corded under section 99( 1) (a), then he is not entitled to a further notice in respect of the same matter, under the proviso.\n\nIn the present case, the finding under section 99(1)(a) relates to the very payments which were the subject-matter of enquiry in the election petition, and therefore no notice was required to be given to the appellant under the pro1iso. This objection also fails, and the appeal must accordingly be dismissed.\n\nThe respondent has stated through his counsel Shri Naunit Lal that he does not propose to contest the appeal.\n\nThere will accordingly be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCHATTANATHA KARAYALAR\n\n\"· RAMACf{A.NDRA\n\nIYER\n\nAND\n\nANOTHER.\n\n{V1v1AN BnsE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nElection Dispute-Returned candidate alleged to be disqualified for being chosen as a member-Hindu fathe1 entering into Government conttact, if does so en behalf of the undivided family-Presumption ef Hindu Law-Finding of benami, if liable to be intei'fered with in\n\nSpecial appeal-Representation of the People Act (XL!Il of 1951),\n\nSS. 7(d), 9(2}.\n\nThere is no presumption in Hindu Law that a business standing in the name of a member of the Hindu joint family is joint family business, even when that member is the manager or the father.\n\nThere is this difference between the position of the father starting new business and a mere manager doing so that while the debts r.ontracted by the father in such business are binding on the sons on the theory of a son's pious obligation to pay his father's debt, those contracted by the latter are not binding on the other\n\nS. Khat/er S/tn'il\n\nv. , .\\funnruwami Gounder and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY, var J.\n\nS1ptemb11 19\n\nChaJtanatha\n\nKaroyalar\n\n\"• Ramachandra Iyer and another.\n\nmcn1bers of the family unless, at least, it can be shown that the starting of the business was necessary.\n\nRam Nath v. Chiranii Lal, ([1934] l.L.R. 57 AIL 605), Chhotey Lal Chaudhury v. Dalip Narain Sing/,., ([1938] l.L.R. 17 Patna 386), Hayat Alia Shah v. Nern Chand (A.LR. [1945] Lah. 169), referred to.\n\nBut this distinctive position of the father docs not by itself make the new business started by him a joint business of the andivided family.\n\nThe question of benaru; is a question of fact and \\Vhcrc there is. evidence to support a finding that a person is a bcnamidar for another, the Supreme Court in a Special appeal will not interfere with it.\n\nConsequently, in a case where an election was challenged on the ground that the candidate returned was intcrt:sted in a contqct entered into by his father, bcnami in the name of another, with the Government for felling trees and transporting timber, and as such disqualified to stand ior election under s. 7(d) read with s. 9(2) of the Representation of the People Act and the Tribunal found on evidence that the father was the real contracting party but without consid_cring the evidence on the other point which, if believed,. might sustain a finding that the father was acting on behalf of the fa.mily, presumed as a matter of law that the son had -interest in the contract and declared the election void.\n\nHeld, that the Tribunal took an erroneous view of the law and made a wrong presumption, so its decision must be set aside, and as the findings are not sufficient for disposal of the matter the case must be remitted back for rehearing on the evidence on record.\n\nCML\n\nAPPELLATE Jua1soicnoN: Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 15th November 1954 of the Election Tribunal, Quilon, Travancore-Cochin, in Election Petition No. 18 of 1954.\n\nS. Mohan Kumara Mangalam, H. /. Umrigar and Ra; inder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nT. R. Balakrishnan, for respondent No. 1.\n\n1955.\n\nSeptember 19.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Election Tribunal, Quilon declaring the election of the appellant to the Legislative Assembly oi the State of. Travancore-\n\nCochin from the Shencottah Constituency void on the ground that he was diSA.ualified to stand for election under section 7(d) read with section 9(2) of Act No.\n\nXLIII of 1951. .\n\nUnder section 7(d), a person is disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly of a State, if he is interested in any contract for the supply of goods or for the execution of any works for the Government of that State.\n\nSection 9(2) declares that if any such contract has been entered into by or on behalf of a Hindu undivided family, every member thereof shall be subject to the disqualification mentioned in section 7(d); but that if the contract has been entered into by a member of an undivided family carrying on a separate business in the course of such business, other members of the family h2ving no share or interest in that business shall not be disqualified under section 7 ( d).\n\nThe contract in the present case was for felling trees in a Government forest and transporting them for delivery at the places specified therein.\n\nThere is now no dispute that this contract is one that falls within section 7 ( d) of the Act.\n\nThe point in controversy is simply whether the contract with the Government was entered into on behalf of the joint family, of which the appellant is a member.\n\nThe ap; reement stands in the name of one Kuppuswami Karayalar, and the allegations in the petition are that he is a mere name-lender for one - Krishnaswami Karayalar, who is the manager of a joint family consisting of himself and his sons, the appellant being one of them, and that he entered into the contract in question on behalf of and for the benefit of the joint family.\n\nThe case of the appellant, on the other hand, is that Kuppuswami whose name appears in the contract was the person solely entitled to the benefits thereof, that he was not a name-lender 'for Krishnaswami Karayalar, and that further neither he nor the joint family had any interest in the contract. Certain other pleas were also put forward by him, but they are not now material.\n\nChaltanatlia\n\nEarayalar\n\nRamJJ<handra ljer and anothl'\n\nV enkalarama\n\nA\"ar ].\n\nC/rJJU-tq\n\nEulf10/• v.\n\nRltatlra l.Jtr \"\"'1 nPl/itr\n\nYmk•,.,•m• ..i_,_,., ].\n\nThe following issues were framed on the above contentions:\n\n\"(2) Is the said 1omt family the owner of the right and benefits of the contract for the felling and removal of timber from Coupe No. 4, Nedumangad Taluq, entered into with the Forest Department, Travancore-Cochin State?\n\nHas the joint family any interest in the said contract ?\n\n(3) Is Mr. Kuppuswami Karayalar whose name appears as the contractor only a name-lender for the joint Hindu family of which the respondent is a member?\" ' On issue 3, the Tribunal found that Krishnaswami Karayalar was the real contracting party, and that Kuppuswami was a benamidar for him, and on issue 2, that the contract was entered into on behalf of the iomt family, of which the appellant was a member.\n\nOn these findings, it held that the appellant was disqualified under section 7(d) read with section 9(2), and declared his election void.\n\nThe appellant questions the correctness of this order firstly on the ground that the finding that Kuppuswarni is a benamidar for Krishnaswami Karayalar is not warranted by the evidence, and secondly on the ground that the finding that Krishnaswami entered into the contract on behalf of the joint family is based on a mistake of law, and is unsustainable.\n\nOn the first question, Mr . Kumaramangalam for the appellant adits that there .is evidence in support of the conclusion that Kuppuswami was a benamidar for Krishnaswami, but contends that it is meagre and worthless.\n\nThe question whether a person is a benamidar or not, is purely one of fact, and a finding thereon cannot be interfered with in special appeal, if there is evidence on which it could be based.\n\nWe must, therefore, accept the finding of the Tribunal that it was Krishnaswami, the father of the appellant, who was the real contracting party to the agreement with the Government.\n\nThe next question is whether Krishnaswami entered into the contract in h.is own personal capacity or as manager of the joint family.\n\nThe Tnbunal found\n\nas a fact that the business started by Krishnaswami\n\narayalar was a new venture, and instead of _proceedmg next to consider on the evidence whether in entering into the contract he acted for himself or for the joint family, it entered into a discussion whether under the Hindu law there was a presumption that a business started by a coparcener was joint family business.\n\nAfter observing that there was no such presumption \"in the case of an ordinary manager\", it held that \"the law is different when the manager happens to be also the father\".\n\nIt then referred to -certain decisions in which it had been held that the\n\nsons were liable for the debts incurred by the father for a new business started by him, and held \"on the .ibove authorities that the joint family of he respondent is the owner or the right and benefit of the preiCnt contract\".\n\nThe appellant contends that tJie statement of law by the Tribunal that there is a presumption that a new business started by the father is joint family business is erroneous, and that its finding that the joint family of which the appellant was a member had an interest in the contract of Krishnaswami could not be supported, as it was based solely on. the view which it took of the law.\n\nThis criticism is, in our ?Pinion, well founded.\n\nUnder the Hindu law, there 1s no presumption that a business standing in the name of any member is a joint family one even when that member is the manager of the family, and it makes no difference in this respect that the manager is the father of the coparceners.\n\nIt is no doubt true that with reference to a trade newly started there is this difference between the position of a father and a manager, that while the debts contracted therefor by the former would be binding on the sons on the theory of pious obligation, those incurred by a manager would not be binding on the members, unless at least there was necessity for the starting of the trade, as to which see Ram Nath v. Chiranji Lal(t ), Chotey Lal v.\n\nDt1lip Narain(') and Ha}'at Ali v. Nem Chand( 8 ). But (') [1934] I.L.R. 57 All. 605.\n\n(1) [1938] I.L.R. 17 Patna 386. (')A.LR. 1945 Lah. 169.\n\nChauanalha\n\nKarayalar\n\nRamochantlra Jy\" and another\n\nVenkafarama\n\n.1'Jar J.\n\nCkallll1Ullha\n\nKaraya/M\n\ny, Ramaehandra Jyar and another\n\nVmkatorama\n\n~.,,., J.\n\nit is one thing to say that the sons are liable for the debts contracted by the father in the trade newly started by him, and quite another thing to treat the trade itself as a joint family concern.\n\nWe arc therefore unable to accept the finding of the Tribunal that the contract of Krishnaswami Karayalar should, as a matter of law, be held to be a joint family business' of himself and his sons.\n\nThis conclusion, however, is not sufficient to dis-· pose of the matter.\n\nThe case of the respondent that Krishnaswami entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of thejoint family rests not merely on a presumption of law but on evidence as to facts and circumstances which, if accepted, would be sufficient to sustain a finding in. his favour: In the view it took of the law on the question, the Tribunal did not discuss the evidence bearing on this point or record a finding thereon. It. is therefore necessary that there should be a remittal of the case for a consideration of this question on the evidence.\n\nThe appellant contends that there is only the evi-· dence of the respondent in rnpport of the plea that the contract was entered into by Krishnaswami on behalf of the joint family, and that this Court could itself record a finding thereon.\n\nBut it is argued by the respondent that there are in the judgment of the Tribunal several observations which would support the conclusion that the contract was entered into on behalf of the joint family.\n\nThus, it is. pointed outthat in para 5 of the judgment the Tribunal observes that Krishnaswami Karayalar started this new bu, iness with a view to discharge the family debts.\n\nIt further observes in para 6 that the business required an initial investment of about Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 30,000, and that while there is evidence that about Rs. 7,000 had been borrowed by Krishnaswami Karayalar,. there is no evidence how the balance was made up.\n\nThe contention of the respondent is that this must have proceeded from the joint family funds, and that this is implicit in the finding of the Tribunal.\n\nIt is also mentioned in the judgment of the Tribunal that'\n\nK.rishnaswami was anxious to support his son, the present appellant, and that many of the witnesses whom the respondent was obliged to examine;, were really anxious to help the appellant. (Vide para 12).\n\nWe do not, however, desire to express any opinion on these contentions, as we propose to leave them to the decision of the Tribunal.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the order f the Tribunal, and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of the joint family or for his own personal benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record.\n\nIt is made clear that no further evidence will be allowed. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nCase remitted for hearing.\n\nM/S. RAM NARAIN SONS LTD.\n\nASST. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX\n\nAND OTHERS\n\n(and other cases)\n\n(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. l\n\nConstitution of India-Article 286(2)-Pro11iso thereto-Whether the proviso is meant to lift the ban only under Article 286(2) an4 no other-And thus does not lift the ban under Article 286{1)(a) read with the Explanation-Assessment consisting of a single undi11idetl sum in respect of totality of property-Wrongful inclusion therein of certain item of property expressly exempted from taxation-Legnl effect thereof-Central Pro11inces and Berar Act 1947 (XXI of J.947) -Explanation II to Section 2(g) as originally enacted-before its amendment by Madhya Pradesh' Act IV of 1951-Whether offended Article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation-Whether the Presidents order issued under the proviso to Article 286(2) protected the same.\n\nHeld, per S. R. DAs\n\nACTING CHIEF JusTICE, BHAGWa\\TI, JAFER IMAM and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.\n\n(JAGANNADHADAS J.\n\nChattanlllho.\n\nKaro,>alar , ..\n\nR(JtnJJ(; handra l)'ar and another\n\nVenkatarama\n\n/glr].\n\n~20", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "section 99( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 489, "end_char": 503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 643, "end_char": 659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 966, "end_char": 976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent has stated through his counsel Shri Naunit Lal that he does not propose to contest the appeal."}}, {"text": "CHATTANATHA KARAYALAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1094, "end_char": 1115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHATTANATHA KARAYALAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMACf{A.NDRA\n\nIYER\n\nAND\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1120, "end_char": 1153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMACHANDRA IYER AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1192, "end_char": 1207, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Special appeal-Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1476, "end_char": 1523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. Khat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is this difference between the position of the father starting new business and a mere manager doing so that while the debts r.ontracted by the father in such business are binding on the sons on the theory of a son's pious obligation to pay his father's debt, those contracted by the latter are not binding on the other\n\nS. Khat/er S/tn'il\n\nv. , .\\funnruwami Gounder and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY, var J.\n\nS1ptemb11 19\n\nChaJtanatha\n\nKaroyalar\n\n\"• Ramachandra Iyer and another."}}, {"text": ".\\funnruwami Gounder", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is this difference between the position of the father starting new business and a mere manager doing so that while the debts r.ontracted by the father in such business are binding on the sons on the theory of a son's pious obligation to pay his father's debt, those contracted by the latter are not binding on the other\n\nS. Khat/er S/tn'il\n\nv. , .\\funnruwami Gounder and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY, var J.\n\nS1ptemb11 19\n\nChaJtanatha\n\nKaroyalar\n\n\"• Ramachandra Iyer and another."}}, {"text": "ChaJtanatha\n\nKaroyalar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2175, "end_char": 2197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is this difference between the position of the father starting new business and a mere manager doing so that while the debts r.ontracted by the father in such business are binding on the sons on the theory of a son's pious obligation to pay his father's debt, those contracted by the latter are not binding on the other\n\nS. Khat/er S/tn'il\n\nv. , .\\funnruwami Gounder and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY, var J.\n\nS1ptemb11 19\n\nChaJtanatha\n\nKaroyalar\n\n\"• Ramachandra Iyer and another."}}, {"text": "Ramachandra Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2202, "end_char": 2218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is this difference between the position of the father starting new business and a mere manager doing so that while the debts r.ontracted by the father in such business are binding on the sons on the theory of a son's pious obligation to pay his father's debt, those contracted by the latter are not binding on the other\n\nS. Khat/er S/tn'il\n\nv. , .\\funnruwami Gounder and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAY, var J.\n\nS1ptemb11 19\n\nChaJtanatha\n\nKaroyalar\n\n\"• Ramachandra Iyer and another."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2826, "end_char": 2839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "evidence to support a finding that a person is a bcnamidar for another, the Supreme Court in a Special appeal will not interfere with it."}}, {"text": "s. 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3192, "end_char": 3199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3210, "end_char": 3217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3225, "end_char": 3257, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. Mohan Kumara Mangalam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4092, "end_char": 4116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mohan Kumara Mangalam, H. /. Umrigar and Ra; inder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "inder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4140, "end_char": 4152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mohan Kumara Mangalam, H. /. Umrigar and Ra; inder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. R. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4174, "end_char": 4192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. R. Balakrishnan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4283, "end_char": 4301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Election Tribunal, Quilon declaring the election of the appellant to the Legislative Assembly oi the State of."}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4625, "end_char": 4637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4674, "end_char": 4686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4911, "end_char": 4923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5101, "end_char": 5113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5366, "end_char": 5375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5598, "end_char": 5607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kuppuswami Karayalar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5829, "end_char": 5849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ap; reement stands in the name of one Kuppuswami Karayalar, and the allegations in the petition are that he is a mere name-lender for one - Krishnaswami Karayalar, who is the manager of a joint family consisting of himself and his sons, the appellant being one of them, and that he entered into the contract in question on behalf of and for the benefit of the joint family.", "canonical_name": "Kuppuswami Karayalar"}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami Karayalar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5931, "end_char": 5953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ap; reement stands in the name of one Kuppuswami Karayalar, and the allegations in the petition are that he is a mere name-lender for one - Krishnaswami Karayalar, who is the manager of a joint family consisting of himself and his sons, the appellant being one of them, and that he entered into the contract in question on behalf of and for the benefit of the joint family.", "canonical_name": "Krishnaswami Karayalar"}}, {"text": "Kuppuswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6220, "end_char": 6230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the appellant, on the other hand, is that Kuppuswami whose name appears in the contract was the person solely entitled to the benefits thereof, that he was not a name-lender 'for Krishnaswami Karayalar, and that further neither he nor the joint family had any interest in the contract.", "canonical_name": "Kuppuswami Karayalar"}}, {"text": "enkalarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chaltanatlia\n\nEarayalar\n\nRamJJ<handra ljer and anothl'\n\nV enkalarama\n\nA\"ar ]."}}, {"text": "Rltatlra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6649, "end_char": 6657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C/rJJU-tq\n\nEulf10/• v.\n\nRltatlra l.Jtr \"\"'1 nPl/itr\n\nYmk•,."}}, {"text": "Forest Department, Travancore-Cochin State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6940, "end_char": 6982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, Nedumangad Taluq, entered into with the Forest Department, Travancore-Cochin State?"}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7545, "end_char": 7557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kuppuswarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant questions the correctness of this order firstly on the ground that the finding that Kuppuswarni is a benamidar for Krishnaswami Karayalar is not warranted by the evidence, and secondly on the ground that the finding that Krishnaswami entered into the contract on behalf of the joint family is based on a mistake of law, and is unsustainable.", "canonical_name": "Kuppuswami Karayalar"}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7721, "end_char": 7733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant questions the correctness of this order firstly on the ground that the finding that Kuppuswarni is a benamidar for Krishnaswami Karayalar is not warranted by the evidence, and secondly on the ground that the finding that Krishnaswami entered into the contract on behalf of the joint family is based on a mistake of law, and is unsustainable.", "canonical_name": "Krishnaswami Karayalar"}}, {"text": "Kumaramangalam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7977, "end_char": 7991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumaramangalam for the appellant adits that there .is evidence in support of the conclusion that Kuppuswami was a benamidar for Krishnaswami, but contends that it is meagre and worthless."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami\n\narayalar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8735, "end_char": 8757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tnbunal found\n\nas a fact that the business started by Krishnaswami\n\narayalar was a new venture, and instead of _proceedmg next to consider on the evidence whether in entering into the contract he acted for himself or for the joint family, it entered into a discussion whether under the Hindu law there was a presumption that a business started by a coparcener was joint family business.", "canonical_name": "Krishnaswami Karayalar"}}, {"text": "Chauanalha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10845, "end_char": 10855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chauanalha\n\nKarayalar\n\nRamochantlra Jy\" and another\n\nVenkafarama\n\n.1'Jar J.\n\nCkallll1Ullha\n\nKaraya/M\n\ny, Ramaehandra Jyar and another\n\nVmkatorama\n\n~.,,.,"}}, {"text": "Ramochantlra Jy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10868, "end_char": 10883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chauanalha\n\nKarayalar\n\nRamochantlra Jy\" and another\n\nVenkafarama\n\n.1'Jar J.\n\nCkallll1Ullha\n\nKaraya/M\n\ny, Ramaehandra Jyar and another\n\nVmkatorama\n\n~.,,.,"}}, {"text": "Government of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11556, "end_char": 11587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the respondent that Krishnaswami entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of thejoint family rests not merely on a presumption of law but on evidence as to facts and circumstances which, if accepted, would be sufficient to sustain a finding in."}}, {"text": "K.rishnaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13149, "end_char": 13162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also mentioned in the judgment of the Tribunal that'\n\nK.rishnaswami was anxious to support his son, the present appellant, and that many of the witnesses whom the respondent was obliged to examine;, were really anxious to help the appellant. (", "canonical_name": "Krishnaswami Karayalar"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13559, "end_char": 13578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly set aside the order f the Tribunal, and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of the joint family or for his own personal benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record."}}, {"text": "RAM NARAIN SONS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14011, "end_char": 14030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/S. RAM NARAIN SONS LTD."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14098, "end_char": 14107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX\n\nAND OTHERS\n\n(and other cases)\n\n(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14123, "end_char": 14131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX\n\nAND OTHERS\n\n(and other cases)\n\n(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHA-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14133, "end_char": 14144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX\n\nAND OTHERS\n\n(and other cases)\n\n(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14151, "end_char": 14161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX\n\nAND OTHERS\n\n(and other cases)\n\n(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14166, "end_char": 14186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX\n\nAND OTHERS\n\n(and other cases)\n\n(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14194, "end_char": 14215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14216, "end_char": 14230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14304, "end_char": 14318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14369, "end_char": 14380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Berar Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14630, "end_char": 14644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14679, "end_char": 14691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14786, "end_char": 14803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14887, "end_char": 14901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Act 1947"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14993, "end_char": 15014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per S. R. DAs\n\nACTING CHIEF JusTICE, BHAGWa\\TI, JAFER IMAM and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15021, "end_char": 15034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(JAGANNADHADAS J.\n\nChattanlllho.", "canonical_name": "JAGANNADHADAS"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_483_508_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 483\n\nK.rishnaswami was anxious to support his son, the present appellant, and that many of the witnesses whom the respondent was obliged to examine;, were really anxious to help the appellant. (Vide para 12).\n\nWe do not, however, desire to express any opinion on these contentions, as we propose to leave them to the decision of the Tribunal.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the order f the Tribunal, and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of the joint family or for his own personal benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record.\n\nIt is made clear that no further evidence will be allowed. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nCase remitted for hearing.\n\nM/S. RAM NARAIN SONS LTD.\n\nASST. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX\n\nAND OTHERS\n\n(and other cases)\n\n(S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. l\n\nConstitution of India-Article 286(2)-Pro11iso thereto-Whether the proviso is meant to lift the ban only under Article 286(2) an4 no other-And thus does not lift the ban under Article 286{1)(a) read with the Explanation-Assessment consisting of a single undi11idetl sum in respect of totality of property-Wrongful inclusion therein of certain item of property expressly exempted from taxation-Legnl effect thereof-Central Pro11inces and Berar Act 1947 (XXI of J.947) -Explanation II to Section 2(g) as originally enacted-before its amendment by Madhya Pradesh' Act IV of 1951-Whether offended Article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation-Whether the Presidents order issued under the proviso to Article 286(2) protected the same.\n\nHeld, per S. R. DAs\n\nACTING CHIEF JusTICE, BHAGWa\\TI, JAFER IMAM and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.\n\n(JAGANNADHADAS J.\n\nChattanlllho.\n\nKaro,>alar , ..\n\nR(JtnJJ(; handra l)'ar and another\n\nVenkatarama\n\n/glr].\n\n~20\n\nM/s. R4m Nar.O.\n\nSons IJd.\n\n~'J' CommissiOIJl'I' .t S.US T.,, and\n\no//ws\n\ndissenting). The bans imposed by Article 286 of the Constitution on the taxing powers of the States are independent and separate and each one of them has to be got over before a State Legislature can impose tax on transactions of sale or purchase of gs. The Expla~ nation to Article 286(i)(a) determines by the legal fiction created therein the situs of the sale in the case of transactions coming with~ in that category and once it is deterl'nined by the application of the Explanation that a transaction is outside the State it follows as a matter of course that the State, with reference to which the transac~ tion can thus be predicated to be outside it, can never tax the trans-- action.\n\nThe ban under Article 286(i)(a) read with the Explanation is effective independently of the fact that the transaction may have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or with reference 'lo goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to bet essential for the life of the community.\n\nThe ban imposed under Article 286(2) is an independent and separate one and looks at the transactions entirely from the point of view of their having taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nEven if such transactions may also fall within the category of transactions covered by Article 286( I) (a) and the Explanation thereto or Article 286( 3) the moment Article 286(2) is attracted by reason of the transactions being in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the ban under Article 286(2) operates and such transactions can never be subjected to tax at the instance of a State Legislature except in so far as Parliament by law may otherwise provide or such power of taxation is saved by the President's order conten1plated in the proviso.\n\nThe ban under Article 286(2) may be saved by the President's order hue that does not affect or lift the ban under Article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation.\n\nApart from the aforesaid construction put upon the several clauses of Article 286 in The Bengal Immunity Co. case the terms of the proviso to Article 286(2) itself make it abundantly clear that the proviso is meant only to lift the ban under Article 286(2) and no other.\n\nIt is a carJinal rule of interpretation that a proviso carves out an exception to the main provision to which it is enacted as a proviso and to no other.\n\nThis is made further clear by the nonohstante clause which states in express terms that it is enacted only with reference to \"this clause\" i.e. Article 286(2).\n\nThe proviso cannot be extended to any of the other provisions -0£ Article 286 and it has, therefore, not the effect of lifting the ban which is imposed by Article 286( I) (a) and the Explanation thereto.\n\nTherefore, so far as the post.Constitution period is concerned the ban impose<l by Article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation _thereto could not be ri.; moved by the President's order which was issued under the proviso to Article 286(2) in the present case.\n\nExpianation II to Section 2(g) of the. Central l'rovmces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 offended Article 286(I)(a) read with the\n\nExplan<1tion to the same and the State of Madhya Pradesh was therefore, not entitled tO\\ tax the transactions of sale in which goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale for purposes of consumption outside Madhya Pradesh and the said Explanation was not protected by the President's order issued under the proviso to Article 286(2).\n\nWhere an assessment consists of a single undivided sum in res- . pect of the totality of the property treated as assessable, the wrongful inclusion in it of certain items of property which by virtue of a provision of law were expressly exempted from taxation, renders the assessment invalid in toto.\n\nBennett & White (Calgary) Ltd. and Municipal District of Sugar City No. 5 (1951 Appeal Cases 786 at.p. 816), referred to.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J. (Dissenting)-The two bans under Articles 286(1) (a) and 286(2) arc overlapping and the fact that they arc imposed from different angles cannot obscure the result, 11iz., that they bring about the demarcation of the same--or substantially the same -field of no taxation.\n\nTo construe the two bans as independently and cumulatively operative is to impute to them some kind of picturesque potency and is to miss the reality, viz.,. that all the bans under Article 286 are meant to serve the same purpose, 11iz., that of imposing restrictions and thereby demarcating the fields of no taxation.\n\nThe bans and the proviso are parts of the same Article and have to be harmoniously construed. The unequivocal and positive language of one part, cannot be taken to have been obliterated by the negative language of the other part so as to result in futility.\n\nThe result of consruing the proviso and by parity of reasoning the saving clause, as merely removing the ban of a particular na-. turc leaving another overlapping ban to operate, would be to render both the saving clause in, and the proviso to, Article 286(2) virtually nugatory.\n\nA non-obstante clause does not normally add to or substract from the main provision of which it is a part. It is often enough inserted by way of extra caution.\n\nBut it does not have the effect of limiting the operation of the main provision. The suggestion that the Presidential action lifts the ban only as regards the inter-State sales would be to read the phrase \"notwithstanding that\" as meaning \"in so far\". There is no warrant for any such reading.\n\nCIVIL Nos. 132, of 1954.\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1cTION : Civil Appeals 133 and 137 of 1955 and Petition No. 567\n\nAppeals under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 18th October 1954 of the Nagpur High Court in Misc. Pcti\n\nM/s. Ram NaraiR\n\nSons Ltd. v . .Asst. Commission<'\n\nof Sales Tax anli\n\nothers\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd. v • • 4Jrt. 0Jtnmissioner 11l Salts Tax and .,,,,,,\n\ntions Nos. 265, 348 and 275 of 1953 respectively and Petition under Article 32 of the Comritutic:n for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nC. Setalvad, Aitorney-General of India (R. M.\n\nHajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, with him) for theappellant in C. A. No. 132 of 1955.\n\nN. C. Chatterji, (R. M. Hajarnavis and G. C.\n\nMathur, with him) for Intervener No. 1 in (;. A. No. 132 of 1955.\n\nR. M. Hajarnavis and G. C.\n\nMathur, for Intervener No. 2 in C. A. No. 132 of 1955.\n\nR. M. Hajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, for the appellant in C. A. No. 133 of 1955\n\nR. M. Hajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, for the appellant in C. A. No. 137 of 1955.\n\nM. Adhikari, Deputy Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and I.\n\nShroff, for respondents in all .appeals.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General 6f India (A. P. Sen, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with them) for the petitioner in Petition No. 567 of 1954.\n\nT. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (M. Adhikari, Deputy Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, with him) for respondents.\n\n/. B. Dadachanji, R. M. Hajarnavis and Rajinder .Narain, for the Intervener.\n\n1955.\n\nSeptembe:- 20.\n\nThe judgment of\n\nS. R.\n\nDas, Acting Chief Justice, Bhagwati, Jafer Imam and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. was delivered by Bhagwati J.\n\nJagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 132, 133 and 137 of 1955\n\nBHAGWATI J.-These 3 appeals with certificate under article 132(1) of the Constitution involve the interpetition of the proviso to articl~ 286(2) and raise a common question as to whether that proviso also saves\n\nthe transactions 0£ sale or purchase covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) from the ban imposed therein.\n\nThe Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1955 are Messrs Ramnarain Sons Ltd., a firm registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and carrying on business at Amravati and at other places in Madhya Pradesh.\n\nAfter the Cotton Control Order, 1949, came into force on the 12th September, 1949, the Appellants entered into Agreements with several mills situated outside Madhya Pradesh by which they undertook to purchase kapas in the various markets in Madhya Pradesh as their agents on their account and on their behalf.\n\nThe kapas after purchase was to be ginned and pressed into bales and sent to the mills. All the expenses involved in the process were to be borne by the mills which were also to be credited with the sale proceeds of the cotton seeds and the Appellants were only entitled to commission on a percentage basis.\n\nThe Appellants worked as such agents for the period 1st October, 1949 to 30th September, 1950. By his order dated the 30th June, 1953 the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Amravati, Respondent No. I, included the transactions valued at Rs. 72,86,454-5-10 with the said mills in the Appellants' turnover and ordered the Appellants to pay Rs. 1,13,850-13-6 as sales tax on the said transactions.\n\nThe Appellants filed an appeal to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 2, on the 30th July, 1953.\n\nThe appeal was, however, entertained by the Deputy\n\nC', ommissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 3, who ordered the Appellants to pay Rs. 25,000/- by the 31st August, 1953.\n\nThe Appellants thereupon filed a petition under Article 226, being Misc. Petition No. 265 of 1953, in the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur, asking inter alia for the quashing of the order of 30th June, 1953, passed by Respondent No. 1 and for consequential reliefs.\n\nThe Respondents filed a return denying the contentions of the Appellants and praying for the dismissal of the petition with costs.\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons Lid.\n\nAsst. Commissiont'f'\n\nof Salts Taxan.1\n\nothers\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd. v.\n\nAsst. Commissiontr\n\nrJj Salts Tax an:!\n\nothers\n\nRhagwali J.\n\nThe Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1955 arc the Eastern Cotton Company, a firm registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 and carrying on business at Amravati and at other places in Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThey also, during the period 1st October, 1949 to 30th September, 1950, worKed as agents of certain mills situated outside Madhya . Pradesh, procured kapas for them in Madhya Pradesh and sent it to the mills for consumption outside the State.\n\nBy his order dated the 9th September, 1953, the Respondent No. 1 included the transactions valued at Rs. 33,47,405-5-0 with the said mills in the Appellants' turn-over and ordered the Appellants to pay Rs. 52,303-4-0 as tax on the said transactions.\n\nThese Appellants also field a petition under article 226, being Misc. Petition No. 348 of 1953, fo the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur for quashing the order dated the 9th September, 1953, passed by Respondent No. 1 and for consequential reliefs.\n\nThe Respondents filed a return denying their contentions.\n\nThe Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 137 of 1955 arc the firm, Ramdas Khimji Brothers, Bombay, registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and carrying on business as cotton dealers in Madhya Pradesh. During the period 1st October, 1950 to 30th September, 1951, the Appellants sold cotton worth Rs. 6,01,949-1-9 to various persons out side Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe cotton was delivered to the buyers for consumption outside Madhya Pradesh as a direct result of such sales.\n\nBy his order dated the 29th December, 1952, the Sales Tax Officer, Amravati, in the assessment, of the Appellants for the same period, included the said transactions in the Appellants' turn-over and assessed sales tax thereon.\n\nThe Appellants filed an appeal to Respondent No. l but the same was dismissed by an order dated the 10th July, 1953. The Appellants filed on 22nd August, 1953, a revision before the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe Appellants also filed a petition under Article 226, being Misc. Petition No. 274 of 1953, in the High Court of Judicature at\n\nNagpur, asking for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of Respondent No. 1 passed by him in Sales Tax Appeal No. 13-A dated the 10th July, 1953, and for consequential reliefs.\n\nThe Respondents filed a return denying the contentions of the Appellants and asking that the petition be dismissed with costs.\n\nThese petitions came up for hearing and final disposal before the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur along with Misc. Petitions No. 288 of 1953 and No. 132 of 1954.\n\nA considered judgment was delivered in Miscellaneous Petition No. 132 of 1954 and the reasoning contained therein governed the decision in the connected Petitions Nos. 265, 274 and 348 of 1953.\n\nThe High Court held that the Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as amended by the Central Provinces and Berar Act XVI of 1949 having been declared invalid from its inception by the High Court in Messrs Shriram Gulabdas\n\nv. Board of Revenue\n\n(I.L.R. 1953 Nagpur 332) and by this Court in 1954 S.C.R. 1122, the original Explanation remained in force until the 1st April, 1951, when it was amended by the Madhya Pradesh Act IV of 1951.\n\nExplanation II originally enacted was in the terms following:- \"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale of any goods which are actually in the Central Provinces and Berar at the time when the contract of sale as defined in that Act in respect thereof is made, shall wherever the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in the Central Provinces and Berar\".\n\nThe Appellants contended that this Explanation offended article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation to the same and the State. of Madhya Pradesh was, therefore, not entitled to tax the transactions of sale in which goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consumption outside Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe Respondents, on the other hand, contended that the said Explanation was protected until the 31st March, l951, by the Sales Tax Continuation Order No. 7 of 1950 issued by the 13-83 S. C. India/59.\n\nM/•. R21nNami11\n\nSonr lJti.\n\nAsst. Commis.; iontr\n\nof Saks Tax anti\n\nothlrs\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nM/1. Ram NaraU.\n\nSons Lid.\n\nv. sst. CommP\"Sionnof Saks T \"\"\"\"\" olhns\n\nBliagwali].\n\nPresident on the 26th January, 1950, under the proviso to article 286(2).\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that the original Explanation was validly enacted as the assent of the Governor-General to the enactment was given on the 23rd May, 1947, and that under that Explanation the ta.x prior to the commencement of the Constitution was lawfully levied on the sales of goods wherever the contracts of sale took place if the goods were actually in the State at the time of contracts of sale were made.\n\nThis power could be exercised by the State even if the sales took place during the course of inter-State trade or commerce and the goods were delivered as a direct result of the sales for the purpose of consumption outside the State. This was because the situs of the goods constituted a sufficient nexus between the transactions and the taxing State which was the foundation for taxation prior to the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nThis positio~ continued until the com- .mencement of the Constitution and on the 26th January, 1950, the President issued the Sales Tax Continuation Order No. 7 of 1950 in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to article 286(2).\n\nThe sales in question had taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and accordingly they were covered by article 286(2) and would, therefore, be liable to tax even after the commencement of the Constitution Ly virtue of the President's order.\n\nReliance was further placed on the majority judgment of this Court in The State of Bdmbay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (1953 S.C.R. 1069) where it was held that the transaction vis-a.vis the delivery State lost its inter-State character if it fell within the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) and was accordingly made liable to taxation by the delivery State.\n\nSo far, however, as the exporting State was concerned, it retained its character of an inter-State transaction and would not, therefore, be liable to taxation by that State, vide article 286(2).\n\nThe President's order, however, removed this ban and the exporting State was entitled to tax the transaction by virtue of the power derived by it from the same. On a construction of\n\nthe relevant provisions of article 286(1) and article 286(2) the High Court was of the opinion that it would be making the proviso to article 286(2) nugatory if it was held that article 286(1) overrides it and takes away the taxing power of all States in inter-State trade or commerce except the delivery State.\n\nThe High Court accordingly dismissed the petitions with costs.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General appearing for the Appellants before us contended that so far as the post-Constitution period is concerned, the position is governed by our judgment in The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Bihar delivered on the 6th September, 1955.\n\nHe urged that the bans in1posed on the powers of the State Legislatures to levy taxes on the sale or purchase of goods in the several clauses of article 286 are independent and separate and that the transactions of sale or purchase referred to in the various clauses must be looked. at from different viewpoints.\n\nEven if a transaction might fall within the category of inter-State sale or purchase and the President's order under the proviso to article 286(2) might enable the State to levy any tax on such sale or pUTchase which was being lawfully levied by the State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, such transaction had also to surmount the ban imposed under article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto so that, if, as a direct result of such sale, the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in another State, the exporting State (to use the phraseology of the Nagpur High Court) or the title-State (to use the phraseology adopted in some of the judgments in The Bengal Immunity Co.'s Appeal) would not be entitled to levy a ta.~ on sud~ sale the transaction being fictionally outside the State by reason of the Explanation and therefore coming within the ban of article 286(1) (a).\n\nIt was, however, urged on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh that the President's order not only saved the transactions from the ban of article 286(2) but also from the ban of article 286 (1) (a), because the transactions covered by the Explanation to article\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd.\n\nAsst. Commilsiolltl'\n\nof Sales T 41< and\n\nothers\n\nBhagwati].\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons LJd.\n\nv. .4.rst. C<mJmissiontr\n\nof Sales Ta. and\n\nothtrs\n\nBhagwati].\n\n286 ( 1 )(a) were of the same category as transactions coveted by article 286(2) and were all in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nIt was further urged that if the transactions covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) were not saved from the ban by the President's order, the whole intention of the Constitution-makers in maintaining the status quo qua the taxes on sales or purchases of goods which were being lawfully levied by the State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution would be frustrated, because the transactions covered by the Explanation to article 286( 1 )(a) being necessarily in the course .of inter-State trade or commerce the President's order would be rendered nugatory and the exporting State or the title State would be restrained from levying tax on such transactions in spite of the ban having been lifted by the president's order.\n\nWe are unable to ac<;.ept this contention. As held by the majority Judges in The Bengal Immunity Co.'s Appeal, the bans imposed by article 286 on the taxing powers of the States are independent and separate and each one of them has to be got over before a State Legislature. can impose tax on transactions of sale or purchase of goods.\n\nThese bans have been imposed from different view-points, and, even though the transactions of sale or purchase may in conceivable cases overlap so far as these different viewpoints are oncerned, each of those bans is opentive and has to be enforced.\n\nSo far as article 286( 1) (a) is concerned, the Explanation . determines by the legal fiction created therein the situs of the sale in the case of transactions coming within that category and when a transaction is thus determined to be inside a particl1lar State it necessarily becomes a transaction outside all other States.\n\nThe only relevant enquiry for the purposts of article 286(1)(a), therefore, is whether a transaction is outside the State and once it is determined by the application of the Explanation that it is outside the State it follows as a matter of course that the Stte with reference to which the transaction can thus be predicated to be outside it can never\n\ntax the transaction. This ban is effective independently of the fact that the transaction may also have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or with reference to goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community.\n\nThe ban imposed under article 286 (2) is an independent and separate one and looks at the transactions. entirely from the point of view of their having taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Even if such transactions may also fall within the category of transactions covered by article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto or article 286(3), the moment article 286(2) is attracted by reason of the transactions being in the course of inter- State trade or commerce, tpe ban under article 286 (2) operates and such transactions can never be subjected to tax at the instance of a State Legislatur.:: except in so far as Parliament by law may otherwise provide or such power of taxation is saved by the President's order contemplated in the proviso.\n\nThe ban under article 286(2) may be saved by the President's order but that does not affect or lift the ban undQ\" article 286 ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation.\n\nApart from the construction thus put upon the several clauses of article 286 by the majority of the Judges in The Bengal Immunity Co.'s Appeal as above, the terms of the proviso itself make it abundantly clear that the proviso is meant only to lift the ban under article 286(2) and no other. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision.\n\nIt carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other.\n\nEven if the non-obi-tante. clause: \"Notwithstanding that the impos1t1on of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause\": had not been enacted in the proviso, the proviso could only have been construed as operating upon the field enacted in article 286(2) and could not be extended to any of the other provisions of article 286.\n\nThe non-obstante clause, however, makes it abundantly and further clear and states in\n\nM/1. Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd. v.\n\nAsst. Commissionn\n\nof Saks T OJt an4 .,,,,,,,\n\nBhagwali].\n\nM/s. Rom Narain\n\nSons IJd.\n\nv. bst. Commissionn\n\nef Sale1 T .. and\n\nOt/rns - Bhapati J.\n\nexplicit terms that it is enacted only with reference to \"this clause\", i.e., article 286(2).\n\nThe President's order may direct tha~ any tax _on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was to continue to be levied until 31st March, 1951, but the effect of that order was to raise the ban in so far as it was imposed by the provisions of \"this clause\".\n\nThe President's order, therefore, only lifted the ban in so far as the transactions took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and could not be projected into the sphere of any other clause of article 286. It had, therefore, not the effect of lifting the ban which was imposed by article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto, even though the transactions covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) by and large fell within the category of transactions which took place in the rourse of inter-State trade or commerce. The ban imposed by article 286(1)(a) was independent and separate and could. not be lifted by the President's order which had operation only in regard to the intcr- Statecharacter of the transactions.\n\nThe moment it was determined that the transactions were outside the State by virtue of the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) the ban imposed by article 286(1)(a) attached to the same and could not be lifted by the President's order which operated only on the inter- State character of the transactions and saved only those inter-State transactions which did not come within the Explanation.\n\nIf the contention urged on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh is accepted it would mean that we should re-write or amend the proviso to article 286(2) in order to effectuate the supposed intention of the Constitution-makers.\n\nThe supposed intention of the Constitution-makers was alleged to be to preserve to the States all the taxes on sale or purchase of goods which were being la\".l'fully levied by them immediately_ before the commencement of the Constitution by having resort to the territorial connection or nexus theory.\n\nWe have no evidence before us of this\n\nsupposed intention of the Constitution-makers. Whatever their intention was can only be gathered from the language which they have used and where the language is plain there is no scope whatever for speculation in that behalf.\n\nWhen the Constitutionmakers themselves used the words \"Notwithstanding that the imposition of such a tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause\" it would not be legitimate for us to go behind the plain words and try to read into the proviso something which would involve either a deletion of the non-obstante clause or a re-writing thereof as suggested.\n\nWhatever be the effect of our judgment on the treasuries of the exporting or title- States we cannot assist them by reading something into the proviso which is not warranted by any canon of construction.\n\nThe proviso has reference only to article 286(2) and cannot be projected into any other clause of article 286.\n\nThe untenability of the contentions of the Respondents will be clear from the following illustration:- Suppose the goods are in the State of Madhya Pradesh at the time the contracts of sale of those goods are made in, say, the State of Bombay. Suppose further that the property in the goods has by reason of such sales passed in the State of Bombay but the goods as a direct result of such sales have been delivered for consumption in the State of Madras.\n\nAccording to the Respondents, the President's order made under the proviso to article 286(2) saves the transactioqs from the ban of article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation. Then the State of Madras will be able to tax by virtue of article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation or on the nexus theory by reason of the goods being delivered there for consumption; the State of Bombay will be able to tax because the title to the goods passed there; and the State of Madhya Pradesh will also be able to tax under the Explanation . II to section 2(g) of the Act because the goods were in the State of Madhya Pradesh at the time when the contracts of sale were made in the State of Bombay. Nobody will say that the Constitution. makers intended to perpetuate multiple taxation of\n\nM/s. Ram Naraia\n\nSons .lid. .... ..bst. Commissionu\n\nof Salts T OJI and\n\nothers\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nMf•· Ram NMain\n\nSon1 l.Jt!.\n\nAsst. Commissionlr\n\nof Sak• T .. and\n\notlins\n\nBhagwati].\n\nthis kind and yet that will be the result if we were to accede to the arguments advanced by the Respon-- dents.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that so far as the Post-Constitution period is concerned the ban which is imposed by article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto cannot be removed by the President's order which was issued under the proviso to article 286(2) and the High Court was in error when it construed the proviso to article 286(2) as projecting into the field of article 286(1) (a) and lifting the ban imposed therein.\n\nOn .. the above reasoning, Civil Appeal No. 137 of 1955 filed by the firm of Ramdas Khimji Brothers, Bombay, which relates only to the post-Constitution period will be allowed and the order of assessment dated the 29th December, 1952, will be set aside. The Respondents will pay the costs of the Appellants here as well .as in the Court below.\n\nAs regards Civil Appeals Nos. 132 of 1955 and 133 of 1955, however, the assessments therein relate not only to the post-Constitution period but also the pre- Constitution period to which different considerations would apply.\n\nThe validity of the assessment in regard to the same would have to be canvassed having regard to the various contentions of law and fact which could be urged against the same by the Appellants.\n\nThere are two Ol!tstanding questions which have ben mooted before us by the learned Attorney- General in regard to this period, viz., (1) a question of fact, as to whether the Appellants were agents of the various miils in regard to the transactions which were the subject-matter of the assessment, and (2) a question of law, whether the law under which the tax was levied, viz., Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Act was validly enacted.\n\nBoth these contentions, though they are also relevant to the Post-Constitution period were not specifically pressed before us because the argument based on the proviso to article 286(2) was considered sufficient to set aside the assessment for that period.\n\nThey would, however, appropriately arise and be urged by the appellants when the liability to assessment for the pre-Constitution\n\nperiod is to be determined and if we were to determine that liability we would have tc deal with the same.\n\nThe necessity for doing so is, however, obviated by reason of the fact that the assessment is one composite whole relating to the pre-Constitution as well as the post-Constitution periods and is invalid in toto.\n\nThere is authority for the proposition that when an assessment consists of a single undivided sum in respect of the totality of the property treated as assessable, the wrongful inclusion in it of certain items of property which by virtue of a provision of law were expressly c:xempted from taxation renders the assessment invalid in toto.\n\nThe Privy Council have observed in Bennett & White (Calgary) Ld. And Municipal District of Sugar City No. 5 (1951 Appeal Cases, 786 at page 816) :-\n\n\"When an assessment is not for an entire sum, but for separate sums, dissected and earmarked each of them to a separate assessable item, a court can sever the: items and cut out one or more along with the sum attributed to it, while affirming the residue.\n\nBut where the assessment consists of a single undivided sum in respect of the totality of property treated as assessable, and when one component (not dismissible as \"de minimis\") is on any view not assessable and wrongly included, it would seem clear that such a procedure is barred, and the assessment is bad wholly.\n\nThat matter is covered by authority.\n\nIn Montreal Light, Heat & Power Consolidated v. City of Westmount ((1926) S.C.R. (Can.) 515 the court (see especially per Anglin, C. J.) in these conditions held that an assessment which was bad in part was infected throughout, and treated it as invalid.\n\nHerc their Lordships are of opinion, by parity of reasoning, that the assessment was invalid in toto\".\n\nIt was, therefore, urged that on the facts of this case the assessment was invalid in toto and that it should be set aside.\n\nThe learned Deputy Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh did not seriously contest this position and the result, therefore, is that the order of assessment dated , the 30th June, 1953, in Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1955 and the order of assessment dated the\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSuns LJd.\n\nAsst. Commission# of Salts Tax and\n\nothers\n\nRhagwati].\n\nM/1, Ram Narain\n\nSon' Ltd.\n\n•• .AsJt. Commissioner\n\nof Saler Ta. and\n\notlurs\n\nBhagwatij.\n\n9th September, 1953, in Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1955 are liable to be set aside.\n\nThe appeals will therefore be allowed the orders of assessment will be set aside and the matters will go back to the Assessment Officer for re-assessment of the Appellants in accordance with law.\n\nThe Appellants will be at liberty to urge before the Assessment Officer the contentions of law and fact available to them in the fresh assessment proceedings including those adverted to above.\n\nThe Respondents will pay the costs of these Appellants here as well as in the Court below.\n\nPetition No. 567 of 1954\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This petition under article 32 of the Constitution . also involves the interpretation of the proviso to article 286(2) and raises the same question as to the meaning, scope and operation of the proviso as was raised in the Civil Appeals Nos. 132, 133 and 137 of 1955 just disposed of.\n\nThe facts giving rise to this Petition may be shortly stated. The petitioners are a partnership firm carrying on business of manufacturing bidis at Jabal pur and registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The petitioners had their branches at Lucknow, Kanpur, Faizabad, Agra, Bombay and Bhopal.\n\nThey had also their selling agents at various places in Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere outside the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThev also entered into transactions direct with merchats in U ttar Pradesh.\n\nThe transactions in question which were the subject-matter of assessment at the instance of the Sales Tax authorities were for the period of assessment 21st October, 1949 to 9th November, 1950, and pread over two periods, viz., ( 1) the period between 21st October, 1949, to 25th January, 1950, which may be called the pre-Constitution period, and (2) the period subsequent to the inauguration of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950, up to the 9th November, 1950, which may be called the post- Constitution period. The petitioned gross turn-over was determined to be Rs. 49,40,140-6-9 and the\n\namount of Sales Tax assessed on the transactions was Rs. 1,51,291-13-0 as per . the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 3, dated the 14th July, 1954, in Sales Tax Appeal No. 6/ A-1.6.54.\n\nThe petitioners preferred a second appeal to the Respondent No. 2 against the said order.\n\nThe Respondent No. 2, however, refused to admit or register the appeal unless the amount of tax assessed was paid up.\n\nThe petitioners paid about Rs. 91,000/- towards the amount of tax assessed but finding it difficult to pay the balance filed this Petition against the State of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 1, the Commissioner of Sales Tai, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 2, and the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 3, for a wm of certiorari quashing the said order dated the 14th July, 1954, made by Respondent No. 3 and for consequential reliefs. The Respondents filed a return denying the contentions of the petitioners and maintaining that the Sales Tax was lawfully assessed by them against the petitioners.\n\nThe position as regards the petitioners' turn-over for the period OE assessment was as stated below :- Nature of tht Parties.\n\nSales Prices of goods Rs.\n\n(a) Direct to seliing agents on orders. .......... ..... 6,15,236- 3o\n\n(b) Direct to merchants on orders. 3,99,450- 2o ( c) Direct to destinations other than branches or depots but accounted for against branches and depots. 6,20,996- 14o\n\n(d) Direct to Stations or destinations having branches or depots owned by the proprietors of this registered firm-Kanpur, Bombay, Luck:iow and Faizabad. ......... 31,06,739-13o\n\nM/1. Ram Narain\n\nSonsUd.\n\nAlst. Commission#\n\nof Saks T aJt and\n\notlurs\n\nBhagwati].\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSon1 Lltf.\n\nAssl. Commissionnof Saks Tax and\n\nothers\n\nBhagwati].\n\nThe Sales Tax authorities treated all these transactions as transactions of sale coming within the deli nition contained in Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Act and assessed the petitioners to sales tax in respect of the same, negativing the contentions of the petitioners that they were in any event sales effected by them outside the State of Madhya Pradesh and that the State of Madhya Pradesh was therefore, not entitled to impose a tax on those transactions by virtue of the provisions of article 286(1)\n\n(a) and the Explanation thereto.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General who appeared for the petitioners contended that the bidis manufactured by the petitioners were all actually delivered as a direct result of the transactions of sale for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh and that after the inauguration of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950, it was only the State of Uttar Pradesh which was the delivery State that alone had the right to impose the tax on these transactions notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to the sale of goods the property in the goods might have passed in the State of Madhya Pradesh. He, therefore, urged that these transactions were sales outside the State of Madhya Pradesh and that the State of Madhya Pradesh was not entitled to impose a tax on such sales.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh on the other hand contended that these were purely intra-State transations entered into by the petitioJlers within the State of Madhya Pradesh and that the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) did not come into play at all because the goods were not actually delivered as a direct result of such sales for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He, therefore, maintained that even for the post-Constitution period there was no ban on the State of Madhya Pradesh imposing the sales tax on what were purely \"inside sales\".\n\nIt is necessary in view of these rival contentions to ascertain the true nature of the transactions in question.\n\nIn paragraph 15 of the Petition, the petitioners\n\nhad averred that the bidis manufactured by the firm were all delivered in the State of Uttar Pradesh for consumption in that State and that after the 26th January, 1950, the delivery State, viz., the State of Uttar Pradesh, had alone the right to impose tax on the sales of the commodity.\n\nThey had further submitted that the State of Madhya Pradesh where the bidis were manufactured :.nd from where they were sent could not any more exercise its right to levy a tax on such transactions of sale taking place elsewhere by reason of the inhibition contained in article 286.\n\nIn the return filed by the Respondents, they did not deny the allegation made by the , Petitioners in their Petition that the bidis manufactured by the firm were all delivered in the State of Uttar Pradesh for consumption in that State.\n\nIn substance, they contended that in spite of the State of Uttar Pradesh being the delivery State within the meaning of the Explanation\n\nto article 286(1)(a), the liability of these transactions to sales tax at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh was saved by the President's order made under the proviso to article 286(2) and that the imposition of such tax at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh was lawful and did not contravene the provisions of article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation thereto.\n\nBoth the order which was made by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, in the original assessment case No. 16 of 1950-51, dated the 7th August, 1953, and the order which was made in Sales Tax Appeal No. 6/ A-1.6.54 by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 3, dated the 14th July, 1954, proceeded on the basis that even though the transactions in question were transactions of sale where the goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sales for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh the President's order made under the proviso to article 286(2) saved the transactions also from the ban of article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto and that the State of Madhya Pradesh was, therefore, entitled to impose a tax on the same.\n\nIt \\\\'.as never\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd. v.\n\nAsst. Commisswnw\n\nof Sales Tax and\n\nothers\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nM/1. Ram N\"'ain\n\nSan1 LJd.\n\nAlll. Cammissionlr\n\nof Sain Talt and\n\nolWI\n\nBhaguiaJi J.\n\ncontended before either of them that the sales were purely \"inside sales\" and that the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) did not come into play at all under the circumstances of the case.\n\nThe facts as found by the Sales Tax authorities also emphasized that these transactions fell within the definition of sale contained in the Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Act and that so far as the post-Constitution period was concerned they were saved from the ban of article 286 ( 1) (a) and the Explanation thereto by the President's order made under the proviso to article 286(2).\n\nIt was, however, urged by the learned Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh that the transactions were pure \"inside sales\" entered into by the petitioners in Madhya Pradesh on orders received by them from outside the State.\n\nThese orders were accepted by the petitioners in the State of Madhya Pradesh and goods were appropriated to the contracts and the property in the goods passed within the State of Madhya Pradesh and that, therefore, they were pure intra-\n\nState sales or \"inside sales\" which it was within the competence of the State of Madhya Pradesh to tax.\n\nThis contention of the learned Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh is untenable. So far as direct supplies to. selling agents on orders and direct supplies to merchants on orders covered by items (a) and.\n\n(b) above are concerned, it was found that these supplies were made to the merchants buying the goods on commission basis or profit on their previous orders, instructions or indents which were either in printed forms or in ordinary letters and the sale prices were realised by sending bills and railway receipts through some scheduled banks. The very fact that the bills and the railway receipts were sent through the sche- . duled banks went to show that the petitioners reserved the right of disposal of goods covered by those railway receipts and the property in the goods passed in the State of Uttar Pradesh only after the relative bills were either accepted or honoured by the purchasers and the railway receipts delivered by the scheduled banks to them.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that\n\nin those cases the sales were completed in the Stat~ of Uttar Pradesh and were not intra-State sales or \"inside sales\" qua the State of Madhya Pradesh. As regards the direct supplies to destinations other than branches or depots but accounted for against the branches or depots being item ( c) above, it was found that the petitioners despatched the goods and hilled them to depot npnagers who were responsible for the collection of the orders and then the railway receipts and bills were sent there.\n\nThe managers prepared other bills adding incidental or other charges and delivered the railway receipts to the customers to whom the goods were sent from the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nHere also the despatches of the goods were made from the State of Madhya Pradesh by the petitioners to their depot managers and it was the depot managers who in their turn prepared and submitted their own bills and handed over the railway receipts to the respective customers appropriating the goods themselves to the contracts of sale which had been entered into by them with the latter and completing the sales in the State of Uttar Pradesh. These transactions also were, therefore, sales effected in the State of Uttar Pradesh and did not fall within the category of intra-State sales or \"inside sales\" qua the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe direct supplies to Stations or destinations having branches or depots owend by the proprietors of the firm, Kanpur, Bombay, Lucknow and Faizabad being item (b) above, also were outside sales qua the\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh inasmuch as the branch managers asked the petitioners to send stocks of goods to execute t~ orders which they had obtained from the customers to make their own supplies to them.\n\nAs a matter of fact it was found that several consolidated indents were placed by the depot managers with the petitioners in respect of the previous orders which had been collected by them and tlie petitioners supplied the goods to the depots or branches in pursuance of such indents.\n\nIf this was the true position qua these supplies, these sales also were completed in\n\nM/1. Ram Narain\n\nSons LU.\n\nAul. Commitsioner\n\nof Salts Tax and\n\nolhtrs\n\nBlaagwati J.\n\nM/s. Ram NOTain\n\nSons IJd. v.\n\nAsst. Commissioner\n\nof Saks Tax and\n\nothers\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe State of Uttar Pradesh by the depots or branches supplying the goods in their turn to several customers.\n\nThere could be no sales as such between the petitioners on the one hand and their depots or branches on the other hand and the State of Madhya Pradesh could certainly not be at all in a position to tax the same.\n\nThe whole theory, therefore, or \"inside sales\" falls to the ground and the only thing which we are left with is that these transactions were inter-State transactions in which as a direct result of such sales the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Explanation to article 286(1) (a) determined the State of Uttar Pradesh to be the State in which the sales took place and which alone was entitled to tax these transactions, the State of Madh}a Pradesh becoming an \"outside\" State for the purpose.\n\nApart from the ban imposed on the State of Madhya post-Constitution period, therefore, is invalid and thereto, these trans2ctions were also in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and were hit by the ban of article 286(2).\n\nThe President's order no doubt lifted that ban but was not competent to lift the ban under article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation diereto with the result that in spite of that order the State of Madhya Pradesh was not in a position to impose a tax on these transactions during the post-Constitution period.\n\nThe assessment of th.:se transactions to tax for the post-Constitution period, therefore, is invalid and cannot be sustained. The assessment, moreover, is a composite one coverin11: the pre-Constitution period as well. The case, therefore, falls within our judgment in Civil Appeals Nos. 132, 133 and 137 of 1955 just delivered, and following the reasoning contained therein, we are of the opinion that the order dated the 14th July, 1954, made by the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Re&pondent No. 3, in Sales Tax Appeal No. 6/ A.-1.654 should be set aside.\n\nWe accordingly allow the Petition, set aside the\n\nsaid order dated the 14t.1i July, 1954, and the matter will go back to the Assessment Officer for re-assessment of the petitioners in accordance with law.\n\nThe petitioners will be at liberty tu urge before the Assessment Officer the content; ons of law and fact available to them in the fresh assessment proceedings.\n\nThe Respon<lents will pay the costs of the petition.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-1 regret I feel constrained to differ from the view taken by my learnt>d brothers as regards the construction of proviso to article 286(2) and the effect of the Presidential order issued thereunder.\n\nThere is no' dispute that the proviso has to be construed as part of article 286(2).\n\nIt is meant to empower the President to keep the ban arising thereunder in temporary abeyance so that the States may continue to levy taxes on sales by virtue of their pre-\n\nConstitution sales-tax laws (if then lawful) for a limited period. It is urged, however, that the proviso (meaning thereby also the Presidential order thereunder) is effective to lift only the ban under article 286(2) and that the ban under article 286(l)(a) is operative nonetheless.\n\nNow, it may be correct to say that these two bans are imposed from different angles and are ir. that sense independent. But there can be no doubt that they are substantially overlapping in operation. A transaction which brings about an outside sale is also an inter-State transaction (barring, if at all, a few ingeniously conceived and illustrated cases).\n\nThe effect of each of the bans under article 286 is to demarcate the fields within which the taxing power of the States on sales c.tnnot operate. If, as I conceive, the two bans under articles 286(1) (a) and 286(2), are overlapping, the fact . that they arc imposed from different angles cannot obscure the result, viz., that they bring about the demarcation of the same-or substantially the same-field of no taxation.\n\nIt appears to me that it is in this light that the proviso and the Presidential order issued thereunder have to be construed.\n\nN'lw, the proviso (with the Presidential order) declares the field covered by sales in the course I .f.-83 S. C. lndia/59.\n\nMis. Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd. v.\n\nAsJt. Cornmissiorur\n\nof Sales TtJJt and\n\nol/urs\n\nBhagwati].\n\nM/t, Ram Narain\n\nSons IJd. v.\n\nAsst. Contmissian1r\n\nof Salts Tiu anJ\n\nothers\n\nJagaftnaJJaada1 J.\n\nof inter-State trade and commerce as taxable for a limited period by stating positively and emphatically that \"any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be levied until the 31st day of March, 1951\".\n\nThere is no d')ubt the non-obstanti: clause which will be dealt with presently, and which only emphasises the fact tl1at this is a proviso to article 286(2).\n\nBut there is no mistaking the positive and mandatory terms of the proviso. The effect of this is clearly and unequivocally to make the whole field of inter-State trade and commerce temporarily taxable in respect of the sales which take place in the course thereof. If this be so, it appears to me to be implicit therein that no other ban on such taxation can operate, for the time being, within that very field. To construe the two bans as independently and cumulatively operative is to impute to them some kind of picturesque potency and is to miss the reality, viz., that all the bans under article 286 are meant to serve the same purpose, viz., that of imposing restrictions and thereby demarcating the fields of no taxation.\n\nThe bans and the proviso are parts of the same article and have to be harmoniously construed.\n\nThe unequivocal and positive language of one part, cannot be taken to have been obliterated by the negative language of the other part so as to result in futility.\n\nA similar situation as that contemplated by the proviso would also arise with reference to the saving clause in article 286(2).\n\nIf the proviso is to be construed in tlie way suggested by the learned Attorney- General, it would seem to follow that when and as the Parliament lifts the ban under article 286(2), the lifting of that ban would equally become futile by virtue \"of article 286(1)(a). The Parliament has not in terms been given the power to lift the latter ban.\n\nThis, therefore, will lead to the extraordinary result that though the Constitution has in terms provided tl1at the ban on taxation of sales in tlie course of inter-State trade and commerce can be lifted, by the Parliament generally, and by the President for a\n\nlimited period, the exercise of both these powers would become ineffective and still-born by virtue of article 286(1) (a).\n\nIt appears to me unreasonable to impute any such intention as inevitably arising from the language used.\n\nIt appears to me, with great respect, that, whether it is by parliamentary legislation or by the Presidential action that the ban on taxing sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce is lifted, the principle of harmonious construction of article 286 taken as an integral whole, requires that the lifting of the ban is to be construed as laying open for taxation the entire field covered by article 286(2) and to carry with it the implication that no other overlapping ban will be operative.\n\nNo doubt, it has been suggested that so far as lifting of the ban under article 286(2) by the Parliament is concerned, the same would be at least partly operative by virtue of article 286(1) (a) taken with the Explanation under which the consumption-delivery State may well be free to tax.\n\nThis was the view expressed by the learned dissenting Judge in the case in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1).\n\nBut the majority in the recent decision in the Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar(2) including the said learned Judge, have left that question open.\n\nIt is problematical whether having regard to the inevitable extra-territorial operation of the levy of such a tax and the consequent harassment to the business community which looms large, the Explanation will receive that construction again and not receive the strict construction preferred in the dissenting judgment in the case in State of Travancore-Cochin v.\n\nShanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory( 8 ). The result, therefore, of construing the proviso and by parity of reasoning the saving clause, as merely removing the ban of a particular nature leaving another overlapping ban to operate, would be to render both the saving clause in, and the proviso to, article 286(2) virtually nugatory.\n\n(ll [1953) S.C.R. 1069.\n\n(2) Sup,.., me Court Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1953.\n\n(3) [1954) S.C.R. 53.\n\nM/1. Ram Narain\n\nSoni Lid.\n\nAW. Commiuion1r\n\no/Sol11 TIJll and\n\nolhm\n\nJagalUllJdhadas J.\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons LJd.\n\nAsst. CommiJsioner\n\nof Sales Tax and\n\nothers\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nThe argument based on the non-obstante clause in the proviso, viz. \"Notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause\" remains to be considered.\n\nIt is urged that this clause clearly indicates the intention that the operation of the proviso is to be confined to the sole purpose of lifting the ban arising under article 286(2) With respect, I am unable to agree. The non-obstante clause undoubtedly affirms the fact that the proviso is operative in respect of article 286(2).\n\nBut it does not purport to limit the efkct of the proviso, which a reasonable construction thereof may justify.\n\nA non-obstante clause does not normally add to or subtract from the main provision of which it is a pa.rt.\n\nIt is often enough inserted by way of extra caut10n.\n\nBut it dx> not have the effect of limiting the operation of the main provision. (See Astvini India v. Shrinbai A. Irani(') ). The suggestion that Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose(') and The Dominion of the Presidential action lifts the ban only as regards the inter-State sales would be to read the phrase \"notwithstanding that\" as meaning \"in so far as\".\n\nI can see no warrant for any such reading.\n\nIn my view, therefore, the pre-Constitution salestax laws, if then lawful, are not hit by article 286( 1) (a)-at least to the extent that the ban under article 286(1) (a) overlaps with - that under article 286(2). In this view, the orders of assessment in these cases cannot be set aside and the validity of the relevant pre- Constitution laws will have to be considered and the . further facts gone into.\n\nBut it is now not necessary to do so in these cases in the view taken by my learned brothers and the order propo>ed by them will govern these cases.\n\nCl) \\1953] S.C.R. 1, 21 and 24.\n\n(2) 1955] I S.C.R. 206 213.", "total_entities": 247, "entities": [{"text": "K.rishnaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.rishnaswami was anxious to support his son, the present appellant, and that many of the witnesses whom the respondent was obliged to examine;, were really anxious to help the appellant. ("}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly set aside the order f the Tribunal, and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of the joint family or for his own personal benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami Karayalar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly set aside the order f the Tribunal, and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of the joint family or for his own personal benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record."}}, {"text": "Government of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 594, "end_char": 625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly set aside the order f the Tribunal, and direct that the Election Commission do reconstitute the Tribunal to hear and decide the question whether Krishnaswami Karayalar entered into the contract with the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of the joint family or for his own personal benefit, on a consideration of the evidence on record."}}, {"text": "M/S. RAM NARAIN SONS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 894, "end_char": 918, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. RAM NARAIN SONS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ASST. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 921, "end_char": 964, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASST. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 986, "end_char": 995, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R.\n\nDas", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1011, "end_char": 1019, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1039, "end_char": 1049, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1054, "end_char": 1078, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1082, "end_char": 1103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1104, "end_char": 1118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1192, "end_char": 1206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1257, "end_char": 1268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Berar Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1518, "end_char": 1532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1674, "end_char": 1691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1775, "end_char": 1789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Act 1947"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1881, "end_char": 1902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per S. R. DAs\n\nACTING CHIEF JusTICE, BHAGWa\\TI, JAFER IMAM and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1909, "end_char": 1922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(JAGANNADHADAS J.\n\nChattanlllho.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1995, "end_char": 2006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karo,>alar , ..\n\nR(JtnJJ(; handra l)'ar and another\n\nVenkatarama\n\n/glr]."}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2128, "end_char": 2139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 286(i)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2370, "end_char": 2387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act 1947", "statute": "Berar Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 286(i)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2803, "end_char": 2820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3028, "end_char": 3038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ban under Article 286(i)(a) read with the Explanation is effective independently of the fact that the transaction may have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or with reference 'lo goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to bet essential for the life of the community."}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3117, "end_char": 3131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3393, "end_char": 3408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286( 3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3471, "end_char": 3485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3597, "end_char": 3611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3877, "end_char": 3891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3977, "end_char": 3994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4093, "end_char": 4104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal Immunity Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the aforesaid construction put upon the several clauses of Article 286 in The Bengal Immunity Co. case the terms of the proviso to Article 286(2) itself make it abundantly clear that the proviso is meant only to lift the ban under Article 286(2) and no other."}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4165, "end_char": 4179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4265, "end_char": 4279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4594, "end_char": 4608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4677, "end_char": 4688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4766, "end_char": 4781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5033, "end_char": 5047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5088, "end_char": 5100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5131, "end_char": 5156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5166, "end_char": 5183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5232, "end_char": 5255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Central l'rovmces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 offended Article 286(I)(a) read with the\n\nExplan<1tion to the same and the State of Madhya Pradesh was therefore, not entitled tO\\ tax the transactions of sale in which goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale for purposes of consumption outside Madhya Pradesh and the said Explanation was not protected by the President's order issued under the proviso to Article 286(2)."}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5539, "end_char": 5553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bennett & White (Calgary) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bennett & White (Calgary) Ltd. and Municipal District of Sugar City No."}}, {"text": "Municipal District of Sugar City No. 5 (1951 Appeal Cases 786", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5892, "end_char": 5953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bennett & White (Calgary) Ltd. and Municipal District of Sugar City No."}}, {"text": "Articles 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6029, "end_char": 6044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6450, "end_char": 6461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7092, "end_char": 7106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7705, "end_char": 7719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7727, "end_char": 7748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram NaraiR\n\nSons Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7850, "end_char": 7871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pcti\n\nM/s. Ram NaraiR\n\nSons Ltd. v .", "canonical_name": "Ram NaraiR\n\nSons Ltd."}}, {"text": "Ram Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7929, "end_char": 7939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commission<'\n\nof Sales Tax anli\n\nothers\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd. v • • 4Jrt.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8072, "end_char": 8082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8147, "end_char": 8158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Aitorney-General of India (R. M.\n\nHajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, with him) for theappellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "R. M.\n\nHajarnavis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8187, "end_char": 8204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Aitorney-General of India (R. M.\n\nHajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, with him) for theappellant in C. A. No.", "canonical_name": "R. M.\n\nHajarnavis"}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8209, "end_char": 8221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Aitorney-General of India (R. M.\n\nHajarnavis and G. C. Mathur, with him) for theappellant in C. A. No.", "canonical_name": "G. C.\n\nMathur"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8277, "end_char": 8292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterji, (R. M. Hajarnavis and G. C.\n\nMathur, with him) for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "R. M. Hajarnavis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8295, "end_char": 8311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterji, (R. M. Hajarnavis and G. C.\n\nMathur, with him) for Intervener No.", "canonical_name": "R. M.\n\nHajarnavis"}}, {"text": "G. C.\n\nMathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8316, "end_char": 8329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterji, (R. M. Hajarnavis and G. C.\n\nMathur, with him) for Intervener No.", "canonical_name": "G. C.\n\nMathur"}}, {"text": "M. Adhikari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8633, "end_char": 8644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Adhikari, Deputy Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and I.\n\nShroff, for respondents in all .appeals."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8738, "end_char": 8752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General 6f India (A. P. Sen, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with them) for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8784, "end_char": 8799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General 6f India (A. P. Sen, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with them) for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "A. P. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8829, "end_char": 8838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General 6f India (A. P. Sen, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with them) for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nDadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8843, "end_char": 8857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General 6f India (A. P. Sen, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with them) for the petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nDadachanji"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8862, "end_char": 8877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General 6f India (A. P. Sen, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with them) for the petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder .Narain"}}, {"text": "T. L. Shevde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8939, "end_char": 8951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (M. Adhikari, Deputy Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, with him) for respondents."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9048, "end_char": 9060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (M. Adhikari, Deputy Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, with him) for respondents."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9093, "end_char": 9106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/. B. Dadachanji, R. M. Hajarnavis and Rajinder .Narain, for the Intervener.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nDadachanji"}}, {"text": "Rajinder .Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9129, "end_char": 9145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/. B. Dadachanji, R. M. Hajarnavis and Rajinder .Narain, for the Intervener.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder .Narain"}}, {"text": "S. R.\n\nDas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9208, "end_char": 9218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of\n\nS. R.\n\nDas, Acting Chief Justice, Bhagwati, Jafer Imam and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.", "canonical_name": "S. R.\n\nDas"}}, {"text": "Jafer Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9252, "end_char": 9262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of\n\nS. R.\n\nDas, Acting Chief Justice, Bhagwati, Jafer Imam and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.", "canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9267, "end_char": 9287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of\n\nS. R.\n\nDas, Acting Chief Justice, Bhagwati, Jafer Imam and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9309, "end_char": 9317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Bhagwati J.\n\nJagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment\n\nCivil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9322, "end_char": 9335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Bhagwati J.\n\nJagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment\n\nCivil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9466, "end_char": 9480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9694, "end_char": 9708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ramnarain Sons Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9802, "end_char": 9821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132 of 1955 are Messrs Ramnarain Sons Ltd., a firm registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and carrying on business at Amravati and at other places in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9865, "end_char": 9912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amravati", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9942, "end_char": 9950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132 of 1955 are Messrs Ramnarain Sons Ltd., a firm registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and carrying on business at Amravati and at other places in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "12th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10052, "end_char": 10072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Cotton Control Order, 1949, came into force on the 12th September, 1949, the Appellants entered into Agreements with several mills situated outside Madhya Pradesh by which they undertook to purchase kapas in the various markets in Madhya Pradesh as their agents on their account and on their behalf."}}, {"text": "1st October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10663, "end_char": 10680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellants worked as such agents for the period 1st October, 1949 to 30th September, 1950."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10684, "end_char": 10704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellants worked as such agents for the period 1st October, 1949 to 30th September, 1950."}}, {"text": "30th June, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10729, "end_char": 10744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his order dated the 30th June, 1953 the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Amravati, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11047, "end_char": 11088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellants filed an appeal to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11371, "end_char": 11382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11429, "end_char": 11463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "265 of 1953, in the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur, asking inter alia for the quashing of the order of 30th June, 1953, passed by Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rhagwali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11892, "end_char": 11900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "others\n\nRhagwali J.\n\nThe Appellants in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Eastern Cotton Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11960, "end_char": 11982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133 of 1955 arc the Eastern Cotton Company, a firm registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 and carrying on business at Amravati and at other places in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12026, "end_char": 12073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya . Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12274, "end_char": 12290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also, during the period 1st October, 1949 to 30th September, 1950, worKed as agents of certain mills situated outside Madhya ."}}, {"text": "9th September, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12418, "end_char": 12437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his order dated the 9th September, 1953, the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12691, "end_char": 12702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Ramdas Khimji Brothers, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13017, "end_char": 13047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "137 of 1955 arc the firm, Ramdas Khimji Brothers, Bombay, registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and carrying on business as cotton dealers in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13084, "end_char": 13131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13213, "end_char": 13230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the period 1st October, 1950 to 30th September, 1951, the Appellants sold cotton worth Rs."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13234, "end_char": 13254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the period 1st October, 1950 to 30th September, 1951, the Appellants sold cotton worth Rs."}}, {"text": "29th December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13487, "end_char": 13506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his order dated the 29th December, 1952, the Sales Tax Officer, Amravati, in the assessment, of the Appellants for the same period, included the said transactions in the Appellants' turn-over and assessed sales tax thereon."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13961, "end_char": 13972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at\n\nNagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14019, "end_char": 14054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "274 of 1953, in the High Court of Judicature at\n\nNagpur, asking for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of Respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14765, "end_char": 14777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14785, "end_char": 14832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Berar Act XVI of 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14874, "end_char": 14895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15128, "end_char": 15143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as amended by the Central Provinces and Berar Act XVI of 1949 having been declared invalid from its inception by the High Court in Messrs Shriram Gulabdas\n\nv. Board of Revenue\n\n(I.L.R. 1953 Nagpur 332) and by this Court in 1954 S.C.R. 1122, the original Explanation remained in force until the 1st April, 1951, when it was amended by the Madhya Pradesh Act IV of 1951."}}, {"text": "Pradesh Act IV of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15179, "end_char": 15201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15268, "end_char": 15346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15715, "end_char": 15732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "State. of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15779, "end_char": 15803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellants contended that this Explanation offended article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation to the same and the State."}}, {"text": "Ram NaraU.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16292, "end_char": 16302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram NaraU.\n\nSons Lid.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16428, "end_char": 16442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17391, "end_char": 17409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This positio~ continued until the com- .mencement of the Constitution and on the 26th January, 1950, the President issued the Sales Tax Continuation Order No."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17533, "end_char": 17547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17672, "end_char": 17686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18090, "end_char": 18104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18356, "end_char": 18370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18583, "end_char": 18597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18602, "end_char": 18616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18690, "end_char": 18704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18734, "end_char": 18748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "6th September, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19182, "end_char": 19201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General appearing for the Appellants before us contended that so far as the post-Constitution period is concerned, the position is governed by our judgment in The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Bihar delivered on the 6th September, 1955."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19349, "end_char": 19360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19650, "end_char": 19664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19891, "end_char": 19905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20118, "end_char": 20135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if a transaction might fall within the category of inter-State sale or purchase and the President's order under the proviso to article 286(2) might enable the State to levy any tax on such sale or pUTchase which was being lawfully levied by the State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, such transaction had also to surmount the ban imposed under article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto so that, if, as a direct result of such sale, the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in another State, the exporting State (to use the phraseology of the Nagpur High Court) or the title-State (to use the phraseology adopted in some of the judgments in The Bengal Immunity Co.'s Appeal) would not be entitled to levy a ta.~ on sud~ sale the transaction being fictionally outside the State by reason of the Explanation and therefore coming within the ban of article 286(1) (a)."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20420, "end_char": 20434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20580, "end_char": 20594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20620, "end_char": 20631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20953, "end_char": 20967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21106, "end_char": 21120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21479, "end_char": 21498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21912, "end_char": 21923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22379, "end_char": 22394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22742, "end_char": 22759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23352, "end_char": 23363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23629, "end_char": 23643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23679, "end_char": 23693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23706, "end_char": 23720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23833, "end_char": 23844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24115, "end_char": 24129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24215, "end_char": 24226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24329, "end_char": 24340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24527, "end_char": 24541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25074, "end_char": 25088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25149, "end_char": 25160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rom Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25345, "end_char": 25355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Rom Narain\n\nSons IJd."}}, {"text": "Bhapati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25417, "end_char": 25424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissionn\n\nef Sale1 T .. and\n\nOt/rns - Bhapati J.\n\nexplicit terms that it is enacted only with reference to \"this clause\", i.e., article 286(2).", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25507, "end_char": 25521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26099, "end_char": 26110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26186, "end_char": 26200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26293, "end_char": 26307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26450, "end_char": 26467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26739, "end_char": 26753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26777, "end_char": 26794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27164, "end_char": 27178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28424, "end_char": 28438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28488, "end_char": 28499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28738, "end_char": 28744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The untenability of the contentions of the Respondents will be clear from the following illustration:- Suppose the goods are in the State of Madhya Pradesh at the time the contracts of sale of those goods are made in, say, the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28950, "end_char": 28956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suppose further that the property in the goods has by reason of such sales passed in the State of Bombay but the goods as a direct result of such sales have been delivered for consumption in the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29037, "end_char": 29051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29091, "end_char": 29108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29145, "end_char": 29160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then the State of Madras will be able to tax by virtue of article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation or on the nexus theory by reason of the goods being delivered there for consumption; the State of Bombay will be able to tax because the title to the goods passed there; and the State of Madhya Pradesh will also be able to tax under the Explanation ."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29194, "end_char": 29208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29328, "end_char": 29343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then the State of Madras will be able to tax by virtue of article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation or on the nexus theory by reason of the goods being delivered there for consumption; the State of Bombay will be able to tax because the title to the goods passed there; and the State of Madhya Pradesh will also be able to tax under the Explanation ."}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29496, "end_char": 29508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Naraia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29743, "end_char": 29753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "makers intended to perpetuate multiple taxation of\n\nM/s. Ram Naraia\n\nSons .lid. .... ..", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain"}}, {"text": "Ram NMain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29836, "end_char": 29845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissionu\n\nof Salts T OJI and\n\nothers\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nMf•· Ram NMain\n\nSon1 l.Jt!.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30142, "end_char": 30159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30269, "end_char": 30283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30349, "end_char": 30363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30396, "end_char": 30410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ramdas Khimji Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30530, "end_char": 30552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "137 of 1955 filed by the firm of Ramdas Khimji Brothers, Bombay, which relates only to the post-Constitution period will be allowed and the order of assessment dated the 29th December, 1952, will be set aside."}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31617, "end_char": 31629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31834, "end_char": 31848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Anglin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33598, "end_char": 33604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "515 the court (see especially per Anglin, C. J.) in these conditions held that an assessment which was bad in part was infected throughout, and treated it as invalid."}}, {"text": "Ram Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34219, "end_char": 34229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132 of 1955 and the order of assessment dated the\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSuns LJd.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain"}}, {"text": "Ram Narain\n\nSon' Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34303, "end_char": 34324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/1, Ram Narain\n\nSon' Ltd.\n\n•• .AsJt.", "canonical_name": "Ram NaraiR\n\nSons Ltd."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35011, "end_char": 35021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35095, "end_char": 35109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jabal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35425, "end_char": 35430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are a partnership firm carrying on business of manufacturing bidis at Jabal pur and registered as a \"dealer\" under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35474, "end_char": 35521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35561, "end_char": 35568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners had their branches at Lucknow, Kanpur, Faizabad, Agra, Bombay and Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35570, "end_char": 35576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners had their branches at Lucknow, Kanpur, Faizabad, Agra, Bombay and Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Faizabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35578, "end_char": 35586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners had their branches at Lucknow, Kanpur, Faizabad, Agra, Bombay and Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35588, "end_char": 35592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners had their branches at Lucknow, Kanpur, Faizabad, Agra, Bombay and Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35605, "end_char": 35611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners had their branches at Lucknow, Kanpur, Faizabad, Agra, Bombay and Bhopal."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35670, "end_char": 35683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had also their selling agents at various places in Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere outside the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "U ttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35796, "end_char": 35810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thev also entered into transactions direct with merchats in U ttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "21st October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35965, "end_char": 35983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The transactions in question which were the subject-matter of assessment at the instance of the Sales Tax authorities were for the period of assessment 21st October, 1949 to 9th November, 1950, and pread over two periods, viz., ("}}, {"text": "9th November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35987, "end_char": 36005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The transactions in question which were the subject-matter of assessment at the instance of the Sales Tax authorities were for the period of assessment 21st October, 1949 to 9th November, 1950, and pread over two periods, viz., ("}}, {"text": "25th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36088, "end_char": 36106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) the period between 21st October, 1949, to 25th January, 1950, which may be called the pre-Constitution period, and (2) the period subsequent to the inauguration of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950, up to the 9th November, 1950, which may be called the post- Constitution period."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37003, "end_char": 37026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "91,000/- towards the amount of tax assessed but finding it difficult to pay the balance filed this Petition against the State of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "14th July, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37244, "end_char": 37259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, for a wm of certiorari quashing the said order dated the 14th July, 1954, made by Respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38362, "end_char": 38374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38719, "end_char": 38733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39001, "end_char": 39023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General who appeared for the petitioners contended that the bidis manufactured by the petitioners were all actually delivered as a direct result of the transactions of sale for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh and that after the inauguration of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950, it was only the State of Uttar Pradesh which was the delivery State that alone had the right to impose the tax on these transactions notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to the sale of goods the property in the goods might have passed in the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39790, "end_char": 39807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40880, "end_char": 40891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41182, "end_char": 41204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In substance, they contended that in spite of the State of Uttar Pradesh being the delivery State within the meaning of the Explanation\n\nto article 286(1)(a), the liability of these transactions to sales tax at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh was saved by the President's order made under the proviso to article 286(2) and that the imposition of such tax at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh was lawful and did not contravene the provisions of article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation thereto."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41272, "end_char": 41289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41448, "end_char": 41462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41598, "end_char": 41612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jabalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41727, "end_char": 41735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the order which was made by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, in the original assessment case No."}}, {"text": "7th August, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41798, "end_char": 41814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of 1950-51, dated the 7th August, 1953, and the order which was made in Sales Tax Appeal No."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42264, "end_char": 42278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42323, "end_char": 42337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42484, "end_char": 42505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It \\\\'.as never\n\nM/s. Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd. v.\n\nAsst.", "canonical_name": "Ram NaraiR\n\nSons Ltd."}}, {"text": "Ram N\"'ain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42572, "end_char": 42582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram N\"'ain\n\nSan1 LJd.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain"}}, {"text": "BhaguiaJi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42639, "end_char": 42648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cammissionlr\n\nof Sain Talt and\n\nolWI\n\nBhaguiaJi J.\n\ncontended before either of them that the sales were purely \"inside sales\" and that the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) did not come into play at all under the circumstances of the case."}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42755, "end_char": 42772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42999, "end_char": 43011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43117, "end_char": 43128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43217, "end_char": 43231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44923, "end_char": 44931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear, therefore, that\n\nin those cases the sales were completed in the Stat~ of Uttar Pradesh and were not intra-State sales or \"inside sales\" qua the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46096, "end_char": 46119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These transactions also were, therefore, sales effected in the State of Uttar Pradesh and did not fall within the category of intra-State sales or \"inside sales\" qua the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Blaagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46973, "end_char": 46982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commitsioner\n\nof Salts Tax and\n\nolhtrs\n\nBlaagwati J.\n\nM/s. Ram NOTain\n\nSons IJd."}}, {"text": "Ram NOTain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46992, "end_char": 47002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commitsioner\n\nof Salts Tax and\n\nolhtrs\n\nBlaagwati J.\n\nM/s. Ram NOTain\n\nSons IJd."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47079, "end_char": 47101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner\n\nof Saks Tax and\n\nothers\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe State of Uttar Pradesh by the depots or branches supplying the goods in their turn to several customers."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47721, "end_char": 47735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madh}a Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47884, "end_char": 47907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Explanation to article 286(1) (a) determined the State of Uttar Pradesh to be the State in which the sales took place and which alone was entitled to tax these transactions, the State of Madh}a Pradesh becoming an \"outside\" State for the purpose."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47988, "end_char": 48003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the ban imposed on the State of Madhya post-Constitution period, therefore, is invalid and thereto, these trans2ctions were also in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and were hit by the ban of article 286(2)."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48168, "end_char": 48182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48276, "end_char": 48293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49631, "end_char": 49645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49776, "end_char": 49790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50170, "end_char": 50184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50208, "end_char": 50225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50648, "end_char": 50659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50795, "end_char": 50810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sons Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51299, "end_char": 51308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Narain\n\nSons Ltd. v.\n\nAsJt."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51951, "end_char": 51965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52561, "end_char": 52572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53070, "end_char": 53084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53253, "end_char": 53267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53335, "end_char": 53352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53797, "end_char": 53811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54173, "end_char": 54184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54325, "end_char": 54339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54499, "end_char": 54513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54603, "end_char": 54617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55671, "end_char": 55685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56356, "end_char": 56370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56504, "end_char": 56518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57283, "end_char": 57298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57345, "end_char": 57359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57391, "end_char": 57405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_48_66_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "March 24\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSETH THAW ARDAS PHERUMAL\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA\n\n(and connected <lppeal)\n\n[1955] •\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADllAOAS and SINHA, J.J .J\n\nArbitratio11 Act, 1940, (Act Xvi 1940), .-. l6t /)(c)-Arbitratio11 -Award-Legality thereof-\\Flwn ca\" be challenged-Arbitratvr- Condition precedent for his jurisdiction-Award-\\\\i'hen Jinal-Both\n\nparties specifically referring a qut?stiun of law for the decision 11/ aTbitrator-Cases where question of law specifically referred aud cases where decision incidentally tnaterial (however necessary) in order to decide the question actually refrred-Distinction between -wrong construction of contract-Error of law-Iuterest awarded-Contract not providing for it-Require1nents of Interest Act, 1839 !Act XXXII of 1839) not fulfilled--Specific type of loss actually contemplated by the partie.--Expres.- stipulatio\" that no damage will be payabe-Parties bound down to the agreement- Agreement on which s:;, it based no1 found in tlie written contract but implied under s. 9 of the fodian Contract Act, 1872-Matter not covered by the arbitration clause---Error of law apparent au the face of the award.\n\n'The appellan;, a contractor, entered into a contract with the Dominion of India for the supply of bricks. A clause in the contract required all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract tq be referrt:d to arbitration. Disputes arose and the matter was duly referred. The arbitrator gave an award in the contractor's favour.\n\nThe Union Government, which by thc'Il had displaced the Dominion of India, contested the a\\vard on a nunibcr of grounds.\n\nHeld: (1) that it is not enough for the contract to provide for arbitration; more is necessary.\n\nAn arbitrator only gets jurisdiction when either, both the parties specifically agree to refer specified matters or, failing that, the court compels them to do so under the arbitration clause if the dispute is covered by it;\n\n(2) the legality of an award cannot be challenged on facts, but it can be challenged on questions of law provided the illegality is apparent on the face of the award: s. 16'l)!c) of the Arbitration Act;\n\n(3) the only exception is when both parties specifically refer a question of law for the decision of the arbitrator. In that event they are hound by his decision on that particular question as well as by his decision on the facts.\n\nBut a distinction must be drawn between cases in which a question of law is specifically referred and those in which a deci,.ion is incidentally material (however necessary) in order to decide the question actually referred. The law about this is the sallll' in India as in England. 1923 A.C. 395 and\n\n1933 A.C. 592, followed. 54 C.W.N. 74 at 79, 50 I.A. 324 at 330 &\n\n331, 54 I.A. 427 at 430, 29 I.A. 51 at 60, 1942 A.C. 356 at 368 l'eferred to and 1950 S.C.R. 7.92 at 798, explained; 1955\n\nSeth Thawa•das Quaere: -Whether the courts will interfere when a question of Pheimal law is specifically referred if the arbitrator acts illegally in deciding The Unioi; of India it, such as deciding on inadmissible evidence or on principles of construction which the la\\Y does not countenance. 1923 A.C. 395 at 409, refen:.ed to;\n\n( 4) a wrong construction of the contract is an error of law and can be challenged provided the error appears on the face of the award;\n\n(5) so is the awarding of interest when the <:ontract does not provide for interest and the requirements of the Interest Act are not fulfilled: 65 I.A. 66, referred to.\n\nQuaere: whether the Interest Act applies to arbitrations~\n\n(6) when a specific type of loss is directly contemplated by the parties to a contract and they expressly stipulate that no damages will. be payable in respect of it they must be bound down to their agreement and any claim for damages in respect of such loss must be dismissed;\n\n(7) when the agreement on which the suit is based is not to be found in a contract which has been reduced to writing but has to be implied under s. 9 of the Contract Act then the matter is not covered by an arbitration clause of the kind referred to above because the dispute in such a case arises out of and relates to the implied agreement and not to the written contract; 1942 A.C. 356 at 371, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE J!JRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1953 and connected appeal (C.A. No. l2 of 1954).\n\nAppeals from the Judgment and Decree dated the 11th day of May 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 253 of 1950 and in appeal from Original Order No. 252 of 1950 arising out of the order dated the 11th day of May 1951 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad in Suit No. 34 of 1949 and in Title Suit No. 27 of 1949 respectively.\n\nMahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar (S. P. Varma and M. M. Sinha, with him). for the appellant (In Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1953).\n\nMahabir PrasaZ dvocate-General for the State of Rihar (M. M. Sinha for R. C. Pmsad. with himl for the appellant (Jn Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1954). '\n\nSith Tha-.JJardas\n\nl'hcrlunal\n\n G. K._ Daphtary, Solicito}-General fo~>lndia (Porus A •. ~JJfehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent (In both the Appeals). - ·-\n\nTllcUnio:o/ lnd; a\n\n- - 1955. l\\Iar6h 24.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court- Was delivered by\n\n_ BosE J.-_ This appeal and Civil Appeal No. 12 of l!J54, which will also be governed by this judgment, raise the same points though there are some differences in the facts. \\Ve_ will deal with Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1953 first. _.\n\nThe suit there related to an arbitration matter.\n\nThe appellant before us, whomit will be convenient to call the contractor, entered into a contract with the Dominion of -India through an Additional Chief Engineer of the C.P. \\V.D. on l-ll-1945 for the supply of bricks to the C.P.\\V.D., a department of the Dominion Government. Disputes arose about a number of matters. -Clause 14 of the agreement provided that all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract should be referred to the Superintending Engineer of the Circle for the time being. Accordingly, there was a reference on 21-1-1949 and an award followed on 8-5-l!l49. It was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, and the contractor prayed that it be accepted and that a decree be passed in terms of it.\n\nThe Dominion of India filed objections under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and prayed that the award be set aside and alternatively that it be modi- ' \"4 fied or corrected.\n\nThe contractor's application was registered as a suit under section 20(2) of the Act and a decree was passed in terms of the award on 18-3-1950. - By that time the Constitution had come into force and the Union of India replaced the Dominion of India as a defendant.\n\nThe Union of India filed an appeal to the High Court.\n\nThe appeal was allowed in part.\n\nThe contractor thereupon appealed to this Court. The dispute that was referred to the arbitrator consisted of 17 heads of claim but only three of them are t contested here, namely items 5, 8 and 17.\n\nIn the 5th head of claim the contractor claimed Rs.\n\nJYSj 75,900 as the price of 88 lacs of katcha bricks that Serh Thall'arda.1 h k h Pher111nal were destroyed by rain.\n\nT ese bric s were not t e v. subject-matter of the contract but the contractor put The Union of India his claim in this way. no.e.t.\n\nThe contract was for the supply of 2} crores of pucca bricks which had to be delivered according to the followil)g schedule-\n\n30 lacs by 25-1-46\n\n50 lacs by 25-2-46 55 lacs by 25-3-46 55 lacs by 25-4-46 60 la'cs by 25-5-46.\n\nDelivery was to be at the kiln site. In order to keep to this schedule the contractor had to think ahead and work to a particular time table. First, he had to prepare katcha or unbaked bricks and place them in his kilns for baking. While this lot was baking he had to prepare and stock another lot of katcha bricks ready to take the place of the baked bricks as soon as they were removed, It was the duty of the C.P.W.D. to remove these bricks as soon as they were ready for delivery, that is to say, as soon as they were fully baked. At a certain stage of the contract the C.P.W.D .. failed to remove the backed bricks which were ready ·\n\nfor delivery and removal. This caused a jam in the kilns and prevented the contractor from placing afresh stock of unburnt bricks in the kilns, and in the meanwhile his stock pile of katcha bricks ready for baking kept on mounting up: Had everything been done to time the n crores of bricks would have been delivered before therains set in.\n\nBut owing to the default of the C.P.W.D. in not removing the burnt bricks· which were ready for removal, delay occurred in the time table and the rains set in with the result that 88 lacs of katcha bricks were destroyed by the rains.\n\nAs this loss was occasioned by the default of the C.P.W.D. the contractor claimed that he should be paid their price.\n\nThe reply of the Union Government was two-fold.\n\nFirst it contended that the katcha bricks formed no\n\npart of the contract and even if it w:1s at fault in not\n\n/955 taking delivery of the burnt bricks in time all that it\n\nSetlr T!rawarda; could be held liable for would be for breach of that\n\nPlrer:_mat contract; and said that the Joss that was occasioned by\n\nThe Union 'If India the damage caused to the katcha bricks which formed\n\nB7'seJ. no part of the contract was too remote. Secondly, that compensation for this Joss could not in any event be claimed because this kind of situation was envisaged by the parties when the contract was made and they expressly stipulated that the Dominion Government would not be responsible. The Union Government relied on additional clause 6 of the agreement which is in these terms:\n\n\"The department will not entertain any claim for idle Jabour or for damage to unburnt bricks due to any c, ause whatsoever\".\n\nThe arbitrator held that this clause was not meant \"to\n\nabsolve the department from carrying out their part of the contract\" and so he awarded the contractor Rs_ 64,075 under tliis head.\n\nWe are clear that the arbitrator went wrong in law.\n\nGovernment departments have their difficulties no less than contractors. There is trouble with labour, there is the likelihood of machinery breaking down in out of the way places and so forth; there was also the danger of thunder sto.rms and heavy showers of rain in the month .of May: it will be remembered that the last date of delivery was 25-5-46.\n\nIf, with that in view, Government expressly stipulated, and the contractor expressly agreed, that Government was not to be liable for any loss occasioned by a consequence as remote. as this, then that is an express term of the contract and the contractor must be tied down to it.\n\nIf he chase to contract in absolute terms that was his affair. But having contracted he cannot go back on his agreement simply because it does not suit him to abide by it. This is not to say that Government is absolved froni all liability, but all it can be held responsible for is for damages occasioned by the breach of its contract to remove the pucca bricks which it had undertaken to remove. But what would such a breach entail?\n\nThe contractor had a duty under section 73 of the l955 Contract Act to minimise the loss, accordingly he would Seth Thawardas have had the right to remove the bricks himself and Pherumat stack them elsewhere and claim compensation for the The Unio~· of India loss so occasioned; and indeed two of his heads of claim (not in dispute here) relate to that.\n\nHe has been awarded Rs. 11,744-11-0 under claim No. 4 for the extra load in connection with the stacking of 1 crore 7 lacs of bricks due to the accumulation at the kiln site owing to the department's failure to work to its part of the time table, and in addition, he has been given Rs. 15,500 under claim 13 for the cost of levelling and dressing land to enable him to stack these extra bricks.\n\nAlternatively, he could have sold the bricks in the market and claimed the difference in price, but ordinarily he could not have cl;; timed compensation for damage done to the katcha bricks unless he could have shown that that kind of damage, ordinarily too remote, was expressly contemplated by the parties when the contract was made: section 73 of the Contract Act.\n\nHere it is clear that this was in their express contemplation and they chose to provide against such a contingency by making clause 6 an express clause in\n\ntheir contract. There can therefore be no doubt that the arbitrator was wrong in his law. His construction of the terms of the contract was at fault. The question now arises whether his decison on this point is final despite it being wrong in law.\n\nIn India this question is governed by section 16(1)\n\n(c) of the Arbitration Act of 1940 which empowers a Court to remit an award for reconsideration.\n\n\"where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it\".\n\nThis covers cases in which an error of law appears on the face of the award. But in determining what such an error is, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which a question of law is specifically referred and those in which a decision on a question of law is incidentally material (however necessary) in order to decide the question actually referred. If a question of law is specifically referred and it is evident that the\n\n8--8 SCT 'ND 182\n\n.BoseJ.\n\n1955 parties desire to have a decision from 'the arbitrator Seth Thawardas about that rather than one from the Courts, then the Pher;_mal Courts. will not interfere, though even there, there is Th• Union of India authonty for the view that the Coutts will interfere if it is apparent that the arbitrator has acted illegally\n\n80\"' J. in reaching his decision, that is to say, if he has decided on inadmissible evidence or on principles of construction that the law does not countenance or something of that nature. See the speech of Viscount Cave in Kelantan Government v. Duff Development Co.(') at page 409. But that is not a matter which arises in this case.\n\nThe law about this is, in our opinion, the same in England as here and the principles that govern this class of case have been reviewed at length and set out with clarity by the House of Lords in F. R.\n\nAbsalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village {iociety (') and in Kelantan Government v. Duff Development Co.('). In Durga Prasad v. Sewkishendas(') the Privy Council appHed the law expounded in A bsalom's case(') to India: see also Champsey Bhara & Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co.(') and Saleh Mohomed Umer Dossal v. Nathoornal Kessamal('). The wider language used by Lord Macnaghten in Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammad Hassan(\") had reference to the revisional powers of the High Court under the Civil Procedure Code and must be confined to the facts of that case where the question of law involved there namely limitation, was specifically referred. An arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or misapply it in order to do what he thinks is just and reasonable. He is a tribunal selected bv the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so is bound fo follow and apply the law, and if .he does not, he can be set right by the Courts provided his error appears on the face of the award. The single exception to this is when the parties choose specifically to refer a question of law as a separate and dis- . ' tmct matter.\n\n(I) [19231 A.C. 395.\n\n(3) 54 C W.N. 74.79.\n\n(5) 54 I.A. 427, 430.\n\n(2l [1933] A.C. 592.\n\n(4) 50 I.A. 324. 330 & 331.\n\n(6) 29 I.A. 51, 60.\n\nReference was made to a decision of this Court in 1955\n\nA_. M. Mair & Co. v. Gordhandass Sagarmul!(') where Seth Thawardas Fazl Ali, J. quoted a passage from Viscount Simon's Plterumal speech in Heyman V. Darwins Ltd. ('where the lear- The U11io~· of India ned Lord Chancellor (Viscount Simon) in turn quoted from Lord Dunedin in another case. It was argued on the basis of this that if you have to have recourse to the contract to establish your case, then the dispute must fall within the arbitration clause.\n\nThat is undeniable but it is not enough that the dispute should fall within the clause. It' is also necessary that the parties should define what the dispute is and agree to refer the dispute so set out and defined to arbitration, or,. if they do not, that the Court should compel them to do so: (see Lord Macmillan in Heyman's case(') just cited at pages 369 and 370). If, therefore, rio specific question of law is referred, either by agreement or by compulsion, the decision of the arbitrator on that is not final however mueh it may be within his jurisdiction, and indeed essential, for him to decide the question incidentally. Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Wright were both in the earlier case, F. R. A bsafon Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Vi11age Society ('); as well as in Heyman's case(') and they would have pointed to any distinction had there been a likelihood of conflict; but in fact there is none and we do not read Fazl Ali J.'s judgment as a decision to . the contrary.\n\nWe have next to see w1i.ether the arbitrator was specifically asked to construe clause 6 of the contract or any part of the contract, or whether any question of law was specifica11y referred. We stress the word \"specifically\" because parties who make a reference to arbitration have the right to insist that the tribunal of their choice shall decide their dispute according to law, so before the right can be denied to them in any particular matter. the Court must be very sure that both sides wanted the decision of the arbitrator on a point of law rather than that of the Courts and that they wanted his decision on that point to be final.\n\n(J) 1950 S.C.R. 792 at 798. 12) 1942 A.C. 356 at 368. (3) 1933 A.C. 592.\n\nBoseJ.\n\nSeslt Thawardas Pherumal v.\n\nThe Union of India\n\nBoseJ\n\nThe clause in the contract that requires disputes about the contract to be referred to arbitration is clause 14 and is in the following terms:\n\n\"Except where otherwise provided in the contract all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specification and instructions hereinbefore mentioned and as to quality of materials or as to any other question, claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the contract, specification, instructions, orders or these conditions, or otherwise concerning the supplies whether arising during the progress of delivery or after the completion of abandonment thereof shall be referred to the arbitration of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle for the time being in the manner provided by law relating to arbitration for the time being in force who after such investigation as he may think proper shall deliver his award which shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the contract\".\n\nThe dispute sprang out of a series of claims made in a number of letters written by the contractor to the Additional Chief Engineer, C.P.W.D. and culminated in a petition, Ex. B(l), in which the contractor summarised his claims. The document is not dated.\n\nOn receipt of this, someone on behalf of the C.P.W.D. invoked the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. That letter has not been filed. The arbitrator then wrote .to the contractor and asked him to submit a statement of claim. That letter has not been filed either but reference is made to it in Ex. C(l), the statement of claim which the contractor filed in response to that letter. As the material documents setting out the terms of reference are not here, we were asked by both sides to infer what the terms were from this statement of claim and the recitals in the award. The learned counsel for the contractor relied on the following: In the statement of claim--\n\n\" Item 5.-Loss of katcha bricks ...... Rs. 75,900.\n\nThe chief reason of the destruction of these hricks was the failure of the depa.rtment to lift the\n\nmonthly quota of bricks ...... The argument of the de- 1955 partment that they are not liable to \\:!Ompensate us Se111 Thawardas On this account because Of clause 6 Of the agreement Plieruma/ . IS not correct.\n\nTile U11io11 of J11dia Clause 6 refers to only such cases over whih Bose J. the department has no control. But if the department would have lifted the bricks (this was entirely under their control) then no such loss would have occurred. Also be it noted that clause 6 refers only to 'damage' and not to 'destruction' .................. Damage\n\nmeans~ only partial loss ........... .it cannot mean total destructibn\". The award states-\n\n\"The statement of claims sulnn; tted by the contractor contains seventeen items in respect of which the contractor claimed a total payment of Rs. 4, 76,138-12-0 plus interest ... , ....... .i.e., approximate total amount claimed: Rs. 5,03,803-12-0 as detailed below\".\n\nThen follow the seventeen items of which item 5 is-\n\n\"Payment for katcha bricks destroyed by rain: Rs. 75,900\".\n\nThe body of the award deals with this as follows:\n\n\" Claim No. 5 Payment for 88 lacs of katcha bri:::ks destroyed by rain.\n\nThe contractor argued etc ........... .\n\nThe Executive Engineer stated ... _. ........ The C.P.W.D. moreover were safeguarded by clause 6 of the contract. ...................... .\n\nThe contractor maintained that clause 6 of the contract could not be invoked when the department was at fault as in this case. Clause 6 was meant to cover contingencies which were not of the department\" s own making. I hold that the removal of the bricks in such a manner or to prevent accumulation in excess of 60 lacs was an implied contractual obligation on the part of the C.P.W.D ..................... .I further hold that the C.P.W.D. cannot take shelter hehind clause 6 of the contract. This clause is not. in my opinion. meant\n\nJY55 to absolve the department from carrying ou~ their Seth Jhawardas part of the contract. It is impossible not to admit Phmmwl this without offending the rudiments of common sense v. . \" The Union ef India reason1ng .\n\nBoseJ.\n\nWe are of opinion that this is not the kind of specific reference on a point of law that the law of arbitrntion requires. In the first place, what was shown to us is no reference at all. It is only an incidental matter introduced by the Dominion Government to repel the claim made by the contractor in general terms under claim No. 5. In the next place, this was the submission of the contractor alone. A reference rc4uires the assent of both sides. If one side is not prepared to submit a given matter to arbitration when there is an agreement between them that it should be referred. then recourse must be had to the Court under section\n\n20 of the Act and the recalcitrant party can then be compelled to submit the matter under sub-section (4).\n\nIn the absence of either, agreement by horh sides about the terms of reference, or an order of the Court under section 20(4) compelling a reference, the arbitrator is not vested with the necessary exclusive jurisdiction.\n\nTherefore, when a question of law is the point at issue, unless both sides specifically agree to refer it and agree to be bound by the arbitrator's decision, the jurisdiction of the Courts to set an arbitration right when the error js apparent on the face of the award is 'lot ousted. The mere fact that both parties submit incidental arguments about a point of law in the course of the proceedings is not enough. The language of Lord Wright in F. R. A bsalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society ('), a case similar to this so far as this point is concerned, is apposite here-\n\n\"There is here no.submission of any specific question of law as such and as a specific question of law; no doubt incidentally, and indeed necessarily, the arbitrator will have to decide some questions on the construction of the building contract, but the two\n\nmatters submitted\"are both composite questions of Jaw and fact: there is no express submission of the\n\n(I) [1933) A.C. 592, 616.\n\ntrue effect of the contrnct on the basis of undis- 1955 puted facts, as in the Kelantan case(') or as a separate Seth Thawardas and distinct matter on facts to be separately assumed Phe~'.mal or found, as in In re King and D11vee11(') .................. The U11io11 of India The arbitrator was not being asked simply and specinoseJ. fically to decide, upon some agreed or assumed basis of fact. the true interpretation of either clause 26 or clause 30 of the conditions or of both together; he was being required to make an award on the two matters submitted on whatever questions of fact and law might emerge\".\n\nClause 32 of the contract in the House of Lords case was the equivalent of clause 14 in ours. It ran--\n\n\"Provided always that in case any dispute or difference shall arise ............... as to the construction of the contract or as to any matter or thing arising thereunder ......... such dispute shall be and is hereby referred to the arbitration and final decision of etc.'' The arbitrator relied on that to invest him with jurisdiction to determine, as a matter of law, the construction of clauses 26-30 of that contract. The House of Lords held that in the absence of a specific reference about the construction of the contract the jurisdiction of the Courts was not taken away. Lord Russell of Killowen put it this way at page 610-\n\n'No specific question of construction or of law\n\nwa~ submitted. The parties had, however, been ordered to deliver pleadings. and by their statement of claim the contractor had claimed th~t the arbitrator should under his powers revise the last certificate issued etc ................... It is at this point that the question of the construction 0f condition 30 arose as a question of law. not specifically suhmittcd, but material in the decision of the matters which had been submitted. This q11estion of law the arbitrator has decided; but if upon the face of the award he has decided it wrongly his decision is, in my opinion. open to review by the Court\".\n\nThat is exactly the position here.\n\nSimply because the matter was referred to incidentally in the plead-\n\n(1) [19231 A.C. 395.\n\n(2) [1913) 2 K.B. 32, 36,\n\n1955 ings and arguments . in support of, or against, the Seth Thawbrdas general issue about liability for damages, that is l}Ot\n\nPhemmal enough to clothe the arbitrator with exclusive juris- T/re Unio~· of India diction on a point of law.\n\nnoseJ.\n\nThe next question is whether the error is apparent on the face of the award. That, in our opinion, is clear from the passages we have quoted from the award.\n\nWe hold that clause 6 ex; pressly relieves the Union Government of all liability under this head of claim and that the arbitrator was wrong in awarding any sum on that account.\n\nThe next head in dispute is item No. 8 in the statement of claim:\n\n\"Cost of additional wages paid to the coolies on account of non-supply of ration and cloth-Rs. 51,495\".\n\nHere again no specific question of law was referred, so all we have to see is whether there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award.\n\nThe contractor put his case as , follows in the statement of claim:\n\n\"At the time when this work was allotted to us there was rationing system in the locality. As per conditions of contract we were bound not to employ local labour and we had to imnort coolies from far olT places. We had in ouF employ about 1800 coolies and it was an impossibility to arrange their ration from open market. This difficulty was brought to the notice of the authorities concerned, and they promised us to supply ration. It was only after this promise tha.t we signed the agreement. ........ From a perusal of these letters it is clear that the department promised us to supply ration .. .... These circumstantial evidences are sufficient enough to show\" that there was a mutual understanding between the parties that ration will be supplied. In the eyes of law even circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that such a promise was made. Any breach of that promise makes the department legally liable to compensate for that loss ...... Apart froin the legal responsibility it was also a moral responsibility for the department to supply ration\".\n\nThis claim, therefore, was not grounded on any clause 1955 of the contract, nor was it said to be implied in the Seth Thawardas contract. What was relied on was a collateral pro- Pherumal mise evidenced, not by the contract, but by two The U11io~; of India\\ letters written by \"the. department\" and a promise BoseJ. by \"the authorities concerned\"; and later this promise is tnrned into a \"mutual understanding\" and to a \"moral responsibility\" in addition to a legal one.\n\nThe arbitrator dealt with this as follows. He began by saying-\n\n\"The contractor his tender on 25-9-45 that the department arrangements. etc.''\n\nstated that when he submitted he did so in the hona fide belief would make the necessary\n\nThen he sets out the following dates. On 1-11-45 the contractor was told that his tender had been accepted.\n\nOn 9-11-45 the contractor \"warned\" the Executive Engineer about his \"immediate requirements in respect of rations\". The contract was finally accepted and signed on 22-11-45.\n\nNow it is admitted that the contract contains no ciause about rations and it is also evident that the question was not raised when the tender was accepted on behalf of the Dominion Government. The question was raised in a letter to the Executive Engineer and the contractor si!:!ned the contract without waiting for a reply. ,\n\nIt is well settled that governments can onlv he bound by contracts that are entered into in a parti· cular wav and which are signed by the proper auth0rit v. A reference to the agreement. Ex.\n\nAO), will show that it was accented on behalf of the Dominion Government by the Additional Chief Fn.iiineer and not\n\nbY an Executive Engineer. A letter written to the Executive En!!:ineer would therefore have no effect and even if it he assumed that the letter was forwarded to the Addition::il Chief Enl!ineer for consideration, what does it amount to? A tender embodvinl!\n\ncertain terms is suhmitted and is accented on 1-11-4\".\n\nB0th sides are a.l!reed on all matters' contained ih it and their conduct shows that hoth side~ indic::iterl thCit the contract should be reduced to writing. Re-\n\n9-8 SCIIND'82\n\n1955 fore the agreement is signed, one party wants to in- S•th Thawardas elude a further condition in the contract. We will Pherumal assume that the requet was made to the other con-\n\nTh< Unio~· of India tr acting party. But without wailing fo~ the assent\n\nBose J~ of the other side, both sides accept and sign the contract as it existed before the fresh suggestion was made.\n\nIt is an error in law to dednce from this that there was acceptance ofl the fresh proposal. On the contrary. the legal conclusion is that the new suggestion was dropped and that the contractor was content to accept the contract as it was without this condition.\n\nIn any case, a person cannot be bound by a one-sided offer which is never accepted, particularly when the parties intend that the contract should be reduced to writing. That is the whole point of insisting on a document. It excludes speculation as to what was and what was not agreed to however much the matter might have been raised by one of the partie~ durng the stage of negotiation.\n\nThe arbitrator continues that the contractor stated that-\n\n\"it was a well known and established fact that Sindri was a rationed area; that the C.P.W.D. were giving rations at controlled rates to their employees and contractors through arrangements with the Joe~ I Ci•.1il Supply Authorities; that nobody working under the C.P.W.D. was allowed to make independent arrangements or approach the Civil Supply Authorities direct\"\n\nand the contractor contended that the verv fact that he tendered such low rates showed that he exvected to supply his labourers with rations at controlled rates.\n\nThe arbitrator then sets out some more of the c0111ractor's contentions and from them concludes that\n\n\"there was an implied contractual obligation for the C.P.W.D. to make available controlled rations to the contractor and that this obligation '.\\'as not fulfillecl with due diligence and care\".\n\nHe accordingly awarded Rs. 40.000 as compensation under this head.\n\nThe error is apparent. Facts must he based either on evidence or on admissions; they cannot be found to\n\nexist from a mere contention by one side especially 1955 when they are expressly denied by the other. The Seth Thawardas inference from the facts stated above is th&~ the con- Pherumal tractor entered into the agreement with his eyes open The Unio~· of India and whatever his one-sided hopes may have been he was content to enter into the agreement as it stood without binding the other side to the uew conditions and without even waiting to ascertain the reaction of the other side to his further proposals.\n\nIt has to be remembered that rationing was not a 111atter that was under the direction and control of the Dominion Government. It was a local matter handled by the then Provincial authorities and under their direction and control. The C.P.W.D.; as a. department of the Dominion Government, was not concerned with rationing except that its employees had to submit to rationing like everybody else in the Sindri\n\narea. This confusion between the Dominion Government and the Provincial Government occurs in the arbitrator's opening sentence under this head where he sets out the contractor's contention that\n\n\"commodities such as rations and cloth which were absolutelv essential for the maintenance of his labourers and i1hich 11erl:' unda Govemml:'nt control\".\n\nAs the arbitrator bases solely on the ..::ontrator's contentions it is evident that he failed to appreciate the fact that the Dominion Government and the Provincial rationing authorities were separate entities distinct. from one another. The position accordingly reduces itself to this: two persons, neither of which is a part ot the Provincial Government or has any control over rationing. chose to enter into an agreement for work i-ri a rationed area. They insisted that their contract should be reduced to writing, and that indeed was essential, this being a contract with the Dominion Government which was incapable of contracting in any other way; they agreed upon and concluded all their terms; then. at the last minute, one side raised a point about rationing but without waiting for a repiy and without having the term entered in the ' contract. he <; igned the contract as it stood before the\n\npoint was raised even during the negotiation. It is\n\nBose!.\n\n\\ . 1955 an error in law to hold that any contractual obligation can be inferred or implied. from these .circum- Scth Thawardas\n\nPherunial stances.,:· ' : v.\n\nThen there is still another error~ If this implied .The Union.of India agreement about rations and cloth does not spring\\ 1 - out of the written contract but is to be inferred col- Bosc J. laterally as a distinct and subsidiary contract, and we gather that that is the finding, especially as reference was made to section 9 of the . Contract Act, then that is not a contract 'to which the arbitration clause can apply. . Wide though it is, clause 14 is confined to any matter relating to the written contract and if ration and cloth are not~ covered by the written contract, they are not matters that relate to it. If parties choose to add a fresh contract in addition to or in substitution for the old, then the. arbitration clause-cannot cover .the new contract. - See Lord l\\Iacmillan in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd.(') . .\n\nThe last item in dispute in this appeal is claim No. 17 about interest. The statement of claims sets out-_\n\n\"Item 17-Interest on the amount of money involved in this claim at the rate of Rs. 6 per cent.-· Rs. 27,6~5. ·. _ .\n\nThis work was finished in l\\Iay 1946 and it . was proper for the department to have decided all our claims at least by 31st December 1947 ....................... .\n\nBut this was not done ... Due to this a heavy amount remained blocked up and we were compelled to take money from our bankers on interest. \\Ve therefore pray for interest for '16 months from 1-1-48 to 31-4-49\". . .\n\nThe arbitrator held-\n\n\"The contractor's contention that his claims should have been settled by January l!J48 is, in my opinion, reasonable.\n\nI therefore award interest at 6% for 16 months on the total amount of the awards given i.e., Rs. 17,363\". _ Then the arbitrator sets out the amounts awarded under each head of claim. A perusal of them shows that each head relates to a claim for an unliquidated sum. The Interest Act, 1839 applies, as interest is\n\n(1) (1942] A.C. 35G at 371.\n\nnot otherwise payable by law in this kind of case (see J<Jss Bengal Nagpur Ry. Co. v. Ruttanji Rumji (')), but even Seth Tlzawartlas if it be assumed that an arbitrator is a \"court\" within Plzerumal the meaning of that Act, (a fact that by no means ap- Tlze U11io~· of India pears to be the case), the following among other condition:, must be fulfilled before interest can be awarded under the Act:-.\n\n(1) there must be a debt or a sum certain;\n\n(2) it must be payable at a certain lime or otherwise;\n\n(3) these debts or sums must be payable by virtue of some written contract at a certain time;\n\n(4) There must have been a demand in writing stating that interest will be demanded from the date . of the demand.\n\nNot one of these elements is present, so the arbitrator erred in law in thinking that he had the power to allow interest simply because he thought the der:pand was reasonable. '\n\nIt was suggested that at least interest from the date of \"suit\" could be awarded on the analogy of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. But section 34 does not apply because an arbitrator is not a \"court\" within the meaning of the Code nor does the Code apply to arbitrators, and, but for section 34, even\n\na Court would not have the power to give interest after the suit. This was. therefore. also rightly struck oat from the award.\n\nWe pause to note that there was only a delay of five days at the outside in the over-all picture. The last date for removal of the last instalment of bricks was 25-5-46 and the contractor says under this head that the whole contract was completed by the end of May, 1946. lt is difficult to see how 88 lacs of bricks could have been damaged by rain in the last five days of May, and if the damage occurred before it would have occurred anyway, for on the contractor's case he had to have a large stack of unbaked bricks on hand ready to enter the kilns in order to kcer race with his time tahle. However. that was a\n\n(1)651.A.66.\n\nBoseJ.\n\n1955 matter within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and is Seth Thawardas not matter in which the Courts can interfere.\n\nPherumal\n\nTh• Unio;· 0f Julia That concludes Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1953 and - ' we now turn to the other appeal, Civil Appeal No. 12 BoseJ. of 1954. Only two items are in dispute here. Heads 4 and 17 of the claim.\n\nThe overall pattern of the clai'm is the same as in the other case. 'fhere was a contractor and he entered into an agreement containing the same terms and conditions, except about the details of supply.\n\nIt was signed on the same day as the other and by the same authority on behalf of the Dominion Government, and the matter went before the same arbitrator and the award in this case was given on 1-5-1949, one week before the other award. Here also, no specific question of law was referred and we need not cover the same ground. Our decision is the same here as there.\n\nThe fourth head of claim is about cloth and rations. The claim here, and the Dominion Government's reply, is the same as in the other case, but the award in-this case is not based on an implied contractual obligation but on \"a moral and implied obligation\".\n\nThe error here is even greater than before.\n\nThe sum claimed was Rs. 51,495 and the amount awarded was Rs. 30,000.\n\nThe seventeenth head of claim was about intere; t. The contractoJ claimed Rs. 27,665 and the arbitrator awarded Rs. 9,954. There is the same error of law apparent on the face of the award.\n\n'The High Court was right in dismissing the claims made under the heads in dispute here. The two appeals fail and each is dismissed with costs in this Court.\n\nA ppea/s dismissed.", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "SETH THAW ARDAS PHERUMAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SETH THAW ARDAS PHERUMAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA, J.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Interest Act, 1839", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1022, "end_char": 1026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Interest Act, 1839", "statute": "Interest Act, 1839"}}, {"text": "Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1041, "end_char": 1059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1219, "end_char": 1236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The appellan;, a contractor, entered into a contract with the Dominion of India for the supply of bricks."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2104, "end_char": 2109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seth Thawa•das Quaere", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "54 C.W.N. 74 at 79, 50 I.A. 324 at 330 &\n\n331, 54 I.A. 427 at 430, 29 I.A. 51 at 60, 1942 A.C. 356 at 368 l'eferred to and 1950 S.C.R. 7.92 at 798, explained; 1955\n\nSeth Thawa•das Quaere: -Whether the courts will interfere when a question of Pheimal law is specifically referred if the arbitrator acts illegally in deciding The Unioi; of India it, such as deciding on inadmissible evidence or on principles of construction which the la\\Y does not countenance.", "canonical_name": "SETH THAW ARDAS PHERUMAL"}}, {"text": "Interest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3458, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Interest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3536, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3987, "end_char": 3991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar (S. P. Varma and M. M. Sinha, with him).", "canonical_name": "Mahabir Prasad"}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4784, "end_char": 4795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar (S. P. Varma and M. M. Sinha, with him)."}}, {"text": "M. M. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4800, "end_char": 4811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar (S. P. Varma and M. M. Sinha, with him)."}}, {"text": "Mahabir PrasaZ", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir PrasaZ dvocate-General for the State of Rihar (M. M. Sinha for R. C. Pmsad.", "canonical_name": "Mahabir Prasad"}}, {"text": "Sith Tha-.JJardas\n\nl'hcrlunal\n\n G. K._ Daphtary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5027, "end_char": 5074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sith Tha-.JJardas\n\nl'hcrlunal\n\n G. K._ Daphtary, Solicito}-General fo~>lndia (Porus A •. ~JJfehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent (In both the Appeals). - ·-"}}, {"text": "~JJfehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5116, "end_char": 5124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sith Tha-.JJardas\n\nl'hcrlunal\n\n G. K._ Daphtary, Solicito}-General fo~>lndia (Porus A •. ~JJfehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent (In both the Appeals). - ·-"}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5129, "end_char": 5142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sith Tha-.JJardas\n\nl'hcrlunal\n\n G. K._ Daphtary, Solicito}-General fo~>lndia (Porus A •. ~JJfehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent (In both the Appeals). - ·-"}}, {"text": "Dominion of -India through", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5683, "end_char": 5709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant before us, whomit will be convenient to call the contractor, entered into a contract with the Dominion of -India through an Additional Chief Engineer of the C.P. \\V.D. on l-ll-1945 for the supply of bricks to the C.P.\\V.D., a department of the Dominion Government."}}, {"text": "Clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "21-1-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6116, "end_char": 6125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, there was a reference on 21-1-1949 and an award followed on 8-5-l!l49."}}, {"text": "8-5-l!l49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6151, "end_char": 6160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, there was a reference on 21-1-1949 and an award followed on 8-5-l!l49."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6195, "end_char": 6221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, and the contractor prayed that it be accepted and that a decree be passed in terms of it."}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6359, "end_char": 6369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6377, "end_char": 6398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6558, "end_char": 6571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "18-3-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6632, "end_char": 6641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contractor's application was registered as a suit under section 20(2) of the Act and a decree was passed in terms of the award on 18-3-1950. -"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6703, "end_char": 6717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that time the Constitution had come into force and the Union of India replaced the Dominion of India as a defendant."}}, {"text": "25-5-46", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7574, "end_char": 7581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contract was for the supply of 2} crores of pucca bricks which had to be delivered according to the followil)g schedule-\n\n30 lacs by 25-1-46\n\n50 lacs by 25-2-46 55 lacs by 25-3-46 55 lacs by 25-4-46 60 la'cs by 25-5-46."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9295, "end_char": 9300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First it contended that the katcha bricks formed no\n\npart of the contract and even if it w:1s at fault in not\n\n/955 taking delivery of the burnt bricks in time all that it\n\nSetlr T!rawarda; could be held liable for would be for breach of that\n\nPlrer:_mat contract; and said that the Joss that was occasioned by\n\nThe Union 'If India the damage caused to the katcha bricks which formed\n\nB7'seJ. no part of the contract was too remote."}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9692, "end_char": 9700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seth Thawardas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11291, "end_char": 11305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contractor had a duty under section 73 of the l955 Contract Act to minimise the loss, accordingly he would Seth Thawardas have had the right to remove the bricks himself and Pherumat stack them elsewhere and claim compensation for the The Unio~· of India loss so occasioned; and indeed two of his heads of claim (not in dispute here) relate to that.", "canonical_name": "SETH THAW ARDAS PHERUMAL"}}, {"text": "Pherumat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11358, "end_char": 11366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contractor had a duty under section 73 of the l955 Contract Act to minimise the loss, accordingly he would Seth Thawardas have had the right to remove the bricks himself and Pherumat stack them elsewhere and claim compensation for the The Unio~· of India loss so occasioned; and indeed two of his heads of claim (not in dispute here) relate to that."}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12267, "end_char": 12277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12425, "end_char": 12433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12743, "end_char": 12756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viscount Cave", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13933, "end_char": 13946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See the speech of Viscount Cave in Kelantan Government v. Duff Development Co.(') at page 409."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14114, "end_char": 14121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law about this is, in our opinion, the same in England as here and the principles that govern this class of case have been reviewed at length and set out with clarity by the House of Lords in F. R.\n\nAbsalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village {iociety (') and in Kelantan Government v. Duff Development Co.(')."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14662, "end_char": 14672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The wider language used by Lord Macnaghten in Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammad Hassan(\") had reference to the revisional powers of the High Court under the Civil Procedure Code and must be confined to the facts of that case where the question of law involved there namely limitation, was specifically referred."}}, {"text": "Seth Thawardas Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15684, "end_char": 15707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Seth Thawardas Fazl Ali, J. quoted a passage from Viscount Simon's Plterumal speech in Heyman V. Darwins Ltd. ('where the lear- The U11io~· of India ned Lord Chancellor (Viscount Simon) in turn quoted from Lord Dunedin in another case.", "canonical_name": "SETH THAW ARDAS PHERUMAL"}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15734, "end_char": 15748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Seth Thawardas Fazl Ali, J. quoted a passage from Viscount Simon's Plterumal speech in Heyman V. Darwins Ltd. ('where the lear- The U11io~· of India ned Lord Chancellor (Viscount Simon) in turn quoted from Lord Dunedin in another case."}}, {"text": "Heyman V. Darwins Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15771, "end_char": 15793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Seth Thawardas Fazl Ali, J. quoted a passage from Viscount Simon's Plterumal speech in Heyman V. Darwins Ltd. ('where the lear- The U11io~· of India ned Lord Chancellor (Viscount Simon) in turn quoted from Lord Dunedin in another case."}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15895, "end_char": 15902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Seth Thawardas Fazl Ali, J. quoted a passage from Viscount Simon's Plterumal speech in Heyman V. Darwins Ltd. ('where the lear- The U11io~· of India ned Lord Chancellor (Viscount Simon) in turn quoted from Lord Dunedin in another case."}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16394, "end_char": 16403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if they do not, that the Court should compel them to do so: (see Lord Macmillan in Heyman's case(') just cited at pages 369 and 370)."}}, {"text": "Heyman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16407, "end_char": 16413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if they do not, that the Court should compel them to do so: (see Lord Macmillan in Heyman's case(') just cited at pages 369 and 370)."}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16725, "end_char": 16732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Wright were both in the earlier case, F. R. A bsafon Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Vi11age Society ('); as well as in Heyman's case(') and they would have pointed to any distinction had there been a likelihood of conflict; but in fact there is none and we do not read Fazl Ali J.'s judgment as a decision to ."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16754, "end_char": 16760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Wright were both in the earlier case, F. R. A bsafon Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Vi11age Society ('); as well as in Heyman's case(') and they would have pointed to any distinction had there been a likelihood of conflict; but in fact there is none and we do not read Fazl Ali J.'s judgment as a decision to ."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17030, "end_char": 17038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Wright were both in the earlier case, F. R. A bsafon Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Vi11age Society ('); as well as in Heyman's case(') and they would have pointed to any distinction had there been a likelihood of conflict; but in fact there is none and we do not read Fazl Ali J.'s judgment as a decision to ."}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17167, "end_char": 17175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17970, "end_char": 17979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20084, "end_char": 20092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20162, "end_char": 20170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20398, "end_char": 20406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21210, "end_char": 21218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21293, "end_char": 21301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21389, "end_char": 21397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21730, "end_char": 21738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22658, "end_char": 22669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22886, "end_char": 22899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24412, "end_char": 24421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24425, "end_char": 24434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24596, "end_char": 24605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24671, "end_char": 24680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Killowen", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25296, "end_char": 25304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Russell of Killowen put it this way at page 610-\n\n'No specific question of construction or of law\n\nwa~ submitted."}}, {"text": "Seth Thawbrdas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26207, "end_char": 26221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in support of, or against, the Seth Thawbrdas general issue about liability for damages, that is l}Ot\n\nPhemmal enough to clothe the arbitrator with exclusive juris- T/re Unio~· of India diction on a point of law.", "canonical_name": "SETH THAW ARDAS PHERUMAL"}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26569, "end_char": 26577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 1955", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28234, "end_char": 28245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25-9-45", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28753, "end_char": 28760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He began by saying-\n\n\"The contractor his tender on 25-9-45 that the department arrangements."}}, {"text": "1-11-45", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28934, "end_char": 28941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1-11-45 the contractor was told that his tender had been accepted."}}, {"text": "9-11-45", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29005, "end_char": 29012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9-11-45 the contractor \"warned\" the Executive Engineer about his \"immediate requirements in respect of rations\"."}}, {"text": "22-11-45", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29166, "end_char": 29174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contract was finally accepted and signed on 22-11-45."}}, {"text": "Sindri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31442, "end_char": 31448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arbitrator continues that the contractor stated that-\n\n\"it was a well known and established fact that Sindri was a rationed area; that the C.P.W.D. were giving rations at controlled rates to their employees and contractors through arrangements with the Joe~ I Ci•.1il Supply Authorities; that nobody working under the C.P.W.D. was allowed to make independent arrangements or approach the Civil Supply Authorities direct\"\n\nand the contractor contended that the verv fact that he tendered such low rates showed that he exvected to supply his labourers with rations at controlled rates."}}, {"text": "C.P.W.D.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31479, "end_char": 31487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arbitrator continues that the contractor stated that-\n\n\"it was a well known and established fact that Sindri was a rationed area; that the C.P.W.D. were giving rations at controlled rates to their employees and contractors through arrangements with the Joe~ I Ci•.1il Supply Authorities; that nobody working under the C.P.W.D. was allowed to make independent arrangements or approach the Civil Supply Authorities direct\"\n\nand the contractor contended that the verv fact that he tendered such low rates showed that he exvected to supply his labourers with rations at controlled rates."}}, {"text": "Dominion Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33174, "end_char": 33193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C.P.W.D.; as a. department of the Dominion Government, was not concerned with rationing except that its employees had to submit to rationing like everybody else in the Sindri\n\narea."}}, {"text": "Union.of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34846, "end_char": 34860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThen there is still another error~ If this implied .The Union.of India agreement about rations and cloth does not spring\\ 1 - out of the written contract but is to be inferred col- Bosc J. laterally as a distinct and subsidiary contract, and we gather that that is the finding, especially as reference was made to section 9 of the ."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35104, "end_char": 35113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35230, "end_char": 35239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-1-48", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36193, "end_char": 36199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Ve therefore pray for interest for '16 months from 1-1-48 to 31-4-49\". . ."}}, {"text": "31-4-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36203, "end_char": 36210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Ve therefore pray for interest for '16 months from 1-1-48 to 31-4-49\". . ."}}, {"text": "Interest Act, 1839", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36629, "end_char": 36647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Seth Tlzawartlas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36818, "end_char": 36834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. v. Ruttanji Rumji (')), but even Seth Tlzawartlas if it be assumed that an arbitrator is a \"court\" within Plzerumal the meaning of that Act, (a fact that by no means ap- Tlze U11io~· of India pears to be the case), the following among other condition:, must be fulfilled before interest can be awarded under the Act:-.", "canonical_name": "SETH THAW ARDAS PHERUMAL"}}, {"text": "Plzerumal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36891, "end_char": 36900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. v. Ruttanji Rumji (')), but even Seth Tlzawartlas if it be assumed that an arbitrator is a \"court\" within Plzerumal the meaning of that Act, (a fact that by no means ap- Tlze U11io~· of India pears to be the case), the following among other condition:, must be fulfilled before interest can be awarded under the Act:-."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37694, "end_char": 37704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37712, "end_char": 37738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37744, "end_char": 37754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "statute": "the Civil Procedure Code, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37893, "end_char": 37903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "statute": "the Civil Procedure Code, 1908"}}, {"text": "1-5-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39416, "end_char": 39424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was signed on the same day as the other and by the same authority on behalf of the Dominion Government, and the matter went before the same arbitrator and the award in this case was given on 1-5-1949, one week before the other award."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_509_517_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nMESSRS MOHANLAL HARGOVIND DAS,\n\nBID! MERCHANTS, JABALPUR (M.P.) v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH &\n\nANOTHER.\n\n[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, }AGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, }AFF..R IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India-Art. 286(2)-Central Provinces and Berar Sa!es Ta:r Act, 1947 (XX/ of 1947), sA(6)-Petitioners- Bidi merchants of Madhya Pradesh-Importing tobacco from the State of Bombay-Whether mch transactions. of sales of goods-Affected by the ban under Art. 286(2) of the Constitution-Petitioners registered\n\n111 \"dealers\" under Central Provinces and Berar Sales Ta:r Act, 1947 and dealers in Bombay selling or supplying tobacco to the petitioners also registered as \"dealers\" under Central Provinces and Berar Sales Ta:r Act, 1947-Whether makes the transactions as intra-State transactions between two registered dealers in the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe petitioners arc carrying on business on a very large scale of making and selling bidis having their head office in Jabalpur in the State of Madhya Pradesh and arc registered as \"dealer\" for the purposes of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. In the course of their said business, the petitioners import tobacco from the State of Bombay in very large quantities after it is blended in that State by the veridors with various other types of indigenous tobacco by an elaborate process.\n\nThis finished tobacco, after its import within the State of Madhya Pradesh is rolled into bidis which arc exported to various other States, largely to the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nThe dealers in the State of Uttar Pradesh and sur.h other States who buy bidis from the petitioners sell the same to various other dealers and 'onsumers in those States.\n\nThe Sales Tax authorities in the State of Madhya Prndesh required the petitioners under threat of criminal prosecution to file a statement of return of the total purchases of tobacco made by them out of Madhya Pradesh and delivered to them in Madhya Pradesh with a view to assess and levy purhase tax on the transa.:tions of purchases made by the petitioners as stated above.\n\nHeld, that the State of Madhya Pradesh had no authority to impose or to authorise the imposition of such a tax and that the action of the State authorities contravened the provisions of Art. 286(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as the transactions in question were in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :is the finished tobacco which was supplied to the petitioners moved from the State of Bombay to the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nM11w1 Molw&lal\n\nHorgorind Da1, Bidi M1rdonls, Jab<l/Jfll (M.P.)\n\nTNSl.Uof Ma4Ji1• \"\"\"'\"° \"\"\"·-·\n\nThe contention that not only the petitioners were the register~. ed dealers under Ruic 8 of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Rules, 1947 but the dealers in Bombay who sell or supply tobacco to them were registered as \"dealers\" for the purpose of the Central Provinces and Bcrar Sales Tax Act, 1947 and therefore the transactions were between two registered dealers in the St.ate of Madhya Pradesh and thus constituted purely internal sales of the goods was without force because what one has to look at is the real narurc of the transactions and not the outside form and as the tn.nt~ actions in dispute invo}vcd movement of the goods across the border they were clearly tranctions of sales of goods in the course of intu State trade or commerce and were hit by the ban under ArL 286(2) of the Constitution.\n\nOatGINAL Juuso1cnoN : Petition No. 67 of. 1955.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-Genoral of India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G.\n\nPathak_, (!. B. Dadachanji, A. P. Sen, Rameshtuar Nath .and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the petitioners.\n\nT. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (M. Adhikari and /. N. Shroff, with him), for the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\n1955.\n\nSeptember, 20.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was ddi vered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-The pet1t1oners are a firm carrying on business on a very large scale of making and selling bidis having their head office in Jabalpur in the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThey are registered as \"dealer\" for the purpose of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947.\n\nIn the course of their said busines, the petitioners import tobacco from the State of Bombay in very large quantities after it is blended in that State by the vendors with various other types of indigenous tobacco by an elaborate process.\n\nThis finished tobacco, after its imnort within the State of Madhya Pradesh is rolled into hidis which are exported to various other States, largely to the State of Uttar Pr.1rlesh.\n\nThe rk:ikrs in the Statr: of Uttar Pradesh\n\n' -.:.\n\n-• 1\n\nand such other States who buy bidis from the petitioners sell the same to various other dealers and consumers in those States.\n\nThe Sales Tax authorities in the State of Madhya Pradesh required the petitioners under threat of criminal prosecution to file a statement of return of the total purchases of tobacco made by them out of Madhya Pradesh and delivered to them in Madhya Pradesh with a view to assess and levy purchase tu on the transactions of purchases made by the petitioners as above.\n\nThe petitioners filed under protest two returns dated the 11th September 1954 and 3rd December 1954 for the periods 3rd May 1954 to 29th\n\nJuly 1954 and 30th July 1954 to 26th October 1954 respectively but without prejudice to their right to challenge the validity of the assessment and levy of the said tax on the aforesaid transactions.\n\nThe Sales Tax authorities further called upon the petitioners to deposit the alleged purchase tax which amounts to thou5ands of rupees in every quarter of the year.\n\nThe petitioners thereupon filed this petition under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus or any appropriate direction or order seeking to restrain the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, from enforcing the said Act and its provisions against the petitioners and for consequential reliefs. The petitioners averred that the imposition of tax on sale or purchase of tobacco rolled into bidis exported out of Madhya Pradesh in the manner described was in contravention of article 286(1) (a) of the Constitution, that the tobacco purchased by them for the purpose of making bidis exported outside Madhya Pradesh was never intended for use as raw material for the making of bidis for the purpose of consumption in Madhya Pradesh and section 4, sub-section (6) of the Act had no application to the tobacco so used and there was no liability to pay the alleged tax and that to the best of the petitioners' information tobacco had not been notified hy the State Government in the Gazette for the puq1o<:c of section 12( A) of the Act\n\nhl1ur1 Mohan/al\n\nH1W.fni1UI Das, lliJi Mntllanb,\n\n,....(M.P.) ..\n\nTh181.t1of l'wld1JJ •...nn. .......,.,.\n\nM1ssrs Moftanlal\n\nHargooind Das, Bi!fi Merci.ants, Jab•lpur {M.P.J v.\n\nThe Stat• of Madlr!a Prad4sh\n\nand anotha\n\nand that the Sales Tax authorities, under the Act. were, therefore, not entitled to levy any tax on the petitioners.\n\nThe petitioners also submitted that the transactions in question had taken place in the course of inter-State commerce, that the State of Madhya Pradesh had no authority to impose or to authorise the imposition of such a tax and that the action of the State authorities contravened the provisions of article 286(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe Respondents filed a return denying the contentions of the petitioners and submitted that the petitioners by purchasing tobacco which was entered in their registration certificate as raw material for the manufacture of bidis for sale by actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for consumption in that State made themselves liable to pay the tax by exporting bidis to other States and thus utilising it for a different purpose under section 4(6) of the Act.\n\nThey admitted that the petitioners imported tobacco from the State of Bombay in large quantities but stated that the tobacco, after its arrival in the petitioners' bidi factories, was cleaned, sieved and blended A few more facts relevant for the decision of this petition may be stated in this context.\n\nNot only the petitioners but also the dealers in Bombay who sell or supply tobacco to the petitioners are registered as\n\n\"dealers\" for the purpose of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947.\n\nThe petitioners are the holders of a certificate of registration, No. LDG 53 obtained by them under Rule 8 of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Rules, 1947. When making purchases of the tobacco in question they also made declarations in the form required by Rule 26(II) declaring that they had purchased the said goods from Shri Shah Chhaganlal Ugarchand Nipani, a dealer holding registration certificate No.\n\nBlv!Y /93- MP and from Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda, a dealer holding registration certificate No. BMY/341- MP on different dates therein mentioned for use as raw material in the manufacture of goods for sale by actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for the purpose .of consumption in that State.\n\nIn the return which\n\nwas filed by the petitioners for the quarter beginning from 3rd May 1954 and ending with 29th July 1954, the petitioners mentioned Rs. 16,47,567-3-3 as the purchase price of goods purchased on declaration as being goods specified in the registration certificate :is inten<led for use as raw material in the manufacture of goods for sale by actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption in that State but utilisc<l for any other purpose.\n\nIn the return which was filed by them for the quarter beginning from 27th July 1954 and ending with 26th October 1954, they di<l not fill in any figure but showed the ahove item as blank contending that the Sales Tax authorities were not entitled to levy any purchase tax against them in respect of the same.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General appearing for the pet1t10ners before us contended ( 1) that the transactiom in question were in the course of inter-State commerce and were, therefore, within the ban of article 286(2) and the State of Madhya Pradesh had no authority to impose or to authorise imposition of tax on these transactions, (2) that in any event the goods were delivered for consumption in the State of Ut'.:ar Pradesh and were not liable to a levy of tax at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh,\n\n(3) that, section 4(6) of the Act was invalid inasmuch as it offended against the provisions of article 286(1) (a), and lastly ( 4) that even if the above contentions were negatived, section 4(6) of the Act had, on its true constructioil, no application to the facts of the present case.\n\nHe, however, urged that if the Court was with him 0'.1 his first contention, viz., that the transactions in question took place in the course of inter- State commerce it was not necessary to go into the other contentions.\n\nWe are of the opinion that this contention of the learned Attorney-General i~; sound.\n\nIt was in fa::t admitted by the RespoPdents in their return that the petitioners imported tobacco from the State of Bombay in large quantities.\n\nThe Bombay suppliers processed tobacco in their go<lowns situated within the State of Bombay and supplied the finished tobacco\n\nMes, rs Moha1Jlal Hargovind Das, Bidi Merchant.r, Jabalpur (M. 1-'.)\n\nThe StaU of Madhya Pradtsh\n\nand anolM1.\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nMmn Mohatrlal HMtouitul Da.i, Bidi Mmlumll, Jaolp (M.P.) v.\n\nTlw8\"'*•/ M~Proi<d \"\"'.,,.,,,.,,\n\n~.,.,.,, ].\n\nto the petitioners in Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe petitioners imported this finished tobacco into Madhya Pradesh from these suppliers who were carrying on business in the State of Bombay and there was of necessity, as a result of these transactions, the mOTement of the goods across the border.\n\nAs a result of the transactions entered into by the petitioners with these suppliers the finished tobacco which was supplied to the petitioners moved from the State of Bombay to the State of Madhya Pradesh and these traru> actions were, therefore, in the course of inter-State trade or commerc(.\n\nThe only answer which was made by the learned Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh was that Shri Shah Chhaganlal Ugarchand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal B:!toda were themselves dealers holding registration certificates Nos. BMY /93/MP and BMY / 341-MP being registered as such under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and that, therefore, the transactions were between two registered dealers in the State of Madhya Pradesh and therefore constituted purely internal sales of the goods.\n\nIf they were thus internal sales there was no question of their being transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and therefore they were not subject to the ban imposed under article 286(2).\n\nThis answer suffers from over-simplification. No doubt, the dealers who supplied the finished tobacc0o to the petitioners were registered dealers under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, but that fact by itself would not be sufficient to invest the transactions which otherwise were in the course of inter-State trade or commerce with the character of intra-State transactions or internal sales or purchases.\n\nWhat one has got to look at is the real namre of the transactions and not the outside form. A person who carries on business of selling or supplying goods in Madhya Pradesh and who comes within the definition of \"dealers\" given in section 2(c) of the Act has, under pain of penalty visited upon him uncler section 24 of the Act, to register himself as a dealer\n\nand possess a registration certificate under section 8(1) of the Act.\n\nMerely because he got himself registered as such to avoid the penalty which would otherwise be visited upon him by the State it cannot be stated that whatever transactions he entered into with other dealers in the State of Madhya Pradesh were all intra- State transactions or internal sales or purchases irres.- pcctive of the fact that the transactions involved movement of the good51, across the border and were clearly transactions of sale of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, We were taken by the learned Attorney-General through the several provi• sions of the Act and we arc confirmed in our opinion that these transactions sought to be taxed by the Sales Tax authorities of the State of Madhya Pradesh were transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nThe activities of selling or supplying goods in Madhya Pradesh if carried on habitually would amount to a carrying on of the business of selling or supplying goods in the State of Madhya Pradesh and even an outside merchant who indulged in such activities may in such event be said to be carrying on business in Madhya Pradesh and would come within the definition of \"dealer\" given in section 2(c) of the Act.\n\nWhen we come, however, to section 8 which deals with the registration of dealers, that section requires that a dealer while being liable to pay tax under the Act shall not carry on business as a dealer unless he has been registered as such and possesses a registration certificate.\n\nThe liability to pay tax under the Act is thus postulated and unless and until a person is liable to pay such tax he need not get himself registered as a dealer.\n\nAll the transactions entered into by a registered dealer, however, do not necessarily import a liability to pay tax under the Act because, whenever the question arises in regard to his liabilty to pay any tax under the Act, such liability would have to be determined in spite of his being a registered dealer with reference, inter alia, to the provisions of section 27-A of the Act which incorporates within its terms the bans w!iich have been imposed on the powers of the State Legislatures to\n\nMnm Malumllll\n\nHMgaoirttl Do1, Bidi M1rcba1111, Ju•llW (M. r:r ...\n\nTlllStoof \"'\"\"\"'• Proifl1f! --\"\"' .,.., iJ.\n\nMes!rl Mohan/al\n\nHartovind Das,\n\nRidi Merchants, Jabalpur (M. P.)\n\nTh~ State of Madhya Pro.rfesh\n\nand another\n\nBhagawati j.\n\ntax under article 286 (1) (a) and (2) of the Constitution.\n\nIf, therefore, a dealer who has got himelf registered as dealer under the provisions of section 8 ( 1) of the Act is sought to be made liable in respect of transactions of sale effected by him he could claim exemption from such liability if the transactions of sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce after the 31st March, 1951, except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide.\n\nIn the case before us there was no such provision made by Parliament and the transactions in question were all after the 31st March, 1951, with the result that the ban imposed by article 286(2) was in operation and if the transactions took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce not only were Shri Chhaganlal U garchand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda exempt from the liability to pay the tax on these transactions but the petitioners also were similarly exempt.\n\nNo liability, therefore, could be imposed either for Sales Tax or for Purchase Tax within the terms of the Act on these transactions which as above stated took place in the course of inter- State trade or commerce.\n\nIt was, however, urged that the petitioners had made declarations at the time of making the purchases of this finished tobacco that they had purchased the said goods for use as raw material.s in the manufacture of goods for sale for actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption in that State and that by virtue of the provisions of section 4(6) of the Act they were liable to pay the purchase tax on the purchase price of goods which had been utilised for any other purpose. Whatever steps rhe State of Madhya Pradesh may be able to take in regard to nbn-compliance with the terms of the declarations by the petitioners we are clearly of opinion that the State of Madhva Pradesh is restrained from imposing any tax on the transactions of purchasr: or sale which take place in the course of inter-St2te trade or commerce and no question of liability of the petitioners by virtue of such declarations survives because even initially Shri Shah Chhaganlal Ugarchand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda were not liable to pay any tax on these transactions nor could any such liability for tax be transferred to the petitioners by virtue of such declarations.\n\nIf, therefore, there was no basis for any such liability, the declarations by themselves cannot create any new liability and the petitioners cannot be held liable to tax even by the operation of section 4(6) of the Act, the very basis of the liability sought to be imposed therein having disappeared.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and its provmons against the petitioners and from imposing a tax in respect of the transactions in question and in particular from imposing a tax on the purchase price of goods purchased on the declarations under Rule 26 being goods specified in the registration certificate as intended for use as raw material in the manufacture of goods for sale by actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption in that State but utilised for any other purpose under the provisions of section 4(6) of the Act.\n\nThe Reondents will pay the petitioners' costs of this petition.\n\nTHE TROPICAL INSURANCE CO LTD.\n\n& OTHERS\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER (and connected petition.)\n\n[S. R. DAS, ACTING C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKA1'A-\n\nRAMA AYYAR, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AYYAR JJ.)\n\nInsurance-Insurer doing life insurance business along with general insurance business-Power of Central Government to appoint Administrator-Such power, if confined exclusively to life insurance business-Grounds not taken in petition under Art 32, if can be urged at the hearing-Insurance Act (IV of 1938), s. 52-A-Constitution of India, Art 32.\n\n1955 Mmrs Mohdll/al\n\nJ/argovind Das, Bidi Merthanls, Jabalpur (M. P.) v.\n\nTht Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nBhagawati J.\n\nSep11m/Jel 22", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "MOHANLAL HARGOVIND DAS,\n\nBID! MERCHANTS, JABALPUR (M", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHANLAL HARGOVIND DAS, BIDI MERCHANTS, JABALPUR (M.P.)", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH &\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 176, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bhagawati", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AFF..R IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197, "end_char": 208, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 240, "end_char": 261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 262, "end_char": 273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 643, "end_char": 649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286(2) of the Constitution-Petitioners registered\n\n111 \"dealers\" under Central Provinces and Berar Sales Ta:r Act, 1947 and dealers in Bombay selling or supplying tobacco to the petitioners also registered as \"dealers\" under Central Provinces and Berar Sales Ta:r Act, 1947-Whether makes the transactions as intra-State transactions between two registered dealers in the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 888, "end_char": 902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286(2) of the Constitution-Petitioners registered\n\n111 \"dealers\" under Central Provinces and Berar Sales Ta:r Act, 1947 and dealers in Bombay selling or supplying tobacco to the petitioners also registered as \"dealers\" under Central Provinces and Berar Sales Ta:r Act, 1947-Whether makes the transactions as intra-State transactions between two registered dealers in the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Jabalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1024, "end_char": 1032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners arc carrying on business on a very large scale of making and selling bidis having their head office in Jabalpur in the State of Madhya Pradesh and arc registered as \"dealer\" for the purposes of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1119, "end_char": 1166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1565, "end_char": 1587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This finished tobacco, after its import within the State of Madhya Pradesh is rolled into bidis which arc exported to various other States, largely to the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1618, "end_char": 1631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dealers in the State of Uttar Pradesh and sur.h other States who buy bidis from the petitioners sell the same to various other dealers and 'onsumers in those States."}}, {"text": "Madhya Prndesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sales Tax authorities in the State of Madhya Prndesh required the petitioners under threat of criminal prosecution to file a statement of return of the total purchases of tobacco made by them out of Madhya Pradesh and delivered to them in Madhya Pradesh with a view to assess and levy purhase tax on the transa.:tions of purchases made by the petitioners as stated above."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2153, "end_char": 2176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, that the State of Madhya Pradesh had no authority to impose or to authorise the imposition of such a tax and that the action of the State authorities contravened the provisions of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2324, "end_char": 2335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Rules, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2769, "end_char": 2818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Bcrar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2932, "end_char": 2979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Bcrar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Bcrar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3564, "end_char": 3585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3630, "end_char": 3644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-Genoral of India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G.\n\nPathak_, (!."}}, {"text": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-Genoral of India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G.\n\nPathak_, (!."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3735, "end_char": 3748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, A. P. Sen, Rameshtuar Nath .and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "A. P. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3750, "end_char": 3759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, A. P. Sen, Rameshtuar Nath .and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Rameshtuar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3761, "end_char": 3776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, A. P. Sen, Rameshtuar Nath .and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3782, "end_char": 3797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, A. P. Sen, Rameshtuar Nath .and Rajinder Narain, with them), for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "T. L. Shevde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (M. Adhikari and /. N. Shroff, with him), for the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "M. Adhikari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (M. Adhikari and /. N. Shroff, with him), for the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (M. Adhikari and /. N. Shroff, with him), for the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4025, "end_char": 4033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was ddi vered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-The pet1t1oners are a firm carrying on business on a very large scale of making and selling bidis having their head office in Jabalpur in the State of Madhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "Bhagawati"}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of their said busines, the petitioners import tobacco from the State of Bombay in very large quantities after it is blended in that State by the vendors with various other types of indigenous tobacco by an elaborate process."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pr.1rlesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4705, "end_char": 4729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This finished tobacco, after its imnort within the State of Madhya Pradesh is rolled into hidis which are exported to various other States, largely to the State of Uttar Pr.1rlesh."}}, {"text": "29th\n\nJuly 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5419, "end_char": 5434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners filed under protest two returns dated the 11th September 1954 and 3rd December 1954 for the periods 3rd May 1954 to 29th\n\nJuly 1954 and 30th July 1954 to 26th October 1954 respectively but without prejudice to their right to challenge the validity of the assessment and levy of the said tax on the aforesaid transactions."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5844, "end_char": 5854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6316, "end_char": 6330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6575, "end_char": 6584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12( A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7512, "end_char": 7526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7978, "end_char": 7990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8462, "end_char": 8509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Rules, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8626, "end_char": 8675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shah Chhaganlal Ugarchand Nipani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8849, "end_char": 8881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When making purchases of the tobacco in question they also made declarations in the form required by Rule 26(II) declaring that they had purchased the said goods from Shri Shah Chhaganlal Ugarchand Nipani, a dealer holding registration certificate No."}}, {"text": "Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8958, "end_char": 8983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Blv!Y /93- MP and from Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda, a dealer holding registration certificate No.", "canonical_name": "Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda"}}, {"text": "27th July 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9773, "end_char": 9787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the return which was filed by them for the quarter beginning from 27th July 1954 and ending with 26th October 1954, they di<l not fill in any figure but showed the ahove item as blank contending that the Sales Tax authorities were not entitled to levy any purchase tax against them in respect of the same."}}, {"text": "26th October 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9804, "end_char": 9821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the return which was filed by them for the quarter beginning from 27th July 1954 and ending with 26th October 1954, they di<l not fill in any figure but showed the ahove item as blank contending that the Sales Tax authorities were not entitled to levy any purchase tax against them in respect of the same."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10213, "end_char": 10227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10535, "end_char": 10547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10621, "end_char": 10635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10708, "end_char": 10720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "StaU of Madhya Pradtsh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11471, "end_char": 11493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The StaU of Madhya Pradtsh\n\nand anolM1.", "canonical_name": "State of Madhya Pro.rfesh"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11508, "end_char": 11516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati J.\n\nMmn Mohatrlal HMtouitul Da.i, Bidi Mmlumll, Jaolp (M.P.) v.\n\nTlw8\"'*•/ M~Proi<d \"\"'.,,.,,,.,,", "canonical_name": "Bhagawati"}}, {"text": "Maniklal Chunanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12352, "end_char": 12370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only answer which was made by the learned Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh was that Shri Shah Chhaganlal Ugarchand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal B:!toda were themselves dealers holding registration certificates Nos.", "canonical_name": "Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12931, "end_char": 12945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "MP being registered as such under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "MP being registered as such under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13104, "end_char": 13151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13607, "end_char": 13619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13682, "end_char": 13692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14990, "end_char": 15002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15042, "end_char": 15051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15820, "end_char": 15830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pro.rfesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16142, "end_char": 16167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iJ.\n\nMes!rl Mohan/al\n\nHartovind Das,\n\nRidi Merchants, Jabalpur (M. P.)\n\nTh~ State of Madhya Pro.rfesh\n\nand another\n\nBhagawati j.\n\ntax under article 286 (1) (a) and (2) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "State of Madhya Pro.rfesh"}}, {"text": "Bhagawati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16182, "end_char": 16191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iJ.\n\nMes!rl Mohan/al\n\nHartovind Das,\n\nRidi Merchants, Jabalpur (M. P.)\n\nTh~ State of Madhya Pro.rfesh\n\nand another\n\nBhagawati j.\n\ntax under article 286 (1) (a) and (2) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Bhagawati"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16206, "end_char": 16217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16344, "end_char": 16353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16602, "end_char": 16618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, therefore, a dealer who has got himelf registered as dealer under the provisions of section 8 ( 1) of the Act is sought to be made liable in respect of transactions of sale effected by him he could claim exemption from such liability if the transactions of sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce after the 31st March, 1951, except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16640, "end_char": 16650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, therefore, a dealer who has got himelf registered as dealer under the provisions of section 8 ( 1) of the Act is sought to be made liable in respect of transactions of sale effected by him he could claim exemption from such liability if the transactions of sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce after the 31st March, 1951, except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16861, "end_char": 16875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chhaganlal U garchand Nipani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16994, "end_char": 17022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case before us there was no such provision made by Parliament and the transactions in question were all after the 31st March, 1951, with the result that the ban imposed by article 286(2) was in operation and if the transactions took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce not only were Shri Chhaganlal U garchand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda exempt from the liability to pay the tax on these transactions but the petitioners also were similarly exempt."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax or for Purchase Tax within the terms of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17223, "end_char": 17280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17738, "end_char": 17750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax or for Purchase Tax within the terms of the Act", "statute": "Sales Tax or for Purchase Tax within the terms of the Act"}}, {"text": "State of Madhva Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18061, "end_char": 18084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever steps rhe State of Madhya Pradesh may be able to take in regard to nbn-compliance with the terms of the declarations by the petitioners we are clearly of opinion that the State of Madhva Pradesh is restrained from imposing any tax on the transactions of purchasr: or sale which take place in the course of inter-St2te trade or commerce and no question of liability of the petitioners by virtue of such declarations survives because even initially Shri Shah Chhaganlal Ugarchand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda were not liable to pay any tax on these transactions nor could any such liability for tax be transferred to the petitioners by virtue of such declarations."}}, {"text": "section 4(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18762, "end_char": 18774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18904, "end_char": 19001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19492, "end_char": 19504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "TROPICAL INSURANCE CO LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19587, "end_char": 19612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE TROPICAL INSURANCE CO LTD."}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19629, "end_char": 19643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "& OTHERS\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER (and connected petition.)"}}, {"text": "RAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19727, "end_char": 19737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKA1'A-\n\nRAMA AYYAR, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AYYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19739, "end_char": 19749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKA1'A-\n\nRAMA AYYAR, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AYYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19754, "end_char": 19777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKA1'A-\n\nRAMA AYYAR, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AYYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19879, "end_char": 19897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Insurance-Insurer doing life insurance business along with general insurance business-Power of Central Government to appoint Administrator-Such power, if confined exclusively to life insurance business-Grounds not taken in petition under Art 32, if can be urged at the hearing-Insurance Act (IV of 1938), s. 52-A-Constitution of India, Art 32."}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20022, "end_char": 20028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20061, "end_char": 20074, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20089, "end_char": 20094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20097, "end_char": 20118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20120, "end_char": 20126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Stale of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20207, "end_char": 20230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 Mmrs Mohdll/al\n\nJ/argovind Das, Bidi Merthanls, Jabalpur (M. P.) v.\n\nTht Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nBhagawati J.\n\nSep11m/Jel 22", "canonical_name": "State of Madhya Pro.rfesh"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_517_523_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 517\n\nchand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda were not liable to pay any tax on these transactions nor could any such liability for tax be transferred to the petitioners by virtue of such declarations.\n\nIf, therefore, there was no basis for any such liability, the declarations by themselves cannot create any new liability and the petitioners cannot be held liable to tax even by the operation of section 4(6) of the Act, the very basis of the liability sought to be imposed therein having disappeared.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and its provmons against the petitioners and from imposing a tax in respect of the transactions in question and in particular from imposing a tax on the purchase price of goods purchased on the declarations under Rule 26 being goods specified in the registration certificate as intended for use as raw material in the manufacture of goods for sale by actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption in that State but utilised for any other purpose under the provisions of section 4(6) of the Act.\n\nThe Reondents will pay the petitioners' costs of this petition.\n\nTHE TROPICAL INSURANCE CO LTD.\n\n& OTHERS\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER (and connected petition.)\n\n[S. R. DAS, ACTING C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKA1'A-\n\nRAMA AYYAR, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AYYAR JJ.)\n\nInsurance-Insurer doing life insurance business along with general insurance business-Power of Central Government to appoint Administrator-Such power, if confined exclusively to life insurance business-Grounds not taken in petition under Art 32, if can be urged at the hearing-Insurance Act (IV of 1938), s. 52-A-Constitution of India, Art 32.\n\n1955 Mmrs Mohdll/al\n\nJ/argovind Das, Bidi Merthanls, Jabalpur (M. P.) v.\n\nTht Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nBhagawati J.\n\nSep11m/Jel 22\n\nTht Tropical Insurance Co. Ltd,\n\nand otlurs\n\nTM Union of India\n\nand anotlur\n\nSUPREME COL'RT REPORTS [19551\n\nThe petitioners, two Insurance Companies, carrying on business both in life insurance and general insurance, questioned the validity of notifications issued against them under s. 52-A of the Insurance Act for appointment of Administrators to take ovr management of their affairs on the ground, inter alia, that s. 52-A was exclusively restricted to life insurance business and the Government had no power to take over n1anagement of general insurance business.\n\nHeld, that the Insurance Act of 1938 no doubt makes a distinc tion between life insurance business and general insurance business, but its main concern is to protect life insurance policy-holdcrs.\n\nAlthough s. 52-A of te Act has no application to an insurer who carries on husiness in general insurance alone, it undonhtedlv applies\n\nto an insurer who combines both and gives the Central Government the powe-r, on the report of the Controller, to appoint an Administrator to take over the management of the entire business of the insurer including general insurance business when such insurer is found to act in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the life policy-holders.\n\nThat grounds not specifically taken in petitions under Ait. 32 cannot be urged at the time of the hearing.\n\nORIGINAL JuRisDICTioN : Petitions Nos. 186 & 195 of 1954.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nS. C. Isaacs, (Mohan Behari Lal and P. K. Ghosh, with him) for the petitioners in both petitions.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Porus A Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1955.\n\nSeptember\n\n22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India question the validity of the notifications issued under section 52-A of the Insurance Act of 1938 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the appointment of an Administrator. In the case of the Tropical Insurance Company Ltd. an Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 14th of July, 1951 and in the case of the Jupiter General Insurance Company Ltd. another Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 10th of July,\n\n1951.\n\nThese two insurance companies do insurance business of life insurance and general insurance. Admittedly previous to the appointment of the Administrators the Controller issued notices under section 52-A to the petitioners and the Finance Ministry of the Central Government sent letters to them pointing out the allegations in the report of the Controller to which they replied.\n\nThe learned Counsel for the petitioners has candidl y stated that he coultl not raise any constitutional point after the fourth amendment to the Constitution of India.\n\nHe assumed, therefore, that the provisions of sections 52-A to 52-G of. the Act were constitutional but he urged that the notifications under section 52-A and the taking over of the management of the affairs of the companies were invalid inasmuch as they were in excess of the powers conferred by section 52-A of the Act and that the notifications appointing the Administrators do not fix the period of management as required by law.\n\nHe further urged that the provisions of the section 52-B of the Act had not been complied with and in consequence the management by the Administrator had been excessively prolonged and thus had become unlawful.\n\nThere has, therefore, been a violation of the \"fundamental rights of the petitioners. Finally it was urged that there was no authority either under the provisions of the Act or of any other law by which the Government was empowered to take over management of the affairs of the company with respect to its general irtsurance business.\n\nThe power of the Government under section 52-A was restricted exclusively to life insurance business.\n\nAs to the first two contentions, they were urged in Petitions Nos. 94 of 1954 and 183 of 1954 but were not allowed to be put forward by this Court as these questions had not been specifically raised in the petitions under article 32 of the Constitution and they were accordingly dismissed.\n\nThe position is simila~ in this respect so far as the present applications are concerned and consequently it must be held that the . petitioners cannot be allowed now to urge grounds which they had not taken in their petitions. 66\n\nT\"4 Tropical Iruurance Co. Ltd.\n\nand others\n\nThe Union of Indio\n\nand another\n\nImam].\n\nThe Tropical Insurana Co. IJd.\n\nand others\n\nT/11 Union oj\n\n4 India and another\n\nImam].\n\nThere remains, however, to consider the last contention urged on behalf of the petitioners.\n\nIt was pointed out by Mr. Isaacs that the petitioners are insurance companies doing both life insurance business and general insurance business.\n\nHe contends that section 52-A of the Act, on a true interpretation of its provisions, applies only to the life insurance business carried on by an insurer and not to the general insurance business done by him. The Administrator appointed under section 52-A Gf the Act could therefore take over management only of the life insurance business done by the insurer. The notifications authorising him to take over the management of the insurance business of the insurer including his general insurance business were thus beyond the powers conferred on Government under section 52-A of the Act and such taking over of the management of the general insurance business of the petitioners by the Administrator was, therefore, without lawful authority.\n\nIn view of the submission made by the learned Counsel, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the section 52-A. Sub-section\n\n(1) of that section states:-\n\n\"If at any time the Controller has reason to believe that an insurer carrying on life insurance business is acting in a manner likely to be prejudicial to the interests of holders of life insurance policies, he may, after giving such opportunity to the insurer to be heard as he thinks fit, make a report thereon to the Central Government\".\n\nSub-section (2) states:-\n\n\"The Central Government, if it is of opinion after considering the report that it is necessary or proper to do so, may appoint an Administrator to manage the affairs of the insurer under the direction and control of the Controller''.\n\nSub-section ( 4) states :-\n\n\"The management of the business of the insurer shall as on and after the date of appointment of the Administrator vest in such Administrator, but except with the leave of the Controller the Administrator shall not issue any further policies\".\n\nSection 52-B of the Act is concerned with the powers and duties of the Administrator.\n\nUnder this section, the Administrator shall conduct the management of the business of the insurer with the greatest economy compatible with efficiency and shall, as soon as may be possible, file with the Controller a report stating what specified courses unde:r the section should be taken which would be most advantageous to the general interest of the holders of life policies.\n\nOne of the courses specified is the winding up of the business of the insurer.\n\nSection 52-D of the Act is concerned with termination of the appointment of the Administrator. Section 53 of the Act is concerned with the winding up by the Court and it enable the Controller to apply to the Court for winding up of an insurance, company on certain grounds, one of them being that the continuance of the company would be prejudicial to the interests of the policy-holders\n\nMr. Isaacs urged that the Act made a clear distinction between life insurance business and general insurance business of an insurer.\n\nHe referred to various sections of the Act with reference to Registration, Separation of Accounts and Funds and Balance-Sheets.\n\nIt was also pointed out by him that the Act defines \"general insurance business\" and \"life insurance business\" and these two kinds of businesses are quite distinct.\n\nThere could be little doubt that the Act does regard \"life insurance business\" as something distinct from \"general insurance business\".\n\nIt seems to us. however, that while keeping this distinction in mind, we have to give to the words used in section 52-A(l) their ordinary and natural meaning. \"Insurer\" has been defined in section 2 of the Act.\n\nThe definition speaks of an insurer cc.rrying on an insurance business.\n\nThis business may be either a life insurance business or a general insurance business or both.\n\nUnder section 7 of the Act deposits have to be made by every insurer other than an insurer specified in sub-clause ( c) of clause (9) of section 2.\n\nThe section specifies µie amount of deposit to be made where the business done is life insurance only.\n\nSimilarly it specifies the deposit to be made in the case of business. 15-93 S.C. India/59\n\nTlllTropieal 11u.,_ Co. Ltd.\n\n11114 al/urs\n\nThi Ullin of India \"\"\" •. ,,..,\n\n1-J.\n\nTht Tropical Iruurance Co. [Jr!.\n\nand others\n\nThe Union of Ilfdia and ,,,.,,,,,,.\n\n1-1.\n\ndone which comes within the description of general insurance business only.\n\nIt also contemplates a combination of life insurance business and general insurance business and specifies the deposit to be made in such event. It is clear that section 52-A ( 1) does not apply to an insurer doing only general insurance business.\n\nThe question . for decision is does it apply to him when he also does along with such business life insurance business?\n\nSection 52-A(l) speaks of \"an insurer carrying on life insurance business\".\n\nIt does not speak of \"only life insurance business\".\n\nIt is permissible for an insurer to combine in his insurance business both life and general insurance business. If he acts in a manner which is likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the holders of the life insurance policies with him, he makes himself amenable to the provisions of the section 52-A of the Act and the Controller is authorised to make a report to the Central Government.\n\nThe Central Government, after considering the report, may appoint an Administrator to manage '.'the affairs\" of th~ insurer and the management of \"the business\" of the insurer shall vest in the Administrator.\n\nThe words \"the affairs\" and \"the business\" of the insurer are wide enough to empower the Central Government to take over the management of the entire business of the insurer including his general insurance business.\n\nTo hold otherwise would be to give an unnatural meaning to the words used in section 52-A of the Act.\n\nIn the present case the insurers are public limited companies and it is difficult to conceive that the Act intended to vest in the Administrator the management of only the life insurance business while the insurers would be free to manage the general insurance business, because under section 52-B the Administrator may suggest to the Controller for the winding up of the company after managing its insurance busines.s economically and efficiently.\n\nUnder section 53 a Court may order a winding up of an insurance company if on an application by the Controller, it is satisfied that the continuance of the company is prejudicial to the interests of the policy-holders.\n\nThe winding up of the com-.\n\npany would be concerned with its entire insurance business including life and general insurance business, because there could be no partial winding up of a company.\n\nIt is not difficult to imagine that the affairs of the company with reference to its general insurance business may be in such a hopeless state that winding up may be the only course to be taken to protect the interests of the life . policy-holders.\n\nWhen the provisions of the Act are closely examined, it will be noticed that its main policy has been to safeguard the interests of life policy-holders, who are deeply affected by the manner in which the insurance business of an insurer is carried on. We have no difficulty in interpreting section 52-A(l) to mean that where an insurer is carrying on insurance business of various kinds which includes life insurance business, he becomes amenable to the provisions of section 52-A if he is acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the holders of life policies and he would have to suffer the consequences following the report made by the Controller and the appointment of an Administrator by the Government.\n\nThe provisions in the Act making a distinction between life insurance business and general insurance business, the keeping of separate accounts :md balance-sheets have been enacted for the safeguard of the holders of life insurance policies and they provide an over-all picture of the business done by the insurer showing the exact state of affairs concerning !he life insurance business of the insurer. These provisions cannot and do not aflect the provisions of of section 52-A of the Act.\n\nThese pet1t1ons are accordingly dismissed with costs to be paid by Petitioners 2, 3 and 4 in Petition No. 186 of 1954 and Petitioners 2 and 3 in Petition No. 195 of 1954.\n\nTiu Tropical Insurance Co. !Jd.\n\nand olhtrs\n\nTiu Union of India\n\nand anothtr\n\n/11111m].", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "chand Nipani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 49, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "chand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda were not liable to pay any tax on these transactions nor could any such liability for tax be transferred to the petitioners by virtue of such declarations."}}, {"text": "Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 84, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "chand Nipani and Shri Maniklal Chunanlal Baroda were not liable to pay any tax on these transactions nor could any such liability for tax be transferred to the petitioners by virtue of such declarations."}}, {"text": "section 4(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437, "end_char": 449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 579, "end_char": 676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1048, "end_char": 1062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result, therefore, is that the Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and its provmons against the petitioners and from imposing a tax in respect of the transactions in question and in particular from imposing a tax on the purchase price of goods purchased on the declarations under Rule 26 being goods specified in the registration certificate as intended for use as raw material in the manufacture of goods for sale by actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption in that State but utilised for any other purpose under the provisions of section 4(6) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 4(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1167, "end_char": 1179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Respondents will be restrained from enforcing the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "THE TROPICAL INSURANCE CO LTD.\n\n& OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1258, "end_char": 1298, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE TROPICAL INSURANCE CO LTD. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1300, "end_char": 1328, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1357, "end_char": 1366, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1381, "end_char": 1389, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bhagawati", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1414, "end_char": 1424, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1697, "end_char": 1703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1749, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1764, "end_char": 1769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1772, "end_char": 1793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1795, "end_char": 1801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Stale of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1882, "end_char": 1905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 Mmrs Mohdll/al\n\nJ/argovind Das, Bidi Merthanls, Jabalpur (M. P.) v.\n\nTht Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nBhagawati J.\n\nSep11m/Jel 22\n\nTht Tropical Insurance Co. Ltd,\n\nand otlurs\n\nTM Union of India\n\nand anotlur\n\nSUPREME COL'RT REPORTS [19551\n\nThe petitioners, two Insurance Companies, carrying on business both in life insurance and general insurance, questioned the validity of notifications issued against them under s. 52-A of the Insurance Act for appointment of Administrators to take ovr management of their affairs on the ground, inter alia, that s. 52-A was exclusively restricted to life insurance business and the Government had no power to take over n1anagement of general insurance business."}}, {"text": "Bhagawati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 Mmrs Mohdll/al\n\nJ/argovind Das, Bidi Merthanls, Jabalpur (M. P.) v.\n\nTht Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nBhagawati J.\n\nSep11m/Jel 22\n\nTht Tropical Insurance Co. Ltd,\n\nand otlurs\n\nTM Union of India\n\nand anotlur\n\nSUPREME COL'RT REPORTS [19551\n\nThe petitioners, two Insurance Companies, carrying on business both in life insurance and general insurance, questioned the validity of notifications issued against them under s. 52-A of the Insurance Act for appointment of Administrators to take ovr management of their affairs on the ground, inter alia, that s. 52-A was exclusively restricted to life insurance business and the Government had no power to take over n1anagement of general insurance business.", "canonical_name": "Bhagawati"}}, {"text": "Tropical Insurance Co. Ltd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955 Mmrs Mohdll/al\n\nJ/argovind Das, Bidi Merthanls, Jabalpur (M. P.) v.\n\nTht Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nBhagawati J.\n\nSep11m/Jel 22\n\nTht Tropical Insurance Co. Ltd,\n\nand otlurs\n\nTM Union of India\n\nand anotlur\n\nSUPREME COL'RT REPORTS [19551\n\nThe petitioners, two Insurance Companies, carrying on business both in life insurance and general insurance, questioned the validity of notifications issued against them under s. 52-A of the Insurance Act for appointment of Administrators to take ovr management of their affairs on the ground, inter alia, that s. 52-A was exclusively restricted to life insurance business and the Government had no power to take over n1anagement of general insurance business.", "canonical_name": "Tropical Iruurance Co. Ltd."}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2233, "end_char": 2238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2248, "end_char": 2261, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2368, "end_char": 2373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2534, "end_char": 2547, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2726, "end_char": 2731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2899, "end_char": 2917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although s. 52-A of te Act has no application to an insurer who carries on husiness in general insurance alone, it undonhtedlv applies\n\nto an insurer who combines both and gives the Central Government the powe-r, on the report of the Controller, to appoint an Administrator to take over the management of the entire business of the insurer including general insurance business when such insurer is found to act in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the life policy-holders."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3371, "end_char": 3381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3389, "end_char": 3410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. C. Isaacs", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3455, "end_char": 3467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs, (Mohan Behari Lal and P. K. Ghosh, with him) for the petitioners in both petitions."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3470, "end_char": 3486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs, (Mohan Behari Lal and P. K. Ghosh, with him) for the petitioners in both petitions."}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3491, "end_char": 3502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs, (Mohan Behari Lal and P. K. Ghosh, with him) for the petitioners in both petitions."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3554, "end_char": 3568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Porus A Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Porus A Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3597, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Porus A Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3615, "end_char": 3628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Porus A Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3728, "end_char": 3732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India question the validity of the notifications issued under section 52-A of the Insurance Act of 1938 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the appointment of an Administrator."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3758, "end_char": 3768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3776, "end_char": 3797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3854, "end_char": 3864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3874, "end_char": 3887, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tropical Insurance Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the Tropical Insurance Company Ltd. an Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 14th of July, 1951 and in the case of the Jupiter General Insurance Company Ltd. another Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 10th of July,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "14th of July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4085, "end_char": 4103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the Tropical Insurance Company Ltd. an Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 14th of July, 1951 and in the case of the Jupiter General Insurance Company Ltd. another Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 10th of July,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "Jupiter General Insurance Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4127, "end_char": 4165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the Tropical Insurance Company Ltd. an Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 14th of July, 1951 and in the case of the Jupiter General Insurance Company Ltd. another Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 10th of July,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "10th of July,\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4231, "end_char": 4250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the Tropical Insurance Company Ltd. an Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 14th of July, 1951 and in the case of the Jupiter General Insurance Company Ltd. another Administrator was appointed under notification dated the 10th of July,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4777, "end_char": 4798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4847, "end_char": 4858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5818, "end_char": 5828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6109, "end_char": 6119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tropical Iruurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6414, "end_char": 6441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66\n\nT\"4 Tropical Iruurance Co. Ltd.\n\nand others\n\nThe Union of Indio\n\nand another\n\nImam].", "canonical_name": "Tropical Iruurance Co. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Union of Indio", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6459, "end_char": 6473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66\n\nT\"4 Tropical Iruurance Co. Ltd.\n\nand others\n\nThe Union of Indio\n\nand another\n\nImam].", "canonical_name": "Union of Ilfdia"}}, {"text": "Tropical Insurana Co. IJd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tropical Insurana Co. IJd."}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6703, "end_char": 6709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out by Mr. Isaacs that the petitioners are insurance companies doing both life insurance business and general insurance business."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6840, "end_char": 6850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7067, "end_char": 7077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7387, "end_char": 7397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7680, "end_char": 7690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8612, "end_char": 8622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9160, "end_char": 9170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9255, "end_char": 9265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10222, "end_char": 10232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10304, "end_char": 10313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10502, "end_char": 10511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10633, "end_char": 10642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tropical Iruurance Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10928, "end_char": 10950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. 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{"document_id": "1955_2_524_530_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "~•plnoHT21\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nMACHANDER, SON OF PANDURANG\n\nti.\n\nSTATE OF HYDERABAD.\n\n[1955]\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nExamination of the accused-Duty of trial court-Failure to examine accused on material points-Effect-Acquittal-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), 1. 342.\n\nThe appellant was put up on his trial on a charge of murder.\n\nThe trial continued for 4! years. His brother who was a co-accused absconded. The evidence against the appellant was circumstantial.\n\nHis confession, made 8 days after his arrest, led to certain discoveries but he was never questioned about it by the trial court under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court excluded the confession fro!ll the evidence, upheld the conviction but altered the death sentence to one of rigorous imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court took the view that the High Court was right in excluding the confession from the evidence and the conviction was unustainablc on the evidence on record. Held, that in the particular facts of the case the omission to examine the accused under s. 342 of the Code was no mere technicality and it would. be unjust to the accused to remand the case for a retrial and the order of conviction and sentence passed on him must be set aside.\n\nThat while it is no doubt incumbent on the court to sec that no guilty person escapes, it is still more its duty to sec that justice is not delayed and accused persons indefinitely harassed. The scales must be held even between the prosecution and t~ e accused.\n\nThat it is imperative that Magistrates and Sessions Judges should remember the duty that s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes on them of questioning the accused person fairly and properly telling him in clear and simple language the case he has to meet and the material points made against him so that he can, if he so desires, explain and meet them.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1smcnoN : Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th September, 1951, of the Hyderabad High Court in Criminal Confirmation N?. 638/6 of 1951 and Criminal Appeal No. 770 of 1951, arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 27th June, 1951, of the Q>urt of the Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, in Criminal Case No. 12/8 of 1951.\n\nR. Patnaik for the appellant. 1955\n\nPorus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokha/.e dent. for the respon- Muliantllr, Son efP~ v. 1955.\n\nSeptember 27.\n\nThe Court was delivered by Judgment of the 91'* of H, U, dbad\n\nBosE J.-This is another of those cases in which Courts are compelled to acquit because Magistrates and Sessions Judges fail to appreciate the importance of section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code and fail to carry out the duty that is cast upon them of questioning the accused properly and fairly, bringing home to his mind in clear and simple language the exact case he has to meet and each material point that is sought to be made against him, and of affording him a chance to explain them if he can and so desires.\n\nHad the Sessions Judge done that in this case it is possible that we would not have been obliged to acquit.\n\nThe facts are simple.\n\nThe appellant Machandcr was charged with the murder of one Manmath.\n\nMachander's brother Gona was also challaned but as he absconded he could not be tried.\n\nThe appellant and the deceased and Gona reside in the same village.\n\nThere was some ill-feeling between the appellant and the deceased and it can be accepted that Gona shared his brother's sentiments because, so far as the latest cause for enmity goes, Gona is equally concerned; and this also applies to Pandu, the appellant's father, and Bhima, another brother.\n\nThe causes for enmity are the following.\n\nIn or about the year 1947 the appellant appears to have stolen a pair of bullocks and a cart belonging to the deceased. The deceased prosecuted him for the theft and also instituted a civil suit for the price of the cart and bullocks. He succeeded in both cases.\n\nThe appellant was convicted of theft and sent to jail. a decree was also passed against him for Rs. 520 and that decree was duly executed.\n\nWe now come to the events immediately preceding the murder. The appellant and his family took forcible possession of some land belonging to the\n\n19~5\n\n}J.achandtr, Son of Paniurang\n\nStat~ of Hyderabad\n\nBos~J\n\ndeceased's sister Parubai.\n\nShe sued the whole family for possession of this land, that is to say, she impleaded the appellant's father Pandu, the appellant and his two brothers Bhima and Gona.\n\nThe last hearing was on 15-12-1950 and the decision was announced on 16-12-1950.\n\nIt was in Parubai's favour.\n\nThe deceased conducted this litigation on behalf of his sister.\n\nHe was present in Court on the 15th and was present :!J: Parenda, where the Court is situate, up to 3 P.M. on the 16th, the day the decision was announced. )hat was the last that was seen of him.\n\nThese facts are said to be the cause of the ill-feeling.\n\nBut, as the facts themselves indicate, a similar cause for enmity (though not to the same degree) could be assigned to the father and the other brothers; equally, they had similar opportunities. The movements of the appellant have been traced to Parenda and back but not the movements of the rest of the family.\n\nSo it is not shown that they had no similar opportunity to murder.\n\nIt can however be , accepted that cause for enmity on the appellant's part is established.\n\nIt is proved that the deceased went to Parenda on the 15th for the last hearing of the case and that the was also there on the 16th' up to 3 P.M.\n\nIt is also proved that the appellant was in Court on the 15th and that he was in Parenda on the following day. It can be accepted that both the deceased and the appellant were present in Court at the same time on the 15th and that therefore the appellant knew that the d~ ceased had attended the Court that day. But there is no proof that the two met each other or that either knew about the movements of the other on the 16th.\n\nAll we know is that both went to see their respective pleaders at different places and times and learned the result of the case.\n\nFour or five days after the case, the appellant came home but not the deceased.\n\nThe deceased's son Shanti ling (P. vV. 10), who knew that the appellant had also gone to Parenda for the case, asked him where his father was. The appellant said that the father had not attended court.\n\nThis made the son\n\nanxious, so he. went to Parenda to make enqumes.\n\nThe pleaders there told him that his father had attended court on the 15th and that he was in Parenda till 3 P.M. on the 16th.\n\nShantiling (P. W. 10) immediately informed the police that his father was missing and gave them a description of him and also a list of the things he was wearing and a description of the horse he was riding.\n\nThis was on the 26th.\n\nThree days later, on the 29th, he lodged a regular complaint and said that he was afraid his father had been murdered and said that he suspected the appellant and his brother Gona.\n\nThe appellant was arrested the same day and after his arrest he led the police and Panchas to a place where blood-stained earth and grass were found and a blood-stained stone, also some of the articles which Shantiling (P. W. 10) had des.cribed to the police on the 26th, namely pieces of a silver linga, two silver\n\nadas, a silver spike and a white gilt button.\n\nAll except the kadas were found to be stained with human blood.\n\nAbout 25 paces from here the appellant pointed out another place where the corpse of the deceased was found to be buried.\n\nPearl ear-rings and a kardoda of yarn with three iron keys were still on the body.\n\nThey were all stained with human blood and are proved to have belonged to the deceased.\n\nOn the 1st of January 1951 the appellant took the police and the Panchas to a place where two saddle straps and two iron stirrups were buried.\n\nOne of the stirrups was stained with human blood.\n\nOn the 3rd the reins of the horse and the horse itself were discovered but this discovery was not at the instance of the appellant.\n\nExcept for the confession, which has been excluded, this is all there is against the appellant.\n\nThe question is whether that is enough to bring guilt home to him. Stated briefly, the circumstances are-\n\n1. That the appellant knew that the deceased had attended the Court at Parenda on the 16th and that he had seen him there but when questioned about it he told a lie.\n\nMachander, <Son\n\nof Pandurang\n\nStal1 of Hyderabatl\n\nBose].\n\n19.55\n\nMae/uJltdn, SIM\n\nq/P-.,.1 v.\n\nStau of ~'6t1Nd\n\nBM•]·\n\nIn passing it is to be observed that this is not the class of case in which an accused person is last seen with a murdered man within a few hours of the murder.\n\nThough the deceased and the appeJlant were both in Court at the same time, they were not there \"together\" and in view of the i11-will between them and in view of the fact that the deceased went on a horse it is unlikely that they travelled together either going or coming; and the appellant was not with the deceased when he was last seen at 3 P.M. on the 16th.\n\nBut it is clear that the appellant wanted to hide .something.\n\n2. That thirteen days after the murder he knew that Manmath had been murdered.\n\nHe also knew where the murder had been committed and where the body and certain articles belonging to the deceased were hidden.\n\n3. That there was ill-will between them, but an ill-will that othre members of the appellant's family might be expected to share.\n\n4. That he had fuJI opportunity to commit the crime, but the same kind of opportunity that the other members of his family also had.\n\nThe question is whether these four circumstances, regarded in the background of this case, are sufficient to warrant a conclusion of murder by the appellant.\n\nIn our opinion, they are not because the same circumstances could be s;1id to point with equal suspicion at other members of the appellant's family.\n\nIt has to be remembered that the brother Gona was also suspected and that he absconded and could not be traced.\n\nWe do not say that he was the murderer and it would be wrong to suggest that in his absence, but if he was, then the appellant's knowledge of the murder and of the concealment, thirteen days later, might have been derived from Gona, or it might even be that he saw his brother commit the crime and hide the corpse and the articles.\n\nThose are hypotheses that are not unreasonable on the facts of this particular case and they have not been reasonably excluded. Consequently, we are unable to hold that mere knowledge thirteen days later, coupled with a motive which three others\n\nshare, and a lie about the deceased' s movements told four, <'>r five days after the murder, are enough; and as that is all that the High Court has based on, the conviction must be set aside.\n\nY.l e have assumed throughout that the identity of the corpse that was discovered on the 29th and the fact of murder have been established. Those facts were not admitted before us but we need not discuss the point.\n\nIt is enough to say that, in our opinion, both facts are satisfactorily proved.\n\nWe referred, earlier in our judgment, to a confession which the High Court has excluded. This was excluded from evidence because the appellant was not questioned about it under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nWe gather that the High Court thought that that occasioned prejudice though the learned Judges do not say so in so many words The appellant was arrested on the 29th and he made many discoveries on the 29th December 1950 and on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd January 1951 but did not confess till the 6th.\n\nMuch might have happened in the eight days between his arrest and the 6th, so the High Court was not unjustified in refusing to take that into consideration without hearing the appellant's side of the s, tory.\n\nWe were asked to reopen the question and, if necessary, t<'> remand the case.\n\nBut we decline to do that.\n\nJudges and magistrates must realise the importance of the examination under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code and this Court has repeatedly warned them or the consequences that might ensue in certain cases.\n\nThe appellant was arrested in December 1950 and has been on his trial one way and another .:ver since, that is to say, for over 4} years.\n\nWe are not prepared to keep persons who are on trial for their lives under indefinite suspense because trial judges omit to do their duty. Justice is not one-sided.\n\nIt has many facets and we have to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties.\n\nWhile it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it .ts even .m0re necessary to see that persons accused\n\nMachandtr, Son\n\nof Pandurang\n\nState of Hyderabad\n\nBo1tJ.\n\nA1achander, Son\n\nofPandurang\n\nStalt of Hydtrabad\n\nBoJ' J.\n\nof crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must he given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detection of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go. Except in clear cases of guilt, where the error is purely technical, the forces that are arrayed against the accused should no more be permitted in special appeal to repair the effects of their bungling than an accused should be permitted to repair gaps in his defence which he could and ought to have made good in the lower courts.\n\nThe scales for justice must be kept on an even balance whether for the accused or agaii:ist him, whether in favour of the State or not; and one broad rule must apply in all cases.\n\nThe error here ts not a mere technicality. The appellant appears to have been ready to disclose all on the 29th and make a clean breast of everything and yet the police waited eight days before getting a confession judicially recorded.\n\nThat may be capable of explanation but the difficulty of asking an accused person to establish facts of this kind in his favour four and a half years later is obvious. Without therefore attempting to lay down any general rule, we are not prepared to order a retrial in this case because of the facts that appear here.\n\nThe appeal is allowed. The ~<;>nviction and sentence are set aside and the appellant is acquitted.", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "MACHANDER, SON OF PANDURANG", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MACHANDER, SON OF PANDURANG", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HYDERABAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HYDERABAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 258, "end_char": 284, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 642, "end_char": 648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 656, "end_char": 682, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 843, "end_char": 856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court took the view that the High Court was right in excluding the confession from the evidence and the conviction was unustainablc on the evidence on record."}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1099, "end_char": 1105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1642, "end_char": 1648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1656, "end_char": 1682, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2322, "end_char": 2332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Patnaik for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2358, "end_char": 2372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955\n\nPorus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokha/.e dent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokha/.e", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2377, "end_char": 2391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955\n\nPorus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokha/.e dent."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2679, "end_char": 2690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Machandcr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3191, "end_char": 3200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Machandcr was charged with the murder of one Manmath.", "canonical_name": "Machandcr"}}, {"text": "Manmath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3236, "end_char": 3243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Machandcr was charged with the murder of one Manmath."}}, {"text": "Machander", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3246, "end_char": 3255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Machander's brother Gona was also challaned but as he absconded he could not be tried.", "canonical_name": "Machandcr"}}, {"text": "Gona", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3266, "end_char": 3270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Machander's brother Gona was also challaned but as he absconded he could not be tried."}}, {"text": "Pandu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3639, "end_char": 3644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was some ill-feeling between the appellant and the deceased and it can be accepted that Gona shared his brother's sentiments because, so far as the latest cause for enmity goes, Gona is equally concerned; and this also applies to Pandu, the appellant's father, and Bhima, another brother."}}, {"text": "Bhima", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3674, "end_char": 3679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was some ill-feeling between the appellant and the deceased and it can be accepted that Gona shared his brother's sentiments because, so far as the latest cause for enmity goes, Gona is equally concerned; and this also applies to Pandu, the appellant's father, and Bhima, another brother."}}, {"text": "J.achandtr", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and his family took forcible possession of some land belonging to the\n\n19~5\n\n}J.achandtr, Son of Paniurang\n\nStat~ of Hyderabad\n\nBos~J\n\ndeceased's sister Parubai."}}, {"text": "Parubai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and his family took forcible possession of some land belonging to the\n\n19~5\n\n}J.achandtr, Son of Paniurang\n\nStat~ of Hyderabad\n\nBos~J\n\ndeceased's sister Parubai."}}, {"text": "15-12-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last hearing was on 15-12-1950 and the decision was announced on 16-12-1950."}}, {"text": "16-12-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4618, "end_char": 4628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last hearing was on 15-12-1950 and the decision was announced on 16-12-1950."}}, {"text": "Parenda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is proved that the deceased went to Parenda on the 15th for the last hearing of the case and that the was also there on the 16th' up to 3 P.M.\n\nIt is also proved that the appellant was in Court on the 15th and that he was in Parenda on the following day."}}, {"text": "Shantiling", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shantiling (P. W. 10) immediately informed the police that his father was missing and gave them a description of him and also a list of the things he was wearing and a description of the horse he was riding."}}, {"text": "Panchas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7137, "end_char": 7144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was arrested the same day and after his arrest he led the police and Panchas to a place where blood-stained earth and grass were found and a blood-stained stone, also some of the articles which Shantiling (P. W. 10) had des.cribed to the police on the 26th, namely pieces of a silver linga, two silver\n\nadas, a silver spike and a white gilt button."}}, {"text": "1st of January 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7786, "end_char": 7805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st of January 1951 the appellant took the police and the Panchas to a place where two saddle straps and two iron stirrups were buried."}}, {"text": "Machander", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8478, "end_char": 8487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Machander, <Son\n\nof Pandurang\n\nStal1 of Hyderabatl\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11330, "end_char": 11341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11343, "end_char": 11366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th December 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11570, "end_char": 11588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We gather that the High Court thought that that occasioned prejudice though the learned Judges do not say so in so many words The appellant was arrested on the 29th and he made many discoveries on the 29th December 1950 and on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd January 1951 but did not confess till the 6th."}}, {"text": "1st, 2nd and 3rd January 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11600, "end_char": 11629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We gather that the High Court thought that that occasioned prejudice though the learned Judges do not say so in so many words The appellant was arrested on the 29th and he made many discoveries on the 29th December 1950 and on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd January 1951 but did not confess till the 6th."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12059, "end_char": 12070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "A1achander", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12779, "end_char": 12789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it .ts even .m0re necessary to see that persons accused\n\nMachandtr, Son\n\nof Pandurang\n\nState of Hyderabad\n\nBo1tJ.\n\nA1achander, Son\n\nofPandurang\n\nStalt of Hydtrabad\n\nBoJ' J.\n\nof crime are not indefinitely harassed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_531_541_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n53L\n\nSHRI KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA&; )AFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]\n\nFundamental Rights, lnfringment of-Act settling fair and equitable rent restricted to a part of the State-Settlement of rent of diffe1ent localities on different dates on decennial average-Possibility of variatio11 in rates of rent-If amount to denial of equality before laru-Deprivation of landlo1d'.c right to realise 1\"C11ts freely and without hindrance, if invasion of right to property-Retrospective enfcrcement of rates of rent, if amoU.'lts to violation of right to property and acquisition ruit/10ut compensation-Such power conferred on Settlement Officer, if arbitrmy-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(l)(f), 31(2)-Marwar Land Revenue Act (XL of 1949), ss. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86.\n\nThe petitioners, who arc jagirdars of Marwar, sought to impugn the constitutional validity of ss. 81 to 86 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act which embody a scheme for fixing fair and equitable rents payable by cultivating tenants on the ground that they infringed their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.\n\nTheir contentions were that after the merger of Marwar in thi:- State of Rajasthan the Act had become discriminatorv as it applie<l only to the jagirdars of Marwar and not to the entire body of jagir dars of the State of Rajasthan, that settlement of rents made with reference to different areas on different dates on the basis of previous ten years' average of collections might result in different rates of rent and lead to inequality such as is prohibited by Art. 14, that the Act deprived the landlords of their right to realise rents from the tenants freely and without hindrance and invaded their right to hold property guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution, that the power conferred on the Scttlem.ent Officer by s. 86 of the Act to enforce the rates of rent retrospectively is an invasion of their right to hold property and amounts tci acquisition of property without compensation and that it confers absolute and uncontrolled discretion on the Settlement Otlicer and is an encroachment on the right to hold property.\n\nHeld, repelling these contentions, that Art. 14 only prohibits unequal treatment of persons similarly situated and a classification might properly\" be made on territorial basis, if that was germane to the purposes of the enactment and no tenancy legislation can be held to contravene the article solely on the ground that it does not apply to the entire State. Before the petitioners could succeed it was\n\nSeptember 2 7\n\n.Shi KUM,. Singh\n\nandol/ra's\n\n\"· Tiit Slat1 of Rqjulhan and\n\n•liur<\n\nincumbent on them to show that conditions obtaining in other parts of the State were similac. to those in Marwar and this they had failed to do.\n\nBowman v. Lewis [1879] IOI U.S. 22: 25 Law. Ed. 989, referred to.\n\nThat the provision in the Act for assessment of rents with ref erence to a portion of the area to which the Act applies is not a contravention of Art.' 14. To hold otherwise would be to make it impossible for any State to carry on its settlement operations.\n\nBiswa~ Singh v. The State of Orissa and others, [1954] S.C.R. 842, and- Tfiak.ur_ Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, applied. - That the fundamental right to hold property in the ease of a landlord in respect of his tenanted lands is no more than the right to receive reasonable rents and no legislation which has for its object the settlement of fair and equitable' rents can contravene Art. 19 (i)(f) of the Constitution even though it may give such rents retros pcctive operation.\n\nThat the provision in s. 86 of the Act empowering the Settle 1nent Officer to give retrospective operation to the rates of rent docs not contravene Art. 19(1)(f) and, therefore, no question as to whc~ ther such a provision is not of a regulatory character and as •Such prohibited by Art. 19(5) can at all arise.\n\nThat it is well settled that a law which regulates the relation of a landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within the meaning of Art. 31 (2) even though it has the effect of reducing his rights. Consequently, there is nq contravention of Art. 31(2} of the Constitution.\n\nThakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, [1943] 6 F.L.J. 55: A.LR. 1943 F.C. 29 and Thakur Jagannath Buksh v.\n\nUnited Provinces, L.R. 73 I.A. 123, relied on.\n\nThat s. 86 of the Act does not confer an absolute and uncontrolled discretion on the Settlement Officer and such power as it gives does not constitute an encroachment on the right to hold property within the meaning of Art. 19(i)(f) of the Constitution.\n\nThakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards. Ajm<r and another, f1953] S.C.R. 1049, explained and distinguished.\n\nORIGINAL JurusmCTION : Petitions Nos. 621, 655 and 678 of 1955.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (S. K. Kaptir and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the petitioners.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Kan Singh and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No. 1.\n\nK. R. Chowdhury, for Goma, Ghisa and Rama, respondents in Petition No. 655 and Dhira, respondent in petition No. 678.\n\n1955. September 27.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-These are aplictios under article 32 of the Constitution by certam pg1rdars of Marwar, challenging the constitutionality of sections 81 to 86 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act No. XL of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that they infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners under article 14, article 19(1) (f) and article 31 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nThese sections provide for fixing fair and equitable rent payable by the tenants and prescribe the procedure to be followed therefor.\n\nSection 81 of the Act provides that when any local area has been brought under settlement operations by a notification under section 64, the Settlement Officer or an Assistant Settlement Officer shall inspect every village in the local area, divide it into soil-classes and assessment circles, select rent rates for the area and publish them in such mannr as may be prescribed.\n\nIf objections to these proposais are received, he has to consider them, and submit his report to the Board of Revenue.\n\nThe Board has the power to sanction the proposals with or without any modifications, and it has also the power to direct further enquiry into the matters. With a view to arriving at fair and equitable rates, the Settlement Officer is required under section 82 to have regard to the collection of rent and cesses in the nature of rent during the ten years p1eceding the settlement excluding such years as the Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be abnormal, the average of the prices of agricultural produce during the same period, the nature of the crops grown and the quantity of the produce and their value. Section 82(2) provides that the rent rates shall not\n\n!955\n\nShri Kishan Singh\n\nand others\n\nTiu Slate of Rajasthan a,.J\n\nollurs\n\nShri K.Uhatt Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe State of Raja.st/um and\n\nothers\n\nV enkalarama\n\n.4.ua: J.\n\nexceed one-third of the value of the produce of unirrigated lands and one-fourth of the value of the produce of irrigated lands.\n\nUnder section 84, the Settlement Officer shall determine rents whether by way of abatement, enhancement or commutation payable for all holdings in the occupation of tenants on the basis of the rates sanctioned by the Board of Revenue. Section 86 enacts that any rent fixed by order of the Settlement Officer shall be payable from the hrst day of July next following the date of such order, \"unless the Settlement Officer thinks fit for any reasons to direct that it shall be payable from some earlier date\".\n\nActing under section 81 of the Act, the Settlement Officer formulated certain proposals with reference to the rent rates in the villages comprised in the jagirs of the petitioners and they were published in the Gazette on 12th December 1953.\n\nObjections to those rate$ were filed by the petitioners on the 12th January,\n\n1954. On 13th October 1954 the Additional Settlement Commissioner submitted his final proposals to the Settlement Officer, who forwarded the same to the Board of Revenue for sanction.\n\nAfter making further enquiry, the Board passed an order on 4-12-1954 determining the rent rates payable. Subsequent to this, an order was also passed under section 86 of the Act bringing the sanctioned rate into operation from 1-7-1954.\n\nThis order is not itself the subject of attack in these proceedings, and it cannot be, seeing that Petition No. 621 of 1954 was filed on 24th November 1954 before that order was, passed, and Petitions Nos. 655 and 678 of 1954 merely repeat verbatim the allegations in Petition No. 621 of 1954.\n\nBefore us, the petitioners conceded that they were not impugning the correctness of the order ' passed under section 86 in so far as it gave operation to the rates of rent from 1st July, on its merits, but that they were attacking the section :is bad only as a step in establishing that the scheme of the Act, of which section 86 is an integral part is, taken as a whole. an infringement of their fundamental rights under articles 14, 19 and 31 (2).\n\nWe have now to consider\n\nwhether sections 81 to 86 of the Act are bad as mfringing the above prov1s10ns of the Constitution.\n\nTi1e contention that sections 81 to 86 of the Act are void as being repugnant to article 14 is sought to be made out on two grounds It is stated firstly that the Act applies only to what was prior to its merger the State of Marwar, that the present State of Ra1asthan comprises Marwar and 17 other States which have merged in it, and that as the Act, as it stands, is\n\ndircted against the jagirdars in one area of the State and not the whole of it, it has become discriminatory and void.\n\nThis contention is clearly untenable. What article 14 prohibits is the unequal treatment of persons similarly situated, and therefore before the petitioners can claim the protection of that article, it is incumbent on them to establish that the conditiom which prevail in other areas in the State of Rajasthan are similar to those which obtain in Marwar. But of this, there has been neither allegation nor proof. On the contrary, it is stated by the respondents in para 10 of their statement that the tenants in the jagirs of Marwar were paying much more by way of rent and cesses than those in the Khalsa area of the State, that with a view to remove the inequality between the two classes of tenants within the State, a law was passed in 1943 providing for settlement of rent, and that again on 1~1-1947 another law was passed abolishing all cesses\n\n(lags) and fixing the maximum share of rent payable in kind. These special features, it is argued, form sufficient justification for a eparate legislation for this area.\n\nIt is also stated that the other States had their own rent laws suited to their conditions.\n\nThere are no materials on which we could hold that the impugned Act is discriminatory in character, and we cannot strike it down merely on the ground that it does not apply to the whole of the State of Rajasthan.\n\nA si.milar question arose for decision in Bowman v.\n\nLcrvis(1 ).\n\nThere, some of the areas in the State of Missouri were governed by a judicial procedure diff-\n\n(1) [1879) IOI U. S. 22: 25 Law. Ed. 989.\n\nShri Kishan Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe State of Rajaslhan anti\n\nothers\n\nV enkalarama\n\nA\"ar ].\n\n'955\n\nShri Kishan Singh\n\nand others\n\nTl1' Stai. of Rajasthan and\n\nothers\n\nVenkalaram,\n\nAl7a' j.\n\nerent from that which prevailed in others. Repelling the contention that this differentiation offended the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court observed :\n\n\"Each State has the right to make political subdivisions of its territory for m'unicipal purposes, and to regulate, their local government. As respects the administration of justice, it may establish one system of courts for cities and another for rural districts; one system for one portion of its territory and another system for another portion. Convenience, if not necessity, often requires this to be done, and it would seriously interfere with the power of a State to regulate its internal affairs to deny to it this right ......... .\n\nIf a Mexican State should be acquired by a treaty and added to an adjoining State or part of a State in the United States, and the two should be erected into a new State, it cannot be doubted that such new State might allow the Mexican laws and judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion and the common law and its corresponding judicature in the other portion. Such an arrangement would not be prohibited in any fair construction of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nIt would not be based on any respect of persons or classes,. but on municipal considerations alone and regard to the welfare of all classes within the particular territory or jurisdiction\".\n\nThis Court has also repeatedly held that classifiotion might properly be made on territorial basis if tbot was germane to the purposes of the enactment.\n\nHaving regard to the fact that the conditions of tenants vary from locality to locality, we have no hesitation in holding that a tenancy legislation restricted to a portion of a Sate cannot be held on this ground alone to contravene article 14.\n\nThe second ground urged in support of the contention that article 14 has been infringed is that discrimination must result from the settlement of rent being taken up only with reference to portions of the\n\narea to which the Act applies and not to the whole of it, because the rent rate is to be fixed on the basis of\n\nthe average of the ten years preceding the settlement; and if the proceedings arc started for different areas on different dates, that might results in different rates being fixed, and that would make for inequality such as is prohibited by article 14.\n\nWe are unable to agree with this contention.\n\nSettlement operations can be conducted only by a specialised staff having technical knowledge and administrative experience, and it might be beyond the capacity of the State to undertake them for the whole area at one and the same time.\n\nTo accede to the contention of the petitioners would, in effect, be to prevent the States from carrying on settlement operations It was held by this Court in Bi'swambhar Singh v.\n\nThe State of Orissa and others(1) and in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Raiasthan(2) that a provision authorising the taking over of estates on different dates was not repugnant to article 14, , md the principle of those decisions would apply to the present case as well.\n\nThe contention that the impugned provisions are in contravention of article 14 must, therefore, be rejected.\n\nIt is then contended that the provisions in question are repugnant to article 19 ( 1) ( f) of the Constitution, because they deprive landlords of their right to realise rents from the tenants freely and without hindrance, and are an encroachment on their right to hold property.\n\nThe provision in section 82 that the Settlement Officer should, in determining the average collection for the previous ten years, exclude from consideration abnormal years as notified by the Government was particularly attacked as a device to reduce the rent payable to the landlord and an invasion of his rights to the property.\n\nWe are unable to agree with this contention.\n\nThe fundamental right which a citizen has to hold and enjoy property imports only a right to recover reasonable rent when the lands are cultivated by a tenant, and therefore, :i legislation whose object is to fix fair and equitable\n\n(I) [195+] S.C.R. 842, 845.\n\n\nSlwi Killla Siat/t\n\n..totltas\n\nTltlSlllU of ~\"\"\" ollwt\n\nShri Kishan Singh\n\nand olkns\n\nThe Stal< of Rajasthan and\n\nothers\n\nf' lnkalarama\n\n, War].\n\nrent cannot be said to invade that right.\n\nThe contention that the provision in section 82(1)(a) that abnoxmal years as notified in the Gazette should be excluded in determining average collections is calculated to reduce the rent, and is therefore unreasonable is unfounded, because a declaration that a year is abnormal is made not only when there are bumper crops but also when the yield is very low, and the provision is intended equally for the benefit of the tenant and of the landlord. A provision of this kind is usual in all tenancy legislation, and there is nothing unreasonable or unfair about it.\n\nIt was next contended-and this was the contention most pressed on us-that section 86 is bad as it confers on the Settlement Officer a power to bring the rent rates into operation from a date earlier than the succeeding year and even retrospectively from a date prior to the settlement, and that such a power was repugnant to both article 19(1) (f) and aricle 31(2).\n\nThe argument with reference to Article 19(1)(f) is that section 86 is an encroachment on the rights of a person to hold property, and can be valid only if it falls within article 19(5), that it is only a law of a regulatory character that is protected by article 19 (5), that there could be regulation only with reference to rights to be exercised in future, and that a law giving retrospective operation is consequently outside article 19(5).\n\nThis contention rests on an assumption for which there is no basis.\n\nThe question whether a law is valid under article 19(5) can arise only when there is a viobtion of the fundamental right declared in article 19(1) (f), and if the right to hold property imports, as we have held it does, only a right to recover reasonable rent from cultivating tenants, that right cannot be held to have been invaded by a law fixing reasonable rent, even when it is retrospective in operation.\n\nIf the rent fixed is reasonable with .reference to a period subsequent to the settlement, it must be reas0!lable for the period prior to it as well, and if the settlement is not an encroachment on the rights of the holder as regards the future-and th1t\n\nis conceded-it cannot be an encroa.chment as regards\n\nthe past.\n\nA consideration, therefore, of the question whether a law under article 19(5) should be regulatory, and whether a law with retrospective operation could be said to be regulatory would be wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present controversy.\n\nThe argument in support of the contention that section 86 is repugnant to article 31(2) is that to the extent that it gives retrospective operation, it deprives the landlord of the right to rent which had accrued prior to the settlement, and that is taking property without payment of compensation.\n\nBut it is well settled that a law which regulates the relation of landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within article 31(2), even though it has the effect of reducing his rights.\n\nIn Thak.ur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces( 1 ), the question 3rose for decision whether the provisions of Act XVII of 1939, United Provinces, under which the rent payable to a landlord became diminished were obnoxious to section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nIt was held by the Federal Court that they were not and in affirming this decision on appeal, the Privy Council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces(2) observed:\n\n\"The appellant relies on c_ertain express provisions of the Government of India Act. Thus he relies on section 299 of the Act which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law, and that neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes save on the basis of providing for the payment of compensation.\n\nBut in the present case there is no question of confiscatory legislation.\n\nTo regulate the relations of landlord and tenant and thereby diminish rights, hitherto exercised .: by the landlord in connection with his land, is different from compulsory acquisition of the land\".\n\nIt was finally urged that section 86 in so far as it\n\n(I) (1943] 6 IU.J. 55; A.LR. 1943 F.C. 29.\n\n(2) [19-!6] L.R. 73 I.A. 123.\n\nShri Kishan Sinzh\n\nand others\n\nTM State of Rqjasthan snd\n\nothers\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA\"arJ.\n\n!9S5\n\nSlrl Eislui~ Sifl(h\n\n\"\"\"Oihlit v.\n\nThi Stole ef Rqjasl/um \"\"\" olh<n vw.iardJ11•~ :,:\n\nconferred authority on the Settlement Officer to give retrospective operation to the rent rates was bad, because l:/le !!Xercise of il!at authority was left to his arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion, that the Act laid down no rules and prescribed no conditions under which the discretion had to be exercised, and that the power conferred in those terms must be held to be unconstitutional.\n\nThe decision in Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Aimer and another( 1 ) was relied on, in support of this contention.\n\nThere, the question was as to the validity of a power conferred on the Court of Wards to take over the management of ; m estate \"if a landlord habitually infringes the right of a tenant\".\n\nUnder the Act, the decision whether the condition aforesaid was satisfied depended on the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Commissioner, apd that was final and not liable to be questioned in civil courts.\n\nIt was held that a power which could be exercised at the absolute discretion of the authority was an encro:ichment on the rights of a citizen to hold property under article 19(1) (f) and that it was not saved by article 19(5).\n\nBut, in the present case, section 86 of the Act expressly lays down that if a Settlement Officer decides to bring rates into operation from a date earlier than the following 1st of July, it must be for reasons. There is no force in the contention that section 86 does not lay down under what circumstances such an order could be passed, because the very nature of the thing requires that a large discretion should be left to the authority.\n\nDiscretion which is wide is not necessarily arbitrary.\n\nIt was said that under section 233 of the Act the civil courts are debarred from enquiring into the reasonableness of the order; but that is because matters concerning revenue and settlement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts, and under section 62 of the Act, the Board of Revenue has revisional jurisdiction over all orders passed in connection with settlement.\n\nWe think that the power conferred on the Settlement Officer to fix an earlier date for giving operation to the rent rate is reasonable and valid,\n\n(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049.\n\n2S, C.lt SUPREME COUllT REPOR'I'S 541\n\nand that it invades no fundamental rights of the landlord.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we must hold that the scheme embodied in sections 81 to 86 of the Act docs not transgress any of the Constitutional limit:rtions, and is valid.\n\nIn the result, the petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.\n\nK. M. RAJAGOPALAN\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ]\n\nIndian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo. VI, C. 30)- s. 10(2) (a)-The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947- Article 7(1)-Inde.pendence, Conferral of-Automatic and legal termination of service-Persons holding civil posts in India-Previous to Independence-Whether deemed to have been appointed and continue in service after Independence-Government of India Act, 1935, ss. 240\n\n(2) and 247.\n\nThe respondent was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by open competition in 1936 and joined duty in the Province of Madras in October 1937. Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal. He went on leave in June 1947. While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947.\n\nHe sent a reply expressing his willingness to continue in service.\n\nOn 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947.\n\nThe respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service. The High Court granted the declaration prayed for accepting the respondent's contention that the order terminating his service was in violation of the\n\n1!155\n\nShri Klihan Singli\n\n/llUl lllltds v.\n\nTM Stille ef ilJJJflltltan °\"' others\n\nV enkalarama\n\n..tyyar J.\n\nS1pumber27", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 169, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 779, "end_char": 800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19(l)(f), 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 802, "end_char": 827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Marwar Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 828, "end_char": 851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 866, "end_char": 892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Marwar Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Marwar Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 81 to 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 989, "end_char": 1001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Marwar Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Marwar Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1187, "end_char": 1215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Marwar Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Marwar Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Marwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1286, "end_char": 1292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their contentions were that after the merger of Marwar in thi:- State of Rajasthan the Act had become discriminatorv as it applie<l only to the jagirdars of Marwar and not to the entire body of jagir dars of the State of Rajasthan, that settlement of rents made with reference to different areas on different dates on the basis of previous ten years' average of collections might result in different rates of rent and lead to inequality such as is prohibited by Art."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1302, "end_char": 1328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Rajasthan the Act", "statute": "State of Rajasthan the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1878, "end_char": 1891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Rajasthan the Act", "statute": "State of Rajasthan the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1968, "end_char": 1973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Rajasthan the Act", "statute": "State of Rajasthan 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 303", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3356, "end_char": 3375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3648, "end_char": 3655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3893, "end_char": 3906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4028, "end_char": 4038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4206, "end_char": 4213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "L.R. 73 I.A. 123", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4952, "end_char": 4962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5027, "end_char": 5043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (S. K. Kaptir and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kaptir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (S. K. Kaptir and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5062, "end_char": 5072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (S. K. Kaptir and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5106, "end_char": 5120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Kan Singh and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Kan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5150, "end_char": 5159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Kan Singh and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5164, "end_char": 5177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Kan Singh and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chowdhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chowdhury, for Goma, Ghisa and Rama, respondents in Petition No."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5396, "end_char": 5414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-These are aplictios under article 32 of the Constitution by certam pg1rdars of Marwar, challenging the constitutionality of sections 81 to 86 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act No."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5444, "end_char": 5454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 81 to 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5542, "end_char": 5559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5724, "end_char": 5734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5758, "end_char": 5768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6678, "end_char": 6688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 82(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7071, "end_char": 7084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kishan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7136, "end_char": 7148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nShri Kishan Singh\n\nand others\n\nTiu Slate of Rajasthan a,.", "canonical_name": "KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "K.Uhatt Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7204, "end_char": 7217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J\n\nollurs\n\nShri K.Uhatt Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe State of Raja.st/um and\n\nothers\n\nV enkalarama\n\n.4.ua: J.\n\nexceed one-third of the value of the produce of unirrigated lands and one-fourth of the value of the produce of irrigated lands."}}, {"text": "State of Raja.st/um", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7235, "end_char": 7254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J\n\nollurs\n\nShri K.Uhatt Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe State of Raja.st/um and\n\nothers\n\nV enkalarama\n\n.4.ua: J.\n\nexceed one-third of the value of the produce of unirrigated lands and one-fourth of the value of the produce of irrigated lands.", "canonical_name": "State of Raja.st/um"}}, {"text": ".4.ua", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7282, "end_char": 7287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J\n\nollurs\n\nShri K.Uhatt Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe State of Raja.st/um and\n\nothers\n\nV enkalarama\n\n.4.ua: J.\n\nexceed one-third of the value of the produce of unirrigated lands and one-fourth of the value of the produce of irrigated lands."}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7429, "end_char": 7439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7658, "end_char": 7668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7945, "end_char": 7955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th December 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8154, "end_char": 8172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting under section 81 of the Act, the Settlement Officer formulated certain proposals with reference to the rent rates in the villages comprised in the jagirs of the petitioners and they were published in the Gazette on 12th December 1953."}}, {"text": "12th January,\n\n1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8238, "end_char": 8257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Objections to those rate$ were filed by the petitioners on the 12th January,\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "13th October 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8262, "end_char": 8279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13th October 1954 the Additional Settlement Commissioner submitted his final proposals to the Settlement Officer, who forwarded the same to the Board of Revenue for sanction."}}, {"text": "4-12-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8497, "end_char": 8506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After making further enquiry, the Board passed an order on 4-12-1954 determining the rent rates payable."}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-7-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8665, "end_char": 8673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent to this, an order was also passed under section 86 of the Act bringing the sanctioned rate into operation from 1-7-1954."}}, {"text": "24th November 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8813, "end_char": 8831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "621 of 1954 was filed on 24th November 1954 before that order was, passed, and Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9080, "end_char": 9090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9290, "end_char": 9300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9393, "end_char": 9415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 81 to 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9455, "end_char": 9472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 81 to 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9569, "end_char": 9586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9629, "end_char": 9639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ra1asthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9806, "end_char": 9815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ti1e contention that sections 81 to 86 of the Act are void as being repugnant to article 14 is sought to be made out on two grounds It is stated firstly that the Act applies only to what was prior to its merger the State of Marwar, that the present State of Ra1asthan comprises Marwar and 17 other States which have merged in it, and that as the Act, as it stands, is\n\ndircted against the jagirdars in one area of the State and not the whole of it, it has become discriminatory and void."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10080, "end_char": 10090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10337, "end_char": 10346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What article 14 prohibits is the unequal treatment of persons similarly situated, and therefore before the petitioners can claim the protection of that article, it is incumbent on them to establish that the conditiom which prevail in other areas in the State of Rajasthan are similar to those which obtain in Marwar."}}, {"text": "Khalsa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10636, "end_char": 10642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary, it is stated by the respondents in para 10 of their statement that the tenants in the jagirs of Marwar were paying much more by way of rent and cesses than those in the Khalsa area of the State, that with a view to remove the inequality between the two classes of tenants within the State, a law was passed in 1943 providing for settlement of rent, and that again on 1~1-1947 another law was passed abolishing all cesses\n\n(lags) and fixing the maximum share of rent payable in kind."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11346, "end_char": 11364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are no materials on which we could hold that the impugned Act is discriminatory in character, and we cannot strike it down merely on the ground that it does not apply to the whole of the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Missouri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11474, "end_char": 11482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, some of the areas in the State of Missouri were governed by a judicial procedure diff-\n\n(1) [1879) IOI U. S. 22: 25 Law."}}, {"text": "S. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11546, "end_char": 11551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kishan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11576, "end_char": 11588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kishan Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe State of Rajaslhan anti\n\nothers\n\nV enkalarama\n\nA\"ar ].", "canonical_name": "KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "State of Rajaslhan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11606, "end_char": 11624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kishan Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe State of Rajaslhan anti\n\nothers\n\nV enkalarama\n\nA\"ar ].", "canonical_name": "State of Raja.st/um"}}, {"text": "Venkalaram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11736, "end_char": 11746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Rajasthan and\n\nothers\n\nVenkalaram,\n\nAl7a' j.\n\nerent from that which prevailed in others."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12592, "end_char": 12605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If a Mexican State should be acquired by a treaty and added to an adjoining State or part of a State in the United States, and the two should be erected into a new State, it cannot be doubted that such new State might allow the Mexican laws and judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion and the common law and its corresponding judicature in the other portion."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13532, "end_char": 13542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13603, "end_char": 13613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14104, "end_char": 14114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14763, "end_char": 14773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14923, "end_char": 14933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15035, "end_char": 15045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15262, "end_char": 15272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kishan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15946, "end_char": 15958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Slwi Killla Siat/t\n\n..totltas\n\nTltlSlllU of ~\"\"\" ollwt\n\nShri Kishan Singh\n\nand olkns\n\nThe Stal< of Rajasthan and\n\nothers\n\nf' lnkalarama\n\n, War].", "canonical_name": "KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "section 82(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16111, "end_char": 16127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16715, "end_char": 16725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16971, "end_char": 16984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17039, "end_char": 17055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17064, "end_char": 17074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17179, "end_char": 17192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17263, "end_char": 17273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17437, "end_char": 17450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17564, "end_char": 17577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17655, "end_char": 17668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18316, "end_char": 18329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18549, "end_char": 18559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18576, "end_char": 18589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18932, "end_char": 18945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19234, "end_char": 19248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19256, "end_char": 19285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19569, "end_char": 19580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19667, "end_char": 19672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus he relies on section 299 of the Act which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law, and that neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes save on the basis of providing for the payment of compensation."}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20224, "end_char": 20234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "L.R. 73 I.A. 123", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20308, "end_char": 20324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kishan Sinzh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20332, "end_char": 20344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kishan Sinzh\n\nand others\n\nTM State of Rqjasthan snd\n\nothers\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA\"arJ.\n\n!", "canonical_name": "KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "State of Rqjasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20361, "end_char": 20379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kishan Sinzh\n\nand others\n\nTM State of Rqjasthan snd\n\nothers\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA\"arJ.\n\n!", "canonical_name": "State of Raja.st/um"}}, {"text": "Vmkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20393, "end_char": 20403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kishan Sinzh\n\nand others\n\nTM State of Rqjasthan snd\n\nothers\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA\"arJ.\n\n!"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21590, "end_char": 21603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21637, "end_char": 21650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21679, "end_char": 21689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of July", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21827, "end_char": 21838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in the present case, section 86 of the Act expressly lays down that if a Settlement Officer decides to bring rates into operation from a date earlier than the following 1st of July, it must be for reasons."}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21905, "end_char": 21915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22173, "end_char": 22184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22408, "end_char": 22418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 541", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22739, "end_char": 22744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 81 to 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22876, "end_char": 22893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23117, "end_char": 23128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.\n\nK. M. RAJAGOPALAN\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ]\n\nIndian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23140, "end_char": 23153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.\n\nK. M. RAJAGOPALAN\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ]\n\nIndian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo."}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23155, "end_char": 23166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.\n\nK. M. RAJAGOPALAN\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ]\n\nIndian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo."}}, {"text": "}AFAR IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23171, "end_char": 23181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.\n\nK. M. RAJAGOPALAN\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ]\n\nIndian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo."}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23187, "end_char": 23216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23245, "end_char": 23253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23308, "end_char": 23320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "ss. 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23566, "end_char": 23573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23709, "end_char": 23715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by open competition in 1936 and joined duty in the Province of Madras in October 1937."}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23769, "end_char": 23789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal."}}, {"text": "Dindigal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23852, "end_char": 23860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23938, "end_char": 23957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24092, "end_char": 24110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24118, "end_char": 24135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24143, "end_char": 24160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "9th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24234, "end_char": 24250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "7th August, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24308, "end_char": 24325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "14th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24538, "end_char": 24555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24598, "end_char": 24613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24622, "end_char": 24636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service."}}, {"text": "7th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24735, "end_char": 24751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service."}}, {"text": "Klihan Singli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25037, "end_char": 25050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court granted the declaration prayed for accepting the respondent's contention that the order terminating his service was in violation of the\n\n1!155\n\nShri Klihan Singli\n\n/llUl lllltds v.\n\nTM Stille ef ilJJJflltltan °\"' others\n\nV enkalarama\n\n..tyyar J.\n\nS1pumber27"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25135, "end_char": 25137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_541_569_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S, C.lt SUPREME COUllT REPOR'I'S 541\n\nand that it invades no fundamental rights of the landlord.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we must hold that the scheme embodied in sections 81 to 86 of the Act docs not transgress any of the Constitutional limit:rtions, and is valid.\n\nIn the result, the petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.\n\nK. M. RAJAGOPALAN\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ]\n\nIndian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo. VI, C. 30)- s. 10(2) (a)-The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947- Article 7(1)-Inde.pendence, Conferral of-Automatic and legal termination of service-Persons holding civil posts in India-Previous to Independence-Whether deemed to have been appointed and continue in service after Independence-Government of India Act, 1935, ss. 240\n\n(2) and 247.\n\nThe respondent was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by open competition in 1936 and joined duty in the Province of Madras in October 1937. Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal. He went on leave in June 1947. While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947.\n\nHe sent a reply expressing his willingness to continue in service.\n\nOn 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947.\n\nThe respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service. The High Court granted the declaration prayed for accepting the respondent's contention that the order terminating his service was in violation of the\n\n1!155\n\nShri Klihan Singli\n\n/llUl lllltds v.\n\nTM Stille ef ilJJJflltltan °\"' others\n\nV enkalarama\n\n..tyyar J.\n\nS1pumber27\n\n!955\n\nT/,. Stale ' ef Madras and\n\nanother\n\nIL. M. Rajagopalan\n\nstatutory guarantee relating to his service under s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which remained in force till the midnight of the 14th August, 1947.\n\nHeld, I. The conferral of .Independence on India brought about an automatic and legal termination of service on the date of Independence.\n\nReilly v. The King ([1934 J A.C. 176) and Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., ([1940] A.C. 1014), followed.\n\n2. But all persons previously holding civil posts in India arc deemed to have been appointed and hence to continue in service, except those governed by \"general or special orders or arrangements\" affecting their respective cases: vide Article 7( I) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 read with section !0(2)(a) of the Indian Independence Act and sections 240(2) and 247 of the Government of India Act as adapted.\n\n3. The guarantee about prior conditions of service and the previous statutory safeguards relating to disciplinary action continue to apply to those who are thus deemed to continue in service but not to others.\n\n4. Those previously holding civil posts in India had the right> and were in fact given the option, of declining to \"continue in service\" under the new regin1e and in the event of their exercising that option they ceased to serve on and from the date of the passing of the Constitution.\n\n5. Equally the new GoYernment had the right to refuse to continue them in service and intimation of this fact given to persons ahead of time came into operation and had legal effect from the moment the new Government assumed office on 15-8-1947.\n\n6. As the petitioner was informed that his services would not be required after 14-8-1947 his services terminated on that date because this was a special order within the meani_qg of Article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947.\n\nAccordingly there was no continuance of service in his case after 14-8-1947 under the deeming provisions of that Order.\n\nLa/l's case (1948) F.C.R. 44 West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King (1905) 2 K.B. 391, Virendra Singh\n\nv. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1955) I S.C.R. 415, Raj Rajendra Malojirao Shitole v. The State of Madhya Bharat (1954) S.C.R. 748, Ladore v.\n\nBennett (1939) A.C. 468 and Govindan Sel/appah Nayar Kodakon Pillai v. Punchi Banda Mudanayake (1953) A.C. 514, referred to.\n\nCrv1L\n\nAPPELLATE Juruso1cTION : Civil Appeal No. 203 of 1954.\n\nOn appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 30th March 1954 of the Madras High Court in\n\nC. S. No. 216 of 1952.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, V. K. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (R. Ganapathy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the appellant.\n\nM. K. Nambiar (C. V. L. Narayan, with him), for the respondent.\n\n1955.\n\nSeptember 27.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-'\"fhis IS an appeal by the State of Madras and the Union of India against the judgment and decree of the High Court on a certificate granted by that Court under article 133 of the Constitution.\n\nThe appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent herein, who was a member of the Indian Civil Service, for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947, purporting to terminate his services as from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947, is null, void and inoperative and that he must be deemed to continue in the Indian Civil Service as a Member thereof.\n\nThe suit was filed on the original side of the High Court of Madras and after having been partly tried by a Single Judge who recorded the evidc:nce, was thereafter heard by a Bench of two Judges in view of the important constitutional question that arose for consideration in the case.\n\nThe Bench found in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit and hence the appeal by the State to this Court.\n\nThe case for the plaintiff is short and 5imple. He was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by open competitive examination in 1936 and joined duty in the then Province of Madras in October, 1937. Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras .in various situations.\n\nThe last office he held was as Sub-Collector and Joint Magistrate at Dindigal.\n\nOn the 2nd June, 1947, he went on leave.\n\nWhile on leave, he received a letter from the Government of India dated the 19th June, 1947, wherein he was asked whether he was willing to continue in the service of\n\nSlate of Madra.\n\nand another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalata\n\n1955 Sef Modral \"\"'.,..,,,,, v.\n\nK. M. Rajago; o/a•\n\nJ4gannadhadas ].\n\nSUPREME COURT llEPORTS [19551\n\nthe Government after the then contemplated transfer of power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947. The plaintiff sent a reply expressing his willingness. On the 9th August, 1947, however, he received a communication from the Government of Madras dated the 7th August, 1947, and signed by the Chief Secretary thereof, stating that it was decided not to retain him in service from an<i after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would therefore be terminated as on the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947.\n\nHe was directed, therefore to apply for extension of leave for which he was then eligible so as to avail himself of the full period of leave which was to his credit.\n\nOn receiving the order of termination of his services, he made attempts to get it cancelled, by interviewing the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister of the Madras State at the time. But the attempts proved futile.\n\nIn the course of these interviews he says he . wa$ given the impression that the order of termination, though issued under the signature of. the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras was in fact so issued under the sanction of the Secretary of State for India, which, according to him, subsequently turned out not to be a fact. Being then under that mistaken impression, he reconciled himself to the situation and availed himself of the full period of leave and accepted the compensation which was awarded for premature termination of services and also began drawing his pension.\n\nLater on he came to know from one Shri Seshadri, another young Civilian, who was in a similar plight and who had also filed a similar suit that certain documents produced in the course of that suit showed that these orders were passed without the sanction of the Secretary of State for India.\n\nHe accordingly brought these matters again to the notice of the Government and made further attempts to get the order in his case reversed.\n\nThese again proved futile.\n\nHe thereupon filed an application for a writ in the High Court on the 7th November, 1951, to quash this alleged illegal order against him. But the High Court rejected it on the ground of there having been\n\nloqg delay since the passing of the orders sought to be quashed: The plaintiff thereafter gave the requisite notice to the Government under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and filed this Suit on the 15th July, 1952.\n\nIn the plaint h~ made the offer to refund the amount of compensation paid to him after making such adjustments asi may be called for towards his claim for salary for the intervening period.\n\nThe plaintiff's claim is based on the contention that the termination of his services by the order dated the 7th August, 1947, . is in violation of the statutory guarantee relating to his service under section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which continued to be operative till the midnight of the 14th August, 1947, and he relies on Lall's case(1 ). To this suit both the State of Madras and the Union of India were impleaded as defendants and their defence was substantially the same.\n\nIt is to be found in paragraph 6 of the written statement filed by the State of Madras which is as follows :\n\n\"This defendant states that on the transfer <>f power to the newly constituted Dominion of India m pursuance of the Indian Independence Act .as and from the appointed day, viz., 15th August, 1947, the tenure of the service of the plaintiff came to an end and he had no legal claim to continue in service thereafter.\n\nThe; plaintiff was holding office only during His Majesty's pleasure.\n\nWhen His Majesty's Government decided to transfer its power to the Dominion of India as and from the 15th day of August, 1947, the career of the plaintiff under covenant with the Secretary of State came to a legal termination \\ as and from the 15th day of August, 1947.\n\nIt is, therefore, not correct to state that there was any termination by the Government of Madras and that there has been . utter lack of legality in the order passed by the said Government. It is further submitted that the alleged termination of the plaintiff's services was only from the 15th August, 1947, and that on such date the\n\n11) [1948] F.C.R. 44.\n\n195!t\n\nSia# of Modrtu\n\narrd onollwr\n\nK. M. RqjagopaJa11\n\nJaztllllllll/hadtl$ ].\n\nStal• of Madras\n\nand anotlur\n\nJr. M. Rajagopo/an\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nProvince of Madras acting under the instructions from the Government of India were competent to decline to accept the offer to continue in service made by the plaintiff\".\n\nThere were other minor pleas such as estoppel, etc. which, it is unnecessary to notice at this stage. The High Court negatived the defence of the State and accepted the contention of the plaintiff and granted him the declaration prayed for.\n\nThe main contention of the learned Attorney- General before us appearing for the State is that the plaintiff has misconceived the legal position, that what happened in this case was not a wilful order of termination of the services of the plaintiff which fell within the scope of section 240 of the Government of India Act,. 1935, and whose validity was liable to be tested with reference thereto.\n\nAccording to him the political changes which came into force from the 15th August, 1947, operated in law to terminate the set vices of all persons in the position of the plaintiff as and from the 15th August, 1947, that in that sitilation it was open to the new Dominion Government of India or the Governments of the various Provinces either to invite such persons to continue to be in their respective services or to intimate that they were no longer required, and that it was in the exercise of this option that the Government of Madras com municated to the plaintiff an advance intimation on the 7th August, 1947, that he would not be retained in service as and from the 15th August, 1947. The substantial question therefore, for our decision is whether this contention put forward by the learned Attorney-General is correct.\n\nIt may be mentioned that, as appears born their judgments, the learned Judges of the High Court appear to have been under the impression that this defence of automatic termination of the services was abandoned during the course of the arguments before them by the learned Advocate-General of Madras.\n\nThis impression seems to be erroneous.\n\nIn any case there is nothing to preclude the question which is purely one of law being reopened before us with our leave in view of its being\n\none of considerable importance.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has based his contention as regards automatic termination of such services on three grounds :\n\n(1) The political change which came into operation on the 15th August, 1947, resulted in creating a new Sovereign State of India and on the creation of such Sovereign State, the pre-existing contracts of service under the previous Government became automatically terminated.\n\n(2) The contract between the Secretary of State for India and the plaintiff being one of service became terminated on the Secretary of State ceasing to have control in respect or the services contemplated under the contract.\n\n(3) The statutory changes which came into operation as from the 15th August, 1947, by themselves brought about a termination of such services and the\n\npotection of section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was no longer available to a person in the situation of the respondent.\n\nFor the purpose of appreciating the above arguments it is necessary to notice the various events that lead up to the political changes, and the statutory provisions by which they were brought about, in so far as they relate to the class of services with which we are concerned in this case. The starting point of these changes was the announcement of his Majesty's Government dated the 20th February, 1947, that power would be transferred to Indian hands by His Majesty's Government by June, 1948, in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan of May, 1946.\n\nSince then the attention of the Government was engaged in the various. steps to be taken to bring about the transition as smoothly as possible.\n\nOne of the steps taken in this directiQll, in so far as it concerns this case, was the announcement by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 30th April, 1947. That announcement purported to relate to \"grant of compensation for premature termination of their service in India to Members of Civil Services app0inted by the Secretary of State and to regular officers and British Warrant\n\nStal• of Madra£\n\nand another v Ir. M. Rq, agopaku.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nStoll qf Mi111ras\n\n\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\" v.\n\nICM. R4jagopalan\n\n]4gamwJ/uldas ].\n\nOfficers of the Indian Naval and Military Forces\", and was inter alia as follows :\n\n\"I. His Majesty's Government have announced their intention that the British Government's authority in India will be finally transferred to Indian hands by June, 1948.\n\nIt is the aim of His Majesty's Government that the transfer of power should be effected in an orderly and regulated manner so that the new authorities may assume their responsibilities in conditions conducive to the best interests of India and maintenance of good relations with Great Britain.\n\nHis Majesty's Government are confident that during this period of transition the Services and all those who man them, whether British or Indian will respond to this call.\n\n2. To those serving under covenant or other form of agreement with the Secretary of State for India or who hold commissions from His Majesty the King, the transfer of power will mean premature termination on that date of a career under the ultimate authority of His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament; and for many there is added to the heavy call of present duty the burden of anxiety for their QWn future and that of those who depend on them.\n\n3. The Government of India are naturally and rightly most anxious and His Majesty's Government share their anxietv that the administration shall not be weakened by the loss of experienced officers.\n\nTo this end, Government of India undertake that those members of the Secretary of State's Services who continue to serve under the Government of India after the transfer of power shall do so on their present terms as to scales of pay, leave, pensionary rights, and safeguards in matters of discipline and that provisions to this effect should be made in the Treaty to deal with matters arising out of the transfer of power.\n\nThe Government of India will now propose to Provincial Governments that they should give similar assurances to members of the Secretary of State's $Crvice who agree to join Provincial services.\n\n4. The Government of India recognise that some [ndian members of the Secretary of State's services\n\nmay be genuinely anxious about their prospects under the Provincial administrations where they are at present employed, and every effort will be made to arrange suitable transfers in such cases.\n\n5. The Government of India agree that compensation should be payable to such Indian Officers of these services as- ( 1) are not invited to continue to serve under the Government of India after transfer of power; or\n\n(2) can satisfy the Governor-General that their actions in the course of duty during their service prior to the transfer of , power have damaged their prospects, or that the appointments offered to them are such as cannot be regarded as satisfactory in the altered circumstances; or\n\n(3) can show to the satisfaction of the Governor- General that they have legitimate cause for anxiety about their future in the Province where they are now serving, and that no suitable transfer can be arranged.\n\nB\\lt the Government of India feel that sentiments of patriotism will naturally impel Indian Officers to continue to serve their country and that, in the light of the undertaking that they have given, and the consideration that in fact Indian members of the Ser vice will have improved prospects, there is no ground, save in these special cases, for payment of compensation to Indian officers on account of the transfer of power.\n\n6. His Majesty's Government have been reviewing the whole position. They have noted the undertaking which the Government of India have given in regard to officers whom they desire should continue to serve under the Government of India. They recognise the force of Government of India's arguments, and they agree that to Indian Officers compensation should not be admissible except in the cases which I have just mentioned.\n\nMany Indian members of the Secretary of State's services will however become members of provincial services and in their cases His Majesty's Government's agreenient that they need not be compensated is conditional upon the Provincial Governments guaranteeing the existing terms of scr-\n\n19$5\n\nSt(#f of M/JIJNI\n\nqnif !lfllllhlr\n\nV• fl. M. Jl4jagf1J4la\"\n\n]ago'fltWfihatlas J.\n\nStat1 of Madras\n\nand another\n\nv. .K. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nvice. If they are not prepared to do so His Majesty's Government reserv.e the right to reconsider the matter.\n\n7. With these reservations I am now authorised by His Majesy's Government to inform members of the Secretary of State's services that they accept the obligation to see that they are duly compensated for the termination of their careers consequent on the transfer of power ................ \" After this announcement was issued, His Majesty's Government, for various political reasons, decided to advance the date of transfer of power and made an announcement on the 3rd June, 1947, detailing various steps which were proposed to be taken to bring about an early transfer of power.\n\nParagraph 20 of that announcement ran as follows:\n\n\"The major political parties have repeatedly emphasized their desire that there should be the earliest possible transfer of power in India With this desire His Majesty's Government are in full sympathy, and they are willing to anticipate the date of June, 1948, for the handing over of power by the setting up of an independent Indian Government or Governments at an even earlier date.\n\nAccordingly, as the most expeditious, and indeed the only practicable way of meeting this desire, His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legislation during the current session for the transfer of power this year on a Dominion Status basis t'o one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a result of this announcement.\n\nThis will be without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India in respect of which they have authority will remain within the British Commonwealth\".\n\nIn persuance of what was indicated herein, the Indian Independence Act was passed on the 18th July, 1947.\n\nIn pursuance of the power vested in the Governor- General thereunder a number of legislative orders were passed by him.\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Indian Independence Act as well as of some of the legislative orders will be presently noticed.\n\nBut it\n\nwill be convenient at this stage to state the further steps taken by the Government relating to the services\n\nof the kind we are concerned with, in pursuance of their plan announced on the 3rd June, 1947, to speed up the transfer of power.\n\nWithin about two weeks after the announcement of His Majesty's Government dated the 3rd June, 1947, a circular letter was issued by the Government of India to the Chief Secretaries of all the Provincial Governments on the 18th June, 1947, which inter alia stated as follows :\n\n\"That in view of the latest announcement of His Majesty's Government (dated the 3rd June, 1947), it is essential to ascertain with the least possible delay, the wishes of individual officers to whom His Excellency the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April 1947 applies in regard to continuance in service after the transfer of power.\n\nThis will enable Government to decide which officers they should continue to retain in service after the transfer of power and to make arrangements to replace officers who desire to quit service, of their own accord or whom Government may not wish to continue in service\".\n\nThe Chief Secretaries were accordingly asked to make arrangements \"to send immediately to every officer belonging to any service specified in the schedule, and serving under the Provincial Government, a copy of the enclosed letter from the Government of India to the officers concerned, where!_>y the officer was asked to communicate within ten days of the receipt of the letter whether he wishes to continue in the service of the Government or whether he desires to retire from service\".\n\nThe circular letter of the Government of India to the Chief Secretaries further asked them that in forwarding the replies received thereto from the individual officers, they may inform them, in case cl. persons who have decided to quit service, the earliest -date on which the Government will be in a position to release the officer and in case of persons who offer to continue in service, whether for any reason, they would prefer him not to continue in the service, notwithstanding the officer's desire to remain in the\n\nStaMqfMabu\n\nand ono#wr\n\nv. r;, M. RajagoJoltm\n\nJagannadhatlas J.\n\nl!lS5\n\nSl.U of Muas\n\nandonotltn\n\nK. M. Rajogopalan\n\nJ•g-..UU. . ., J.\n\nservice and pointed out that in the latter case the Provincial Government will be incurring liability to pay compensation.\n\nIn pursuance of these instruc.. tions the individual letters to the officers concerned were presumably sent and replies were obtained, and the necessary orders were passed in respect, at any rate, of such of the officers whom the various Governments were not prepared to retain in service after the transfer of power.\n\nPausing here, it will be seen that the announcement of the Viceroy dated the 30th April, 1947, and the circular letter issued by the Govern ment of India to the Chief Secretaries on the 18th June, 1947, as well as the individual letters issued by and under the authority of the Government of India to those officers on the same date asking for information from them as to their desire to continue in service or not, were all based on the assumptions clear!, stated or indicated therein, (1) that transfer of power brings about an automatic premature termination of the services, (2) on such termination, it woulJ be open to the servant concerned either to decline to continue in the service of the new Government or to offer to continue his services, and (3) that in case the individual servant intimated his desire to continue in service, it was open to the Government either to accept the offer or not.\n\nThus the continuance of service was contemplated only in respect of such of the previous servants who intimated their desire for the continuance of their services and whose offer in this respect was accepted.\n\nWhile, therefore, discontinuance of service was to be brought about by the option of either of the parties and on such discontinuance the servant was to become entitled to compensation the continuance of the service was a matter which would depend upon the mutual consent of both, viz., the individual servant and the Government concerned.\n\nThat the position so taken up must have been perfectly within the knowledge of every one of the persons to whom these circular letters were sent is virtually admitted by the plaintiff himself in his evidence and also appears clearly froni the fact that a copy of the Vicroy' s announcement dated the 30th April,\n\n1947, appears to have been enclosed with the individual letters dated the 18th June, 1947, sent to each of the officers by the Government of India.\n\nThe plaintiff himself in his letter dated the 2nd July, 1947, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, wrote as follows :\n\n\"I am in receipt of your Memorandum No. 2738 of 1947-4, Public (Special) Department, dated 5th June, 1947, enclosing the announcement of His Excellency the Viceroy. I wish to state that I desire to continue to serve the Madras Government and that I desire no transfer to any other Province\". (The reference to the date 5th June, 1947, is probably a mistake since it is clearly admitted in the plaint that the plaintiff intimated his desire to continue in service in reply to the letter dated the 18th June, 1947.) To complete the course of events as regards the imlividual case of the plaintiff, the further facts may be stated. After receiving this reply from the plaintiff dated the 2nd July, 1947, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras wrote to him a letter dated the 7th August, 1947, as follows:\n\n\"I am to say that with reference to your reply to the letter cited electing to continue in service after the transfer of power, the Government have decided not to retain you in service after 15th August, 1947.\n\nYour services will he terminated on the afternoon of 14th August 1947 and you may proceed on leave (your present leave will be automatically converted into leave) preparatory to retirement as from 15th August\n\n1947. You may therefore apply for the leave (extension of leave) for which you arc eligible direct to Government.\n\nThe Accountant-General is being asked to certify the amount of leave for which you are eligible.\n\nA formal communication will issue to you shortly from the Government of India terminating your services as from 14th August, 1947 A.N.\n\nI am to express regret that the decisions in your case has been delayed so long\".\n\nThis is clearly an advance intimation that the termination of the services of the plaintiff would become I 7-83 S. C. India./59.\n\nSla/4 of Madrt11\n\nOlldoaothlr\n\nE. M. Rqjagopala•\n\nJagaMalllulllas J.\n\nSim of Madras\n\nand anothu\n\nK. M. Rlgagopalan\n\nJagannadluzdas ].\n\noperative at the very moment when the transfer of power comes into force, i.e., on the midnight of 14th/ 15th August, 1947.\n\nThe mention of the termination on the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947, was clearly because of the official practice that a person who hands over charge of his office in the afternoon of a particular day, continues in service and draws the salary for that day. (Vide Audit Instruction (1) at page 163 of the Fundamental Rules, 3rd Edition).\n\nA letter was immediately addressed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras under date 8th August 1947, to the Under Secretary of State for India, India Office, London, and ; i copy thereof was sent to the plaintiff. The letter runs thus:\n\n\"I am directed to say that Mr. K. M. Rajagopalan, I. C. S. proceeded on three months' leave on the 3rd June, 1947, and that as he will not continue in the service of Government in India, al; ter the transfer of power, he will be entitled to compensation or settlement grant, as the case may be, as from the 15th August, 1947\".\n\nOn the 8th August, 1947, a formal Government Order No. 377 was passed which is as follows :\n\n\"Mr. K. M. Rajagopalan, I.C.S. proceeded on three months' leave on the 3rd June, 1947, and that as he will not continue in the service of Government of India after the transfer of power, he will be entitled to compensation or resettlement grant, as the case may be, as from the 15th August, 1947\".\n\nThis order was published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated the 19th August, 1947. Presumably this order (along with other similar orders) was also intimated to the Government of India and the Government of India sent a telegram to the Government of Madras on the 14th August, 1947, as follows: •\n\n\" ...... No objection to your proposal to terminate services of .......... Rajagopalan\".\n\nOn the 29th September, 1947, the Government of Madras pas<ed a G. 0. sanctioning pavment of £4,500./ as compensation for the plaintiff and ordered disbursement thereof by the Accountant-General.\n\nThis compensation was drawn by the plaintiff in April,\n\n1950. In the light of this background it is now necessary to notice the various statutory prov1S1ons which brought about the political change and particularly those which relate to the services.\n\nThe instrument which brought about the transfer of power from the British Government to the Dominion Government of India in a.:cordance with the announcements of His Majesty's Government dated the 20th February, 1947 and the 3rd June, 1947, is the Indian Independence Act, 1947, (10 & 1i Geo. 6, Ch. 30) passed by the British Parliament and which became law on the 18th July,\n\n1947. The preamble thereto is as follows :\n\n\"An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Govern~ ment of India Act, 1935, which apply outside those Dominions and to provide for other matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions\".\n\nBy section 1 of the said Act two independent Dominions to be known respectively, India and Pakistan, were to be set up in India as from the 15th day of august, 1947, with territories assigned to each of them as indicated in sections 2, 3 and 4 thereof. Under section 5, there was to be a Governor-General for each of the Dominions to be appointed by His Majesty who was to represent His Majesty for the purposes of the government of the Dominion.\n\nBy section 6 it was provided that Legislature of each of the new Dominions was to have full power to make laws for that Dominion including laws having extra-territorial operation and laws which would be valid notwithstanding any repugnancy to the law of England or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of the Parliament.\n\nIt was also provided that the assent to the laws as made by the Legislatures, was to be given by the Governor-General in the name of His Majesty without any power of disallowance by His Majesty and without any power of reservation of laws for the significance of His Majesty's pleasure. By section 7, :it was specifically provided that as from the 15th\n\n!955\n\nStat• of Madras\n\nand onothn\n\nK. M. Rajagopalon\n\nJagannadhat!as J,\n\nSlal1 of Madras\n\nand anotktr\n\nIr. M. Rqjagopalan\n\n]agOIUladMdas J.\n\nAugust, 1947, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was to have no responsibility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India.\n\nTemporary provisions as to the Government of each of the new Dominions as from the 15th August, 1947, until such time that each of the two Dominions evolves its own independent Constitution were made by sections 8 and 9. By Section 8(1) the respective Constituent Assemblies of India, and Pakistan which had already come -into existence and were functioning for the purpose of evolving a new Constitution for each of the Dominions, the first by virtue of the Cabinet Mission Plan of May, 1946, and the second by reason of the announcement of His Majesty's Government dated the 3rd Tune, 1947, were recognised as interim Legislatures for each of the Dominions.\n\nBy section 8(2) the pre-existing Government of India Act, 1935, with modifications and adaptations to be made by the Governor-General and subject to any other provision or alteration to be made by the Constituent Assembly functioning as the interim Legislature, was to continue in force.\n\nBy section 9 of the Act, the Governor-General was given various and extensive powers to make provisions in order to bring the provisions of the Indian Independence Act into operation and for removing difficulties arising in connection with the transition of power from the British Government to the Dominions and to carry on the business of the Governor-General in Council in the interim period. It was specifically provided that the Governor-General's power in this behalf was to be retrospective as from the 3rd June, 1947.\n\nIt will be seen that by virtue of the Indian Independence Act a completely independent Dominion of India was set up with a wholly independent Lcgisl:lture and with a COl?lpletcly independent Government free from any kind of fetters as regards thcit functioning, either from the British Parliament or from the British Government.\n\nThe Government of the Dominion, however, was still to be carried on in the\n\nname of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, by the Governor-General of India to be appointed by His Majesty.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General strenuously contended that these changes resulted in the emergence of India as an independent Sovereign State and that it followed therefrom, on well-recognised principles of international law, that this brought about automatic termination of the contracts of service between the prior Government and its servants.\n\nIn support of this principle of international law, the k1rned Attorney-General cited a number of authorities as also the case in West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King(1), which was quoted by this Court in Virendra Singh v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh(2). On the other hand, Shri Nambiar for the respondent stressed the fact that however independent the new Dominion Government may be as regards the functioning of its Legislature and of its executive Government, the new Government was still to function in the name of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and that, therefore, the Dominion is not on the same footing as an independent sovereign State, which obtains sovereignty over a new country by virtue of conquest or cession.\n\nHe urged that the principle of international law relied upon would not apply to such a case. In support of his contention he drew our attention to various other provisions in the Indian Independence Act and to the various legislative orders passed by the Governor-General by virtue of powers vested in him under section 9 of the Indian Independence Act as also to adaptations made in respect of various existing laws. The question as to whether the Indian Independence Act brought about a full oovereign State for each and every purpose is one of considerable importance and is not free from difficulty.\n\nWe do not wish to decide that question on the present occasion. It appears to us that the present case has to be decided with reference to the question as to what exactly has been brought about by the Indian Independence Act and the subsidiary legislatirn.1 which followed thereupon, in so far as they relate\n\n(!) [1905] 2 K. B. 391.\n\n(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 415, 427.\n\n!955\n\nStall of MaJro.r\n\nand anotMr\n\nK. M. R.ajagopalaa\n\nJagannadhado.r J.\n\nStale of Madras and .,.,,,,,,.\n\nK. M. ll<efa10/Jflkm\n\n-JaganMdhada1 J.\n\nto the tenure of persons in the position of the plaintiff.\n\nFor this purpose it is necessary in the first instance to have a clear idea as to what was the tenure of service of the plaintiff prior to the 15th August, 1947 Persons in the position of the plaintiff were recruited directly by the Secretary of State for India by virtue of the powers conferred on him under section 244(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 (or under the corresponding provisions in the prior Government of India Acts).\n\nThe persons so recruited, were appointed to the service called the Indian Civil Service.\n\nEach person so recruited had to enter into a covenant by means of an indenture between himself and the Secretary of State.\n\nThe indenture (whose form is to be found as Appendix I of the Indian Civil Service Manual) recited that the person was appointed by the Secretary of State to serve His Majesty as a Member of the Civil Service of India and that such service was to continue during the pleasure of His Majesty, to be signified under the hand of the Secretary of State for India with liberty for the covenantor to resign the said service with the previous permission of the Secretary of State or of the Government under which he was, for the time being, serving. The indenture incorporated various covenants by the appointee with reference to the exercise of his functions during the period of h_is service such as, (1) general fidelity,\n\n(2) obedience to orders of general nature, (3) keeping of regular accounts, preservation and due delivery and production of private accounts, ( 4) not to misapply or employ for improper purposes the prcr pcrty entrusted to his care, (5) not to divulge secrets, ( 6) not to accept corrupt presents or to make corrupt bargains, (7) not to trade contrary to law or regulations, (8) not to quit India without leave and to satisfy all debts due to His Majesty before departure, and (9) to make prescribed payments towards pension, etc. Apart from these covenants, his tenure was regulated by a number of statutory provisions under the Government of India Act.\n\nSection 240 .• while affirming that the service was at the pleasure\n\nof His Majesty provided that dismissal or reduction in rank should be preceded by a reasonable opportunity for showing cause against the action proposed and that dismissal (or removal) from service could only be by an authority not subordinate to the appointing authority-which in the present case meant that the appellant could be dismissed or removed only by the Secretary of Stae.\n\nThe Government of India Act contained also a number of provisions specially applicable to a person recruited by the Secretary of State.\n\nThe conditions of his service as regards pay, leave, pension and other matters were to be such as may be prescribed by the rules to be made by the Secretary of State and (in the absence of any specific rules by the Secretary of State) by the rules to be made by the Governor-General or the Governor of a Province in accordance as he was in service under. the Government of India or the Provincial Government [section 247 (1) ] . In the matter of promotions or leave exceeding three months or in the matter of an order of suspension, he was to be directly under the authority of the Governor-General or the Governor, as the case may be, exercising their respective individual judgments [sections 247 (2) and (3) ]. No award of pension less than the maximum pension under the rules could be made except with the consent of the Secretary of State [section 247 (6) l He had the right to approach the Governor-General or the Governor in the exercise of tbeir individual judgment if he had any grievance or complaint in respect of his service and a right of appeal to the Secretary of State as against the order of any authority which punished or formally censured him or interpreted any rule to his disadvantage (section 248).\n\nThe Secretary of State had to make rules specifying the number and character of the civil posts under the Crown which were to be reserved for and to be filled by persons belonging to the Indian Civil Service recruited by him (section 246).\n\nIf the conditions of the service were adversely affected by reason of anything done under the Act or for any other reason which might have appeared to the Secretary of State to justify payment of compensation, he was entitled\n\nStau qf Madr, M\n\nand anothw\n\nIC. M. Rajagopallltl\n\nJagtJtltl4dhadtU J.\n\nSlaU qf Madt-tu\n\nW OMl/tu v.\n\nK. M. Rtgaaopolan\n\nJaglllllltJdiiadtu ].\n\nthereto, the compensation being such as the Secretary of State might fix. The said sum was payable from the revenues of the Government of India or the Provincial Government as the case mav be (section 249).\n\nIt will be seen from the above that the tenure of an Indian Civil Servant was basically contractual but with conditions and prospects of such service regulated by statute.\n\nA person recruited to such service was in a very special position, in comparison with persons holding other civil posts of the Government of India or the Provincial Government. He enjoyed a number of rights and privileges attached to him by virtue of the fact that he belonged to a specially recruited service with certain high posts reserved for him and having the right of appeal to the Secretary of State in respect of matters relating to his service by virtue of sections 244, 246, 247, 248 and 249.\n\nThus the Indian Civil Service was a specially privileged class of service under the Crown with the essential characteristic of direct and ultimate protection by the Secretary of State representing His Majesty's Government. .\n\nNow it is necessary to notice the fundamental changes brought about in this behalf by the Indian Independence Act.\n\nIn the first instance the Secretary of State who, as a Member of British Cabinet, acting in the name of the Crown and responsible to the British Parliament, was exercising such control as was vested in him in respect ot the affairs of India and in particular as regards these services, completely disappeared.\n\nIt was specifically provided by section 7\n\n(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, that as a consequence of the setting up of the new Dominions as from the appointed day (15th August, 1947) \"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day were included in British India\". There was a further specific provision by way of section 10 in the Indian Independence Act as regards the Secretary of State services which was as follows:\n\n\"10. Secrettwy of State's services etc.\n\n( 1) The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, shall not continue in force the provisions of that Act relating to appointments to the civil services of, and civil post~ under, the Crown in India by the Secretary of State, or the provisions of that Act relating to the reservation of posts\".\n\nNow the India (Provisional Constitution) Order of 1947, which was issued by the Governor-General on the 14th August, 1947, under the power of adaptation vested in him under section 9 ( 1 )( c) of the Indian Independence Act and which was to come into operation simultaneously with it, gave effect to the above two provisions, viz., section 7(1)(a) and section 10(1) of the Indian Independence Act, by specifically deleting from th, e Government of India Act, 1935, the various sections relating to the Secretary of State and his services, i.e., sections 244, 246, 248 and 249 and 278 to 284-A (vide schedule to the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947). Changes were also made by the same order in sections 240 and 247 relating to conditions of service which will be noticed presently, whose chief purpose was. to withdraw the responsibility of the Secretary of State as regards matters covered by these sections. The resultant position was clearly this. (1) There was no. further recruitment to a special covenanted service by the Secretary of State.\n\n(2) There was to be no statutory reservation of posts to be made by the Secretary of State.\n\n(3) The conditions of service as made by the Secretary of State\n\nno longer continued in operation. ( 4) No :right of ; ippeal or approach to the Secretary of State for redress of any personal grievances relating to such servants, or right of compensation, etc. for any adverse action to be, determined by the Secretary of State, continued to subsist.\n\nTrue, some of the conditiom of service previously governing these persons were continued . by section 10(2) of the Indian Independence Act and the adaptations made thereunder which will be noticed presently.\n\nBut apart from the question whether such continuance is available to all the previous members of the service-a matter which will be\n\n!955\n\nState of Madras\n\nanti anothtr\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSlate of Madras\n\nand anot!:tr\n\nK. M. Rajazopalan\n\nJagannadhadtu].\n\ndealt with presently-the ultimate responsibility for the framing and maintenance of the conditions of service was no longer with the Secretary of State.\n\nIt is also true that in respect of such of these civil servants whose services were retained by the new Dominion Government the service continued to be under the Crown (as shown by the adaptation of section 240 of the Government of India Act).\n\nBut this was only because in theory the new Government of India was still to be carried on in the name of His Majesty. This was no more than a symbol of the continued allegiance . to the Crown. The substance of the matter, however, was that while previously the Secretary of State's services were under the Crown in the sense that the ultimate authority and responsibility for these services was in the British P\\}Iliament and the British Government, this responsibility and authority completely vanished from and after the 15th August, 1947, as envisaged in the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April, 1947, and as specifically affirmed by section 7(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act.\n\nThus the essential structure of the Secretary of State services was altered and the basic foundation of the contractual-cum-statutory tenure of th~ service disappeared.\n\nIt follows that the contracts as well as the statutory protection attached thereto came to an automatic and legal termination as held by the Privy Council and the House of Lords in somewhat analogous situations in Reilly v. The King(') and Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.(2).\n\nTo repel the above view of the change brought about by the Indian Independence Act. learned counsel for the respondent relied on certa; n other provisions which may now be noticed. These provisions far from supporting the contention of the respondent, clearly confirm , the above view.\n\nThe first of these is section 10(2) of the Indian Independence Act, which is as follows:\n\n\"10.\n\n(2) Every person who-\n\n(a) having been appointed by the Secretary of State, or Secretary .of State in Council, to a civil (I) [1934j A.C. 176.\n\n(2) (1940} A.C. 1014.\n\nservice of the Crown in India continues on and after the appointed day to serve under the Government of either of the new Dominions or of any Province or part thereof;\n\nshall be entitled to receive from the Governments of the Dominions and Provinces or parts which he is from time to time serving .................. .. the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects the tenure of his office or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit, as that person was entitled to immmediately before the appointed day\".\n\nThe contention of the learned counsel is that this prov1s10n clearly indicates that persons previously appointed by the Secretary of State to the Indian Civil Service continue under the new Government and that they are entitled to similar conditions of service as they had before.\n\nAccording to him the order of termination of plaintiff's service being invalid, he must be deemed to continue in service.\n\nBut, it is to be noticed that the above provision does not say that all persons previously appointed shall be continued in service.\n\nIt is very carefully worded and merely guarantees the same conditions of service, etc. to persons who ·\"having been appointed by the Secretary of State ................ rnntinue on and after the appointed day to serve under the Government ........ \".\n\nThis section has nothing to say as to who are the persons who continue in service and receive the benefit.\n\nThat was obviously left to be provided by delegated legislation in the shape of orders of the Governor- General by virtue of section 9(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act. The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, referred to above deals with this matter in article 7(1) thereof which runs as follows :\n\n\"Subject to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting his case, any person, who immediately before the appointed day is holding any civil post under the Crown in connection with the\n\nState of Madras\n\nand another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nStat1 of Madras and another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagaMadhadas J.\n\naffairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of a Province other than Bengal or the Punjab shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India or as the case may be, of the Province\".\n\nThe Schedule to this Order also shows the adaptations made in respect of sections 240 and 247 of the Government of India Act to give effect to section 10(2) of the Indian Indepoodence Act above quoted.\n\nNow section 247 of the Government of Indi.a Act as adapted is as follows:\n\n\"The conditions of service of all persons who, having been appointed by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State in Council to a civil service of the Crown in India, continue on and after the date of the establishment of the Dominion to serve under the Government of the Dominion or of any Province, shall- ( a) as respects persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Dominion, be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Governor-General;\n\n(b) as respects persons serving in connection with the affairs of a Province- ( i) in regard to their pay, leave, pension, gen~ ral rights as medical attendance and any other matter which immediately before the establishment of the Dominion was regulated by rules made by the Secretary of State, be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Governor-General; and\n\n(ii) in regard to any other matter, be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Governor of the Province\".\n\nSection 240(2) as modified is as follows:\n\n\"No such person as aforesaid (referring to the persons mentioned in section :240(1) which includes persons appoirited by the .Secretary of State) who having been appointed by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Sate in Council continues after the establishment of the Dominion to serve under he Crown in India shall be dismis.sed from the savice of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to the\n\nGovernor-General or the Governor according as that person is serving in connection with the affairs of the Dominion or of a Province, and no other such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed\".\n\nTaking these various provisions together, it is clear that the guarantee of the prior conditions of service and the previous statutory safeguards relating to the disciplinary action are now confined to such as continue in service on and after the establishment of the Dominion to s, erve under the Crnwn, i.e., of the Government of the Dominion or of a Province, as the case may be.\n\nWho the persons are who fall within the category of persons so continuing is clearly indicated by implication in article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, already quoted, which says that any person who immediately before the appointed day is holding any civil post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of a Province, shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India or, .as the case may be, of the Province. It is clear that the continuance contemplated by section 10(2) (a) of the 1ndian Independence Act and by section 240(2) and section 247 of the Government of India Act, as adapted, is the continuance impliedly brought about by this deeming provision in article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order.\n\nBut it has to be noted that this provision is specifically preceded by the qualifying phrase \"subject to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting his ta3e\".\n\nThus all persons who were pteviously holding civil posts are deemed to have been appointed and hence to continue in service, excepting those whose case is governed by \"general or special orders or arrangements affecting his case\".\n\nNow, omitting \"general orders\" which has no application in this case, there can be no reasonable doubt that the special orders or arrangements contemplated herein, in so far as the\n\nStalt of Madraa\n\nanti anothtr\n\nK. M. Rajagopalatt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nState of MadraJ\n\nand anothn ; .... v.\n\nK. M. R•jagopal1111\n\nJagamurdhadu J.\n\nmember. of the Secretary of State's services are concerned, are the special orders or arrangements which followed on the Viceroy's announcement dated the 30th April, 1947, in pursuance of which the individual civil servants had been circularised and their wishes ascertained, and the Governments concerned had finally intimated their option not to invite the continuance of the service of particular individuals as has happened in the case of the present plaintiff.\n\nTo repel this conclusion, the learned counsel for the respondent urges ( l) that . the \"special orders or arrange1I)ents\" contemplated by article 7 ( 1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 194'.7, must be valid orders or bilateral valid arrangements made by the appropriate authority, amongst which category according to him, the order of termination of the service of the plaintiff-respondent, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 8th August, 1947, does not fall, and (2) that the previous history commencing from the announcement by the Viceroy is not admissible .to construe the meaning and effect of the Indian Independence Act and the legislative orders made by the Governqr-General thereunder.\n\nAs regards the first objection above, there is no reason , to. think that the words \"special orders or arrangements\" . indicate either. a valid order or a bilateral and valid arrangement.\n\nIn view of the his t!Jry as set out above and the extreme urgency with which all these steps had necessarily to be taken before the appointed day in order to facilitate a smooth transition, the legislative authorities concerned must be taken to have proceeded on a recognition of the factual situation as it then existed. .For a similar approach in a similar situa):ion see for instance Raj Rajendra M alojirao Shitole \"· The. State of Madhya Bharat(') where this Court held that article 385 of the Constitution proceeded on_ a recognition of the factual situation, at the time, relating to the matter involved,_ Even apart from _-this answer to the objection, the .objection itself appears to be based on a misapprehension.\n\nIt is true there is no clear evidence in the\n\n(1) [1954) s.c.R. 748, 757.\n\ncase that the order of termination of the service of the plaintiff was one made with the sanction of then Secretary of State.\n\nIt may also be that the decision not to retain his services as and from the 15th August, 1947, was based on his past record as admitted in the written-statement and works serious hardship in view of his not having had an opportunity to shpw cause.\n\nBut it was an order to come into operation at the precise moment when the Indian Independence Act came into force.\n\nAt that moment the Secretary of State's concern with this matter was at an end. There i:s no reason to think that an order of this kind with the sanction of the Central Government, not purporting to exercise a power of termination of services, but acting on the assumption implicit in the Viceroy's announcement that the services would come to an automatic termination and intimating the decision of the appropriate Government not to retain the services of the plaintiff as and from the 15th August, 1947, is not within the competence of the: very Government under whose service, the plaintiff wanted to serve. The very nature of the situation demanded the taking of such anticipatory decisions and the communication of the same to the person concerned, in order to become operative at the crucial moment of the transition of power. As regards the second objection, it appears to us that the contention as regards the inadmissibility of reference to the announcement of the Viceroy and the action taken thereupon by the Central and the Provincial Governments, both in its general aspect as also with reference to -individual cases like that of th.e plaintiff, is without any substance.\n\nThe phrase \"special orders or arrangements affecting his case\" in article 7(1) of the India (Ptovisional Constitution) Order, 1947,. <:an on:ly refer to. this and similar other material culminating in the orders and arrangements relating, to the -concerned individuals. That there were any other kind of special orders or arrangements contemplated by this provision concerning' the Secretary of State's servites has not been suggested and it is clear there were none. That such pre':'iOU'li material which led up to the particular legislative prov $ion is\n\nStat• of Mtidt1JS\n\n~ IDWl/tn ....\n\nIr. Al. lllljagopalan\n\nJa1atlllihadas ].\n\nSlatt of Madras\n\nand anolher\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nadmissible in evidence has been so held in Ladore v.\n\nBennet(') which was held valid in Govindan Sellappah Nayar Kodakan Pillai v. Punchi Banda Mudanayake( 2 ).\n\nAs pointed out by Lord Atkin in the case in Ladore v.\n\nBennett(') at page 477, such documents indicate the materials which can be taken to have been before the Governor-General when he passed the relevant legislative order. This material indicates quite clearly that while the initial option to continue or not in service was with the servant concerned, the final option to continue him or not to continue him was with the appropriate Government and that the special orders or arrangements contemplated were the action taken in pursuance of that final option.\n\nIt was faintly suggested that the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April, 1947, was before His Majesty's- Government decided' to advance the date of transfer of power by nearly a yar and that the original announcement contemplated a treaty between the British Government and the future Dominion Government to regulate all these matters and that since no such treaty has in fact been entered into, the announcement was not admissible in evidence.\n\nThe fact that the transition of power took the form of legislation by the British Parliament and not of a regular treaty between the two Governments in view of the changed circumstances is not a matter which can in any way effect the situation so far as it relates to the particular matter with which we are con cerned.\n\nIt is that very announcement that has been acted upon after the further announcement of the 3rd June, 1947.\n\nThis appears clearly from the fact that the circular letter of the Government of India to the various provincial Chief Secretaries referred to this very _announcement a:nd from the further fact that the letter which was sent to each and every individual civil servant was accompanied by a copy of the said announcement.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, from the above discussion that a part from the fact that the Secretary of State\n\n(1) (1939) A.C. 468.\n\n(2) (1953] A.C. 514, 528.\n\nand his services disappeared as from the 15th August, 1947, section 10(2) of the Indian Independence Act and article 7 ( 1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order proceeded on a clear and unequivocal recognition of the validity of the various special orders and the individual arrangements made and amount to an implicit statutory recognition of the principle of automatic termination of the services: brought about by the political change.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the services of the plaintiff came to an automatic termination on the emergency of Indian Dominion.\n\nThe special order and arrangement affecting his case that was made in pursuance of the Viceroy's announcement resulted in his service not being continued from and after the 15th August, 1947, and the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration prayed for.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court in corning to the conclusion they did, have with respect, missed the significance of the phrse \"special orders or arrangements affecting his case\" used in article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, and failed to appreciate that this was to be construed in the light of all the relevant events that proceeded, commencing from and following upon the -announcement of the Viceroy dated the 30th April, 1947.\n\nThe result is that the appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances without costs.\n\n18-83 S.C.India/59\n\nSlal1 of Madrar\n\nand. anat/rer\n\nK. M. Rqjagopaltm\n\nJagannadhatlas J ~", "total_entities": 183, "entities": [{"text": "S 541", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 37, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 81 to 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 385, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. RAJAGOPALAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 407, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 410, "end_char": 421, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 423, "end_char": 431, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 433, "end_char": 446, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jagannadhatlas", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1002, "end_char": 1008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by open competition in 1936 and joined duty in the Province of Madras in October 1937."}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1062, "end_char": 1082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal."}}, {"text": "Dindigal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1145, "end_char": 1153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since then he was serving under the Government of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1231, "end_char": 1250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1385, "end_char": 1403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1411, "end_char": 1428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1436, "end_char": 1453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While on leave he received a letter from the Government of India asking him whether he was willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "9th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1527, "end_char": 1543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "7th August, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1601, "end_char": 1618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "14th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1831, "end_char": 1848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th August, 1947 he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August, 194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1891, "end_char": 1906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1915, "end_char": 1929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947 purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative and that he should be deemed to continue in service."}}, {"text": "Klihan Singli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2330, "end_char": 2343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court granted the declaration prayed for accepting the respondent's contention that the order terminating his service was in violation of the\n\n1!155\n\nShri Klihan Singli\n\n/llUl lllltds v.\n\nTM Stille ef ilJJJflltltan °\"' others\n\nV enkalarama\n\n..tyyar J.\n\nS1pumber27\n\n!"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2428, "end_char": 2430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2553, "end_char": 2559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2567, "end_char": 2596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 7( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3161, "end_char": 3174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "sections 240(2) and 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3611, "end_char": 3616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those previously holding civil posts in India had the right> and were in fact given the option, of declining to \"continue in service\" under the new regin1e and in the event of their exercising that option they ceased to serve on and from the date of the passing of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "15-8-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4090, "end_char": 4099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Equally the new GoYernment had the right to refuse to continue them in service and intimation of this fact given to persons ahead of time came into operation and had legal effect from the moment the new Government assumed office on 15-8-1947."}}, {"text": "14-8-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4182, "end_char": 4191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the petitioner was informed that his services would not be required after 14-8-1947 his services terminated on that date because this was a special order within the meani_qg of Article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947."}}, {"text": "Article 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4285, "end_char": 4297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1948) F.C.R. 44", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4485, "end_char": 4501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. K. T.\n\nChari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, V. K. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (R. Ganapathy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5124, "end_char": 5141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, V. K. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (R. Ganapathy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5143, "end_char": 5157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, V. K. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (R. Ganapathy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, V. K. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (R. Ganapathy Iyer, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5209, "end_char": 5222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar (C. V. L. Narayan, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. V. L. Narayan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5224, "end_char": 5240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar (C. V. L. Narayan, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5519, "end_char": 5530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5761, "end_char": 5777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent herein, who was a member of the Indian Civil Service, for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the 7th August, 1947, purporting to terminate his services as from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947, is null, void and inoperative and that he must be deemed to continue in the Indian Civil Service as a Member thereof."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6030, "end_char": 6050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was filed on the original side of the High Court of Madras and after having been partly tried by a Single Judge who recorded the evidc:nce, was thereafter heard by a Bench of two Judges in view of the important constitutional question that arose for consideration in the case."}}, {"text": "2nd June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2nd June, 1947, he went on leave."}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajagopalata", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6984, "end_char": 7002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalata\n\n1955 Sef Modral \"\"'.,..,,,,,", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajago", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7037, "end_char": 7049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nK. M. Rajago; o/a•\n\nJ4gannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "Seshadri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8670, "end_char": 8678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on he came to know from one Shri Seshadri, another young Civilian, who was in a similar plight and who had also filed a similar suit that certain documents produced in the course of that suit showed that these orders were passed without the sanction of the Secretary of State for India."}}, {"text": "7th November, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9164, "end_char": 9182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He thereupon filed an application for a writ in the High Court on the 7th November, 1951, to quash this alleged illegal order against him."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9440, "end_char": 9450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9506, "end_char": 9521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the High Court rejected it on the ground of there having been\n\nloqg delay since the passing of the orders sought to be quashed: The plaintiff thereafter gave the requisite notice to the Government under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and filed this Suit on the 15th July, 1952."}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9917, "end_char": 9928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9936, "end_char": 9965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10060, "end_char": 10064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is in violation of the statutory guarantee relating to his service under section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which continued to be operative till the midnight of the 14th August, 1947, and he relies on Lall's case(1 )."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10123, "end_char": 10137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this suit both the State of Madras and the Union of India were impleaded as defendants and their defence was substantially the same."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India m pursuance of the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10403, "end_char": 10463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10813, "end_char": 10837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When His Majesty's Government decided to transfer its power to the Dominion of India as and from the 15th day of August, 1947, the career of the plaintiff under covenant with the Secretary of State came to a legal termination \\ as and from the 15th day of August, 1947."}}, {"text": "[1948] F.C.R. 44", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11323, "end_char": 11339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. M. RqjagopaJa11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11379, "end_char": 11397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195!t\n\nSiaof Modrtu\n\narrd onollwr\n\nK. M. RqjagopaJa11\n\nJaztllllllll/hadtl$ ].", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "M. Rajagopo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11457, "end_char": 11468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stal• of Madras\n\nand anotlur\n\nJr. M. Rajagopo/an\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nProvince of Madras acting under the instructions from the Government of India were competent to decline to accept the offer to continue in service made by the plaintiff\".", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11473, "end_char": 11486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stal• of Madras\n\nand anotlur\n\nJr. M. Rajagopo/an\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nProvince of Madras acting under the instructions from the Government of India were competent to decline to accept the offer to continue in service made by the plaintiff\".", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhatlas"}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12185, "end_char": 12196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14441, "end_char": 14452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14460, "end_char": 14489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14950, "end_char": 14969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The starting point of these changes was the announcement of his Majesty's Government dated the 20th February, 1947, that power would be transferred to Indian hands by His Majesty's Government by June, 1948, in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan of May, 1946."}}, {"text": "30th April, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15403, "end_char": 15419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the steps taken in this directiQll, in so far as it concerns this case, was the announcement by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 30th April, 1947."}}, {"text": "R4jagopalan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15754, "end_char": 15765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R4jagopalan\n\n]4gamwJ/uldas ]."}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16323, "end_char": 16330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the aim of His Majesty's Government that the transfer of power should be effected in an orderly and regulated manner so that the new authorities may assume their responsibilities in conditions conducive to the best interests of India and maintenance of good relations with Great Britain."}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16800, "end_char": 16818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To those serving under covenant or other form of agreement with the Secretary of State for India or who hold commissions from His Majesty the King, the transfer of power will mean premature termination on that date of a career under the ultimate authority of His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament; and for many there is added to the heavy call of present duty the burden of anxiety for their QWn future and that of those who depend on them."}}, {"text": ".K. M. Rajagopalan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20054, "end_char": 20072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Jl4jagf1J4la\"\n\n]ago'fltWfihatlas J.\n\nStat1 of Madras\n\nand another\n\nv. .K. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nvice.", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "3rd June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20668, "end_char": 20682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With these reservations I am now authorised by His Majesy's Government to inform members of the Secretary of State's services that they accept the obligation to see that they are duly compensated for the termination of their careers consequent on the transfer of power ................ \" After this announcement was issued, His Majesty's Government, for various political reasons, decided to advance the date of transfer of power and made an announcement on the 3rd June, 1947, detailing various steps which were proposed to be taken to bring about an early transfer of power."}}, {"text": "18th July, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21887, "end_char": 21902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In persuance of what was indicated herein, the Indian Independence Act was passed on the 18th July, 1947."}}, {"text": "18th June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22625, "end_char": 22640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within about two weeks after the announcement of His Majesty's Government dated the 3rd June, 1947, a circular letter was issued by the Government of India to the Chief Secretaries of all the Provincial Governments on the 18th June, 1947, which inter alia stated as follows :\n\n\"That in view of the latest announcement of His Majesty's Government (dated the 3rd June, 1947), it is essential to ascertain with the least possible delay, the wishes of individual officers to whom His Excellency the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April 1947 applies in regard to continuance in service after the transfer of power."}}, {"text": "30th April 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22928, "end_char": 22943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within about two weeks after the announcement of His Majesty's Government dated the 3rd June, 1947, a circular letter was issued by the Government of India to the Chief Secretaries of all the Provincial Governments on the 18th June, 1947, which inter alia stated as follows :\n\n\"That in view of the latest announcement of His Majesty's Government (dated the 3rd June, 1947), it is essential to ascertain with the least possible delay, the wishes of individual officers to whom His Excellency the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April 1947 applies in regard to continuance in service after the transfer of power."}}, {"text": "M. RajagoJoltm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24336, "end_char": 24350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "persons who have decided to quit service, the earliest -date on which the Government will be in a position to release the officer and in case of persons who offer to continue in service, whether for any reason, they would prefer him not to continue in the service, notwithstanding the officer's desire to remain in the\n\nStaMqfMabu\n\nand onowr\n\nv. r;, M. RajagoJoltm\n\nJagannadhatlas J.\n\nl!lS5\n\nSl.", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhatlas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24352, "end_char": 24366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "persons who have decided to quit service, the earliest -date on which the Government will be in a position to release the officer and in case of persons who offer to continue in service, whether for any reason, they would prefer him not to continue in the service, notwithstanding the officer's desire to remain in the\n\nStaMqfMabu\n\nand onowr\n\nv. r;, M. RajagoJoltm\n\nJagannadhatlas J.\n\nl!lS5\n\nSl.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhatlas"}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajogopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24404, "end_char": 24421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U of Muas\n\nandonotltn\n\nK. M. Rajogopalan\n\nJ•g-..UU. . .,", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "30th April,\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26642, "end_char": 26659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the position so taken up must have been perfectly within the knowledge of every one of the persons to whom these circular letters were sent is virtually admitted by the plaintiff himself in his evidence and also appears clearly froni the fact that a copy of the Vicroy' s announcement dated the 30th April,\n\n1947, appears to have been enclosed with the individual letters dated the 18th June, 1947, sent to each of the officers by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Madras Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27158, "end_char": 27175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I wish to state that I desire to continue to serve the Madras Government and that I desire no transfer to any other Province\". ("}}, {"text": "2nd July, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27623, "end_char": 27637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After receiving this reply from the plaintiff dated the 2nd July, 1947, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras wrote to him a letter dated the 7th August, 1947, as follows:\n\n\"I am to say that with reference to your reply to the letter cited electing to continue in service after the transfer of power, the Government have decided not to retain you in service after 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "15th August\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28158, "end_char": 28175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Your services will he terminated on the afternoon of 14th August 1947 and you may proceed on leave (your present leave will be automatically converted into leave) preparatory to retirement as from 15th August\n\n1947."}}, {"text": "E. M. Rqjagopala•", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28764, "end_char": 28781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sla/4 of Madrt11\n\nOlldoaothlr\n\nE. M. Rqjagopala•\n\nJagaMalllulllas J.\n\nSim of Madras\n\nand anothu\n\nK. M. Rlgagopalan\n\nJagannadluzdas ]."}}, {"text": "JagaMalllulllas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28783, "end_char": 28798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sla/4 of Madrt11\n\nOlldoaothlr\n\nE. M. Rqjagopala•\n\nJagaMalllulllas J.\n\nSim of Madras\n\nand anothu\n\nK. M. Rlgagopalan\n\nJagannadluzdas ]."}}, {"text": "K. M. Rlgagopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28830, "end_char": 28847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sla/4 of Madrt11\n\nOlldoaothlr\n\nE. M. Rqjagopala•\n\nJagaMalllulllas J.\n\nSim of Madras\n\nand anothu\n\nK. M. Rlgagopalan\n\nJagannadluzdas ].", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29508, "end_char": 29514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A letter was immediately addressed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras under date 8th August 1947, to the Under Secretary of State for India, India Office, London, and ; i copy thereof was sent to the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajagopalan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29618, "end_char": 29635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter runs thus:\n\n\"I am directed to say that Mr. K. M. Rajagopalan, I. C. S. proceeded on three months' leave on the 3rd June, 1947, and that as he will not continue in the service of Government in India, al; ter the transfer of power, he will be entitled to compensation or settlement grant, as the case may be, as from the 15th August, 1947\".", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "8th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29922, "end_char": 29938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th August, 1947, a formal Government Order No."}}, {"text": "19th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30373, "end_char": 30390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated the 19th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "Rajagopalan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30682, "end_char": 30693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Presumably this order (along with other similar orders) was also intimated to the Government of India and the Government of India sent a telegram to the Government of Madras on the 14th August, 1947, as follows: •\n\n\" ...... No objection to your proposal to terminate services of .......... Rajagopalan\".", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "29th September, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30704, "end_char": 30724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th September, 1947, the Government of Madras pas<ed a G. 0."}}, {"text": "Dominion Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31237, "end_char": 31265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The instrument which brought about the transfer of power from the British Government to the Dominion Government of India in a.:cordance with the announcements of His Majesty's Government dated the 20th February, 1947 and the 3rd June, 1947, is the Indian Independence Act, 1947, (10 & 1i Geo."}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31393, "end_char": 31422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "18th July,\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31510, "end_char": 31526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30) passed by the British Parliament and which became law on the 18th July,\n\n1947."}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31727, "end_char": 31742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31888, "end_char": 31897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31976, "end_char": 31984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 1 of the said Act two independent Dominions to be known respectively, India and Pakistan, were to be set up in India as from the 15th day of august, 1947, with territories assigned to each of them as indicated in sections 2, 3 and 4 thereof."}}, {"text": "15th day of august, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32025, "end_char": 32049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 1 of the said Act two independent Dominions to be known respectively, India and Pakistan, were to be set up in India as from the 15th day of august, 1947, with territories assigned to each of them as indicated in sections 2, 3 and 4 thereof."}}, {"text": "sections 2, 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32109, "end_char": 32128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32144, "end_char": 32153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32336, "end_char": 32345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32587, "end_char": 32594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 6 it was provided that Legislature of each of the new Dominions was to have full power to make laws for that Dominion including laws having extra-territorial operation and laws which would be valid notwithstanding any repugnancy to the law of England or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of the Parliament."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32653, "end_char": 32663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 6 it was provided that Legislature of each of the new Dominions was to have full power to make laws for that Dominion including laws having extra-territorial operation and laws which would be valid notwithstanding any repugnancy to the law of England or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of the Parliament."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32956, "end_char": 32965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajagopalon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33055, "end_char": 33072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nStat• of Madras\n\nand onothn\n\nK. M. Rajagopalon\n\nJagannadhat!as J,\n\nSlal1 of Madras\n\nand anotktr\n\nIr.", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhat!as", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33074, "end_char": 33088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nStat• of Madras\n\nand onothn\n\nK. M. Rajagopalon\n\nJagannadhat!as J,\n\nSlal1 of Madras\n\nand anotktr\n\nIr.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhatlas"}}, {"text": "M. Rqjagopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33127, "end_char": 33141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Rqjagopalan\n\n]agOIUladMdas J.\n\nAugust, 1947, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was to have no responsibility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India.", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "agOIUladMdas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33144, "end_char": 33156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Rqjagopalan\n\n]agOIUladMdas J.\n\nAugust, 1947, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was to have no responsibility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India."}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33577, "end_char": 33593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33598, "end_char": 33610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd Tune, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33951, "end_char": 33965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Section 8(1) the respective Constituent Assemblies of India, and Pakistan which had already come -into existence and were functioning for the purpose of evolving a new Constitution for each of the Dominions, the first by virtue of the Cabinet Mission Plan of May, 1946, and the second by reason of the announcement of His Majesty's Government dated the 3rd Tune, 1947, were recognised as interim Legislatures for each of the Dominions."}}, {"text": "section 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34038, "end_char": 34050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34068, "end_char": 34097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34327, "end_char": 34336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of the Dominion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35185, "end_char": 35211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the Dominion, however, was still to be carried on in the\n\nname of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, by the Governor-General of India to be appointed by His Majesty."}}, {"text": "Nambiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36007, "end_char": 36014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Shri Nambiar for the respondent stressed the fact that however independent the new Dominion Government may be as regards the functioning of its Legislature and of its executive Government, the new Government was still to function in the name of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and that, therefore, the Dominion is not on the same footing as an independent sovereign State, which obtains sovereignty over a new country by virtue of conquest or cession."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36773, "end_char": 36782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. M. R.ajagopalaa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37468, "end_char": 37486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nStall of MaJro.r\n\nand anotMr\n\nK. M. R.ajagopalaa\n\nJagannadhado.r J.\n\nStale of Madras and .,.,,,,,,.", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "K. M.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37539, "end_char": 37544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. ll<efa10/Jflkm\nJaganMdhada1 J.\n\nto the tenure of persons in the position of the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "section 244(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37948, "end_char": 37962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37970, "end_char": 37999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38052, "end_char": 38075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39669, "end_char": 39680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40669, "end_char": 40680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40946, "end_char": 40958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41105, "end_char": 41116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41468, "end_char": 41479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Civil Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41670, "end_char": 41690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary of State had to make rules specifying the number and character of the civil posts under the Crown which were to be reserved for and to be filled by persons belonging to the Indian Civil Service recruited by him (section 246)."}}, {"text": "section 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41709, "end_char": 41720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. M. Rtgaaopolan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42053, "end_char": 42070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Rajagopallltl\n\nJagtJtltl4dhadtU J.\n\nSlaU qf Madt-tu\n\nW OMl/tu v.\n\nK. M. Rtgaaopolan\n\nJaglllllltJdiiadtu ].", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "section 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42288, "end_char": 42299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 244, 246, 247, 248 and 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42943, "end_char": 42978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43666, "end_char": 43675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now it is necessary to notice the fundamental changes brought about in this behalf by the Indian Independence Act", "statute": "Now it is necessary to notice the fundamental changes brought about in this behalf by the Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43692, "end_char": 43721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43863, "end_char": 43877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was specifically provided by section 7\n\n(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, that as a consequence of the setting up of the new Dominions as from the appointed day (15th August, 1947) \"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day were included in British India\"."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44006, "end_char": 44019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was specifically provided by section 7\n\n(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, that as a consequence of the setting up of the new Dominions as from the appointed day (15th August, 1947) \"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the Government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day were included in British India\"."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44071, "end_char": 44081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44229, "end_char": 44316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44736, "end_char": 44745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 7(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44895, "end_char": 44910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44915, "end_char": 44928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44997, "end_char": 45026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 244, 246, 248 and 249 and 278 to 284", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45108, "end_char": 45153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "sections 240 and 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45269, "end_char": 45289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46163, "end_char": 46176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajagopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46448, "end_char": 46465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nState of Madras\n\nanti anothtr\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSlate of Madras\n\nand anot!:tr\n\nK. M. Rajazopalan\n\nJagannadhadtu].", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajazopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46516, "end_char": 46533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nState of Madras\n\nanti anothtr\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nSlate of Madras\n\nand anot!:tr\n\nK. M. Rajazopalan\n\nJagannadhadtu].", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46905, "end_char": 46916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British P\\}Iliament and", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47354, "end_char": 47377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substance of the matter, however, was that while previously the Secretary of State's services were under the Crown in the sense that the ultimate authority and responsibility for these services was in the British P\\}Iliament and the British Government, this responsibility and authority completely vanished from and after the 15th August, 1947, as envisaged in the Viceroy's announcement of the 30th April, 1947, and as specifically affirmed by section 7(1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act."}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47594, "end_char": 47606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "To repel the above view of the change brought about by the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48106, "end_char": 48188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48415, "end_char": 48428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To repel the above view of the change brought about by the Indian Independence Act", "statute": "To repel the above view of the change brought about by the Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50326, "end_char": 50338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50469, "end_char": 50481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50712, "end_char": 50727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, referred to above deals with this matter in article 7(1) thereof which runs as follows :\n\n\"Subject to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting his case, any person, who immediately before the appointed day is holding any civil post under the Crown in connection with the\n\nState of Madras\n\nand another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nStat1 of Madras and another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagaMadhadas J.\n\naffairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of a Province other than Bengal or the Punjab shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India or as the case may be, of the Province\".", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Stat1 of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50779, "end_char": 50794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, referred to above deals with this matter in article 7(1) thereof which runs as follows :\n\n\"Subject to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting his case, any person, who immediately before the appointed day is holding any civil post under the Crown in connection with the\n\nState of Madras\n\nand another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nStat1 of Madras and another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagaMadhadas J.\n\naffairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of a Province other than Bengal or the Punjab shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India or as the case may be, of the Province\".", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "JagaMadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50827, "end_char": 50839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, referred to above deals with this matter in article 7(1) thereof which runs as follows :\n\n\"Subject to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting his case, any person, who immediately before the appointed day is holding any civil post under the Crown in connection with the\n\nState of Madras\n\nand another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nStat1 of Madras and another\n\nK. M. Rajagopalan\n\nJagaMadhadas J.\n\naffairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of a Province other than Bengal or the Punjab shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India or as the case may be, of the Province\".", "canonical_name": "Jagannadhatlas"}}, {"text": "sections 240 and 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51232, "end_char": 51252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51302, "end_char": 51315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51366, "end_char": 51377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 240(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52385, "end_char": 52399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53619, "end_char": 53631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54167, "end_char": 54180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 240(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54223, "end_char": 54237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54242, "end_char": 54253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54370, "end_char": 54382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajagopalatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55049, "end_char": 55067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, omitting \"general orders\" which has no application in this case, there can be no reasonable doubt that the special orders or arrangements contemplated herein, in so far as the\n\nStalt of Madraa\n\nanti anothtr\n\nK. M. Rajagopalatt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nState of MadraJ\n\nand anothn ; .... v.\n\nK. M. R•jagopal1111\n\nJagamurdhadu J.\n\nmember.", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "State of MadraJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55087, "end_char": 55102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, omitting \"general orders\" which has no application in this case, there can be no reasonable doubt that the special orders or arrangements contemplated herein, in so far as the\n\nStalt of Madraa\n\nanti anothtr\n\nK. M. Rajagopalatt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nState of MadraJ\n\nand anothn ; .... v.\n\nK. M. R•jagopal1111\n\nJagamurdhadu J.\n\nmember.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "K. M. R•jagopal1111", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55126, "end_char": 55145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, omitting \"general orders\" which has no application in this case, there can be no reasonable doubt that the special orders or arrangements contemplated herein, in so far as the\n\nStalt of Madraa\n\nanti anothtr\n\nK. M. Rajagopalatt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nState of MadraJ\n\nand anothn ; .... v.\n\nK. M. R•jagopal1111\n\nJagamurdhadu J.\n\nmember.", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}, {"text": "Jagamurdhadu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55147, "end_char": 55159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, omitting \"general orders\" which has no application in this case, there can be no reasonable doubt that the special orders or arrangements contemplated herein, in so far as the\n\nStalt of Madraa\n\nanti anothtr\n\nK. M. Rajagopalatt\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nState of MadraJ\n\nand anothn ; .... v.\n\nK. M. R•jagopal1111\n\nJagamurdhadu J.\n\nmember."}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55769, "end_char": 55778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raj Rajendra M alojirao Shitole", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56947, "end_char": 56978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".For a similar approach in a similar situa):ion see for instance Raj Rajendra M alojirao Shitole \"· The."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56987, "end_char": 57009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madhya Bharat(') where this Court held that article 385 of the Constitution proceeded on a recognition of the factual situation, at the time, relating to the matter involved, Even apart from _-this answer to the objection, the .objection itself appears to be based on a misapprehension."}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57040, "end_char": 57051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "was an order to come into operation at the precise moment when the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57744, "end_char": 57834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58014, "end_char": 58032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There i:s no reason to think that an order of this kind with the sanction of the Central Government, not purporting to exercise a power of termination of services, but acting on the assumption implicit in the Viceroy's announcement that the services would come to an automatic termination and intimating the decision of the appropriate Government not to retain the services of the plaintiff as and from the 15th August, 1947, is not within the competence of the: very Government under whose service, the plaintiff wanted to serve."}}, {"text": "article 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59106, "end_char": 59118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Al. lllljagopalan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 59636, "end_char": 59653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Al."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59926, "end_char": 59931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Lord Atkin in the case in Ladore v.\n\nBennett(') at page 477, such documents indicate the materials which can be taken to have been before the Governor-General when he passed the relevant legislative order."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61878, "end_char": 61891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61927, "end_char": 61936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62845, "end_char": 62857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. M. Rqjagopaltm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63254, "end_char": 63271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "anat/rer\n\nK. M. Rqjagopaltm\n\nJagannadhatlas J ~", "canonical_name": "K. M. R•jagopal1111"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_570_582_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "S1pllmb-r 28\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nDEONANDAN MISHRA\n\nfl.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR.\n\n[1955]\n\n(VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nCircumstantial evidence-Conviction based thereon-Standard of proof-Various links completing the chain of evidence-Failure to offer an explanation by the accused-Whether an additional link in the chain.\n\nThe standard of proof required to convict a person on circumstantial evi<lence is well-established by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court.\n\nAccording to that standard the circumstances relied upon in support of the conviction must be fully established and the chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances must be so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.\n\nThe appellant was convicted under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to transportation for life.\n\nThere were no eye~ witnesses to the murder and the conviction of the appellant rested solely on the circumstantial evidence which was relied on by the courts below.\n\nThe various facts which formed the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence in the present case taken together advanced the case against the appellant very much beyond suspicion and reasonably and definitely pointed to the appellant as the person who committed the murder.\n\nIn a case like the present when the various links in the chain had beez:i satisfactorily made out and the circumstances pointed to the appellant as the probable assailant with reasqnable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he offered no explanation, which if accepted, though not proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion on the entire case consistent with his innoceqce, such absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an additional link which completed the chain.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh ([1952] S.C.R. 1091 ), referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 11th May 1954 of the Patna High Court in Death Reference No. 8 of 1954 with Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1954 arising out of the Judgment\n\nand Order dated the 12th March 1954 in Sessions 1955 Trial No. 2 of 1954.\n\nDeonant1an Mishra\n\nv, B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant.\n\nThi Stall of Bihar\n\nM. M. Sinha, for the respondent.\n\n1955. September 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave. The appellant Deonandan Mishra (Deonandan Missir) who was a stenographer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Patna, has been convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for having committed the murder of his second wife, Mst. Parbati Devi, on the night of the 3rd/4th September, 1953 and sentenced to transportation for life.\n\nThe deceased was married to the appellant in or about the year 1941 and was his second wife. As appears from the subsequent events, she was considered to be a woman of loose morals.\n\nShe appears to have been forsaken by her husband as also by her father in or about the year 1945 and to have sought shelter in the Anath Ashram at Gaya.\n\nThrough the intervention of the Secretary of the Ashram and with the consent of both the husband and the father, she got remarried to one Nand Lall of Punjab in December, 1945.\n\nAfter a stay of about an year and a half with Nand Lall in Punjab, she appears to have left him on account of alleged ill-treatment.\n\nShe came back to the Anath Ashram at Gaya in June, 1947, but left it again in October, 1947. What happened thereafter is not clear from the evidence and her whereabouts between October, 1947 and August, 1953, are not known and do not seem to have been traced. All that appears is that for some time prior to the date of the murder, she was found going up and down in places near about Gaya and that particularly on the 2nd and 3rd September, 1953, i.e., two days prior to her murder she was found going between Gay:l and Patna and a place Chakand in between these two places.\n\nEarly morning at about 7 A.M. on the 4L.1 September, 1953, P. W. 10, Havildar, found a naked dead body of a\n\nIMnandan Mishra\n\nT/,. Stali of BU.or\n\njaprnadhatlas ].\n\nfemale lying in the Kabristhan at the outskirts of Gaya about a mile and a half from the police thana.\n\nIt was lying on the western verandah of the bungalow of the Kabristhan with a number of cut injuries on the neck and on other parts of the body. Report of this was carried to the police and the body was subsequently identified to be that of Parbati Devi, the second wife of the appellant. Investigation followed and the appellant was arrested on the 6th September, 1953, and put up for trial in due course.\n\nThere is no eye-witness to the murder and the case against the appellant depends entirely on circumstantial evidence.\n\nThe standard of proof required to convict a person on such evidence is well-established by a series. of decisions of this Court, of which it is sufficient to mention Hanumant v. The. State of Madhya Pradesh(').\n\nThis standard requires that the circumstances relied upon must be fully established and that the chain of evidence furnished by these circumstances should be so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant ha~, therefore, strenuously contended before us that the circumstances relied on have not been fully established and that in any case they are not enough to bring the offence home to the accused. The various circumstances relied upon have, therefore, to be briefly noticed.\n\nThe appellant belongs to a place called Chakanddih about a mile and a half from a railway station called Chakand, which is in between Patna and Gaya and which is about five miles from Gaya. It is in evidence that the deceased woman was seen alighting at the Chakand railway station on the night of the 2nd September, 1953, at about 10-15 P. M. from a train. proceeding from Gaya to Patna and that after so alighting she was found proceeding to the village Chakand-dih. It is also in evidence that she took the train again early next morning at Chakand for Patna.\n\nThe evidence further shows that on the 3rd morning at about 10 o'clock, she presented herself at the\n\n(I) [1952] S.C.R.!091.\n\nIncome-tax office at Patna, and made enqumes about the appellant from a peon of the office, P.W. 12, and that the appellant was informed about this by him.\n\nOn receiving this information the appellant came out and on seeing the woman told the peon that she was his wife and asked him to make some arrangement to keep her for the day so that he might meet her in the evening after he was free from the office work.\n\nThe peon accordingly made arrangements for her stay till the evening in the quarters of the Chowkidar, P. W. 22, who lived in the compound of the office.\n\nIn the evening of that day, i.e., 3rd September, at about 7 P.M. the appellant came to his quarters and took away this woman in a rickshaw.\n\nThese facts are spoken to by the peon, P. W. 12, and the Chowkidar, P. W. 22.\n\nIt is further in evidence that after midday on the 3rd September, 1953, the appellant filed an application for casual leave, for one day, i.e., 4th September and that leave was granted. That the appellant did apply for leave and got it is not disputed.\n\nThe next evidence against the appellant is that he was seen that night, travelling with the deceased Parbati Devi in a compartment of the train which left Patna at about 8 P.M. that night for Gaya.\n\nThis evidence is that of three witnesses, P. W. 1, a daffadar and P.Ws. 3 and 4, two chowkidars, all of whom were on duty at Chakand railway station that night.\n\nAll of them speak to their having seen the appellant along with the deceased woman in a third class compartment at about 11 or 11-30 P.M. that night in the train from Patna to Gaya when it stopped at Chakand railway station for a few minutes.\n\nIt is their evidence that they knew both these persons well and that these persons did not get down at that station but proceeded in the train towards Gaya.\n\nThis evidence, if accepted as it has been by both the courts below-undoubtedly is a strong circumstance against the appellant inasmuch as it makes out that the appellant was last seen with the murdered woman a few hours before the tinu: when the murder must have taken place.\n\nThis evidence has been strongly clialle.tiged. The appellant admitted that the murdered\n\nDeonandan Misltta\n\nT\"4 State of Bihar\n\nJagannadhaJas J\n\n.0-onandan Mishra\n\n.v.\n\nTiu SI°\" of Bihar\n\n1az-•dloata1 J.\n\nwoman met him at his office at Patna in the first week of September, but his case before the Sessions Judge was that this was not on the 3rd but on the 2nd. In answer to questions under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code by the learned Sessions Judge, he admitted that the deceased came to the Income-tax Office at Patna, to see him and that he met her there and that he made her stay in the house of the Chowkidar and that he took her from the lodging of the chowkidar in the evening on a rickshaw. But he maintained that all this happened on the 2nd and not on the 3rd and said that after taking her from the lodgings of the chowkidar, at Patna on a rickshaw, he got down at the crossing and gave her money and sent her away.\n\nHe also added that once formerly she had come to his office to demand money. His case that he met the deceased woman at Patna on the 2nd and not on the 3rd was not accepted by both the courts below. Not only was there the evidence of the peon,\n\nP.W. 12, and the chowkidar, P.W. 22, in support of the prosecution case as to the date being the 3rd but a responsible and educated person like the Inspector of Income-tax, against whom nothing has been alleged, has also spoken to the same from his personal knowledge.\n\nIt is also significant that the appellant when he was questioned under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code in the court of the Committing Magistrate did not specifically put forward his case that it was on the 2nd and not on the 3rd, that he met the woman at his office in Patna.\n\nHis answers in that court were bare denials when he was asked whether he saw Parbati Devi at the Patna Incometax Office on the 3rd and whether he asked the chowkidar to allow her to remain i.n his house for the whole of the day.\n\nHis present case that he met the deceased at Patna on the 2nd and not on the' 3rd appears to be afterthought. In the circumstances, the following facts, viz., that the appellant met the deceased at Patna Income-tax Office on the 3rd, that .he took charge of her tht evening from the quarters of the chowkidar of the office by taking her in a rickshaw, that he was found travelling with her by\n\nthe night train at about 11 or 11-30 P.M. at the Chakand railway station and proceeding towards Gaya, must be taken to have been fully and clearly established as found by both the courts below.\n\nThe next important circumstance alleged against him is the existence of a strong motive.\n\nThat the relations between both of them were completely strained, and that the marital tie was virtually (though not legally) snapped, is admitted and is clearly borne out on the record by the Thyagpatra which he gave to the Secretary, Anath Ashram, in 1945 authorising him to get her married to another person.\n\nIt is also admitted that the appellant had married a third wife some time before this murder.\n\nThe suggestion for the prosecution is that in all these circumstances and having regard to the bad reputation which this woman had gathered round her, as the evidence clearly shows, and in view of the fact that she started troubling him by visits at his office, the appellant had a strong motive to commit the murder.\n\nIt is urged for the defence that this woman must have had a p.umber of persons with whom she must have been carrying on love intrigues and that she must have provoked strong jealousies of various persons in and around the place where she was admittedly moving for at least some time prior to her murder and that any one of such persons might have had much sronger motives to commit the crime.\n\nNow, while it is perfectly true that there is no clear evidence about the life and movements of this woman from about October, 1947 to August, 1953, there can be no doubt that on the material before the Court, the existence of a strong motive on the part of the appellant is clearly indicated.\n\nAs has been already stated this woman left the appellant in the year 1945 and took shelter jn the Anath Ashram, Gaya. Ex. 2 (a), a Thyagpatra executed by the appellant on the 12th October, 1945, shows that he purported to give up all rights , over this woman as a husband and authorised the Ashram to arrange to get her married according to her choice.\n\nSimultaneously with this Thyagpatra, he als0 sent a letter to the Secretary~\n\nDlonandan Mishra v.\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nDlonandan Mi1hta ...\n\nTill Stall of Bihm\n\nl•1annadhadas ].\n\nAnath Ashram, Ex-2-A(l), which is as follows:\n\n\"It is submitted that I have duly filled the tyagpatra (divorce form) in connection with my wife Parbati Devi and submitted the same to the Ashram.\n\nBesides this, I pray to the Ashram Samiti and the Bibah Samiti, with my folded hands that they should keep in mind to get Parbati Devi married at a very distant place in any other State, because she is woman of such a loose character that if she is married to a place near about it will bring ill fame to the A&hram and to me.\n\nAs I am an employee in the Police department, it shall adversely affect my service.\n\nI pray you not to refuse my prayer\".\n\nThe state of mind of the appellant as disclosed in this letter furnishes a clue as to how his mind would have reacted when in spite of her having been married away at a distant place, she came. back and was virtually knocking about from place to place between Patna and Gaya and went so far as to meet him in the very office where he was working to demand money. It is strongly urged that tills letter only shows the state of his mind about eight years prior to the murder.\n\nBut in view of his own admission that she started troubling rum again by visiting rum at his office, and demanding money at least on two occasions including that on the 3rd September, the courts below were perfectly justified in considering that a strong present motive on the part of the appellant has been made out.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant urges that the existence of the motive and the evidence as to the appellant having been last seen travelling in the train with tills woman on the night of the 3rd September a few hours prior to the time of the murder, even if believed are, at best circumstances whlch may create a\n\ntrong suspicion but that they are not enough by themselves to make out the guilt of the accused. It is pointed out that there is no evidence that the appellant and the deceased woman were found getting down at the Gaya station or that they were both found proceeding towards Kabristhan after so getting down. Undoubtedly there is some gap in the evidence\n\nat this point.\n\nBut their getting down at Gaya or proceeding towards Kabristhan must have taken place at or after midnight.\n\nIt is in evidence that Kabristhan was on the out-skirts of Gaya about a mile and a half from the Gaya police station, on the bank of the river Phalgu and that there was no human habitation within about 100 yards of the place.\n\nThe absence of any specific evidence, therefore, as to the appellant having been seen with the murdered woman going towards Kabristhan or near about Kabristhan is intelligible.\n\nIt cannot be denied, however, that if the circumstances against the appellant stopped short at this poin::, there may be room for hesitation. There are however further circumstances relied upon by the courts below and they require to be noticed and considered.\n\nThese further circumstances are ( 1) the finding of a blood-stained knife (pen-knife) near the dead body, and (2) the existence of certain injuries upon the person of the appellant when he was arrested on the 6th.\n\nThe evidence of P.W. 23, the officer-in-charge of Kotwali police station, Gaya, who proceeded to investigate this offence on getting information thereof at 7 A.M. on the 4th September shows that he then found the dead body of the woman, in a pool of blood underneath and near the neck, and that there was found at the time a blood-stained knife near the head. This knife was seized and marked as Ex. 1.\n\nThe prosecution has given evidence of three witnesses, P.Ws. 11, 13 and 18, who are respectively the Daftari, the Chaprasi and the Inspector attach to the Income-tax Office, Patna, in which the appellant was working, that they had seen with the appellant a knife similar to the one which was shown to them in Court, as having been found by the side of the dead body.\n\nOut of these P.W. 18, the Income-tax Inspector says in crossexamination that he had never seen such a knife \"before\".\n\nThe appellant, while in his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code admitted that he used to keep a knife for mending pencil, denied that the knife, produced in court as being the one which was found by the side of the dead body, was\n\nD1onand1Jt1 MlshrtJ\n\nTh6 Stale of Blhar\n\nJaganna4/uulu J.\n\nIJ.oMndan Misl1'a\n\nTl# Stal1 of Bihar\n\nJagannadlia4as J.\n\nhis or was like the one he kept. It was strongly urged on behalf of the defence that there was no proof that this was the very knife which the appellant used to have.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court met this criticism as follows:-\n\n\"Of course no witness could have possibly deposed that this was the knife which was in possessioa of the appellant.\n\nThey say that the knife which they had seen with the appellant prior to the occurrence was a knife similar to the one . which was found in a blood-stained condition near the dead body. We have examined that knife for ourselves and it has a peculiarity of its own.\n\nThe knife has an ivory handle. It has a cork screw and a bottle opener-all combined.\n\nA knife of this description, therefore, can be identified and it is not one of the kind which can be said to be an ordinary one\".\n\nIn view of the above observation by the learned Judges and having regard to the evidence of P.W. 18, who, though he did not speak of these peculiar features, has categorically said that he had never seen such a knife before, there is no reason to disagree with the finding of the High Court that the find of this knife near the dead body is a strong circumstance against the appellant.\n\nThe next circumstance found against the appellant is the presence of injuries on his. body at the time of his arrest on the 6th.\n\nP.W. 24, a Civil Assistant Surgeon of Gaya who examined him at 6 P.M. on t11e 6th of September, found the following four simple injuries on his person. ( 1) One wound on the left ring finger, (2) one wound on the back of left hand near thumb, (3) two abrasions in front of right knee, and ( 4) one small abrasion in front of left knee.\n\nIn his opinion, the injuries were. all about three days old.\n\nNumbers 1 and 2 might have been cawed by a sharpedged weapon such as a pen-knife and injuries 3 and 4 by some hard and rough substance such as friction against the ground. According to him, the nature and position of the injuries were . such that \"if the victim is lying on the ground and if the assailant is over on the chest of the victim and he is holding the victim\n\nby his left hand and if he is inflicting injuries near about his left hand the victim is struggling-making the assailant unsteady, then injuries Nos. 1 and 2 may be caused by his own weapon and injuries Nos. 3 and 4 may be caused due to friction against the ground\".\n\nThis answer indicates the possibility of the injuries having been received by. a person while making a murderous attack on the victim with a pen-knife. The appellant when asked about these injuries in his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code stated in the Sessions Court (as well as in the committal court) that he fell down at Jehanabad platform on the 3rd due to Dhoti getting entangled, and sustained injuries.\n\nIn support of his explanation he relied on an applicatiGn for extension of leave sent first by telegram on the morning of the 5th of September to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Patna asking for extension of leave followed by a letter of that very date to the same effect.\n\nThe letter was addressed to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Northern Range, Patna, and runs as follows:\n\n\"I beg to state that I started from home from Patna in the night train of 3rd September 1953. When the train stopped at Jehanahad I wanted to come out of the train for taking a stand on the platform due to unbearable heat in the train.\n\nAt the gate of the compartment as soon as I wanted to come out my one leg entangled with the lower part of my dhoti resulting instantaneous fel~ down from the train. Due to this accident I got injuries at both the knees and the cut marks in the bck of my left palm. I therefore request you to kindly extend my leave up to 10th September, '53\".\n\nWhen questioned under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code before the Sessions Court about the extension of his leave, he said \"I was a stenographer.\n\nHow can have I typed when my left hand was injured.\n\nHence I wanted to extend the leave\".\n\nIt appears to us, however, very doubtful, having regard to the nature of the injuries, whether this can be the real reason for his extending the leave.\n\nHe does not\n\nDI01lll1lllan Mislrr• v.\n\nT\"6 StaU of Bihar\n\nJaglJlltllllflzadl J.\n\nD10rumdan Mishra\n\nThi State of Bihi:ir\n\nJagannadh.atla1 ].\n\nsay so specifically in his application for leave. Nor, does it appear so likely from the medical evidence how injuries Nos. 1 and 2 could have been caused by the alleged fall on the railway platform. In the crossexamination of the Doctor it was suggested that if there is a broken glass piece lying on the ground and if during the fall the hand came in violent contact with that piece of glass, then such injuries may be caused.\n\nBut the appellant in his explanation and in the application for leave does not say anything which indicates that he received the injuries on the hand from a .. Qiece of glass.\n\nIn this state of the evidence, it cannot be said that the courts below were not justified in coming to the conclusion which they did, viz., that the explanation of the appellant for the injuries was false and that the injuries may well have been received on the occasion of the murder.\n\nSumming up, the various facts which formed the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence m this case, may be stated to be as follows :\n\n1. There was a fairly strong motive for the appellant to cofnmit the murder in question.\n\n2. He took charge of the murdered woman on the evening of the 3rd September by taking her out from the quarters of the chowkidar of the Incometax Office, Patna, and leaving the place with her in a rickshaw.\n\n3. He was found travelling with her by a train which was proceeding to Ga ya that night, at Chakand railway station and this was at about 11 or 11-30 P.M., i.e., a few hours priorto the time when she must have been murdered.\n\n4. The knife, which looked like the one which he was known to be using in his office and which was not of a common pattern, was. found just by the side of the head of the murdered woman stained with blood.\n\n5. V!hen he was arrested two and a half days after the murder, he had simple injuries on his hand and the knees which might well have been received, according to the medical evidence, in an assault on the murdered woman with the knife above mentioned.\n\nThese circumstances taken together, advance the case against the appellant very much beyond suspicion and reasonably and definitely point to the appellant as the person who committed the murder.\n\nIn such a situation the fact that he has no explanation to offer as to how, after having taken charge of this woman on the evening of the 3rd at Patna and after having travelled with her in the train that very night towards Gaya, he left the woman, where and how he parted company with her and what became of her so far as he knows, goes a long way against him.\n\nThe fact that on the other hand he tries to dissociate himself from her company at the relevant time by putting fo1ward for the first time in the Sessions Court, the story of having met her at Patna on the 2nd September and of his having parted company with her that evening at some crossing after giving her some money, which is patently false, is very significant. The further fact that the explanation for his injuries appears to be false is also significant.\n\nThese false explanations are telling circumstances which, in a case depending on circumstantial evidence taken with the other facts such as those in this case, are enough to bring the guilt home to the accused.\n\nTo combat this conclusion, learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the nature and position. of the injuries on the body of the deceased woman as disclosed by the medical evidence of the Doctor,\n\nPW. 17, who conducted the post-mortem examination, as also the various indications at the site of the occurrence, as found and spoken to by the policeofficer,, P.W. 23, who was the first officer to go to the scene by about 7 A.M. on the 4th on receiving information.\n\nHe also drew our attention to the fact that according to the report of the Serologist and Chemical Examiner, no human blood appeared to have been found on the saree and the bodice found lying near about the place where the dead body was lying and that neither the saree nor the bodice showed anv indication of having been torn or tampered with , and that on the other hand the body was found lying absolutley naked with face upwards.\n\nThese features\n\nDeonandan Mishra\n\nThe Stak of Bihar\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nDllJIUlnllan Mislita\n\nTiu State of Bifuw\n\nJagamuzahadas J.\n\nhave all been pressed into service for a strong argu ment that the murder must have been the act of more than one person and probably having its source in sex jealousy.\n\nWe have very closely and anxiously gone into this aspect of the matter by carefully scrutinising the entire evidence in this behalf. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the same.\n\nWhatever may have been the actual situation on the spot and the method by which the murder was in_ fact committed-a matter for mere speculation-we are satisfied that the murder could have been committed by a single individual in the .. position of the appellant. Sitting in an appeal by way of special leave, we are not prepared to say that the medical evidence and other concomitant circumstances were such as to compel a conclusion contrary to that arrived at by the Courts below. It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence not only should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly established, but the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. But in a case like this where the various links as stated above have been satisfactody made out and the circumstances point to the appellant as the prqbable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he offers no explanation, which if accepted, though not proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion on the entire case consistent with his innocence, such absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an additional link which completes the chain. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this is a case which satisfies the standards requisite for conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence.\n\nWe find, therefore, no sufficient reason to differ from the view taken by the lower courts and this appeal must accordingly be dismissed.", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 2, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DEONANDAN MISHRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Deonant1an Mishra", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jagannadlia4as", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 473, "end_char": 486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The standard of proof required to convict a person on circumstantial evi<lence is well-established by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 820, "end_char": 826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 834, "end_char": 851, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Deonant1an Mishra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2305, "end_char": 2322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deonant1an Mishra\n\nv, B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Deonant1an Mishra"}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2327, "end_char": 2343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deonant1an Mishra\n\nv, B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. M. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2385, "end_char": 2396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi Stall of Bihar\n\nM. M. Sinha, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Deonandan Mishra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2550, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Deonandan Mishra (Deonandan Missir) who was a stenographer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Patna, has been convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for having committed the murder of his second wife, Mst.", "canonical_name": "Deonant1an Mishra"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2697, "end_char": 2708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2716, "end_char": 2733, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parbati Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2791, "end_char": 2803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parbati Devi, on the night of the 3rd/4th September, 1953 and sentenced to transportation for life."}}, {"text": "3rd/4th September, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2825, "end_char": 2848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parbati Devi, on the night of the 3rd/4th September, 1953 and sentenced to transportation for life."}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3222, "end_char": 3226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She appears to have been forsaken by her husband as also by her father in or about the year 1945 and to have sought shelter in the Anath Ashram at Gaya."}}, {"text": "Nand Lall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Through the intervention of the Secretary of the Ashram and with the consent of both the husband and the father, she got remarried to one Nand Lall of Punjab in December, 1945."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3380, "end_char": 3386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Through the intervention of the Secretary of the Ashram and with the consent of both the husband and the father, she got remarried to one Nand Lall of Punjab in December, 1945."}}, {"text": "2nd and 3rd September, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that appears is that for some time prior to the date of the murder, she was found going up and down in places near about Gaya and that particularly on the 2nd and 3rd September, 1953, i.e., two days prior to her murder she was found going between Gay:l and Patna and a place Chakand in between these two places."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that appears is that for some time prior to the date of the murder, she was found going up and down in places near about Gaya and that particularly on the 2nd and 3rd September, 1953, i.e., two days prior to her murder she was found going between Gay:l and Patna and a place Chakand in between these two places."}}, {"text": "4L.1 September, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4155, "end_char": 4175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Early morning at about 7 A.M. on the 4L.1 September, 1953, P. W. 10, Havildar, found a naked dead body of a\n\nIMnandan Mishra\n\nT/,."}}, {"text": "Havildar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4187, "end_char": 4195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Early morning at about 7 A.M. on the 4L.1 September, 1953, P. W. 10, Havildar, found a naked dead body of a\n\nIMnandan Mishra\n\nT/,."}}, {"text": "IMnandan Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4227, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Early morning at about 7 A.M. on the 4L.1 September, 1953, P. W. 10, Havildar, found a naked dead body of a\n\nIMnandan Mishra\n\nT/,."}}, {"text": "6th September, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4737, "end_char": 4756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Investigation followed and the appellant was arrested on the 6th September, 1953, and put up for trial in due course."}}, {"text": "Chakand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant belongs to a place called Chakanddih about a mile and a half from a railway station called Chakand, which is in between Patna and Gaya and which is about five miles from Gaya."}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6017, "end_char": 6036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in evidence that the deceased woman was seen alighting at the Chakand railway station on the night of the 2nd September, 1953, at about 10-15 P. M. from a train."}}, {"text": "Chakand-dih", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6171, "end_char": 6182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "proceeding from Gaya to Patna and that after so alighting she was found proceeding to the village Chakand-dih."}}, {"text": "Chowkidar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6912, "end_char": 6921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The peon accordingly made arrangements for her stay till the evening in the quarters of the Chowkidar, P. W. 22, who lived in the compound of the office."}}, {"text": "3rd September, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7246, "end_char": 7265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further in evidence that after midday on the 3rd September, 1953, the appellant filed an application for casual leave, for one day, i.e., 4th September and that leave was granted."}}, {"text": "Deonandan Misltta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8578, "end_char": 8595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant admitted that the murdered\n\nDeonandan Misltta\n\nT\"4 State of Bihar\n\nJagannadhaJas J\n\n.0-onandan Mishra\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "Deonant1an Mishra"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8601, "end_char": 8615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant admitted that the murdered\n\nDeonandan Misltta\n\nT\"4 State of Bihar\n\nJagannadhaJas J\n\n.0-onandan Mishra\n\n.v."}}, {"text": "JagannadhaJas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8617, "end_char": 8630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant admitted that the murdered\n\nDeonandan Misltta\n\nT\"4 State of Bihar\n\nJagannadhaJas J\n\n.0-onandan Mishra\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadlia4as"}}, {"text": "onandan Mishra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8637, "end_char": 8651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant admitted that the murdered\n\nDeonandan Misltta\n\nT\"4 State of Bihar\n\nJagannadhaJas J\n\n.0-onandan Mishra\n\n.v."}}, {"text": "Tiu SI°\" of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8658, "end_char": 8675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tiu SI°\" of Bihar\n\n1az-•dloata1 J.\n\nwoman met him at his office at Patna in the first week of September, but his case before the Sessions Judge was that this was not on the 3rd but on the 2nd."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8880, "end_char": 8891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8893, "end_char": 8916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "chowkidar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9687, "end_char": 9696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not only was there the evidence of the peon,\n\nP.W. 12, and the chowkidar, P.W. 22, in support of the prosecution case as to the date being the 3rd but a responsible and educated person like the Inspector of Income-tax, against whom nothing has been alleged, has also spoken to the same from his personal knowledge."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10011, "end_char": 10022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10024, "end_char": 10047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anath Ashram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11367, "end_char": 11379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the relations between both of them were completely strained, and that the marital tie was virtually (though not legally) snapped, is admitted and is clearly borne out on the record by the Thyagpatra which he gave to the Secretary, Anath Ashram, in 1945 authorising him to get her married to another person.", "canonical_name": "Anath Ashram"}}, {"text": "12th October, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12722, "end_char": 12740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 (a), a Thyagpatra executed by the appellant on the 12th October, 1945, shows that he purported to give up all rights , over this woman as a husband and authorised the Ashram to arrange to get her married according to her choice."}}, {"text": "Dlonandan Mi1hta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13038, "end_char": 13054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simultaneously with this Thyagpatra, he als0 sent a letter to the Secretary~\n\nDlonandan Mishra v.\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nDlonandan Mi1hta ...\n\nTill Stall of Bihm\n\nl•1annadhadas ]."}}, {"text": "Anath Ashram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13098, "end_char": 13110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anath Ashram, Ex-2-A(l), which is as follows:\n\n\"It is submitted that I have duly filled the tyagpatra (divorce form) in connection with my wife Parbati Devi and submitted the same to the Ashram.", "canonical_name": "Anath Ashram"}}, {"text": "Ashram Samiti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13322, "end_char": 13335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides this, I pray to the Ashram Samiti and the Bibah Samiti, with my folded hands that they should keep in mind to get Parbati Devi married at a very distant place in any other State, because she is woman of such a loose character that if she is married to a place near about it will bring ill fame to the A&hram and to me."}}, {"text": "Bibah Samiti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13344, "end_char": 13356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides this, I pray to the Ashram Samiti and the Bibah Samiti, with my folded hands that they should keep in mind to get Parbati Devi married at a very distant place in any other State, because she is woman of such a loose character that if she is married to a place near about it will bring ill fame to the A&hram and to me."}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14015, "end_char": 14019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "back and was virtually knocking about from place to place between Patna and Gaya and went so far as to meet him in the very office where he was working to demand money."}}, {"text": "Kabristhan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15130, "end_char": 15140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pointed out that there is no evidence that the appellant and the deceased woman were found getting down at the Gaya station or that they were both found proceeding towards Kabristhan after so getting down."}}, {"text": "Kabristhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15359, "end_char": 15369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in evidence that Kabristhan was on the out-skirts of Gaya about a mile and a half from the Gaya police station, on the bank of the river Phalgu and that there was no human habitation within about 100 yards of the place."}}, {"text": "Gaya police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15433, "end_char": 15452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in evidence that Kabristhan was on the out-skirts of Gaya about a mile and a half from the Gaya police station, on the bank of the river Phalgu and that there was no human habitation within about 100 yards of the place."}}, {"text": "Kotwali police station, Gaya", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16268, "end_char": 16296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of P.W. 23, the officer-in-charge of Kotwali police station, Gaya, who proceeded to investigate this offence on getting information thereof at 7 A.M. on the 4th September shows that he then found the dead body of the woman, in a pool of blood underneath and near the neck, and that there was found at the time a blood-stained knife near the head."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17155, "end_char": 17166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17168, "end_char": 17191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jagannadlia4as", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17457, "end_char": 17471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, while in his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code admitted that he used to keep a knife for mending pencil, denied that the knife, produced in court as being the one which was found by the side of the dead body, was\n\nD1onand1Jt1 MlshrtJ\n\nTh6 Stale of Blhar\n\nJaganna4/uulu J.\n\nIJ.oMndan Misl1'a\n\nTlStal1 of Bihar\n\nJagannadlia4as J.\n\nhis or was like the one he kept.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadlia4as"}}, {"text": "6th of September", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18908, "end_char": 18924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 24, a Civil Assistant Surgeon of Gaya who examined him at 6 P.M. on t11e 6th of September, found the following four simple injuries on his person. ("}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20091, "end_char": 20102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20104, "end_char": 20127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dhoti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20251, "end_char": 20256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant when asked about these injuries in his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code stated in the Sessions Court (as well as in the committal court) that he fell down at Jehanabad platform on the 3rd due to Dhoti getting entangled, and sustained injuries."}}, {"text": "3rd September 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20775, "end_char": 20793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter was addressed to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Northern Range, Patna, and runs as follows:\n\n\"I beg to state that I started from home from Patna in the night train of 3rd September 1953."}}, {"text": "Jehanahad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20821, "end_char": 20830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the train stopped at Jehanahad I wanted to come out of the train for taking a stand on the platform due to unbearable heat in the train."}}, {"text": "10th September, '53", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21260, "end_char": 21279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I therefore request you to kindly extend my leave up to 10th September, '53\"."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21305, "end_char": 21316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21318, "end_char": 21341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D10rumdan Mishra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21759, "end_char": 21775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He does not\n\nDI01lll1lllan Mislrr• v.\n\nT\"6 StaU of Bihar\n\nJaglJlltllllflzadl J.\n\nD10rumdan Mishra\n\nThi State of Bihi:ir\n\nJagannadh.atla1 ]."}}, {"text": "V!hen", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23587, "end_char": 23592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V!hen he was arrested two and a half days after the murder, he had simple injuries on his hand and the knees which might well have been received, according to the medical evidence, in an assault on the murdered woman with the knife above mentioned."}}, {"text": "Deonandan Mishra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26002, "end_char": 26018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These features\n\nDeonandan Mishra\n\nThe Stak of Bihar\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nDllJIUlnllan Mislita\n\nTiu State of Bifuw\n\nJagamuzahadas J.\n\nhave all been pressed into service for a strong argu ment that the murder must have been the act of more than one person and probably having its source in sex jealousy.", "canonical_name": "Deonant1an Mishra"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26039, "end_char": 26052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These features\n\nDeonandan Mishra\n\nThe Stak of Bihar\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nDllJIUlnllan Mislita\n\nTiu State of Bifuw\n\nJagamuzahadas J.\n\nhave all been pressed into service for a strong argu ment that the murder must have been the act of more than one person and probably having its source in sex jealousy.", "canonical_name": "Jagannadlia4as"}}, {"text": "Jagamuzahadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26099, "end_char": 26112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These features\n\nDeonandan Mishra\n\nThe Stak of Bihar\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nDllJIUlnllan Mislita\n\nTiu State of Bifuw\n\nJagamuzahadas J.\n\nhave all been pressed into service for a strong argu ment that the murder must have been the act of more than one person and probably having its source in sex jealousy."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_583_589_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 583\n\nBED RAJ v.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nSentence, Enhancement of-By the High Court-Principles applicable thereto.\n\nA question of sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an accused person except for very strong reasons which must be disclosed on the face of the judgment.\n\nIn a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment.\n\nInterference is only called for when it is manifestly inadequate.\n\nIn the circumstances and bearing all the considerations of the present case in mind it was impossible to hold that the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial sentence.\n\nThe Supreme Court set aside the sentence imposed by the High Court and restored that of the Sessions Judge as no adequate reason\n\nhad been assigned by the High Court for considering the sentence passed by the Sessions Judge as manifestly inadequate.\n\nDalip Singh v. State of Punjab ([1954] S.C.R. 145) and Nar Singh v. State pf Uttar Pradesh ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 238), referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 88 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 7th January, 19~4 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 1953 connected with Crimizial Revision No. 461 of 1953 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 17th November, 1952 of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge at Meerut in Session Trial No. 113 of 1952.\n\nB. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta, with him), for the appellant.\n\nK. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent. 1955.\n\nSeptember 28.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The only question here is about sentence.\n\nSeptemb1r 118\n\nBid Raj v.\n\nTiu State of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nThe appellant Bed Raj and another, Sri Chand were jointly charged with the murder of one Pheru.\n\nThe Sessions Judge convicted Bed Raj under section 304, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to three years' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nHe 'acquitted Sri Chand.\n\nBed Raj appealed to the High Court and that Court, on admitting the appeal for hearing, issued notice to the appellant to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. The appeal and the rev1S1on were heard together.\n\nThe appeal was dismissed and the High Court enhanced the sentence to ten years.\n\nNow, though no limitation has been placed on the High Court's power to enhance it is nevertheless a judicial act and, like all judicial acts involving an exercise of discretion, must be exercised along well known ju_dicial lines.\n\nThe only question before us is wheth\"r those lines have been observed in the present case.\n\nThe facts that have been found by the Sessions Judge and accepted by the High Court are to be found in the opening paragraph of the lear.ned Sessions Judge's judgment.\n\nThey are as follows : \"Roop Chand, the son of Bed Raj accused, was removing the dung of the bullocks of Pheru deceased from an open space near his cattle shed.\n\nPheru protested to the boy and turned down the basket in which the boy had put the dung. The two accused who are brothers then came to the scene from their own cattle shed which was near by and there was an exchange of abuses between them and Pheru.\n\nThe accused Sri Chand then caught hold of Pheru by the waist and Bed Raj accused took out a knife and stabbed him in 3 or 4 places. The knife was then left sticking in the neck of the deceased and the accused ran away\".\n\nThe assault occurred about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd February 1952. Pheru was removed to the hospital and the Medical Officer Dr. Fa.teh Singh examined him and found that he was suffering from shock.\n\nHe found three injuries on his person :\n\nall \"simple\".\n\nHe gave the following description of them:\n\n\" ( 1) Incised and punctured wound f'Xf'X(' neck, right side lower part.\n\n(2) Incised wound 1 X \"l\" X ! \" right deltoid regior. frontal and lower part above downward. (3) Incised wound f'X 1/s\" <¥' Epigastric region\".\n\nHe said-\n\n\"Whcn Pheru was admitted in the hospital he was under shock but his condition was _not dangerous .... When Pheru came he could speak. He was not unconscious. As he was under shock no report was made for recording his dying declaration .... I cannot give the definite cause of death.\n\nI cannot tell if such an injury can cause death. There was no haemorrhage from Pheru's neck after his arrival in my hospital\".\n\nSpeaking of the injuries, the doctor said-\n\n\"Injuries 2 and 3 on the person of Pheru which were incised wounds were not punctured. It was not possible to inflict them from a sharp pointed weapon\".\n\nThe appellant was also examined by the doctor and a slight simple injury, which could have been caused by a simple blunt weapon, was discovered.\n\nThis indicates that there was a scuffle between the appellant and the deceased in which the appellant was hit over the nose and, up to a point, bears out what the appellant says in his defence, namely that Pheru was beating the appellant's son Rup Chand; he went there and tried to extricate Rup Chand; Pheru started beating him (the appellant) and he, the appellant, received a fist blow on the nose.\n\nThe depth of the injury on Pheru's neck was ! of :m inch.\n\nIn this connection the doctor says- \" A knife can penetrate lt or 2 inches in a case of deliberate stabbing\".\n\nPheru died about 12-45 A. M. on the 24th February 1952, that i~ to say, about 16 or 17 hours after the assault.\n\nThe post-mortem was conducted gy another doctor, Dr. J. K. Dwivedi.\n\nDescribing the injury on the neck-the only one we need consider as the other two were slight-he said that clotted blood was present all roun1l injury No. 1 and that- 9-83 S. C\";. Indi::i/59\n\n1955 - Btd Rq/\n\nTlir. 8~1111 of Ullar\n\nPradtsh\n\nBoSI J.\n\n1955 \"the right side dome of pleura is punctured under Bed Raj injury No. 1 and clo1ted blood present all round it.\n\nTh• Stat;01 Utt., Upper lobe of right lung\n\n(appex) is punctured for p, a, foh , i\"X.!-''Xf'.\n\nClotted blood present over the lung surface ~II round the punctured area.\n\nA branch of the Bose J.. l l d externa jugu ar vein was divi ed in right side neck under injury No. 1. . . . Death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of injury to neck\".\n\nIn cross-examination he said-\n\n\"It 'was possible and impossible also that the bleeding could be stopped.\n\nSuch injury as injury No. 1 are more likely to cause death\".\n\nAfter reviewing the evidence the learned Sessions Judge held-\n\n\"It is evident that the whole scene took just a few moments.\n\nBoth of the accused must have been in a moment of heat and before either of them could think of doing any act, the whole thing was over ...... .\n\nThat the injuries with the knife were likely to cause death is clear but they were caused at a time when the parties were in a heat and there was a sudden fight and no room for premeditation\".\n\nBecause of this, and seeing that ther was no reason to infer pre-concert, he acquitted the other accused, and by reason of those circumstances he considered that three years would be sufficient punishment and sentenced the appellant accordingly.\n\nThis was on 17-11-1952.\n\nThe appellant filed an appeal to the High Court on 13-12-1952 and that Court thereupon issued notice to him to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced.\n\nThe High Court directed enhancement on 7-1-1954.\n\nOn the same day the State Government ordered the release of the appellant on probation, under section 2 of the\n\nU. P.\n\nPrisoner's Release on Probation Act, 1938, for the full term of the sentence imposed by the Sessions Court. We are not concerned with the State Government's order except in so far as _it indicates the view that that Government took of the antecedents and conduct in prison of the appellant, matters that arc also relevant for consideration by a Court\n\nwhen determining a question of sentence: a prisoner can only be released on probation under that Act if the State Government is satisfied.\n\n\"from his antecedents and his conduct m the prison that he is likely to abstain from crime and lead a peaceable life, if he is released from prison\".\n\nThese facts were not known to the High Court when it made its order of enhancement, but it is a matter relevant for our consideration now that the appeal is before us.\n\nNow the High Court accept the findings of the Sessions Judge about the circumstances in which the offence took place.\n\nThey agree that the attack was not premeditated and that there was a sudden quarrel and that the blows were inflicted in the heat of passion.\n\nThey also say that there was counter-abuse and they notice the abrasion on the appellant's nose.\n\nDespite this they hold that\n\n\"it is possible that this injury was received by the appellant in the attempt of the deceased to resist the attack made by the appellant.\n\nThere was therefore no fight\".\n\nThis is a very half-hearted finding and ignores the fact that the benefit of all doubts must be given to the accused.\n\nIf it was only \"possible\" that the injury was due to Pheru's attempt to ward off an attack by the appellant, then it r_nust be equally \"possible\" that it was received in the course of a scuffie.\n\nThe appellant very definitely says in his examination that there was a fight and the abrasion on his nose, which the doctor says was caused by a blunt weapon, bears out his version that Pheru struck him with his fist.\n\nThe circumstances also indicate that there must have been a scuffie. Why else should it be necessary for the second accused to come and hold him down by the waist?\n\nWhen villagers or any man for that matter, come to blows after hot words and an interchange of abuse, there is nearly always resis'tance to the initial attack.\n\nVery rarely does a man \"turn the other check\". It must also be remembered that the incident started with the use of force by Pheru. It was he who took hold of the basket of oow dung and 20-83 S. C. Indiaj59\n\nBed Raj v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nBose J.\n\n,1955\n\nBtd Rqj\n\nTill Stale of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBosa J.\n\noverturned it.\n\nThat occasioned the quarrel, and the finding is that there was abuse and counter-abuse. It was then that the second accused rushed in and caught Pheru by the waist. That accused was acquitted because there was nothing to suggest that that was done. in aid of the appellant's intention to assault Pheru and he was absolved .of all intention to assault on. his own account; and the finding is that even the appellant had no such intention till the last moment.\n\nIf that was the case, then why should the second accused rush in and hold Pheru by the waist? If he had no intention to assault on his own account and none to assist the appellant in his assault, the only other reasonable conclusion is that he tried to stop a fight.\n\nIt would be fair in the circumstances to reach that conclusion, for the accused is as much entitled to the benefit of any doubt when a co-accused is acquitted as in any other case. In any case, it was incumbent on the High Court to reach a more definite finding than the one given before deciding to enhance the sentence.\n\nThe only reason that the learned Judges give is that Pheru was unarmed and as the attack was made with a knife it cannot be said that the appellant did not act in a cruel or unusual manner.\n\nNevertheless, they uphold the finding that the offence falls under section 304, Indian Penal -Code, and not under section 302.\n\nA question of a sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an accused person except for very strong reason.. which must be disclosed on the face of the judgment; see for example the observations in Dalip Singh v.\n\nStilte of Puniah(') and Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh(°). In a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment.\n\nInterference i~ only called for when it is manifestly inadequate Jn our opinion, these principles have Jlot been observed.\n\nIt is\n\n(II {UJ5f] 8. C.R. 145, 156.\n\n(2) {Jiiii~] I S. C. lt. 2311, :Ml.\n\nimpossible to hold in the circumstances described that the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial senteilce, and no adequate reasoP has been assigned by the learned High Court Judges for considering the sentence manifestly inadequate.\n\nIn the circumstances, bearing all the considerations of this case in mind, we are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the question of sentence) should be allowed and that the sentence , imposed by the High Court should be set aside and that of the Sessions Court restored. Ordered accordingly.\n\n---r-\n\nBHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nAND ANOTHER.\n\n[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]\n\nFundamental Rights, Infringement of-I.Aw void for inconsistency -'Void', Meaning of-Removal of inconsistency by amendment of the'\n\nConstitution, if revivifies the law-Constitution of India as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Arts. 13, 19(6), 31(2)-C.P. & Berar Motor Vehic!es (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act Ill of 1948).\n\nThe petitioners who carried on their business as stage carriage operators of Ma<ihya Pradesh for a considerable number of years challenged the constitutional validity of the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehides (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 19!l8) which amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) and conferred extensive powers on the Provincial Government including the power to create a monopoly of the motor transport business in its favour to the exclusion of all motor transport operators.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by new s. 43(1)(iv) a notification was issued on the 4th of February, 1955, qeclaring the intention of the Government to take up certain ro.ites. The case of the petitioners was that the passing of the Constitution and the grant of fundamental rights rendered the ltct void under Art. 13 ( 1) being inconsistent with the provisions of Arts. 19(1) (g) and 31(2), and reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme CQurt in Shagir Ahmad v. The State of T.J .P. & others. On behalf of the .respondents it was contended that although as a result of the said decision the iu>pugned Act w:iS\n\nBed iw\n\nT/14 SI/JU of Ullar\n\nPraduh\n\nBose J.\n\nSeptember 29", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "583\n\nBED RAJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BED RAJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 881, "end_char": 894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court set aside the sentence imposed by the High Court and restored that of the Sessions Judge as no adequate reason\n\nhad been assigned by the High Court for considering the sentence passed by the Sessions Judge as manifestly inadequate."}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 238", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1220, "end_char": 1239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. B. Tawakley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1673, "end_char": 1687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1690, "end_char": 1701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley, (K. P. Gupta, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1734, "end_char": 1747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1752, "end_char": 1761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bid Raj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1915, "end_char": 1922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Septemb1r 118\n\nBid Raj v.\n\nTiu State of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nThe appellant Bed Raj and another, Sri Chand were jointly charged with the murder of one Pheru.", "canonical_name": "Bid Raj"}}, {"text": "Tiu State of Ullar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1927, "end_char": 1945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Septemb1r 118\n\nBid Raj v.\n\nTiu State of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nThe appellant Bed Raj and another, Sri Chand were jointly charged with the murder of one Pheru."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1956, "end_char": 1960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Septemb1r 118\n\nBid Raj v.\n\nTiu State of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nThe appellant Bed Raj and another, Sri Chand were jointly charged with the murder of one Pheru."}}, {"text": "Bed Raj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 1986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Septemb1r 118\n\nBid Raj v.\n\nTiu State of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nThe appellant Bed Raj and another, Sri Chand were jointly charged with the murder of one Pheru.", "canonical_name": "Bid Raj"}}, {"text": "Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2004, "end_char": 2009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Septemb1r 118\n\nBid Raj v.\n\nTiu State of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nThe appellant Bed Raj and another, Sri Chand were jointly charged with the murder of one Pheru."}}, {"text": "Pheru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2054, "end_char": 2059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Septemb1r 118\n\nBid Raj v.\n\nTiu State of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nThe appellant Bed Raj and another, Sri Chand were jointly charged with the murder of one Pheru."}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2105, "end_char": 2116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2118, "end_char": 2135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sri Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2209, "end_char": 2218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He 'acquitted Sri Chand."}}, {"text": "Roop Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3041, "end_char": 3051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are as follows : \"Roop Chand, the son of Bed Raj accused, was removing the dung of the bullocks of Pheru deceased from an open space near his cattle shed.", "canonical_name": "Roop Chand"}}, {"text": "Bed Raj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are as follows : \"Roop Chand, the son of Bed Raj accused, was removing the dung of the bullocks of Pheru deceased from an open space near his cattle shed.", "canonical_name": "Bid Raj"}}, {"text": "Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3499, "end_char": 3502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused Sri Chand then caught hold of Pheru by the waist and Bed Raj accused took out a knife and stabbed him in 3 or 4 places."}}, {"text": "23rd February 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3710, "end_char": 3728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assault occurred about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd February 1952."}}, {"text": "Fa.teh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3792, "end_char": 3804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pheru was removed to the hospital and the Medical Officer Dr. Fa.teh Singh examined him and found that he was suffering from shock."}}, {"text": "Rup Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This indicates that there was a scuffle between the appellant and the deceased in which the appellant was hit over the nose and, up to a point, bears out what the appellant says in his defence, namely that Pheru was beating the appellant's son Rup Chand; he went there and tried to extricate Rup Chand; Pheru started beating him (the appellant) and he, the appellant, received a fist blow on the nose.", "canonical_name": "Roop Chand"}}, {"text": "24th February 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5557, "end_char": 5575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pheru died about 12-45 A. M. on the 24th February 1952, that i~ to say, about 16 or 17 hours after the assault."}}, {"text": "J. K. Dwivedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5687, "end_char": 5700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The post-mortem was conducted gy another doctor, Dr. J. K. Dwivedi."}}, {"text": "Pradtsh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5933, "end_char": 5940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8~1111 of Ullar\n\nPradtsh\n\nBoSI J.\n\n1955 \"the right side dome of pleura is punctured under Bed Raj injury No."}}, {"text": "17-11-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7311, "end_char": 7321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was on 17-11-1952."}}, {"text": "13-12-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7375, "end_char": 7385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed an appeal to the High Court on 13-12-1952 and that Court thereupon issued notice to him to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced."}}, {"text": "7-1-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7527, "end_char": 7535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court directed enhancement on 7-1-1954."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7632, "end_char": 7641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Release on Probation Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7668, "end_char": 7698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bosa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10192, "end_char": 10196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was he who took hold of the basket of oow dung and 20-83 S. C. Indiaj59\n\nBed Raj v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nBose J.\n\n,1955\n\nBtd Rqj\n\nTill Stale of Ullar\n\nPradesh\n\nBosa J.\n\noverturned it."}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11573, "end_char": 11584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12891, "end_char": 12913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r-\n\nBHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nAND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12970, "end_char": 12979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12995, "end_char": 13003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13005, "end_char": 13024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "}AFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13026, "end_char": 13036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13041, "end_char": 13055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13057, "end_char": 13062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13236, "end_char": 13257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 13, 19(6), 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13368, "end_char": 13390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13721, "end_char": 13745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13747, "end_char": 13769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 43(1)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14013, "end_char": 14025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Central Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "4th of February, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14059, "end_char": 14080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by new s. 43(1)(iv) a notification was issued on the 4th of February, 1955, qeclaring the intention of the Government to take up certain ro.ites."}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14286, "end_char": 14293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Central Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14341, "end_char": 14352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Central Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "Supreme CQurt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14415, "end_char": 14428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(1) (g) and 31(2), and reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme CQurt in Shagir Ahmad v. The State of T.J .P. & others."}}, {"text": "Praduh\n\nBose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14626, "end_char": 14638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the .respondents it was contended that although as a result of the said decision the iu>pugned Act w:iS\n\nBed iw\n\nT/14 SI/JU of Ullar\n\nPraduh\n\nBose J.\n\nSeptember 29"}}, {"text": "September 29", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14643, "end_char": 14655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the .respondents it was contended that although as a result of the said decision the iu>pugned Act w:iS\n\nBed iw\n\nT/14 SI/JU of Ullar\n\nPraduh\n\nBose J.\n\nSeptember 29"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_589_602_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 589\n\nimpossible to hold in the circumstances described that the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial senteilce, and no adequate reasoP has been assigned by the learned High Court Judges for considering the sentence manifestly inadequate.\n\nIn the circumstances, bearing all the considerations of this case in mind, we are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the question of sentence) should be allowed and that the sentence , imposed by the High Court should be set aside and that of the Sessions Court restored. Ordered accordingly.\n\n---r-\n\nBHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nAND ANOTHER.\n\n[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]\n\nFundamental Rights, Infringement of-I.Aw void for inconsistency -'Void', Meaning of-Removal of inconsistency by amendment of the'\n\nConstitution, if revivifies the law-Constitution of India as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Arts. 13, 19(6), 31(2)-C.P. & Berar Motor Vehic!es (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act Ill of 1948).\n\nThe petitioners who carried on their business as stage carriage operators of Ma<ihya Pradesh for a considerable number of years challenged the constitutional validity of the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehides (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 19!l8) which amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) and conferred extensive powers on the Provincial Government including the power to create a monopoly of the motor transport business in its favour to the exclusion of all motor transport operators.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by new s. 43(1)(iv) a notification was issued on the 4th of February, 1955, qeclaring the intention of the Government to take up certain ro.ites. The case of the petitioners was that the passing of the Constitution and the grant of fundamental rights rendered the ltct void under Art. 13 ( 1) being inconsistent with the provisions of Arts. 19(1) (g) and 31(2), and reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme CQurt in Shagir Ahmad v. The State of T.J .P. & others. On behalf of the .respondents it was contended that although as a result of the said decision the iu>pugned Act w:iS\n\nBed iw\n\nT/14 SI/JU of Ullar\n\nPraduh\n\nBose J.\n\nSeptember 29\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras and othtrs\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nandanotlur\n\nrendered void, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, had the effect of removing the inconsistency and the Amending Act (III of 1948) became operative again. It was, however, contended on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Act being void under Art. 13(1) was dead and could not be revivified by any subsequent amendment of the Constitution.\n\nIt must be re-enacted.\n\nHeld that Shagir Ahmad's case had no application and the con tentions put forward by the respondents were well founded and must be accepted.\n\nThat it is well-settled that the word 'void' in Art. 13 means void to the eXtent of the inconsistency with a fundamental right and the language of the article makes it clear that the entire operation of an inconsistent Act is not .wiped out.\n\nIt applies to past transactions and the rights and liabilities accruing therefrom and continues even after the commencement of the Constitution to pply to noncitizens.\n\nKeshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay [1951] S.C.R. 288, relied on.\n\nThe true effect of Art. 13( 1) is to render an Act, inconsistent with a fundamental right, ifioperative to the extent of the inconsistency. It is overshadowed by the fundamental right and remains dormant but is not dead. With the amendment made in cl. ( 6) of Art. 19 by the first Amendment Act the provisions of the impugned Act were no longer inconsistent therewith and the result was that the impugned Act began to operate once again from the date of such amendment with this difference that, unlike amended clause (2) of Art. 19 which was expressly made retrospective, no rights and obligations could be founded on the provisions of the impugned Act from the date of the Commencement of the Constitution till the date of the amendment. The notification declaring the intention of the State to take over the bus routes to the exclusion of all other motor transport operators was, therefore, perfectly valid. . .\n\nShagir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. & Others, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707 and Behrom Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bomby. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613, distinguished and held inapplicable.\n\nAmerican authorities held inapplicable.\n\nNor can the impugned Act, e>n a parity of reasoning be held to infringe any longer the fundamcnal rights of the petitioners under Art. 31(2) in view of the amenament effected therein by the Constitution (Fo11rth Amendment) Act of 1955 which came into force on the 27th April, 1955, these petitions having been filed thereafter, and the petitioners could not be allowed to challenge the validity of the impugned Act on that ground.\n\nScmble.\n\nIt is not clear at all that the impugned Act was in conflict with s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, before the advent of the Constitution,\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 189 to 193 of 1955.\n\nPetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nG. S.\n\nPathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioners in Petition No. 189 of 1955.\n\nRameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, for petitioners in Petition No. 190 of 1955.\n\nSri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 191 to 193 of 1955.\n\nT. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (I. N. Shr_off, with him), for respondents in all petitions. 1955.\n\nSeptember 29.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS Acre. C. J.-This judgment will dispose of all the five petitions (Nos. 189 to 193 cl. 1955) which have been heard together and which raise the same question as to the constitutional validity of the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 1948).\n\nThe facts are short and simple.\n\nEach of the petitioners has been carrying on business as stage carriage operator for a considerable number of years under permits granted under section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) as amended by the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 1948).\n\nPrior to the amendmen, t section 58 of the Motoc Vehicles Act, 1939 was in the following terms:-\n\n\"58(1). A permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may in its discretion specify in the permit.\n\nProvided that in the case of a permit issued or renewed within two years of the commencement of this Act, the permit shall be effective . without renewal\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras and othtrs\n\nThe State of Madh, a Pratksh\n\nandanotlur\n\n!955\n\nBlliktJji Jf trraln D/uJkras and ot/urs\n\nv; T Ji. Stai. qf Madhya Pradesh\n\nandnnothtr\n\nDas .dctg. C. J.\n\nfor such period of less than three years as the Provincial Government may prescribe.\n\n(2) A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit:\n\nProvided that, other conditions Leing equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits\".\n\nIt will be noticed that under the section as it originally stood the permit granted thereunder was for a period of not less than 3 years and not more than 5 years and a permit-holder applying for renewal of the permit had, other things being equal, preference over new applicants for permit over the same route and would ordinarily get such renewal.\n\nVery far reaching amendments were introduced by the C. P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 .in its application to Central Provinces and Berar.\n\nBy section 3 of the amending Act, item (ii) of sub-section ( 1) of section 43 of the Central Act was replaced by the following items : . \"(ii) fix maximum, minimum or specified fares or freights for stage carriages and public carriers to be applicable throughout the province or within any area or any route within the province, or\n\n (iii) notwithstanding anything contained in section 58 or section 60 cancel any permit granted under the Act in respect of a transport vehicle or class of such permits either generally or in any area specified in the notification :\n\nProvided that no such notification shall be issued before the expiry of a period of three months from the date of a notification declaring its intention to do so:\n\nProvided further that when any such permit has been cancelled, the permit-holder shall be entitled to such compen5ation as may be provided in the rules; or\n\n(iv) declare that it will engage in the business of road transport service either generally or in any area specified in the notification\".\n\nThe following sub-section (3) was added section (2) of section 58 of the Central Act 8 of the amending Act, namely:-\n\nafter sub-\n\nI 955\n\nl;>y section Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and othns \"(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I), the Provincial Government may order a Regional Transport Authority or the Provincial Transport Authority to limit the period for which any permit or class of permits is issued to any period less than the minimum specified in the Act\".\n\nSection 9 of the amending Act added after section 58 a new section reading as follows :-\n\n\"58-A.\n\nNotwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained the Provincial Government may by order direct any Regional Transport Authority or the provincial Transport Authority to grant a stage carriage permit to the Provincial Government or any undertaking in which the Provincial Government is financially interested or a permit-holder whose permit has been cancelled under section 43 or any local authori ty specified in the order\".\n\nThe result of these amendments was that power was given to the Government ( i) to fix fares or freights throughout the Province or for any area or for any route, (ii) to cancel any permit after the expiry of three months from the date of notification declaring its intention to do so and on payment of such compensation as might be provided by the Rules, (iii) to declare i.:s intention to engage in the business of road transport generally or in any area specified in the notification, (iv) to limit the period of the license to a period less than the minimum specified in the Act, and (v) to direct the specified Transport Authority to grant a permit, inter alia, to the Government or any undertaking in which Government was financially interested.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that in the State of Madhya Pradesh there are two motor transport companies known as C. P. Transport Services Ltd., and Provincial Transport Co. Ltd., in which, at the date of these writ petitions, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Union of India held about 85 per cent. of the share capital. Indeed, since the filing of these petitions the entire undertakings of these\n\nv Tll4Ststeof Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anot!rn\n\nDas Act1:. C. J.\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhah-as and others\n\nTM State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\ncompanies have been purchased by the. State of Madhya J;>radesh and the latter are now running the services on some routes for which permits had been granted to them.\n\nA cursory perusal of the new provisions introduced by the amending Act will show that very extensive powers were conferred on the Provincial Government and the latter were uthorised, in exercise of these powers, not only to regulate or control the fares or freights but also to take up the entire motor transport business in the province and run it in competition with and even to the exclusion of all motor transport operators.\n\nIt was in exercise of the powers under the newly added sub-section (3) or section 58 that the period of the permit was limited to four months at a time. It was in exercise of powers conferred on it by the new section 43(1) (iv) that the Notification hereinafter mentioned declaring the intention of the Government to take up certain routes was issued.\n\nTt is obvious that these extensive powers were given to the Provincial Government to carry out and implement the policy of nationalisation of the road transport business adopted by the Government.\n\nAt the date of the passing of the amending Act (III of 1948) there was no such thing as fundamental rights of the citizens and it was well within the legislative. competency of the Provincial Legislature to enact that law.\n\nIt has been conceded that the amending Act was, at the date of its passing, a perfectly valid piece of legislation.\n\nThen came our Constitution on the 26th Janmry\n\n1950. Part III of the Constirution is headed \"Fundamental Rights\" and consists of articles 12 to 35.\n\nBy article 19(1) the Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom under seven heads. Although in article 19(1) all these rights are expressed in unqualified language, none of them, however, is absolute, for each them is cut down or limited by whichever of the several clause< (2) to (6) of that article is applicable to the particular right.\n\nThus the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business conferred by article 19(1)\n\n(g) was\n\ncontrolled by clause (6) which, prior to its amendment to which reference will presently be made, ran as follows :-\n\n\" ( 6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public:, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clau~ shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it presc1lbes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business\".\n\nThe fundamental rights conferred by articles 14 to 35 are protected by the provisions of article 13 the relevant portions of which are as follows:-\n\n\"13. (1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.\n\n(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void\".\n\nThe amending Act ( III of 1948) was, at the commencement of the Constitution, an existing law. The new provisions introduced by the Act authorised the Provincial Government to exclude all private motor transport_ operators from the field of transport business. Prima f acie, therefore, it was an infraction of the provisions of article 19(1)\n\n(g) of the Constitution and would be void under article 13(1), unless this invasion by the Provincial Legislature of the fundamental right could be justified under the provisions of clause ( 6) of article 19 on the ground that it imposed reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right under article 19(1) (g) in the interests of the general\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras and otlw\n\nTiu State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nBltikqji Narain Dhalcras and oth1J1s\n\nThe State of MadhJa Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDat Aclg. C.Jo\n\npublic.\n\nIn Shagir Ahmad v.\n\nThe State of U.P. d: Others(') it was held by this Court that if the word \"restriction\" was taken and read in the sense of limitation and not extinction then clearly the law there under review which, like the amending Act now before us, sanctioned the imposition of total prohibition on the right to carry on the business of a motor transport operator could not be justified under article 19(6).\n\nIt was further held in that case that if the word \"restriction\" in clause (6) of article 19 of the 'Constitution, as in other clauses of that article, were to be taken in certain circumstances to include prohibition as well, even then, having regard to the nature of the trade which was perfectly innocuous and to the number of persons who depended upon business of this kind for their livelihood, the impugned law could not be justified as reasonable.\n\nIn this view of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the amending Act, in so far as it was inconsistent with article 19(1) (g) read with clause (6) of that article, became. under article 13(1), void \"to the extent of such inconsistency\" and if there were nothing else in the case the matter would have been .completely covered by the decision of this Court in that case.\n\nOn the 18th June 1951, however, was passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.\n\nBy stc tion 3(1) of that Act for clause (2) of article 19 a new sub-clause was substituted which was expressly made retrospective.\n\nClause (6) of article 19 was also amended. That clause, so amended, now reads as follows:-\n\n\"(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State . from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of anv existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,-\n\n(!) [1955] I S. C.R. 707.\n\n(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or\n\n(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise\".\n\nIt will be noticed that clause (6), as amended, was not made retrospective as the amended clause (2) had been made. The contention of the respondents before us is that although the amending Act, on the authority of our decision in Shagir A4mad's case (supra), became on and from the 26th January, 1950 void as against the ciLizens to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of article 19(1) (g), nevertheless, after the 18th June 1951 when clause (6) was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 the amending Act ceased to be inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19( I) (g) read with the amended clause (6) of that article, because that clause, as it now stands, permits the creation by law of St:ite monopoly in respect, inter alia, of motor transport business and it became operative again even as against the citizens.\n\nThe petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the law having become void for unconstitutionality was dead and could not be vitalised by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing the constitutional objection, upless it was re-enacted, and reference is made to Prof Coolev's work on Constitutional Limitations, Vol.\n\nI, p. 3.84 Note referred to in our judgment in Shagir Ahmad's\n\ncase (supra) and to similar other authorities.\n\nThe question thus raised by the respondents, however, was not raised by the learned Advocate-General in that case, although the notification was published by the U. P. Government on the 25th March 1953 and the proposed scheme was published on the 7th April, 1953, i.e., long after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 had been passed.\n\nThis question was not considered by this Court in Shagir Ahmad's case, for it was there conceded (see p. 720 of the report) that the validity of the U. P. Act which, in this res-\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras and otlurs\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anot/ur\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nBhikoji Nor a in Dhakras and others\n\nTi1' State •f MadhJa PraJesh\n\nand another\n\nDOI Adg. C. J.\n\npcct, was similar to the C. P. & Berar Act now under consideration, was not to be decided by applying the provisions of the amended clause (6).\n\nNor was this problem raised before or considered by this Court in Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay(').\n\nWe, therefore, conceive it to be open to us to go into the new question that has now been mooted before us and to consider what effect the amended clause ( 6) has on the impugned Act.\n\nThis involves a question of construction of article 13 of the Constitution.\n\nThe meaning to be given to the word \"void\" in article 13 is no longer res integra, for the matter stands concluded by the majority decision of this Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v.\n\nThe State of Bombay(').\n\nWe hJve to apply the ratio decidendi in that case to the facts of the present case.\n\nThe impugned Act was an existing law at the time when the Constitution came into force.\n\nThat existing law imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed to the citizens of India by article 19(1) (g) restrictions which could not be justified as reasonable under clause ( 6) as it then stood and consequently under article 13(1) that existing law becamr void \"to the extent of such inconsistency\".\n\nAs explained in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case (supra) the law became void not in toto or for all purposes or for all times or for all persons but only \"to the extent of such inconsistency'', that is to say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the provisions of• Part III which conferred the fundamental rights on the c1t1zens.\n\nIt did not become void independently of the existence of the rights guaranteed by Part III. In other words, on and after the commencement of the Constitution the existing law, as a result of its becoming inconsistent with the provisions of article 19(1) (g) read with clause (6) as it then stood, could not be permitted to stand in the way of the exercise of that fundamental right.\n\nArticle 13(1) by reason of its language cannot be read as having obliterated the entire operation of the inconsistent law or having wiped it out altogether from\n\n(1) [1955] 1 S. C.R. 613.\n\n(2) [1951] S. C.R. 228.\n\nthe statute book.\n\nSuch law existed for all past transactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution, as was held in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case.\n\nThe law continued in force, even after the commencement of the Constitution, with respect to persons who were not citizens and could not claim the fundamental right.\n\nIn short, article 13(1) had the effect of nullifying or rendering the existing law which had become inconsistent with article 19(1) (g) read with clause (6) as it then stopd ineffectual, nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect only with respect to the exercise of the fundamental right on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore. between the 26th January 1950 and the 18th June 1951 the impugned Act could not stand in the way of the exercise of the fundamental right of a citizen under article 19 (1) (g). The true .position is that the impugned law became, a.~ it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fudamental right.\n\nThe effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity. If that were not so, then it is not intelligible what \"existing law\" could have been sought to be saved from the operation of article 19(1) (g) by the amended clause (6) in so far as it sanctioned the creation of State monopoly, for ex hypothesi, all existing laws creating such monopoly had already become void at the date of the commencement of the Constitution in view of clause\n\n(6) as it then stood. The American authorities refer only to post-Constitution laws which were inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Such laws never came to life but were still born as it were.\n\nThe American authorities, therefore, cannot fully apply to pre-Constitution laws which were perfectly valid before the Constitution. But apart from this distinction between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws on which, however, we need not rest our decision, it must be held that these American authorities can have no application to our Constitution.\n\nAll laws, existing of future, which are inconsistent\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras and others\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradtsh\n\nand another\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nBb.ikoji Narain DhaMas and others\n\nThe State of\n\nMad~?a Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\nwith the provisions of Part III of our Constitution are, by the express provision of article 13, rendered void \"to the extent of such inconsistency''..\n\nSuch laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remailled operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citizens.\n\nIt is only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition; In our judgment, after the amendment of clause (6) of article 19 on the 18th June 1951, the im- . pugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became revivified and enforceable agaii1st citizens as well as against non-atJzens.\n\nIt is true that as the amended clause (6) was not made retrospective the impugned Act could have no operation as against citizePs between the 26th January 1950 and the 18th June 1951 and no rights and obligations could be founded on the provisions of the impugned Act during the said period whereas the amended clause (2) by reason of its being expressly made retrospective had effect even during that period.\n\nBut after the amendment of clause\n\n(6) the impugned Act immediately became fully operative even as against the citizens.\n\nThe notification declaring the intention of the State to take over the bus routes to the exclusion of all other motor transport operators was published on the 4th February 1955 when it was perfectly constitutional for the State to do so.\n\nIn our judgment the contentions put forward by the respondents as to the effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 are wellfounded and the objections urged against them by the petitioners are untenable and must be negatived.\n\nThe petitioners then contend that assuming that the impugned Act cannot be questioned on the ground of infringement of their fundamental right under article 19(1) (g) read with clause (6) of that article, there has been another infraction of their fundamental right in that they have been deprived of their property, namely, the right to ply motor vehicles for gain whim is an interest in a commercial undertaking and, therefore, the impugned Act does conflict with the prq.vns of article 31(2) of the Constitution and\n\nagain they rely on our decision in Shagir Ahmad's case.\n\nHere, too, if there were nothing else in the case this co.Ptention may have been unanswerable. But unfortunately for the petitioners there is the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which came into force on the 27th April, 1955.\n\nBy section 2 of that Act article 31 of the Constitution was amended and for clause (2) of that article the following clauses were substituted:-\n\n\" (2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not a<lequ; ite.\n\n(2-A) Wl:ere a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property\".\n\nArticle 31-A of the Constitution was also amended.\n\nThere can be no question that the amended provisions, if they apply, save the impugned law, for it does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property and cannot, therefore, be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of any property. But the petitioners contend, as they did with regard to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, that these amendments which came into force on the 27th April 1955 are not retrospective and can have no application to the present case. It is quite true that the impugned Act became inconsistent with article 31 as soon as the Constitution came into force on the 26th January 1950 as held by this Co1,1rt in Shagir Ahmad's case (supra) and continued to be so inconsistent right\n\nB/aikaji Narain Dhakras and other&·\n\nThe Stau of Madhya PraJnli\n\nand another\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nBlai!oji Narain DluWas and others\n\nThi Stat• of Madhya Pr!Uksh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act~. C. ].\n\nup to the 27th April 1955 and, therefore, under article 13(1) became void \"to the extent of such inconsistency\".\n\nNevertheless, that inconsistency was removed on and from the 27th April 1955 by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.\n\nThe present writ petitions were filed on the 27th May 1955, exactly a month after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 came into force, and, on a parity of reasoning hereinbefore mentioned, the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the constitutionality of the impugned Act on and from the 27th April 1955 and this objection also cannot prevail.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners sought to raise the question as to the invalidity of the impugned Act even before the advent of the Constitution. Prior to the Constitution, when there were no fundamental rights, section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which corresponds. to article 31 had been construed by the Federal Court in Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces and Berar (') and in other cases referred to in Rajah of Bobbili v. The State of Madras(•) and it was held by the Federal Court that the word \"acquisition\" occurring in section 299 had the limited meaning .of actual transference of ownership a..'ld not the wide ·· meaning of deprivation of any kind .that has been given by this Court in s,, bodh Gopal Bose's case (') to _that wo.rd acquisition appearing in article 31 (2) in the light of the other provisions . of the Constitution.\n\nIt is, therefore, not clear at all that the impugned Act was in conflict with section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nBesides, this objection was not taken or even hinted at in the petitions and cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that these petitions must be dismissed. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs.\n\n(1) fl944~ F. C.R. 284.\n\n(2J 1952 1 M. L. J. 174, 193-194.\n\n13) 1954 S. C.R. 587.\n\nGll':\\-56 83 S. C. India/59-16-4-63-1,000.", "total_entities": 132, "entities": [{"text": "BHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 592, "end_char": 625, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 627, "end_char": 667, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 13, 19(6), 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1069, "end_char": 1091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1422, "end_char": 1446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1448, "end_char": 1470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 43(1)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1714, "end_char": 1726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Central Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "4th of February, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1760, "end_char": 1781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by new s. 43(1)(iv) a notification was issued on the 4th of February, 1955, qeclaring the intention of the Government to take up certain ro.ites."}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1987, "end_char": 1994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Central Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2042, "end_char": 2053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Central Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "Supreme CQurt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2116, "end_char": 2129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(1) (g) and 31(2), and reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme CQurt in Shagir Ahmad v. The State of T.J .P. & others."}}, {"text": "Bhikaji Narain Dhakras", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2358, "end_char": 2380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the .respondents it was contended that although as a result of the said decision the iu>pugned Act w:iS\n\nBed iw\n\nT/14 SI/JU of Ullar\n\nPraduh\n\nBose J.\n\nSeptember 29\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras and othtrs\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nandanotlur\n\nrendered void, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, had the effect of removing the inconsistency and the Amending Act (III of 1948) became operative again.", "canonical_name": "BHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Art. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2745, "end_char": 2755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shagir Ahmad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2877, "end_char": 2889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held that Shagir Ahmad's case had no application and the con tentions put forward by the respondents were well founded and must be accepted.", "canonical_name": "Shagir Ahmad"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3057, "end_char": 3064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3517, "end_char": 3528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3758, "end_char": 3765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4023, "end_char": 4030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act the provisions of the impugned Act were no longer inconsistent therewith and the result was that the impugned Act", "statute": "Amendment Act the provisions of the impugned Act were no longer inconsistent therewith and the result was that the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 707", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4458, "end_char": 4477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 613", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4530, "end_char": 4549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4760, "end_char": 4770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act the provisions of the impugned Act were no longer inconsistent therewith and the result was that the impugned Act", "statute": "Amendment Act the provisions of the impugned Act were no longer inconsistent therewith and the result was that the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "27th April, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4894, "end_char": 4910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31(2) in view of the amenament effected therein by the Constitution (Fo11rth Amendment) Act of 1955 which came into force on the 27th April, 1955, these petitions having been filed thereafter, and the petitioners could not be allowed to challenge the validity of the impugned Act on that ground."}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5151, "end_char": 5180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5298, "end_char": 5308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5316, "end_char": 5337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. S.\n\nPathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5382, "end_char": 5395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S.\n\nPathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioners in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S.\n\nPathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioners in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Nath"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5417, "end_char": 5432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S.\n\nPathak, (Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him) for the petitioners in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5494, "end_char": 5508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, for petitioners in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Nath"}}, {"text": "Narain Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5580, "end_char": 5593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain, for petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "T. L. Shevde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5670, "end_char": 5682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (I. N. Shr_off, with him), for respondents in all petitions."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shr_off", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5720, "end_char": 5733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (I. N. Shr_off, with him), for respondents in all petitions."}}, {"text": "DAS Acre", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5846, "end_char": 5854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS Acre."}}, {"text": "cl. 1955", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5932, "end_char": 5940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6295, "end_char": 6305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6313, "end_char": 6337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6476, "end_char": 6486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Central Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "Motoc Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6609, "end_char": 6619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motoc Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motoc Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "State of Madh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7004, "end_char": 7017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "without renewal\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras and othtrs\n\nThe State of Madh, a Pratksh\n\nandanotlur\n\n!", "canonical_name": "State of MadhJa Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7948, "end_char": 7972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7996, "end_char": 8023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Very far reaching amendments were introduced by the C. P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 .in its application to Central Provinces and Berar."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8029, "end_char": 8038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8093, "end_char": 8103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8404, "end_char": 8414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8418, "end_char": 8428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9109, "end_char": 9119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9533, "end_char": 9542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9575, "end_char": 9585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9995, "end_char": 10005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10845, "end_char": 10868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that in the State of Madhya Pradesh there are two motor transport companies known as C. P. Transport Services Ltd., and Provincial Transport Co. Ltd., in which, at the date of these writ petitions, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Union of India held about 85 per cent."}}, {"text": "C. P. Transport Services Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10918, "end_char": 10947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that in the State of Madhya Pradesh there are two motor transport companies known as C. P. Transport Services Ltd., and Provincial Transport Co. Ltd., in which, at the date of these writ petitions, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Union of India held about 85 per cent."}}, {"text": "Provincial Transport Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10953, "end_char": 10982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that in the State of Madhya Pradesh there are two motor transport companies known as C. P. Transport Services Ltd., and Provincial Transport Co. Ltd., in which, at the date of these writ petitions, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Union of India held about 85 per cent."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11067, "end_char": 11081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that in the State of Madhya Pradesh there are two motor transport companies known as C. P. Transport Services Ltd., and Provincial Transport Co. Ltd., in which, at the date of these writ petitions, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Union of India held about 85 per cent."}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11343, "end_char": 11350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Madhya J;>radesh and", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11398, "end_char": 11427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madhya J;>radesh and the latter are now running the services on some routes for which permits had been granted to them."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12032, "end_char": 12042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhikaji Narain Dhah-as and others\n\nTM State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Bhikaji Narain Dhah-as and others\n\nTM State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "section 43(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12167, "end_char": 12180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhikaji Narain Dhah-as and others\n\nTM State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Bhikaji Narain Dhah-as and others\n\nTM State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "26th Janmry\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12884, "end_char": 12901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then came our Constitution on the 26th Janmry\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "articles 12 to 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12979, "end_char": 12996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13002, "end_char": 13015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13112, "end_char": 13125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13462, "end_char": 13475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14 to 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14338, "end_char": 14355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14391, "end_char": 14401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14498, "end_char": 14503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall to the extent of such inconsistency, be void."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15215, "end_char": 15228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15278, "end_char": 15291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15427, "end_char": 15437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15527, "end_char": 15540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15653, "end_char": 15660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of MadhJa Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15712, "end_char": 15735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J.\n\nBltikqji Narain Dhalcras and oth1J1s\n\nThe State of MadhJa Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDat Aclg.", "canonical_name": "State of MadhJa Pradesh"}}, {"text": "article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16176, "end_char": 16189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and otlw\n\nTiu State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and otlw\n\nTiu State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16273, "end_char": 16283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and otlw\n\nTiu State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and otlw\n\nTiu State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anothtr\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16774, "end_char": 16787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16844, "end_char": 16857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "18th June 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17044, "end_char": 17058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th June 1951, however, was passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17174, "end_char": 17184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17273, "end_char": 17283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shagir A4mad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18445, "end_char": 18457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the respondents before us is that although the amending Act, on the authority of our decision in Shagir A4mad's case (supra), became on and from the 26th January, 1950 void as against the ciLizens to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of article 19(1) (g), nevertheless, after the 18th June 1951 when clause (6) was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 the amending Act ceased to be inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19( I) (g) read with the amended clause (6) of that article, because that clause, as it now stands, permits the creation by law of St:ite monopoly in respect, inter alia, of motor transport business and it became operative again even as against the citizens.", "canonical_name": "Shagir Ahmad"}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18497, "end_char": 18515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the respondents before us is that although the amending Act, on the authority of our decision in Shagir A4mad's case (supra), became on and from the 26th January, 1950 void as against the ciLizens to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of article 19(1) (g), nevertheless, after the 18th June 1951 when clause (6) was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 the amending Act ceased to be inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19( I) (g) read with the amended clause (6) of that article, because that clause, as it now stands, permits the creation by law of St:ite monopoly in respect, inter alia, of motor transport business and it became operative again even as against the citizens."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18603, "end_char": 18616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18821, "end_char": 18835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Coolev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19366, "end_char": 19372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the law having become void for unconstitutionality was dead and could not be vitalised by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing the constitutional objection, upless it was re-enacted, and reference is made to Prof Coolev's work on Constitutional Limitations, Vol."}}, {"text": "U. P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19690, "end_char": 19706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question thus raised by the respondents, however, was not raised by the learned Advocate-General in that case, although the notification was published by the U. P. Government on the 25th March 1953 and the proposed scheme was published on the 7th April, 1953, i.e., long after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 had been passed."}}, {"text": "25th March 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19714, "end_char": 19729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question thus raised by the respondents, however, was not raised by the learned Advocate-General in that case, although the notification was published by the U. P. Government on the 25th March 1953 and the proposed scheme was published on the 7th April, 1953, i.e., long after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 had been passed."}}, {"text": "7th April, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19775, "end_char": 19790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question thus raised by the respondents, however, was not raised by the learned Advocate-General in that case, although the notification was published by the U. P. Government on the 25th March 1953 and the proposed scheme was published on the 7th April, 1953, i.e., long after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 had been passed."}}, {"text": "Stale of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20091, "end_char": 20114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question was not considered by this Court in Shagir Ahmad's case, for it was there conceded (see p. 720 of the report) that the validity of the U. P. Act which, in this res-\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras and otlurs\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pradesh\n\nand anot/ur\n\nDas Actg.", "canonical_name": "State of MadhJa Pradesh"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20735, "end_char": 20745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20814, "end_char": 20824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21245, "end_char": 21258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21377, "end_char": 21390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Keshavan Madhava Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21477, "end_char": 21499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As explained in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case (supra) the law became void not in toto or for all purposes or for all times or for all persons but only \"to the extent of such inconsistency'', that is to say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the provisions of• Part III which conferred the fundamental rights on the c1t1zens."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22035, "end_char": 22048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22179, "end_char": 22192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S. C.R. 613", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22345, "end_char": 22365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22770, "end_char": 22783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22878, "end_char": 22891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23149, "end_char": 23166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "between the 26th January 1950 and the 18th June 1951 the impugned Act could not stand in the way of the exercise of the fundamental right of a citizen under article 19 (1) (g)."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23294, "end_char": 23304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23710, "end_char": 23723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24670, "end_char": 24677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bb.ikoji Narain DhaMas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24687, "end_char": 24709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J.\n\nBb.ikoji Narain DhaMas and others\n\nThe State of\n\nMad~?a Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Actg."}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24765, "end_char": 24772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24867, "end_char": 24877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25279, "end_char": 25289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Pradesh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "4th February 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26145, "end_char": 26162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification declaring the intention of the State to take over the bus routes to the exclusion of all other motor transport operators was published on the 4th February 1955 when it was perfectly constitutional for the State to do so."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26613, "end_char": 26626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26945, "end_char": 26958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27280, "end_char": 27289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27302, "end_char": 27312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28252, "end_char": 28262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "27th April 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28756, "end_char": 28771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the petitioners contend, as they did with regard to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, that these amendments which came into force on the 27th April 1955 are not retrospective and can have no application to the present case."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28907, "end_char": 28917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Blai!oji Narain DluWas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29179, "end_char": 29201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nBlai!oji Narain DluWas and others\n\nThi Stat• of Madhya Pr!Uksh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act~. C. ]."}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29256, "end_char": 29263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29321, "end_char": 29334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uksh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Uksh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "27th May 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29560, "end_char": 29573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present writ petitions were filed on the 27th May 1955, exactly a month after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 came into force, and, on a parity of reasoning hereinbefore mentioned, the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the constitutionality of the impugned Act on and from the 27th April 1955 and this objection also cannot prevail."}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30094, "end_char": 30105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uksh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Uksh\n\nand another\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30113, "end_char": 30142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30165, "end_char": 30175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30442, "end_char": 30453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "bodh Gopal Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30615, "end_char": 30630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to article 31 had been construed by the Federal Court in Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces and Berar (') and in other cases referred to in Rajah of Bobbili v. The State of Madras(•) and it was held by the Federal Court that the word \"acquisition\" occurring in section 299 had the limited meaning .of actual transference of ownership a..'ld not the wide ·· meaning of deprivation of any kind .that has been given by this Court in s,, bodh Gopal Bose's case (') to _that wo.rd acquisition appearing in article 31 (2) in the light of the other provisions ."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30682, "end_char": 30692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30836, "end_char": 30847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30855, "end_char": 30884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_603_841_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 603\n\nTHE BENGAL IMMUNITY COMPANY LIMITED\n\n''\n\nTHE ST ATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS.\n\n(S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI,\n\n]AGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA\n\nand JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India-Arts. 141, 226, 286(1), (2) and (3)-Art. 286(J)(a) read tvith the Explanation-Construction of-Whether controlled by Art. 286(2)-Situs of a sale or purchase determined by general law or created by fiction in the Explanation-Whether relevant fo1 ascertaining inter-State character of such sale or punhase- Appellant company registered in Calcutta-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Bihar Act XIX of 1947)-S. 13-Whether appellant company liable to Sales Tax-Where goods deliveted in the State of Bihm as a direct result of sale for purposes of consumption there-Art. 226-Petition thereunder-.\\1.aintainability of-Supreme Court whether competent to modify or review its pri01 decisions-Art. 141-Meaning of-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, s. 33-Taxing sales or purchases taking place in the course of inter-State trade-Validity of-Act whether wholly ultra vires and void.\n\nThe appellant company, having its registered office in Calcutta and its factory and laboratory in the District of 24-Parganas in \\Vest Bengal, carried on the business of manufacturing and selling sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines.\n\nIt was registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act. Its products haYing extensive sales throughout India and abroad were despatched from Calcutta against orders accepted by the appellant company in Calcutt'1.\n\nIt had no agent or manager in Bihar nor any office or laboratory in that State. A notice under s. 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 was issued by the Bihar Sales Tax authorities calling upon the appellar:t company to apply for registration and to submit returns showing its turn over for a period between the 26th of January, 1950 and 30th September 1951. The appellant company denied its liability on the grounds, inter alia that it was not resident in Bihar, it carried on no business there and none of its sales took place in Hihar. It characterized the notice under s. 13(5) as ultra vires and illegal and called upon the Sales Tax authorities to cancel it forthwith.\n\nThe Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained that all sales in West Bengal or in any other State under which goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purposes of consumption in that State were liable to Bihar Sales Tax.\n\nUltimately the appellant company presented before the High Court at Patna a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution claiming the reliefs mention.:d above.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the petition holding that it was not maintainable. On appeal under a certificate\n\nSeptembw 6\n\nThe &ngal\n\nlmmlllliJv Company limited\n\nTire Stale of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nunder Art. 132(1) of the Constitution:. -\n\nHeld, (per curiam) (i) that the High Court was not right in holding that the petition under Art. 226 was misconce, ived.\n\nIn so holding the High Court overlooked the fact that the petitioners' contention was that the Act, in so far as it. purported to tax a non-resident in\n\nrespect of inter-State sales or purchases of goods was ultra vires the Constitution. There are various provisions in the Act laying down certain conditions, which dealers must comply with or submit to.\n\nThey consti_tuted restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen of India by Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and these onerous conditions could not be justified as reasonable restrictions within the meaning of clause (6) of Art. 19 and further the remedy under the Act cannot be said to be adequate and was indeed useless if the Act providing for such remedy was itself ultra vires and void :\n\n(ii) that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevent& the Supreme Court from departing fron1 a previous decision of its own if the court is satisfied of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public.\n\nt..feld, per S. R. DAs, AcTrc C. J., V1v1AN BosE, BHAGW.ATI and fAFER\n\nIMAM\n\nJJ.\n\n(JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nVENKATARAMA AvYAJ. and B. P. S1NHA JJ., Jisse,, ting) that the present is a fit case for reviewing the previous majority decision of the Supre1ne Court in\n\nThe State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([.1953) S.C.R. 1069), in view of several circumstances relating to the case.\n\nHeld, per s. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., V1v1AN BosE, BttAGWATI and }AFER IMAM JJ. (JAGANNADHADAs, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA JJ., dissenting). The operative provisions of the several parts of Art. 286, namely clause (l){a), clause (l)(b), clause (2) and clause (3) arc intended to deal with different topics and, one cannot be projected or read into another anc1 therefore the Explanation in clause ( 1) (a) cannot be legitimately extended to clause (2) either as an exception or as a proviso thereto or read as curtailing or limiting the ambit of clause (2).\n\nThe sales or purchases made by the appellant company which were sought to be taxed by the State of Bihar actually took place in the course of interState trade or commerce. Parliament not having by law otherwise provided, no State law could, therefore, tax these sales or purchases, that is to say, Bihar could not tax by reason of clause (2) although they fell within the Explanation and other States could not tax. by reason of both clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation and clause (2).\n\nWhat is an inter-State sale or purchase continues to be so irrespective of 'tl1e State where the sale is to be located cithc.r under the . general law when it is finally determined what the. general law is or by the fiction crean:d by the Explanation. The situs of a sale or purchase •is wholly irrelevant as regards its intcr ... Statc character.\n\nUntil Parliament by law made in exercise of the powers vested in it by clause (2) of Art. 286 provides otherwise, no State can impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or puri:hases of goods when such sales or purchases take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and the majority decision in The State\n\nof Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ((1953] S.C.R. 1069) in so far as it decides to the contrary cannot be accepted as well founded on principle or authority.\n\nIn view of the above interpretation upon Art. 286 the charging section of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 read with the relevant definitions cannot operate to tax interState sales or purchases and as Parliament has not otherwise provided, the Act, in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in the course of inter- State trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void.\n\nThe Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude in express terms subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared wholly ultra vires and void for it is feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those levied on exempted subjects and to exciude the latter in the assessment of the tax.\n\nHeld (per JAoANNADHADAs,\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.\n\nSINHA JJ.). The scheme of Art. 286(1)(a) is, that it fixes the situs of the sales with a view to avoid multiple taxation and for that purpose it divides them into two categories-inside sales and outside salesand cnaets cha~ a State cannot tax an outside sale.\n\nWhen in the same context the &planation declares that a sale in the course of inter-State trade must be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods arc delivered for consumption, its purpose is clearly to take it out of inter-State trade and stamp it with the character of an intra-State sale.\n\nWhether regard is had to the object of the enactment or its language, the Explanation must be held to authorise the imposition of tax by the delivery Statc.\n\nArticle 286(2) applies to sales in the course of inter-State trade.\n\nThe salc!s which fall within the Explanation an! intta-Statc sales.\n\nThe grolHlds covered by the two provisions uc distinGt and separate. :Each has operation within its CIWn sphere, and there is no conllict between them.\n\nAccerdirtg to die vit:w ellpre!SCd by Bose J. in The Sllltc of Bombay v. Tht United Motors (India) Ltd. ((1953] S.C.R. 1069) and by Das J. in S1111e of TravM1cor11-CocAit1 v. Shanmuglla Vilas Cashuv Nut Factory ([1954] S.C.R. 53) Articll! 286(2) controls the Explartation.\n\nThis cannot be sttstaintd on the language! of the enactment.\n\nThe Explanation; is not fiFJl'l'SS'd to be subjert t~ Art. 286(2). N'bc decs thelatter cootaia tile words \"notwiHi.ssmling anyehing OOBt*Md in the Explanation to Art. 286(I)(a)\". These arc simple and familiar capsoession. used by the legislature wh11n it intends that a particular provision in the Statute should be subject to or override\n\nThe B<l!gal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limiltd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand othas\n\nTu Bengal\n\n1 .. mu11it1 Company L1mittd v.\n\nTu Stale ef Bihar\n\nand olhns\n\nanother.\n\nNor is thre anything in the language of the Explanation providing that its operation is not to be in. praesenti but contingent on Parliamentary legislation under Art. 286(2). To construe, therefore, Art. 286(2) as controlling the Explanation, one must import into the Statute words which are not there and thereby cut down the operation of the Explanation \\vhich on its terms is of equal authority and potency with Art. 286(2).\n\nThe impugned Act in so far as it authorises the imposition of tax. or. sales falling within the Explanation to Art. 286(J)(a) is neither ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature nor bad on the ground that it is extra-territorial in its operation.\n\nPer ]AGANNADHADAS J.\n\nThe only reasonable: construction of Art. 286(I)(a) taken with the Explanation is that this provision while intended to prohibit taxation by States on outside: sales was also meant to demarcate: the boundary between inside sales and out side sales and to assimilate one particular category of outside sales into the field of inside sales and to make it available for taxation by the consuming State.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1953.\n\nAppeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th December 1952 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Misc. Judicial Case No. 241 of 1952.\n\nN. C. Chatterji (V. S. Sawhney, S. N. Mukerii and R. R. Biswas, with him) for the appellant company.\n\nThe High Court was wrong in holding that there was no warrant for issuing a writ under article 226 of the Constitution on the facts of the case. Although no actual assessment was made by the Sales Tax authorities the issue of notice by them constituted a sufficient threat which the High Court had jurisdiction to quash by means of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution: see Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh ([1954] S.C.R. 1122), The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069}, Mohammad Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, falalabad ([1952) S.C.R. 572), The King v.\n\nCommissioners for the General Purposes of the Income- Tax for Kensington ([19141 3 K.B. 429), Gtnerai Com• missioners for the purposes of Income Tax for Kensington v. Aramayo ([1916] 1 A.C. 215), Madan Gopal Kabra v. The Union of India ([1951 l l.T.R. 214), Sales\n\nTax Officer, Pilibhit v.\n\nMessrs Budh Prakash /ai Prakash ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 423), Commissioner of Police, lJombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji (f1952J S.C.R. 135). Article 286(2) which is in Part XII of the Constitution is meant to implement the supremacy of Parliament with regard to inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nThat Article puts an embargo on the power of the State\n\nLegislature to levy any tax with respect to inter- State trade or commerce. Only when the embargo is lifted by appropriate Parliamentary Legislation that the State Legislature can levy any tax on sales or purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Article 286 puts a fetter on the State Legislatures and the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) does not confer any power on any State Legislature to levy any tax.\n\nThe Explanation is meant to explain only clause (1) (a) of article 286, that is, what is an outside sale or purchase.\n\nIt does not remove fetter and it does not convert any inter-State sale or purchase into an intra-State transaction.\n\nSee the judgment of Bose J. in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([19531 S.C.R. 1069) and that of Das J. in The State of Travancore-Cochin \"· Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nttt Factory (f 19541 S.C.R. 53). The construction of the Explanation by the learned Judges of the High Court is not correct. They were wrong in assuming that if article 286(2) is construed in a full and unqualified sense, the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) would become nugatory and of no effect. They also erred in holding that the Explanation expressly confers legislative power, and that the Explanation is in the nature of an exception which excludes a particular class from a larger class.\n\nThe High Court erred in holding that the Explanation created a nexus for conferring jurisdiction on the State Legis1ature.\n\nTest of territorial nexus 1s no longer applicable after the coming into force of the Constitution. See The State of Bombay v. 'i.'he United Motors (India) Ltd. ([19531 S.C.R. 1069).\n\nOn a proper reading of all the sections of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 the idea seems to be that the intention was only to tax the dealers within the\n\nThe Bmgal\n\nImmunity Company Limitetf\n\nThe State of Bilrur\n\nand others\n\n18&5 - TM B<q•I Comptmy Limittd\n\n' \\It; The Sltlle of Biltar\n\nGnd oJllm\n\nState of Bihar, as some of the provisions of the Act would be incapable of enforcement outside the State.\n\nConsequently the appellant which has no office or agent within the State could not be taxed. See ss. 1, 2(c), 2(g), 4, 10, 14-A, 17, 26(a) (c) (b) & (k), of the Act.\n\nBihar Legislature has . no power to authorise imposition of tax on outside dealers. The legislative competence of a State Legislature is derived from Article 246 read with the Lists. Under article 245(2) Parliament is given power to enact legislation with respect to extra-territorial operation.\n\nState Legislature has no such power. The combined effect of article 246(3) read with item 54 of List II is that the State Legislature is competent only to make law imposing tax on sale or purchase of goods for the whole or any part of that State. Under article 245 of the Constitution power is limited within the boundary of the State.\n\nTaxable event must happen in that State.\n\nSee Swifte v. Attorney-General for Ireland ( [ 1912] A.C. 276), Commercial Cable Company v. Attorney-General\n\nfor N_ewfoundland ([1912] A. C. 820), and MacLeod v.\n\nAttorney-General for New South Wales ([1891]\n\nA.C. 455).\n\nHigh Court failed to appreciate the true effect of the judgment in Wallace . Brotherr and Co., Ltd.\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-Tar, Bombay City and Bombay Suburban District ( [ 1948 I 75\n\nI.A. 87).\n\nThe Australian case cited by the High Court viz., Q. Gilpin Limited v.\n\nCommissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (New South Wale!) ([1935] 52 C.L.R. 189) has been overruled in Hugher and Vale!\n\nProprietary, Ltd. v. State of New South Wales ([1954] 3 All. E.R. @).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( B. Se11 and P. K. Bose: with him), for the State of West Bengal\n\n(Intervener). Bihar Sales Tax Act has to be read as a whole and on a correct reading of the Act it clearly appears that the Act is intended to apply only to dealers in Bihar. Bihar cannot tax the sale because it takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and the State is barred from taxing such sales by reason of clause (2) of article 286. The ques. tion is whether the majority view in the case of State\n\n.of Bombay v. Unittd Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R.\n\n1069) is correct. Article 245 read with Entry 54 in List II gives the Legislative power whereas article 286 imposes restrictions on such Legislative power of .a State. There are four restrictions placed by that article-the first by clause ( 1) (a), the second by clause (l)(b), the third by clause (2) and the fourth by clause (3). Basis of article 286(2) is to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country which principle is to be found in article 301. Article 286(2) gives authority to the Parliament to watch over the principles underlying article 301 and to see what restrictions are necessary.\n\nIn determining the ambit of clause (2) it is not permissible to apply the Explanation. If you do so then logically you must also apply it to clause 1 (b). If the majority decision in Statt of Bombay v. Unittd Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069) is right on the interpretation of clause (2) then that clause becomes absolutely meaningless.\n\nThe Supreme Court can overrule its previous decision if it is satisfied that the decision was erroneous: London Strut Tramways Company v. London\n\nCounty Council ([18981 A. C. 375), In rt Transftrrtd Civil Strvants (!rt/and) Comptnsation ([1929]\n\nA.C. 142), Tht Tramways cast (No. 1) (18 C.L.R. 54), Smith\n\nv. Al/wright (321 U.S. 649; 88 L. Ed. 987) and Vinayak\n\nv. Mortshwar (I.LR. [1944] Nag. 342).\n\nEven if the ban imposed by clause (2) of article 186 did not apply, Bihar is not competent to tax on a reading of article 246(3), Entry 54, List II and article 286(1) (a). The word 'sale' in Entry 54, means passing of property in the sense of the Sale of Goods Act, s. 4. Sec Salt! Tax Offictr, PilibAit v. Mtssrs Budh Prakash Jai Praka.rh ([19551 1 S.C.R. p. 243}. 'On a true construction of the Explanation to article\n\n286(1)(a) Bihar is competent to levy a purchase tu and not a sales tax in respect of transactions entered into by dealers residing outside. The Explanation cannot be read as extra-territorial.\n\nIt must be read as consistent with article 245. Although the Federal\n\n1'955\n\nTh• Bea,..t\n\nlmmunil, J Company Limited\n\nv • The Slilll of Bih•\n\nand other<\n\nTh~ Bngal\n\nImmunity Cumpany Limittd v.\n\nThe Stall of Bihar\n\nand othos\n\nLegislature had extra-territorial power under the Government of India Act, 1935 the Provincial Legis- _ lature did not have such power. The position is the same under the Constitution : The Governor-General in Council v. The Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. ([1944] F.C.R. 229) and In re S. Mohan Kumaramangalam (A.LR. 1951 Mad. 583).\n\nSo far, nexus theory has been applied to extra-territoriality as between two independent States.\n\nDecision of the Supreme Court in Poppatlal Shah's case is applicable to component parts of the same State; Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras ([1953]' S.C.R. 677), The State of Bombay v.\n\nThe United hfotors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069,\n\n1078) and The Governor-General in Council v.\n\nThe Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. ([1944] F.C.R. 229). It is doubtful if nexus theory is applicable to this kind of legislation. -In any event. the nexus theory is not applicable under the Constitution of India. If machinery for enforcement of the Ai:t has extra-territorial operation and is linked up with the charging section\n\nthe whole scheme of taxation is bad due to the prov1S1ons of article 245.\n\nIn any event the machinery is bad.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Rajeswari Prasad and S. P. Varma, with him) for Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., (Intervener) supported the appellant.\n\nT. N. Subramanya Aiyar (T. V. R. Tatachari, with him) for M. A. Kuriakose (Intervener) adopted the arguments of the Attorney-General and referred to V. 0. Vakkan v. The Government of the Province of Madras ([19521 2 M.L.J. 353), Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras (A.LR. 1953 Mad. 91), Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd., Monghyr v. The State of Bihar (A.LR. 1950 Pat. 450),, The State of Bzhar v. Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (A.LR. 1954 Pat. 14), Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 148 and Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p. 174.\n\nLal Narain Sinha (B.K.P. Sinha and R.C. Prasad,. with him), for the respondent (State of Bihar).\n\nArticle 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II is by itself enough to grant legislative competence to the making of laws imposing tax on sales of inter-State character having a . real and sufficient territorial connection with the taxing State. Delivery of goods within the State where such delivery. takes place in performance of the contract of sale is by itself real and sufficient territorial connection.\n\nThe position was the same under section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 read with Entry 48 of List II. A legislation on the basis of a real and sufficient connection is not invalid on the ground of ext.ta-territorial . operation. The Governor-General in Council v. The Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. (1944 F.C.R. 229), Wallace Brothers and Co.\n\nLtd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City and Bombay Suburban District ([1948] 75 I.A. 86), Broken Hill South Limited (Public Officer) v. The Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) (56 C.L.R. 337), Commissioners of Taxation v. Kirk (1900 A.C. 588) and In re S. Mohan Kumaramangalam (A.LR. 1951 Mad. 583, 588). So far as conception of sale is concerned it comprises of several elements. The situs of the sale is where the various ingredients of the sale take place.\n\nArticle 286(l)(a) dr)CS not govern the whole of inter- State trade or commerce. It does not apply to a case where goods are delivered in the purchasing State for purposes other than consumption.\n\nArticle 286(1)(a) has no application to cases where the Explanation itself does not apply. If a Bengal dealer sells to a Bihar purchaser and delivery takes place in Bihar and if the purpose is consumption then the Explanation applies and Bihar alone can tax. If the purpose is not consumption the Explanation does not apply, the matter is set at large, and States will be entitled to tax on the nexus theory.\n\nThe ban imposed by clause (2) of article 286 does not apply to cases covered by article 286(l)(a). The class of sales fallipg under the purview of Article 286(1)(a) form a special class of inter-State sales which on general principles of interpretation cannot be affected by the general provisions of clause (2). Article 286(1)(a) and article 286(2) are exactly on the same topic and they\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stau of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nTht Btotol\n\n1-11.1 Cmtpany Liviited\n\nTlw Slat1 of Bih1Jr\n\norul olhtr$\n\nare to achieve the same purpose, i.e., elimination of multiple taxation on a single sale. The device employed in article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation is to convert inter-State sale into an intra-State sale and thereby to localise a sale and to take away the taxing power of other States.\n\nArticle 286( 1) (a) and article 286(2) are complimentary to each other and they have to be interpreted harmoniously so that each of them can operate within its own field. Whilst article 286(2) comprises all classes of inter-State trade, article 286(1) (a) deals with a special class. If article 286(2) applies to cases covered by article 286 (!) (a) and the Explanation then it will result in discrimination against local trade in favour of intcr- State trade and this will be inconsistent with the pr<>-\n\nvisions of Part XIII of the Constitution. The purpose of article 286 being to eliminate multiple taxation and article 286(1) (a) having achieved that purpose in regard to a class of sales falling within it, it is no longer necessary for that purpose to apply article 286(2) to the aforesaid class.\n\nThe Constitution itself has divided inter-State sales into two categories.\n\nIn regard to one class it has itself provided as to which State will tax the sale and under what conditions. In regard to the other class the Constitution itself has imposed a ban in general terms and granted Parliament power in general to relax that ban to such extent as Parliament thinks fit. The sale though of an inter- State character has been converted into an intJra-Statc sale by reason of the legal fiction. If power of taxation is given all ancillary powers are included in that very power.\n\nV. K.- T. Chari, Advocate-General of Mlldras\n\n(K.\n\nVeerasami, with him) for the State of Madras (Intervener). A State is sovereign within the limits of the\n\nsubject matter of List II as well as within its geographical area.\n\nThe te..t of legislative competence both as regards the subject matter and the geographical limits is the same whether it is the Parliament or the State Legislature. As to the subject matter the rul~ that applies is that of \"pith and substance\" and inO. dental invasion of the other Lists is permitted. As\n\nto area, the test is the territorial connection or nexus as the limiting factor. The connection must be relevant and real and if the connection is real then any impact on persons, things, acts or events outside the State is permissible and valid. The word 'extra-territoriality' is used in the sense of legislation with respect to conduct of citizens when they are outside the country. [Reference was made to Charter Act of 1833, s. 43, Government of India Act, 1915, s. 65 ( 1) (a), Hodge\n\nv. The Queen (9 A. C. 117), The Commissioner of Stamp Duties (New South Wales) v. Miller and another (48 C.L.R. 618), The Australasian Scale Company Limited\n\nv. The Commissioner of Taxes (Queens Land) (53 C.L.R. 534), Broken Hill South Limited v. The Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) (56 C.L.R. 337)]. Under the Government of India Act, 1935 the requirement of levying sales tax was that the goods belonging to the seller must be located within the Province and that those goods should have been made the subject matter of a sale transaction.\n\nTo establish territk>rial connection for sale. transaction the sine qua non is that the goods belonging to the seller must be located within the Province and that the goods should be made the subject matter of a sale transaction. The Explanation to article 286(1) (a) is a deliberate reversal of the pre-existing position.\n\nT. L. Shet1de, Adt1ocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and M. Adhikari (I. N. Shroff, with them) for the State of Madhya Pradesh (Intervener). Whereas the legislative power of all States under article 246(3) read with Entry 54 List II to tax all outside transactions of sale or purchase has been curtailed or restricted by clause l(a) and also by clause (2) of article 286 the said legislative power of the deliverv State is fully saved by the Explanation of clause I (a) and is not ubject to the provisions of clause (2).\n\nEvery delivery State is competent to tax extra-territorially within the ambit of the Explanation and is not fettered by clause (2). Clause (2) puts a ban on all inter-State transactions except those covered by the Explanation. The contention that the Explanation does not come into effect until the ban under\n\nThr B'••al\n\nfmmumJ1 Compan.J Limit•d\n\nThi StoJt of Bihar\n\nand •Iha•\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stale fl.( Bihar\n\nand others.\n\nclause ( 2) is lifted by Parliament is incorrect and untenable and moreover such a contention directly contravenes the provisions of article 394 of the Constitution. The operation of the Explanation excludes the operation of clause (2) and vice versa. Sales Tax is in fact and substance only a purchase tax paid on one and the same transaction.\n\nIntention was to put an end to the evil of multiple taxation.\n\nS. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Punjab (Intervener). Article 286(1)(a) like article 286(2) deals with only sales or purchases which take place during the course of inter-State trade or commerce, i.e., trade or commerce in which more than one State have interest. The words 'inter-State trade or commerce' have to be given the widest possible meaning. The Explanation has the effect of divesting a transaction of its inter-State character. Commonwealth of Australia\n\nv. Bank of New South Wales (1950 A.C. 235) and Bank of N. S. W. v. The Commonwealth (76 C. L. R. 1).\n\nAssuming that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to. overrule its own decision there is no reason for doing so. Sec Denning on The Changing Law, 1935 Edn., p. 5.\n\nNittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Mysore, K. S. Hajela, Advocate- General of Rajasthan (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the. State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/\" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.\n\nGokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent.\n\nN. C. Chatterji replied.\n\n1955.\n\nSeptember 6. The judgment of S. R. Das, Acting Chief Justice, Bose and Jafer Imam JJ. wa• delivered by S. R. Das Acting Chief Justice. Bhagwati,\n\nf agannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar and B. P. Sinha JJ. delivered separate judgments.\n\nDAs Acre. C.J.-This appeal, filed under a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Patna, is directed against the judgment of that High Court pronounced on the 4th December 1952 whereby it dismissed the application made by the appellant company under article 226 of the Constitution praying for an appropriate writ or order quashing \"the proceedings issued by the opposite parties for the purpose of levying and realising a tax which is not lawfully leviable on the petitioners\" and for other ancillary reliefs.\n\nThe relevant facts appearing from the petition filed in support of the appellant company's aforesaid application are as follows : The appellant company is an incorporated company carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines.\n\nIts registered head office is at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the district of 24-Perganas in West Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and its registered number is S. L. 683A.\n\nIts products have extensive sales throughout the Union of India and abroad.\n\nThe goods are despatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted by . the appellant company in Calcutta.\n\nThe appellant company has neither any agent or manager in Bihar nor any office, go<lown or laboratory in that State.\n\nOn the 24th October 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant company which concluded as follows :-\n\n\"Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act.\n\nSteps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Jax dues in any Bihar Treasury at an early date under intimation to this Departplent.\" On the 18th December, 1951 a notice was issued by the Superintendent, Commercial Taxes, Central Circle Bihar, Patna calling upon the appellant company (i) to apply for registration and (ii) to submit returns showing its turnover for the period commencing from the 26th January, 1950 and ending with the 30th\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni!J: Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\nTiu Bmgal\n\nltrm1Uni!J Company Limited\n\nT 11' Slal1 of Bihm\n\nend tJthers\n\nDtU Adg. C. J.\n\nSeptember, 1951.\n\nThis notice was issued under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) read with rule 28. It was drawn up according to Form No. 8 prescribed by the rules and was headed \"Notice of hearing under section 13(5) \". The reason for issuing this notice, as recited therein, was that on information which had come to his possession the Superintendent was satisfied that the appellant company was liable to pay tax but had nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for registration under the Act. Thereafter there was some correspondence between the appellant company and the Bihar Sales Tax authorities to which it is not necessary to refer in detail. Suffice it to say that while the appellant company denied its liability on the ground, inter alia, that it was not resident in Bihar, it carried on no business there, none of its sales took place in Bihar and that it did not collect any sales tax from any person of that State, the Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained that under section 33, which was substantially based on article 286 of the Constitution and was inserted in the Act by the' President's Adaptation Order promulgated on the 4th April, 1951, all sales in West Bengal or any other State under which the goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purpose of consumption in that State were liable to Bihar Sales Tax. Eventually on the 29th May, 1952 the Assistant Superintendent of Sales Tax, Bihar called upon the appellant company to comply with the notice by the 14th June, 1952 and threatened that, in default of compliance, he would proceed to take steps for assessment to the best of his judgment.\n\nThe appellant company by its letter dated the 7th June, 1952 characterised the notice under section 13\n\n(5) as ultra vires and entirely illegal and called upon the Superintendent to forthwith rescind and cancel the same. On the 10th June, 1952 the appellant company presented before the High Court at Patna a petition under article 226 claiming the reliefs hereinbefore mentioned. The respondents did not file any affidavit in opposition controverting any of the allegations of facts made in the petition and it must, accordingly, be taken that those facts are admitted as correct by the respondents. The High Court dismissed the petition on the 4th December, 1952 but on the next day issued a certificate, under article 132(1) of the Constitption, that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.\n\nHence the present appeal.\n\nIn view of the importance of the issues involved in this 'appeal the States of Madras, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa, Punjab, Pepsu, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin and Rajastban applied for and obtained leave to intervene in this appeal. Si111ilar leave was applied for by and was granted to Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., and one\n\nM. K.\n\nKuriakose.\n\nThe State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., and M. K. Kuriakose have supported the appellant company while the rest of the intervcners have opposed the appeal.\n\nBefore the High Court the question of maintainability of the petition was raised by the respondents as a preliminary objection and it was answered in their favour by the High Court. In its judgment the High Court noticed that facts had not been investigated nor had the liability of the appellant company been determined and that in fact no on:1a of assessment had been made. It pointed out that it was not a case for the Sales Tax Officer usurping a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or acting in excess of his jurisdiction or acting ma/a fide. The High Court took the view that the Act undoubtedlv conferred jurisdiction on the Sales Tax Officer to. investigate the question of liability of a dealer to Sales Tax under the Act and accordingly he was acting well within his jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notice. lf on assessment the Sales Tax Officer erroneously holds the appellant liable t<l any tax, the Act provides for rectifying that error by appeal or revision under sec- ·\n\ntions 24 and 25 of the Act.\n\nAccording to the High Court such a decision, however erroneous, will, nevertheless, be a decision within the ambit of pis jurisdiction and the High Court cannot interfere with it by 2-84 S.C. India/59\n\nThe Bengal\n\nIm mun it;: Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited ...\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand othtrs\n\nD.as Actz. C.]•\n\na writ of prohibition or certiorari to quash. The High Court accordingly held that the petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the above conclusion .\n\nIn reaching that conclusion the High Court appears to have overlooked the fact that the main contention of the appellant company, as set forth in its petition, js that the Act; in so far as it purports to tax a nonresident dealer in respect of an inter-State sale or purchase of goods, is ultra vires the Constitution and wholly illegal.\n\nIn the impugned Act there are various provisions laying down conditions which dealers must comply with or submit to, namely, to give only a few instances, compulsory registration of dealers (Section 10), filing of returns (Section 12), attendance and production of evidence in support of the return (Section 13), production, inspection and seizure of books of account or documents and search of premises (Section 17). Section 26 prescribes penalties for contravention cif the provisions of the Act. These and other like provisions in the Act undoubtedly constitute restrictions on the fundamental right to carry on business which is guaranteed to every citizen of India by article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.\n\nIf, as contended, the Act is ultra vires the Constitution and consequently void these onerous conditions can never be justified as reasonable restrictions within the meaning of clause ( 6) of that article as this Court held in the case of Mohammad Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, Jalalabad( 1 ). The same view was also expressed in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.('), and again only recently in HimmatlaJ Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(').\n\nIt is urged that the appellant being a company is not a itizen ; ind cannot, therefore, claim any fundamental right under article 19 which is available only to citize~ and, therefore, the decisions of this C', ourt referred to above have no application.\n\nWhile it is noteworthy that the second case mentioned above\n\n(I) [1952} 3 S.C.R. 572.\n\n(2) [1953 4- S.CcR. 1069, 1077.\n\n(3) [1954 s s.c.R. 1122, 1121.\n\nwas concerned with the rights of a company, it is, nevertheless, unnecessary, for the purposes of this appeal, to decide whether a juristic person like a company is a citizen as defined in Part II of the Constitution and as such entitled to the benefits of Artick 19.\n\nNor is it necessary to consider whether there has been any infraction of the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by article 14 in that being a juristic person it cannot claim any of the rights under article 19 which only citizens can do. It is also true that article 31 which protects citizens and non-citizens alike cannot be availed of as it deals with deprivation of property otherwise than by way of levying or collecting taxes as held by this Court in Ramjilal v. Income-Tax Officer, Mohindargarh(1) and that, therefore, the Act does not constitute an infringement of the fundamental right to property under that article.\n\nIt is, however, clear from article 265 that no tax can be levied or collected except by authoritv of law which must mean a good and valid law.\n\nThe contention of the appellant company is that the Act which authorises the assessment, levying and collection of sales tax on inter-State trade contravenes and constitutes an infringement of article 286 and is, therefore, ultra vires, void and unenforceable.\n\nIf, therefore, this contention be well founded, the remedy by way of a writ must, on principle and authority, be available to the party aggrieved.\n\nIt has been argued that the application was prem.1ture, for there has, so far, been no investigation or finding on facts and no assessment under section B\n\nof the Act. The appellant co:npany, contending, as it does, that the Act is ultra vires and void, hou1d have ignored the notice served on it and should 'not have rushed into Court at this stage. This line of argument appears to us to be utterly untenabie. i:n the first place, it ignores the plain fact that this notice, calling upon the appellant company to forthwith get itself registered as a dealer, and to submit a return and to deposit the tax in a treasury in Bihar, places\n\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmwiity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Aclg. C.J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunip Company Ltmiltd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas ..4.ctg. C.Ji\n\nupon it considerable hardship, harassment and liability which, if the Act is void under article 265 read with article 286 constitute, in presenti, an encroachment on and an infringement of its right which entitles it to immediately appeal to the appropriate Court for redress.\n\nIn the next place, as was said by this Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v.\n\nGordhandas Bhanji ('), when an order or notice emanates from the State Government or any of its responsible officers directing a person to do something, then, although the order or notice may eventually transpire to be ultra vires and bad in law, it is obviously one which prima facie compels obedience as a matter of prudence and precaution.\n\nIt is, therefore, not reasonable to expect the person served with such an order or notice to ignore it on the ground that it is illegal, for he can only do so at his own risk and peril. This Court has said in the last mentioned case that a person placed in such a situation has the right to be told definitely by the proper legal authority exactly where he stands and what he may or may not do.\n\nAnother plea advanced by the respondent State 1s that the appellant company is not entitled to take proceedings praying for the issue of prerogative writs under article 226 as it has adequate alternative remedy under the impugned Act by way of appeal or revision.\n\nThe answer to this plea is short and simple. The remedy under the Act cannot be said to be adequate and is, indeed, nugatory or useless if the Act which provides for such remedy is itself ultra vires and void and the principlt : elied upon can, therefore, have no application where a party comes to Court with an allegation that his right has been or is being threatened to be infringed by a law which is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it and as such void and prays for appropriate relief under artide\n\n226. As said bv this Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The Stdte of Madhya Pradesh (supra) this plea of the State stands negatived by the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (I) [19521 3 s.c.R. 135, 148, 149.\n\n(India) Ltd. (supra). We are, therefore, of the opm1on, for reasons stated above, that the High Court was not right in holding that \"the petition under article 226 was misconceived or was not maintainable.\n\nIt will, therefore, have to be examined and decided on merits.\n\nComing, then, to the merits of the petition, the principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar. The legal capacity of the State of Bihar to tax these sales is questioned on the following grounds, namely:- (A) that the sales sought to be taxed having taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and Parliament not having by law provided otherwise, all States are debarred from imposing tax on such sales by reason of article 286(2); (B) that even if the ban under article 286(2) did not apply, the State of Bihar is not competent to impose tax on such sales on a correct reading of article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II in the Seventh Schedule and article 286(1);\n\n(C) that the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 can have no extra-territorial operation and cannot, therefore, impose tax on such sales by a non-resident seller; (D) that on a true construction of the Act itself, it does not apply to the sales sought to be taxed.\n\nRe (A) : The main controversy in this appeal has centred round this ground.\n\nIt raises a question of construction of article 286 of the Constitution. In the judgment under appeal the High Court took the view that ·; ales or purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce referred to in article 286 (2) must be construed so as to exclude the particular class of sales or purchases described in the Explanation to clause (a) of article 286 (1) and that, therefore, the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, in so far as they purported to impose tax on such sales, were not ill conflict with article 286(2) as so construed.\n\nAfter this decision of the Patna High Court the question came up for consideration before a Constitution\n\n195$\n\nThe Bengal\n\nJmmu•i!J' Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nTke Bmgal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nV TM State of Bihar\n\na'fld others\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nBench of this Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra). The majority of that Bench held that article 286(l)(a), read with the Explanation thereto and construed in the light of articles 301 and 304, prohibited the taxation of sales or purchases. involving inter-State elements by all States . except the State in which the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption therein and that clause (2) of article 286 did not affect the power of the State in which delivery of the wlO<!s was so made to tax the sales or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation, the effect of which was to convert such inter-State transactions into intra-State transactions and to take them out of the operation of clause (2) of that article. It is quite clear that if this majority view is to prevail this. ground uqied by learned counsel for the appellant company and strongly supported by the learned Attorney- General appearing for the interveners, the State of West Bengal and Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., and by learned counsel for M. K. Kuriakose must fail.\n\nIt has, accordingly, been pressed upon us that we are not hound by the maiority decision in that appeal from Bombay and that it is still open to us to examine and ascertain for ourselves the true meaning, import and scope of the article in question. Learned counsel for some of the interveners question our authority to go behind the majority decision.\n\nIt is, therefore, necessary at this stage to determine this preliminary question before entering upon a detailed discussion on the question of construction of article 286.\n\nIn England, the Court of Appeal has imposed upon its power of review of earlier precedents a limitation, subject to certain exceptions.\n\nThe limitation thus accepted is that it is bound to follow its own derisions and those of courts of Co--ordinate jurisdiction, and the \"full\" Court is in the same position in this respect as a division Court consisting of three members.\n\nThe only exceptions to this rule are: (l) the Court is entitled and bound to decide which of the two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow: (2) the Court is hound to refuse to follow a decision of\n\nits own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion stand with a decision of the House of Lords; and (3) the Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own, if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam, e.g., where a Statute or a rule having statutory effect which would have affected the decision was not brought to the attention of the e:lr!ier Court. [See Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.(1) which, on appeal to the House of Lords, was approved by Viscount Simon in L.R. 1946 A.C. 163 at p. 169].\n\nA decision of the House of Lords upon a question of law is. con<0lusive and binds the House in subsequent case.\n\nAn erroneous decision of the House of Lords can be set right only by an Act of Parliament. f See Street Tramways v. London County Council (2) ]. This limitation was repeated by Lord Wright in Radcliffe v.\n\nRibble Motor Services Ltd. (3).\n\nThe High Court in Australia, which is the highest Court in that Commonwealth, has not adopted such a rigid rule.\n\nIn the Tramways case (4) the rule was thus laid down by Griffith, C.J. at p. 58:\n\n\"In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain an abstract proposition that Court is either legally or technically bound by previous decisions.\n\nIndeed, it may, in a proper case, be its duty to disregard them.\n\nBut the rule should be applied with great caution, and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired Statute, or is contrary to a decision of another Court which this Court is bound to follow; not, I think, upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the members of the later Court might arrive at a different conclusion if the matter was res integra. Otherwise there would be grave danger of want of continuity in the interpretation of law.\" In the same case Barton, J. m the concluding paragraph of his judgment at p. 69 expressed himself thus:\n\n\"In conclusi9p, I would say that l never thought\n\n(I) L.R. 19H K.B. 718 C.A.\n\n(3) 1939 A.C. 215, 245.\n\n(2) 1898 A.C. 375.\n\n(4) [1914) 18 C.L.R. 54.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunit, J Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nar.d others\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nT; t Benal\n\nlmmuni'.Y Company Limited\n\n•• T fie Statt of Bihar\n\nand othtrs\n\nV.s A.-tg. C.J.\n\nthat it was not open to this Court to review its previous decisions upon good cause. The question is not whether the Court can <lo so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need for continuity and con, istency in the judicial decision. Changes in the number of appointed Justices can, I take it, never of themselves furnish a reason for review.\n\nThat the prior decision was that of little more than half their number might be urged with greater fairness, but it cannot be urged against W hyhrow's case which was decichl by the whole Court then .in existence save the Justice who as President of the Arbitration Court, . was a party respondent to the order nisi.\n\nBut the Court can always listen to argument as to whether it ouglit to review a particular decision, and the strongest reason for an overruling is that a decision is manifestly wrong and its continuance is injurious to the public interest\".\n\nIt is interesting to note that in that case all the Judges agreed that the decision in W hybrou/ s case wa. to be treated as open to review (Per Griffith, C.J. at p. 58) although in the end, after reviewing the position afresh in the light of new arguments advanced before it, the Court came to the same conclusion.\n\nAmalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co.(') may also be referred to as an instance where the High Court of Australia departed from its previous decision.\n\nIn the United States of America there have been a considerable number of cases in which the Supreme\n\nCourt has explicitly and avowedly overruled its prior decisions but there have been more insta11ces in which the doctrines declared in prior cases have been in paf.I: evaded or modified without explicit repudiation. (Willoughby-Constitution of the United States, 2nd E:rln., Vol. I, pp. 74-75).\n\nIn State of Washington v.\n\nDawson & Co.( '), Brandies, J. in his dissenting ju, lgment said :\n\n\"The doctrine of .<tare deci.<is should not deter us from overruling that case and those which follow it.\n\n(I) [1920] 28 C.L.R. 129.\n\n(2) 264 U.S. 646; 68 L.Ed. 219.\n\nThe decisions are recent ones.\n\nThey have not been acquiesced in. They have no.t created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered.\n\nThey affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On the other hand, they affect seriously the lives of men, women and children, and the general welfare.\n\nStare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal. inexorable command. The instances in which the Courts have disregarded its admonition are many\".\n\nIn a foot-ncte to this judgment the learned Judge set out a large number of instances where the earlier decisions had been overruled.\n\nIn another dissenting judgment in David Burnet v.\n\nCoronado Oil & Gas Company(1) the same learned Judge, after quoting a passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice Lurton in Hertz v. Woodman( 2 ) proceeded to say:\n\n\"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled right. Compare National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99; 26 L.Ed. 443-444 This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of seriom rnncern, provided correction can be had by legislation.\n\nBut in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often\n\nOV('Truled its earlier decisions.\n\nThe:: Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning recognising that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical science~, is appropriate also in the )udicial function\".\n\nIn his separate but concurring judgment in Mark Grave.< v. People of tl1e State of Nefll York(3) Frankforter, J. observed :\n\n\"Judicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference to an act like our Constitution, drawn in many particular~ with purposed vagueness so as to leave room for the unfolding future. But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not\n\n(I) 285 U.S. 393; 76 L.Ed. 815.\n\n(2) 218 U.S. 205, 212; 54. L.Ed. 1001, 1005.\n\n(3) 306 r .S. 466; 83 L.Ed. 927.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nbnmunity Company Limited\n\nv, The Stll.te of Bihar\n\nmu/ others\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nThe Be111.al\n\nImmunity Company Limited ...\n\nThe StaU ef Bihar and othtrs\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nwhat we have said about it\".\n\nIn this case two previous dcisions were expressly overruled and two more were impliedly overruled.\n\nWe now come to the Privy Council which, prior to the commencement of our Constitution, was the highest Court of Appeal to hear appeals from the Indian High Courts. In a case about Compensation to Civil Servants('), in repelling the contention that the Board was bound in law, and without examination, to follow an earlier decision whether they consi<lered it right or wrong the Marquess of Reading said :\n\n\"Their Lordships are unable to hold that this proposlt:ion stated in such an extreme form is estab.. lished. It may well be said that the Board would hesitate long before disturbing a solemn decision by a prewus Board, which raised an identical or even a similar issue for determination; but for the proposition that the Board is, in all circumstances, bound to follow a previous decision, as it were, blindfold, they are unable to discover any adequate authority.\n\nIn other words, no inflexible rule, which falls in all circumstances to be applied, has been laid down\".\n\nIn the Attorney-General of Ontario v. The Canada Temperance Federation(') Viscount Simon stated the practice of the Board in the following terms :\n\n\"Their Lordships do not doubt that in tendering humble advice to His Majesty, they are not absolutely bound by previous <lecisions of the Board, as is the House of Lords by its own judgments. In ecclesiastical appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion the Board has tendered advice contrary to that given in a previous case, which further historical research has shown to have been wrong.\n\nBut on constitutional questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board would depart from a previous decision which it may be assumed will have been acted upon both by Governments and subjects\".\n\nFinally, in Phanindra Chandra Neogy v. The King(') Lord Simonds said at p. 88 :\n\n(I) L.R. 1929 A.G. 242; A.LR. 1929 P.C. B4, 87.\n\n(2) [1946] 50 c.w.N. 535; A.LR. 1946 P.c. 88.\n\n(3) L.R. 76 I.A. IO; 1939 Dom. L.R. 87 (P.C.).\n\n\"Theiv Lordships then have before them a decision upon facts which in no material respect differ from those of the present case. Even so, it is, as they re.· cognise, competent for them humbly to tender advice to His Majesty inconsistent with a previous decision, though it can only be in most exceptional circumstances that such a course should be taken ......... .\n\nRecognising the possibility, they have heard full argument and, having done so, see no reason to doubt the validity of the reasoning of the correctness of the conclusion in Gill's case, and they do not think it necessary to repeat what was said there\".\n\nIn considering the applicability of the principles laid down in the decisions hereinbefore mentioned, ic should be borne in mind that the English decisions may well have been influenced by considerations which can rio longer apply to the circumstances prevailing in India. The error, if any, of the Court of Appeal in England, may be corrected bv the House of Lords or eventually by Parliament by a simple majority. The mistakes, if anv, made by the High Court of Australia, if not corrected bv itself in a subsequent case, could be set right by the Privy Council when appeals were taken there or bv the appropriate legislativ~ authority. An error made by the House of Lords or the Privy Council can easily be rectified by Parliament by a simple majority by an amending statute.\n\nBut in a country governed by a federal constitution, such as the United States of America and the Union of India are, it is bv no means easy to amend the Constitution if an erroneous interpretation is put upon it by this Court. (See article 368 of our Constitution). An erroneous interpretation of the Constitution may quite conceivably be perpetuated or may at any rate remain unrectified for a considerable time to the great detriment to public well being. The considerations adverted to in the decisions of the Supreme Court of America quoted above are, therefore, apposite and apply in full force in determining whether a previous decision of this Court should or. should not he disregarded or overruled. There is nothing in our Constitution which\n\nThe Bmgal\n\nImmunity Company Limitei v.\n\nThe State of Bil.ar\n\nand othns\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nThe Benial\n\nImmunity Company LimiUd\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas .ctg. C. J.\n\nprevents us from departi11g from a previous dcci, ion if we are convinced of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public.\n\nArticle !41 which lays down that the law declared bv this Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India quite obviously refers to Courts other rhan this Court. The corresponding provision of the Government of India Act, 1935 also makes it clear that the Courts contemplated are the Subordinate Court<.\n\nThere are several circumstances relating to the maiority decision of the Court in The Stale of Bomhav\n\nv. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) to which reference must be made. That appeal was heard immediately before the hearing of the appeal r.ported as The State of Travqncore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory(') commenced. The two appeal< were, as a matter of fact, heard one after the other and judgments were reserved in both of them. The constitution of the Benches was. however, different.\n\nIn the first appeal one of the Judges of that Bench expressly differed from the majority decision and an<>- ther learned Judge did not accept the majority dci sion on many points. In the second appeal one Jude of the Bench, who was not a party to the fir>t appeal, differed from the majoritv decision in the first apl\"t':ll.\n\nThe result, therefore. was that the majority decision was definitely differed from by two Judges. Bhagwati J. has now in the judgment he has written in the present appeal which we have had the advantage of reading reconsidered the matter and on further reAection he thinks that the maiority decision on the pre<ei)t issue was erroneous and he now agrees substantially with the view of article 286(1 )(a) read with the Explanation and article 286(2) which was expressed in the two minority judgment< referred to above and which is adopted in the iudgment now being delivered in the present appeal. If Bhagwati J. had then expre5'ed the views he is now doing, ther> the maioritv in the Bomhav appeal would haYe been 3 to 2 and if we add the oninion of the dissenting fudge in the Travanrore-Cochin appeal 1hen judicial opinion would\n\n(I) (1954] 5 S.C..R. 53.\n\nhave been divided 3 to 3. In this juxtaposition it is difficult to give the majority decision in the Bombay appeal that amount of sanctity and reverence which is usually attributed to an unretracted majority decision of this Court.\n\nThe majority decision does not merely determine the rights of the two contending parties to the Bombay appeal. Its effect is far reaching as it affects the rights of all consuming public.\n\nIt authorises the imposition and levying of a tax by the State on an interpretation of a constitutional provision which appears . to us to be unsupportable.\n\nTo follow that interpretation will result in perpetuating what, with humility we say, is an error and in perpetuating a tax burden imposed on the people which, according to our considered opinion, 1s manifestly and wholly unauthorised.\n\nIt is not an ordinary pronouncement declaring the rights of two private individuals inter se. It involves an adjudication on the taxing power of the States as against the consuming public generally. If the decision is erroneous, as indeed we conceive it to be, we owe it to that public to protect them against the illegal tax burdens which the States are seeking to impose on the strength of that erroneous recent decision.\n\nThe third circumstances is that there appears to be some vagueness, if not inconsistency, in the majority judgment itself.\n\nAt p. 1084 of the authorised reportthe majority judgment says : ''The expn:ssion 'for the purpose of consumption in that State' must. in our opinion, be understood as having reference not merely to the individual impori.er or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to consumers in general within the State.\n\nThus all buyers within the State of delivery from out-of-State sellers, except those buying for re-export out of the State, would be within the scope of the Exolanation and liable to be taxed by the State on their inter-State transactions\".\n\nThis passage seems to suggest that it is only the huvcrs fa\\lin~ within the Explanation who are liable to be taxed by what has been called in the discussion\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company' LimitLd\n\nThe State of /Jiha•\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmwtity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Aclg. C. J.\n\nbefore us as the delivery State.\n\nAccording to this passag<, r<ad by itself, the out-of-State sellers are not considered liable to be taxed on the sales. The whole trend of the rest of the majority judgment and the actuai decision therein run counter to this conclusion, for the out-of-State sellers were, by reason of the Explanation, subjected to the taxing power of the delivery State. Indeed, Bihar is claiming to tax the appellant company, an out-of-the-State seller, by virtue of the majority decision and all other States intervening and supporting Bibar read the judgment in that way and none of them accepts the quoted passage as containing the actual ratio decidendi of the majority judgment.\n\nThis confusion, we consider, is also a cogent reason for re-examining that decision.\n\nReference is made to the doctrine of finality of judicial decisions and it is pressed upon us that w< should not reverse our previous decision except in cases where a material provision of law has been overlooked or where the decision has proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired statute and that we should not differ from a previous decision merely because a contrary view appears to us to be preferable. It is needless for us to say that we should not lightly dissent from a previous pronouncement of this Court. Our power of review, which undoubtedly exists, must be exercised with due care and caution and onlv for advancing the public well being in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case brought to our notice but we do not consider it right to confine our power within rigidly fixed limits as suggested before us. If on a re-examination of the question we come to the conclusion, as indeed we have, that the previous majority decision was plainly erroneous then it will be our duty to say so and not to perpetuate our mistake even when one learned Judge who was party to the previous decision considers it incorrect on further reflection. We should do so all the more readily as our decision is on a constitutional question and our erroneous decision has imposed illegal tax burden on the consuming public and has\n\notherwise given rise to public inconvenience or hardship, for it is by no means easy to amend the Coristitution.\n\nSometimes frivolous attempts may be made to question our previous decisions but if the reasons on which our decisions are founded are sound they will by themselves be sufficient safeguard against such frivoious attempts.\n\nFurther, the doctrine of stare aecisis has hardly any application to an isolated and stray decision of .the Court very recently made and not followed by a series of decisions based thereon.\n\nThe problem before us does not involve overruling a series of decisions but oniy involves the question as to whether we should approve or disapprove, follow or overrule, a very recent previous decision as a precedent. In any case, the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule of law and cannot be permitted to perpetuate our errors to the detriment to the general welfare of the public or a considerable section thereof.\n\nIt is pointed out that all the States are realising sales tax in respect of sales or purchases of goods where the goods are actually delive.red for consumption within their respective boundaries on the faith of our previous decision and a reversal of that decision will upset the economy of the States and will indeed render them liable to refund moneys already collected by them as taxes.\n\nThis circumstance, it is pressed upon us, should alone deter us from differing from the previous decision. We are not impressed by this argument. It has not yet been decided by this Court that moneys paid under a mutual mistake of law induced by a wrong judicial interpretation of a statute or the CQnstitution must necessarily be refundable as money had and received.\n\nIf, as contende<l, moneys so paid are in law refundable the States cannot complain any more than a private individual in similar circumstances could do. Finally, if the State economy is upset the appeal must be to Parliament which under article 286(2) itself has ample power to make suitable legislation.\n\nThe impugned decision is a recent one. The judicial opinion was divided, if not evenly balanced. One of\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmUTi.ity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand otlters\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\nThe B1ragal\n\nlmmunitv\n\nCompan_;~ Liinited\n\nThe State of Bif1ar\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\nthe four Judges who formed the majority has revised his opinion as stated above. The decision on the point noted above seems to be somewhat inconsistent and is, at any rate, not quite clear.\n\nIt has encouraged the imposition of tax burdens on the consuming public on an interpretation of the Constitution which appears to us to be plainly erroneous. It has given rise to considerable inconvenience and hardship to business people who have not acqniesccd in it by any means. To rectify the error by the legislative process is difficult, for a constitutional amendment reqnires a specified majority which may not always be available and if it involves an amendment of the legislative lists it will require the consent of a requisite number of the States which, in this instance, cannot reasonably be expected.\n\nIn the premises, we think that it is precisely a case wher7, in the public interests, the meaning, scope and effect of article 286 should be re-examined afresh in the light of the fresh arguments now advanced before us and the experience we have since acquired. In our judgment the majority deci.sion in The State of Bombay\n\nv. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) is, in the circumstances alluded to; open to review and we are entitled to re-examine article 286 in order to ascertain its true meaning, scope and effect so far as it is necessary for the purposes of this appeal and we proceed on this basis.\n\nIt is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case(') was decided that-\n\n\". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:-\n\nht. What was the common law before the making of the Act., 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide., 3rd.\n\nWhat remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth., and (I) 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 E.R. 637.\n\n4th. The true reason of the remedy ; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure\n\nand remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico\".\n\nIn In , re Mayfair Property Company( 1 ) Lindley, M.R. in 1898 found the rule \"as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case\". In Eastman Photographic Material Company v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks(2) Earl of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows :\n\n\"My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to th() ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion\".\n\nIt appears to us that this rule is equally applicable to the construction of article 286 of our Constitution.\n\nIn order to properly interpret the provisions of that article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief.\n\nThe position with respect to taxation on sales or purchases of goods that prevailed in the country had better be stated in the language of Patanjali Sastri, C. J. who delivered the majority judgment in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra).\n\nAfter expressing the view, based on the authority of the Wal/ace Brothers' Case(3) that in the case of sales tax, it was not necessary that the sale should take place within the territorial limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale, like the agree-\n\n(!} L.ll. [1898] 2Ch. 28, 35.\n\nM L.R. [1898] A.C. 571, 576. .\n\n(3) 1948 F.C.R. I. 3-84 S. C. India/59\n\nThe Bncgal\n\nImmuniry Campany Limilt4\n\nThe State of Biliat'\n\nand othws\n\nDas Actg. C. J-\n\nThe Bmga.l\n\nImmunity Co1t1p\"ny LimiUd\n\nTilt Slat• of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nD•s Actg. C. ].\n\nment to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods, etc., should have a territorial connection with the State and that, broadly speaking, local activities . of buying and selling carried on in the State in relation to local goods would be a sufficient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, providecj of course that such activities ultimately resulted in a concluded sale to be taxed, the learned Chief Justice proceeded to say:-\n\n\"In exercise of the legislative power conferred upon them in substantially similar terms by the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Leis latures enacted Sales Tax laws for their respective Provinces, acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the basis of their sales tax legislation.\n\nAssam and Bengal made, among other thing~ the actual existence of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxabilitv. In Bihar the production or manufacture of the goods in the Province was made an additional ground. A net of the widest range perhaps was laid in the Central Provinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the goods were actually \"found\" in the Province at any time after the Contract of Sale or Purchase in respect thereof was made.\n\nWhether the territorial nexus put forward as the basis of the taxing power in each case would be sustained as sufficient was a matter of doubt not ,.having been tested in a Court of law. And such claims to taxing power led to multiple taxation of the same transaction by Provinces and cumulation of the burden falling ultimately on the consummg public.\n\nThis situation posed to the Constitution makers the problem of restricting the taxing power on sales or purchases involving inter-State elements, and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer. At the same time they were evidently anxious to maintain the State power of imposing non-discriminatory taxes on goods imported from other States, while upholding the economic unity of India by providing for the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce.\n\nIn their attempt to harmonise and achieve these somewhat conflicting objectives, they enacted articles 286, 301 and 304\".\n\nLeaving out, for the moment, the question as to whether articles 301 and 304 have any bearing on the question of construction of article 286, as to which we entertain a contrary opinion, the above passage quite adequately depicts the oictml\". of chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter-State trade or commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing power by the different Provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus between the respective Provinces and the sales or purchases sought to be taxed.\n\nTt was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-State trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the Constitution makers adopted article 286 m the Constitution which runs as follows :-\n\n\"286.\n\n(1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- ( a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.\n\n(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce: Provided that the President may by order direct\n\nThi Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nT ht State of BibMr\n\nMruf ot/ierJ\n\nD•s .dctg. C. J.\n\nTire Bmg•I\n\n/111munil)' ComjJtmJ Limited\n\nThe State of Bihat\n\ntJNl t1lhlrs\n\nDas)Actg. C. J.\n\nthat any tax. on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediatdy before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until th~ thirty-first day of March, 1951.\n\n(3) No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent\".\n\nArticle 286 is in Part XII of the Constitution which deals with \"Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits\".\n\nIt is one of the several articles which are grouped under the heading \"Miscellaneous Financial Provisions\" in Chapter I of that Part. It is to be noted that it has not found a place in Part XI, Chapter I whereof deals with \"Legislative Rdations\" including \"Distribution of Legislative Powers\" between Parliament and the Legislatures of States.\n\nThe marginal note to article 286 is \"Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods'', which, unlike the marginal notes in Acts of the British Parliament, is part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly, prima facie, furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the article. Apart from the marginal note, the very language of that article makes it abundantly clear that its object is to place restrictions on the legislative power of the States with respect to the imposition of taxes on the sales or purchases of goods. It will be recalled that section 100(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 read with Entry 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act gave power to the Provincial Legislatures to make laws with respect to \"Taxes on sale of goods and on advertisements\". Pursuant t::> the. legislative power thus conferred on them the Fr<'~ vincial Legislatures enacted Sales Tax Acts for thei1 respective Provinces. Althougli in most of those Acts\n\n\"Sale\" was first defined as meaning transfer of the property in the goods, so as to make the passing of the property within the Province the principal . basis for the imposition of the tax, yet by means of Explanations to that definition, those Acts gave extended meanings to that word and thereby enlarged the scope of their operation. The imposition of ux on the sales or purchases of goods on the basis of a very slight territorial connection or nexus resulted in what has been graphically described by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the passage quoted above from the majority judgment in the Bombay appeal. This imposition of multiple taxes on one and the same transaction of sale or purchase was certainly calculated to hamper and discourage free flow of trade within India regarded as one economic unit. This undesirable state of affairs had to be put right. Therefore, while the Constitution makers by article 246(3) read with Entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution conferred power on the Legislatures of Part A and Part B States to make law with respect to \"Taxes op\n\nthe sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers\" they at the same time by article 286 clamped on that legislative power several fetters.\n\nBroadly speaking, the fetters thus placed on the taxing power of the\n\nStates are that no law of a State shall impose or autnorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place,\n\n(a) outside the State or (b) in the course of import or export or ( c) except in so far as Parliament otherwise provides, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and lastly ( d) that no law made by the Legi~ lature of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of a, ny such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. It should be noted that these arc four separate and independent restrictions placed upon the legislative competency of the States to make a law with respect to matters enumerated in Entry 54 of List II. In order\n\nT!w B,,,,,, l\n\nJ,,, mlllli?\n\nCompany l1rniU'\n\nThe Stall of Bifuzr\n\n&'1111 ol/rll'I - DtU kit C. J.\n\n!955\n\n; he Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThe St ate of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nto make the ban effective and to leave no loophole the Constitution makers have considered the different aspects of sales or purchases of goods and placed checks on the legislative power of the States at different angles. Thus in clause (l)(a) of article 286 the question of the situs of a sale or purchase engaged their attention and they forged a fetter on the basis of such situs to cure the mischief of multiple taxation by the States on the basis of the nexus theory. In clause (l)(b) they comidered sales or purchases from the point of view of our foreign trade and placed a ban on the States' taxing power in order to make our foreign trade free from any interference by the States by way of a tax impost. In clause (2) they looked at sales or purchases in their inter-State character and imposed another ban in the interest of the freedom of internal trade. Finally, in clause (3) the Constitution makers' attention was rivetted on the character and quality of the goods themselves and they placed a fourth restriction on the States' power of imposing tax on sales or purchases of goocls declared to be essential for the life of the community.\n\nThese several bans may overlap in some caseo but in their respective scope and operation they are sep; irate and independent. They deal with different phase, of a sale or purchase but, nevertheless, they are distinct and one has nothing to do with and is not dependent on the other or others. The States' legislative rower with respect to a sale or purchase may\n\n0 be hit bv one or more of these bans. Thus, take the case of a sale of goods declared by Parliament as essential by a selkr in West Bengal to a nurchaser in Bihar in which goods are actually delivered as a direct result of such sale for consumption in the State of Bihar. A law made by West Bengal without the assent of the Prcsi:knt taxing this sale will he unconstitutional because ( l) it wiJI offend article 286(1) (a) as the sale has taken place outside tlic territory by .virtue of the Explar1'1tion to clause (1) (a), (2) it will also offend article 286(2) as the sale has taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and (3) such law will also be contrary to article 286(3) as the goods are\n\nessential commodities and the President's assent to the law was not obtained as required by clause (3) of article 286. This appears to us to be the general scheme of that article.\n\nWe come now to the particular bans. Although the Legislatures of the States were empowered by article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II to make a law with respect to taxes on sales or purchases of goods, the different State Legislatures, as already mentioned, considered themselves free to make a law imposing tax on sales or purchases of goods provided they had some territorial nexus with such sales or purchases, e.g., that one or other of the ingredients or events which go to make up a sale or purchase was found to exist or had happened within their respective territories. whether they were right or wrong in so acting is a question which has not been finally decided by the Courts but the fact is that they did so. This resulted in multiple taxation which manifestly prejudiced the interests of the ultimate consumers and also hampered the free fl.ow of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nSo the Constitution makers had to cure that mischief. The first thing that they did was to ta!(e away the Statts' taxing power with respect to sales or purchases which took place outside theii respective territorie;. This they did by clause ( 1) (a).\n\nIf the matter had been left there, the solution would have been imperfect, for then the question as to which sale or purchase takes place outside a State would yet have remained open. So the Constitution makers had to explain what an outside sale was and tliis they\n\ndid by the Explanation set forth in clause ( 1).\n\nThe language employed in framing the Explanation, however, has given scope fpr argument to counsel and presented considerable difficulties to the Court m ascertaining its purpose and intendment.\n\nIf the Explanation simply said \"For the purposes of subclause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place outside a State when the goods have actually been delivered for the purpose of consumption in another State, notwithstanding the fact, etc., etc.\", then none of the difficulties would have arisen\n\nThe Beftal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Actz. c. J.\n\nTh1Bmgal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nTiu State of Bihsr\n\n1112d others\n\nDos Aag. C. J.\n\nat all.\n\nBut why, it is asked did the Constitution makers seek to explain what was an outside sale or purchase by saying that a sale or purchase was to be deemed to take place inside the particular State mentioned in tht Explanation? Was the purpose of the Explanation only to explain what was an outside sale or purchase or was it also its purpose to allot or assign a particular class of sales or purchases of the kind mentioned therein to a particular State so as to put the question of situs of the sales or purchases of that description beyond the pale of controversy ?\n\nThese are. questions which arise and are raised because of the somewhat involved language of the Explanation. Four different views as to the true meaning and effect of the Explanation have been suggested for our consideration and arguments have been advanced for and against the correctness of each of them. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion in the matter.\n\nWe propose accordingly to note the possible views and record very briefly the criticisms relating to each of those views and the suggested answers to such criticisms.\n\nOne view which has been called the strict view is this. In clause\n\n(1) (a) the Constitution makers have placed a ban on the taxing power of the States with respect to sales or purchases which take place outside the State. If the matter had been left ther~ the ban would have been imperfect, for the argument would have still remained as to where a particular sale or purchase took place. Does a sale or purchase take place at the place where the contract of sale is made, or where the property in the goods passes or where the goods are delivered? These questions are answered bv the Explanation. That Explanation is \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a)\" i.e., for the purpose of explaining which sale or purchase is to be regarded as having taken place outside a State.\n\nBy saying that a particular sale or purchase is to be deemed to take place in a particular State the Explanation only indicates that such sale or purchase has taken place outside all other States.\n\nThe Explanation is neither an\n\nException nor a Proviso but only explains what is an outside sale referred to in sub-clause (a). This it does by creating a fiction. That fiction is only for the purposes of sub-clause (a) and cannot be extended to any other purpose. It should be limited to its avowed purpose. To say that this Explanation confers legislative power on what for the sake of brevity has been called the delivery State is to use it for a collateral purpose which is not permissible.\n\nFurther, it is utterly illogical and untenable to say that article 286 which was introduced in the Constitution to place restrictions on the legislative powers of the State, by a side wind, as it were, gave enlarged legislative powers to the State of delivery by an explanation sandwiched between two restrictions. This construction runs counter to the entire scheme of the article and the explanation and one may see no justification for imputing such indirect and oblique purpose to this article. Had the Constitution makers so desired they could have done so in a more direct and straight-forward way. To hold that the Explanation has, besides its declared purpose, another hidden purpose of conferring or enlarging legislative power is to build up a fanciful argument merely on the unfelicitous and involved language used _in the Explanation although it is distinctly not the purpose of the Explanation and althoµgh it does not purport substantively and propno\n\nvigore, to confer any legislative power on any State.\n\nIts only purpose is to explain what an outside sale is, so that, by one stroke, as it were, it takes away the taxing power, in respect of sales or purchases of the kind referred to in the Explanation, of all States other than the State where such sales or purchases are, by the Explanation, to be deemed to have taken place.\n\nThis view of the Explanation was taken in the dissenting judgment in the case of the State of Tr.wancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory\n\n(supra). The view that the Explanation is only for the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (1) and cannot be carried over to clause (2) was also taken in the dissenting judgment in the State of Bombay v.\n\nThe United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) at p. 1103.\n\nThe BengaJ\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nad others\n\nDas Actg. c. ].\n\nTht Ben1al .\n\nImmunity C:?mpany Limited\n\nTM State of Bihar\n\nand otMrs\n\nDas Aclg. C. ].\n\nThe criticislI} that has been levelled against thi1 strict view of the Explanation is that it will not entirely eliminate the claims of the States to tax sales or purchases on the basis of the nexus theory. Suppose, it is said, Parliament lifts the ban .placed on inter-State trade or commerce by clause (2), all States will, in that situation, claim the right to tax sales or purchases if any one of the ingredients or events making up the sale is to be found to exist or to have happened in that State. It has been suggested in reply to this criticism that this apprehension is not at all well-founded. When Parliament will lift the ban imposed by clause (2), the Explanation will continue to operate, so that inter-State sales or purchases falling within it will still be deemd to have taken place in the delivery State and, therefore, outside all other States none of which latter States will, by reason of the ban imposed by clause (I) (a), be entitled to tax such sale. The ban under clause (2) being lifted the delivery State will become free to tax such sales or purchases in exercise of the taxing power conferred on it by article 246(3) read with Entry 54 in List II. Then, it is asked, what will happen to those sales or purchases which do not fall within the Explanation?\n\nAfter Parliament hfts tbe ban under clause (2) which State will tax sales or purchases in which goods are actually delivered in a particular State. not for consumption in that State but, say, for re-export to another State for consumption ? One of the suggested answers was that those sales or purchases were not like! y - to be numerous, for ordinarily a dealer would not actually get the goods imported into a State only for re-exporting the same to another State for consumption in the last mentioned State but would find it more convenient and economical to arrange for the delivery of the goods straight to the last mentioned State. A further suggestion was that it might well be that when Parliament would by law lift the ban of clause (2) it would, by the same law, provide which .of the States would tax such inter-State sales or purchases which were not covered by the Explanation and on what basis.\n\n.. -\n\nThis suggested answer, in its turn, raises a question as to the scope and ambit of the legislative power conferred on Parliament by clause (2). The .opening words of clause (2), namely, . \"Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide\" clearly indicate that the lifting of the ban may be total or partial, that is to say, Parliameilt may lift the ban wholly and unconditionally or it may lift it to such extent as it may think fit to do and on such terms as it pleases.\n\nIt is to be remembered that under Entry 42 of List I Parliament alone may make law with respect to inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nIt is, therefore, conceded that in exercise of its legislative powers under that entry read with article 286(2) Parliament may make a law permitting the States to tax inter- State sales or purcj1ases of certain commodities only.\n\nIt is also not questioned that Parliament may, by way of regulating inter-State trade or commerce, fix a ceiling rate of tax on sales or purchases of goods which the law made hy the States under Entry 54 of List II, may not exceed.\n\nCan Parliament also override the Explan:ition? If not, cannot Parliament at least provide which of the States may tax inter-State\n\nsales or purchases of goods which do not fall within the Explanation ?\n\nThese are some of the questions which may arise as and when Parliament will choose to make a law in exercise of the powers conferred on it and it will then be time enough to discus> and decide those questions. It is not for the C0urts to advise Parliament in advance as to the scope of . its legislative competency under clause (2) and, therefore, we only note those questions and leave them here.\n\nThe second view as to the meaning and effect of the Explanation is that it once for all fixes rhe situs of a sale or purchase so that one knows when such a sale or purchase is outside a State and when it is inside a State. To put it differently, States are told when a sale or purchase is )inside a particular State and, therdore, the States are also told when a sale or purchase is outside a State. In short the Explanation not c; mly explains what is an outside sale or purchase but al59 actually fixes the situs of a sale or\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Ctmftany Limited v.\n\nT/it State of Bihar •nd others\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nThe Bmgfl/\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nv. 1'11.e Stall of Bi/uzr\n\nand others\n\nJJas Actg. C. J.\n\npurchase in a particular State.\n\nThis view of the Explanation was taken in the majority decision in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra). The majol:ity decision quite clearly concedes that the Explanation does not, by itself, confer any legislative power on any State, not even the delivery State, with respect to sales or purchases of the kind mentioned therein but as it fixes the situs of such sales or purchases in the delivery State that State is left free to tax them in exercise of its legislative powers under article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II. The criticism offered against this view is, first of all, that it uses the Explanation for a purpose which is beyond that of sulrclause (a). This view turns the fiction created expressly for sub.clause (a) into a reality fixing the location of such sales and purchases for all purposes. In the next place this view ignores the existence of clause (2) which imposes a different ban on the legislative power of all States including the delivery State also, so that as long as Parliament does not lift the ban no State, not even the delivery State, may tax sales or purchases which take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, even though they may fall within the Explanation. The further objection is that this view also does not completely eliminate the confusion arising from the nexus theory.\n\nSuppose Parliament lifts the ban under clause (2), which State will tax sales or purchases which do not come within the Explanation? The same answer was suggested as was done in reply to similar objections to the first view. That, as we have said, will call for decision if and when Parliament exercises its legislative powers under clause (2). The third view, which was adQmbrated and discussed in the separate judgment of Bhagwati, J. in the case of The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) is that the Explanacion concerns itself with notionally fixing the situs of sales or purchases in the delivery State only but in no way affects the taxing power of the State in which, under the general law relating to the sale of goods, the property in the goods has passed. The result of this view is\n\nsaid to be that the State in which the sales or purchases are to be deemed to have taken place may tax them but the State in which, under the general law relating to the sale of goods, the property in the goods has passed may also tax them if and when.\n\nParliament lifts the ban of clause (2). This view, it is said, is open to all the criticisms to which the second view is subject and in addition to that a further objection • has been suggested against this view, namely, that it will perpetuate double, if not multiple, taxation on one and the same transaction of sale or purchase at least after Parliament lifts the ban.\n\nA fourth view has also been suggested before us as a possible view although it was not put forward on the previous occasion. It is founded on the non-obstante clause in the Explanation. It is said that clause ( 1) (a) and the Explanation concern themselves with only two States, namely the title State, i.e.. the State in which,\n\nn<ler the general law, title to the goods passes to the purchaser and the delivery State, i.e., the State in which goods are actually delivered as a direct result of the sale or purchase for consumption in that State.\n\nThe purpose of the Explanation is said to be to demarcate the taxing power of only these two States by taking out the sales or purchases of the kind mentioned therein from the sphere of the taxing power of the title State and subjecting them to the taxing power of the delivery State.\n\nIn the ju, xtaposition of those two States clause (l)(a) read with the Explanation provides that the title State cannot tax because such sales or purchases are, by the fiction, made to take place outside its territory and that the delivery State can tax because the sales or purchases in question are, by the fiction, made to take place inside its territory.\n\nIn short, the result of clause (l)(a) read with the Explanation, according to this view, is that the State which cannot tax such sales or purchases on the ground that thev have taken place outside its territory is only that State in which the property in the goods has passed.\n\nThe criticism is immediately put forward that if clause (l)(a) and the Explanation are limited in their opeation only to the two States men-\n\nTire B\"'gal tI111munity Company Limited\n\nT/14 Stau of Bi/iM\n\nand olh4rs\n\nDas Aclg. C. ].\n\n~9.>S\n\nT 11' Btng•l\n\nImmunit, Y Company Limitti\n\nv' Thi Stat1 of Bihu\n\nand others\n\n.Das ; fclg. C. J.\n\ntioned above then the other States which also claimed to tax on the strength of the nexus theory, e.g., the State where the contract was made, or the State where the goods were produced or manufactured or were found, will be outside the ban and the mischief of multiple taxation which the Constitution makers were out to curb will continue to be rampant and unabated. This view is also subjected to some of the other criticisms mentioned in connection with the other views of the Explanation.\n\nAs we have already stated, we do not desire, on this occasion, to express any opinion on the validity claimed for or the infirmities imputed to any of these several views, for, in our opinion, it is not necessary to do so for disposing of this appeal. Whichever view is taken of the explanation it should be limited to the purpose the Constitution makers had in view when il1ey incorporated it in clause (1). It is quite obvious that it created a legal fiction.\n\nLegal fictions are created only for some definite purpose.\n\nHere the avowed purpose of the Explanation is to explain what an outside sale referred to in sub-clause (a) is. The judicial decisions referred to in the dissenting judgment in The State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shannwgha\n\nVilas Cashew Nut Factory (supra) at pp. 81 and 82 and the case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Fin.cbury Borough Council(') clearly indicate that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it was created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. It should further be remembered that the cle>- minant, if not the sole, purpose of article 286 is to place restrictions on the legislative powers of the States, subject to certain conditions in some cases and with that end in view article 286 imposes several bans on the taxing power of the States in relation to sales or purchases viewed from different angles and according to their different aspects.\n\nIn some cases the ban is absolute as, for example, with regard to outside sales covered by clause (!)(a) read with the Explanation, or with regard to imports and exports .covered by .clause ( 1 )(b) and in som.e cases it is con-\n\n(!) L. R. 195~ A.C. 109. 132.\n\nditional, e.g., in the cases of inter-State sales or purchases under clause (2) which is, in terms, made subject to the proviso thereto and also to the power of Parliament to lift the ban. Again, in some cases the bans may overlap but nevertheless, they are distinct and independent of each othec The operative provisions of the several parts of article 286, namely, clause (l)(a), clause (l)(b), clause (2) and clause (3) are manifestly intended to deal with different topics and, therefore, one cannot be projected or read into another.\n\nOn a careful and anxious consideration of the matter in the light of the fresh arguments advanced and discussions held on the present occasion we are definitely of the opinion that the Explanation in clause ( l) (a) cannot be legitimately extended to clause (2) either as an exception or as a proviso thereto or read as curtailing or limiting the ambit of clause (2). Indeed, in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (fodia) Ltd. (supra) at pp. 1083-1084 and again at p. 1086 the majority judgment also accepted the position that the Explanation was not an exception or proviso either to clause (l)(a) or to clause (2).\n\nIf, therefore, the Explanation cannot be read into clause (2) because of the express language of the Explanation and also because of the difference in the subject-matter of the operative provisions of the two clauses, then it must follow that, except in so far as Parliament may by law provide otherwise, no State law can impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases when such sales or purchases take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and irrespective of whether such sales or purchases do or do not fall within the Explanation. It is not necessary, for the purposes of this appeal, to enter upon a discussion as to what is exactly meant by inter-State trade or commerce or by the phrase \"in the course of\", for it is common ground that the sales or purchases made by the appellant company which are sought to be taxed by the State of Bihar actually took place in the course of inrer-State trade or commerce.\n\nParliament not having by law otherwise provided, no State law <; an, therefore, tax these sales or purchases, that is\n\nThe Benial\n\nJm., unity Com; a11y Limited v.\n\nT lie State of Bihar . •nd •thers\n\nDas .Mz. c. J.\n\nThe Beng1d\n\nImmunity Comp11ny Limited\n\nThe Siat1 of Bihar\n\nand oth1rs\n\nDos A.ctg. C. J.\n\nto say, Bihar cannot tax by reason of clause (2) although they fall within the Explanation and other States cannot tax by reason of both clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation and clause (2). This conclusion lead us now to consider the arguments by which the respondent State and the intervening States which support the respondent State seek to get over this position.\n\nIn the forefront is placed the argument that found favour with the majority of the Bench which decided the case of The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.· (supra). That argument is to be found in the majority judgment at pp. 1085-1086.\n\nShortly put, the majority opinion was that the operation of clause (2) stood excluded as a result of the legal fiction enacted in the Explanation. In their view the effect of the Explanation in regard to inter-State dealings was to invest what, in truth, was an inter-State transaction with an int'ra-State character in relation to the State of delivery and clause (2) could, therefore, have no application. They recognised that the legal fiction was to operate \"for the purposes of subclause (a) of clause ( 1)\" and that that meant merely that the Explanation was designed to explain the meaning of the expression \"outside the State\" in clause (1) (a). They, nevertheless, came to the conclusion that when once it was determined with the aid of the fictional test that a particular sale or purchase had taken place within the taxing State, it followed as a corollary, that the transaction lost its inter-State character and fell outside the purview of clause (2), not because the fiction created by the Explanation was used for the purpose of clause (2), but because such sale or purchase became, in the eye of the law, a purely local transaction.\n\nIn his own inimitable language the learned Chief Justice, who wrote and delivered the majority judgment, concluded the discussion on this point by saying that the statutory fiction completely masked the inter-State character of the sale or purchase which, as a collateral result of such masking, fell outside the scope of clause (2). In spite of the great respect we always entertain for the\n\nop1ruons of the then learned Chief Justice and the other learned Judges who constituted the majority we are unable to accept the aforesaid arguments or the conclusions as correct for the reasons we now proceed to state.\n\nThe situs of an intangible concept like a sale can only be fixed notionally by the application of artificial tules i11vented either by Judges as part of the judgemade law of the land.. or by some legislative authority. Bur a< far as we know, no fixed rule of universal application has yet been definitely and finally evolved for determining this for all purposes. There are many conflicting theories: One, which is more popular and frequently put forward and is referred to :irid m:iy, indeed, be urged to have been adopted bv the Constitution in the non-obstante clause of the F:xplanation, favours the place where the property in the goods passes, another which is said to be the\n\nAmerican view and which was adopted in G. Govindaraju/11 Naidu & Co. v. The State of Madras( 1) fixes upon the place where the contract is concluded, a third which prevails in the continental countries of Europe prefers the place where the goods sold are actually deli- Yered, a tourth ooims to the place where the essential ingredients which go to make up a sale are most densely grouped. In this situation if the Explanation were not there and the ban under clause (2) were to be raised unconditionally it would become necessary for the Courts to reach a conclusion and choose between these conflicting views.\n\nArticle 286( 1 )(a), it should be noted, does not say that an inside sale mav be taxed. It only says that no outside sale shall be taed.\n\nNow if a State claims that the sale is inside because part of its ingredients lies within its boundaries, by the same logic it is also an outside sale because the remaining parts are outside its territories and if it is an outside sale it cannot be taxed whether or not it can be deemed to be mside for some particular purpose.\n\nThe prohibition of article 286(1)(a) is against taxing an outside sale and if the sale is outside even partially it may well be argued that no State legislature can\n\n(I) A.LR. 1953 Mad. 116. 4-84 S. C. India/59.\n\n1955\n\nTh• Ben.a/\n\nImmunity Compa11y L1'mitld\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C. J-\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlinmunity Company Limittd ,- T h6 Stall of Bihar\n\nand ot/; e's\n\nDas Act:. C.J.\n\noverride the Constitution by deeming it to be an ir._s; de sale. Therefore, if the last of the aforesaid theories were to be adopted, then either no State would be able to tax, or all having the requisite nexus would be able to do so. But this, in our opinion, is the very mischief which the Constitution makers wished to avoid and that, as we understand the majority iudgmcnt in the Bombay case, was their view also. So that view can be placed on one side. On any one of the other views the situs would have to be fixed artificially in one place ancl then one would have to apply the logic of the majority decision and hold that as soon as the situs is determined to be in one place by judicial fiction, i.e., a fiction enunciated by judicial decision, the inter-\n\nState character of the transaction must cease.\n\nThe majority hold that this is the result when the situs is placed in only one State, namely, the delivery State,\n\nbecause of the fiction which the Explanation creates.\n\nThe same result would have to follow logically if the situs were to be established by judicial fiction instead of by a constitutional one. The reasoning of the majority, pushed to its logical conclusion, will inevitably lead us to hold that all inter-State transactions must eventually be converted into intra-State transactions and, therefore, become amenable to the taxing power of the State within whose territories they are, by the constitutional or judicial fiction, to be deemed . to take place.\n\nIn this view there will remain no inter-State transaction on which clause\n\n(2) may possibly operate.\n\nThe argument which leads to this astounding conclusion has only to be stated to be rejected. The truth is that what is an inter- State sale or purchase continues to be so irrespective of the State where the sale is to be located either under the general law when it is finally determined what the general law is or by the fiction created by the Explanation. The situs of a sale or purchase is wholly irrelevant as regards its inter-State character.\n\nWe find no cogent reason in support of the argument that a fiction created for certain definitely expressed purposes, namely, the purposes of clause (1) (a) can legitimately be used for the entirely foreign and '\n\ncollateral purpose of destroying the inter-State character of the transaction and converting it into an intra- State sale or purchase Such metamorphosis appears to us to be beyond the purpose and purview of ciause (l)(a) and the Explanation thereto. When we apply a fiction all we do is to assume that the situation created by the fiction is true. Therefore, the same consequences must flow from the fiction as would have flown had the facts supposed to be true been the actual facts from the start. Now, even when the situs of a sale or purchase is in fact inside a State, with no essential ingredient taking place outside, nevertheless, if it takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, it will be hit by clause (2). If the sales or purchases are in the course of inter-State trade or commerce the stream of inter-State trade or commerce will catch up in its vortex all such sales or purchases which take place in its course wherever the situs of the sales or purchases may be. All that the Explanation does is to shift the situs from point A in the stream to point X also in the stream. It does not lift the sales or purchases out of the stream in those cases where they form part of the stream. The shifting of the situs of a sale or purchase from its actual situs under the general law to a fictional situs under the Explanation takes the sale or purchase out of the taxing power of all States other than the State where the situs is fictionally fixed. That is all that clause\n\n(1) (a) and the Explanation do. Whether the delivery State will be entitled to tax such a sale or purchase will depend on the other provisions of the Constitution. The assignment of a fictional situs to a sale or purchase has no bearing or effect on the other aspects of the sale or purchase, e.g., its inter-State character or its export or import character which are entirely different topics. This fixing of a situs for a sale or purchase in any particular State either under the general law or under the fiction does not conclude the matter. It has yet to be ascertained whether that sale or purchase which by virtue of the Explanation has taken place in the delivery State was made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nFor this\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nTht State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas .4.ct.!!. C.J.\n\npurpose the Explanation can have no relevancy or Jpplication at all.\n\nAnother argument adumbrated m the majority judgment in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra) at p. 1081 and at pp. 1086-1087 and elaborated before us is that just as the freedom of trade referrod to in article 301 has been made to give way to the States' power of 1mposmg nondiscriminatory taxes by article . 304 so must article 286(2) be regarded as subject to the States' taxing power, for the protection of article 286(2) could not have been intended to be larger. This argument was refuted by the dissenting judgment in that Bombay case (supra) at pp. 1102-1103 and p. 1127 and also by the dissenting judgment in The State of Travancore- Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (supra) at p. 89. Nothing that we have heard on the present occasion induces us to depart from the views expressed on this subject in those dissenting judgments.\n\nIt is next urged that the Explanation in effect operates as an exception or a proviso to clause (2). This view runs directly counter to the express language of the Explanation itself.\n\nSo the argument is formulated in a slightly different way. It is said that clause (2) contains the enunciation of the general rule and the Explanation embodies a particular or special rule.\n\nAccording to a cardinal rule of construction the particular or special rule must control or cut down the general rule. This view was adopted by the High Court in the judgment under appeal and also found favour with one of the Judges in the Bombay case (supra).\n\nIt appears to us that this argument overlooks the basic fact that clause (I) (a) to which is appended the Explanation and clause (2) deal with\n\nJilferent topics altogether.\n\nThe Explanation is concemed with explaining what is an outside sale or purchase by fixing a fictional situs. It cannot be read as a provision independent of clause (!)(a). It does not, by itself and in terms, confer any legislative power on anv State. It is true that the Explanation may apply to fix the situs of many inter-State transactions but that is only for ascertaining. for the\n\npurposes of clause (l)(a), whether it has taken place in side or outside a particular State. The inter-State aspect of the sales or purchases is not within the purview of clause (l)(a) which looks at sales or purchases from the point of view of their location only.\n\nClause (2), on the other hand, takes note of the inter- State character of sales or purchases which is an entirely different topic.\n\nThe two provisions do not relate to the same subject and, therefore, it is not possible to hold that one is the enunciation of a general rule and the other the enunciation of a particular or special rule on one and the same subject.\n\nThe principle of construction relied upon cannot, in our opinion, be called in aid in construing clause (2) and the Explanation of clause (l)(a). If the Explanation cuts down clause (2), it must also, on a parity of reasoning, cut down clause (3) which, as will hereinafter be explained more fully, could not possibly have been intended by the Crmstitution makers. lt must also cut down clause ( 1) (b) dealing with import an<l export; but to hold that would run counter to the decision in State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. The Bombay Co. Ltd.( 1 ). In our opinion to use the Explanation to cut down the operation of clause (2) or clause\n\n(3) will be to us.~ it for a purpose other than its legitimate' and avowed purpose.\n\nThe same argument is put in a slightly different way and in a more attractive form. It is said that we must construe article' 286. as a whole and give meaning to every part of it. Sales or purchases which fall within the Explanation to clause (1) (a) clearly partake of the character of inter-State transactions.\n\nTherefore, if we construe clause (2) of article 286 literally and strictly then the whole of clause (1) (a) and the Explanation will be redundant and useless and will have no immediate operation and will remain a dead letter, at any rate, until Parliament, in exercise of its powers under clause (2), lifts the ban. We must, it is urged, make an attempt to avoid such a result and adopt such a construction as will not only give effect to each part of the article but also make each . part\n\n(I) [195°) 3 S.C.R. 1112.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limi1t~\n\n\"· The Stale of Billa•\n\nand others\n\nDas Act.~. C.].\n\nThe &ngal . Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nant[ others\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\napplicable in presenti.\n\nThat, it is pointed out, can well be done if clause (2) is interpreted in a restricted manner.\n\nThe argument runs-give full and immediate. effect to the Explanation and then leave clause\n\n(2) to govern or operate on cases which do not fall within the Explanation.\n\nIn effect this argument means that we must treat all transactions of sales or purchases falling within the Explanation as outside clause (2). Shorn of its thin veneer of disguise this argument is nothing more than the argument that the Explanation, in effect, operates as an exception to clause (2) and all the cnttmms applicable to that construction will apply mutatis mutandis to the argument in the present form.\n\nApart from that there are obvious fallacies which render the argument utterly unacceptable.\n\nWe now proceed to deal with these fallacies seriatim.\n\n(i) In the first place, the mere circumstance that a provision in the Constitution will, on a proper cof!- struction, take effect on the happening of a future event can, by itself, be no ground for not giving effect to the plain language of that provision. Take the very next provision in article 286 itself, namely, clause (3).\n\nIt has no present application and its usefulness will ensue only when Parliament by law declares certain goods to be essential for the life of the community. The fact that the Explanation, in so far as it relates to inter-State sales, may nor have an immediate operation until Parliament lifts the ban under clause (2) need not unnecessarily oppress us or lead us to adopt a forced construction only to give the whole of it an immediate and present operation.\n\n(ii) In the second place, it is not correct to say that the Explanation, construed as suggested above, can have no immediate operation at all.\n\nIt certainly has immediate operation to render sales and purchases which fall within the explanal:!on to be outside sales and purchases so as immediately to take away the taxing power of all States other than the delivery State with respect to them. Further cases ma, y arise in which purchases or sales which are outside clause (2)_ may, nevertheless, fall within and be immediately\n\ngoverntd by the Explanation.\n\nWe do not wish to ex-· press any opm1on on . )'ypothetical cases but the following illustration will show that on a given view of the law . the Explanation would be called into play\n\ndspite tbe' fact that clause (2) . was not attraded.\n\nTake, for instance, a case where both the seller and the buyer reside and carrv on business in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab. Let us say that the seller has a godown in the State of Delhi where his goods are stored and that the buyer has also a retail shop at Connaught Circus also in the State of Delhi.\n\nThe ' buyer and the seller enter into a contract at Gurgaon for the sale of certain goods and a term of the contract is that the goods contracted to be sold will be actually delivered from the seller's godown to the buyer's retail shop, both in the State of Delhi, for consumption in the State of Delhi. Pursuant to this contract made in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab, the buyer pavs the full price of the goods at Gurgaon and the seller hands over to the buyer - also at Gurgaon a delivery order addressed to the seller's godown-keeper in Delhi to deliver the goods to the buyer's retail shop.\n\nAs a direct result of this sale the seller's gcxlown-keeper, on the presentation of this delivery order, actually deliver_s the goods to the buyer's retail shop at Connaught ircus for consumption in the State of Delhi.\n\nOn one view of the law, the situs of such a sale would be Gurgaon.\n\nWe need not decide that it is, because that type of case is not before us and there may be other views to consider, but it is certainly a possible view. It is also possible to hold that this is not inter-State trade or commerce, because there is no movement of goods across a State boundary. Again, we need not decide that because that also may be controversial.\n\nBut given these two postulates the transaction would fall squarely within the Explanation and yet it would not come within clause (2), for there is no movement of the goods acrrn the border of any State and both the seller and the buyer are in the same place.\n\nSurely, the Explanation will, in presenti, govern such cases irrespective of whether Parliament has lifted the ban under clause\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited , ..\n\nThi Stat; of Bih\"'\n\nand othtr.r\n\nDas Artg. C.J.\n\nThe Benpal\n\nimmunity Company Limikd\n\nTM State of Bihcr\n\nand othLrs\n\nDm ..4.cl.(· C.J.\n\n(2). It these postulates are accepted then by virtue of clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation the State of Delhi alone will be entitled to impose a tax on such a sale or purchase and the State of Punjab will be precluded from doing so bv reason of the fictional sitt<S assigned to such a sale or purchose by the Explanation, although the contract was made, price was paid and symbolical or constructive delivery of the goods by the handing over of the delivery order took place in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab.\n\n(iii) It is not correct to say that ciause (l)(a) read with the Explanation is wholly useless .. It may well be argued that there was scope for the operation of clause (!)(a) and the Explanation as and when the President exercised the powers vested in him by the Proviso to clause (2). It will be noticed that under that proviso the President's order was to take effect \"notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause\".\n\nThis non obstante clause does not, in terms, supersede clause (1) at all and, therefore, prima facie, the President's order was subject to the prohibition of clause (I) (a) read with the Explanation.\n\nIt is, however, pointed out that the proviso says that any tax which was being lawfully levied by the States immediately before the commencement of the Constitution will continue to be levied .until the date therein specified. It is said that before the Constitution sales tax was levied bv the different States on the basis of the nexus theory irrespective of the situs of the sales or purchases and. therefore, this very proviso clearly indicates that the intention of the Constitution makers was that all taxes imposed on the basis of the nexus theorv must continue irrespective of the provisions of the Explanation which fictionally fixes the situs of the sales or purchases in the delivery State. The argument is not without some force but cannot prevail.\n\nIt is true that the different States used to levy sales tax on the basis of slight nexus but the legality , of them had not, at the date of the Constitution, been tested in a Court of law.\n\nTherefore, the proviso authorised the President by order to continue only such of them as were\n\nbeing \"lawfully\" levied and consequently there is no reason to think. that the President's order was intended to continue all sales taxes previously \":}e.yie<l irrespective of their legality. In the next place, there is nothing to be surprised at if the President's qrder was made to operate subject to the prohibition of lause (1) (a) read with the Explanation.\n\nFinally, to accede to this argument must mean that we must read into the proviso s0mething which is not there. To give effect to this argument we shall have to alter the non obstante clause towards the end of the proviso and substitute the Words \"of the foregoing clauses\" for the words \"of\n\nthis clause\". However, we need not rest our decision on this point. It will certainly operate as soon as Parliament, in exercise of the power vested in it by clause (2), lifts the ban imposed on the States. Upon the lifting of the ban by Parliament those inter-State sales or purchases which fall within the Explanation will, by virtue of it, he deemed to take place within the delivery State and such sales or purchases being, as a re- -suit of such fiction, outside all other States none of them will be entitled to tax such sales or purchases.\n\nWhether the delivery State will be entitled to make a law imposing tax on such sales or purchases in exercise of the legislative powers vested in it by article 24o\n\n(3) read with Entry 54 in Lisr II or whether Parliament, while lifting the ban, may also by the same law authorise the delivery State to do so or what is the extent of the authority vested in Parliament by the opening words of clause (2) are questions which will arise for consideration only after the ban under clause (2) is lifted and we need not in advance express any opinion on a foture problem.\n\n(iv) If we accept the argument that we are to give full effect to clause (I) (a) and the Explanation and let it operate immediately on all transactions which come within their terms and leave clause (2) to govern only those cases which are outside clause (l)(a) read with the Explanation then, on a parity of reawning, we shall have to give effect to clause (l)(a) and the Explanation and leave clause ( 1) (b) and also clause (3) to govern only those cases which do not\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Biho1\n\nand others\n\nDas Act.~. C. J.\n\n'.i-M Btnga/\n\nlnununity Co111pan_v Limited\n\nT!it Slate of Bihar\n\nand olhtrs\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nfall within c.lause ( 1 )(a) read with the Explanation.\n\nTo illustrate this point, take clause (3).\n\nSuppose under clause (3) Parliament by law declare' certain goods, say wheat, to. be essential for the lite of the community. Suppose there is a sale of such essential goods by a seller in the State of Delhi to a buyer in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab in which as a direct result of such sale the goods are delivered in Gurgaon in Punjab for consumption in that State. According to the argument we have to give full efkct first to clause ( 1 )(a) and the Explanati::>n and accordingly we must hold that the transaction is wholly covered by the Explanation and, therefore, Punjab will be entitled to tax it and clause (3) must be left to govern only cases other than those which fall within the Explanation. If the argument were sound it must follow that the State of Punjab will be perfectly justified in saying that for the purpose of making a law imposing a tax on such sales or purchases its law need not be reserved for the assent of the President at all.\n\nIt may well say that the restrictive requirements of reserving the bill for the President\" s assent and of obtaining such assent before the law n:iay take effect apply only to a law which imposes tax on sales or. purchases which are outside the Explanation. In other words, the State of Punjab, in our illustratioo, will be entitled to ,:ay that clause (3) governs only those cases of sales or purchases of essential goods which do not come within the description mentioned in the Explanation, namely, for instance, only those sales or purchases in which essential goods are delivered in a State not for consumption in that State but for re-export to another State. This will rob clause (3) of practically the best part of its content and, therefore, of its usefulnes• and defeat• the very purpose the. Constitution makers obviously had of safeguarding sales or purchases of essential commodities by imposing the restriction requiring the reservation of the bill for the President's assent and the obtaining of such assent.\n\nWhen a famine is raging in say Punjab, and . sales and purchases are made of wheat which is declared as essential\n\nto the life of the community and as a direct result of such sale wheat is delivered in the Punjab for consumption there the State of Punjab may, according to the reasoning underlying the argument, put up the price of these essential goods by imposing a sales tax by making a law to that effect and ignoring the safeguards prescribed by clause (3). An argument which leads us to a result so utterly absurd and untenable in reason cannot for a moment be countenanced.\n\nNo less than five reasons have been suggested in support of the argument that a restricted construction should be placed on clause\n\n(2) of article 286.\n\nIt will be convenient to deal with them at this stage one by one.\n\n(a) In the first place, it is urged that clause (2) should be construed in a restricted way because the class of sales falling within article 286(l)(a) forms a\n\nspecial class of inter-State sales and they cannot be affected by the general provisions of article 286( 2).\n\nThis argument totally overlooks the real scheme of article 21:16. It fails to note that bv this article the Constitution makers were imposing 'restrictions on the taxing power of the States with respect to sales or purchases in their diff.:rent aspects viewed from entirely different angles which we h<, ve heretofore already explained. The subject-matters of the different parts of article 286 are, therefore, different and distinct and the principle of interpretation, namely, the special provision cutting down the general provision cannot be properly invoked.\n\n(b) The second reason urged is that if article 286(2) applies to the class of sales or purchases falling within article 286(l)(a) then it will result in discrimination against local trade and in favour of inter- State trade and this will be inconsistent with the provisions of Part XII I of the Constitution. It is said that when a Bihar dealer sells certain goods to a Bihar purchaser the former is obliged to pay sales tax which he passes on to the 'Bihar purchaser but when the Bihar purchaser directly imports into Bihar similar goods from say a West Bengal dealer for consump-\n\nThe Bm.al\n\nlmmunily Compariy Limited\n\nThe-Stale ef Bihar\n\n\"nd others\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmnnmipi Company Limited\n\nv, Thi Stt:ttt of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act, g. C. J.\n\ntion in Bihar that transaction will not be liable to Bihar Sales Tax as it will be an inter-State transaction. This, it is said, will prejudice the Bihar seller for all Bihar purchasers will then be driven to purchasing goods from out-of-State sellers and local producers will suffer a set back. The argument is that as a literal construction of clause (2) will result in such discrimination against local trade, the cardinal rule of interpretation, namely, reading the written provision literally ancl giving to the words their ordinary natural meaning should give way to a restricted construction.\n\nThis argument overlooks several basic things. lf there is any real hardship of the kind refened to, there is Parliament which is expressly invested with the power of lifting the ban under clause\n\n(2) either wholly or to the extent it thinks fit to do.\n\nWhy should the Court be called upon to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for mitigating a hardship, which after all may be entirely fanciful, when the Constillltion itself has expressly provided for another authority more competent to c:.valuate the correct position to do the needful? This argument also fails to take into account the benefit which the consuming public derives from the free flow of goods from one State to another resulting in lower prices. Further, the argument overlooks the fact that the se>-called hardship, if any, is brought about, not really by reason of the liberal construction of clause (2) but by reason of the State of Bihar imposing a sales tax on an intra-State transaction. The State of Bihar is not obliged to levy a sales tax on sales or purchases of goods in respect of which there is competition between out-of-State producers, manufacturers and dealers and the Bihar producers, manufacturers and dealers and, indeed, if it intends to encourage its local manufac!llrers or producers it should not do so. It will not do for the State of Bihar to say that it must levy a sales tax on intra-State sales or purchases which it is not obliged to do and at the same time that it must protect the Bihar dealers or producers and enable them to compete With outside dealets or producers and, therefore, ask us to construe the\n\nConstitution in an unnatural way so as to enable it to have the best of both worlds. It is immediately retorted that the welfare State must have sufficient revenue to run itself, that if it is to forego sales tax its economy will be totally upset.\n\nThis harrowing picture of economic collapse of the States\n\nhas been pressed upon this Court on this as on the previous occasion and it evidently oppressed the minds of the Judges who were parties to the majority decision. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the matter a little more closely.\n\nOrdinarily, inter-State trade or commerce is done between a dealer in one State and a dealer in another State. The dealer in the consuming State in his turn sells the goods in retail to actual consumers. There can be no objection to insisting upon all inside dealers getting themselves registered\n\nand submitting returns showing goods imported and sold by them and bringing their annual turnovers to tax which they will pass on to the actual consumers.\n\nCall it a purchase tax vis-a-vis the earlier transaction under which the goods were delivered in Bihar for consumption in that State or call it a sales tax vis-a-vis the subsequent local sales by the Bihar dealer to actual consumers in Bihar, the State will get the full revenue on these local sales or purchases from the local sellers. There can be no doubt that sales or purchases of this kind to or from one dealer to another dealer actually form the bulk of inter-State trade or commerce. To take them out of clause (2) will be to make the protection of inter-State trade or commerce wholly illusory and to rob clause (2) of the best part of its content and utility. Ordinarily individual local consumers buy goods in the local market and do not generally bring goods for their personal consumption from outside dealers. It is only in exceptional cases that a local consumer will be energetic enough to bring goods from outside the State for his consumption and their number will be small. It is only those stray individual consumers who are energetic enough to get goods direct from a dealer in another State and may be willing to pay freight, etc.. and undertake the risk of loss or damage who may ev<!de\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni!Y Company L1miltd\n\nTho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\nThe Btnial\n\nImmuni!J Compan_'I' Limited\n\nTh.t State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Ac ti. C. J.\n\nthe tax. The difficulty in tracing such stray actual local consumers cannot be any cogent reason for adopting the unnatural construction sought to be put upon clause (2) of article 286. If big Bihar purchasers, e.g., Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., who are very heavy consumers of coal, prefer to get their supply of coal from Ranigunge coal fields in West Bengal for consumption in their large factories at Tatanagar in Bihar to getting their supplies from the Jharia coal fields in Bihar and thereby evade sales tax to the detriment of the revenues of the State of Bihar, then again there is Parliament to mitigate such hardship by malting suitable laws in exercise of its power under article 286(2). Such supposed hardship is, in our view, no ground for putting a forced and unnatural interpretation upon article 286. ( c) The third reason in support of a restricted construction of article 286(2) is thus formulated : The\n\npurpo~ of article 286 being to eliminate multiple taxation and article 286( 1 )(a) having already achieved that purpose with regard to the class falling within the Explanation, it was no longer necessary for that purpose to apply article 286(2) to that class. This reasoning appears to us to be untenable. It overlooks the patent fact that the different parts of the article look upon sales and purchases from different perspectives and place different bans on the taxing power of the States at different angles. The circumstance that the bans may in given cases overlap is no justification for concluding that the subject-matter of th~ different provisions is the sanie. This line of reasoning assumes that the only purpose of article 286 is to eliminate multiple taxation. The purposes of the different parts of the article have to be ascertained from the language of the article itself read in the light of the contemporary history of the legislative activities of the different States with respect to taxes on sales or purchases of goods' and the chaos and confusion that arose and the havoc that ensued as a result of those activities. There was multiple taxation which imposed a heavy burden on the consumers and which was also calculated to impede and hinder the free flow of inttt•\n\nState trade or commerce. The Constitution makers, therefore, imposed several bans on the taxing power of the States with respect to sales or purchases, namely, first on the basis of their situs, secondly and thirdly on the basis of the character of the transactions,, e.g., foreign trade or inter-State trade and fourthly on the basis of the nature or quality of the goods sold or purchased, i.e., whether they have been declared to be essential to the life of the community.\n\nAs regards inter-State trade or commerce the clear intention of the Constitution makers was to place an absolute ban for the time being, subject to the proviso, and to give some time to Parliament to study the situation and to evaluate the result of the ban and to lift the ban to such extent as it thought fit in the interest of the general public and that of inter-\n\nStatc trade or commerce. If the matter is approached in this way it becomes abundantly clear that this part of the argument we arc now considering proceeds on a wrong assumption of the purpose of the Constitution.\n\n(d) A restricted construction of article 286(2) is said to he necessary and called for because the Constitution itself has divided inter-State sales or purchases into two categories and in regard to one class it has itself provided both as to which State will tax them and under what condition and in regard to the other class the Constitution has imposed a ban in general terms and granted power to Parliament in general terms to relax such ban as Parliament thinks fit. This is clearly begging the question and does not require any elaborate refutation. ( e) Another string to the bow is that because of the legal fiction created by the Explanation the inter- State sales or purchases were converted into intra- State transactions. This, it will he recalled, was the reasoning adopted in the majority decision in 'I' he State Qf Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra).\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument for the reasons given above which need not be repeated here.\n\nIt is said that the picture of harassment and inconvenience to the traders referred to in the dissenting\n\nThe Bmga/\n\nlmm1111i!J Company L1mittd\n\nThe Slate of Bihflr\n\na•d othlr.<\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmtmit)' Company Limitd\n\nTh! State of Bihar and others\n\nl), l r Actg. C. 7.\n\njudgments is more imaginary than real. It is pointed out that it is only big traders who will have sales of .their goods in all the States in the Union of India.\n\nThose big traders maintain a large staff of clerks and a.:countants and there can be no difficulty if they are ubliged to file returns in each State where they sell their goods.\n\nThis argument overlooks the practical effects of the different sales tax laws enacted by different States. All big traders will have to get themselves registered in each State, study the Sales Tax Acts of each State, conform to the requirements of all State laws which are by no means uniforms and, finally, may be simultaneously called upon to produce their-- books of account in support of their rd:lJrns before the officers of each State.\n\nAnybody who has any practical experience of the working of the sales tax laws of the different States knows how iong books are detained by the officers of each State during assessment proceedings.\n\nThere are different stages of these proceedings, original, appellate and revisional and there will be as many proceedings under each heading as there are States where the goods are sold.\n\nThe harassment to traders is quite obvious and needs no exaggeration. On the other hand if any risk to the economy of the States ensues from the construction of anicle 286 which commends itself to us, the appeal must be to Parliament which can by law made under the opening words of clause (2) mitigate that risk.\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons we are definitely of opinion that, until Parliament by law made in exercise of the powers vested in it by clause (2) provides otherwise, no State can impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases of goods when such sales or purchases take place m the course of inter-State trade or commerce and the majority decision ir: Tlie State of Bombay v.\n\nThe United Motors (India) Ltd.\n\n(supra) in so far as it decides to the contrary cannot be accepted as well founded on principle or auth<>rity.\n\nIn the view we have taken on uestion (A) it is not nece; sary for us, on this occasion, to discuss the other questions (B), '(C) or (D}. All that remains to\n\nbe seen is whether as a result of our finding on question (A) the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 is ultra vires and void in its entirety or it is only bad in so far as it seeks to impose a sales tax on out-of-State sellers in respect of inter-State sales or purchases: This will depend on whether the objectionable parts of the Act are severable from the rest of its provisions.\n\nIt will be necessary here to refer to a few provisions of the Act.\n\nThe long title of the Act is \"An Act to provide for the levy of a tax on sales of goods in Bihar\".\n\nThe preamble recites that \"It is necessary to make an addition to the revenues of Bihar and for that purpose to impose a tax on the sale of goods in Bihar\".\n\nThe Act extends to the whole of the State of Bihar. \"Dealer\" was originally defined in section 2(c) as meaning:\n\n\"any person who sells or supplies any goods in Bihar whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise and includes any firm or a Hindu joint family and anv society, club or association which sells or supplies goods to its members\".\n\nBy the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 the words \"in Bihar\" were omitted from this definition. Clause (g) of the same section defines sale. That definition has undergone various changes from time to time. The period we are concerned with in this appeal is from 26th January 1950 to the 30th September 1951.\n\nBetween 1st October 1948 and 31st March 1951 which covers the earlier part of the relevant period the clause stood as follows :-\n\n\"Sale\" means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire-purchase or other instalment system of payment shall,\n\nnotwithst:inding the fact that the seller retains a title 5-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nTill &tiff\" Co~\n\nThi Stall of Biltar\n\nand othm\n\nDas A•tg. C. J.\n\nTh• Bengal\n\nlmmunif.1 Company Limited\n\nTk1 Stau of Bi/1at\n\nand others\n\nDai Actg. C. J.\n\nto any goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale : Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930\n\n(III of 193'b), the sale of any goods-\n\n(i) which are actually in Bihar at the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, or\n\n(ii) which are produced or manufactured in Bihar by the producer or manufacturer thereof, shall, wherever the delivery or contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in Bihar : Provided further that the sale of goods in respect 0£ a forward contract, whether goods under such contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery\".\n\nThis definition was amended and between the !st April 1951 and the 31st March 1952 which covers the latter part of the relevant period it read as follows:- \" 'sale' means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for 'cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire purcha<e or other instalment system of payment shall, notwithstanding the fact that the seller retains a title to any goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale : Provided further that the sale of goods in respect of a forward contract, whether goods under such contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery.\n\nExplanation.-The sale of any goods actually delivered in Bihar as a direct result of such sale for the purpuse of consumption in Bihar shall be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in\n\nBihar, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods, the property in the goods has, by reason of such sale, passed in another State\".\n\nIt will be noted that the Explanation which is substantially a reproduction of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) was introduced for the first time by this amendment.\n\n\"Turn over\" is defined in section 2(i). The charging section is .section 4 which provides, amongst other things, that subject to the provisions of sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 and with effect from the commencement of the Act every dealer whose gross turn over during the year immediately preceding the date of such commencement on sales which have taken place both in and outside Bihar exceeds Rs. 10,000 shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on sales which have taken place in Bihar and from the date of such commencement. It will be noticed that although the long title and the preamble refer to the sale of goods in Bihar the words \"in Bihar\" were deleted from the definition of the word \"sat::\" in section 2(g). There are various provisions for working out the scheme of the Act to which no detailed reference need be made. It may, however, be pointed out that a new section was inserted by the Adaptation of Laws (Third Amendment) Order, 1951 which substantially reproduced the provisions of article 286(1) and (2). Although, therefore, the charging section read with the definition of \"dealer\" and \"sale\" may be wide enough to cover inter-State sales, the new section 33 makes all those provisions subject to its provisions which are nothing but a reproduction of th<; corresponding provisions of article\n\n286. In view of the interpretation we have put upon article 286 it must follow that the charging section of the Act r.ead with the relevant definitions cannot operate to tax inter-State sales or purchases and it must be held that as Parliament has not otherwise provided, the Act, in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in the course of inter- State trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void. This being the position the question arises\n\nT Ill Bmgal\n\nImmunity Compa'!Y Limilld\n\nT Ill Stall of Bihar\n\nand ot/llrs\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nThi Bmgal\n\nlmmuttil Compaf!1 .cY..ma v.\n\nThi SlaU .r Bi/uJr\n\nand others\n\nDos Aclg. C.J.\n\nwhether the Act is bad in toto or is bad only in so far as it offends the provisions of article 286 as construed above. It appears to us that the Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude in express terms subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared wholly ultra vires and void, for it is feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those levied on exempted subjects and to exclude the latter in the assessment of the tax.\n\nIn these circumstances it is difficult to say that the scheme of taxing inter- State sales forms such an integral part of the entire scheme of taxation on sales or purchases of goods as to be inextricably interwoven with it. There is no reason to presume that had the Bihar Legislature known that the provisions of the Act might be held bad in so far as they imposed or authorised the imposition of a tax on inter-State trade or commerce even though Parliament had not by law provided otherwise it would, nevertheless, not have passed the rest of the Act.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed and we issue an order directing that, until Parliament by law provides otherwise, the State of Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing sales tax on out-of-State dealers in respect of sales or purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or purchases\n\nfor consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the appellant in this Court and in the Court below. The interveners must bear and pay their own costs.\n\nBHAGWATI J.-I agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached in the judgment just delivered by my Brother S. R. Das.\n\nIn so far however as I was a party to the judgment in The State of Bombay and Another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and Others(') it is but proper that I should record my reasons for doing so. (I) [t95Sl s.c.R. 1069.\n\nThe Appellant is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act having its registered office at No. 153, Dharamtala Street, Calcutta and laboratory and factory at Baranagar in the District of 24 Parganas in West Bengal and carrying on business of manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines, etc., in Calcutta.\n\nThe Appellant has extensive sales of its products throughout the whole of the Union of India and the goods are despatthed by the Appellant from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted at Calcutta and all sales take place within the State of West Bengal. The Appellant has no offices, agents, managers, godowns or laboratories in the State of Bihar. It is not a resident of Bihar nor has a place of business in Bihar and does not enter into any transaction of sale within the State of Bihar.\n\nOn the 24th October 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, headquarters Patna, wrote to the Appellant to get itself registered under .the Bihar Sales Tax Act and to take necessary steps to deposit the Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar treasury at an early date, contending that all sales in West Bengal in which the goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purpose of consumption in Bihar were leviable to Bihar Sales Tax with effect from the 26th January\n\n1950. The Appellant denied the right of the State of Bihar to tax the sales effected in West Bengal and by his letter dated the 18th December 1951 the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar sent a notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act to the Appellant calling upon it to apply for registration and to submit the return, showing its turn-over for the period from the 26th January 1950 to the 30th September 1951.\n\nCorrespondence thereafter ensued in which both the parties made futile attempts to convince each other of the legality of the stand taken by it. The Appellant asserted that it was not liable to assessment under the Bihar Sales Tax Act and denied the authority of the State of Bihar to levy sales tax upon\n\nThi Bengal\n\nImmunity Comµny Limittd v.\n\nThi Stau qf BU!•\n\nand olhn1\n\nBhagwati].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni; Company LimiUd v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and oth1rs\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe Appellant. The Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar, ultimately by his letter dated the 28th May 1952 rejected the contention of the Appellant and asked it to comply with the notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act failing which he threatened to proceed to take steps for assessment to the best of his judgment. The Appellant thereupon by its letter dated the 7th June 1952 called upon the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar to forthwith rescind and cancel the notice issued under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act as the said notice was ultra vires of the Constitution and also the Bihar Sales Tax Act and was entirely illegal and inoperative.\n\nAs the aforesaid demand was not complied with the Appellant filed in the High Court of Judicature at Patna a petition under article 226 of the Constitution asking for appropriate reliefs by way of issue of a writ of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition and any other appropriate writs or orders quashing the proceedings issued for the purpose of levying and realising a tax which was not lawfully leviable on the Appellant and asking the Appellant to file a return and register itself as a dealer. The State of Bihar, Respondent 1, The Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Patna, Respondent 2 and Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar, Respondent 3 were the opposite parties to the petition. They did not file any affidavit in reply.\n\nThe facts alleged by the Appellant were not denied but arguments on questions of law arising out of the petition were addressed by the Government Pleader appearing for them before the High Court. The High Court held:\n\n(1) That the Respondent 3 was acting within his jurisdiction in issuing the notice under section 13(5) and holding that the applicant was liable to pay the tax, that if he made an assessment under section 13\n\n(5) the Act provided a right of appeal whereby any error of law might be corrected by the Appellate authorities prescribed under the Act, that sections 24 and 25 of the Act furnished a complete and effective machinery for appeal and revision against assessments made under the Act and that there was therefore no warrant for issuing a writ under article 226 of the Constitution;\n\n(2) That the phrase \"sale or purchase in the course of int<:, r-State trade or commerce\" in article 286(2) must be construed so as to exclude the particular class of sales or purchases described in the explanation to article 286(1) and that therefore the amended clauses ( c) and (g) of section 2 and section 33 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act were not in conflict with article 286(2);\n\n(3) That the Bihar Sales Tax Act was in pith and substance not a law with respect to sale of goods but a law imposing tax on the sale of goods and the legislation fell entirely within Item 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, viz., taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers\n\nand that the Act could not therefore be said to be invalid under article .254;\n\n(4) That the Bihar Sales Tax Act had been enacted for the purpose of imposing tax on the sale of goods and not for regulating inter-State or intra-State trade and commerce and that therefore the Act did not contravene in any way article 304; and\n\n(5) That the Act was also not invalid on the ground that it was t::xtra-territorial in operation, that the jurisdiction to tax existed not only in reg-ard to persons or property but also as regards the business done within the State, that it was not necessary for the purposes of jurisdiction that the entire transaction of sale should have taken place within the territories, that on the other hand the fact that the goods were delivered in Bihar for consumption constituted sufficient nexus or territorial connection which conferred jurisdiction upon the Bihar legislature to impose the tax and that the explanation to article 286{1)(a) expressly corJerred upon the State power to tax sales or purchases of gooCls which were actually delivered for consumption inside the State.\n\nThe High Court therefore dismbed the petition with costs.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni?\n\nCompa1rv Limittti\n\nThi State q; Bihu\n\nand ethers\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nTiii Bengal\n\nImmunil) Company Limited\n\n;,, Ti.. Stale of Bi\\IW\n\nand ot/tfrs\n\nBhagwati].\n\nThe Appellant applied for leave to appeal to this Court and the High Court granted the requisite certificate under article 132( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nAt the hearing of the appeal before us the State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Calcutta, the State of Madras, the State of Mysoe, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the State ot Orissa, the State of Pepsu, the State of Rajasthan, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Travancore-Cochin, the State of East Punjab and one M. K. Kuriakose applied for and were granted leave to intervene and counsel for the lnterveners appeared before us and urged their respective points of view.\n\nThe first question as regards the maintainability of a petition for writ under article 226 on the facts disclosed in the petition can be disposed of very shortly in the words of Mahajan, C. J. in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. Tht: State of Madhya Pradesh & Others( 1 ) where he repelled a similar contention urged by the Advocate-General of the State of Madhya Pradesh:-\n\n\"The learned Advocate-General of the State ..... . . . . . . . however contended that on the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in Raleigh ln~stment Co.\n\nv. Tht: Governor-General-in-Council( ), jurisdiction to question assessment otherwise than by use of the machinery expressly provided by the Act, was inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay, arising by virtue of the assessment and that the liability to pay the sales tax under the Act is a special liability created by the Act itself which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy which ought to be resorted to, and therefore the remedy by a writ ought not to be allowed to be used for evading the provisions of the Act, especially a fiscal Act ............. : ........... . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . In our opinion the contentions raised by the learned Advocate-General arc not well founded. It is plain that the State evinced an intention that it could certainly proceed to apply the penal provisions of the Act against the appellant if it failed to make the return or to meet tl1e demand\n\n(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1122, 1126.\n\n(2) 74 I.A. 50.\n\nand in order to escape from such serious consequences threatened without authority of law, and infringing fundamental rights, relief by way of a writ of mandamus was clearly the appropriate relief.\n\nIn Mohd.\n\nYasin v. The Town Area Committee( 1 ), it was held by this Court that a licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the licensee but also operates as a restriction on his fundamental right to carry on his business and therefore if the imposition of a licence fee is without authority of law it can be challenged by way of an application under article 32, a fortiori also under article 226.\n\nThese observations have apposite application to the circumstances of the present case.\n\nExplanation II to section 2(g) of the Act having been declared ultra vires, any imposition of sales tax on the appellant in Madhya Pradesh is without the authority of law, and that being so a threat by the State by using the coercive machinery of the impugned Act to realize it from the appellant is a sufficient infringement of his fundamental right under article 19( 1 )(g) and it was clearly entitled to relief under article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe contention that because remedy under the impugned Act was available to the appellant it was\n\ndisentitled to relief under article 226 stands negatived by the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay\n\nv. The United Motors (India) Ltd.( ), above referred to.\n\nThere it was held , t the principle that a court will not issue a prerogative writ when an adequate alternative remedy was available could not apply where a party came to the court with an allegation that his fundamental right had been infringed and sought relief under article 226. Moreover, the remedy provided by the Act is of an onerous and burdensomr character. Before the appellant can avail of it he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax.\n\nSuch a provision can hardly be described as w adequate alternative remedy\".\n\nThis sufficiently disposes of that contention and I am of the opinion that the High Court was in error when -- it held that there was no warrant for issuing a writ\n\n(I) [1952} S.C.R. 572.\n\n(2) tJ'l53] S.C.R. !069.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuniry Compa'!Y Limiud\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunif:Y Compa1iy Limited ...\n\nThi State of Bilzar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nunder article 226 of the Constitution on the facts disclosed in the appellant's petition,\n\nOn the merits Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing for the appellant urged :- ( 1) That article 286 put a fetter on State Legislature and the explanation did not confer any power on any State Legislature tv levy any taxes but was meant to explain only clause l(a), i.e., what was an outside sale or . purchase and that it did not remove any restrictions or fetters and did not convert any inter-State sale or purchase into an intra-State or local or domestic tran'Saction;\n\n(2) That article 286(2) in Part XII was meant to implement the supremacy of Parliament with regard to inter-State trade or commerce and it put an embargo on the power of State Legislature to levy any tax on sale or purchase with respect to inter- State trade or commerce and that it was only when the embargo was lifted by appropriate Parliamentary legislation that State Legislature could levy any tax on sales or purchases in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; and\n\n(3) That legislative competence of a State Legislature was derived from article 246 read with the lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, that under article 245(2) only Parliament was given the power t(} enact legislation with extra-territorial operation and the State Legislatures had no such power, and that the combined effect of article 246 ( 3) and article 245 read' with Item 54 of List II was that the State Legislature\n\nwa~ only competent to make laws imposing tax on sale or purchase of gOods for the whole or part of that State. The determination of these questions involves a: construction of the provisions of article 286( 1) and\n\n(2) of the Constitution and their trUe scope and effect_ These proviions read as follows :-\n\n\"Article 286. (1) No law of a State shall impose,. or . authorise the imposition of, a tax on thr> sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes. place-\n\n(a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be <leemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been <lelivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.\n\n(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or pur- -chase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes\n\npbce in the course of inter-State trade or commerce : Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which w:is being lawfully le.vied by the Government of any\n\nState immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of March, 1951\".\n\nThey are enacted in Part XII of the Constitution which relates to finance, property, contracts and suits and fall under the caption of 'Miscellaneous Financial Provisions'. Their main purpose is to lay down the restnct10ns on State Legislatures to enact laws imposing or authorising the imposition of tax on the\n\nsale or purchase of goods. Article 286(1) lays down such restrictions where such sale or purchase takes place-( a) outside the State, or (b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. Article 286(2) lays down such restrictions where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade . or commerce. Article 286(1) is hedged in with the explanation and article 286(2) is hedged in with the exception \"in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide\" and the proviso under which the President might direct that any tax which was being lawfully\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiteif\n\nThe State ef Bihar\n\nand olhtrs\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stat< •f Billar\n\nand other1\n\nBhagwati].\n\nlevied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution mav, notwithstanding the provisions of article 286(2), continue to be levied until the .31st March 1951. Except for these special dispensations the restrictions laid down by article 286(1) and (2) prevail and the true scope and extent of these restrictions would have to be culled out of the terms m which these provisions are couched.\n\nThese provisions came to be considered by this Court in two cases, ( 1) The State of Bombay and Another v.\n\nThe United Motors (India) Ltd. and others(') and (2) State of Trat/ancore-Cochin and Others\n\nv. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory and Others( 1).\n\nThe first of these cases was concerned with the constitutionality of the Bombay Sales Tax Act XXIV of\n\n1952. The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952 ultra vires the State Legislature and had issued a writ in the nature of mandamus against the State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, directing them to forbear and desist from enforcing the provisions of the said Act against the respondents. The main ground of attack in the High Court had been that the Act purported to tax sales and purchases of goOds regardless of restrictions imposed on the State legislative power by article 286 of the Constitution and in that connection the provisions of article 286(1) and (2) came to be considered by this Court. The majority judgment of this Court delivered by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. with which Mukhcrica, J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. concurred held that article 286(l)(a) of the (', onstitution read with the explanation thereto and construed in the light of article 301 ap.d 304 prohibits the taxation of sales or purchases involving inter- Statc elements by all States except the State in which the gOOds arc delivered for the purpose of consumption therein. The latter State is left free to tax such sales or purchases. and it derives this power not . by virtue of article 286(1) but under artic~ 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II. The majority judgment\n\n(I) [1953] S; C.R. 1069. ',\n\n(2) gQU] s.c.R. 51.\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUI'REME COURT REPORTS 677\n\ndiffered from the view which was taken by me that the Explanation does not deprive the State in which the property in the goods passed of this taxing power and that consequently both the State in which the property in the goods passes and the State in which the goods are delivered for consumption have the power to tax and characterised it as not correct.\n\nThe majority judgment also held that clause (2) of article 286 does not affect the power of the State in which the delivery of goods is made to tax inter-State sales or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation to clause ( 1). The effect of the Explanation is that such transactions are saved from the ban imposed by article 286(2).\n\nBose, J. and myself agreed that article 286(2) could not be construed in the light of article 304(1) as the two articles dealt with different matters.\n\nBose, J. however held that the basic idea underlying article 286 is to prohibit taxation in the case of inter-State trade and commerce until the ban under dause (2) of the said article is lifted by Parliament and always in the case of imports and exports.\n\nWhen the ban is lifted, the Explanation to clause (I) of article 286 comes into play to determine the situs of the sale. This Explanation does not govern clause\n\n(2) of article 286 and as it can only apply to transactic 1s which in truth and in fact take place in the course of inter-State trade and commerce, there is no need to call it in aid until the ban is removed. The ma.jority judgment as well as Bose, J. recognised that the provisions of article 286(1) and (2) had been enacted in order to prevent multiple taxation which used to be levied by the States before the commencement of the Constirution having resort to the nex4s theory. They however did not discard that theory altogether and were of the opinion that it was sufficient to invest the State Legislature with jurisdiction to impose a tax on sale or purchase of goods, if any of the essential ingredients of sale had taken place within its territory. They did not accept the transfer of ownership in the goods or 'the passing of property therein as the sole criterion determining the situs of the sale and thus investing the State within\n\nTM Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nTiu State ef Bihar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuniry Company Limited ... 'The State of Bihar\n\nand otherJ ·\n\nBhagwati].\n\nwhose territories the sale had thus taken place as the only State entitled to impose the tax on sale or purchase of goods. I howe'l'.er held that under the general law relating to sale of goods a sale mustbe regarded as having taken place in the State in which the property in the goods sold has passed to the purchaser, and that the State is entitled to tax the sale or purchase as having taken place inside the State. The Explanation to article 286(1) does not take away the right which the State in which the property in the goods passed has to tax the sale or purchase but only deems such purchase or sale, by a legal fiction, to have taken place in the State in which the delivery of the goods has been made for consumption therein so as to enable the latter State also, to tax the sale or purchase in question. The Explanation only lifts the ban imposed by clause ( 1) (a) on taxation of sales or purchases which take place outside the State, to the extent of the transactions mentioned in the Explanation to enable the delivery State also to tax them. l also held that the general provision enacted in article 286(2) against the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce should give way to the special provision which is enacted in the Explanation to article 286( 1)\n\n(a) enabling the delivery State to tax such sale or purchase in the limited class of cases covered by the Explanation, the transactions covered by the Explanation being thus lifted out of the category of transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and assimilated to transactions of sale or purchase which take place inside the State and thus invested with the character of an intra-State sale or purchase so far as the delivery State is concerned. There was thus a divergence between the learned Judges as regards the true scope and effect of the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) read with article 286(2) and even though the same conclusion was reached by the majority Judges and myself we reached the same on different grounds. The interpretation put on article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation thereto therefore was that the delivery State is left free to tax such\n\nsales or purchases as fall within the terms of the Explanation and article 286(2) does not affect the power of such a State to tax inter-State trade or commerce of the kind mentioned in the Explanation. The Explanation saves such transactions from the ban imposed by article 286(2).\n\nIt may be noted that though there was a consensus of opinion that article 286(1) was designed to avoid the multiple taxation of a sale or purchase by various States having resort to the nexus theory there was divergence of opinion as regards the real purpose of the Explanation as also the construction of the non-obstante clause and the true concept of consumption as embodied therein. According to the majority view the Explanation explained what is an outside sale by defining what is an inside sale. Bose, J. was of the opinion that the purpose of the Explanation is to explain what is not outside the State and therefore what is inside. l was of the view that what is otherwise a sale or purchase which takes place outside the State is deemed to have taken place inside the delivery State and the only purpose of the Explanation is to introduce a. legal fiction whereby the delivery State is also entitled to tax the transaction of sale or purchase along with the State in which the transfer of ownership has taken place or the property in the goods has passed. The non-obstante clause also was differently interpreted.\n\nI took the the view that the non-obstante clause is incorporated in the Explanation to state what according to the Constitution makers ls the basic idea of fixing the situs or the location of the sale or purchase in the place where the transfer of ownership takes place or the property in the goods passes and to indicate that notwithstanding that fact a sale or purch::.se which falls within the category mentioned in the Explanation is nevertheless to be deemed to have taken place inside the delivery . State. The majority judgment stated that the non-obstante clause is inserted in the Explanation simply with a view to make it clear beyond all possible doubt that it is immaterial where the property in the goods passes as it might otherwise\n\nThe Bengal\n\n.lmmunilJI Company Limited\n\ng; The State :f Bihar and others\n\nBhagwati].\n\n!955\n\nTi.. Bengal\n\nImmuniJy Company I imited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati].\n\nbe regarded as indicative of the place of sale. Bose, J. stated that the object of the Explanation is to fix the location of a sale or purchase by means of a fiction, but he disagreed with the view expressed by me that the non-obstante clause enunciates the general 1<1w on this poi_nt. He stated that there was no general law which fixed the situs of a sale, not even the Sale of Goods <\\ct, that what the general law does is to determine the place where the property passes in the absence of a special agreement, but the place where the property passes is not necessarily the place where the sale takes place, nor has that ever been regarded as the determining factor. As regards the concept of consumption the majority were of the view that it should be understood as having reference not merely to the individual importer or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to consumers in general within the State.\n\nBose, J. construed that word to mean the usual use made of an article for the purposes of trade and commerce.\n\nI adopted the Dictionary meaning of the term and held that the Explanation covers only those cases where as a direct result of the sale or purchase goods are delivered for consumption in the delivery State by the consumer and it is only that limited class of transactions which are covered by the Explanation and which are liable to tax by the delivery State. I did not accept the contention that . the words \"for the purpose of consumption\" must be accepted in a comprehensive sense as having reference to immediate as well as ultimate consumption within the State\" and excluding only resales out of the State.\n\nIn regard to article 286(2) all the judges were agreed that transactions of sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are within the restriction and no State can tax such transactions, except in the two excepted cases, viz., (1) except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide and (2) provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on sale or purchase of goods which was being levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be levied until the 31st March\n\n1951. The Explanation to article 286(1)(a) though it is specifically stated to be for the purposes of sub. clause (a) was construed by me as an exception or proviso to article 286(2), thus enabling the delivery State to tax the transactions of sale or purchase taking place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The majority Judges differed from this view and held that the Explanation converts the inter- State transaction into aJil intra-State one and therefore there is no scope at all for the operation of article 286(2) in cases covered by the Explanation. Bose, J. was of the view that the article 286(2) bans the delivery State also from taxing such transactions, because if the transactions were in the course of inter-State trade or commerce the Explanation merely shifts the point from A to B but this shifting is of no consequence at all, because both the points are caught in the vortex of inter-State trade and commerce. It is only when the Parliament otherwise provides or the President gives the directions within the meaning of the proviso that this ban is lifted and the Explanation is there to settle a matter of considerable controversy regarding the situs of a sale.\n\nThe argument that on this construction being put on the Explanation to article 286(1) and on article 286(2) the Explanation would become nugatory though accepted by me was rejected by Bose, J. by pointing out that once\n\nth~ Parliament by law otherwise provided or the President by order gave the direction within the meaning of the proviso the Explanation would come into operation and would determine the situs of the sale thus enabling the appropriate State to impose a tax on such transaction of sale or purchase.\n\nThe second case concerned itself with the construction of article 286(1) (b) in connection with the Sales Tax levied by the State of Travancore-Cochin upon certain dealers in cashew nuts within its territory under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1124 M.E. (Act No. XVIII of 1124 M.E.) and the question for the consideration of the Court was whether certain sales and purchases could\n\n6-R4'S. C. India'59\n\nThi a.,111 ,.....,, Com,..yu.t#lrl\n\nV• Tl,_~ .J.:U.\n\n\"TJ..B'\"gaJ\n\nImrnuniJ Com/Jdl'Y Lfmiled\n\n\"y.\n\nTM SlaJ1 of Biluu\n\nand °\"\"''\n\nbe said to be in the course of the impor\"t of the goods into or the export of the goods out of the territorv of India. The High Court had put a very wide construction on the words of ; irticle 2il6(1) (h) and held :.Int the clause is not restricted to the point of time at which goods are imported into or exported from India and the series of transactions which necessrily precede export or succeed import of goods will come within the purview of this clause.\n\nThere was a divergence of opinion between Pataniali Sastri, C.J., ~.fok herjea, J., Bose, J, and Ghulam Hasan, J, on the one side and S. R Das, J. on the other so far as the construction of the words \"in the course of\" was concerned. But apart from this construction of article 286(l)(b) S. R. Das, J. who was not a party to the earlier decision hereinbefore referred to put on record his views on the construction of article 286(1) (a), the Explanation thereto and article 286(2) expressing his disagreement with the interpretation which the majority judgement in that case had put up on the same. He agreed that the Provincial Legislatures purporting to act under Entry 48 in List II of the Se\\1enth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, had enacted the Sales Tax Acts imposing tax on sales or purchases of goods on the basis of one or more of the ingredients of sale having wme connection with the Province and that this practice had resulted in the imposition of multiple taxes on a single transaction of sale or purchase thereby raising the price of rhe commodity concerned to the serious detriment to the consumer, that this evil had to be curbed and that is what has been done by clause (I) (a) of article 286.\n\nHe however was \"of the opinion that in imposing the ban that no law \"of a State shall impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State, the Constitution proceeds on the footing that a sale or purchase has a location or situs. He further held that the 11rm-obstante clause in the Explanation also clearly implies that the framers of the Constitution adopted the view that a sale or purchase has a situs and further that it ordinarily takes place at the place\n\nwhere the property in the goods passes. In effect, therefore, the Constitution, by this Explanation to clause ( 1) (a), acknowledges that under the general law the sale or purchase of the kind therein mentioned may not really take place in the delivery State, but nevertheless requires it to be treated as if it did. That is to say, the Explanation creates a legal fiction.\n\nSo far he agreed with me, but he differed from me in holding that the only effect of this assignment of a fictional location to a particular kind of sale or purchase in a particular State' is to attract the ban of clause (1) (a) and to take away the taxing power of .all other States in relation to such a sale or purchase even though the other ingredients which go towards the making up of a sale or purchae are to be found within these States or even if under the general law the property in the ods passes in any of those States.\n\nThe purpose of the Explanation ends there and cannot be stretched or extended beyond that purpose.\n\nHe therefore held that the effect of clause (l)(a) read in the light of the Explanation is not to permit both\n\nStates, viz.. the State where the property passes under the general law as well as the State in which, by force of the Explanation, the sale or purchase is .deemed to take place. to tax such sale or purchase, because in that event it will stultify the very purpose of that clause and it will fail to prevent the imposition of multiple taxes which it is obviously designed to prevent.\n\nIn his opinion clause ( 1 )(a) in terms only takes away the taxing power of all States with respect to as sale or purchase which, by reason of the fiction introduced by the Explanation, is to be deemed to take place outside their respective territories and the purpose of the Explanation is only to explain the scope of clause ( 1) (a).\n\nThe Explanation is neither an exception nor a proviso. It is not its purpose nor does it purport, substantively and proprio vigore, to confer any power on any State, not even on the delivery State, to impose any tax. Whether the delivery State can tax the sale or purchase of the kind mentioned in the Explanation will depend on other provisions of the Constitution. Neither clause (1) (a) nor\n\nThi Bengal\n\nlmmuniJY Com/Jal!Y Limited y; TktStaliof Bihar\n\nand ot1\"'s\n\nBhagwati ].\n\n195~\n\nTM&ltrJ 1,,.,,...,,, C.mpanJ Limited\n\nT 1w !i\"\".:/,/; ih\"'\n\nBhagwoli J.\n\nthe Explanation has any bearing on that question.\n\nSo far as the purpose and design of clause (2) are concerned he was of the opinion that clause (2) places yet another ban on the taxing power of the State under Entry 54 read with article 246(3), in addition to the ban imposed by clause (l)(a).\n\nA sale or purchase contemplated by the Explanation to clause ( l)\n\n(a) undoubtedly partakes of the nature of a sale or purchase made in the course of inter-State trade and, therefore, no State, whether it is the State in which the property in the goods passes under the general law or the State where the goods are delivered as mentioned in the Explanation, can impose a tax on such sale or purchase, unless and until Parliament lifts this ban. He differed from the view taken by me that the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) must be regarded not only as having authorised the delivery State to impose the tax on the sale or purchase covered by the Explanation, but having also exempted it from the ban imposed by clause (2).\n\nHe also differed from the majority view that what was an inter-State transaction within the ban of article 286(2) is converted into an intra-State or -local or domestic transaction by virtue of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a).\n\nHe saw no warrant for the argument that the fiction embodied in the Explanation for this definitely expressed purpose, can be legitimately used for the entirely foreign\n\npurpose of destroying the inter-State character of the ttansaction and converting it into an intra-State sale or purchase for all purposes.\n\nSuch metamorphosis is completely beyond the purpose and purview of clause (!)(a) and the Explanation thereto.\n\nAfter expressing himself as above, he made the following observations which are very apposite to the appeal before us :-\n\n\"To accede to this argument will mean that the Sales Tax Officer of the delivery State will have jurisdiction to call upon dealers outside that State to submit returns of their turn over in respect of goods delivered by them to dealers in that State under transactions of sale made by them with dealers within that State. Thus a dealer in, say, Pepsu who\n\ndelivers gOods to a dealer ir., say, Travancore-Cochin will become subject to the jurisdiction of the 1ast mentioned State and will have to file returns of their turn over and support the same by producing their books of account there. I cannot imagine that our Constitution makers intended to produce this anomalous result. On the contrary, it appears to me that they enacted clauses (l)(a) and (2) for the very purpose of preventing this anomaly. I repeat that it is not permissible, on principle or on authority, to extend the fiction of the Explanatioh beyond its imme<liate\n\nand avowed purpose which I have explained above.\n\nIn my judgment, until Parliament otherwise provides, all sales or purchases which take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are.. by clause (2) of article 286, made immune from taxation by the law of any State, irrespective of the place where the sales or purchases ma1 take place, . either under the general law or by virtue of the fiction intro<luced by the Explanation to clause (l)(a). If a particular inter-State sale or purchase takes place outside. a State, either under the general law or by virtue of the fiction created by the Explanation, it is exempted from taxation by the law of that State both under clause (l)(a) and clause (2). If such inter-State sale or purchase takes place within a particular State, either under the general law or by reason of the Explanation, it is still exempt from taxation even by the law of that State under clause (2), just as a sale or purchase which takes place within a State, either under the general law or by reason of the Explanation, cannot be taxed by the. law of that State, if such sale or purchase takes place in the course of import or export within . the meaning of clause (l)(b)\" ..\n\nIt may be observed that the contentions urged before us by the Appellant are in conformity with the above observations of S.R. Das, J.\n\nNormally speaking the construction put by the majority judgment on the article 286(1), the Explanation thereto and article 286(i) of the Constitution in the Bombay Sales Tax appeal would be the law bind-\n\nThi B1ngol\n\nlllllftllllilw ca,..., Umild\n\nVo Thi $111#1 of BW.r -\"\"\"'' B/iogwtdl\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmrmi~ c.,\"ompatt.1, Limited\n\nThi Stale of BihtJr\n\nlld otlidt\n\nBhagwali J.\n\ning on all parties and in the judgment just referrc<l to in the Travancore-Cochin Sales Tax Appeal S. R. Das, r. rightly expressed that decision to be binding on him so long as it stands. The Appellant has however sought to urge before us that that decision was erroneous and has attempted to persuade us to reconsider the same and put a construction on article 286(1)(a), the Explanation thereto and article 286(2) which is different from that. adopted by the Majority Judges in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal.\n\nThe question therefore arises whether we arc entitled to reconsider that decision.\n\nThe House of Lords in England has always considered itself bound by its previous decisions. These <lecisions, as distinguished from the opinions which arc delivered bv the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as ad ice to the Crown, arc pronounced in the form of judgments and are binding on the House a' precedents. The question whether the House had the power to reconsider the previous decisions of its own and if it thought the decisions wrong to overrule or depart from them in subsequent cases was considi:red in Street Tramways v. London County Council(') Earl of Halsbury, L.C. who delivered the judgment of the House observed at page 379 :-\n\n\"A decision of this House once given upon a point of law is conclusive upon this House afterwards, and that it is impossible to raise that question again as if it was res integra and could be reargued, and so the House be asked to reverse its own decision. That is a principle which has been, I believe, without any real decision to the contrary, established now for some centuries, and I am therefore of opinion that in this case it is not competent for us to rehear and for a, unsel to reargue a question which has been recently decided\".\n\nThe reason of the rule was thus stated at page 380 :-\n\n\"Of course I do not deny that cases of individual hardship may arise, and there may be a current of opinion in the profession that such and such a judgment was erroneous; but what is that occasional\n\n(I} (1898] App<al Cases 375.\n\ninterference with what is perhaps abstract justice as compared with the inconvenience-the disastrous inconvenience-of having each question subject to being reargued and the dealings of mankind rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions, so that in truth and in fact there would be no real final Court of Appeal?' My Lords, \"interest rei publicae\" that there should be \"finis litittm\" at some time, and there could be no \"finis litium\" if it were possible to suggest in each case that it might be reargued, because it is \"not an ordinary case,\" whatever they may mean\".\n\nand the conclusion was thus recorded at page 381 :-\n\n\"Under these circumstances it appears to me that your Lordships would do well to act upon that which has been universally assumed in the profession, so far as I know, to be the principie, namely, that a decision of this House upon a question of law is conclusive, and that nothing but an Act of Parliament can set right that which is alleged to be wrong 111 a judgment of this House\".\n\nThe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the other hand has held that it is free to. differ from its own dt:cisions or from. those of tht: House of Lords.\n\nThe power of the Privy Council to rt:consider its own decisions was discussed in In re Compensation to Civil Servants( 1 ). In that case :\\11 earlier decision of the Board in Wigg v. Attorney-General o.f the Irish Free State(2) was attempted to be reviewed and after discussing the case-law on the point the Board came to the conclusion that the Privv Council is not bound in law and without examination to follow the decision in a prior appeal whether they considered it to be right or wrong although the Privy Council would hesitate long before disturbing a solemn decision bv a previous .Board, which raised an identical or even a similar issue for &termination. While laying down this principle the Board discussed the earlier cases and in particular the case of Ridsdale v. Clifton(8 ) which was followed in Tooth v. Power(4) and Read v.\n\nBishop of Lincoln(5 ) and the proposition was thus laid\n\n(1) A.l.R. 1929 P.C. 84.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1928 P.C.'!39.\n\n(3) [ 1877] 2 P.D. 276.\n\n(4) [1891] A.C. 284.\n\n(5) [89 ] A.C. 644.\n\nThe Btngal\n\nImmunity°!!\n\nCompany Limited .,,.\n\nThe State of Bihtir\n\nand othws.\n\nBhagwati ].\n\n1955 - T!w&ngol\n\n1,,...,.;1 eom,...,~\n\n\"' TM Sia qf SW. -- BM,...ii ].\n\ndown in the last mentioned case :-\n\n\"In the present case their Lordships cannot but adopt the view expreS&Cd in Ridsdale v. Clifton(') as to the effect of previous decisions. Whilst fully sensible of the weight to be attached to such decisions, their Lordships are at the same time bound to examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest, and 'to give effect fo their own view of the law\".\n\nThe same principle was reiterated by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ontario and Others v. Canada Temperance Federation and Others( 2 ). The Board was there concemea with the consideration of a constitutional question. An earlier decision of the Board in Russell v. Reg( 8 ) had upheld the validity of the impugned statute. That decision had stood unreversed for 63 years and had moreover received express approval of the Board in subsequent cases between 1883 and 1937. It was contended that the case had been wrongly decided and ought to be overruled and their Lords.hips repelled that contention :-··\n\n\"Their Lordships do not doubt that in tendering humble advice to His Majesty they are not absolutely bound by previous decisions of the Board. as is the House of Lords by its own judgments. Jn ecclesiastical appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion, the Board has tendered a\\lvice contrary to that given in a previous case, which further historical research has shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board would depart from a previous decision which it may be assumed will have been acted upon both by governments and subjects. In the present case the decision now sought to be overruled has stood for over sixty years: the Act has been put into operation for varying periods in many places in the Dominion; under its , provisions business must have been closed, lines and imprisonments for breaches of the Act have been imposed and suffered. Time and again the occasion has arisen when the Board could have overruled. the decision had it thought it wrong. Accordingly, in\n\n(I) (1877] 2 P.D. 276.\n\n(2) A.I.R.1946 P.C. (3l [1882] 7 A.c. 8:9.\n\nthe opinion of their Lordships, the decision must be regarded as firmly embedded in the constitutional law of Canada and it is impossible now to depart from\n\nit\"\n\nIt is therefore settled law so far as England is concerned that their Lordships of the Privy Council do not consider themselves bound in law and without examination to follow their decision in a prior appeal whether they consider it to be right or wrong but feel themselves bound to examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest and to give effect 'to their own view of the law. We here are the highest Court of the land and would derive considerable assistance from th.e µractice of the Privy Council set out above.\n\nThe High Court of Australia is the highest Court of Appeal in the Commonwealth and concerns itself inter a/ia with deciding constitutional questions.\n\nThe question whether it is bound by its previous decisions came up for consideration in the Tramways Case (No. J) (1) and the High Court held that it was not bound by its previous decision but would only review a previous decision when that decision was manifestly wrong. Griffith,\n\nC.J. in this connection made the following observations at page 58 :-\n\n\"In my opinion it is impossible to maintain as an abstract proposition that the Court is either legally or technically bound by previous llecisions. Indeed, it mav in a proper case be its duty to disregard them.\n\nBut the rule should be applied with great caution, and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong ...... Otherwise there would he grave danger of a want of continuity in the interpretation of the law'.\n\nBarton, f. observed at page 69 :-\n\n\"In conclusion, I would say that I have never thought that it was not open to this Court to review its previous decisions upon good cause. The question is not whether the Court can do so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need for continuity and consistency in judicial decisions.\n\nChanges in the number of appointed Justices can, I take it, never of\n\n(I) 18 C.L.R. 54.\n\n1955 Tu Bengal\n\nImmunity Comflilny Limilld\n\nV• Thi StaU of Bihar -4 oth111\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nT/,. Bmgal\n\nImmunil7 Company Limikd\n\nv; T/,. Stole of B; har\n\nad otkMr\n\n_ Bhagwati ].\n\nthemselves furnish a reason for review.\n\nThat the prior decision was that of little more than half their number might be urged with greater fairness, but it cannot be urged against an earlier case. . . . . . . . . . But the Court can always listen to argument as to whether it ought to review a particular decision, and the strongest reason for an overruling is that a decision is manifestly wrong, and its maintenance is injurious to the public interest\".\n\nPowers, J. at page 86 referred to an earlier decision given by him in the case of The Australian Agricultural Co.\n\nv. Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of AtlStralasia(') :-\n\n\"I am at all times prepared to consider the review of any decision of this Court, by a Full Bench called to consider that question, and to reverse any decision if it is shown to be clearly wrong, subject to the well known considerations to be applied to the particular case in question at the time, according to the well known judicial policy of British, Australian and American Courts, and I think of all Courts of Appeal in English-speaking communities\"-except the House of Lords... . . . . . . . \"I decline even to consider a questioa of reversing a decision of this Court casually, or even seriously, raised by counsel, not clearly urgent, and not raised before as full a bench as is available. If we do not show some respect to oui own Court's decisions, no counsel will feel safe in advising the public, and it will create uncertainty and confusion\" ........... .\n\n. . . . . . \"Under those circumstances I think it would have to be shown that the decision was clearly wrong, and, as it has been followed by this Court in other cases, that it would be in the interests of the public to reverse it\".\n\nThis_ question came for consideration again by the High Court of Australia in The Amalgamated Society of Enginurs v. The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited and Others (2) and the majority judgment stated at p. 142:-\n\n\"It is therefore, in the fest duty of this Court to\n\n(1) 17 C.L.R. 261, \"9c.\n\ncircumstances, the maniturn its earnest attention\n\n(2) <8 C.L.R. 129.\n\nto the provmons of the Constitution itself. That instrument is the political compact of the whole of the people of Australia, enacted into binding _law by the Imperial Parliament, and it is the chief and special duty of this Court faithfully to expound and give effect to it according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout precisely as framed.\n\nIn doing this, . we follow, not merely previous instances in this Court and other Courts in Australia, but also the precedent of the Privy Council in Read v. Bishop of Lincoln(1), where the Lord Chancellor, speaking for the Judicial Committee in relation to reviewing its own prior decision, said: \"Whilst fully sensible of the weight to be attached to such decisions, their Lordships are at the same time bound to examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest, and to give effect to their own view of the law\". The ground upon which the Privy Council came to that conclusion we refer to, but need not repeat, adding, however that as the Commonwealth and State Parliaments and Executives arc themselves bound by the declarations of this Court as to their powers inter se, our responsibility is so much the greater to give the true eftect to the relevant constitutional provisions. In doing this, to use the language of Lord Macnaughten in Vacher & Som Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors( 2 ), \"a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the Court, and !ts only d}Ity, is to expound the language of the Act m accordance with the settled rules of construction\".\" Higgins, J. at page 160 added:-\n\n\"But the decision is now directly impugned by the claimant ; and it is our duty to reconsider the subject, and to obey the Constitution and the Act rather than any decision of this Court, if the decision be shown to have been mistaken\".\n\nThe High Court of Australia has therefore considered itself free to review its own decisions just as much\n\n(l) [1892JA.C. 644.\n\n(2) [1913] A.C. 107, 118.\n\nlmmuttity Company Limilld\n\nThe Sla11 of Bi/Jlw\n\nONfllfwl\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nTht Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiletl\n\nVo T/1' Stale of Bi/ia'\n\nand oth#s\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nas the Judicial Committee , pf the Privy Council, examine the reasons upon which the decisions rest and to give effect to its own views of the law, in other words to reconsider the subject and to obey the Constitution and the Act rather than any decision of the Court if the decision be shown to have been mistaken.\n\nOur Constitution has drawn freely inter ali11 upon the Constitution of the United States and it would be helpful to consider what is the position in the United\n\nStates in regard to the re-consideration of its previous decisions by the Supreme Court. There have been numerous decisions of. the Supreme Court in which the Court has departed from the doctrine of stare decisis and has either refused to allow or overruled its previous decisions.\n\nIn Hertz v. Woodman(') Mr. Justice Lurton observed:-\n\n\"The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decisions, is not inflexible.\n\nWhether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which again is called upon to consider a qus tion once decided\".\n\nMr. Justice Brandies while delivering his dissenting opinion in Waslzington v. Dawson & Co.( 2) rims expressed himself with regard to the proprietv upon the part of the Supreme Court of departing from its earlier doctrines if it has coipe to consider those doctrine as erroneous :-\n\n\"The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter us from overruling that case and those which follow it.\n\nThe decisions are recent ones. They have not been acquiesced in. They have not created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered.\n\nThey affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On the other hand, they affect seriously the live; of men, women, and children, and the general welfare.\n\nStar~ decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal, inexorable command.\n\nThe instances\n\n(1) 218 u.s. 205.\n\n(2) 264 U.S. 219\n\nin which the court has disregarded its admonition arc many\".\n\nThe same learned Judge in a dissenting opinion in David Bttrnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Company (1) reitera1..!d the same position in the manner following:--\n\n\" Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res iudicata, a universal, inexorable command\".\n\nAfter quoting the passage from the judgment of Mr.\n\nJustice Lurton in Hertz v. Woodman (1 ) above cited the learned Judge proceeded:-\n\n\"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in mosr matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. ............. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.\n\nTht: (', ourt bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function ........... .\n\nRecently, it overruled several leading cases, when it concluded that the States should not have been permitted to exercise powers of taxation which it had theretofore repeatedly sanctioned. In cases involving the Federal Constitution the position of this Court is unlike that of the highest court of England, where the policy of stare decisis was formulated and is strictly applied to all classes of cases.\n\nParliament is free to correct any judicial error; and the remedy may be promptly invoked\".\n\nIt will be instructive at this juncture to note the following passages to be found in foot-note 3 at p. 825 in the report of this case (') :- ·\n\n\"Compare Taney, Ch. J. in Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 470; 12 L. Ed., 702, 780: After such opinions judicially delivered, I had supposed that question to be sc;.ttled, so far as any question upon the construction of the Constitution ought to be regarded\n\n(I) 285 U.S. 393.\n\n(2) 218 U.S. 205.\n\n(3) 76 L. Ed. 815.\n\nTht&11gal\n\nlmmunily ComjJally Limild\n\nThe Sta11 of Bihar .i o11r1rt\n\nBhagwali J.\n\nTiu Blng, U\n\nIm~ Com~: Limited\n\nas closed by the decision of this Court. I <lo not, however object to the revision of it, and am quit<; willing that it be regarded heraher as the law of this court,. that its opinion upon the co'.l, trnction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its\n\nTM Stat, of Bih\"'\n\narJt! 9Jbns - B/uJgwati ]. judicial authority should hereafter depend' altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported\".\n\nCompare Field; J. in Barden v. Northern P.R. Co. ( 1): '\"It is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations.\n\nThose doctrines only will eventually stand which bear the strictest examination and the test of experience\".\n\nIn Mark Graves v. People of the State of New Yorlc(') Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:-\n\n\"But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it\".\n\nThe same principle was reiterated in Smith v. Al/- wright (3) :_::\n\n\"In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional questions.\n\nHowever, when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.\n\nIn constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to re-examine the basis of its constitutional decisions.\n\nThis has long been accepted practice, and this practice has continued to this day\". and in United States of America v.\n\nSouth-Eastern Underwriters Association (') iil the dissenting judgment of Stone, C.J. at p. 579:-\n\n\"This Court has never committed itself to any rule or policy that it will not \"bow to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning\" by overruling a mistaken precedent ............ This 1s\n\n(I l 154 U. s. \"BB, 3 ').\n\n(2) 306 U. S. 466, 4Si\n\n(3 321 U.S. 649. '-\n\n(4) 312 U.S. 533.\n\nespecally the case when the meaning of the Consl:ltuaon is at issue and a mistaken construction is one which cannot be corrected by legislative action.\n\nTo give blind adherence to :i rule or policy that no decision of this Court is to be overruled would be itself to overrule many decisions of the Court which do not accept that view. But the rule of stare decisis embodies a wise policy because it is often more important that a rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is especially so where as here, Congr<'.\"$s is not without regubtory power ........ The question then is not whether an earlier decision should ever be overruled, but whether a particular decision ought to be. And before overruling a precedent in any case it is the duty of the Court to make certain that more harm will not be done in rejecting than in retaining a rule of even dubious validity\".\n\nThe position has been thus summarised by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States--·.V oL I-Second Edition-at p. 74 :--\n\n\"There are indeed good reasons why the doctrine of stare decisis should not be so rigidly applied to the constitutional as to other laws.\n\nIn cases of purely private import, the chief desideratum is that the law remain certain, a!lll, therefore, where a rule has been judicially declared and private rights created there· under, the courts will not, except in the clearest cases of error, depart from the doctrine of stare decisis.\n\nWhen, however, public interests are inv:>lved, and especially when the question is one of constitutional construction, the matter is otherwise. An error in the construction of a statute may easily be corrected by a legislative act, but a Constitution and particularly the Federal Constitution, may be changed only with great difficulty.\n\nHence an error in its interpretation may for all practical purposes be corrected onlv bv the court's repudiating or modifying its frme~ decision\".\n\nThese then are the principles which should guide us in determining whether we should reconsider the earlier decisions of this Court. We are here not merely concerned with legislative enactments which it would\n\nTire Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiteil\n\n.v.\n\nTire State ef Bihar\n\nfllld others\n\nBhogwati J.\n\nThe Bmf.al\n\nJmm:muy O.mpany Limited ...\n\nTht State of Bihar\n\nal•lh1rs\n\nBhaKUJQli ].\n\nbe within the competence of either the Union lature or the State Legislatures to enact if our earlier decisions were erroneous. We are concerned with the construction of the prov1S1ons of the Constitution which it will be almost impossible to amend. The Howie of Lords considered itself bound by its pRvious decisions, because it felt that the Act of Parliament could set right an erroneous decision of th\" House by enacting appropriate legislation.\n\nBut the High Court of Australia as well as the Supreme Court of the United States felt themselves free to reconsider their earlier decisions because of the practical impossibility of correcting the erroneous decisions through legislative action.\n\nThey considered it their bounden duty to construe the constitutional provisions andbe guided by the provisions of the Constitution itself and not bv what had been their earlier decisions on the questions of its construction. The only safeguard which they put on the exercise of such powers of reconsideration was that the earlier decision should be manifestly wrong or erroneous. We here also are concerned with the construction of the prov1S1ons of the Constitution which cannot he amended so easilv and if we come to the conclusion that the earlier decision was manifestly wrong or erroneous and that public interest demanded that the same should be reconsidered we should not have the slightest hesitation in doing so.\n\nWe therefore approach the consideration of the earlier decision of this Court in the Bombay Sales. Tax Appeal bearing in mind the principles above enunciated.\n\nIt will be necessary at the outset to take stock of the situation as it obtained before the enactment of article 286 of the Constitution. The Government of India Act, 1935 contained provisions in regard to the distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion and the Provincial Legislatures in sections 99 and 100. The Dominion Legislature was competent to make laws including laws having extra-territorial operation for the whole or any part of the Dominion and the Provincial Legislatures were competent to make laws for the Province or for any part thereof,\n\nThe legislative heads in respect of which the laws could be made by the respective Legislatures were enumerated in the lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Act and the demarcation between the powers of the Dominion Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures in that behalf was to be found in section 100. Entry 48 in List II of the said Schedule gave the power to the Provincial Legislatures in respect of \"taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements\". Even though the entry mentioned taxes on sale of goods that head was construed to mean in reality a power to tax the transaction and the power to tax the transaction carried with it the power to tax either party thereto.\n\nThe expression \"taxes on sale\" was therefore construed to include also a tax on purchases of goods, as the transaction resulted in change of ownership from one person to another and was from its very nature a bilateral transaction with a seller on the one hand and the purchaser . on the other. (Vide V. M. S. Md. & Co.\n\nv. State of Madras( 1 ) ). The same distribution of legislative powers obtained when the Constitution came to he enacted and article 245 provided that Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. Exclusive power to make laws with respect to the legislative heads enumerated in the Union List (List I) and the State List (List II) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution was given to Parliament and the State Legislatures respectively by article 246.\n\nEntry 54 of the State List gave the exclusive power to the State Legislatures with respect to taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers.\n\nWhat was implicit in the phraseology of Entry 48 of List II of the evnth Schedule to the Government of Indja Act was thus made explicit by the phraseology adopted in Entry 54 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nPrima f acie laws enacted by State Legislatures would have operation within the territories of the States. Primarily legislation of a country is territorial\n\n(I) A.LR. 1953 Ma<lra, 105. -84 S. C. i.ndia/59\n\nThe Btngal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nT/16 Stal< of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nTM Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThi State of Bihm\n\nand o'thm\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nand the general rule is \"extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur\". The laws of a nation apply to all. its subjects and to all things and acts within its territories. (See Maxwell on the Interprtation of Statutes-10th Edn. page 144).\n\nCraies' on Statute Law-5th Edn. at p. 174 contains the following citation from the speech of Lord Cranworth in Jefferys v.\n\nBoosey( 1 ) :-\n\n\"Prima facie the Legislature of this country must be taken to make laws for its QWn subjects exclusively\".\n\nThe same principle has been applied also to sales tax and it is stated in American Jurisprudence-Vol. 47, p. 202 Para. 5 under the caption \"Territorial Jurisdic tion\" that :·-\n\n\"The general rule that a State may not ta.:i persons, property or interests which are not wichin its territorial jurisdiction is applicable to sales taxes\".\n\nIt would therefore appear that when the State Legislatures enacted laws in respect of taxes on sales or purchases of goods they would only have operation within the territories of the States and the sales or purchases of goods even though they are not specified in the relative entry to be \"within the territories\" of the States would prima facie , be such as take place within the respective territories of the States.\n\nThis po.wer to tax the sales or purchases of goods would again have to be construed with reference to the connotation of the term \"sale\" as it was understood in the legislative practice of the country at the time when the power was conferred. As was observed by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Croft v.\n\nDunphy(') :-\n\n\"When a power is conferred to legislate on a particular topic it is important, in determil)ing the scope of the power, to have regard to what is ordi\n\nnarily treated as embraced within that topic in legislative practice and particularly in the legislative practice of the State which has conferred the power\".\n\nThe expression \"Sale of goods\" in Entry 48 in List\n\n(1) [1854] 4 H.L.C. 815, 955.\n\n(2) [1933] A.G. 156, 165.\n\nII of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 came to be construed by this Court in Sales Tax Officer v. Budh Prakash Jai Prakash(1) in relation to an attempt by the State of Uttar Pradesh to tax forward contracts of sale and this Court held :-\n\n\"There having existed at the time of the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, a welldefined and well-established distinction between a sale and an agreement to sell it would be proper to interpret the expression 'sale of goods' in Entry 48 in the sense in which it was used in: legislation both in England and India and to hold that it authorises the imposition of a tax only when there is a completed sale involving transfer of title\".\n\nThe expression \"sale of goods\" was construed in the light of the definition thereof to be found in section 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act (Act III of 1930) as also the corresponding provision of the English Sale of Goods Act and the relevant passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 15, Para 13 quoted therein. Section 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act runs as follows :-\n\n\" ( 1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price. There mav be a contract 9f sale between one part-owner and another.\n\n(3) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer, the contract is called a sale, but where the transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is called an agreement to sell.\n\n(4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses, or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred\".\n\nThe corresponding provision in section 1 of the English Sale of Goods Act is as follows :-\n\n\" ( 1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract\n\n(I) f1955] I S.C.R. 243.\n\nTh6BmfJl\n\nImmunity Company Limiutl\n\nThi Stal4 of Bilutr\n\n01ttl otll#rs\n\nBhogwiiti J.\n\nTi.. Bengal\n\nImmunity Company LimiUd\n\nTM Statt ef Bihar\n\nand othPs\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nwhereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price. There may be a contract of sale between one part-owner and another.\n\n(3) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer the contract is called a sale; but where the transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled the contract is called an agreement to. sell. ( 4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred\".\n\nThis being the legislative practice in India as well as in England at the time when the power to tax sales or purchases of goods was conferred on the State Legislatures the scope of that power would have been ordinarily determined by the definition of. the sale of goods to be found in these respective Sales of Goods Acts and the State Legislatures would have had the power to tax sales or purchases of goods in which the property in the goods passed within the respective territories of the State, s. This was not a power to tax a seller or a purchaser in personam.\n\nIt was a power to tax the sale or purchase of goods which took place within the territories of the State and was to be exercised in those cases where the property in the goods which were the subject matter of the sale or purchase passed within the territories of the State.\n\nThis position however was not acceptable to the various States which wanted to enlarge the scope of their power to tax sales or purchases of goods. There was therefore an attempt made to analyse the concept of sale into its various ingredients and to fasten upon any one of the ingredients as conferring upon them the power to tax the sale or purchase of goods by having resort to the theory of territorial connection or nexus.\n\nAs was observed by Bose, J. in The State of Bombay and\n\nAnother v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. & Others(') at p. 1101 :-\n\n\"The difficulty is apparent when one begins to split a sale into its component parts and analyse them. When this is done, a sale is found to consist of a number of ingredients which can be said to be essential in the sense that if any one of them is missing there is no sale. The following are some of them : ( 1) the existence of goods which form the subjectmatter of the sale, (2) the bargain or contract which, when executed, will result in the passing of the property in the goods for a price, (3) the payment, or promise of payment, of a price, ( 4) the passing of the title\".\n\nHaving analysed the concept of the sale thus into its essential ingredients the only essential condition which was considered necessary to be satisfied was the completion of the transaction of sale wheresoever it, may take place and the taxable event was taken to be any one of these essential ingredients provided it took place within the territories of the State. Reliance was placed for this purpose on the decision of the Federal Court in In re The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 ( C. P. & Berar Act No. XIV of 1938) ( 2) where Their Lordships observed that :-\n\n\"Tax on sale of goods must necessarily be a tax imposed at the time of the sale of goods and must exclude other forms of transfer like mortgages, leases, etc.\"\n\nSimilar observations were also to be found in the Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons(3) where it was stated that a tax on the sale of goods is atax levied on the occasion of the sale of goods and the liability to tax arises on the occasion of the sale. The sale was therefore taen to be the concrete event which gave rise to the power of the State to tax the sale of goods but was taken as not necessarily taking place within the territories of the taxing State, the only thing considered essential for the purpose being the\n\n(I) [1953] s.c.R. 1069.\n\n(2) (1939] F.C.R. 18, 86.\n\n(3) [1942) F.C.R. 90, 101.\n\nThe Benal\n\nJmmlJllUy Company LimiUtl\n\n~ The Stau of Bi/tar\n\nand olh#I\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nTl1' B'\"$al\n\nIm\"\"\"!'!>' Company Limited\n\nY• Th< Sia/< of Bihm\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nterritorial connection or nexus between the taxing State and one or more of the necessary ingredients of sale analysed as above.\n\nThe territorial connection or nexus theory was sought to be supported by reference to certain decisions of the High Court of Australia, e.g., The Wanganui Rangitikey Electric Power Board v.\n\nThe Australian Mutual frovident Society(') where Dixon, J. observed :\n\n\"So long as the statute selected some fact or circumstance which provided some relation or connection with New South Wales, and adopted this as the ground of its interference, the validity of an enactment reducing interest would not be open to challenge\". and the dissenting judgment of Rich, J. in Broken Hill South Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.)( 2) which stated that :-\n\n\"I do not deny that once any connection with New South Wales appears the legislature of that State may make that connection the occasion or subject of the imposition of a liability. But the connection with New South Wales must lie a real one and the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connction\".\n\nThese observations of the learned Judges of the High Court of Australia were referred to with approval by our Federal Court in Governor-General-in-Council v.\n\nRaleigh Investment Co. Ltd.(•). It was an income-tax case and the dispute related to the claim of the Indian Government to levy income-tax and super tax on the dividends paid to the assessee company (which was a joint stock company incorporated under the English Companies Act having its registered offices in the Isle of Man and its main offices in England) by nine sterling companies, the bulk of whose shares were held by the assesse~ company. These sterling companies were registered under the English Companies Act and were controlled in London where the Boards of Directors sat, the sare registers were situate and dividends were declared. They however carried on the business\n\n(1) [1934] 50 C.L.R. 581, 60Q. \\2) [l937] 56 C.L.R. 331, 361. (S) A.l.R. 1944 F.C. 51 s.c. 1944 F.C.R. 229.\n\nof manufacturing and selling tobacco and cigarettes in India and the business in India where all profits were made was managed by the local boards which were constituted by the Boards in London. The financial policies of these companies were controlled by the London Boards and in all important matters of busi ness the London Boards were consulted and all the general meetings of the Companies were held in England. The dividends of these Companies were aho declared by them in England and paid by them in England to the assessee company in England. It was however held that the source of the dividends paid to the assessee company by the sterling companies was British Indian and when the attempt was to tax income and not the corpus and the question to be considered was the 'source' of that income it was legiti-· mate to take into account the place where the business from which the income was derived was in fact carried on and not to treat the situs of the shares in the eves\n\nof the law as concluding the matter. The Court as therefore of the opinion that the source of the dividends paid to the assessee company by the sterling companies was British Indian and that in making them liable to income-tax on that basis the Indian Legislature was not giving its law any extra-territorial operation.\n\nSpens, C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Court further quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Evatt, J. in Trustees. Executors & Agency Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation( 1 ) at p. 236 :-\n\n\"The Constitution requires that it must be possible to predicate of every valid law that it is for the peace, order and good government of the Dominion with respect to a granted subject, e.g., customs, taxation, external affairs. In such cases, the presence of non-territorial elements in the challenged law has to be considered upon a slightly different footing and those affirming its validity have to show not only that the Dominion has some real concern or interest in the matter, thig or circumstance dealt with by the legislation, but that the concern or interest is of such\n\n(I) [1933] 49 C.L.R. 220.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nIm1nrmily Company Limited\n\nThe State 1( Biha1\n\nand olhtrs\n\nT!it Bengal\n\nlmmrmity CtJmpany Limiled\n\nTill Stau of BiM<\n\nand others\n\nBlwgwati ].\n\na nature that the challenged law is truly one with respect to an enumerated subject-matter\".\n\nTwo more decisions of the Federal Court reiterating the same principle may be noted in this context : Wallace Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometar, Bombay . City(') and A.H. Wadia v. Commissioner of Income-tar, Bombay(2 ). In the former case the Court held that where the Imperial Parliament has conferred a power to legislate on a particular topic it\n\ni~ permissible and important in determining the scope and meaning of the power to have regard to what is ordinarily treated as embraced within that topic in the legislative practice of the United Kingdom. The general conception as to the scope of the legislative practice in the United Kiogdorn with regard to income-tax is that given a sufficient territorial connection between the person sought to be charged and the country seeking to tax him, - income-tax may properly extend to that person in respect of his foreign income.\n\nThat general conception, both on a consideration of the British legislation and as a matter of construction of the Government of India Act, 1935, finds a place in the phrase \"taxes on income\" as used in that Act and the principle of sufficient territorial connection is implicit in the power conferred by the Act of 1935.\n\nThe derivation from British India of the major portion of its income for a year gives to a company as respects that year a territorial connection sufficient to justify the company being treated as at home in British India for all purposes relating to taxation on its income for that year from whatever source it may be derived, and if it is so at home in British India it is a person properly subject to the jurisdiction of the Central Indian legislature.\n\nIn the latter case the Court held that a law imposing a tax cannot be impugned on the ground that it is extra-territonal if there is a connection between the person who is subjected to the tax and the country which imposes that tax. The connection must however be a real one and the liability sought to be imposed . must be pertinent to that connection; but, if these conditions are satis-\n\n(1) [19~8] F.C.R. I.\n\n(2) (1948] F.C.R. 121.\n\nfied it is of no. importance on the question of validity that the liability imposed is, or may be, dispropor\n\ntionate to the territorial connection. Kania, C.J. also observed at p. 141 :-\n\n\"As mentioned above, the aspect of it affecting persons who are beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal courts cannot be considered sufficient for the Court to hold it ultra vires. The municipal courts are bound to enforce the law. Whether after obtaining the opinion or decree the same is enforceable against the other side or not, is not a matter for the Court's consideration. The Court has only to see that the legislation is within the ambit of the powers of the Legislature\".\n\nHaving resort therefore to the territorial connection or the nexus cheory enunciated in the cases abmc\n\nnoted and . analysing the concept of sale into its necessary ingredients as above the various State Legislatures enacted laws in respect of taxes on sales or purchases of goods spreading their net as wide as they could having regard to the situation obtaining in their respective territories.\n\nA transaction of sale or purchase of goods thus came to be taxed by more States than one even though really there was only one transaction of sale or purchase of goods as between the seller and the purchaser. The consumer was the last person who ever counted in the scramble for taxes on sales or purchases of goods and even the free flow of inter-State trade and commerce was affected.\n\nThe state of affairs was thus graphically described by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in his judgment in Bombay Sales Tax Appeal(1) at p. 1079 :-\n\n\"In exercise of the legislative power conferred upon them in substantially similar terms by the Government. of India Act 1935, the Provisional Legislatures enacted sales-tax laws for their respective Provinces, acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the basis of their sales-tax legislation.\n\nAssam and Bengal made among other things the actual\n\n(J) fl953J s.c.R. 1069\n\nThi Benga.\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stau of Bihal\n\nand otherl\n\nBhogwati J.\n\nThe Ben{fal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nT ht State ?f Bihar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwali ].\n\nexistence of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxability.\n\nIn Bihar the production or manufacture of the goods in the Province was made an additional ground. A net of the widest range perhaps was laid in Central Provinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the goods were actually 'found' in the Province at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made. Whether the territorial nexus put forward as the basis of the taxing power in each case would be sustained as sufficient was a matter of doubt not having been tested in a court of law. And such claims to taxing power led to multiple taxation of the same transaction by different Provinces and cumulation of the burden falling ultimately on the consuming public.\n\nThis situation posed to the Constitution makers the problem of restricting the taxing power on sales or purchases involving inter-State elements, and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer\".\n\nApart from the States resorting to the territorial connection or nexus theory in the manner aforesaid the courts also appeared to lend their support to the theory and the High Court of Madras in particu Jar in two decisions, Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras(') and C. G. Naidu & Co. v. State of Madras( 2 ), gave its imprimatur to this theorv. In the former case the expression \"sale of goods\" was understood m its popular sense as distinct from its legal sense and it was held that the sales tax could be levied if the transaction substantially took place within the State notwithstanding that the property did not pass within the State.\n\nIn the latter case it was held that the power of the State to impose taxes was not conditioned on the subject-matter being whollv within its jurisdiction and the exercise of the power was valid if there was sufficient territorial connection with reference to the subject-matter.\n\nAfter discussing the American case law on the subject the Court came to the conclusion that in respect of inter-State sales the State in which the contract was concluded wa,; the\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1953 Madras 91. '(2} A.I.R. 1953 Madras 117.\n\nonly State which had the power to impose a tax. This Court also in the majority judgment in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal(1) while summarising the position as it obtained before the enactment of the Constitution incidentally ei<:pressed its opinion in this behalf at p, 1078 as under :-\n\n\"As pointed out by the Privy Council in the Wallace Brothers case( ) in dealing with the competency of the Indian Legislature to impose tax on the income arising abroad to a non-resident foreign company, the constitutional validity of the relevant statutory pro'; isions did not turn on the possession by thi:: legislature of extra-territorial powers but on the existence of a sufficient territorial connection between the taxing State and what it seeks to tax. In the case of sales-tax it is not necessary that the sale or purchase should take place within the territorial limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods, etc.. should have a territorial connection with the State.\n\nBroadly speaking local activities cf buying or selling carried on in the State in relation to local goods would be a sufficient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, provided of course. such activities ultimatelv resulted in a concluded sale or purchase to be taxed\".· In another case decided immediatelv thereafter Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras(3) this Court understood this expression of opinion in the majority judgment as laying down the principle of territorial connection or nexus :--·\n\n\"It :idmits of no dispute that a Provincial Legislature could not pass a taxation statute which would be binding on anv other part of India outside the limits of the Province. but it would be quite ccmpetent to .enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the Province, provided that there was sufficient and a real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing Province. This principle, which is based upon the decision of the Judicial Committee i!1 Wallace Brothers & Companv v.\n\n(I) [1'153] S.C.R. 1069.\n\n(2) [1948] F.C.R. I.\n\n(3) [1953] S.C.R. 677.\n\nThe Bengal\n\n•Immunity Comp1J11y Limilltl\n\nThe State of Bih•\n\nand others\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe&IJgal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bihar\n\nand other,'\n\nBha.11, WQti j.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay( 1 ) has been held by this court to be applicable to sale tax legislation, in its recent decision in the Bombay Sales Ta:r: Art case(2) and its propriety is beyond question. As :i matter of fact, the legislative practice in regard to sale tax laws adopted by the Provincial Legislatures prior to the coming into force of the Constitution has been to authorise imposition of taxes on sales and purchases which were related in some manner with the taxing Province by reason of some of the ingredients of the transaction having taken place within the Province or by reason of the production or location of goods within it at the time when the transaction took place'°.\n\nIt may be observed that in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal the question of the territorial connection or nexus was not directly in dispute and in Poppatlal's case(') referred to above it was taken as decided by this C->urt in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal that the theory of territorial connection or nexus was applicable to sales tax legislation. It is a moot point whether this theory of territorial connection or nexus which has been mainly applied .in income-tax cases is also appkable to sales ta:-r legislation, the 'pheres of an income-tax legislation and sales tax legislation being quite distinct. 'Vhereas in the case of income-tax legislation the tax is levied either on a person who is within the territory by exercising jurisdiction over him in personam or upon income which has accrued or arisen to him or is deemed to have accrued or arisen to him or has been derived by him from sourcrs within the territory and it is therefore germane to enquirt whether any part of such income has accrued or arisen or has been derived from a source within the territory, in the case of sales-tax legislation it is the sale or purchase of goods which is the subject-matter of taxation and it cannot be predicated that the sale or purchase takes place at one or more places where the necessary ingredients of sale happen to be located.\n\nThe theory of territorial connection or nexus was not put to the test at any time prior to the enactment of\n\n(I) [1948] F.C.R. J,\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. IO!i9.\n\n(3) [1953] S.C.R. 6i7\n\nthe Constitution and it is not necessary also for us to give a definite pronouncement on the subject. Suffice\n\nit to say that there was this evil which was rampant in the pre-Constitution period by reason of the various States fastening upon one or more ingredients of the sale and arrogating to themselves the power to tax sales or purchases of goods by reason of the territorial connection or nexus which they claimed to have with one or more of the ingredients of the sale provided however that a sale or purchase ultimately did take place either within their territories or anywhen: else.\n\nIt was this evil amongst others which was sought to be remedied by the Constitution-makers when they came to enact article 286 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Constitution-makers enacted several provisions in Part XIII relating to trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India with an eye\n\ntowards India. as an economic unit and enacted in ahicle 301 that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free and by article 302 they empowered the Parliament to impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest. Broad based on this conception of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India and also with a view inter alia to relieve the consumer of the burden of multiple taxation which he was subjected to by the various State Legislatures by having resort to the territorial connection or nexus theory as afort>said the Constitution-makers in article 286 enacted restrictions on the power of the State Legislatures in regard to the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods and these restrictions were fourfold :- (I) State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place outside the State;\n\n(2) The State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of thr\n\nTk Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nTheBmpl\n\nlmmuniry Company LimiUd\n\nThe Stau of Bihar and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nimport of the goods into or export of the goods out of the territory of India; ( 3) The State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce except in so far as the Parliament might by law otherwise provide; and ( 4) The State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as had been declared by Parliament by law as essential for the life of the community unless such law had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent.\n\nThese were the four restrictions which were put upon the powers of the State Legislatures to impose a tax on the sales or purchases of goods and were imposed with different objectives in view.\n\nThe first restriction was devised to achieve the objective of relieving the consumer of the burden of multiple taxation and put it out of the power of a State to tax the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place outside the State. The Sale of Goods Act contained several provisions which determined when a sale or purchase took place or in other words when the property in the goods sold passed from the seller to the purchaser. But it was silent in regard to the place where the sale or purchase took place. There was no rule of law enacted therem which determined the situs or location of such sale or purchase and resort was therefore had to the general law of the land for the purpose. The territorial connection or nexus rheory had an eye over the various ingredients of a sale or purchase and if anyone or more , of these ingredients fixed the situs or the location of 'the sale it would mean that a sale had more situses or locations than one. This state of affairs could not be allowed to continue any further having reg\"d to the interests of the consumer and it was therefore thought necessary, when the State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place outside the State, also to determine when\n\nsuch sale or purchase could be said to take place outside the State. It was for this purpose that the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) was enacted and it was enacted for the express purpose therein mentioned, viz., \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a)\". The Explanation was thus enacted for the express purpose of determining what sales or purchases could be said to have taken place outside the State and the basic idea which was adopted therein was that under the general law relating to Sale of Goods property in the goods would by reason of such sale or purchase pass in a particular State which would therefore be the situs or location of such sale or purchase. But notwithstanding that fact the sale or purchase was deemed to have taken place in the. State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purposes of consumption in that State. The anti-thesis appears to have been between the State in which the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed and the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State and in the competition between these two States the Explanation provided that the sale or purchase in those circumstances shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goo<ls have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption therein. This Explanation was interpreted in various ways, one view being that it defined an outside sale and went no further :m(\\ that the situs of the sale was determined for the limited purpose of telling the State what it could not tax by telling it that in the cases covered by the EXj'hnatinn in spite of the property in the goods having passed within its territories it was an outside sale qua that State. The other view was that besides fixing the situs of sale in this manner it also defined what was a sale or purchase which shall be deemed to inve taken place in the delivery State and thus fulfilled a double function of investing only the delivery State with the power to tax such sale or pur-\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company limited\n\nThe State of Biha' and oth., s\n\nBhagwati ,7.\n\nTht Btn..t:al\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and olhtr.t\n\nBhagwati ].\n\ncha; e to the exclusion of all other States qua whom the sale or purchase was deemed to be an outside sale.\n\nThe third view was that the Explanation was concerned with fixing the situs of sale in respe.:t of the delivery State only and did not affect the power of the State in which the property in the goods had passed to tax such sale or purchase which it enjoyed by reason of the fact that the property in the goods had passed within its territories.\n\nA fourth possible view was that the only State which could not tax such sale or purchase on the ground that the sale was outside the State was the State in which the property in the guu, ls had passed leaving open to the other States to tax such sales or purchases by having resort to the power which they possesml under article 246(3) and Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Whatever be the correct view to take of this Explanation one fact remained that article 286 (l)(a) and the Explanation thereto were enacted with the one and only motive to relieve the consumer of the burden of multiple taxation to which he wos subjected by having .resort to the territorial connection or nexus theory and to replace the nexus theory by what may be described as the situs theory fixing the situs or the location of the sale or purchase a1d putting a restriction on the taxing power of the States qua which it could be predicated that such sale or purchase took place outside the State, thus leaviqg only one State in which the goods have been actually delivere<l as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption therein free to tax the sale or purchase having resort to the powers vested in the State Legislature by article 246( 3) and Entr)' 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nIf therefore the situs or location of the sale was laid down as the criterion of the taxing power of the State the non-obstante clause contained in the Explanation gave the clue as to what was in mind of the Constitution-makers when they substituted the situs theory in place of the nexus theory which theretofore prevailed. They took cognisance of the general law\n\nrelating to the sale of goods under which the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or pur- . chase. The conception of the transfer of ownership of the goods by the seller to the purchase was thus accepted by them as determining the situs or location of the sale or purchase and this conception had its roots in the relevant provisions of the Sale of Goods Acts both in India and in England and in spite of the fact that those provisions did not in terms say where the sale took place or the transfer of ownership came about or the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or purchase, the general law relating to sale of goods was taken in the . Explanation to fix the situs or location of such sale or pur- <:hase within the territories of a particular State and that event could only take place in one State and not in more .States than one. There could be onlv one situs or location of the sale or purchase and if that were so the State in whose territories such sale or purchase took place or in which the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or purchase was the State which could claim the power to tax such sale or purchase by reason of its having taken place within its territory. It would therefore appear that the Constitution-makers had in enacting the Expla.- nation the one and only motive of negativing the territorial connection or nexus theory and replacing it by the situs theory and fixing the situs or location of the sale or purchase withiri the State in which the property in the goods passed by reason of such sale or purchase. While doing so they also created a legal fiction whereby in the competition between what may be called the title State and the delivery State the delivery State was given the power to impose a tax on sale or purchase of goods where the goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that\n\nState. If the object to be achieved was the relief of the consumer from the burden of multiple taxation that object could only be achieved by subjecting him to taxation at the instance of one State only and not by more States than one and to that C'XtCtt the view ~4 S. C. Jndia/59\n\nThi B1ngal\n\nlmmunii, Compon;• Lirnitd\n\nThi Stott of Bill•\n\nand otliln -· Bhtlgwoti ].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity C.mpany Limil•d\n\nT111:s1ate of Bih.ar\n\nand otkws\n\nthat both the title State and the delivery State woul<l be entitled to impose the tax on the sale or purchase falling within the Explanation was clearly erroneous, the only State which would be in a position to tax the sale or purchase in question being the State in which the goods had been actually delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption herein.\n\nThe second restriction on the taxing power of the State Legislatures was devised to safeguard the import and ex!JOrt trade of the country and embraced transactions of sale or purchase of goods where such sales or purchases took place in the course of the import of the goods into or export of the goods out of the territory of India, vide article 286(1) (b ).\n\nIt is significant to observe that the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) was definitely put for the purposes of subclause (a) and it hdd therefore no application to the cases which were covered by article 286(l)(b). This concept was quite di>tinct from the concept which was dealt with in arcicle 286(l)(a). The sales or purchases were looked at from different view-points and the particular aspect whtch was dealt with in article 286(l)(b) was the import-export aspect of the transactions of sales or purchases. That aspect was separately dealt with even though for the sake of economy of words the provisions in regard thereto were incorporated in article 286(1). They had nothing in common with the provision contained in article 286 (l)(a).\n\nThe third restriction was divised to protect inter- State trade or commerce and covered transactions of sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce except in so far as Parliament might by law otherwise provide. This was still another viewpoint and this restriction was put with a view to safeguard the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India. The imposition of this restriction meant that the States would be deprived of a large part of their income which they used to derive from tairing sales or purchases falling •\n\nwithin this category before the commencement of the Constitution. A proviso was therefore enacted that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of article 286(2), continue' to be levied until the thirty-first day of March. 1951. This proviso enabled the State Governments to levy the taxes which they used to levy before the commencement of the Constitution up to the 31st March 1951 within which period they were expected to adjust their economies and replenish their treasuries by having resort to their legitimate powers of taxation. By the 31st March 1951 the States could also make representations to the Centre and induce the Parliament to otherwise provide by appropriate legislation within the meaning of article 286(2) and\n\nauthorie them to impose taxes on the sale or purchase of any goods where rnch sales or purchases took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nBut until that ban was lifo::Ll by appropriate legislation by the Parliament the ban imposed under article 286(2) was absolute and no transaction of sale or purchase of goods where ~11ch sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce could eve.r be made the subject-matter of taxatio'1 at the instance of a State Legislature. The Explanation to artide 286(1)(a) being expressly for the purpose of sub-clause (a). i.e.. for the purpose of determining what transaction of sale or purchase was outside the State or inside the State as above stated could not be read into article 286(2) nor could it be read as an exception or proviso to article 286(2). Reading it as such exception or proviso would be contrary to the express terms of the Explanation and would also stultify the purpose of the enactment of article 286\n\n(2) thus taking a large slice out of the transactions falling within that category. The rule as to the exclusion of the general provision by a special provision would also not apply for the simple reason that\n\nThe Birtt.J.\n\nImmunity Company Limitd\n\nVI Thi State of BiM,\n\nand oth\" - Bhag>JJati J.\n\nThi Bengal\n\nImmuni~ Company Limited\n\nThe StaU of Bih\"'\n\nan4 olhen\n\nBlaogwati].\n\nthe object of article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation thereto is quite distinct from the object of article 286(2) and the objects being quite different these provisions do not cover the same subject-matter and therefore there would be no occasion for the application of that rule of construction. To this extent the view taken by me in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal(') that the Explanation to article 286( 1 )(a) was an exception or proviso to article 286(2) was clearly erroneous.\n\nThe last restriction on the taxing powers of the State Legislatures was devised to maintain the supply of essential commodities and related to the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community unless such law has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. This restriction also though of another nature was a restriction put on the power of the State Legislatures to tax such transactions of sale or purchase and was absolute in terms having nothing whatever to do with the restrictions put in the earlier clauses of article 286. These transactions comprised a distinct category by themselves and were not affected bv the restrictions put in the earlier clauses of the article.\n\nTt may be noted that the transactions covered by article 286(l)(a), article 286(2) and article 286(3) though looked at from different view-points may overlap.\n\nA transaction which is covered by article 286( 1 )(a) may also be covered by article 286(2) and both these sets of transactions may be covered by article 286(3). Such overlapping would not necessarily mean that the provisions of one particular clause have to be read as fastening upon the transactions falling within the category comprised therein and treating them as lifted out of the ban sought to be imposed by the other clauses of the article. Each ban has got to be effective and imposed on the transactions falling within its ambit and even though the transaction may be saved out of the ban imposed in one particular clause it may just as\n\n(I) [1953] S. C.R. 1069.\n\nwell fall within the ban imposed in another clause and thus be excluded from the taxing power of the State Legislatures. It cannot therefore be urged that the Explanation to article 286( 1) (a) lifts the transaction out of the ban imposed by article 286(2) or by article 286(3) and leaves such transaction of sale or purchase as is covered by the Explanation free to be\n\ntaxed by the delivery State in spite of the same heing of an inter-State character or being in regard to goods declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community.\n\nThe whole scheme of article 286 is that four different restrictions are put on the taxing power of the State Legislatures in regard to the sales or purchases of goods and each one of these restrictions has got to be considered separately by itself and it is only those transactions of sale or purchase which do not fall within any of those categories that can be taxed by the State Legislatures by having resort to their powers under article 246(3) and Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nThe learned Government Advocate for Bihar however urged five distinct reasons why article 286(2) cannot apply to the transactions of sale or purchase covered by article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto and they were :- ( 1) The class of sales falling under article 286( 1) (a) form a special class of inter-State sales which on general principles ought not to be af!ected by the general provisions of article 286(2);\n\n(2) If article 286(2) applies to the class of sales covered by article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto it would result in discrimination against local trade in favour of inter-State trade and it will be inconsistent with the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution;\n\n(3) The purpose of article 286 being to eliminate multiple taxation and article 286(1)(a) having already achieved that purpose with regard to the class of sales falling within it it was no longer necessary for that purpose to apply article 286(2) to that class of sales;\n\nTiii Bengal\n\nlmmuni!J> Compo'!)! L1mittd\n\n'Vo Tl# State of Bi!zar\n\nand olhw1\n\nBhagwati].\n\nThi Be•gal\n\nImmuni'l C1mpany Limited\n\nTM Stale of Bihar\n\nand othtrs\n\nIJha:•aJi ].\n\n( 4) The Constitution itself has divided inter-State sales into two categories and in relation to one class it has itself provided which State will tax and under what conditions and in relation to the other class the Constitution itself has imposed a ban in general terms and granted Parliament power in general terms again to relax that ban as and when Parliament thinks lit;\n\nand (5) By a legal fiction, the inter-State sale is converted into an intra-State sale.\n\nWe shall deal with these reasons seriatim.\n\nAs to reason ( 1) : it was submitted that the transaction~ of sale covered by article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto and the transactions of sale covered by article 286(2) were of the same category and both these provisions dealt with the same topic.\n\nThat being so, article 286(2) contained a general pr<>- vision whereas article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto contained a special provision having reference to the transactions of sale or purchase falling within that category, with the result that the rule of harm<>- nious construction applied and the special provision was to be read as an exception to the general provision. This argument found favour with the High Court below as well as myself in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal('). This rule of harmonious construction no doubt would apply if the topics covered by both these provisions were the same, and the subjectmatters dealt with in both these provisions were identical. There is this difference however between the two provisions, viz., that the transactions covered by both do not fall within the same category and a transaction of sale which is looked at from the point of view of its being an outside or an inside sale may just as well be a sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. In article 286(1)(a) the transaction is looked at from the point of view of its situs or location and in article 286(2) it is looked at from the ppint of view of its being in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and the two approaches arc quite distinct one from the other. That being so it cannot\n\n(I) [1953] S. C. R. 1069.\n\nbe said that the topics which are dealt with by both these provisions are the same or that the subjectmatters thereof are identical. The ban which is impmed by article 286(1)(.a) and the rule of harmonious construction and the exception of the special provisions from the general one as indicated above would have no application in the matter of the construction of both these provisions.\n\nAs to reason (2) : there is no question of discrimination against local trade in favour of inter-State trade if article 286(2) applied to the class of sales covered by article 286( 1) (a) and the Explanation thereto. The local trade would certainly be liable to the levy of intra-State sales tax which could be avoided if a transaction takes place in the course of inter- State trade or commerce. For the working of the Union as an economic unit and for the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India it is necessary that no fetter should be placed on the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nThe consumers within a State who would rewrt to transactions of purchase across the border with a view to avoid the payment of the intra-State sales tax would be comparatively few and could in conceivable cases be caught within the net by imposing a tax on goods of a non-discriminatory nature within the meaning of article 304(a). This reason is therefore no deter:rent to our holdin~ that the ban under article 286(2) is absolute and unaffected by article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation thereto.\n\nAs to reason (3) : it postulates that the only purpose of the enactment of article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto is to eliminate multiple taxation. If that was the only purpose of the article it might conceivably be argued that once that purpose is achieved in regard to the particular set of transactions which are c:overed by article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation thereto there is no further need of putting any ban unller article 286(2).\n\nAs has been already observed l>efore, the purposes of the enactment of article 286 were manifold and they were achieved by enacting the four distinct provisions in the manne indicated\n\nTh1Bmfll\n\nlmmun•I/ Crm/llJtly Limilld\n\nVJ Thi Stuof Rihtrr\n\nand othn-;\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nTM Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited ..\n\nThe Statt of Bihar\n\ntmd others\n\nabove and the restrictions which were put on the powers of the State Legislatures to tax transactions of sale or purchase were mutually exclusive even though the transactions might so far as their naturr. and character be concerned overlap in certain events.\n\nEven though therefore a transaction fell within the ban of article 286(1) (a) it could nonetheless be subjected to the ban which was imposed by article 286(2) and it could be taxed only if it survived th.is scrutiny also, which could be done if the Parliament by law otherwise provided as set out in article 286(2).\n\nAs to reason ( 4) : it assumes that the Constitution itself has divided transactions of sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade and commerce into two distinct categories, one falling within article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation thereto and the other falling within article 286(2). There is no warrant for holding that transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are divided into such distinct categories for the purpose of the imposition of the ban.\n\nThe transaction of sale or purchase would be one but it is subject to the imposition of distinct bans having regard to the view-point from which it is being looked at. If it is looked at from the view-point of its being an outside or an inside sale it may be caught within the ban of article 286(1) (a). If it is looked at from the view-point of its being a transaction in the course of inter-State trade or commerce it may be caught within the ban imposed by article 286(2). These bans are mutually exclusive and may have to be applied to the same transaction of sale or purchase, one ban not necessarily excluding the other.\n\nAs to reason (5) : the argument totally ignores the purpose and efficacy of a legal fiction. A legal fiction pre-supposes the correctness of the State of facts on which it is based and all the consequences which flow from that state of facts have got to be worked out to their logical extent. But due regard must be bad in this behalf to the purpose for which the legal fiction has been created. If the purpose of this legal hcnon contained in the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) is solely for the purpose of sub-clause (a) as expressly\n\nstated it would not be legitimate to travel beyond the scope of that purpose and read into the provision any other purpose howsoever attractive it may be. The legal fiction which was created here was only for the purpose of determining whether a particular sale was an outsid<; sale or one which could be deemed to have taken place inside the State and that was the only scope of the provision. It would be an illegitimate extension of the purpose of the legal fiction to say that it was also created for the purpose of converting the inter-State character of the transaction into an intra-State one. This type of conversion could not have been in the contemplation of the Constitution makers and is contrary to the express purpose for which the legal fiction was created as set out in the Explanation to article 286(1)(a).\n\nAll these reasons therefore taken individually or collectively are not sufficient to negative the position that the transactions c9vered by article 286(1)(a) and the Explanation thereto are not excluded from the operation of article 286(2) and that the ban under article 286(2) also applies to the same.\n\nIt was also urged that this construction put upon article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto and article 286(2) would render the Explanation nugatory and that the Constitution makers at the very commencement of the Constitution would not have given the power by one hand and taken it away by the other and that therefore the Explanation to artide 286 ( 1) (a) should be read as an exception or a proviso to article 286(2).\n\nThis argument no doubt found favour with me in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal( 1 ) and also with the High Court below. If due regard however is had to the purpose of the enactment of article 286 as a whole and also to the various considerations which have been set out herein above it is clear that this argument is untenable.\n\nThe transactions of sale and purchase covered bv the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) are not necessarily co-extensive or conterminous with the transactions of sale or purchase covered by article 286(2). There are transactions which would be covered bv the\n\n(I) [1953] .<;. C R. !069.\n\n1955 .\n\nThe Bmgal\n\nImmunity Company Limiutl\n\n\"' The State of Bilulr\n\nand ot,,., s\n\nB/llJgwali J.\n\n1 h• Jlmgal\n\nlmmunit; Company L1mittd\n\n•• The Stat' of Bihar\n\na'1d olh,, s\n\nBlrazwatiJ.\n\nExplanation to article 286(1) (a) without their being transactions of sale or purchase in the col\\fse of inter- State trade or commerce and which therefore would without anything more be covered by the Explanation and would be the subject-matter of taxation by the delivery State by the appropriate exercise of its power of taxation. There is also a further fact to be noted and it is that even though the transactions covered by both these provisions . may be conceivably co-extensive or conterminous with each other, the Explanation to article 286 ( 1) (a) would come into operation the moment the ban of article 286(2) was lifted by an otherwise provision enacted by Parliament and it was certainly lifted up to the 31st March 1951 by the President directing the continuance of the operation of the sales tax laws which previously existed in the various States. It coul<l not therefore be stated that the construction put upon article 286( I) (a) and the Explanation thereto and article 286(2) as above would render the Explanation nugatory. If the States thought that the operation of the ban under article 286(2) prevented them trom taxing transactions of sale or purchase which take place in the course of inter-State trade and commerce and which are also covered by the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) it was open to them to adopt proper measures for lifting the ban under article 286(2) and making themselves free to tax the transactions of sale or purchase covered by the Explanation. Parliament would in that event consider the proposals made by the respective States in their proper perspective having regard to the provisions of the Constitution in regard to the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India, the convenience or inconvenience of the public and the needs of the respective States and lift the ban in the manner and to the extent it thought fit.\n\nThe majority judgment in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal has been construed by the various States as giving them an authority to impose a tax on the transactiom of sale or purchase covered hv the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) and authorising them to\n\nimpose such tax on the seller even though he may be residing outside their territories.\n\nThe non-resident businessmen therefore who entered into Uansactions of sales of goods where as a direct result of iUch sales the goods are actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in a particular State have been iC>ught to be subjected to the levy of sales tax at the instance of these States with great inconvenience and harassment to themselves, and the warrant for their action in this behalf is stated by these States to be the majority judgment of this Court. The various States however in the scramble ior taxes have been oblivious to the fact that a transaction of sale or purchase is not a unilateral transaction but a bilateral one and when it is looked at from the point of view of a sale or purchase it is one transaction which has two facets.\n\nFrom the point of view of a seller it is a sale transaction and from the point of view of a purchaser it is a purchase transaction. When therefore the transaction is one on which a tax on sale or purchase can be levied it does not necessarily mean that onlv a sales tax can be levied and not a purchase tax. The inside dealer may therefore be taxed on his purchases or if he sells in retail to actual consumers in the State he may be taxed on the sales. lf the inside dealer is himself the consumer then there will be no difficulty in assessing him for his books will show how much he has imported from other States and how much he has consumed. In any case, the convenience or . inconvenience of collecting a sales tax or a purchase tax \\s not a relevant consideration when one is considering the validity or otherwise of such a tax, as was observed by Kania, C. J. in the case of A.H. Wadia v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bomuay(1) at p. 141. In the very judgment of the majority in !he Bombay Sab Ta:v Appea!C) there is a passage at p. 1084 which indicates that all buyers within the delivery State except those buying for re.-export out of the State would be within the scope of the Explanation and liable to be taxed by the State on such transactions, anti it would be an unwarranted assumption on\n\n(ll [1948] F. C. R.121.\n\n(2) [1953] S. C.R.1069.\n\nThe Rental\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bih11r\n\nand oth4r•\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n'Tiu Bengal\n\nlmmuni?\n\nCampany L1miud v.\n\nTlw State of Bilw\n\nond others\n\nBltat, wati].\n\nthe part of anyone who read that judgment to say that the delivery State was entitled to levy a tax on the sale or purchase of goods falling within the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) on the seller alone. The seller would be outside the territories of the taxing State and would primarily not be liable to the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Act enacted by the taxing State. It would be by adopting the theory of the territorial connection or nexus as it was being done prior to the enactment of the Constitution that the taxing Sate WQuld seek to reach the non-resident businessmen outside its territories and if regard be had to the fact that the taxation is either in personam or in relation to the transaction of sale or purchase which takes place within its territory there is no warrant at all for taxing the outside businessmen on the transactions of sale or purchase covered bv the Explanation to article 286(1)(a). All the prc:>- visions contained in the Bihar Sales Tax Act with regard to t~ registration of the outside dealer, the maintenance of the, books of account, submission of returns bv him to the Sales Tax authorities of the State of Bihar, the production and inspection of books of account before the Sales Tax authorities, the search of the premises of the outside dealer by them and the imposition of penalties on him by reason of his noncompliance with the various provisions contained in the Act amongst others are unwarranted and illegitimate exercise of the powers incidental to the power of taxing sales or purchases conferred upon the State of Bihar by article 246(3) and the Entry 54 iri List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and do nut affect non-resident businessmen who ate outside the territories of the State of Bihar.\n\nThe majority judgment in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal(') did not say that the delivery State was entitled to tax the sellers in the transactions of sale or purchase covered by the Explanation to article 286 (1) (a). The question whether the seller or the purchaser would be subject to the levy of a tax on the transaction of sale or purchase at the instance of the delivery\n\n(1) [1953] S. C. R. 1069.\n\nState was not before the Court and the observations contained in the majority judgment were made with reference to a pure question of the interpretation of article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation thereto. As a matter of fact the passage above-quoted from the judgment(1) at p. 1084 would go to show that they contemplated the purchasers being amenable to tax at the instance of the delivery State in the case of transactions covered by the Explanation to article 286(1)(a). Even though it is not strictly relevant to consider the consequences of a particular position in law when construing a statutory provision it is nonetbdess necessary to visualise those consequences when one tries to probe into the mi11d of the legislators and see whether they could have ever contemplated such consequences. If the construction sought to be put upon the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) and the majority judgment in relation thereto by the State Legislatures were accepted, all outside dealers wheresoever they may be located or residing or carrying on their liusiness all over tl1e Union would be amenable to the levy of sales tax at the instance of the delivery State and one dealer in a particular State who had a very large business ancl was entering into transactions of sale with consumers in outside States all over the Union would be amenable to the jurisdiction of several States in the matter of his transactions of sale of his goods. There are as many as 21 Sales Tax Acts to be found in the Manual of Sales Tax Acts and if a dealer in one State was going to be held amenable to the levy of sales tax at the instance of all the other States it would mean that he would have to ascertain from the purchaser in each of the transactions of sale which he enters into the State to which the purchaser belongs, whether the purchaser is purchasing the goods for the purpose of consumption within that State. to get himself registered as a dealer in that State; to maintain his books of account with a view to produce them and subject them to inspection by the Sales Tax authorities in that State, to submit returns of the sales tax recovered by him from the . purchasers\n\n(I) [195!] S. C.R. 1069.\n\nThe &ni\"I\n\nlmmun\"?\n\nCompanf Lsmiktl\n\nThe State ef Biltttr\n\nand ot/rlr1\n\nBftai1raali J\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Llmilld ...\n\nThi State of Bihal\n\nond othlrs\n\nin that State before the Sales Tax authorities of that State and make himself liable for the non-observance of the various requirements of the Sales Tax Act enacted by that State. The task of fulfiliing the requirements qua one State would be formidable enough.\n\nBut when one visualises that the dealer who enters into such transactions of sale with the various cusromers may be subjected to this process at the instance of each and every State within whose territory the purchaser may happen to be importing the goods as a direct result of such sale for actual consumption within the territories of that State, one can easilv u, nderstand what untold harassment and inconvenfence the dealer would have to suffer from. It will be easy to understand that if those were the circumstances attendant upon his business the dealer may as well close down his business rather than submit to all this harassment at the hands of the various States.\n\nThe free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India will be thoroughly choked up and we are quite sure that neither the Constitution makers nor the majority judgment in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal would ever have contemplated these consequences.\n\nIt is legitimate therefore to hold that no such thing could ever have bt:·:n contemplated by them and nothing would have l'een farthest from their minds than such a position. The seller in such cases would certainly not be ameuable to the levy of a sales tax at the instance of the deiivery State and no law passed by the delivery State in regard to a levy of sales tax would have any operation against the non-resident businessman who enters into a transaction of sale where as a direct result pf such sale the goods are actually delivered for consumption within the taxing State.\n\nIf however the majority judgment be construed to have said that the seller could be subjected to the levy\n\nof a sales tax at the instance of the delivery State in the case of transactions covered by the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) I am of the opinion that it was clearly erroneous and public interests demand that the same should be reversed.\n\nTh6 Bmgal\n\nImmunity Ca-y Liiniltd\n\nv Tllc Si4Jeef Bihar\n\nlllld.ot/tm\n\nj.,\"\"\"\"'°\"11J ].\n\nby all the Courts which function on the pattern of the British Judicial system. This rule, in its very strict form, is observed by the English Courts. (Vide Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.(') and Williams\n\nv. Glasbrook Brothers Ltd.('). The House of Lords has ruled, after careful consideration, in its judgment in the case in London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council(') that the House is bound to follow its own previous decisions and will not allow any question settled thereby to be reopened and argued again, nor can the House be asked to reverse its own prior decision. Such reversal, if needed, is one that has to be brought about by parliamentary legislation.\n\nThe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has, however, not adopted this extremely rigorous view but has felt itself free, in appropriate cases, to reconsider its prior decisions. (Vide In Re.\n\nTransferred Civil Servants (Ireland) Compensation(') ).\n\nThe same is the case with the Supreme Court of the United States of America. (See Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. I, page 74).\n\nOur Constitution which has made detailed provision about various matters relating to the Supreme Court including a matter relating to its practice, such as, whether there can be a dissenting judgment (sec article 145(5). has not, in terms, made any provision in this behalf. Article 141, no doubt, provides that \"the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India\". It has been urged before us that the phrase \"all Courts\" is comprehensive enough to include the Supreme Cpurt. It is pointed out, that since every decision declares the law, a later decision declaring the law in a contrary sense, would in effect, be the exercise of legislative function which must be taken to have been impliedly prohibited.\n\nWhile these arguments arc not without force, it is reasonably clear, in the context of article 141, that the phrase \"all Courts\" must refer to Courts other than the Suprem~ Court. In the absence, therefore, of any clear provision m the\n\n(I) [1944] K. B. 718.\n\n12) [1947] 2 All E. R. SM.\n\n{3) [1898] A.C. 375.\n\n(4) [1929] A. C. 242. '\n\nConstitution and in view of the fact that this Court has historically succeeded to the pre-existing Federal Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, we cannot deny to this Court, the competence to reconsider its prior decisions.\n\nBut, it does not follow that such power can be exercised without restriction or limitation or that a prior decision can be reversed on the ground that, on later consideration, the Court disagrees with the prior decision and thinks it erroneous. The necessity for certainty and continuity in the declaration of law by the highest courts in the cpuntry is recognised on all hands. That necessity is all the greater, and not the less, by reason of the Constitution itself having formally provided that the decisions of this Court are declaratory of the law. The rule as to the binding character of a judicial precedent is based on a juristic principle of universal application. The reason for its adoJ,>tion is \"the disastrous inconvenience of subjecting each question decided by a previous judgment to reargument, thereby rendering the dealings of mankind doubtful by different decisions; so that in truth and in fact there would be no real final court of appeal\" (See London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. The London County\n\nCounojl(1) at page 380).\n\nIt is, therefore, necessary to consider within what limits the competency of this Court to reconsider its prior decisions may well be exercised. For this purpose the actual practice of other comparable Courts as affording guidance requires close examination.\n\nThe practice of the Supreme Court of America is indicated in the following passage from Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States of America, Vol. I, page 74:\n\n\"In cases of purely private import, the chief desideratum is that the law remain certain, and, therefore, where a rufe has been judicially declared and private rights created thereunder, the courts will not, except in the clearest cases of error, depart from the doctrine of stare decisis.\n\nWhen, however, public\n\ninterest~ are involved, and especially .when the que~\n\n(1) [1898] A.C. 375. 9-$4 s. C. India/59\n\nTM Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limild\n\nTM Slat. of Bilur\n\nand olhers\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nTiu Btngal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihm'\n\nand ot/:ers\n\n.7agannac/ftadas ]•\n\ntion is one of constitutional construction, the matter is otherwise. An error in the construction of a statute may easily be corrected by a legislative act, but a Constitution and particularly the Federal Constitu tion, may be changed only with great difficulty.\n\nHence an error in its interpretation may for all practical purposes be corrected only by the Court's IC pudiating or modifying its former decision\".\n\nIt would appear, therefore, that the power of reconsideration of a prior decision is somewhat freely exercised by the Supreme Court of America in Consti tutional cases.\n\nThe reason for such free exerc1Se, or to the same extent, does not exist under our Consti tution.\n\nTo appreciat~ this, it is necessary to compare the provisions in the two Constitutions for amend ment of the Constitution.\n\nThe machinery for amendment of the Constitution of the United States is prc.>- vided in Article V thereof and is as follows :\n\n\"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of two thirds of the several States. shall call a convet!· tion for proposing amendments, which, in either ca~, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may he proposed by the Congress\".\n\nUnder article 368 of our Constitution, the normal procedure provided for amendment. except in 1;, spect of specified matters to be presently enumerated, is as follows:\n\n\"An amendment of this Constitution may he initiated bv the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall he presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill\".\n\nIn respect, however, of a limited number of matters specified in the Constitution, an additional step is required, namely, that \"before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent, the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than onehalf of the States specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures\". Now the special matters where amendment is conditional on this additional requirement relate to the election of President (articles 54 and 55), extent of the executive power of the Union\n\n(article 73), extent of the executive power of a State (article 162), provisions relating to the Union Judiciary (Supreme Court) (Chapter IV of Part V), and to the High Courts of the various States, in Parts A and B (Chapter V of Part VI) and in Part C (article 241), and the relations between the Union and the States (Chapter I of Part XI), as also the distribution of the legish}tive powers and the various lists in the Seventh Schedule, the representation of the States in Parliament, and the provision in the Constitution relating to the machinery for amendment of the Constitution. Thus, it will be seen, excepting in respect of a few basic matters-of which it may be noticed article 286 is not one-the normal machinery for the procedure of amendment is the same as that for the passing of any statute by Parliament except that a specified majority in each of the Houses is essential, the securing of which would be difficult or easy according to the strength of the Government at the time in each of the Houses. The requirement of special majority as a condition for the passing of legislation in respect of certain specified items of business is not altogether an unknown feature. However that may be, it is quite clear that while the amendment of the Constitution does not depend upon the ordinary majority rule under which Parliament conducts its business, the machinery therefor is by invoking the very same Parliament and not anything so difficult, cumbroµs and dilatory as that envisaged in article V of the American Constitution. Even as regards the\n\n195.5\n\nThe Bengtl.l\n\nImmunit company d\n\nv. n .. Stau of mna,\n\nand othln\n\nJo~].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunit, Y\n\nCompay Limited\n\nThe Stau of BIM'\n\nand others\n\nJagannadhadtu ],\n\nfew specified matters for which an additional requirement of ratification by State Legislatures is provided for, our machinery for amendment is clearly much easier and less cumbersome, It does not appear to me, therefore, right to rely upon the American practice as a safe guide to determine our practice on the question as to the binding character of a judicial precedent. Neither, are we bound to adopt the very rigid rule which the House of Lords has formulated for its own practice. The problem of interpreting a written Constitution does not generally arise before it.\n\nThe only other comparable courts whose practice has been brought to our notice, through citation of cases, are the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the High Court of Australia. As th is is the first case in this Court wherein this question arises, it is desirable to consider that practice carefully for our guidance, though it is not necessary to lay down any absolutely rigid or inelastic formula. It is worthwhile at this stage to notice what, according to the Constitution of Australia, is the machinery for the alteration of their Constitution. This is to be gathered from section 128 of the Commonwealth Act of 1900 which -broadly speaking-shows that what is required there is an absolute majority in each of the Houses and the approval of each State to be obtained by a referendum to the electors of each State. This is definitely much more ditlicult, cumbersome and dilatory than what. obtains in our Constitution. Therefore, there can be no reason for our adopting a less rigid standard than that adopted by the High Court of Commonwealth of Australia, nor is there any reason for our adopting a standard less rigid thah that of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. who while feeling themselves free not to follow the very strict rule of the House of Lords, were under no constitutional limitations in this behalf.\n\nThe practice of the Judicial Committee as to the limits within which they generally exercise the freedom to reconsider their prior decisions can be gathered from the cases in In Re. Transferred Civil Servants\n\n(Ireland) Compensation( 1 ); Attorney-General for Ontario\n\nv. Canada Temperance Federation( 2 ); and Phanindra\n\nChandra Neogy v. The King(3). The matter was discussed elaborately and various prior decisions of the Privy Council were considered and the conclusion was summed up as follows in In Re. Transferred Civil Ser- 11ants (Ireland) Compensation( 1 ) :\n\n\"There is no inherent incompetency in ordering rehearing of a case already decided by the Board, even when a question of a right of property is involved but such an indulgence will be granted in very exceptional circumstances only. It is of the nature of an extraordinarium remedium\".\n\nAfter the above formulation of their practice, the Privy Council in this case permitted itself to reconsider the previous decision in Wigg's caseC), on two grounds. ( 1) The case came up before them on a reference under section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act of 1933, and that reference would have been futile if it did not necessarily involve such reconsideration.\n\n(2) The reference itself was granted on account of an alleged material mistake of fact, into which the previous Board of the Judicial Committee had fallen. On\n\nsuch reconsideration the previous decision was affirmed. In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation ( 2 ) the Judicial Committee expressed itself as follows at page 206 :\n\n\"The appellants' first contention is that Russell's c11Je( •) was wrongly decided and ought to be overruled.\n\nTheir Lordships do not doubt that in tendering humble advice to Hi.s Majesty they are not absolutely bound by previous decisions of the Board, as is the House of Lords by its own. judgments. In ecclesiastical appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion, the Board has tendered advice contrary to that given in a previous case, which further historical research has shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board would depart from a previous decision which it may be\n\n(I) [19291 A.C. 242.\n\n(5) 76 I.A. JO.\n\n(5) 7 A. C. 829.\n\n(2) [!946] A.C. !93.\n\n(4) [1927] A.C. 674.\n\nThe Beng\"l\n\nImmullity Company Limikd\n\nYo The State of Bihar\n\nand othlrs\n\n]agannadhadas .1\n\nTM Bmgal\n\nlmmunif; Y Company Limited\n\nv.· The Stale of Bihar and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nassumed will have been acted on both bv Governments and subjects\". In this case the Privy Council was invited to reconsider the correctness of the law laid down by them in Russell v. The Queen ( ) but they declined to do so on two grounds, viz., ( 1) on constitutional questions the Board seldom departs from its previous decisions, and (2) the prior decision stood unchallenged for over 60 years. .\n\nIn Phanindra Chandra Ncogy v. The King( 2) the Privy Council stated that it is only \"in the most exceptional cases\" that they would tender advice to His Majesty inconsistent with a previous decision and reaffirmed the decision in Gill's case(').\n\nThree cases of the High Court of Australia out of those brought to our notice are instructive.\n\nIn the Tramways case( ') the position was expressed in the following terms. Griffith, C.J. observed as follows :\n\n\"In my opinion it is impossible to maintain a\" an abstract proposition that the Court is either legally or technically bound by previous decisions.\n\nIndeed, it may, in a proper case, be its duty to disregard them.\n\nBut the rule should be applied with great caution, and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired statute, or is contrary to a decision of another Court which this Court is bound to follow; not, I think upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the members of the later Court might arrive at a different conclusion if the matter were res integra. Other wise there would be grave danger of want of conti\" nuity in the interpretation of the law''.\n\nJustice Barton observed as follows :\n\n\"I have never thought that it was not open to this Court to review its previous decisions upon good cause. The question is not whether the Court can do so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need for continuity and consistency in judicial decisions.\n\nChanges in the number of appointed Justices can, I\n\n(I) 7 A.C. 829.\n\n(3) 761.A.41.\n\n(2) 76 I.A. IO.\n\n(4) 18 C.L.R. 54.\n\ntake it, never of themselves furnish a reason for review .......... But the Court can always listen to argument as to whether it ought to review a particular decision, and the strongest reason for an overruling is that a decision is manifestly wrong, and its maintenance is injurious to the public interest\".\n\nHaving so laid down the rule of practice for their\n\nCourt, the learned Judges, on account of the special\n\ncircumtances in that case, unanimously agreed to reconsider the prior decision and on such reconsideration affirmed it. In so reaffirming the prior decision, one of the learned Judges, Justice Powers, stated his grounds to the following effect.\n\n\"In Whybrow's case( 1 ), the Court consisted of all the Justices of this Court who could sit on the application.\n\nThe case was very fully argued.\n\nBoth parties and two of the States were represented by counsel.\n\nThe judgments were considered judgments delivered more than two weeks after the preliminary objection was taken ......... Under the circumstances I have no hesitation in following the judgment\".\n\nThe same learned Judge at another portion of his judgment stated as follows :\n\n\"If we do not •, how some respect to our own Court's decisions, no counsel will feel safe in advising the public, and it will create uncertainty and confusion''.\n\nThe principles so laid down have been reiterated in. a recent case of the High Court of Australia in perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd.\n\nv. Federal Commissioner of Taxation(2) in the following terms:\n\n\"The Court is not bound by its previous decisions so as absolutely to preclude reconsideration of a principle approved and :ipplied in a prior case, but, as was stated in Cain v. Malone(3), the exceptions to the rule are exceptions which should be allowed only- - with great caution and in clear cases\".\n\nThen the above quotation from the judgment of Justice Barton in the Tramways Case( 4 ) was repeated\n\n(I) 11 C.L.R. I.\n\n(3) 66 C.L.R. JO.\n\n(2) 77 C.L.R. 493.\n\n(4) 18 C.L.R. 54.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nJagannar/hadas J.\n\nTu B'\"t•I\n\nImm1111ill C.mpan7 Limikd v.\n\nTM Siok of Bihar\n\nand \"\"\"' J•t•tlNl<ihadas J.\n\nand the principle indicated therein was reaffirmed. In this case the Court was asked to overrule their prior decision in Trustees Excutors and Agency Co. Ltd. v.\n\nFederal Commissioner of Taxation( 1). The learned Judges declined to reconsider it with the following observations :\n\n\"The decisions of a superior Court have a double aspect. They determine the controversy between the parties, and in deciding the case they may include a statement of principle which it is the duty of that Court and of all subordinate courts to apply in cases to which that principle is relevant. Continuity and coherence in the law demand that, particularly in this Court, which is the highest court of appeal in Australia, the principle of stare decisis should be applied, save in very exceptional cases\".\n\nThe criterion, viz., that of manifest error plus injury to public interest by maintenance of previous decision laid down in the above cases as being the ground on which a reconsideration can be granted was reiterated by Justice Williams in his judgment in Attorney- General for N.S. W. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd.(•).\n\nIn this case the High Court was asked to reconsider the correctness of the majority decision in a prior case, viz., that in Commonwealth v. Quince(•). On reconsideration the Judges by a majority affirmed the prior decision.\n\nOne of the learned Judges, Justice Dixon, considered the matter on its merits elaborately and came to the conclusion that if the matter were to be considered afresh he should prefer a view contrary to that which had been expressed in the prior decision but concurred with the majority view with the following observations :\n\n\"There appears to me to be no ground for reconsidering the dision in Quince case(8 ) unless it be a sufficient ground simply that the opposite conclusion is to be preferred. It is evident that the decision was reached only after a very full examination of the question. It cannot be said that any compelling consideration or important authority was overlooked or that the decision conflicts with well established principle or fails\n\n(1) 69 C.L.R. 270.\n\n(2) 85 C.L.R. 237.\n\n(3) 68 C.L.R. 227.\n\nto go with a definite stream of authority. It is a re.cent and well considered decision upon what is evidently a highly disputable question.\n\n. • . - • ••••••• e e I• •••••• e. •. • • e • • e • • e\n\nI do not think that we should reconsider the correctness of that decision.\n\nThe proper course judicially is to follow and apply that decision\".\n\nThis is a strong case of the year 1951-52 indicating the most recent practice of that Court, and the above passage aptly summarises almost the very considerations applicable to the present case.\n\nA consideration of these cases shows that while the highest courts other than the House of Lords have reserved to themselves theoretically the competency to reconsider the correctness of a prior decision, they have also carefully confined the actual exercise of that\n\nwer within very narrow limits. In a number of cases in which they did permit themselves to reconsider, they have ultimately declined to overrule the prior decision notwithstanding that another view might well have been taken. The only instances brought to our notice where, on a reconsideration, a previous decision was not followed, are two. One is the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd.(1). That was a case where the question which arose was a very important one as to the power of State Legislature to encroach on the field of the Commonwealth Legislature by virtue of a rule of construction laid down in an earlier case, viz., Railway Servants' case( 2 ).\n\nThe learned Judges were of the_ opinion that that was a question of far reaching public importance and that the prior decision being\n\nman~'festly wrong and opposed to the rules of construction laid down by the Privy Council in a number of cases, should be reconsidered and overruled. It would be seen that in this case the Court acted upon the limitations which they have laid down in the course of their decisions, that reconsideration and overruling of a prior decision is to be confined to cases where the prior decision is manifestly wrong and its maintenance\n\n(I) 28 C.L.R. l29.\n\n(2) 4 C.L.R. 488.\n\nThi Bengal\n\nlmrmm~ Company Limilld\n\nV; Thi State of Bihar\n\n.1111 othlll\n\n]ag•naihadas J\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. /' !11J State of Bif.ar\n\nand others\n\nis productive of great public mischief.\n\nThe second is the case in Gideon Nkambule v. The King('), where the Privy Council declined to follow its prior deision in T umahole' s case (2).\n\nIn this case, the Privy Council, while it reaffirmed the proposition that a prior decision upon a given set of facts ought not to be reopened without the greatest hesitation, explained why they, in fact, differed from the previous one in the following passage :\n\n\"From a perusal of the judgment in Tumahole's case( 2 ), it is apparent that the history of the adop tion and promulgation of the various statutes and proclamations dealing with the effect of the evidence of accomplices in South Africa was only partially put before the Board, and much material which has now been ascertained was not presented to their Lordships on tint occasion.\n\nThe present case, therefore, is one in which fresh facts have been adduced which were not under consideration when T11mahole's case was decided, and accordingly it is one in which, in their Lordships' view, they are justified in reconsidering the foundations on which that case was determined\".\n\nThis was a case where the question arose as to the applicability of the English rule of law relating to accomplice evidence as laid down in Rex v. Baskerville(\"), viz., that a particular portion of the rule which lays down that the evidence of one accomplice cannot be corroborated by that of another. What was under consideration of the Privy Council was whether a prior decision of the Judicial Committee, construing a particular section of the relevant statute applicable in that case in consonance with the above rule, was correct. It will be noticed that the overruling of the prior decision in this case was based on the fact that important and relevant material was not placed before the Judicial Committee in the earlier case. These cases emphasise under what exceptional circumstances a prior decision of the highest and final court in a country is treated as not binding on itself.\n\n(I) [1950] A.C. 379.\n\n(2) [1949] A.C. 253.\n\n(3) [19161 2 K.B. 658.\n\nNow what are the grounds in the present case to justify a reconsideration of the prior decision.\n\nAt this stage, I cannot help noticing that the argument before us-'3.S it appears to me-has taken a somewhat unusual course.\n\nI should have thought that when the decision in a case so recent as that in the United Motors case( 1 ) given after full consideration, is sought to be challenged, the first question to have been considered was whether or not there were circumstances to justify a reconsideration.\n\nIt is only after the Court came at least to a prim a f acie conclusion on that preliminary matter that a reargument on the merits of that decision should have been permitted.\n\nWhat has happened, however, is that the correctness of the prior decision was straightaway canvassed before us and the question as to the competency or the desirability of such reconsideration occupied a later and subordinate part in the arguments. I must confess to the feeling that this all important question has accordingly suffered for want of due consideration thereof at the stage of arguments before us.\n\nNow, let us see what are the facts relating to the prior decision. The decision was given on the 30th March,\n\n1953. The case itself was heard for 12 working days, i.e., from the 9th February, to the 25th February, 1953.\n\nThe Union of India and as many as eight States were permitted to intervene and their arguments were also heard. A perusal of the judgments then given shows that every possible aspect had been fully presented and considered. The decision was that of a majority as against that of one dissenting Judge. One of the learned Judges in the majority, though concurring on the main point, was prepared . to go further on one point than what the majority held (though, as appears now, he is prepared to go back on his concurrence).\n\nIt is true that in a later decision in State of T ravancore-C ochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory(2), another Judge of this Court expressed a view in disagreement with the view of the majority in this case.\n\nBut that was a decision given on the 8th May, 1953, more than a month after the judgment in the prior\n\n(I) [1953) S. C. R. 1069.\n\n(2) [1954] S. C.R. 53. 94\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni'l' Company Limited\n\n~- The Sta;, q/ Bihar\n\nand otheTs\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\n. Thi B,.gal\n\nlmmunit,1 Company. Limited\n\n''• Tht Slal1 of Bilw\n\nand othlrs\n\nJagannadhad., J.\n\ncase had been delivered and had become binding. The question that directly arose for consideration in the later case was not the one that had come in for consideration in the earlier case. However this may be, it may also be noticed that in a later decision of this Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ( 1 ) the law as laid down in the earlier decision in the United Motors case(2 ), was reiterated and it was stated that the correctness of the view could no longer be questioned. (See page 1126). In view of the above facts, it appears to me prima facie, that there was no reason for reconsideration except the fact that a different view had been taken by two of the learned Judges of this Court and except the chance of a differently constituted majority emerging on rehearing.\n\nThis, however, is sought to be justified on various grounds. It is said that the prior decision does not merely determine the rights of the two contending partjes to that case but has far reaching effects on the rights of the consuming public and that it involves the. adjudication of the taxing power of the States as against the consuming public in general.\n\nIt is, therefore, said that, if that decision is erroneous, it is our duty not to perpetuate the error. It appears to me, with respect, that this is begging the question. There is no absolute standard by which the erroneous character of a previous decision can be ascertained. What a previous decision has determined, must be presumed to be right unless it can be pronounced to be perverse or manifestly wrong. It is, therefore, a strong thing to characterise a previous decision as erroneous where, even on reconsideration, no w1animity is reached and the previous view is supported by a substantial minority.\n\nNor, can the mere fact of one of the prior learned Judges having gone back on his views be any criterion to determine which out of his two views is erroneous. As regards the suggestion of tax burden on the consuming public, it is relevant to notice that the burden, if any, which arises under the prior decision can only be by legis-\n\n(1) [1954] s. a. R. 1122.\n\n(2) [1953] s. a. R. 1009,\n\n, '\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREJl.!E!CQURT. REPORTS '141\n\nlative action of the very State in .which the'consum• 1sss ing public are residents. The removal of the burden; .The &ngal if called for, is a matter which, under the :constitu- Immunity tion, can be brought about by democratic process 'C<nn}any Limiteil which is available to the consuming public, through . \"v. its representatives in the State Legislature; It appears The st?t• 0! Bihizli to me that that is not a matter for. our considera• and others t.ion:: I may be permitted to add that in the course Jagann-;;:adasJ;. of the arguments there has been.no serious grievance made about the alleged burden . on .the consuming public. But there has been a good deal of emphasis on the harassment to the business community, i.e., to the out-of-State dealers, from whom the tax is pri\" marilycollected and passed on, under the law,-to the consumer. We are not, however, concerned with any question arising from_ such alleged hardship. The hardship such as it is, is one that: may have to be ob\". viated by the adoption of a common and agreed machi~ nery by all the States for the assessment (as distinguished from levy) and collection of the tax from out• of-State dealers, or if necessary, by the passing of the requisite legislation enabling this to be dorie. But that hardship, if any, can afford no reason for reversing the prior decision which, as will be shown later, has construed article 286 consistently with the entire scheme of the Constitution..\n\nThat decision enables the consuming State. to derive an elastic source of revenue from its own residents to make it available for the expanding needs of the State in the discharge of the responsibilities allotted to it under the Cons ti• tution. It is not for this Court now to choose between the alleged hardship of the business community and the interests.of the consuming State and treat the former as a ground for reconsideration. :\n\nIt is next suggested that there is some vagueness, if not inconsistency, in the prior majority judgment which justifies reconsideration .. It is said, with reference to a particular passage quoted from the judg~ ment, that it is only buyers falling within the Explanation who were contemplated as liable and nof the out-of-State dealers, but that the whole trend of the rest of the judgment and the actual.. decision i:un$ .\n\n!955\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmnnity Company Limiltd v.\n\nThe State of Bit.M\n\nand olhtrs\n\nJagannadha<IU J.\n\ncounter to this.\n\nWith very great respect, it I< hardly fair to read the decision as being in any way vague or inconsistent with itself by extracting one single passage. The passage relied on is at page 1084 and appears, in the context where the question was being considered, as to whether the phrase \"acn1al delivery for consumption\" has reference to \"delivery to the actual consumer-purchaser\" or delivery also to \"a purchaser fo_r eventual distribution to the consu. mers in the State\".\n\nThe view indicated in the extracted passage was that delivery to a purclzaser for eventual distribution to the consumer in the State was also \"actual delivery for consumption\" and hence the designation of purchaser as liable to tax in that passage. That the extracted passage was not meant to indicate that only such purchaser was taxable and not the seller is quite clear from the various passages in the immed_iately succeeding paragraph at pages 1084 and 1085 where \"taxation of sales or purchases involving inter-State elements bi the State in which the goods are delivered for consumption in the sense explained above\" is repeatedly referred to. All that can, If at all, be said is that the decision has not, in terms, indicated the choice hetween the seller or the purchaser as regards taxability but has indicated either of them, as taxable.\n\nIt has next been said that the impugned decision is a recent one and that \"judicial opinion was divided, if not evenly balanced\". It is no doubt tru~ that the prior decision is only two years old. But that is not by itself a ground for reconsideration. On the other hand, I should have thought that the very fact of its being recent should militate against reconsideration.\n\nThe real test to my mind, as indicated by Justice Dixon in Attorney-General for N.S.W. v.\n\nPerpetual Trustee Co. Ltd.(•) is whether it was a fully considered judgment and whether any fresh material has been brought to the notice of the Court. In considering the question whether a decision is open to reconsideration on account of its being recent, it is of importance ro observe that our decisions become\n\n(I) 85 C. L .. R. 237.\n\ndeclarations of law under article 141 and must be treated norm'!llY as final from the very moment they are pronounced. The finality of the decisions of this Court, which is the court of last resmr, will be greatly weakened and much mischief done if we treat our own judgments, even though recent, as open to reconsideration.\n\nIt has next been suggested that rectification of the error, if any, in the view taken by the previous decision, is difficult and that this could be brought about only by the amendment of the legislative lists necessitating the consent of the requisite number of States.\n\nWith respect, I am unable to appreciate this. The points of difference in the two opposing views ultimately boil down to this. (1) Does the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) taken with the relevant legislative entry enable the consuming State to tax fictional inside sale?\n\n(2) If so, does article 286(2) override this taxing power? If the right construction of article 286(2) is not what has been accepted by the majority in the prior decision, what all was required to correct that error would be to amend article 286(2) so as to make it clear that it overrides article 286(1) (a) taken with. the Explanation bv the insertion therein of some appropriate phrase like \"notwithstanding Explanation to article 286(1) (a)\". The responsibility for any such amendment, if called for, should be left to the Parliament who, as recent experience has shown. is quite capable of bringing about constitutional amendments when it felt the clear necessity for it.\n\nThe proper course for this Court, therefore, is to adopt the attitude of Justice Dixon in the case in Attorney-General for N.S.W. v. The Perpetual Tmstee Co. Ltd.(1) wherein notwithstanding that he came to a contrary conclusion, he declined to disturb the prior decision. The case for not disturbing the prior decision is all the stronger. where, as happens in the fJresent case, no unanimous opinion could be reached in favour of overruling the prior decision.\n\nNotwithstanding my opinion that there is no ground for reconsideration of the prior decision of this Court\n\n(I) 85 C. L. R. 237.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiud\n\nThi State of Bihll1'\n\nand others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThi Blngol\n\nlmnumil ComJlal!J J;.; i14\n\nThi Stale ef Bi/oar\n\nanti othtn\n\n]agannadhadas ].\n\nin the United Motors case('), I propose, out of respect for my learned brothers, who are prepared to take the opposite view, to give my reasons why, on a fresh consideration of the question involved, I am clearly m agreement with the decision of the majority in the said case. Having had the benefit of reading the judgments of my learned brothers, Justice S. R. Das and Justice Venkatarama A yyar, I propose to confine myself mainly to the consideration of the construction of article 286.\n\nThere can be no doubt that article 286 taken as a whole has to be read in the context of the power vested in the States for levying taxes on e sales or purchases of goods (other than newspapers) under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule taken with artide 246(3). Entry 54 does not, in terms, say that the sales or purchases of goods contemplated thereby as taxable are to be sales or purchases \"within the State\".\n\nIn this respect it is in contrast with Entry 26 which vests in the State the power to legislate in respect of trade and commerce \"within the State\".\n\nThe apparently wide language of Entry 54 is in recognition of the theory that in substance a tax on sale or purchase of goods is a tax on the goods with reference to the event of sale or purchase thereof. (See the United Motors case('). Article 286 appears in Part XII of , the Constitution relating to finance, property, contracts and suits and is in Chapter I thereof relating to finance. This is mainly concerned with the prob. !cm of allocation of finances between the Centre and the States in order to enable each to carry on the respective governmental functions allotted to it under the Constitution. Keeping this context in view as also the avowed purpose of the article as indicated by the marginal note, it may be taken that article 286 was intended to indicate clearly the ambit of the taxing power ot the State on sales or purchases of goods and to limit it to a demarcated field. To determine the exact scope of this ambit and of the limitations, it is relevant to consider what was the sales-tax law b operation just prior to the new Constitution.\n\n(I) [1953] S. c; R. 1069.\n\nA careful and thorough examination of the Provinciai Sales-tax Acts at the time discloses the following. There were sales tax laws in operation in all the then nine Provinces, which subsequently became Part A States under the Constitution, as also in one Native State of Mysore. The pattern of the sales-tax laws in everv one of the ten units had the following common features (with minor additions and variations).\n\nUnder the charging section in each of these Acts, tax\n\nwa~ levied as against a \"dealer\" whose turnover of sales (or purchases) exceeded a particular amount. A \"dealer\" was defined as a person carrying on the !-msiness of selling or supplying goods in the Province. \"Sale\" was defined as meaning transfer of property in goods in the course of trade for valuable consideration. In addition, each one of these Sales-tax Acts had an Explanation to the definition of the word ''sale\" to the etfect that, notwithstanding anvthing to the contrarv in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, a sale or purchse of goods \"which were actually in the Province'' at the time when the contract of sale or purchase is made, slzall be deemed to have taken place in the Province, wherever the contract for sale or purchase may have been made. This was, broadly speaking, the common pattern of every one of the sales-tax laws just prior to the Constitution, subject to some further additions to the definition of sale by a few of the States, which will be r, resentk noticed.\n\nThis pattern indicates, that apart from the purely internal sales-in respect of which the power of taxation hv the States was undoubted-the States claimed the pwer to tax sales with an outside element in the following two cases: (1) Where the transfer of ownership in the goods was within the State (assumed to be so) according to the Indian Sale of Goods Act. (2) Where the gocds which are the subject-matter of th-= sale are actuallv in the Province at the time when the contract of sale' is made, i.e., at the crucial moment of transfer of ownership. If I may express this in another way, these Sales-tax Acts purported .to tax\n\nales as being within the State1 with reference to (1) .rit!1s (a:; :i~nmecl) under the Sale of Goods Act, and to-84 s. c tnclhp0\n\nTht Bengal\n\nImm11ni(1 Compan_y L1miltd\n\nThe Stale of Bihar\n\nlltld others\n\nJaganrwtfhadas J.\n\nTh~ 1Je11gal\n\nImmunity\n\nCom~'V Limited v.\n\nT1\"JState of Bihar\n\nand othns\n\nJag41WJl/hadas J.\n\n746 Su-PREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1955J\n\n(2) situs (as probably assumed to be) under the general law. It is possible that this general law was so assumed with reference to the dictum of Lord Loreburn in Badische Anz'fin Und Soda Fabrik v. Hickson( 1 ) which suggests that the situs of the goods at the time of appropriation of the goods to a particular sale is the situs of the sale. Whether the underlying assumptions as regards both these criteria were right or wrong is not material at this stage.\n\nWhile this was the general pattern, four of the States claimed the taxing power with reference to some additional criteria. Madras and Mysore had an additional Explanation as follows :\n\n\"In case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods are actually produced in the Province at any time, after the contract of sale or purchase in resp.ect thereof was made, the sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the Province, wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have been made, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act\".\n\nBihar and United Provinces had the following additional Explanation. (Taken from the U. P. Act). \"Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, the sale of any goods which are produced or manufactured in the Province by the producer or manufacturer thereof, shall, wherever the delivery or contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of the Act to have taken place in the Province\".\n\nBoth these additions refer to future goods.\n\nMadras and Mysore apparently treated such future goods as having been appropriated to the sale the moment they. were \"actually produced in the Province\". The Bihar and U .P. addition was more or less the same and is limited to the case of sale by the very manufacturer or prqducer. The above additions are in effect .the same as category No. 2 of the general pattern as applied to future goods. The underlying assumption appears to be that future goods which are contracted to, be sold get appropriated thereto on their coming\n\n(I) [1906] A. a. +19.·\n\ninto existence and that thus a taxable sale emerges.\n\nBesides the above mentioned variations from the general pattern, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh had further additions to the definition pf sale relating to forward contracts which virtually amounted to treating \"agreement to sell\" itself as being the taxable event. This, it may be seen, had nothing to do with the nexus theory of taxation of sales and has been pronounced invalid by this Court in The Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs Budh Prakash fai Prakash( 1 ).\n\nFrom the above broad summary it will be seen that the Provinces were deriving sales-tax revenues not only in respect of purely internal sales, but also in respect of sales with an outside element. But in the generality of such sales, the tax was leviable at either or both of the above mentioned two points, i.e., (1) transfer of ownership within the State, (2) actual existence of goods within the State at the moment of such transfer. The ultimate consumer in respect of such sales would normally be not a person within the taxing State. Hence having regard to the structure of the sales-tax and the universally accepted machinery therefor which brings about the passing on, of the incidence thereof, to the ultimate consumer, this must have been felt to be inequitable. It appears to me that in the adjustments called for on the passing of the Constitution it was this feature of the pre-existing sales-tax law which called for being remedied by the imposition of a ban on taxation of sales with an outside element.\n\nBut that very consideration would equally indicate the permissibility of taxing an out~ side sale where the ultimate burden of it could be passed on to the resident of the very taxing State. This could be done by making the consuming State the taxing Stat<:. This, in my opinion, was the background with reference to which article 286 was incorporated m the Constitution.\n\nThe Constitution wanted to put a ban on taxation of sales with an outside element on account of tbct inequity of making the residrnts of other States\n\n(I) [1955] I g, C. R~43.\n\n195:i\n\nT/18 Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nTM State of Bi/uzJ'\n\nand DIM'ls\n\nJ~].\n\nThe B\"'l•I\n\nlmmunitl Company Limited\n\nThe Siok of Bihar\n\nand olhtrs\n\n]ogannadhados ],\n\ncontribute towards the resources of the selling State.\n\nBut in doing so it could not have intended to confine the resources of the State under this head to the comparatively small fiejd of pure! y internal sales.\n\nHaving regard to the expanding needs of a . social welfare State and the limited taxing powers allocated to it, the Constitution could not have meant to limit an elastic source of taxation payable by its own consumers to the very small field of purely internal sales.\n\nIt, therefore, selected and took out one category of sale with an outside element from the field of restriction, by adopting the device of a fictional inside sale and left that category taxable so that the incidence thereof may be the same as that of a purely internal sale. This, to my mind, is the reason for the positive approach in the Explanation by a deeming provision as to an inside sale.\n\nIt is on account of this common feature, as to the incidence of taxation. that the fictional inside sale indicated in the Explanation was assimilated to a purely internal or intra- State sale. It appears to me not very reasonable to assume that the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) was required in order merely to determine what an outside sale is. If the Constitution intended nothing more than to ban taxation on outside sales, it might well have contented itself with declaring such a ban.\n\nI do not think that the Courts would then have found any serious difficulty in construing \"outside sale\" to mean, a sale with a substantial outside element, or in the alternative, as a sale in which the ownership has passed outside the State in the assumed sense of the Sale of Goods Act. ft was quite unnecessary and indeed out of the way to define: 3n outside sale as the implied negative of a fictional inside >;:le. Nor can the purpose of the Explanation be readily ;;~urned to be to obviate the supposed chaotic condition arising out of the adoption of the nexus theory in the Sales-tax Acts. This could have been sufficiently and effectively provided for-as in fact it was done-by the ban imposed under article 286(2).\n\nIt has been suggested that the Explanation covers some outside sales which do not fall within article 286(2) and that\n\ntherefore the Explanation was necessary.\n\nBut the possibility of a few ingenously illustrated. cascslike the Gurgaon-Delhi illustration put forward in the course of • arguments-as falling outside the ambit of article 286(2) and within the scope of article 286(1)\n\n(a) taken with the Explanation, would not have been any adequate reason fof the Constitution involving itself in two such provisions, mostly overlapping in effect.\n\nIt appears to me, therefore, that the reasons for having these two provisions were distinct and different. Article 286(l)(a) with the Explanation was meant to prevent taxation whose ultimate incidence would fall on residents of outside States. Article 286\n\n(2) was meant to prevent the taxing structure of the States being availed so as unduly to hamper the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce which, for the first time, the Constitution declared by article 301.\n\nIn this context it also became necessary to provide that the foreign trade of the country should not be affected at all by the sales-tax structure of the States, while . at the same time indicating that the internal trade could be permitted to bear a limited burden of taxation. It is in reconciliation of these various ideas that article 286(1) and (2) were drafted.\n\nJudged in this light the following is the only reasonable construction of article 286 ( 1 )(a) taken with the Explanation. This provision, while intended to prohibit taxation by States on outside sales was also meant to demarcate the boundary between inside sales and outside sales and to assimilate one particular category of outside sales into the field of inside sales and to make 'it available for taxation by the consuming State. The underlying aim of this demarcation was to obviate the inequity of one State levying a tax whose ultimate incidence was on the residents of another State but to provide instead an elastic source of taxation which in its effect was to be against its own residents. The field of export trade is completely marked off as not being available for the operation ot sales-tax by article 286(1) (b). Then the ban on sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce is declared. This ban, which was for a\n\nTu &Aglll 1,.._,, w,, Ctnnp;;; Tfmw\n\ny, Thi Stall of BWtl\n\nOndolhm\n\nJaganaadliodas J.\n\nTiu Bengal\n\nlmmunitv c.mpany LimiUd\n\nTiu Stale of B; har\n\nand others\n\nJagannadkadas J.\n\ntotally different l?rpose cannot be so construed as to nullify the positive results intended and brought about by article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation.\n\nTo such a situation the principle of harmonious construction would apply as enunciated by Lord Herschell in John Carter Colquhoun v. Henry Brooks(') at page 506 in the following terms :\n\n\"It is beyond dispute that we are entitled and indeed bound when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to shew that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be if considered alone and apart from the rest of the Act\".\n\nIf, as my learned brother, Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, is inclined to think, a sale cannot be said to have occurred in the course of inter-State trade and commerce if the sale follows the completion of the inter- State transportation of goods, as for instance, would be the case when a hawking pedlar brings goods across a State boundary and vends it from door to door in another State, then clearly the fiction which brings about the notional inside sale would by itself be sufficient to take such a sale out of the category \"of the course of inter-State trade and commerce\".\n\nBecause, in such a situation, while the transportation of goods across State boundaries remains as a fact, the sale itself is deemed to be inside the consuming State, the very purpose of the fiction being to shift the situs of the sale for the purpose of taxability.\n\nIt is, I think, in this sense that in the earlier decision, the learned then Chief Justice laid down that by virtue of the Explanation this particular category of inter-State sale became an intra-State sale, of course, not for all purposes, but for the limited purposes for which the Explanation was inserted, viz., the purpose of demarcating the taxable field from the non-taxable field. Looked at either on the ground of harmonious construction or on the ground that the notional inside sale brought about by the Explanation ceased,\n\n(l1 [1889] 14 A. C. 493, 506.\n\nby that very fiction, to be part of the course of inter- State trade and commerce for taxation purposes, the only proper construction of article 286(2) would be that it cannot override article 286(1)(a) taken with the Explanation.\n\nHaving indicated the broad lines on which I have, on independent consideration of the construction of articles 286(1) and (2), arrived at the same construction as that adopted in the United Motors case( 1 ), it is unnecessary for me to deal with all the various aspects raised before us in the course of the arguments, except to express my general agreement with a good deal of the reasoning of my learned brother, Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, on this part of the case. It is, however, necessary to refer to a few matters referred to in the contrary view.\n\nThe contrary opinion adopted by my learned brothers is based almost entirely on the view that artick 286 is inspired by the anxiety of the Constitution to prevent the mischief of multiple taxation, which arose from the operation of the pre-existing sales-ta:i. laws.\n\nIt is said that this result was achieved bv covering all loopholes from various angles, articls 286(1)(a), 286(1)(b), 21l6(2) and 286(3) being said to be the four plugging points. With respect, I i; Jn only think that this is the outcome of an overdrawn picture as to the chaos said to have been created bv the earlier pre-Constitution sales-tax laws.\n\nAs already pointed out, the common feature of all the previous ten Sales-Tax Acts, was to bring about limited multiple taxation in respect of outside sales at two points, viz.,\n\n(1) transfer of ownership within the taxing State, and\n\n(2) the actual presence of goods in the taxing State at the point of time when the transfer of ownership takes place in another State. It must be mentioned that none of the Sales-Tax Acts took the mere presence of goods in the S_tate as enabling it to levy the tax.\n\nWhat was taken as enabling taxation was the existence of goods within the State at the crucial point of time, viz., the point at which the ownership became transferred wherever it may be. Once this is appreciated, it is difficult to agree with the assumption that\n\n(!) [1953] S. c. R. 1069.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of BihflJ'\n\nand others\n\nJagannadhaaas].\n\nTM Btngal\n\nlmmunit'V Campan_-v Llmited v.\n\nThe'iStale of Bihat\n\nand othtn\n\n]agannad; tulas ].\n\nunder the pre-existmg law, the taxauon might get multiplied in the course of the transit of goods under sale through a number of States, if the . goods happened to remain in the successive States for some time. In none except one of the States would the goods be in actual existence at the single crucial point of time of transfer of ownership. Hence, 1 am clear in my mind tftat the previous legislation would not have normally involved taxation of the same sale with an outside element, at more than two points. (Whether even this would not get limited by the fact that a \"dealer\" is defined in all the then Acts as \"within the Province\" would he a matter for consideration).\n\nFour of the .then provincial units had, as already stated, an additional criterion for taxation.\n\nBut, so far as Madras and Mysore were concerned that criterion which relates to futnre r, oods cannot be cumulative with criterion two. So far as U.P. and Bihar are concerned which authorised the manufacturing State as such to levy the tax, it appears to me that if it is borne in mind that this is limited to the sale b1' the\n\nvery manufacturer, this was also not likely to operate as a cumulative point. Even otherwise these additional criteria might, if at all, have given rise to taxation at a third point, when the sale transaction had to be put through vja these particular States.\n\nBut even so there is no justification for the impression of chaotic conditions resulting therefrom which has been assumed. There is no evidence before us that prior to the Constitution there was in fact multiple taxation of sales in operation, at any rate at more than the m•o points as explained by me above. Hence in the light of the detailed scrutiny of the provisions in the various Sales-Tax Acts which were in torce prior to the Constitution, I cannot help feeling that the mischief of multiple taxation which might if at all have existed in a limited measure as pointed out above, has been overstated.\n\nNo doubt, the future prevention of such multiple taxation by invoking the nexus theorv recognised by the Privy Council in Wr1!/11ce's casr(') mav well be one of the results of article 286.\n\n(I) (1q4q7 F\n\n. R. J.\n\nBut l am unable to think that the main purpose Wlderlying each and every one of the provisions ol article 286 was to prevent the continuance of, pre e:ustmg chaotic conditions of multiple taxaon by virtue of the nexus theory. I cannot help feelmg that a wholly wrong impression of the pre-existing\n\nstate of law in this respect has been created by overlooking that the existence of goods in a particular State has been taken as a taxing point only if that existence was at the crucial moment of transfer of ownership. (A statement showing the definition of\n\n\"sale\" under each of the Sales-Tax Acts in operation just prior: to the Constitution is appended-as Appendix I-for reference).\n\nOn the construction of article 286, reference has also been made in the dissenting view to sub-article (3J\n\nof article 286 which runs as follows :\n\n\"No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been .declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent\".\n\nWith great respect, J am unable to see its bearing on the question at issue. It is a totally different kind of restriction from what sub-articles (1) .and (2) brig about. While sub-articles (1) and (2) impose certam bans on taxation what sub-article (3) does is not to impose a ban at all but to impose a fetr 1.n: respect of taxation on sales of e, ssntial goods declared as such by th~ l'arliamt'nt1 by requiring that before such a taxation-law can have any effect, it should be reserved for the consideration of the President and receive his assent. In this respect it is in line with what would happen if any other Sta~ legislation passed 'by that Legislature is presented to the Governor for his assent and he reserves the same for the consideration of the President. The only difference is that while in the latter the reservation for the President is optional, in the case of such essential goods the reservation is compulsory. Subject to\n\nTill Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limittd\n\nThe State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nJagannaihadas ].\n\nThe Bmgal\n\nlmmunit/ Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nJagamiadhadas J.\n\nthis, even essential goods continue to be, m theory and by Constitution, taxable (by the States themselves) in respect of sales thereof. I am, therefore, unable to see the bearing of this provision on the construction of the other two provisions which bring about a total or contingent ban of taxation in respect of the sales to which they have reference.\n\nThere is one other matter which has been stressed or implied in the dissei\\ting view and it is this. The assumption is that even a single point tax on a sale arising in the course of inter-State trade would be a burden on the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce guaranteed under the Constitution by article 301 which runs as follows :\n\n\"Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free\".\n\nNow it is not disputed that a tax on a purely internal sale which occurs as a result of the transportation of goods from a manufacturing centre within the State to a purchasing market within the same State is clearly permissible and not hit by anything in the Constitution. If a sale in that kind of trade can bear the tax and is not a burden on the freedom of trade, it is difficult to see why a single point tax on the same kind of sale where a State boundary intervenes between the manufacturing centre and the consuming centre need .. be treated as a burden, especially where that tax is ultimately to come out of the residents of the very State by which such sale is taxable. Freedom of trade and commerce applies as much within a State, as outside it. It appears to me again, with great respect, that there is no warrant for treating such a tax as in any way contrary either to the letter or the spirit of the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse povided under article 301.\n\nFor all the above reasons, I am quite clear in my mind that the view taken in the prior decision, viz., that the consuming State has the present power to tax a fictional inside sale which falls within the scope of the Explanation and that th~ said , power is not affected by article 286(2) and that article 286(2)\n\ncannot be construed as overriding article 286(1)(a) read with the Explanation, is correct and that there is no reason to depart from that decision.\n\nThe real difficulty, if any, that arises from this view is as regards what has been called the extraterritorial operation of the tax which such a view may involve. In the conclusion reached by my learned brothern who are prepared to uphold the dissenting view taken in the prior decision that question does not arise for consideration and has been left untouched..\n\nI do not, therefore, feel called upon to go into it or to commit myself to any particular view on this . somewhat difficult question.\n\nI am doubtful whether, as between the component States of a Union of the kind, which India is under the Constitution, there can be any question of extra-territoriality in the sense of the doctrine that one nation does not act in aid of the revenue laws of another (and foreign) nation. It is true that a defined geographical part of India constitutes the territory of each unit called the State and that the governance of that unit is committed to that State. But it appears to me that on that account, the territory of one State is not a foreign territory in respect of another State, when freedom of movement and a number of other common fundamental rights are guaranteed. On the other hand, I think it permissible to suggest that where the various .States owe their existence to the same Constitution and are subject to its common operation, any taxing power vested in an individual State must carry with it the incidental implication of enforceability, if need be, in any other State within the Union when the very nature of that tax, as contemplated by the Constitution involves it. In this context article 261 ( 1) which enjoins that full faith and credit shall be given throughout the territory of India to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and of every State, may well be relied upon to justify such a view. I am aware that this has been generally taken as applicable to judicial and legislative proceedings.\n\nRut the language of the article is capable of wider application. I do not, however, wish to go into the\n\n19!>5\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuni~ Company Lsmit4d\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuni'l Company Limed\n\nTiu State of Bili.at\n\nand others\n\nJaganNJdhadas J.\n\nmatter further because even if in the course of the administration of sales-tax, of the kind permissible, in the view of article 286 which the prior decision has accepted, there emerges the element of extra-territorial operation of such a tax, that by itself can be no reason for negativing the construction of articles 286( 1) and (2) above indicated. In this context it is necessary to bear in mind the following clear dictum of the Privy Council in British Columbia Electrical Railway Co., Ltd. v. The King(') :\n\n\"A legislature which passes a law having extraterritorial operation 'may find that what' it has enacted cannot be direct! y enforced, but the Act is not invalid on that account, and the courts ot Its country must enforce the law with the machinery available to them\".\n\nThe question, therefore, of extra-territoriality is not germane for construction of article 286.\n\nAt the present stage we are not concerned with the enforcement of the levy of the assessed tax but with the assessment of the tax. All that we are concerned with is the validity of the steps so far taken by tbe assessment authorities and particularly of the notice dated the 29th May, 1952, which intimates that on non-compliance before the 14th June, 1952, proceedings for assessment on the basis of \"best judgment\" will be made. That step, to my mind, is perfectly valid as appears from the following. In Whitney v.\n\nCommissioners of Inland Revenue('), the House of Lords by a majority held that where a tax was leviable on a non-resident, a requisition served upon him by post to file a return and to produce accounts was valid so as to entitle the taxing authority to make ;,.n assessment on the basis of best judgment on non-compliance with the requisition. The following passage from Lord Wrenbury's speech at page 56 is instructive:\n\n\"There is a S!!Cond question in the case-namely, whether the appellant has been duly brought within the machinery for assessment provided by the Act.\n\nThis turns upon section 7. There was sent to the appellant by post addressed to him in the United\n\n(I)\n\nA.C. 37.\n\nStates a notice under section 7, sub-section 2, requiring him to make a return. It is contended that there was no right to post him such a notice so addressed.\n\nThe case, it is contended, is similar to the case of service of a writ out of the jurisdiction. I do not agree.\n\nIt is similar rather to the service of a notice of dishonour of a bill or of a notice to quit or of a notice requiring payment of calls upon shares as a preliminary to' forfeiture in default of payment. It is not a step in judicial proceeding but a step which will create inter partes a state of things in which judicial proceedings can subsequently be taken in default of\n\ncompliance\".\n\nIt may be that some or all of the provisions in the Bihar Act which contemplate enforcemerit out of State or create penalties for non-compliance out of State may require closer examination when the validity thereof is directly challenged. It may also be that the harassment consequent on such outside operation may require to be remedied either by agreed co-ordination between the States or by appropriate legislation, if need be. These, however, are not relevant considerations for us on the question we have now to deal with.\n\nI am accordingly clear in my opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.\n\nAPPENDIX-I.\n\nSTATEMENT SHOWING THE DEFINITION OF\n\n\"SALE\" UNDER EACH OF THE SALES-TAX\n\nACTS IN OPERATION JUST PRIOR TO THE\n\nCOMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.\n\n(Vide Page 753).\n\nMADRAS SALES-TAX ACT, 1939. \"Sale\" (with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions) means every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration, (and includes also a transfer of property in goods involved in the execu-\n\nTh. Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiletl\n\nTh• Stale ef Bihar\n\nand others\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\n195.i:.\n\nTht Bengal Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stale of Bihar\n\nand others\n\n]agannadhadas ].\n\ntion of a works contract, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge;) (Explanation 1 : A transfer of goods on the hirepurchase or other instalment system of payment shall, notwithstanding the fact that the seller retains the title in the goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale.) Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to tlit: contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act. J 930, the sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have taken place in this Province, wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have been made- ( a) if the goods were actually in this Province at the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made, or\n\n(b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods are actually produced in this Province at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made.\n\nBENGAL FINANCE (SALES-TAX) ACT, 1941. \"Sale\" means any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ............... . • • • • Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian .Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale of any goods which are actually in West Bengal at the time when the contract of sale (as defined in that Act) in respect thereof is made, shall, wherever the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in West Bengal.\n\nBOMBAY SALES-TAX ACT, 1946. \"Sale\" means any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable considention .............. . • • • •\n\nExplanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930. the sale of any goods which are actually in the Province of Bombay at the time when the contract for sale (as defined in that Act) is made in respect thereof, shall, wherever the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in the Province of Bombay.\n\nASSAM SALES-TAX ACT, 1947. \"Sale\" means any transfer of property in goods by any person for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ............... .\n\nExplanation : Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale of any goods which are actually in the Province at the time when the contract of sale (as defined in that Act) in respect thereof is made, shall, irrespective of the place where the said contract is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in the Province.\n\nBIHAR SALES-TAX ACT, 1947. \"Sale\" means • • • any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ................ .\n\n• • • • Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act,\n\n1930, the sale of any goods-\n\n(i) which are actually in Bihar at the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, or\n\n(ii) which are produced or manufactured in Bihar by the producer or manufacturer thereof, shall, wherever the delivery of contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to haW! taken place in Bihar; Provided further that the sale of goods in respect of a forward contract, whether goods under such con-\n\nThe Be•gal\n\nlmmrmi'!\n\nCompany L1mittd\n\nTM State of Bih\"'\n\nand olh,, s\n\nJagannadhuas J.\n\nTM Bengai\n\nImmunity ompany Limited v. ht StaU of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nagnnnadhadas J.\n\ntract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery.\n\nCENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR\n\nSALES-TAX ACT, 1947.\n\n\"Sale\" ............ means any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ........... . • • • • • Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale of any goods which are actually in the Central Provinces and Berar at the time when the contract of sale as defined in that Act in respect thereof is made, shall wherever the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in the Central Provinces and Berar.\n\nORISSA SALES-Tj\\.X ACT, 1947.\n\n\"Sale\" means .......... any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ..............• • • • • •\n\nProvided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale of any goods which are actually in Orissa at the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, shall, wherever the said contract of sale is made be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in Orissa.\n\nMYSORE SALES-TAX ACT, 1948.\n\n\"Sale\" means ............ every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ........... . • • • • •\n\nExplanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the S:i Ir l}f Goods Act, 1932, the sale or pmchase of any goods shall be deemed, for the purposes of ' this Act, to have taken place in Mysore, wherever the contract of sale might have been made;\n\n(a) if the goods were actually in Mysore at the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect ther.:- of was made, or\n\n(b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods hv description, then, if the goods !lre actually produced in Mysore at any time\n\nafter the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made.\n\nEAST PUNJAB GENERAL SALES-TAX ACT, 1948.\n\n\"Sale\" means any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration ........... . • • Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the\n\nsal~ of any goods whic!i are actually in East Punjab at the time when the contract of sale (as defined in that Act) in . respect thereof is made, shall, wherever the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in East Punja!,.\n\nUNITED PROVINCES SALES-TAX ACT, 1948. \"S l \" f a e means ............ any trans er goods for cash or deferred payment or consideration .......... .\n\nof property in other valuable\n\n• Explanation II : Notwithstanding anything m the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, or any other law for the time being in force, the sale of any goods-\n\n(i) which are actually in the United Provinces at the time when in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, or\n\n(ii) ...,:J.iich are produced or manufactured in the United Provinces by the producer or manufacturer\n\n11-9~ S.C. Ind1a/.5\".\n\nTiii Bengal\n\nlmmuni'l Company Limiltd\n\nThe Slate of Bihar\n\nand othns\n\nT.i1t Bengal\n\nlmnwnity Company L; miud\n\nThe StaU of Bihat\n\nand ot/rns\n\nJagannadMJas J.\n\nthereof, shall, wherever the delivery. or contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in the United Provinces.\n\nExplanation Ill : Where goods under a forward contract are not actually delivered, the sale in respect of such contract shall be deemed to have been completed on the <lat~ originally agreed upon for delivery.\n\nNote : The omitted portions .in the definitions other than those in the Madras Act are to the same effect as those shown within brackets in the Madras definition.\n\nVENKATARAMA AvYAR J.-The appellant is a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act carrying on business in the manufacture and sale of sera, biological products and medicines. Its registered office is at No. 153, Dharamtalla Street, Calcutta, and its laboratory and factory are situated at Baranagar, 24 Parganas, West Bengal. The first respondent is the State of Bihar, and respondents 2 rrnd 3 are respectiveiy the Secretary ::111<l the ..i\\.ssist'.lnt Secret2!\"y of Commercial Taxes.\n\nOn the 18th December 1951, the second respondent issued a notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Act XIX of\n\n1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) calling upon the appellant to register itself as a dealer under the Act and to submit a return for assessment of sales tax. To this the appellant sent a reply on the 8th january 1952 disputing its liability on various grounds, and after further correspondence between the parties which it is needless to set out, the third respondent sent a notice on the 29th May 1952 that if the appellant failed to comply with the notice dated the 18th December 1951 by the 14th June 1952, steps would be taken to assess tax on the basis of best judgment.\n\nThe appellant replied by filing the application out of which the present appeai arises, under artide 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from proceeding with\n\nthe assessment. It was alleged in the petition that as the appellant had no .place of business wit}\\in the\n\nState of Bihar, the provisions of the Act under which it was sought to be taxed were ultra vires as extraterritorial in operation, and that further those provisions were repugnant to article 286(2) of the Constitution and were therefore void. The State of Bihar, which will hereafter be referred to as the respondent. resisted the application on the ground firstly, that it was not maintainable for the reason that the appellant had, under the provisions of the Act, a right of appeal against the assessment to the appropriate authorities, and secondly, that as the sales proposed to be taxed must be deemed to have taken place by reason of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) within Bihar, the provisions of the Act imposing tax on a non-resident seller were neither ultra viresnor unconstitutional. The learned Judges of the High Court upheld both these contentions and dismissed the application, and this appeal has been preferred against their judgment on a certificate granted under article 132(1) of the Constitution. In view of the importance of the issues involved, leave of the Court was sought PY and granted to ten States, one commercial firm and one individual dealer. Nine out of the ten States, namely Orissa, PEPSU, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore, Rajasthan, Travancore-Cochin and Uttar Pradesh, have intervened and supported the respondents.\n\nOne State, West Bengal, represented by the learned Attorney-General supported the appellant, and so did the Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., and one M. K. Kuriakose.\n\nOn the arguments addressed before us, the following points arise for determination :\n\n1. Whether the application for a writ of prohibition is maintainable?\n\n2. Whether the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) confers authority on the State Legislatures to impose tax on sales falling within its purview?\n\n3. Whether the sales covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) are subject to the prohibition contained in article 286(2) ?\n\nThe Btn&ol\n\nl1111nut1ih Company il,,;; ud\n\nTM Slau of Bilutr\n\nand others\n\nThe Bengal\n\n/mnumilv enpm, dmiled\n\nTM Stau qf Bilim\n\nand \"'\"\"' v-. ...\n\n4.l!l\"' 1•\n\n4. Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 is invalid on the ground that it is extra-territorial i11 its operation, and ultra vires the power of the State Legislature?\n\n5. Whether the assessment proposed to be made on the appellant is not authorised by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a)?\n\n1. On the question of the maintainability of the application for a writ of prohibition, it was observed by the learned Judges that under section 13.(5) of the impugned Act, the Commissioner was competent to decide whether the appellant was a person liable to pay tax under the Act, that even if he came to an erroneous conclusion on the merits, that did not affect his jurisdiction over the subject-matter, that the Act itself provided in sections . 24 and 25 a complete and effective machinery by way of appeal and revision for correction of such errors, and that accordingly a writ of prohibition was not the proper remedy. If the learned Judges intended to lay down that a writ of prohibition should not issue because another remedy was open under the Act, that cannot be supported.\n\nThe existence of another remedy is . a very material circumstance . to be taken into account when the Court is calied upon to issue a writ of certiorari, but wholly different considerations arise when the writ asked for is prohibition. Writ of prohibition is issued whenever a, subordinate Court or Tribunal usurps jurisdiction which does not belong to it, and when that has been shown, the issue of the writ, though not of course, is of right and not discretionary. The point to be determined, therefore, is whether in taking\n\nprocedings under section 13(5) of the Act, respondents 2 and 3 acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it. The contention of the appellant is that the Bihar Legislature had no competence to tax the sales in question, because they were effected in Bengal, and the appellant was not carrying on business within the State of Bihar. If this contention is we!lfounded, \"then section 13(5) of the Act would be oid and inoperative in its application as against the ap-· pellant, and the proceedings taken thereunder would\n\nin consequence be without jurisdiction. We are not here concerned with a statute whose vires is not in question, and which confers jufisdiction on anv authority to take proceedings if certain facts exist and the enquiry directed by the authority is as to whether those facts exist. The determination in such a case is incidental to the effective exercise by the authority of its undisputed jurisdiction and if, as a result of that enquiry, it came to an erroneous conclusion, there is 1no\n\nerror of jurisdiction, and it might well he contended in that case that the remedy of the party aggrieved was to resort to the machinery provided in the statute itself by way of appeal or revision, and that a writ of prohibition would be misconceived. But here, the contention of the appellant is that the statute itself is void in so far as it authorises the imposition of a tax on dealers who are not residents within the State <>r do not carry on business there, and that, in consequence, the proceedings taken under section 13(5) of the Act should be restrained on the ground of want of jurisdiction. It is no answer to this contention that the appellant should seek redress through the channels provided in the Act therefor.\n\nIndeed, the contention that the Act is ultra vires is not one which the Tribunals constituted under the Act, whether original, appellate, or revisional, could entertain, their duty being merely to administer the Act.\n\nIt was argued by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that if the tax was illegal, as contended by the appellant, then the proceedings taken for imposing the same would amount to unconstitutional interference with the fundamental right of the appellant to carry on business guaranteed under article 19(1)(g), and that the -courts were bound to interfere under article 226. He relied on the decisions of this court in Mahommad Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, /alalabad(1), The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ld.( 2 ), and Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(8 ). That is undoubtedly the position in law, but as the appellant is a Company registered under\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 578. .\n\n(2) [1953] s.c.R. 1069.\n\n(3) [1954] S.C.R. 1122.\n\nTht &llgal\n\nlmmunitl Company LimitMJ\n\nT/14 State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\n19$5\n\nTIN .Bmpl\n\nlmmtmily eo..pan, Llmi1'tl\n\nTIN Stale of Bihar\n\nanti ollN'1\n\nY lllkatarama\n\nAY.1\"' J.\n\nthe Indian Companies Act and the question whether a juristic person is a citizen for the purpose ot article 19(1) (g) is still an open one, I would prefer not to rest my decision on this ground. It is sufncient for the purpose of this appeal to hold that a writ of pr<>- hibition should issue, if the appellant establishes that the proceedings taken against it under section 13(5) of the Act are without jurisdiction.\n\nThe contentions urged in support of that position must now be examined.\n\n2. It is firstly argued that the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) on which the validity ot the impugned Act depends confers no authority on the State Legislature to impose a tax on sales falling within its purview.\n\nTo appreciate the contentions advanced on either side, it must be mentioned that the Act as passed in 1947 contemplated the in.position ot a tax on residents within the State. They might be natural persons, or they might be juristic persons carrying on business within the State. The business might be\n\ncarried on in person or through agents. But if the persons who carried on the business of buying and selling did not reside within the State or carry on business there, then the Act did not authorise the imposition of tax on them. That was the effect of the definition of \"dealer'' as mea.ning \"any person who carries on the business of selling or buying goods in Bihar\". Thi:n came the Constitution, and the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) enacted that sales shall be\n\ndeemed to have taken place in that State in which die goods are delivered for consumption; notwithstanding that title to them passed in another State.\n\nThe construction which the respondent puts on the Explanation is that it confers on the States proprio vigore, a power to tax sales when the conditions mentioned. therein are satisfied. Agreeably to this view, the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 (Act XVII of 1950) substituted for the words \"who carries on business of selling or buying goods in Bihar\" the words \"who sells or supplies any goods\". The point to be noted is that the words \"in Bihar\" which occurred in the previous definition were omitted.\n\nIn 1951 by the Adaptation\n\nof Laws Order, a new section, section 33, was added and that is as follows :\n\n\"33.\n\n(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,-\n\n(a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods shall not be imposed under this Act-\n\n(i) where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State of Bihar; or\n\n(ii) where rnch sale or purchase takes place in the course of import of the gooJs into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India;\n\n( b) a tax on the sale or purchase of any good' shall not, after the 31st day of March 1951, be imposed where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide.\n\n(2) The Explanation to clause (1) of article 286 of the Constitution shall apply for the interpretation of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (1)\".\n\nThe contention of the respondent is that the appelb nt has become iable to be taxed under these provisions. The appellant replies that article 286(1)(:i) is restrictive in its scope, that it merely takes away a power to tax which the State might otherwise possess, but that it does not positively confer on a State a power to tax where it did not previously exist, and that on its true construction, it would operate to divest Bengal of its power to tax but not to vest it in Bihar. To decide which of these two contentions is the correct one, it is necessary to examine what the law was prior to the enactment of article 286(1) (a) and the Explanation, what the defect was which was disclosed in the working of that law, and how it was proposed to remedy it.\n\nUnder the Government of India Act, 1935, the power to enact a law imposing tax on sale of goods was conferred on the Provincial Legisla\"1re by Entry 48 in List II. Under sections 99( 1) and 100(3) that law must be for .the Province, and as interpreted in Wallace Bros. v. /. T. Commissioner, Bombay( 1 ), that meant that there should be sufficient territorial\n\n(I) (1948] !i'.C.R. I.\n\n.1955\n\nTluJJmgoJ\n\nJmmunil.J Company Limikd\n\nTh-. State of Bihar\n\nand olhtrS\n\nTht Btrsgal\n\nImmunity Compan_v LimiUd\n\n•• 1\"h1 StaJt of Bihm\n\nand othnt\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ri95sJ\n\nconnection between the person proposed to be taxed and the State seeking to tax with reference to the subject matter of the taxation.\n\nDealing with this aspect of the matter, Pataniali Sastri, C.J. obsened in The State of Bombay v. The United Mota,.,. (111<t1al Ltd.(') as follows :\n\n'The expression 'for such :; rare or any part thereof' cannot, in our view, be takeu to import mto Entry 54 the restriction that the sale or purchase referred to must take place within . the territory of that State.\n\nAll that it means is that the laws which a State is empowered to make must be for the purposes of that State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In the case of salestax it is not necessary that the sale or purchase should take place , within the territonal limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods, etc. should have a territorial .:onnection with the State.\n\nBroadly speaking, locai activities of buying and selling carried un m the State in relation to local goods would be a sufficient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, provided of course, such activities ultimately resulted in a concluded sale or purchase to be taxed\".\n\nThis statement of the law was again adopted l:.y this Court in Poppatlal Shah v. The State ot Madras(•).\n\nVide the observations of Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) at pages 682 and 683. In this view, a law of the State imposing a tax on sales must, to be valid, fulfil two conditions. Firstly, there must be a completed sale involving the transfer of title in the goods to the purchaser. It is only then that the power to tax arises. That was held by this Court m The Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs Budh Prakash Jai Prakash(•).\n\nSecondly, there must be sufficient territorial nexus between the transaction and the State which seeks to tax it.\n\nThis condition undoubtedly introduced an element of uncertainty and vagueness in the law with the result that the power to tax which was linked up with it, had indefiniteness which could lerid itself to\n\n(i) (1953] s.c.R. 1069.\n\n(2) [1953) S.C.R. 677.\n\n(3) [1~55) 1 •.C.R. 243.\n\n.abuse. How c:xoansive was the area open to the State\n\nLegislature to impose a tax on the basis of the nexus theory is forcibly brought out by Bose, J. in the following observations in The State of Bombay\n\nv. The United Motors (India) Ltd.( 1) at page 1101 : \"The difficulty is apparent when one begins to\n\nolit a sale into its component parts and analvse them. When this is done, a sale is found to consist -of a number of ingredients which can be said to be essential in the sense that if any one of them is missing there is no sale. The following are some ol: them : ( 1) the existence of gtX>ds which form the subjectmatter of the sale, (2) the bargain or contract which, when executed, will result in the passing of the property in the goods for a price, (3) the payment, or\n\npromise of payment, of a price, ( 4) the passing of the title. When all take place in one State, there is no difficultv. The situs of the sale is the place in which all the ingredients are brought into being. But when ore or more ingredients take place in different States, what criterion is one to employ? It is impossible to -say that any of these ingredients is more essential than any other because the result is always the same the moment you take one away. There is then no sale\".\n\nMany were the problems which this state of the law created both for the State and for the consumers.\n\nWhether the fact on which a State law seeks to tax is sufficient nexus must, except in some obvious cases, be open to debate, and until a court pronounces on it, there must be a cloud of uncertaintv hanging over the validity of the enactment. More than that, when the several elements which go to make up a sale are distributed over different States it might happen that the same transaction might be subjected to tax by more States than one and the burden thereof must ultimatdy fall on the consumers. It was this, the possibilitv of multiple taxation that was the most serious defect in the law as it stood prior to the Constitution, and it was to remedy this that a new provi- sion. trticle 286(1 )(a) with its Explanation was\n\n(I) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bih11r\n\nand others\n\nVenkalarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Btngal\n\nlmmunil' Compan, LimiUd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVen.tatarama A.uarJ.\n\nenacted. It is as follows :\n\n\"'7.86. ( 1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purehase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place-\n\n(a) outside the State.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of_ such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods bas by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State\".\n\nIt will be convenient hereafter to refer to the State in which title to the goods passes as the selling State, and the State in which goods are delivered for consumption as the delivery State.\n\nNow, we may examine how this provision is designed to put an end to multiple taxation.\n\nThe scheme of the enactment is to fix, what had not been done under . the Government of India Act, 1935, the situs of the sale, and for that purpose, to classify it into two categories, sale inside the State and sale outside the State. On what principle the situs was fixed will presently be considered. But when once that is done, the problem is solved. If a sale is inside a State, the power of that State to tax it under Entry 54 remains unaffected. But if the sale is outside a State, article 286(1)(a) prohibits that State from taxing it This process must have the effect of eliminating multiple taxation, because a sale must be either inside or outside a State, and if it is inside one State it must be outside all other States. In this respect, article 286(1)(a) effected a fundamental alteration in the law under Entry .48 in List II and section 100(3) of the Government of India Act; 1935, as construed by the courts.\n\nWhereas under these provisions a State could tax irrespective of where a sale took place, provided there was sufficient territorial nexus, under article 286(1)(a) that power can be exercised only\n\nwhen it takes place inside the State, mere nexi being insufficient to support such a power. The theory of nexus as a source of jurisdiction to tax was thus abandoned, and the power to tax was annexed to the situs of the sale to be exercised by the State wherein it is fixed and as a given sale can take place only in one State and in no other, it must follow that the power of taxing that sale is capable of exercise only by one State and not others.\n\nThe foundation on which this scheme rests is the location of a sale in a particular State. But how is this to be done? When all the essential elements of a sale take place within one State, the question presents no difficultv.\n\nBut what, if they are distributed over several States? It is to deal with this situation that the Explanation has been enacted. Its purpose is to fix the situs of a sale when it is of an inter-State character, and it does that by providing that it shall be deemed to have taken place in that State in which\n\nthe goods are delivered for consumption.\n\nWhat the significance of the words \"for consumption\" is, will be considered in due course.\n\nBut that apart, it is delivery of the goods that has been adopted by the Constitution as the determining factor in fixing the situs of the sale, not the agreement to sell, nor the passing of title to the goods, nor other ingredients of sale, and there is good reason for this.\n\nWhere an agreement to sell is concluded by correspondence as generally it must be when the transaction is of an inter-State character, difficult questions m1gnt crop up as to where the agreement was concluded. Likewise, the conception as to passing of property in the goods is largely juristic and not seldom obscured by legal subtleties and refinements, and it is conceivable that there might be conflict among the States as ta in which of them the title has passed. But deliverv is a matter of fact,' about which. there ought to be no dispute, and it is consistent with the purpose of article 286(l)(a) that the Explanation should have chosen delivery as the determining element in the transaction of sale. Now, the question to be decided is whether in the light of the above discussion, the\n\n:955\n\nTht Bengal\n\nlmmunily Company Limiled v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVen(catarama AyyarJ.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\ncontention of the appellant that the Explanation opcr:>tes only to deprive the selling State of its power to tax the sale, and that it confers no authority on the delivery State to impose a tax can be accepted.\n\nAn obvious objection to this view might at once be stated. If the Explanation has no application to any but the selling State, it must follow that all the other States including the delivery State will have power to impose a tax under Entry 54 uncontrolled by the Explanation, and that will bring into play the nexus theory with its attendant evii of multiple taxation.\n\nOn this contention, therefore, article 286 ( 1) (a) must be held to have failed to achieve what it set about to do. A construction which leads to such a conclusion cannot be accepted unless there are cogent reasons therefor. Wl:iat are those reasons?\n\nIt is urged that article 286(1)(a) does not, in terms, purport to confer a power on the State to impose a tax on sale, that, on the other hand, it assumes the pre-existence of such a power in the State, and then proceeds to restrict it, that the substantive provisions which confer power to tax are Entry 54 in List II and article 246(3), that when a State has no power to tax under those provisions, then article 286(1) (a) could have no application as there could he no question of restricting what does not exist, and that it could not, therefore, operate to confer 'on it such a power. In support of this position, reliance is placed on the form of article 286(J)(a) that no law of a State shall impose a tax on outside sale. This prescription, it is argued, is merely negative and destructive and not positive and creative in its content.\n\nBut this contention does not give sufficient effect to the Explanation which is in substance and form positive, and it also fails to take adequately into consideration the purpose of the enactment. The object of artide 286(1) (a)-and there is no dispute about it -is to avoid multiple taxation and that as already stated, was sought to be achieved by fixing the situs of sale in one State in accordance with the Explanation.\n\nThe scheme of the enactment must, by its very nature, have both a positive. and a negative\n\naspect. In so far as it lays down which of the several States could .tax-and it <loes that in the Explanation -it is positive in its aspect, and in so far as it prohibits the other Scates from imposing tax-and it does this in the body of article 286(l)(a)-it is negative in its aspect. The body of article 286(l)(a) and the Explanation together form parts of a single enactment charged with a single purpose and to refer to it either as negative or positive in character can only be a partial and not an accurate statement of the true position. It is no doubt true that article 286(1)(a) assumes that there is in the State a power to tax al.iunde. \"111d then proceeds to restrict it. But it is not inconsistent with .this to construe the Explanation as positive m character. The problem of multiple taxation, which it is the object of the enactment to avoid, is possible only when the sale is of an inter- State character, and when the Explanation enacts that in such .cases the sale shall be deemed to have\n\nt<1krn place in the delivery State, that is at once a recognition and a declaratio!1 by the Constitution that delivery is sufficient nex.us on which the State can tax the sale under Entry 54. The object of this declaration was to remove the question from the arena of controversy and settle it once and for all. It is thus a positive enactment and not the less so, because . it is decl:iratorv in character and it is also restrictive in that it takes away by necessary implication the power of taxation on the basis of other nexi which other States would have had under Entry 54.\n\nNo purpose would be served by entering into a subtle disputation as to whether the Explanation conferred a new and substantive power, or whether it affirmed an existing power. In either case, the power of the delivery State to tax could not be challenged.\n\nLooking at the form of the Explanation, it is emphaticalfy positive in that it declares that the sale shall be deemed to have taken place in the delivery State, and that is all the more significant in view of the fact that the body of article 286(1)(a) to which it is appended is negative in form. The change over from the negative of the body of article 286(l)(a) to\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTiu &ngal\n\nlmm11nity Company Limiltd\n\n•• T Ju Slalt of Biliar\n\nand olhers\n\nV o!nkalarama\n\nA\"\"'].\n\nthe positive of the Explanation is highly significant, and the appellant has been unable to suggest any reason for this, except inadvertence and slovenliness on the part of the draftsman .\n\nThe marginal note to article 286 was also referred to as showing that the ExP.lanation was merely restrictive in character.\n\nIn T hakurain Ba/raj Kunwar\n\nv. Rae fagat Pal Singh(') Lord Macnaghten observed :\n\n\"It is well settled that marginal notes to the sections of an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. The contrary opinion originated in a mistake, and it has been exploded long ago. There seems to be no reason for giving the marginal notes in an Indian statute any greater authority than the marginal _ notes in an English Ace of Parliament ...\n\nThe reason on which this ru!e rests was thus 'tated\n\nby Baggallay, L. J. in Attorney-Genera! v.\n\nG. E.\n\nRy.(2):\n\n\"I never knew an amendment set down or discussed upon marginal notes to a clause.\n\nThe House oi Commons has nothing to do with a marginal' note\".\n\nVide also the observations of Lord Hanworth, M.R., in Nixon v. Attorney-General('). This reasoning applies with equal force to marginal notes in Indian 'Statutes.\n\nIn my opinion, the marginal note to artide 286(l)(a) cannot be referred to for construing the Explanation.\n\nIt is clearly inadmissible for cutting down the plain meaning of the words of the Constitution.\n\nVide Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v.\n\nAhmedbhai Umarbhai and Co.('). , Two other views as to the scope of the Explanation which were discussed by the learned Attorney-General in the course of his argument must now be noticed.\n\nOne is that the Explanation does not deprive the selling State of its power to tax under Entry 54 but confers additional power of taxation on the delivery State. And the other is that the Explanation merely settles the competing claims of the selling and of the delivery State, and leaves untouched the power of the\n\n(I) 31 I.A. 13~, 142, 143.\n\n(3) [1930] I Ch. 566, 593.\n\n(2) [1879] 11 Ch. D. 449, 461.\n\n(4) [1950] S.C.R. 335, 353.\n\nother States to tax on the basis of the nexus theory.\n\nNeither of these views has been pressed by any of the parties before us, and both of them are open to the objection that they would result in multiple taxation, which it was the purpose of the Explanation to avoid, and must in consequence be rejected. In the result, whether regard is had to the object of the enactment or its language, the Explanation must be held to authorise the imposition of tax by the delivery State.\n\n3. It is next contended by the appellant that the sales covered by the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) are within the prohibition contained in article 286(2) and that in consequence the charge sought to be imposed on such sales by the impugned Act is illegal and void. That raises the question as to what the scope of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) is, and whether it is controlled by article 286(2). The Explanation declaring as it does that the situs of a sale for purposes of taxation is the delivery and not the selling State can apply, by its very terms, only to sales of an inter-State character, and that is the basis on which the argument of both the parties to the appeal has proceeded.\n\nArticle 286(2) prohibits the impositio:1. of tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade.\n\nThus, the field on which the Explanation operates falis within the area covered by article 286(2), and there is apparently a conflict between them.\n\nNow the question is how the power of a State to tax on the basis of the Explanation is affected by the impact of article 286(2), and on that, three views have been put forward :\n\n(a) The Explanation fixes he situs of the sale b the delivery Smte.\n\nIt becomes thereby a sale inside that State and outside all other States. It accordingly ceases to be a sale in the course of inter-State trade and becomes an intra-State sale and is, therefore outside the purview of article 286(2); and the power of the delivery State to tax under the Explanation remains unaffected. That was the view taken by the majority of the learned Judges in The State of Bombay\n\nv. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1 ), and accordin1r\n\n(I) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stale of BihDI\n\nand others ,\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nThe Bengal\n\n-4mmunUy Company' Limited v.\n\nTM Stau of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAY,1at ].\n\nto it, there is no conflict between the Explanation and article 286(2).\n\n(b) The sales to which the Explanation applies are in the course of inter-State trade, and fall within the coverage of article 286(2), and there is thus a conflict between the two provisions, but the Explanation deals with a special topic, and therefore preva.ils against article 286(2) on the principle of generalia speczalibus non derogant, and the power to tax thereunder is unaffected. That was the view taken by Bhagwati, J. in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Lid.(').\n\n( c) The sales to which the Explanation applies are in the course of inter, State trade, and are hit by article 286(2) and unless Parliament lifts the ban as pr<>- vided therein, no ta can be levied on them. According to this view, the twn orovisions are irreconcilably in conflict, and article 286(2) must prevail as against the Explanation unless its operation i~ superseded by Parliamentary legislation. This was the view taken by Bose, J. in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.('), and by Das, J. in State of Travancore-Cochin v.\n\nShanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory(•).\n\nThe points for determination are thus whether there is .conflict between the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) and article 7.86(?.), and if so, which of them is to prevail. To decide this, it is necessary to examine first what the position was under the Government of India Act, 1935, and next how it has been affected by the provisions of the Constitution.\n\nUnder the Government of India Act, 1935, the Pr<>- vinces had under Entry 48. in List II the exclusive power to make laws in respect of taxes on sale of goods, and under Entry 27, in respect of trade and commerce within its territory. There was no entry relating to trade and commerce among the Provinces though several topics relating to inter-State trade and commerce were specifically enumerated in List I. Nor was there any provision for regulating inter-State commerce though under section 297 some restrictions were placed on the powers of the Provincial Legislature 'Witll\n\n(I) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.\n\n(~ [1954J $.C.R.. 53.\n\nreference thereto. The conception of a commerce clause, as we now have it, was unknown to the Government of India Act, 1935. It came in for the first time as part of the Constitution. To understand its true scope, it would be legitimate and indeed necessary tQ examine its bearings and incidents in other systems of law.\n\nThe American Constitution is the oldest written Federal Constitution in the world, and the problems it had to deal with were what many Federal Governments have had since to face. The commerce clause is one of its notable provisions, and it was before the framers of the British North America Act, 1867 and\n\ncf the Commonwealth Act of Australia, 1900.\n\nOur Constitution also has largely been influenced by it, and it would be useful to examine it to see what light it throws on the present controversy.\n\nIn America the authority of the Congress to enact laws on the matters delegated to it under the Constitution is supreme.\n\nIn respect qf all other matters, the States po5$ess plenary powers of legislation subject to the inhibitions contained in the Constitution.\n\nIt is in exercise of these powers that the States enact laws regulating sales and imposing tax on them.\n\nUnder section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution, the power \"to regulate commerce among the States\" is vested in the Congress. Thus, while intra-State commerce is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State, inter-State commerce is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.\n\nA question which came up frequently for decision before the Courts was wkether the States had the power to enact\n\nlaws with reference to goods which Ind come into a State 'in the course of inter-State trade, and it was settlecl on the highest authority that if the sale was for the purposes of consumption within the State it became domestic in its character, and fell within the power of the State to regulate and to tax, but that if it was for, purposes other than consumption such as re-sale, then that was in the course of inter- State commerce, and Congress alone had the iuriscliction to legislate m respect of it. In Pennsylvania\n\n12-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThl&ngal\n\nImmunity Company LimiUd\n\nYo Th• Slau of Biltar\n\nand oli.trs\n\nVenkalarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTh< Bengal\n\nlmmiini!J Company Limittd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand ot11.ers\n\nV en/catarama\n\nAyyar j.\n\nGas Co. v. Public Service Commission(') the question was as to the validity of a statute of New York regu lating the rates which could be charged for sale of natural gas for consumption within the State. The gas was transported into the State by pipe lines from outside, and it was accordingly held that the regulation was in respect of inter-State trade and commerce, and was therefore \"subject to applicable Constitutional limitations\" but that the State law was valid because \"the thing which the State Commission has undataken to regulate, while part of inter-State transmission, is lo>al in its nature, and pe; L1ins to the furnishing of natural gas to local consumers within the city of Jamestown, in the State of New York\".\n\nIn Missouri e.t: rel. Barrett v .. Kansas Natural Gas Co.(2), the facts were similar except that the sales were not for consumption within the State bu( for resale. It was held that those sales continued to retain the character of inter-State trade, and fell within the commerce clause. Vide also Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.(3 ). The principle underlying these decisions would appear to be that goods which are transported in inter-State trade must neces5arily come to the end of their journey when they are consumed, and that, therefore, sales for consumption take them out of the course of inter-State trade.\n\nBut if the goods are sold for re-sale, they are still moving in inter-State journey and therefore the commerce clause applies. ln Ed8 the Congress enacted a legislation with reference to sales in the course of inter-State trade for purposes of resale.\n\nExamining the. question whether the States had thereafter the power to enact a law regulating sales which take place in the course of inter-State trade but for local consumption, the Supreme Court held in Panhandle Eastern Pipe line Co. v. Public Service Commis- _rion of India(') that they had, and observed :\n\n\"Prior to that time (1938) this Court in a series of . decisions had dealt with various situations arising from State efforts to regulate the sale of imported\n\n(1) 252 U.S.23; 6·1 L, Ed. 434.\n\n(3) 273 U.S; 83; 71 L. Rd. 549.\n\n(2) 265 U.S. 298; 68 L. Ed. 1027.\n\n(4) 332 U.S. 507; 92 L. Ed. 128.\n\nnatural gas. The story has been adequately told antl we do not stop to review it again or attempt reconciliation of all the decisions or their groundings. Suffice it to say that by 1938 the Court had delineated broadly between the area of permissible state control and that in which the states could not intrude. The former inclu<led intertatc direct sales to local consumers, the latter, service interstate to local distributing companies, for resale\".\n\nIt further held that the Congress legislation was itself a recognition of. the distinction established by. the decisions \"between sales for resale and direct sale for consumpti•)n\". This decision was followed quite recently in Panli1mdle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission (1 ). Four propositions might accordingly be taken as well-settled in American law :\n\n(i) The States have plenary and exclusive power of . legislation in respect of intra-State sales.\n\n(ii) Regulation of inter-State commerce is a topic within rhe exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.\n\n(iii) Sales which take place in the course of inter- State tr:idc are local in character and within the jurisdiction of the State, if they are for consumption within the State.\n\n(iv) Where such sales ::ire for other purposes than consum; ition such as resale, they retain their character as s:ilcs in the course of inter-State trade and are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.\n\nThe provisions of the Indian Constitution bearing on this subject may now be referred to :-\n\n(a) The States have exclusive jurisdiction under Entry 54 to impose sales tax and under Entry 26 to\n\nregulate trade and commerce within the State. Legislative .powers in respect of these matters were conferred on the Provinces by the Govemment of India Act, 1935, and these powers have been continued in the States by the COnstitution.\n\n(b) Article 301 enacts that trade and commerce within the territory of India shall be free, and under Entry 42 in List I, the power to legislate on inter- State trade and commerce is vested exclusively in the (I) 34-1 U.S. 319; 95 L. Ed. 99S.\n\nThe Bericul\n\nlmmui1ity Company LimihJ\n\nThe Slate of JJihar\n\nand otlt.rs\n\nYenkatarama\n\n~Y\"' J.\n\nThe /hnp\n\nImmunity Cotnpa1!v limiJed\n\nThe Stale of BiluJr and ot,, as\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!1'l' ].\n\nUnion.\n\nThere was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act, 193;.\n\n(c) Under the Explanation to article 286(l)(a), a sale is deemed to take place within the State 111 which the goo<ls are delivered for consumption. This again is a new provision introduced in the Constitution. ( d) No law of a State can impose a tax on a sale which takes place in the course of inter-State trade- That is article 286(2) which is also a new provision.\n\nReading side by side the law on the subject both in America and under the Indian Constitution, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Explanation to article 286(l)(a) and article 286(2) have been inspired by the American law on the subject, and that their spheres of operation correspond respectively to the jurisdiction of the State and of the Cougress in America as delineatea m Mwot1ri ex rel. Barrett v.\n\nKansas Natural Gas Co.('), and Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission of India(').\n\nI shall now pass on to consider which of' the three views which have been placed before us as to the effect of article 286(2) on the Explanation to article 286( l )(a) deserves to be accepted. The fir>t view is that the sales falling within the Explanation are intra-State in character, an<I are therefore outside the area covered by article 286(2). This derives consid· erable support from the language of the enactment The scheme of article 286( l) (a) is, as already stated, that it fixes the situs of the sales with a view to avoid multiple taxation, and for that purpose it divides them into two categories-inside sales and outside sales-and enacts that a State cannot tax an out<i•.le sale. When in the same context the Explanation <k dares that a sale in the course of inter-State trade-· that this is its scope is common ground-mrnt be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goo<ls are delivered for consumption, its purpose is clearly to take it out of inter-State trade and stamo it with the character of an intra-State sale.\n\nUnder Entry 26 in List II, it is the State that has juriS<iic-\n\n(1) 265 U.S. •911; 68 L. Ed. 1027.\n\n(2) 332 U.S. 507; 92 L. F.cl. 128.\n\ntion in respect of trade and commerce within the State, dlld reading that with the language of the Explanation that the sales covered by it are deemed to take place in the State, the inference is irresistible that the intention of the Constitution-makers was to bring those sales within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State for purposes of taxation undc:r Entry 54. The result is that with reference to sales for local consumption made in the course of intcrState trade, the iaw under the Constitution is exactly what it is in America and indeed, the similarity is too striking to be merely accidental.\n\nThe position may thus he summed up : Article 286(2) applies to sales in the .course of inter-State trade.\n\nThe sales which fall within the Explanation are intra-State sales.\n\nThe grounds covered by the two provisions are distinct and\n\nseparate. Each has operation within its own sphere, and there is no conflict between them.\n\nThe appellant resists this conclusion on several grounds, and they will now be considered. It was argued firstly that the conclusion that the Explanation and article 21:16(2) relate to two different subjects and that they operate on different fields could be reached only by importing the Explanation into article 286(2), and that could not be done because it is in terms stated to be ·\"for the purposes of subclause (a)\" and also because such a course could not be supported on any recognised rule of interpretation.\n\nNow. \\\\i1at is the significance of the words \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a)\" occurring in the Explanation?\n\nIn rhe context, its purpose is only to exclude its application to article 286( 1 )(b).\n\nArtic1e 2R6(1) deals w•th two matters, sales outside the State and sales in the course of export and import.\n\nThe former is dealt with in sub-clause (a) and the latter in\n\nsub-clauc: (b).\n\nJf the Legislature intended that the Exnlanation should aoply to the former and not to the fatter. the most natural and obvious mode of expressing rhat intention would be to enact, as it has, that it is \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a)''. This prol)lem wm11f\\ 1i1lt have arien if, the two matters h:id heen <leal1 wnli in two different clauses as logically they\n\nTlt1 Fen.al\n\nImmunig Compan.J limil•d\n\nTiu State nf Bihar\n\naod olil4rs\n\nV 1nkalaram•\n\n~'\"' J.\n\nThe Be,, gal\n\nltwnunity\n\nCflm~· LirniJtd\n\n•• 'I h11 State of Bihar\n\nrmd ot, ins\n\nI 'tr; katarama\n\n.~'l'}Ot ].\n\nmight have been. If that had been done, the article simplifying it, would run as follows :\n\n\"286. (1) No law of a State shall impose a tax on a sale, where it takes place outside that State .\n\nExplanation : A sale shall be deemed to have taken place within that State where the goods are delivered for consumption as a direct result of the sale • .. • •\n\n286. (4) No law of a State s.hall impose a tax on a sale in the course of export or import.\" Article 286 ( 1) as drafted above, relegating sub-clause\n\n(b) to a separate clause and omitting the words \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a)\" in the Explanation would convey precisely the import of article 286(1)\n\n(a) as it now stands with sub-clause (b) and with the words \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a)\". That would clearly show that the force of the words \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a)\" becomes spent when ar:icle 286(l)(b) is excluded frotn the operation of the Explanation.\n\nBut then, it is contended that whatever the form in which the Explanation may be couched, it could not be extended beyond article 286(1)(a) and projected into article 286(2), and that unless that was done, it was not possible to hold that the sales falling within the Explanation are taken out of the purview of article 286(2). In my opinion, rhis argument proceeds on a misconception of the real reasoning on which the conclusion that the Explanation and article 286\n\n(2) relate to two different subjects is based.\n\nIn view of the insistence with which this contention was pressed by the appellant, it seems desirable to examine the position in some deta.il.\n\nTo start with, the two relevant provisions to IJC considered are article 286(1)(a) with the Explanation and article 286(2).\n\nOmitting what is not material, they would run as follows:\n\n\"286. (1) No law of a State shall impose a ta~ on a sale, where it takes place outside that State.\n\nExplanation: A sale in the course of inter-State\n\n' - \\\n\ntrade is inside that State in which goods are actually_- 7955 delivered for consumption.\n\n- _ -\n\n.,.\n\nThe Bengal (2 No law of a State shall impose tax on a sale Im-,,, zmity - in the course of inter-State trade\". company Limited The argument of the appellant that article- 286(2) is v. comprehensive and includes all sales in the course of The State of mhar inter-State trade and that therefore the sales covered _ and others by the Explanation fall -within its_ purview, ta. kes - \" Venkatarama into account only ar.ticle 286(2) and the Explanation, ' Anar J. and it would have been unassailable if the question had to be decided on a construction only of these tw'o provisions. But that, however, is not the position.\n\nAn explanation appended to a section or clause get, s __ incorporated into it, and becomes an integral part of it, and has no independent existence apart from it._ There is, in the eye of law, only one enactnient,- of which both the section and the Explanation are two_ inseparable parts. \"They move in a body if they move_ at all\". When, therefore, the question is whether - sales falling within the Explanation are comprised within article 286(2), what has to be construed is that article in relation to, not merely the Explanation taken in isolation but to article 286(l)(a) readwith the Explanation. If the matter is thus considered, the resultant position might thus be stated;- Article 286(I)(a) - confers on States power to tax sales inside their territory. Article 286(2) prohibits them from taxing sales in the course of inter-State trade. Explan-ation to article 286(1)(a) enacts that sales in the course of inter-State trade in which goods are delivered for consumption in a State shall be deemed to have taken place inside that State. The combined effect of all these provisions is that States can tax sales in the course of inter-State trade if they _fall within the Explanation. _ This conclusion is .reached, it will be seen, not by reading the Explanation into article 286\n\n(2) as a sort of exception but giving to all the provi- _ sions the status of independent enactments and determining what, on a construction of the language, their respective spheres of operation are.\n\nIn this view, the argument that if the Explanation could be read into article 286(2) it might as well be\n\nr--------~-------\n\nrt.e &nraJ\n\nImmunity Campany Lir1dled\n\nT111 SltJte of Bifia,\n\nand olh#r;\n\nVmhtara•nu\n\nA\")'ar ].\n\nread into article 286(l)(b) and article 286(3) does not cail for consideration.\n\nAs the question is one of determining on a reading of the entire article the precise operation of the several parts thereof, there can be no objection to examining the scope of article 286(1) including the Explanation in relation to article 286(l)(b) and article 286(3). Article 286(l)(a) relates to sale inside a State, and article 286 ( 1) (b) to sales in the course of export from or import into the country, and there could not be any interaction between them, and that is made abundantly clear by the words \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a)\" in the Explanation.\n\nLikewise, reading article 286(l)(a) including the Explanation along with article 286(3), the result is that the power to tax which the State otherwise possesses has to be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the latter, when there is a Parliamentary declaration thereunder. The impact of article 286(3) is, it should be noted, not confined lo the Explanatiun but extends to the whole of article 286(l)(a). It operates not only on the inter-State sales falling within the Explanation but also on sales which are indisputably intra-State, and it controls both of them on the principle of generalia specialibtts 12012 derogant.\n\nIt is next contended that the sales to which the Explanation applies, takes place as a fact in the course of inter-State trade, and that the Explanation could not be construed as altering that fact, and that its true scope was merely to shift the sitlls of the sale from the selling to the delivery State. Conceiving inter- State trade as a stream flowing from point A in the selling State to a point B in the delivery State, it was argued that what the Explanation did was to shift the situs of the sale from point A to point B, that the stream was still there despite the shifting and that the sale therefore did not cease to be in the course of inter-State tra, le. \\Vith respect, the fallacy in this argument lies in thinking that after the shifting of the sittts from point A to B, the sale could be regarded as one in the course of inter-State trade. A sale could be said to be in the course of inter-State trade oniy if two conditions concur: (!) A sale of goods,\n\nand (2) a transport of those goods from one State to another under the contract of sale. Unless both these conditions are satisfied, there can be no sale in the course of inter-State trade. Thus, if X, a merchant in State A goes to State B, purchases goods there and transports them into A, there is undoubtedly a movement of goods in inter-State commerce. But that is not under :iny contract of sale. X might be entitled under article 301 to certain rights in the matter of transportation. But article 286(2) has no application, as there is no sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nIn the same illustration, if X after transporting the goods into State A sells them, then also there is no sale in the course of inter-State trade.\n\nIt is true that there is a sale, and there is also a movement of goods from one State to another.\n\nBut that movement has not been under the sale, there having been no sale at the time of transportation. In Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law (1939 Edition) sale in the course of inter-State commerce is thus defined :\n\n\"The activities of buying and selling constitute inter-State commerce if the contracts thert:for contemplate or necesrarily involve the movement of goods in in- Jer-State Commerce\".\n\nThe law is thus stated by Gavit in \"Commerce Clause\"\n\n(1932 Edn.) :-\n\n\"The dividing line between an inter-state sale and intra-state sale is rather fine, although clear.\n\nIf the goods are shipped into a State without a previous sale, any sale within the State is intra-State commerce ..... .\n\nihus if the sale succeeds the transportation in point\n\n-of time, however close, the state may license it\".\n\nIn William T. WaJ!ner v. City of Covington( 1 ), it was held that local sales of goods brought into the State from outside for the very purpose of the sale were not parts of inter-State commerce. The following observations at page 197 might be quoted :\n\n\"Of course the transportation of plaintiffs' goods across the state line is of itself inter-state commerce ;\n\n(I) 252 U. S. 95; 64 L. Ed. 157.\n\n195'.i\n\nTlr• &ngaJ\n\nImmunity Company Limit•J\n\nT ht State of Bi\\ar\n\nOlld otNrs\n\nTh4 Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand otMrs\n\nV 11tkatarama\n\nA\"ar ].\n\nbut it is not this that is taxed by the city of Covington, nor is such commerce a part of the business that is taxed, or anything more than a preparation for it.\n\nSo far as the itinerant vending is concerned the goods might just as well have been manufactured within the\n\nState of Kentucky; to the extent that plaintiffs dispose of their goods in that kind of sales, they make them the subject of local commerce; and this being so, they can claim no immunity from local regulation, whether, the goods remain in original packages or not\".\n\nIn the light of the above principles, what is the legal character of the sales effected by the appellant and sought to be taxed by the respondent? There is firstly the fact that the goods were actually delivered in Bihar, and secondly, there is the fiction enacted by the Explanation that the sale had taken place not in Bengal but in Bihar. If both sale and delivery ace in Bihar, it is difficult to see how the sale can be said to be in the course of inter-State trade. The argument of the appellant that there was, in fact, a movement of goods from Bengal to Bihar and that stood unaffected by the fictional . shifting of the sittts of the sale from Bengal to Bihar, overlooks that by this very shifting, the character and complexion of the sale become altered, because as the sale follows the transport of goods, it cannot, according to the principles already stated, be said to be in the course of inter-State trade. It may be urged as against this conclusion that as the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) merely shifts the situs of the sales, and leaves unaffected\n\nthe agreements to sell which must in the present case be held to have been made at Calcutta when the anpellant executed the orders received from the Bihar purchasers, the transport of goods from Bengal to Bihar was under the above contracts to sell, and that therefore the sales were in the course of inter-State trade. Such a contention would be untenable, because the expression \"contract of. sale\" in this context has the same meaning as the words \"contract of buying and selling\" in the definition of inter-State commerce: given by Rottschaefer in the passage already quoted.\n\n~ I\n\nand they both refer to the bargain resulting in the\n\nsale irrespective of whether it is in the stage of an agreement to sell, or whether it is a sale in which title\n\n10 the goods has passed to the purchaser. That is also the definition of 'contract of sale' in section 5 (l) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. As there can be only one final and concluded bargain in respect of any particular sale, and as that is fixed by the Explanation at Bihar, it follows that there could not be any bargain with reference thereto in Calcutta, and the movement of goods from Bengal to Bihar was not under any contract of sale. The position in law is exactly the same as if the goods had been sent by the seller from Bengal to Bihar on his own account and tl1en sold there and delivered to the purchaser, in which case it would be indistinguishable from William T. Wagner v. City of Covington(1), and the sale would clearly be intra-State. This conclusion does not negative the factum of inter-State movement of goods, and does not prevent any rights being put forward on that footing under article 301. It only negatives the notion of a sale in the course of inter-State trade, and thus takes it out of the purview of article 286(2).\n\nIt was argued that the Explanation merely enacted a legal fiction, and that it being a well-established rule of construction that legal fictions should be limited to the purpose for which they are enacted, it would be contrary to this rule to hold that the Explanation not merely shifted the situs of the sale but also obliterated the course of inter-State commerce. But the conclusion that the sales covered by the Explanation cease to be in the course of inter-State trade is not the result of any extension of the fiction because, as already stated, the factum of inter-State transportation is not ignored. That is the legal consequence of the fictional shifting of the situs. It will be useful in this connection to q\n\n0uote what Lord Asquith observed in dealing with a similar contention in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council(2).\n\n\"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of (I) 251 U. S. 95; 64 L. Ed. 157.\n\n(2) [i952] A. C. 109, 13l.\n\nThe B'\"gal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nT /, e State ef Bihar and ot/iers\n\nV enkatara\"'a\n\nA; yar ].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\n.4yyar ].\n\naffairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and inci<lents which, if the putative state of aftairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of these in this case is emancipa tion from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state ur atlatrs; ll does not say that having dune , u, yuu must came m permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs\".\n\nIt is next contende<l that the view that sales in which goods are delivered for consumption within the State are not within article 286(2) would render that pro vision practically useless, because sales for purposes other than consumption such as for resale must be very few and negligible. Why should a seller ior consumption, it is asked, get his goods from an in termediary and not directly from the manufacture?\n\nBut then, the Constitution has itselt recognise<! in clear and unmistakable terms a distinction between sales in which goods arc delivered for consumption and sales in which they are delivered for purposes other than consumption such as re-sale, and what purpose this distinction serves, the appellant has been unable to explain.\n\nBesides, what are the materials on which we can hrmh it asicle on the ground that it is not one of substance? One of the developments of modern big business is the agency system under which middlemen enter into contracts with manufacturers, stipulate for monopoly of the distribution rights within a specified area, guarantee a certain volume of business, and are granted liberal commission on the sales. In such cases, retail sellers can get the goods only from the distributors, and even when there is no grant of monoooly, it is nothing unusual in business that largedistributors are able to get the goods from the manufacturers on rates more favourable than retail sellers can obtain and that consequently, it is\n\nmore economic~] for the latter to buy them from the distributors than from the manufacturers. And it is not without significance that the distinction between the two classes of sales has been rccognistd in commerciallv ::icivanced America for now nearly a century :md recognied for this very purpose; and how can such a distinction be characterised as unsubstantial?\n\nIt was finally contended by the learned Attorney- General that 1t article 286 ( 2) were to be construed as not comprehending sales falling within the Explanation, then then wnnld lv'. nr>thing on which it could oper:i.te. The argument was thus presented : Article 286 ( 1 )(a) bars the selling State, in the present case Bengal, from taxing the sale because by reason of the Explanation, it becomes an outside sale, and if article 286(L) is to be construed 1s 11ut barring the delivery St:ite, in the instant case Bihar, from taking the sale, then there is nn ale to which it can apply, and it will serve no purpose.\n\nThe error in this argument lies in taking the illustration as exhausting the entire range of inter-State trade.\n\nBut that is not correct.\n\nInter-State commerce consists in a flow of goods not merelv from one State to another but in its continuous flow through several States, and article 286(2) is designed to protect such a flow without being bur<len- <'d by State taxes.\n\nThus, if A in Bengal sells to B in Bihar, and if in his turn B sells the same goods to C in U. P. for local consumption, there will be inrer- State commerce under article 286(2) and in the course thereof. there will be two sales.\n\nTaking first the sale frnm Benval to Bihar, \"RengJI can tax it under article 286(1) (a) becJuse the Explanation thereto is not applicable as the delivery to Bihar is not for locJI con- :mmption.\n\nBut :uticle 286(2) would interpo<e a har.\n\nBihar cannot tax the safe under article 286(J)(a), became that is an outside sale. the Explanation heing inapplicable.\n\nComing next to the sale bv Bihar to U.P .. Bihar will be entitled to tax it under the body of article 286(1) (a) as the ~-ale took place inside its limits. But it cannot Jo so as under the Explanation, it becomes an outside sale.\n\nBut U. P. will be entitled to tax the sale under the Explanation as it wa~ for mnsumption within that State.\n\nThus, the effect of the combined operation of both article 286(2) and ::irticlt\" 281l(l)(a) rf\"ad witli the Explanation is that the on Iv State which can tax the sale is .the one m\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunitv Company Limited ..\n\nThe State of Bihnr and ol.iers\n\nVenkataramn\n\nAyyar ].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmU11ity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and ot.1trs\n\nV enkataram.a\n\nAJ.>ar J.\n\nwhich the goods are sold for local consumption.\n\nThese are the objections advanced by 1 the appellant against the view that the sales covered by the Explanation are outside article 286(2), and they are not of sufficient weight to overthrow it.\n\nThe consideration of this question will, however, be incomplete without an examination of the other two views that have been put forward as to the true meaning and scope of article 286(2). The second view-and that was taken by Bhagwati, J. in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1) -is that the sales covered by the Explanation are in the course of inter-State trade and they are, therefore, within the purview of article 286(2), but that as the latter is a general provision covering all sales in the course of inter-State trade, and the former deals only with a special class thereof, the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant applies, and the Explanation prevails as against article 286(2). It will be noticed that this agrees with the fust view in its conchision but it differs from it on the reasoning by which it reaches it. According to the first view, sales in the course of inter-State trade contemplated by article 286(2) include only those under which goods are delivered for purposes other than local consumption; whereas according to the second, they include all sales including those in which goods are delivered for consumption within the State and those in which they are delivered for other purposes. According to this view, therefore, there is conflict between the Explanation and article 286(2), and the solution for it is to be sought in the application of the rule of constniction that general provisions do not derogate from the special. As between these two views, the first view is, for the reasons already given, to be preferred. But if the contention that article 286(2) applies both to sales in which goods are delivered for local consumption and those in which they are delivered for other purposes is correct, then. it is difiicult to see how the appellant can escape the conclusion reached by Bhagwati, J. in The State of Bombay v. The. Uniied\n\n{1){1953] S.G.R. 1069.\n\n.Motors (India) Ltd.(1). The appellant is plainly m\n\nth1: horns of a dilemma. Sales in which gooJs are deii vered for local consumption fall either outside anicle 286 ( 2) . or inside it. If they fall outside article\n\n2<~6\\2), then the appellant can claim no immunity\n\nfrorn taxation under that provision. In case they fall m, Juc article 286(2), then the Explanation must picvall as against it on the principle generalia specwftf4ts non derogant, and the sales will be liable to be taxed.\n\nTo get out of this difficulty, the appellant contended that article 286(2) and the Explanation related to two different matters, and therefore the maxim in question had no application. The argument was that article 286 imposed a number of restrictions on the power of the State to tax sale of goods from different angles, e.g., when they were outside the State, article 286(1) (a); in the course of export or import, article 286(1)(b); in the course of inter-State trade, article 286(2); and in relation to commodities\n\ndecl:ued essential by Parliamentary legislation under article 286(3); that the Explanation was enacted from the standpoint whether the sales were outside or inside and article 286(2) from the standpoint whether they were in the course of inter-State trade or intra- State trade, and that the purpose and the policy of the two proviions being different, their subject-matter mmt he held to be different and that therefore the maxim was inapplicable.\n\nI see no force in this contention. It is a cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a Statute two provisions which are in conflict with each other such that both of them cannot tand, they should, if possible, be so interpreted that effect can be given to both, and that a construction which renders either of them inopera, tive and useless should not be adopted except in the last resort.\n\nTh~ is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction. One application of this rule is that when there is a law generally dealing with a subject and another dealing particularly with one of the topics comprised therein, the general\n\nlaw is to be construed as yielding to the special in\n\n(I) [l953J ~.C.R. 1069.\n\n'1955\n\nThe Bengul\n\nImmunity Compa:p Limittd\n\nThe State of Bi!w\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarmnri\n\nA_Y.Yar J.\n\n1955 respect of the matters comprised therein. Now, the reason of the rule requires that it should apply when~\n\n~';::,~f;\n\n1 ever there is overlapping of the fields occupied by two Company Limited conflicting enactments, and when that is shown; it v. would not be logical to exclude its application on the The State of Bihar ground that the enactments have been made with a\n\nan.I others different purpose. It is the identity of the subject-\n\nVenkatarama matter of the conflicting provisions, not the identity Ayyar J. of their purpose or angle of vision that is essential for the application of the maxim. No authority was cited for limiting it in the manner contended for by the appellant. Now, it is the appellant's own contention that t_he sales covered by the Explanation are within the purview of article 286(1)(a), and are therefore exempt from taxation thereunder, and that such taxation would be permissible only when the hold of article 286(2) over the Explanation is removed by Parliamentary legislation under that sub-clause. That is to say, the subject-matter of the Explanation is within the coverage of article 286(2), and that the two provisions are directly in conflict. It is difficult to see how consistently with this stand the appellant could resist the application of the maxim aforesaid.\n\nIt is true that Bhagwati, J. who took that view in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(') !las now retreated from that position. But with respect, there is irrefragable logic in his reasoning in that decision, and that comends itself to me. Then, there is the third view thatthesalestowhich the Explanation applies are' in the course of inter- State trade, and therefore fall within the purview of article 286(2), and that in consequence, the power of the delivery State to tax those sales is incapable of exercise, as it is within the prohibition contained in that article, and that when the Parliament enacts a · Jaw in terms of article 286(2) lifting the ban thereunder, then and not until then could the Explanation have any operation. That was the view expressed by Bose, J. in The State of Bombay v. The United :Motors\n\n(India). Ltd.(') and by Das, J. in State of Trai-ancore- Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory(').\n\n 11> (1963) s.c.11. 1069. m r195!) s.0.11. 63,\n\nBriefly, according to this view article 286(2) controls the Explanation.\n\nCan this be sustained on the language of the enactment? The Explanation is not expressed to be subject to article 286(2). Nor does the latter contain the words \"notwithstanding . anything contained in the Exptanation to article 286(1)\n\n(a)\". These are simple and familiar expressions used by the legislature when it intends that a particular provision in the Statute should be subject to or override another. Nor is there anything in the language of the Explanation providing that its operation is not to be in praesenti but contingent on Parliamentary legislation under article 286(2). To construe, therefore, article 286(2) as controlling the Explanation, we must import into the Statute words which are not there and thereby cut down the operation of the Explanation which on its terms is of equal authority and potency with article 286(2).\n\nThere being nothing express in the language of the enactment to lead to the conclusion that the Explanation is controlled by article 286(2), it has to be seen whether that conclusion can be drawn on a construction of the relevant provisions of the Statute.\n\nThe appellant argues that it can be, and relies firstly on the saving clause in article 286(2), and secondly, on the proviso thereto as supporting it. The argument based on the saving clause may thus be stated : The contention that article 286(2) controls the Explanation would have resulted in rendering the latter wholly nugatory, if the words \"except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide\" had not been there. But that result is avoided by the saving clause under which the Explanation can come into operation when there is Parliamentary legislation lifting the ban under article 286(2). This construction, it is argued, gives effect to the plain language of the article and also to both the provisions. But when examined, it will be seen that far from giving effect to both the Explanation and article 286(2), this construction results in destroying one or the other of them. The harmonious construction which the law favours is one which gives operation to both 13-64 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkaJarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nthe provisions at the same time but in their respective spheres.\n\nBut according to the appellant, if article 286(2) is in force then the Explanation cannot operate, and if the Explanation is to operate, it can only be if the Parliament puts an end to article 286(2) by legislation theunder. This construction, far from reconciling the two provisions and giving operation to both of them, renders them uncompromisingly hostile, and makes their co-existence and cooperation impossible.\n\nIt is also open to question whether the saving clause could be referred to for the purposes of determining the respective spheres of operation of the Explanation and the body of article 286(2). The scope of a saving clause or an exception is that it operates within the area covered by the main provision on which it is engrafted. It cannot add to it though, when in force, it can detract from it. It would, therefore, be inadmissible for enlarging what woul<l otherwise be the sphere in which article 286(2) would operate. If the view that article 286(2) controls the Explanation cannot be maintained on a construction of the body of article 286(2) and the Explanation, it cannot properly be adopted on the strength of the saving clause annexed thereto.\n\nThere was considerable discussion before us as to the nature and scope of the law that could be enacted under article 286(2). It must be confessed that the matter is not free from doubts and difficulties.\n\nBut about one thing, there can be no dispute. The law to be enacted by Parliament cannot run counter to any of the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, it cannot itself impose a tax on sales, that being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the States under Entry 54 in List II. Nor can it confer a power to tax a sale in the course of inter-State commerce on any State of its own choice in contravention of the Explanation to article 286(1) (a). Its operation can only be negative. It can lift the ban imposed by article 286(2). It . was suggested for the appellant that it can do that as regards particular commodities or with reference to particular States, and that further in so limiting\n\nthe operation it could enact suitable provisions for an equitable adjustment of the interests of all the States. But laws limited in their operation to specified commodities and States must in their very nature, be temporary legislation to be withdrawn and reenacted from time to time suitable to the everchanging conditions of inter-State trade and commerce. If that was the sort of legislation that the Constitution-makers had in mind, one would have expected that the authority contemplated by article 307\n\nwould have been empowered to deal not merely with the matters mentioned in articles 301 to 304 but also article 286(2), and it is also not a little surprising that no legislation should have been enacted on those lines during all these years.\n\nIn any event, it must be a profitless task to speculate on the scope and effect of a hypothetical legislation under article 286(2), and it would be unsafe to base any conclusion as to the true scope of the' Explanation on the existence of a power in the Parliament to enact a law under article 286(2).\n\nThe contention based on the proviso to article 286(2) must now be considered. It was argued that while the proviso is to have operation notwithstanding anything contained in article 286(2) it does not similarly override article 286(1)(a) and that therefore when the President issued an order under that proviso, the Explanation would have operation, and that therefore it was not useless. To this contention, there are two answers: (1) An order issued by the President under the proviso can operate only to continue existing taxes. It cannot go further, and authorise the imposition of a tax even when the conditions mentioned in the Explanation are satisfied, if, in fact, it had not been previously collected.\n\nTherefore, the Explanation can have no practical effect on the operation of the proviso. If, in fact, a delivery State had been levying a . tax before the commencement of the Constitution, that would continue to be valid under the proviso, not by the operation of the Explanation but by reason of the fact that it had been levied before. Thus, the Explanation as such has no operation.\n\n(2) It should also be mentioned that prior to\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nTM-State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkalarama Ayyar ].\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nV enkaturama\n\nAYJ'OT J.\n\nthe Constitution no State was actually levying a tax on the basis of delivery and therefore the Explanation could have no practical effect even when the President made the order. The Constitution-makers presumably had before them the sales tax legislation of all the States, and it is a legitimate inference that they could not have thought of the Explanation as deriving any force or operation by reason of an order of the President under the proviso.\n\nMr. Taifad Subramanya Iyer, counsel for M. K.\n\nKuriakose, one of the intervene.rs, arguing in support of the contention of the appellant that article 286(2) is the controlling provision, suggested a third category of cases wherein the Explanation could operate apart from a law under the saving clause in article 286(2) or the order of the President under the proviso thereto.\n\nHis argument was this : Suppose that both the seller and the purchaser are in State 'A' and the goods are located in State 'B'. The instrument of sale is executed in State A, and pursuant thereto, the purchaser gets actual delivery of the goods in State B Article 286(2) has no application to the sale as there is no inter-State movement of goods thereunder. But for the Explanation, State A would have been entitled to tax the sale as it was inside that State. But the Explanation bars it, and confers on State B the right to tax it. This, it is contended, gives operation to the Explanation consistently with the view that it is controlled by article 286(2).\n\nThe assumption underlying this argument is that the property in the goods passed in State A when the instrument of sale was executed, though the goods were then located in State B. But this is not correct. It is one thing to say that title to the goods passes at the time when the instrument of sale was executed and quite a different thing to state that it passes at the place where it is executed. Considering the matter with particular reference to the power of a State to impose tax, sale is a practical conception havil)g relatioµ to the right to enjoy and dispose of the goods, and it is a wellsettled feature of all sales.-tax legislation that the power to tax the sale is annexed to the place where\n\nthe goods are located at the time of the contract.\n\nUnder the general law also, the position is that title to the goods passes in the State in which the goods are situated at the time of the de. In Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik\n\nv. Hickson( 1 ), there was a contract of sale signed by both the parties in England with reference to goods situated in Switzerland. The action was laid in England for breach of patent, and the point for decision was whether it was maintainable tliere.\n\nIt wou}d have been maintainable there if the sale was in England but not if it was in Switzerland. It was held by the House of Lords that the sale was , not in England, and that the action did not lie. The position in law was thus stated by Lord Loreburn, L. C. at page 421 :\n\n\"As I understood him, Mr. Cripps argued that the defendant had 'vended' these goods in England within the terms of the patent.\n\nHe admitted that merely to make a contract of sale would not be 'vendi!'lg' or, to use a word in sense equivalent and in use more familiar, selling. But he maintained that if the contract to sell was made in England, and, in pursuance of it goods were, by the consent of buyer and seller, appropriated to meet the contract, then the transaction became a sale completed in England, and that it did not signify whether the goods were at the time of such appropriation in England or abroad.\n\nI cannot accept that view.\n\nA contract to sell unascertained goods is not a complete sale, but a promise to sell. There must be added to it some act which completes the sale, such as delivery or the appropriation of specific goods to the contract . by the assent, express or implied, of both buyer and seller.\n\nSuch appropriation will convert the executory agreement into a complete sale. • In my opm1on, if you must decide in what country an appropriation of goods by consent takes place, it takes place not where the consent is given, but where the goods are at the time situate\".\n\n(1){1906]A.C. 419 •.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTht Bengal\n\nImmuhit) Compahy Limited\n\nV• Tht State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyaT J.\n\nIn view of these observations, it cannot be contended that the title to th~ goods passed in State A and that State B gets the right to tax by reason of the Explanation. State B gets the power to tax the sale not under the Explanation but under the general law.\n\nThis contention, it should be noted, has reference to cases which ex hypothesi are outside article 286(2), and has on! y an indirect bearing on the question whether article 286(2) controls the Explanation.\n\nIt is necessary now to refer to the arguments addressed by both parties based on what were stated to be the broad principles underlying the Constitution and on - considerations of hardship or inconvenience arising from one vie~ or the other. It was argued for the appellant that the intention of the Constitution-makers as disclosed in article 301 was to encourage the free flow of trade and commerce within the Union unimpeded and unobstructed by State legislation, that article 286(2) was enacted in furtherance of that policy, as taxation by the States might become so heavy as to become burdensome to inter-State commerce; that the normal situation envisaged by that article was, therefore, that no tax should be levied on sales in the course of inter-State trade, power being reserved in Parliament to intervene in appropriate cases and that consistently with this policy, article 286(2) should 'be construed as the controlling provision and the Explanation as an emergency reserve.\n\nThe reply of the respondent was that the intention of the Constitution as expressed in article 286(1)(a) was to avoid multiple taxation of sales in the course of inter-State trade, and not to free them from any taxation, that the Constitution did contemplate the levy of one tax on every sale, and that the construction of the appellant, if accepted, . must place local sales in a greatly disadvantageous situation as against sales in the coui:_se of inter-State trade, and that must result in driving out local trade and business across the borders of the Statx.\n\nThe appellant is undoubtedly right in his contention that the Constitution intended trade ahd commerce within the Union to be free. But the question\n\nis whether that requires that there . should be no tax at all at any stage even when the goods have come to the end of their journey as a result of sale. That clearly is not the law in America where inter-State commerce is highly developed and jealously protected.\n\nThat the Constitution did contemplate one tax on a sale in the course of inter-State trade when it is for local consumption is clear from the Explanation. To argue that freedom from taxation under article 286(2) is the normal condition, and that taxation under the Explanation is an exception is to beg the very question that we have got to decide. No other provisions of the Constitution have beeri cited as expressive of that intention.\n\nOn the other hand, such indication as there is, tends in the opposite direction.\n\nArticle 304(a) which is an exception to article 301 authorises the imposition of a tax on imported goods when similar goods locally manufactured are subject to a State tax provided that such imposition is not discriminatory.\n\nIt is true, as contended by the learned Attorney- General, that under article 304(a) the ta.x is levied on the goods whereas under article 286(2) it is laid on the transaction of buying and selling. But on a question of policy, what difference would it make whether the tax is imposed on the transaction of sale or on the import of goods, as in either case it must fall on the consumers? That clearly is the reasoning of the majority of the learned Judges in The State of Bombay v.\n\nThe United Motors (India) Ltd.(1), and there has been no satisfactory answer to it by the appellant.\n\nOn the other hand, article 304(a) lends considerable support to the contention of the respondent that it could not have been the intention of the Constitution to place local sales in a worse position than sales in the course of inter-State commerce, which must be the result of holding that sales in the course of inter- State trade are immune from taxation under article 286(2), while intra-State sales are liable to be taxed under Entry 54. What reason or justice can there be for making a local purchaser of goods pay a higher price therefor than what a purchaser of the same goods\n\n(I) [ 1953] S.C.R. I 069, I 088.\n\nTlie Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkataraina\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunily Company Limited v.\n\nT1\" Slate of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nacross the State line would have to pay? The only answer that was suggested was that the State might refrain from taxing even intra-State sales of those commodities which are the subject-matter of inter- State trade.\n\nSeeing that inter-State trade is happily an expanding factor , in national life, and that it tends to comprehend an increasing variety of goods, there will be left, if the suggestion of the appellant is to be followed, very few commodities which the State could tax, and Entry 54 might as well be effeced from out of the Constitution. There is, besides, the apprehension expressed by the respondent-and it cannot be brushed aside as fanciful-that if the contention put forward by the appellant is accepted, then it must inevitably result in local trade shifting on to adjacent States. If the scheme of the Constitution is, as I conceive it to be, to put both intra-State sales and sales in the course of inter-State trade on the same footing -and that is manifest on the language of article 301 -it must follow that as the former are liable to be taxed under Entry 54, the latter should also be s1m1larly liable to be taxed, and that is precisely what the Explanation provides for.\n\nIt was next argued for the appellant that the view that under the Explanation delivery States would be entitled to tax all sales in the course of inter-State\n\ntrade if goods are delivered for consumption there, would render sellers liable to be taxed in all the States in which their goods are sold, and that would subject them to a perplexing multitude of assessment proceedings in several States and that that must cause great inconvenience and hardship in business circles. Our attention was also .invited to the provisions of the impugned Act relating to assessment and collection of tax, and it was contended that they must result in considerable harassment of the assessees.\n\nAs against this, the respondent contended that the sellers had really no grievance in the matter as the tax would be ultimately pa.id by the consumers, and that, on the other hand, if the contention of the appellant were to be accepted, the States would have to lose a substantial portion of the revenue derived from\n\nsales tax and that must seriously affect their economy.\n\nIt must be conceded that in the view that the Explanation authorises the imposition of tax on all sales in the course of inter-State trade falling within its purview, non-resident sellers will be liable to be taxed in every State in which the goods ai;-e sold for consumption, and that they must in consequence be exposed to multiple assessment proceedings in different jurisdictions and that that must cause inconvenience.\n\nBut then, that is necessarily inherent in the Explanation whether it operates when the ban under article 286(2) is lifted by Parliamentary legislation as contended for by the appellant, or even without such law, as the respondent maintains.\n\nThat does not, therefore, appear to be very material in construing the scope of the Explanation.\n\nThe right which residents of one State have to trade freely in other States is one conferred by article 301 and is a creature of the Constitution,. and when the same Constitution provides for taxation of sales in the course of inter-State trade by the Explanation to article 286(1)(a), and the inconvenience complained of results from that proYision and is incidental to its enforcement, it does not sound logical that the sellers should, while electing to take the benefit under article 301, disclaim their obligations under the Explanatiollr\n\nThe point of substance against the appellant is that the sellers are not the persons really affected, as the incidence of taxation will ultimately fall on the consumers.\n\nThe Explanation applies to goods delivered for consumption within the State, and the tax imposed on the sale of such goods is really a tax laid on the purchasers for consumption.\n\nIt might happen that such purchasers are numerous and scattered all over the State, and that must be so when the goods sold are, as in the present case, medicines. The power to tax in such a case can be effectively exercised only . through the seller.\n\nNo administrative machinery can succeed in reaching the consumers when thir name is legion, and as the seller is merely to pass on the tax to the consumer, he is, in fact, constituted collector of the tax on behalf of the State. This is the\n\nThi Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe Stale of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Campany Limil<d\n\nThe Stale •f Bih!W\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\npractice largely adopted in America in the collection of Use Tax, and its validity has been repeatedly affirmed.\n\nA recent decision on the question is that in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commi1sion of the State of Iowa('). There, the State of Iowa imposed a Use Tax on a foreign Company in respect of goods distributed by it for consumption within the State.\n\nIn upholding the tax, Frankfurter, J. observed:\n\n\"To make the distributor the tax collector for the State is a familiar and sanctioned device.\n\nM onamotor Oil Co. v. fohnson( 2), Felt & T. Mfg. Co. v.\n\nGallagher(\")\".\n\nIt was. argued by the appellant that in the above case, the foreign Company was \"a retailer maintaining a place of business\" within the State. But as the tax in question was not a sale-tax but a use tax payable by the purchaser, it would be wholly irrelevant whether the distributor had a place of business within the State, and that indeed is what is stated in the judgment itself.\n\nEven looking at the matter from the practical standpoint, it is easy to exaggerate the inconvenience which the Explanation might cause. If sellers have trade and commerce all over the . States, theirs must undoubtedly be a big business.\n\nThat means that they would have, for the purpose of the business, adequate clerical establishment-accountants, correspondence clerks and so forth.\n\nRegular account books would be maintained showing the dispatch of goods to dealers and purchasers in other States.\n\nAnd thus, all the materials on which retnrns have to be made would be already there.\n\nThe additional burden will consist in this that in posting the entries in the ledger accounts, . separate folios will have to be opened for the several States.\n\nThis is no doubt additional work thrown on the sellers, but viewed in its true perspective, it is too unsubstantial to deny the States a substantive power to tax.\n\nIt is said that there would be considerable harassment of the sellers under the provisions of the impugned Act.\n\nBut why should there\n\n(1) 332 U.S. 335; 88 L. Ed. 1309 •.\n\n(2) 292 U.S. 86; 78 L. Ed. 1141, 1147, 1148.\n\n(3) 306 U.S. 62; 82 L.Ed.488.\n\nbe? It must be presumed that sales-tax officers will do nothing unfair or oppressive, and the c, orrespondence between the parties preceding the proceedings shows a just and sympathetic attitude on the part of the respondent.\n\nTrue, some of the provisions of the Act are of a stringent character.\n\nBut they have terrors only for those who would evade and avoid tax, and persons like the appellant doing big business of an all-India character and maintaining regular and correct accounts have nothing to fear from them.\n\nNow, let us look at the other side of the picture.\n\nPrior to the Constitution, the States had the power to tax even sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce, and it is stated that a substantial portion of their revenue was derived from this source.\n\nThe Constitution enacted article 286(1)(a) with a view to avoid multiple taxation of sales in the course of inter-State trade, and it is the contention of the respondent that the Explanation on its true interpretation provides for a single taxation of those sales, at the stage of consumption.\n\nIf the contention of the appellant as to the scope of the Explanation and of article 286(2) is accepted, this tax could not be levied after the 31st March 1951, and the States would have lost a substantial source of revenue. \\Vhat is the substitute that the Constitution has provided therefor?\n\nNone.\n\nIn the result, there must be, as argued by the respondent, a financial crisis in the affairs of the States.\n\nThe position, therefore, is that we have to choose between depriving the States of their power to impose a tax on which their very existence depends, and exposing the sellers having business outside their State to the inconvenience of multiple assessment proceedings.\n\nIn that situation, can there be any doubt as to what . our decision should be? Surely, the claim of the State should have precedence over that of individuals.\n\nIt is very significant that all the States which have intervened have, with one exception, strongly supported the stand of the respondents.\n\nThat e; i:ception is the State of West Bengal.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General appearing for this State did not contend for any right in it to tax the sales. His argu-\n\nThe Bengdl\n\nlmmrinit) Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayjar ].\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nTht Sttt (If Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nment was that neither West Bengal nor Bihar was entitled to tax by reason of artide 286(2). The intervention of West Bengal is, therefore, not for protecting its rights but for the vindication of the law, as it conceives it to be.\n\nIt was suggested for the appellant that the solutiop to the problem lay in the Centre taking over the subject of tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade, provision being made for distribution of the receipts among the States under . article 269 after making the necessary amendments to the Constitution.\n\nOur duty is to construe the provisions as they stand and not to discuss questions of policy which it is for the Legislature to decide; and if I examine the suggestion of the appellant, it is only for the purpose of finding out what light it throws on the present controversy, and how far it will be an improvement on the present position under the Constitution. Under Entry 48 in List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, the States had the power to impose tax on sale of goods and advertisements. When dealing with this topic, the Constitution-makers took over advertisement of newspapers to the Union List, the residue being left to the States. Thus, the decision to entrust the power to tax sales to the States was deliberate, and there is good reason for it. Sales might take place either in the course of inter-State trade or the intra- State. There can be no question of the Centre taking over taxation of intra-State sales. To confer a power on the Centre to tax sales in the course of inter-State trade alone would be to dichotomise the power to impose sales tax and distribute it between the States and the Centre. For such a course, there does not appear to be any precedent, anywhere, and the practical inconvenience attendant thereon is obvious. Moreover, let us assume that the Centre takes over the taxation of sales in the course of inter-State trade.\n\nWhat difference will it make in the present position?\n\nSo far as sellers are concerned, they will have to submit one consolidated statement of all the sales outside their State instead of splitting them according to the States in which the sales are effected, and there will\n\nhe a single assessment proceeding instead of as many as the States where the sales take place. That would no doubt avoid much of inconvenience. But, so far as the burden of taxation on the sellers is concerned, the position would be exactly what it is now. And on what principle is the Centre to distribute the tax realisations among the States? It can only be on the basis of receipts from the several States. And there is justice in each State claiming what is realised from the consumers resident within its territory.\n\nThat is precisely the scope of the consumption tax under the Explanation. Thus, the suggestion of the appellant, if acted upon, will not relieve it from the liability to be taxed; it will only reduce the assessment proceedings from many to one. In other words, the relief will be with reference not to substantive rights. but to a matter of procedure. But the contention of the appellant that article 286(2) controls the Explanation is directed not against the procedure in the assessment of tax, but against the very liability to be assessed to it, the argumentum ab inconvenienti being availed of as a ground for denying it.\n\nThe suggestion, therefore, that the taxation of sales in the course of inter-State trade should be left to the Centre lacks substance. Even with reference to the inconvenience that might result from the multiplicity of\n\n::isessment proceedings, it is one which is capable of being removed without disturbing the existing scheme of the Constitution, by Parliament enacting a law constituting an authority under article 307 and conferring on it power to receive from the sellers one consolidated statement of all their sales outside their State and determining the precise extent thereof effected in the several States and making that determination final for purposes of assessment by the States. That would, on the one hand, secure to the States the finance legitimately due to them under the Explanation, and at the same time, save the sellers from the harassment of multiplicity of proceedings. Such a law cannot be impugned as trespassing on the exclusive domain of the States to impose sales tax under Entry 54, as the authority to impose the tax would continue\n\nTl\" Bengal\n\nImmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bih ar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nto be the States. It is the law of the several States that will determine the conditions under which, and the rate at which, the tax will be chargeable. It is the machinery set up by the States that will make the assessment and collect the taxes, and these realisatiojls will find their way into the coffers of the States.\n\nThe effect of the Act would be only to enact a rule of evidence, on which the ; tssessing authorities have to act. Such a law would not conflict with any of the provisions of the Constitution. It is scarcely necessary to add that this suggestion is only by way of answer to the one put forward by the appellant, and even if there are Constitutional difficulties in the way of acting on it, that would not affect the decision of this appeal, which must turn on the provisions of the Constitution as they stand.\n\nHaving carefully considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the appeal and for the interveners, I am clearly of opinion that the sales falling within the Explanation are, by reason of the fiction enacted therein, intra- State sales, that accordingly they fall outside the ambit of article 286(2) and are unaffected by the prohibition contained therein. In coming to this conclusion, I have considered the question afresh and on its own merits as if it were res integra. But, in fact, it is concluded by the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(') to which reference has been made in the course of the discussion. It is conceded that if this decision is to govern, then this point would have to be found against the appellant. But it is contended that it is erroneous and should not be followed. That raises the question whether this Court has the power to reconsider a previous judgment given by it on the identical issue.\n\nAs the point arises for decision for the first time before this Court, and as our pronouncement thereon must be of the highest importance, we have heard arguments as to what the practice is in the highest judicial tribunals of other countries with reference to this matter.\n\n(I) f1QS3J s.a. 1Qli9.\n\nIn Street Tramways v. London County Council(1), it was held by the House of Lords that its decision on a question of law was conclusive and binding on the House in subsequent cases and that if it was erroneous, it could be set right only by an Act of Parliament.\n\nThe practice before the Privy Council however has been different.\n\nIn Ridsdale v. Clifton( 2 ), Lord Cairns dealing with this question observed as follows :\n\n\"In the case of decisions of final Courts of appeal on questions of law affecting civil rights, especially rights of property, there are strong reasons for holding the decisions, as a general rule, to be final as to third parties. The law as to rights of property in this country is to a great extent based upon and formed by such decisions. When once arrived at, these decisions become elements in the composition of the law, and the dealings of mankind are based upon a reliance on such decisions.\n\nEven as to such decisions it would perhaps be difficult to say that they were, as to third parties, under all circumstances and in all cases absolutely final, but they certainly ought not to be reopened without the very greatest hesitation\".\n\nThe case before the Board was one involving questions of ecclesiastical law, and it was held that in such cases their Lordships were free to examine for themselves the reason on which the prior decision rested and to decide on their own view of the matter. The authorities bearing on this question were reviewed by the Privy Council at some length in Re : Transferred Civil Servants (Ireland) Compensation( 3 ), and the result was thus summed up :\n\n\"There is no inherent incompetency in ordering a rehearing of a case already decided by the Board, even when a question of a right of property is involved, but such an indulgence will be granted in very exceptional circumstances only. It is of the nature of an extraordinarium remedium\".\n\nThis opinion was reiterated in Attorney-General of Ontario v. Cattada Temperance Federa1ion( •) wherein Viscount Simon said :\n\n(1) [1898] A.C. 375.\n\n(2) [1877] 2 P.D. 276.\n\n(3) [1929] A.C. 242.\n\n(4) A.I.R. J946\"P.C. 88.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Compa'!)I Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nTht State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkcrama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n\"Their Lordships do not doubt that m tendering humble advice to His Majesty they are not absolutely bound by previous decisions of the Board, as is the House of Lords by its own judgments. In ecclesiastical appeals, for instance, on more than one occasion. the Board has tendered advice contrary to that given in a previous case, which further historical research has shown to have been wrong. But on constitutional questions it must be seldom indeed that the Board would depart from a previous decision which it may be assumed will have acted upon both by Government and subjects\".\n\nThus, the practice of the Privy Council has been to recognise a power to reconsider its previous decisions, but it is exercised only in exceptional circumstances. In Jame.< v. Commonwealth(') the High Court of Australia has ruled that it has the power to examine the correctness of its previous decisions.\n\nThe practice of the Supreme Court of America is that it has considered itself free to reconsider its previous decisions especially when they relate to questions of constitutional law. (Vide Willoughby on Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pages 74 and 75 and the cases cited there). The reason given for this view is that while errors of law not bearing on constitutional provisions could be corrected by ordinary process of legislatior., an error on a question of constitutional law could he set right only by resort to the dilatory and cumbersome machinery of amendng the Constitution. (Vide Smith v. Al/right(') ). This reasoning will also be applicable to decisions involving interpretation of our Constitution .. It was argued for the respondents that article 141 gives the decisions of this Court the status of law, and that, therefore, if they are to be changed that could be only by process of legislation. Article 141 only enacts that the decisions of this Court are binding on all courts, and that does not stand in the way of this Court itself, reversing or modifying a previous decision, as when that is done, such decision would thereafter become itself the law under that article.\n\nThere is, therefore, good\n\n(1) 18 C.L.R. 54.\n\n(2) 321 U.S. 659:88I .. Ed. 987.\n\nreason for holding that this Court has the power to reconsider, m appropriate cases, a previous decision given by it.\n\nThe question then arises as to the principles on which and the limits within which this power should be exercised. It is of course not possible to enumerate them exhaustively, nor is it even desirable that they shoulJ be crystallised into rigid and inflexible rules.\n\nBut oqe principle stands out prominently above the rest, and that is that in general, there should be finalitv in the decisions of the highest courts in the land, and that is for the benefit :.mJ protection of the public. In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind that next to legislative enactments, it is decisions of Courts that form the most important source of law.\n\nIt is on the faith of decisions that rights are acquired and obligations incurred. and States and subjects alike shape their course of action. It must greatly impair the value of the decisions of this Court, if the notion c:ime to be entertai1,,:d that there was nothing certain or final about them, which must be the conseq uencc if the points decided therein came to be reconsidered on the merits every time they were raised.\n\nIt should be noted that though the Privy Council has repeatedly declared that it has the power to reconsider its decisions, in fact, no instance has been quoted in which it cfid actually reverse its previous decision except in ecclesiastical cases.\n\nIf that is the correct pos1t10n, then the power to reconsider\n\n1s one which should be exercised very sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, such as when a material provision of law had been overlooked, or where a fundamental asmmption on which the decision is based turns out to be mistaken.\n\nIn the present case, it 1s not suggested that in deciding the question of law as they did in Tlze State of Bombff\\1 v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1) the learned Judges ignored any material provisions of law, or were under any misapprehension as to a matter fundamental to the decision. The arguments for the appellant before us, were in fact only a\n\n(I) (1953] S.C.R. 1069. 14-8-1 S. C.Ir.dia/59\n\n\"I he Bengal\n\nImmunity Compan_v Limited\n\nThe State onBihat'\n\nand others\n\nV m/r:atarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihnr\n\nand oths\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nrepet1t1on of the very contentions which were urg<d\n\nbefore the learned Judges and negatived by them.\n\nThe question then resolves itself to this.\n\nCan we differ from a previous decision of his Court, because a view contrary to the one taken therein appears to be preferable?\n\nI would unhesitatingly answer it in the negative, not. because the view previously taken must necessarilv be infallible but because it is important in public. interest that the law declared should be certain and final rather than that it should be declared in one sense or the other. That, I conceive, is the reason behind article 14 L There are questions of law on which it is not possible to avoid difference of opinion, and the present case is itself a signal example of it. The object of article 141 is that the decisions of this Court on these questions should settle the controversy, and that they should be followed as law by all the Courts, and if they are allowed to be reopened because a different view appears to be the better one, then the very purpose with which articl~ 141 has been enacted will be defeated, and the prospect will have been opened of litiirants sub1ecting our decisions to . a continuous process of attack before successive Benches in the hope that with changes in the personnel of the Court \\vhich time must inevitably bring, a different view might find acceptance. l can imagine nothing more damaging to the prestige of this Court or to the value of its pronouncements.\n\nIn fames v. Commonu•ealth(' ), it was observed that a question settled by a previous decision should not be allowed to be reopened \"upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the Members of the later Court might arrive at a different conclusion if the matter was re.< integra. Otherwise, there would he grave danger of want of continuity in the interpretation of the law\"\n\n(per Griffiths, C.J. at page 58). It is for this reason that article 141 invests decisions of this Court with special authority, but the weight of that authority can only be what we ourselves give to it.\n\nIt was suggested as a ground for reconsidering the correctness of the decision in The State of Bombay v.\n\n(I) 18 C.L.~. 54.\n\nThe United Motors (India) Ltd.(') that it had caused great hardship to the business world.\n\nI h:::ve already held that there is not much of substance in this complaint. On the other llJnd, acting on the view that the Explanati0i1 confers on the delivery States power to tax the sales, several States amended their Sales Tax Acts in 1951 by inserting appropriate prov1s10ns and it is represented before us that for some y\"ars, taxes have been collected by the States on the basis of these provisions. If we are now to hold th:tt the view taken in T lze State of Bombay v. The U 11ited Motors (India) Ltd.(') is erroneous, the consequences will be to render the amended pro, isions inoperative and the collections of taxes made thereunder illegal.\n\nThe States will then be not merely powerless to tax sales falling within the Explat13tion in future, but will have actually to refund whatever they might have collected in the past. I can see no end to the chaos, confusion\n\nam\\ trouble that must ensue on such a decision'-a situation that can be retrieved only by Parliament removing article 286(2) out of the scene with retrospective operation, and all this, to benefit not the consumers who are the persons really affected but the sellers who are only statutory middlemen for collection, some of whom are stated to have collected sales tax from purchasers outside their States. I consider it wholly inexpedient that our power of reconsideration should be exercised for that end. This, of course, is apart from my conclusion that on a correct interpretation of the Explanation and artick 286(2). the respondents have the power to tax.\n\nIn the result, this point must be held against the appellant.\n\n4. I shall now consider the question urged by the appellant that the Bihar Sales Tax Act is invalid on the ground that it is extra-territorial in operation and ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature.\n\nThe Comtitutional provisions bearing on this question are articles 245(1) and 246(3) which are as follows:\n\n\"245. ( 1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legis-\n\n(ll [1953] S.C.R. 1069.\n\nThe Btr, gal\n\nlmmuniry Cmnpan_1• Limited v.\n\nThe State <f Bihar and others\n\nVenkalarama\n\n.l!rr•r ].\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nlature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State.\n\n246. (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the \"State List\")\".\n\nThe contention of the appellant is that the words \"for the whole or any part of the State\" in article 245(1) and \"for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II\" in article 246(3), impose a territorial limitation on the jurisdiction of the State Legislature; that under these provisions it can enact laws only for persons and properties within the State and that the provisions of . the Act to the extent that they impose tax on sellers who are outside the State are ultra vires. It was also contended that the impugned provisions were extra-territorial in their operation, and were beyond the competence of the State Legislature.\n\nThe questions thus raised are of great importance involving the determination of the nature and extent of the power which a\n\nState has to make laws in respect of the matters enumerated in List II.\n\nIt is necessary, to begin with, to define the precise meaning of the words \"extra-territorial operation\".\n\nA sovereign State has plenary jurisdiction to enact laws for its own •erritory. Such laws may be in respect of persons within the territory whether citizens or not, of property, immovable or movable, situated within the State; or of acts and events which occur within its borders. In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (10th Edn. p. 144) the law is thus stated :\n\n\"Primarily, the legislation of a country is territorial. The general rule is, that extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur. The laws of a nation apply to all its subjects and to all things and acts within its territories\".\n\nIn \"Conflict of Laws-Restatement of the Law\" by\n\nthe American Law Institute, the position is thus summed up:\n\n\"47. A State has jurisdiction over a person :\n\n(a) if he is within the territory of the State, ( b) if he is domiciled in the State although not present there, ( c) if he has consented or subjected himself to the exercise of jurisdiction over him either before or after the exercise of jurisdiction.\n\n48. An immovable thing is subject to the jurisdiction of the State within which it is.\n\n49. A chattel is subject to the jurisdiction of. the State within which it is.\n\n56. A State has jurisdiction over all acts done or events occurring within the territory of the State, and over all failures to act in cases where there is a legal duty to act within the State\".\n\nThe legislation in respect of the above matters is intra-territorial, notwithstanding that it might operate on persons residing outside the State. Thus, a law of a State taking over the management of lands of absentee-landlords must operate on owners who are residing abroad.\n\nBut in strictness, this is not extraterritorial legislation but legislation in respect of lands within the State. Likewise, a law with reference to acts or events which occur within the State is not extra-territorial, though it might have to be enforced against a person who is residing outside the State.\n\nSuch a law is one in respect of an act or event within the State.\n\nThese laws, though intra-territorial, are often loosely described as extra-territorial in operation.\n\nIn this context the words \"extra-territorial operation\" connote laws in respect of properties or acts or events within a State but having impact or operation on persons outside the State.\n\nThere is another sense in which these words are used. When a State enacts a law with reference to an act or event which takes place outside its territory, it is described as extra-territorial,_ and such legislation is recognised as valid by rules of International Law where it is directed against its own nationals and persons in its service. Thus, in \"Con-\n\nTht Btnal\n\nlmmunil)' Company LimiUd\n\nTht Stau of Bili•\n\nand olhn\"s\n\nV en, l; atarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nThe &ngai\n\nImmunfty Company Limited\n\nv. 17~ Stale Of Bihar\n\nt1t1d othtr's\n\nP mkatarama\n\nA>J\"' J.\n\nllict of Laws-Restatement of Law\" it is observed that \"a nation has jurisdiction over its nationals aJ.. though not present within the territorial limits of the nation\". (Page 78). In Corpus Juris Secundum, extraterritoriality is defined as \"the act by which a State extends its jurisdiction beyond its own boundaries into the territory of another State'', and it is added that \"the almost self-evident proposition should perhaps also be noted in this connection that a sov\" ereignty has power to make laws regulating the conduct of its subjects, while beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction\". (Volume 15, pages 868-869) \"Extra-territorial Legislation\", says Wheare, \"simply means legislation which attaches significance for courts within the jurisdiction to facts and events occurring outside the jurisdiction\". (Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status by Wheare, 4th Edition, page 167).\n\nA typical illustration of this class of legislation is furnished by section 4, Indian Penal Code, which enacts that \"the provisions of this. Code apply also to any offence committed by- ( 1) any citizen of India in any place without ancl beyond India;\n\n (2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be.\n\nExplanation : In this section the wore! 'offence' includes every act committed outside (India) which, if committed in (India) would be punishable under this Code.\n\nIllustration : A (who is a citizen of India) commits a murder in Uganda. He can be tried and convicted of murder in any place in (India) in which he may be found\".\n\nIn this connection, extra-territorial legislation means a law of a State with reference to its own cmzens in respect of acts or events which take place outside the\n\nState.\n\nIn discussing questions relating to extra-territorial operation, it is desirable that the two connotations of the words should be kept distinct and separate.\n\nAs the impugned Act purports to tax sales within its territory, its operation against persons who are residing outside but in respect of sales within the\n\nState is extra-territorial in the first sense, and it is the validity of the provisions. of the Act in this sense that this appeal is concerned with.\n\nNow, the question is, can a State Legislature make laws with extra-territorial operation in the sense stated above? The appellant contends that it cannot,\n\nand calls in aid observations and decisions of the Privy Council with reference to the powers of a subordinate or colonial legislature to enact iaws with extra-territorial operation.\n\nIn Macleod v.\n\nAttorney- General for New South Wales(1), the point for decision was whetht>r an Act of New South Wales conferred, on its true construction, jurisdiction on the Courts within the Colony to try an offence of bigamy committed presumably by its national in America.\n\nIn construin!!' it as intended to apply to crimes committed within the state. Lord Halsbury, L.C. observed tbat the jurisdiction of the colonies to enact laws was confined within their own territories'', and that \"it would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the Colony\" to enact a law in respect of a crime committed outside their territory.\n\nThese observations rder to extra-territorial operation in the second sense stated ah9ve, and have no application when the law of the State is in respect of an act or event taking place within its territories.\n\nIn Commercial Cable Company v. Attorney-Genern! of Newfoundland( 2 ), the question was with reference to a law of Newfoundland imposing a tax on telephone companies in respect of cables landed or established in the Colony. In\n\ndisrnsing the scope of these provisions, Lord Macn:tghtcn observed at page 826 :\n\n\"While, of course, it was competent to impose taxation on cables within its territorial jurisdiction, it was not competent for the Government to lay a tax on cables outside its territorial jurisdiction\".\n\nThese observations again have no bearing on the point now under consideration whether a law enacted in respect of an act or event occurring within the State is incompetent, if it seeks to operate on a person concerned in the act but residing outside the State. In\n\n(I) (!89l]A.C.455\n\n('.:) [19 12] A.C. R20.\n\nThe Bntgal\n\nImmunity Company pmilld\n\nV; Tire Stale of Bihm\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nT hz Bengal\n\nImmunity Campany Limited\n\nTire Slate of .Biliar\n\nand Others\n\nV m/catarama\n\nAY.J'OT J.\n\nN ad an v. The King('), the question was as to the validity of section 1025 of the Criminal Code of the Dominion of Canada which enacted that \"no appeal shall lie in criminal case to any authority in the United Kingdom by way of appeal or petition to His Majesty in Council\". It was held by Viscount Cave, L.C., that that section was repugnant to the Privy Council Acts of 1833 and 1844, and was therefore void under the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and that accordingly the appeal to I he Privy Council was competent. He also observed that however widely the powers of the Dominion Parliament be construed, they were confined to action to be taken in the Dominion, and could not extend to annulling the prerogative right of the King in Council to grant special leave to appeal. As the law in question was in respect of crimes committed within the State, these observations are capable of the construction which the appellant seems to put on them that such a law would be incompetent to the extent that it is to have operation outside the State. But it must be mentioned that the vires of the action to be taken under the Act within the State itself was affirmed in unqualified terms, and that is what we are concerned with in this appeal. The question, however, must now be taken to be settled by the decision in Croft v.\n\nSylvester Dunphy(2 ). There, the question related to the validity of sections 151 and 207 of the Customs Act of Canada under which the officers of the State were authorised to search ships within 12 miles of the coast, and seize dutiable goods found in them, the provisions being obviously intended to aid in the effective collection of customs. There was no dispute\n\nthat the legislation was within the competence of the Dominion Legislature,, customs being one of the topics enumerated in section 91 of the British North America Act, 1867, but the attack was on the validitv of sections 151 and 207 on the ground that their op~ ration was extra-territorial. Thus, the question raised is the very question which now arises for determination.\n\nIn holding that the kgislation , was valid, Lord Macmillan obsei:ved as follows :\n\n(!) [1926] A.C. 482.\n\n(2) [1933] A.C. 156.\n\n\"Once it is found that a particular topic of legislation is among those upon which the Dominion P::.rliament may competently legislate as being for the peace, order and good Government of Canada or as bdng one of the specific subjects enumerated in section 9.1, British North America Act, their Lordships see no reason to restrict the permitted scope of such legislatiun by any other consideration than is applicable to lhe legislation of a fully Sovereigi1 State\".\n\nThe law as settled by this decision may thus be stated: Whether a subordinate Legislature has power to enact laws with extra-territorial operation will depend on the terms of the Constitution Act which creates it and subject to any limitations contained therein, it has 1n . respect of the topics assigned to it powers of legislation as plenary as the Sovereign Legislature which constitutes it.\n\nIt was argued by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that subsequent to the decision in Croft v. Dunphy(1) the Privy Council had again to consider in British Coal Corporation v. The King(2) the validity of a Canadian law which had extra-territorial operation, and therein the :grounds of the decision in Nadan v. The King(3) were stated at page 516 with apparent approval, and that though the legislation was held to be valid, it was because of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and that in the absence of a similar statute for India, the Legislature of this country had only the limited powers recognised in Nadan v. The King(3), and that extraterritorial legislation was incompetent. llut there is nothing in the observations in British Coal Corporation v. The King(2) relied on by the appellant, to support the contention that the view expressed in Nadan's case(3 ) was adopted in preference to that taken in Croft v.\n\nDunphy( 1 ) ; in fact there was no decision at all on this point.\n\nNor does the fact that the Statute of Westminster has conferred an express power on the Colonial Legislature to enact laws with extra-territorial operation affect the weight to be :attached to the conclusions come to in Croft v. Dtm-\n\n(1) [1933) A.C. 156.\n\n(2) [!935] A.C. 500, 516.\n\n(S) [1926] A.C. 482.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\n4J>yar J.\n\nT l1e Ben, l!, al\n\nlmmuni!J Com/xmy Ltmi'trrl\n\nTht Stalt of Bihnr\n\nand nlh\".1\n\ni 'enkatara111a\n\n1h!:i1ar J.\n\nphy('), because they were reached, not with reference to the Statute of Westminister about the applicability of which retrospectively to the case before the Boatd there was controversy, but on general principles, and what is more to the present case, it was the law as declared in Croft v. Dunphy(') that was before the framers of the Constitution when they enacted 5c, tions 99 and 100 of the Government of India AC!, 1935.\n\nTurning now to the Constitutiorul provi, ions under the Indian law, this topic is dealt with in sections 99(1) and 100(3) of the Government of India Act. To understand the precise scope of these provisions, it is necessary to examine the position under the previous C', onstitution Acts.\n\nSection 43 of the Charter Act, 1833 (3 and 4 Will. IV, Chap. 85) conferred power ou the Governor-General in Council \"to make laws and regulations for all persons .............. and for all Courts and for all places and things whatsoever within and throughout the wlzole and every part of the said territory\".\n\nIn the Government of India Act, 1915 (5 and 6 .Geo.\n\nV, Ch. 61) the corresponding provisions was section 65(1) (a) which enacted that the Indian Legislatures have the \"power to make laws for all persons, for all Courts and for all places and things within the British India\". Under these provisions, it cannot be doubted that the Indian Legislatures would have had no jurisdiction to enact laws operating on persons who were not within the Stat~,. a< that would be plainly opposed to the limitation that they should be \"for persons within the territory'.'. Both section 43 of the Charter Act, 1833 and section 65(1)(a) of the Government of India Act, 1915 are based on the theory which was then widely held that a subordinate Legislature had no competence to enact laws with extra-territorial operation. Then came the Government of India Act, i'\n\n1935. Sections 99(1) and 100(3) which are relevant .. provisions are as follows :\n\n\"99. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Federal Legislature may make laws for the whole or any part of British India or for any Federated\n\n(I) [1933] A.C. 156.\n\nState, an<l a Provincial Legislature may make l'aws for the Province or for any part thereof.\n\n100. ( 3) Subject to the two prece<ling sub-sections, the Provincial Legislature has, an<l the Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Sche<lule (hereinafter called the \"Provincial Legislative List\")\".\n\nThe language of these sections marks, it will be noticed, a wide departure from that of section 43 of the Charter Act an<l section 65 (1) (a) of the Government of India Act, 1915.\n\nThe limitation that the legislation should be for persons or things within the territory has been removed.\n\nInstead, it is enacted that it could be ;'for the whole or part of British India in the case of Federal Legislature\" and \"for the Province or part thereof in the case of Provincial Legislature\", and under section 100(3), the power is to make laws for a Province or a part thereof with respect to the matters enumerated in List\n\nII.\n\nUnder sections 99(1) and 100, the legislative power of the Centre or the Province is determined by two conditions. It must be for the territory specified, and it must be in respect of the topics enumerated in the rtspective lists. If these conditions are satisfied, then the law is valid notwithstanding that it may have impact or operation outside the State. The scope of the legislative power conferred by sections 99( 1) and 100 is precisely the same as that conferred on the Legislatµres of Canada under sections 91 and 92 of tht; British North America Act.\n\nThat was also a power conferred on the Dominion Parliament or the Provincial Legislature to make laws for the Dominion or the Province in respect of the matters mentioned in sections 91 and 92 respectively.\n\nIt is on the construction of these , provisions that Lord Macmillan held in Croft v. Dunphy(1) that the Dominion Legislature was competent to enact laws in respect of those matters even if. thc; y had extra-territorial operation.\n\nThe framers of the Government of . India Act, 1935\n\nchanged the language of section 65 ( 1) (a) of the Gov-\n\n( I) [!933] A.C.. '5o.\n\nTlie Bengal\n\nImmunity Companv Limited\n\nThe State of Bi/ia•\n\nand others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nA;, var J.\n\nThe Btngnl\n\nImmunity C-Ompany Limited\n\nT ht State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAJYar ].\n\nernment of India Act, 1915, and substituted wunls similar to those in sections .91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867. It is a reasonable deduction to make that they intended to give effect to the law as declared in Croft v. Dunphy('). A law which satisfies the two conditions prescribed m sections 99\n\n(1) and 100, therefore, must be held to L, e intra vtres, even though it might have extra-territorial operation. ·\n\nThe precise extent of the powers conierred by sections 99( 1) and 100 has also been the subject of considerable judicial consideration.\n\nIn Governor-General in. Council v. Releigh. Investment Co. Ltd.(\"), the question was as to the liability of a Company which was incorporated under. .the English Companies Act having its ain office in England and no place of business in India to be assessed . to income-t<l'x under the provmons of . the Indian Income-tax Act. The Company held the bulk of shares in nine Companies which were also registered in· England and controlled from there, and carried on business . in British Jndia and earned profits.\n\nDividends in respect of these profits were declared. in London and paid to the assessec in London. The Explanation to section 4(i) (c) of the Indian Income-tax Act enacts that a dividend paid outside British India shall be deemed to be income accruing i!' or arising in British India to the extent to which it has been paid out .of profits subjected to _tax in British India. The income-tax authorities claimed that the dividends received by the assessee-Company were liable to be taxed under this provision. The Company resisted the daim inter alia on the ground that as it was not resident in British India. and did not carry on business there, the Indian Legislature had no competence to impose a tax on it, and that the provisions of the Act 'were ultiu vires as e:traterritorial in . their operation.\n\nThis contention succeeded before the High Court of Calcutta,. the Chief Justice observing that the impugned provision amounted to the \"Legislature of British India without specific or apparent authority stretching out its legislative arm and physical hand beyond British\n\n(I) [1933] A.C. 156.\n\n(2) [1944] F.C.R. 229,\n\nIndia into other countries in an attempt to tax persons and property there not subject to its laws\"; and Mitter, J. characterising it as a \"piece of extra-territorial legislation not by a superior or Dominion Legislature but by a subordinate Legislature\".\n\nOn appeal, this decision was reversed by the Federal Court. Spens, C. J. who delivered the judgment of the Court held firstlv that as the source of the income which was subjected. to tax was Indian, it was competent for the Indian Legislature to impose a tax thereon, and no question of extra-territorial operation arose. That is to say, Entry 54 in List I gave power to the Indian Legislature to tax income which arises from British India, even though the person to be taxed was not residrnt within the British India. He also held that even if an element of extra-territoriality\n\nwa~ ivolved, the legislation was not bad on thit account, because section 99( 1) and section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 were intended to embody the law as declared in Croft v. Dunphy(1) and to confer on the Indian Legislature plenary powers of legislation in respect of matters mentioned in the lists, departing in this respect from the position under section 65 ( 1 )(a) of the Government of India Act, 1915.\n\nIn Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay(\"), the appellant was a Company registered in England and controlled from there.\n\nIt held a 14/32 share in a firm called Messrs Wallace & Co., which was carrying on business in Bombay.\n\nThe appellant was sought to be taxed not merely on its income as partner of the Bombay firm about >vhich there was no dispute but also on the i!'.come of over seven lakhs of rupees which had arisen and had acuued to it abroad.\n\nThe appellant resisted the claim on the ground that the provisions of the Indian Act were ultra vires as their operation was extra-territorial; inasmuch as they sought to tax income of a non-resident received abroad.\n\nThe Federal Court rejected this contention.\n\nIt held that if the person proposed to be taxed had sufficient business connec-\n\n(1) [1933] A. C. 156.\n\n(2) [1945] F.C.R. 65.\n\nThe Be11gal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVt11kalarama\n\nA.l'llT J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Compan_)' Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ:Yar .J ..\n\ntion with British India, that would confer a jurisdiction on the Indian Legislature to tax him, and that what heads of income in his hands should be taxed was a matter of policy which was within the province o!' the Legislature to decide. It also held that the pro visions of the Act were \"not in their operation extraterritorial in the strict legal sense'\". There was an appeal against this judgment to Privy Council, i.e., Wallace Bros. v. /.\n\nCommissioner, Bombay(').\n\nAffirming the judgment of the Federal Court, Lord Uthwatt observed that the fact that the appellant \"was a member of the partnership carrying on business in British India\" was irrelevant in .consi(lering whether the legislation was intra vires; that it w:ts to be assumed that there was \"no connection between the Companies and British India except the derivation from British India of the larger part of their income\", and that the validity of the legislation should be determined on that basis.\n\nHe .then observed:\n\n\"There is no rule of law that the territorial li.mits of subordinate legislature define the possible scope of its legislative enactments or mark the field open to its vision. The ambit of the powers possessed by a subordinate legislature depends upon the proper construction of the statute conferring those powers. No doubt the enabling statute has to be read against the back ground cha only a defined territory has been committed to the charge of the legislature. Concern by a subordinate Legislature with affairs or persons outside its own territory may therefore suggest a query whether the Legislature is in truth minding its. own business. It does not compel the conclusion that it is not. The enabling statute has to be fairly construed\".\n\nHe then referred to section 99(1) and section 100 of the Government of India Act unde.r which the Indian Legislature had power to enact laws for the whole or part of British India with respect to tax on incomes, and concluded :\n\n\"The resulting general conception as to the scope\n\n(I) [1948] F.C.R. I.\n\nof income-tax is that given a sufficient territorial connection between the person sought to be charged and I he country seeking to tax him income-tax may properly extend to that person in respect of his foreign incomf' ............ The principle-sufficient territorial connection-not the rule giving effect to that principle -residence-is implicit in the power conferred by the Government of India Act,\n\n1935. The result is that the validity of the legislation in question depends on\n\nthe sufficiency for the purpose for which it is used of the territorial connection set _forth in the impugned portion of the statutory test''.\n\nIt is the contention of the respondent that the present question is concluded by this decision. In A. H. W adia\n\nv. I. T. Commissioner, Bombay(1), the question related to the liability of the Gwalior Durbar to be assessed to income-tax in respect of interest received at Gwalior. There was a Company called the Providenc.e Investment Co. Ltd. carrying on business in Bombay.\n\nThe shares of the Company were all held by the Durbar or by its nominees. It was financed by the Durbar, the transaction taking the form of loan adv:rncrd at Gwalior. On these facts, the Income-tax Officer assessed the Agent of the Durbar to tax on the interest received at Gwalior. The validity of this assessment was disputed on the ground that the statutory provisions under which it was made were extra-territorial in their operation and therefore ultra vires. It w:i.s held by all the learned Judges following the decisions in Governor-General in Council v Releigh Investment Co, Ltd.(2) and W a/lace Bros. v. I.\n\nT. Commissioner, Bombay(8) that the assessee would be liable to ta'lC if there was sufficient business con. ni:ction between him and British India, and that, m that event, the provisions would not be bad on the ground of extra-territorial operation.\n\nThere was, however, a difference of opinion among the learned Judges as to whether, on the facts, sufficient territorial connection had been established, the majority holding that it had been, while two learned Judges\n\n(1) [1949] ~'.C.R. 18. .\n\n~2) [1944] F.C.R. 229.\n\n(3J [1948] F.C.R. J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nT fie State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nT ht State of Bihar and othns\n\nVenkalarama\n\nAyym- ].\n\nthought otherwise.\n\nThat, however, is not material to the pre5ent discussion.\n\nThese authorities establish that under section 99(1) and section 100 of the Government. of India Act, ; i law enacted by the Indian Legislature in respect of the matters enumerated in the appropriate lists would be valid provided it is for the territory entrusted to their charge; that whether it was so or not would depend on whether there was sufficient territorial connection between the person who is sought to be charged or proceeded against under the law and the. country which enacts the law; and that .when such .connection exists, the law is not strictly speaking. extra-territorial, and it is not ultra vires on the ground that the person is not residing within the State which enacts the law.\n\nThen, we come to the Constitution.\n\nArticles 245 ( 1) and 246 which deal with this subject reproduce sections 99(1) and 100 with only alterations of a formal character. They confer on the Parliament and the State Legislatures power to enact laws in respect of the opics mentioned in the respective lists to be exercised for the territory over which they have j1irisdiction. It is a well-settled rule of construction that when a statute is repealed and re-enacted and words in the repealed statute are reproduced in the new statute,. they should be interpreted in the sense which had been judicially put on them under the repealed Act, because the Legislature is presumed to be acquainted with the construction which the Courts have put upon the words, and when they repeat . the same words, they must be taken to have accepted the interpretation put on them by the Court as correctly reflecting the legislative mind. On a construction of articles 245(1) and 246, therefore, it will be difficult to come to any other conclusion than that a sales tax legislation of a State which is otherwise valid is not ultra vires on the ground that the person proposed to be taxed is not resident within the territorial limits of the State.\n\nThree other contentions urged in opposition to this conclusion must now be considered :\n\nI. It is only the Central or Federal Legislature that has the power to enact laws with extra-territorial operation, and that the Legislatures of the States forming units of a Federal Union do not possess such power.\n\n2. Under article 245(2) there is a prohibition against States enacting laws with extra-territorial operation.\n\n3. Some of the provisions of the Act forrning the rnachinerv sections for the assessment and collection of taxes , are, in any event, unauthorised and the whole Act is void on the ground that the valid provisions thereof cannot be separated from the invalid ones.\n\nOn the first question, it is argued by the learned Attorney-General that the decision in Croft v. Dunphy(1) had reference to a law enacted by the Legislature of Dominion of Canada and not any of the Provinces, and that the decisions in Governor-General in Council v. Raleigh Investment Co.( 2 ), Wallace Brothen f:T Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, BombayC) and A. H. Wadia v. Income-tax Commissioner, Bombay( 4 ) related to the Indian Income-tax Act which was enacteci by the Central Legislature, and that to apply the doctrine laid down in those cases to laws passed by the States would be to extend it~ operation beyond recognised limits, and that there was no warrant for it in the Constitution. On principle, it is difficult to see why a law enacted by the State in respect of the matters assigned exclusively to its jurisdiction should stand on a different footing from a law passed by Parliament on a matter within its jurisdiction.\n\nBoth the Legislatures derive their authority from the same source, whether it be the Government of India Act, 1935, or the Constitution of India. Under these Statutes, the State is not subordinate to the Centre, its authority ' being supreme in respect of the matters entrusted to it. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, when the British Government decided to change what was a unitary into a Federal Government, the process adopted for\n\n(I) [1933] A. C. 156.\n\n(3) [1948] F.C.R. I. 15-84 S.C. India/59.\n\n( 0 ) [1944] F.C.R. 2~9.\n\n(4) [1949] F.C.R. 18.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nimmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe Stott of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA; yar J.\n\nthat purpose was that the Parliament resumed all the powers that had been granted under the previous Constitution Act and redistributed them between the Centre and the Province. The terms on which the redistribution was made were identical both for the Centre and the Province, their authority under sections 99(1) and 100 being to enact laws in respect of the matters mentioned in the appropriate lists and for their respective territory.\n\nThe extent of this authority must, therefore, be the same both in the case of the Centre and the State, each being sovereign within its own sphere. The principle laid down in Croft v. Dunphy(') that a subordinate Legislature has plenary powers in respect of the topics assigned to it will apply as much to the State with reference to the matters enumerated in List II as to the Centre with reference to the topics mentioned in List I and III. In Hodge v. The Queen(') which is one of the cases on which the decision in Croft v. Dtmplzy('} was based, the law under challenge was that of the Province of Ontario in Canada in respect of a topic enumerated in seetion 92 of the British North America Act of 1867. The question whether States as distinct from the Commonwealth have competence to enart\n\nlaws with extra-territorial operation has also been considered in some of the decisions of the Australian High Court. In Broken Hill South Limited v. The Commissioner of Taxation(•), Evatt, J. in discussing this question observed as follows at page 378 :\n\n\"Some of the cases also ill1JStrate the fact, occasionally overlooked, that, constitutionally speaking, the status of the States of Australia is equal to, or co-ordinate with, that of the Commonwealth itself.\n\nSovereignty is not attributable to one authority more than to the others; it is divided between them in accordance with the demarcation of functions set out in the Commonwealth Constitution.\n\nWithin the limits so prscribed, the legislative authority of the States is of precisely equivalent quality and potency to that of the Commonwealth, the authority of which\n\n(1) [1933] A.C. 156.\n\n(2) [1883] 9 A, C, 117,\n\n(3) 56 C.L.R. 337.\n\n' .....\n\nis, in sections 51 and 52 of the Commonwealth Constitution, limited by reference to subject-matter.\n\nIn short, the Commonwealth Parliament may legislate for 'the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to' a large number of subject-matters.\n\nSimilarly, the State of New South Wales may legislate for 'the peace, welfare and good government' of New South Wales. In relation to such a subject-matter as that of taxation, and subject, of course, to any overriding provision of the Commonwealth Constitution, it is quite impossible to deny to the States in relation to their geographical area constitutional powers precisely analogous to those possessed by the Commonwealth Parliament in relation to its geographical area. The legislation of the States cannot be deemed ultra vires merely because of territorial reasons, unless analogous legislation of the Commonwealth Parliament would similarly be deemed unconstitutional and void\".\n\nThese observations are very apposite to the present controversy. The conclusion is inescapable that the powers of the Union and the State under sections 99(1) and 100 of the Government of India Act, as also under articles 245 ( 1) and 246 in respect of the matters mentioned in their respective lists have the same content anrl quality, and that if legislation with extra-territorial operation is within the competence of the Union, it is equally within the competence of the State.\n\nComing now to the second contention, the argument of the appellant is that in enacting that \"no law of Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation\", article 245(2) prohibits by implication the enactment of such laws by the States. This contention is unsound. The words \"extra-territorial operation\" are used, as already , stated, in two different senses as connoting firstly, laws in respect of acts or events which take place inside the State but have operation outside, and secondly, laws with reference to the nationals of a State in respect of their acts outside; that in its former sense, the laws are strictly\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe Stalt of BihlW\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nspeaking intra-territorial though loosely termed 'extra-territorial', and that under article 245(1) it is within the competence of the Parliament and of the State Legislatures to enact laws with extra-territorial operation in that sense. The words \"laws with extraterritorial operation\" in article 245(2) must be understood in their second and strict sense as having reference to the laws of a State for their nationals in respect of acts done outside the State.\n\nOtherwise, the provision would be redundant as regards legislation by Parliament and inconsistent as regards laws enacted by States.\n\nThis conclusion is placed beyond doubt when regard is had to the history of legislation on this topic. Section 43 of the Charter Act, 1833 while restricting the scope of legislative authority to persons and things within the State thus denying the power to enact laws with extra-territorial operations in the first sense, conferred a power to make laws \"for all servants of the Company within the Dominion of Princes and States in alliance with the said Company\". This was a power to enact extra-!erritorial legislation in the second sense for servants of the Company. Section 65(1) of the Government of India Act, 1915 followed the same pattern, and while limiting under sub-clause (a) the power of Indian Legislatures to enact laws for persons and things within British India conferred jurisdiction to enact laws with extra-territorial operation in the second sense by sub-clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) which are as follows :\n\n\"65.\n\n(1) The (Indian Legislature) has power to make laws-\n\n(b) for all subjects of His Majesty and servants of the Crown within other parts of India; and ( c) for all native Indian subjects of His Majesty, without and beyond as well as within British India; and ( d) for the government of officers, soldiers,\n\n(airmen) and followers in His Majesty's Indian forces, wherever they are serving, in so far as they are not subject to the Army Act (or the Air Force Act); and ( e) for all persons employed or serving in or\n\nbelonging to the Royal Indian Marine Service\".\n\nThis topic was again dealt with in section 99(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which runs as follows:\n\n\"99. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers co:1ierred, by the preceding sub-section, no Federal law shall, on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation, be deemed to be iIJ valid , in so far a~ it applies- ( a) to British subjects and servants of the Crown in any part of India; or\n\n(b) to British subjects who are domiciled m any part of India wherever they may be; or ( c) to, or to persons on, ships or aircraft registered in British India or anv Federated States whereever they may be; or . ( d) in the case of a law with respect to a matter accepted in the Instrument of Accession of a Federated State as a matter with respect to which the Federal Legislature may make laws for that State, to subjects of that State wherever they may l:ie; or ( e) in the case of law for the regulation or discipline of any naval, military, or air force raised in British India, to members of, and persons attached to, employed with or following, that force, wherever they may be\". In Governor-General in Council v. Raleigh Investment Co.( 1 ) , the question was raised whether these provisions were restrictive of the power of the Indian Legislature to enact laws with extra-territorial operation in respect of matters other than those enumerated in section 99(2). Spens, C.J. held that as the impugned provisions were within the ambit of legislative power under sections 99(1) and 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, they were not extra-territorial m operation and that even if they were, the words \"without prejudice to the gnerality of the powers conferred by the preceding sub-section\" occurring in section 99(2) posited the existence of a power aliunde, and that the enumeration of the specified topics in that sub-clause was by way of abundant caution. On the\n\n(l) [1944] F.C.R. 229.\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited\n\n\"· The State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited ...\n\nTht State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkalaTama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n14th August, 1947, acting under section 9 of the Indian Independence Act the Governor-General issued an Adaptation Order, and therein, for the words \"for the whole or any part of British India or for any Federated State\" were substituted the words \"including laws having extra-territorial operation for the whole or any part of the Dominion\"; and sub-section\n\n(2) was omitted. When the Constitution was enacted, the words \"including laws having extra-territorial operation for the whole or any part of the Dominion\" were omitted, and in their place, article 245(2) was enacted. Thus, article 245(2) is a successor to section 65(1), sub-clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Government of India Act, 1915 and section 99(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and its scope is extraterritorial legislation in the second sense. As we are concerned in this appeal with extra-territorial operation in its first sense, article 245(2) has no application, and the attack on the impugned Act on the ground that it is barred by article 245(2) must fail.\n\nThe third contention has reference to the machinery sections of the Act relating to the assessment and collection of taxes. The argument was that even if the Bihar Legislature had the competence to enact under Entry 54 a taxation law against non-residents, it had no power to enforce it outside its own territorial limits, and some of the provisions were bad on this ground, such as section 17 which authorised search of premises and seizure of accounts, and section 26 which made it an offence to obstruct such search or seizure. But we are not called upon in these proceedings to pronounce on the validity of these prc>- visions.\n\nThe respondent issued notice under sectivn 13(5) of the Act calling upon the appellant to .send his returns and proposing in'. case of default to make assessment on the basis of best judgment. It was at this stage that the appellant rushed to the Court, and moved for a writ of prohibition to restrain the proceedings on the ground of want of jurisdiction. That is the one and the only question that now falls to be determined. Even if some of' the machinery sections are bad-it is a question to be decided when it arises\n\nwhether they can be justified on the ground that they are ancillary or incidental to the substantive provisions, as to which see Attorney-General for lanada v.\n\nCain(1) and Croft v.\n\nDunphyC)-that would not affect the power of the State to impose a tax, and it will therefore be foreign to the scope of this appeal to enter into a discussion of their validity.\n\nIt was urged_ by the learned Attorney-General that if the machinery sections were bad on the ground that . they were extra-territorial in their operation, and if the power to tax was so mixed up with them as to be inseparable from them, then, when they fall it must also fall. A power to tax is a matter of substantive law, whereas the machinery sections providing for the execution of that power such as, assessment, and collection of tax, pertain to the domain of adjectival law, and the two are distinct and separable. It is elementary law that the power to tax does not depend on the abilitv to realise it. In British Columbia Electric Railway co. Ltd. v. The King(s) Viscount Simon observed:\n\n\"A legislature which passes a law having extraterriorial operation may find that what it has enacted cannot be directly enforced, but the Act is not invalid on that account, and the courts of its coumry must enforce the law with the machinery available to them\".\n\nWithout expressing any opinion, therefore, on the validity of the machinery sections, I must hold that the impugned Act in so far as it authorises the imposition of tax on sales falling within the Explanation to article 286(1 )(a) is neither ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature nor bad on the ground rhal it is c:xtra-territorial in its operation.\n\n5. Then there remains the contention of the appellant that even assuming that the States could, under the Explanation, enact a law imposing a tax on a non-resident and that such law would not be hit by article 286(2), the impugned Act must even then be held to be bad for the reason that it was not auth-\n\n\\ \\) (19061 A.G. SE\n\n(2) [1933] A.C. 156.\n\n(3) [1946] A.C. 527.\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVrnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n)955\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Corrlj>any Limited\n\nTiu Slate of Bikar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyy<U' J.\n\norised by the terms of the Explanation. Two grounds were urged in support of this contention : ( l) that under the Explanation truly construed, a seller could be taxed only if he is within the State, and (2) that the goods were actually delivered not in Bihar but in Bengal and that therefore the Explanation did not apply. The argument in support of the first ground was that as the Explanation enacts that the sak or purchase-not mere! y the sale-must be deemed to have taken place in the delivery State, it must be construed in the light of the presumption that the laws of a State are intended to operate on persons or things within its territory, and so construed, it should be held to authorise the levy of a tax on the seller only if he was within the State or on the purchaser who must be within the territory.\n\nThe assumption on which this argument rests is that States have jurisdiction only over persons and property within their territory; but this, as already shown, is not correct.\n\nA State has jurisdiction to .enact laws in respect of acts and events which occur within its territory; and if a sale takes place within the State as under the Explanation it does by a legal fiction, then its jurisdiction to enact a law imposing a tax thereon is complete, and no question of its overstepping its territorial limits arises. It should also be noted that the scope of the presumption that the laws of a State are not intended to operate outside its territory is, as stated by Maxwell, that \"Parliament does not design its Statutes to operate on its subjects beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom\" (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., page 145). That has reference to extra-territorial operation in the second sense. There is no presumption that the laws of a State made with reference to acts and events occurring within its borders are not intended to have operation outside its territory.\n\nMoreover, a tax on sale of goods is, as observed in The Province of Madras v. Messrs Boddu Paidanna & Sons(') \"a tax levied on the occasion of the sale of goods\" and the liability to tax arises \"on the occasion\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 33.\n\nof a sale\". In The State of Bombay v. The United\n\nMotors (India) Ltd.(1) it was stated that the sales tax was a tax imposed \"on the occasion of the sale as a £axable event\". It is thus, in essense, a tax levied on the act of buying and selling. Sale is the result of a contract, and is bilateral in character. There can be seller only in relation to a purchaser and vice versa.\n\nIt therefore follows that the power to impose a tax on sale imports a power to tax either the seller or the purchaser.\n\nIn V. M. Syed Mohammad & Co. v. The State of Andhra(2), the question was raised for decision whether Entry 48 in the Provincial List of the Government of India Act 1935 \"tax on sale of goods\" included a power to impose a tax on the purchaser. It was held that it did, and it was observed that when Entry 54 ' in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution substituted for the words \"tax on sales\" occurring in Entry 48 the words \"tax on sale or purchase\", it did not thereby enlarge the powers previously conferred by Entry 48 but \"merely expressed in clearer language what was implicit in that corresponding entry\". When article 286(1)(a.) and the Explanation refer to a sale or purchase, they merely conform to the terms of Entry 54, and these words cannot therefore be construed as splitting up the power to tax sales into two parts, one available against the purchaser at all times, as in the very nature of it he must be within the State, and the other against a seller if he is within jurisdiction. The power is one and indivisible to be exercised when the conditions mentioned in the Explanation are satisfied against either a seller or buyer as the Legislah1re might determine.\n\nThe language of the Explanation, it should be marked, does not impose any limitation or condition on the exercise of this power. It is general and unqualified, and will comprehend all cases in which goods are delivered for consumption in the taxing State irrespective of whether the seller is within the State or not. To hold that the tax could be imposed on a seller only if he is within the State would be to {l) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.\n\n(2) [1954] S.C.R. 1117.\n\nThi Beng\"l\n\nlmr11U1lity <Ampany Limited v.\n\nThi Slate of Bih•r\n\nGM oth1rs\n\nYenkatarama\n\nAY.Jiar ].\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State flj Bihar\n\nand othrrs\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nadd words to the Explanation which are not there, and for this, there is no justification.\n\nOn the other hand, there are good reasons why the power should have been vested in the legislature to determine w hether it will tax the seller or the buyer. The tax imposed under the Explanation really falls on the consumer-purchaser. While it is possible that with reference to certain classes of goods the tax can effectively be imposed on the purchaser, it must happen that with reference to other kinds of goods as, for example, medicines in the present appeal, it cannot be so done, and, as already pointed out, it is a \"familiar and sanctioned device\" to make the seller the agent of the State for collection of taxes. In leaving it to the States to determine whether they will tax the seller or the buyer, the Explanation has merely given recognition to a familiar principle of taxation laws sanctioned by usage anJ upheld by authority_ This objection must accordingly be overruled.\n\nIt was then contended that the sales proposed to be taxed did not take place in Bihar as the goods were actually delivered as contemplated by the Explanation not there but in Bengal. The argument is that the words \"actual delivery\" in the Explanation are used in contrast to constructive or symbolic delivery as meaning physical delivery of goods, that under section 39(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Act III of\n\n1930) the common carrier is the agent of the purchaser, and that therefore delivery of the goods to the railway authorities in Bengal was actual delivery thereof to the purchaser in Bengal. Section 39(1) is as follows:\n\n\"Where in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised or required to send the goods to the buyer, deliYcry of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of trans-- mission to the buyer, or delivery of the goods to a wharfinger for safe custody is prima facie deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer\".\n\nIt is difficult to see what there is in this section to support the contention that deli very to a common carrier is actual delivery to the purchaser. The section\n\ndoes not say so. On the other hand, it proceeds on the assumption that there was, in fact, no delivery to the purchaser, actual or otherwise, a t.hing being deemed to be something only, when as a fact it is not that, and then enacts on that basis a fiction that deli- . very to a common carrier shall be deemed prim a f acie to be delivery to the buyer. What is the purpose. of this fiction? It is, as will be clear from section 39(2), to fix on whom the loss is to fall in case the goods are lost or damaged in course of transit. But where no such question arises, the fiction has to be ignored, and the matter will have to be decided on the factua>l basis whether the goods were actually delivered.\n\nA reference to section 51 ( 1) of the Sale of Goods Act is very instructive. It runs as follows :\n\n\"Goods are deemed to be in course of transit from the time when they are delivered to a carrier or other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, until the buyer or his agent in that behalf takes delivery of them from such carrier or other bailee\".\n\nIn this clause, the word \"delivery\" is used to denote both the delivery of goods by the seller to the common carrier and the delivery to the purchaser by the common carrier. They cannot both be acmal deliveries, as goods sold under a sale can actually be delivered only once.\n\nIf the delivery of the goods to the common carrier was actual deliYery, then what is the nature of delivery when the purchaser took possession of the goods from the common carrier? It is also physical delivery of the goods, and is therefore actual delivery on the appellant's own definition.\n\nThe fact is that while for some purposes delivery to t):ie common carrier is treated as delivery to the purchaser, there is delivery in fact and in its popular sense, only when the purchaser obtains possession of the goods and it is this that is connoted by the words \"actual delivery\". When section 51(1) refers to delivery to buyer or his agent, it refers to actual delivery, and delivery to common carrier is regarded as constructive, having regard to section 39(1). The section, it will be noticed, proceeds on the footing that :r\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limitet! v.\n\nThe State of Bi ha~\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThe Btntal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\n..;_ The State of Bihar\n\nand otht1s\n\nVnkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\ncommon carrier is not the agent of the buyer with reference to actual delivery. He is the agent of the purchaser for transmission of the goods to him.\n\nThis position was well-established in the common law of England, and was thus stated by Parke, B., in James v. Griffin(') in the following terms:\n\n\"The delivery by the vendor of goods sold to a carrier of any description, either expressly or by implication named by the vendee, and who is to carry on his account, is a constructive delivery to the vendee; but. the vendor has a right if unpaid, and if the vendee be insolvent, to retake the goods before they are actually delivered to the vendee, or some one whom he means to be his agent, to take possession of and keep the goods for him, and thereby to replace the vendor in the same situation as if he had not parted with the actual possession .......... The actual delivery to tlze vendee or his agent, which puts an end to the transit11s or state of passage, may be at the vendee' s own warehouse, or at a place which he uses as his own, though belonging to another, for the deposit of goods: (Scott\n\nv. Prettit( 2): Rowe v. Pickford(') ) ; or at a place where he means the goods to remain until a fresh destination is communicated to them by orders from himself; Dixon v. Baldwen(') ; or it may be by the vendee's taking possession by himself or agent at some point short of the original intended place of destination''.\n\nIn Ex parte Rosevear C/zina Clay Company. In Re Cock(') James, L.J. said :\n\n\"The authorities show that the vendor has a right to stop in transitu until the goods have actually got home into the hands of the purchaser, or of some one who receives them in the character of his servant -or agent\".\n\nIn the same case, the position was stated even more fully by Brett, L.J., in the following terms :\n\n\"As soon as the clay was appropriated by the vendors to this contract and was placed on board the ship, the property in it passed to the purchaser and\n\n(1) 2 M. & W. 623; 115 E.R., 906, 910.\n\n(2) [1803] 3 B. & P. 469.\n\n(3) (1817) 8 Taunt, 83.\n\n(4) (1804] 5 East 175.\n\n(5) II Ch. D. 560.\n\nat the same time as between the vendor and the purchaser, there was a delivery of the claim to the latter.\n\nBut it was a constructive not actual. delivery\".\n\nThe same learned Judge again observed in Kendal v.\n\nMarshall (1) as follows :\n\n\"Where the goods have been appropriated by the vendor, and have been delivered by him to a carrier to be transmitted to the vendee, a constructive possession exists in the vendee\".\n\nThe law as declared in the above decisions was embodied in section 32(1) of the English Sale of Goods Act, which has been reproduced in section 51(1) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. Vide also Benjamin on Sales, Eighth Edn., page 889 where the possession of the carrier on behalf of the buyer is stated to be \"constructive though not yet actual possession\".\n\nIt must accordingly be held that the expression \"actual delivery'' in the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) means delivery of the goods to the purchaser or his agent, and delivery to the common carrier is not actual delivery, and that, in this case, the goods were actually delivered not in Bengal when they were delivered to the common carrier but in Bihar when they were deliv<; red to the purchaser. This contention of the appellant must also be rejected.\n\nIn the result, the appeal should, in my judgment, be rejected with costs.\n\nSrNHA J.-1 have had the advantage of perusing the judgments prepared by my brothers, . S. R. Das, N.\n\nBhagwati, B.\n\nJagannadhadas and\n\nT. L.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar. After a careful and anxious consideration of the two viewpoints contained in the judgments respectively of my brother S. R. Das holding that the previous decision of this court in The\n\nState of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(2) should be overruled, and of my brother T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar that it should be followed, I have come to the conclusion that the latter view is more acceptable.\n\nWe are all agreed that the present case is governed\n\n(l) 11 Q.B.D. 356, 3M.\n\n(:!) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVe•katarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nSinha].\n\nby the previous decision of this Court just referred to and that if that case lays down the correct rule of law, this appeal should be dismissed. We are also agreed that the language of article 286 of the Constitution on which the case depends is not felicitous and free from vagueness, with the result that the interpretation of that article is not free from doubt and difficulty.\n\nThe very fact that in the case referred to, as also in the later decision of this Court reported in State of Travancore-Cochin v.\n\nShanmugha Vilas Cashetl! Nut Factory( ) involving the construction of article 286, the Court was divided in its opinion shows that the interpretation of the articles in question is by no means easy. The fact that the Court is sharply divided in the present case also emphasizes the difficulty. The question we have to determine at the outset is whether or not we should follow the previous decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.('). We are all agreed that in a proper case it is permissible for this Court to go back upon its previous decision; but we are again divided as to whether this is a fit occasion for reviewing its previous decision. For the reasons given by my brothers, Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Aiyar, I would agree with them in holding that sufficient grounds have not been made out for overruling that decision which had been taken after hearing all the parties interested in the result of the case.\n\nNot only the parties directly concerned with the case but a number of States by way of interveners as in the present case were also heard. After giving a very full hearing the Court gave its judgment which is a very elaborate one,-the report of the case running into 60 pages in print.\n\nIt is true that much can be said for the opposite view as adumbrated in the judgment of my brother S. R. Das; but, in my opinion, simply because another view may be taken of the points in controversy is not a sufficient justification for our reviewing the previous judgment of this Court. It has not been suggested that any relevant provisions of the Indian Constitution or any\n\n(I) [1954] S.C.R. 53.\n\n(2) [1953) S.C.R. 1069.\n\n'>ther provision of law had been overlooked by this Court when it pronounced its previous ruling; nor has it been suggested that this Court on the previous occasion proceeded on erroneous suppositions.\n\nUnder the Constitution and even otherwise this Court is naturally looked upon by the country as the custodian of law and the Constitution, and if this Court were to review its previous decisions simply on the ground that another view is possible, the litigant public may be encouraged to think that it is always worthwhile taking a chance with the highest court in the land.\n\nDefiniteness and certainty of the legal position are essential conditions for the growth of the rule of law.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, this Court should review its previous decisions only in exceptional circumstances as is the practice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the cases referred to by my brothers Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Aiyar.\n\nIf this Court has taken a view of the relevant provisions of the Constitution which does not commend itself to the acceptance of the Legislature, the latter can make necessary amendments, as has been done in the recent past.\n\nComing to the merits of the case in hand, we are all agreed that the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution has created a legal fiction as a result of which a transaction of sale or a purchase partaking of an inter-State character has been treated as a domestic transaction. The fiction has localized sales or purchases contemplated by the Explanation, by converting such transactions as would otherwise have been inter-State sales or purchases into sales or purchases inside one State in a sense in which it is placed in a class distinct and separate from what is referred to as sales or purchases \"outside the State\" in , the main body of article .286(1) (a) which prohibits imposition of tax by any State. There is a general agreement amongst us, I take it, that the main purpose of creating the fiction is to prevent multiple taxation of the same transaction, but, it may be added, not altogether to stop the taxation of such transac tions.\n\nWe are also agreed that full effect must\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand ot/.trs\n\nSin.'1a J.\n\nTht Btngal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and othtrs\n\nSinha].\n\nbe given to the legal fiction on the supposition that the putative state of affairs is the real one. While thus agreeing on the general principle bearing on the question of the. purpose and scope of a legal fiction, we are again divided on the question of how far the legal fiction should be carried in its actual application.\n\nFor the reasons given by my brother Venkatarama Aiyar, I agree with him that the fiction created by the Explanation brings such a sale within the taxing power of the State within which such a sale is said to have taken place. Such a result is brought about not by holding that the Explanation has conferred positively the power on the relevant State to impose sales tax, but by holding that such an inside sale is beyond the scope of the prohibition contained in the main body of article 286(1)(a) which interdicts the imposition of a tax on a sale \"outside the State\". The Explanation has got to be read as an integral part of article 286(1) ( :i.) and thus read, it means negatively that a sale or purcha, se outside a State cannot be taxed; and by necessary , implication, that a sale or purchase inside a State may be taxed by that State as falling outside the mischief of the prohibition directed against the imposition of a tax on a sale or purchase of goods outside a State; in other words, as soon as a sale or purchase of goods is declared to be outside the pale of the prohibition contained in article Z86(l)(a), the State's power of imposing a tax contained in article 246 read wil'11 item 54 of List II of the 7th Schedule comes into operation. I do not find myself in agreement with the view propounded by my brother S. R. Das chiefly because that view goes beyond the purpose of the creation Qf the fiction which admittedly was to prevent multiple taxation. The view as propounded by him besides preventing multiple taxation goes to the length of prohibiting any irnposititm of sales tax by any State.\n\nSuch, in my opinion, was not the intention of the Constitution.\n\nWhereas the imposition of multiple sales tax on transactions of sale or purchase may be an obstacle to the free flow of inland trade and commerce, the impo<..ition of sales tax by a single State in which the sale is\n\ndeemed to have taken place by virtue of the Explanation cannot be predicated as having such an effect.\n\nThe view propounded by my learned brother Venkatarama Aipr is thus not inconsistent with the avowed purpose of the Constitution, as expressed in article\n\n301. wb; ch provides that trade, commerce and intercourse shall be free throughout the territory of India.\n\nIn my opinion, the view propounded by my learned brother S.\n\nDas about the actual application of the legal fiction stops short of giving full effect to that fiction.\n\nAllied with this question is the controversy a~ to. whether clause (2) of article 286 is subject to article 286(1) (a) re:id with the Explanation or /lice versa.\n\nIn my opinion, for the reasons given by my ieamed brother Vcnkatarama Aivar the hetter view is that clause (2) of article 286 of the Constitutior~ is subject to article 286(1 )(a) read with the Explanation. On the whole, therefore, I would agree\n\n\\\\'ith the view d1at the previous decision of this Court in 1953 S.C.R. 1069 should continue to hold good :md govern the present controvcrsv also.\n\nIn that view of the matter I would dismiss this appeal with costs.\n\nBY THE CouRT.-The appeal is allowed and an order shall be issued directing that, until Parliament by law provides otherwise, the State of Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing Sales Tax on out-of- State dealers in respect of sales or purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or purchases for consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the appellant in this Court and in the Court below.\n\nThe interveners must bear and pay their own costs.\n\n16-84 S. C. India/59.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmm1.nity Co111panr Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bihar and others\n\nSinha).", "total_entities": 1299, "entities": [{"text": "603\n\nTHE BENGAL IMMUNITY COMPANY LIMITED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE BENGAL IMMUNITY COMPANY LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ST ATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. 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"label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 622, "end_char": 643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 645, "end_char": 650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XIX of 1947", "statute": "Bihar Act XIX of 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 801, "end_char": 809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XIX of 1947", "statute": "Bihar Act XIX of 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 924, "end_char": 932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XIX of 1947", "statute": "Bihar Act XIX of 1947"}}, {"text": "Meaning of-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 933, "end_char": 969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 971, "end_char": 976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "Meaning of-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company, having its registered office in Calcutta and its factory and laboratory in the District of 24-Parganas in \\Vest Bengal, carried on the business of manufacturing and selling sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1472, "end_char": 1477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its products haYing extensive sales throughout India and abroad were despatched from Calcutta against orders accepted by the appellant company in Calcutt'1."}}, {"text": "Calcutt'1", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1571, "end_char": 1580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its products haYing extensive sales throughout India and abroad were despatched from Calcutta against orders accepted by the appellant company in Calcutt'1."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1613, "end_char": 1618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had no agent or manager in Bihar nor any office or laboratory in that State."}}, {"text": "s. 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1678, "end_char": 1686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "Meaning of-Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1694, "end_char": 1719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1897, "end_char": 1918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notice under s. 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 was issued by the Bihar Sales Tax authorities calling upon the appellar:t company to apply for registration and to submit returns showing its turn over for a period between the 26th of January, 1950 and 30th September 1951."}}, {"text": "30th September 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2292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained that all sales in West Bengal or in any other State under which goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purposes of consumption in that State were liable to Bihar Sales Tax."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2322, "end_char": 2333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained that all sales in West Bengal or in any other State under which goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purposes of consumption in that State were liable to Bihar Sales Tax."}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2579, "end_char": 2598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately the appellant company presented before the High Court at Patna a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 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((1953] S.C.R. 1069) and by Das J. in S1111e of TravM1cor11-CocAit1 v. Shanmuglla Vilas Cashuv Nut Factory ([1954] S.C.R. 53) Articll!"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8326, "end_char": 8329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accerdirtg to die vit:w ellpre!SCd by Bose J. in The Sllltc of Bombay v. Tht United Motors (India) Ltd. ((1953] S.C.R. 1069) and by Das J. in S1111e of TravM1cor11-CocAit1 v. Shanmuglla Vilas Cashuv Nut Factory ([1954] S.C.R. 53) Articll!"}}, {"text": "S1111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8336, "end_char": 8341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8692, "end_char": 8706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8913, "end_char": 8927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "used by the legislature wh11n it intends that a particular provision in the Statute should be subject to or override\n\nThe B<l!gal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limiltd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand othas\n\nTu Bengal\n\n1 .. mu11it1 Company L1mittd v.\n\nTu Stale ef Bihar\n\nand olhns\n\nanother.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9186, "end_char": 9197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9223, "end_char": 9234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9439, "end_char": 9450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(J)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9564, "end_char": 9578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9767, "end_char": 9781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10207, "end_char": 10221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10229, "end_char": 10250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10314, "end_char": 10347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th December 1952 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Misc."}}, {"text": "N. 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"article\n\n286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17685, "end_char": 17703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17923, "end_char": 17934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Slilll of Bih•", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18014, "end_char": 18028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the Federal\n\n1'955\n\nTh• Bea,..t\n\nlmmunil, J Company Limited\n\nv • The Slilll of Bih•\n\nand other<\n\nTh~ Bngal\n\nImmunity Cumpany Limittd v.\n\nThe Stall of Bihar\n\nand othos\n\nLegislature had extra-territorial power under the Government of India Act, 1935 the Provincial Legis- _ lature did not have such power."}}, {"text": "Legislature had extra-territorial power under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18113, "end_char": 18192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18368, "end_char": 18385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Poppatlal Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18576, "end_char": 18590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Decision of the Supreme Court in Poppatlal Shah's case is applicable to component parts of the same State; Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras ([1953]' S.C.R. 677), The State of Bombay v.\n\nThe United hfotors (India) Ltd. ([1953] S.C.R. 1069,\n\n1078) and The Governor-General in Council v.\n\nThe Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. ([1944] F.C.R. 229).", "canonical_name": "Poppatlal Shah"}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18867, "end_char": 18884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19021, "end_char": 19042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19222, "end_char": 19233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajeswari Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19315, "end_char": 19331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Rajeswari Prasad and S. P. 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Sinha and R.C. Prasad,.", "canonical_name": "B. P.\n\nSINHA"}}, {"text": "R.C. Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20036, "end_char": 20047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha (B.K.P. Sinha and R.C. 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K.- T. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24152, "end_char": 24167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K.- T. Chari, Advocate-General of Mlldras\n\n(K.\n\nVeerasami, with him) for the State of Madras (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "K.\n\nVeerasami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24199, "end_char": 24212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K.- T. Chari, Advocate-General of Mlldras\n\n(K.\n\nVeerasami, with him) for the State of Madras (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24232, "end_char": 24247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K.- T. Chari, Advocate-General of Mlldras\n\n(K.\n\nVeerasami, with him) for the State of Madras (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "Reference was made to Charter Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25071, "end_char": 25104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25114, "end_char": 25119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference was made to Charter Act", "statute": "Reference was made to Charter Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25121, "end_char": 25150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25152, "end_char": 25157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25497, "end_char": 25526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25978, "end_char": 25992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "T. L. Shet1de", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26053, "end_char": 26066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shet1de, Adt1ocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and M. Adhikari (I. N. Shroff, with them) for the State of Madhya Pradesh (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26089, "end_char": 26103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shet1de, Adt1ocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and M. Adhikari (I. N. Shroff, with them) for the State of Madhya Pradesh (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "M. Adhikari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26108, "end_char": 26119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shet1de, Adt1ocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and M. Adhikari (I. N. Shroff, with them) for the State of Madhya Pradesh (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26121, "end_char": 26133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shet1de, Adt1ocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and M. Adhikari (I. N. Shroff, with them) for the State of Madhya Pradesh (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26154, "end_char": 26177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shet1de, Adt1ocate-General of Madhya Pradesh and M. Adhikari (I. N. Shroff, with them) for the State of Madhya Pradesh (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26242, "end_char": 26256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26410, "end_char": 26421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 394", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27158, "end_char": 27169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27434, "end_char": 27445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Punjab (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27475, "end_char": 27485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Punjab (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27490, "end_char": 27503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Punjab (Intervener).", "canonical_name": "P. G.\n\nGokhale"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27523, "end_char": 27538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Punjab (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27553, "end_char": 27570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27576, "end_char": 27590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28231, "end_char": 28253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Mysore, K. S. Hajela, Advocate- General of Rajasthan (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28284, "end_char": 28301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Mysore, K. S. Hajela, Advocate- General of Rajasthan (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28306, "end_char": 28319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Mysore, K. S. Hajela, Advocate- General of Rajasthan (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the.", "canonical_name": "P. G.\n\nGokhale"}}, {"text": "K. S. Hajela", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28356, "end_char": 28368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Mysore, K. S. Hajela, Advocate- General of Rajasthan (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the."}}, {"text": "Lachman Das Kaushal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28456, "end_char": 28475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/\" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.\n\nGokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28554, "end_char": 28567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/\" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.\n\nGokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28572, "end_char": 28581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/\" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.\n\nGokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28615, "end_char": 28626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/\" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.\n\nGokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G.\n\nGokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28631, "end_char": 28645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/\" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.\n\nGokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent.", "canonical_name": "P. G.\n\nGokhale"}}, {"text": "T. R. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28675, "end_char": 28693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/\" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.\n\nGokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28698, "end_char": 28720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State 9f Rajasthan, Lachman Das Kaushal, Advocate-Genera/\" of Pepsu (P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the State of Pepsu, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, P. A. Mehta and P. G.\n\nGokhale, for the State of Orissa and T. R. Balakrishnan and Sardar Bahadur Saharya, for the State of Travancore-Cochin (Interveners ), supported the respondent."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28800, "end_char": 28815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterji replied.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "S. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28862, "end_char": 28871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of S. R. Das, Acting Chief Justice, Bose and Jafer Imam JJ.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "Jafer Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28904, "end_char": 28914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of S. R. Das, Acting Chief Justice, Bose and Jafer Imam JJ.", "canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM JJ."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28968, "end_char": 28976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati,\n\nf agannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar and B. P. Sinha JJ.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW.ATI"}}, {"text": "f agannadhadas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28979, "end_char": 28993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati,\n\nf agannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar and B. P. Sinha JJ.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28995, "end_char": 29012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati,\n\nf agannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar and B. P. Sinha JJ.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "B. P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29017, "end_char": 29028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati,\n\nf agannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar and B. P. Sinha JJ.", "canonical_name": "B. P.\n\nSINHA"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29326, "end_char": 29337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Baranagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29961, "end_char": 29970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its registered head office is at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the district of 24-Perganas in West Bengal."}}, {"text": "24th October 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30460, "end_char": 30477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th October 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant company which concluded as follows :-\n\n\"Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act."}}, {"text": "Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30606, "end_char": 30703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "18th December, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30849, "end_char": 30868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th December, 1951 a notice was issued by the Superintendent, Commercial Taxes, Central Circle Bihar, Patna calling upon the appellant company (i) to apply for registration and (ii) to submit returns showing its turnover for the period commencing from the 26th January, 1950 and ending with the 30th\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni!J: Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Actg."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30952, "end_char": 30957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th December, 1951 a notice was issued by the Superintendent, Commercial Taxes, Central Circle Bihar, Patna calling upon the appellant company (i) to apply for registration and (ii) to submit returns showing its turnover for the period commencing from the 26th January, 1950 and ending with the 30th\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni!J: Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Actg."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31155, "end_char": 31161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th December, 1951 a notice was issued by the Superintendent, Commercial Taxes, Central Circle Bihar, Patna calling upon the appellant company (i) to apply for registration and (ii) to submit returns showing its turnover for the period commencing from the 26th January, 1950 and ending with the 30th\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni!J: Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Actg."}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31377, "end_char": 31390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31398, "end_char": 31423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31576, "end_char": 31589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32354, "end_char": 32364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32399, "end_char": 32410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "4th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32515, "end_char": 32530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suffice it to say that while the appellant company denied its liability on the ground, inter alia, that it was not resident in Bihar, it carried on no business there, none of its sales took place in Bihar and that it did not collect any sales tax from any person of that State, the Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained that under section 33, which was substantially based on article 286 of the Constitution and was inserted in the Act by the' President's Adaptation Order promulgated on the 4th April, 1951, all sales in West Bengal or any other State under which the goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purpose of consumption in that State were liable to Bihar Sales Tax."}}, {"text": "29th May, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32765, "end_char": 32779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually on the 29th May, 1952 the Assistant Superintendent of Sales Tax, Bihar called upon the appellant company to comply with the notice by the 14th June, 1952 and threatened that, in default of compliance, he would proceed to take steps for assessment to the best of his judgment."}}, {"text": "7th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33081, "end_char": 33095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company by its letter dated the 7th June, 1952 characterised the notice under section 13\n\n(5) as ultra vires and entirely illegal and called upon the Superintendent to forthwith rescind and cancel the same."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33127, "end_char": 33137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33263, "end_char": 33278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th June, 1952 the appellant company presented before the High Court at Patna a petition under article 226 claiming the reliefs hereinbefore mentioned."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33359, "end_char": 33370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "4th December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33681, "end_char": 33699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court dismissed the petition on the 4th December, 1952 but on the next day issued a certificate, under article 132(1) of the Constitption, that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33748, "end_char": 33762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33990, "end_char": 33996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the importance of the issues involved in this 'appeal the States of Madras, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa, Punjab, Pepsu, Mysore, 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K.\n\nKuriakose."}}, {"text": "M. K.\n\nKuriakose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34262, "end_char": 34278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Si111ilar leave was applied for by and was granted to Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., and one\n\nM. K.\n\nKuriakose.", "canonical_name": "M. K.\n\nKuriakose"}}, {"text": "Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34307, "end_char": 34337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., and M. K. Kuriakose have supported the appellant company while the rest of the intervcners have opposed the appeal."}}, {"text": "M. K. Kuriakose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34343, "end_char": 34358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., and M. K. Kuriakose have supported the appellant company while the rest of the intervcners have opposed the appeal.", "canonical_name": "M. 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36625, "end_char": 36635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36702, "end_char": 36712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36807, "end_char": 36817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36820, "end_char": 36830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37075, "end_char": 37088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37716, "end_char": 37726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38399, "end_char": 38409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38482, "end_char": 38492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38542, "end_char": 38552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42569, "end_char": 42580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43298, "end_char": 43312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43345, "end_char": 43359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43463, "end_char": 43477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43515, "end_char": 43531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43536, "end_char": 43550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43566, "end_char": 43591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43926, "end_char": 43937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44105, "end_char": 44116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44245, "end_char": 44256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax 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{"linked_statute_text": "Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "articles 301 and 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44941, "end_char": 44961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45179, "end_char": 45190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45946, "end_char": 45952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has, accordingly, been pressed upon us that we are not hound by the maiority decision in that appeal from Bombay and that it 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(3)."}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47858, "end_char": 47867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court in Australia, which is the highest Court in that Commonwealth, has not adopted such a rigid rule."}}, {"text": "Tramways", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47961, "end_char": 47969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Tramways case (4) the rule was thus laid down by Griffith, C.J. at p. 58:\n\n\"In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain an abstract proposition that Court is either legally or technically bound by previous decisions."}}, {"text": "Griffith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48010, "end_char": 48018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Tramways case (4) the rule was thus laid down by Griffith, C.J. at p. 58:\n\n\"In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain an abstract proposition that Court is either legally or technically bound by previous decisions.", "canonical_name": "Griffiths"}}, {"text": "Barton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48818, "end_char": 48824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same case Barton, J. m the concluding paragraph of his judgment at p. 69 expressed himself thus:\n\n\"In conclusi9p, I would say that l never thought\n\n(I) L.R. 19H K.B. 718 C.A.\n\n(3) 1939 A.C. 215, 245."}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nImmunit, J Company Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49059, "end_char": 49093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunit, J Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nar.d others\n\nDas Actg.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "hyhrow", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49733, "end_char": 49739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the prior decision was that of little more than half their number might be urged with greater fairness, but it cannot be urged against W hyhrow's case which was decichl by the whole Court then .in existence save the Justice who as President of the Arbitration Court, ."}}, {"text": "Per Griffith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50291, "end_char": 50303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to be treated as open to review (Per Griffith, C.J. at p. 58) although in the end, after reviewing the position afresh in the light of new arguments advanced before it, the Court came to the same conclusion."}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50578, "end_char": 50601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co.(') may also be referred to as an instance where the High Court of Australia departed from its previous decision."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50647, "end_char": 50671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States of America there have been a considerable number of cases in which the Supreme\n\nCourt has explicitly and avowedly overruled its prior decisions but there have been more insta11ces in which the doctrines declared in prior cases have been in paf."}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50732, "end_char": 50746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States of America there have been a considerable number of cases in which the Supreme\n\nCourt has explicitly and avowedly overruled its prior decisions but there have been more insta11ces in which the doctrines declared in prior cases have been in paf."}}, {"text": "Brandies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51082, "end_char": 51090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In State of Washington v.\n\nDawson & Co.( '), Brandies, J. in his dissenting ju, lgment said :\n\n\"The doctrine of .<tare deci.<is should not deter us from overruling that case and those which follow it."}}, {"text": "S. 646", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51276, "end_char": 51282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lurton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52083, "end_char": 52089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In another dissenting judgment in David Burnet v.\n\nCoronado Oil & Gas Company(1) the same learned Judge, after quoting a passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice Lurton in Hertz v. Woodman( 2 ) proceeded to say:\n\n\"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled right."}}, {"text": "S. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52312, "end_char": 52317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Frankforter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52947, "end_char": 52958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "< v. People of tl1e State of Nefll York(3) Frankforter, J. observed :\n\n\"Judicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference to an act like our Constitution, drawn in many particular~ with purposed vagueness so as to leave room for the unfolding future.", "canonical_name": "Frankforter"}}, {"text": "S. 393", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53248, "end_char": 53254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 205, 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53281, "end_char": 53292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53328, "end_char": 53334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nbnmunity Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53355, "end_char": 53387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nbnmunity Company Limited\n\nv, The Stll.te of Bihar\n\nmu/ others\n\nDas Actg.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55437, "end_char": 55444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, in Phanindra Chandra Neogy v. The King(') Lord Simonds said at p. 88 :\n\n(I) L.R. 1929 A.G. 242; A.LR."}}, {"text": "Gill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56147, "end_char": 56151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Recognising the possibility, they have heard full argument and, having done so, see no reason to doubt the validity of the reasoning of the correctness of the conclusion in Gill's case, and they do not think it necessary to repeat what was said there\"."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57106, "end_char": 57120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in a country governed by a federal constitution, such as the United States of America and the Union of India are, it is bv no means easy to amend the Constitution if an erroneous interpretation is put upon it by this Court. ("}}, {"text": "article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57241, "end_char": 57252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 57522, "end_char": 57546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The considerations adverted to in the decisions of the Supreme Court of America quoted above are, therefore, apposite and apply in full force in determining whether a previous decision of this Court should or."}}, {"text": "corresponding provision of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58270, "end_char": 58330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59632, "end_char": 59650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59681, "end_char": 59695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travanrore-Cochin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60025, "end_char": 60042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Bhagwati J. had then expre5'ed the views he is now doing, ther> the maioritv in the Bomhav appeal would haYe been 3 to 2 and if we add the oninion of the dissenting fudge in the Travanrore-Cochin appeal 1hen judicial opinion would\n\n(I) (1954] 5 S.C..R. 53."}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmwtity Company Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62288, "end_char": 62320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmwtity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Aclg.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "Bibar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62926, "end_char": 62931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, Bihar is claiming to tax the appellant company, an out-of-the-State seller, by virtue of the majority decision and all other States intervening and supporting Bibar read the judgment in that way and none of them accepts the quoted passage as containing the actual ratio decidendi of the majority judgment."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66498, "end_char": 66512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B1ragal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 66769, "end_char": 66776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The B1ragal\n\nlmmunitv\n\nCompan_;~ Liinited\n\nThe State of Bif1ar\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg."}}, {"text": "State of Bif1ar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 66812, "end_char": 66827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The B1ragal\n\nlmmunitv\n\nCompan_;~ Liinited\n\nThe State of Bif1ar\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67786, "end_char": 67797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68120, "end_char": 68131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Heydon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68381, "end_char": 68387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case(') was decided that-\n\n\". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69357, "end_char": 69364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In , re Mayfair Property Company( 1 ) Lindley, M.R. in 1898 found the rule \"as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case\"."}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69432, "end_char": 69436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In , re Mayfair Property Company( 1 ) Lindley, M.R. in 1898 found the rule \"as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case\"."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70022, "end_char": 70033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70514, "end_char": 70530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position with respect to taxation on sales or purchases of goods that prevailed in the country had better be stated in the language of Patanjali Sastri, C. J. who delivered the majority judgment in the State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra).", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "State of Biliat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71062, "end_char": 71077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) 1948 F.C.R. I. 3-84 S. C. India/59\n\nThe Bncgal\n\nImmuniry Campany Limilt4\n\nThe State of Biliat'\n\nand othws\n\nDas Actg.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Bmga.l\n\nImmunity Co1t1p\"ny LimiUd\n\nTilt Slat• of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71112, "end_char": 71166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J-\n\nThe Bmga.l\n\nImmunity Co1t1p\"ny LimiUd\n\nTilt Slat• of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nD•s Actg."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72058, "end_char": 72063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assam and Bengal made, among other thing~ the actual existence of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxabilitv."}}, {"text": "articles 286, 301 and 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73441, "end_char": 73466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 301 and 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73526, "end_char": 73546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73599, "end_char": 73610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74233, "end_char": 74244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75356, "end_char": 75376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce: Provided that the President may by order direct\n\nThi Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nT ht State of BibMr\n\nMruf ot/ierJ\n\nD•s .dctg.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "State of Bihat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 75450, "end_char": 75464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J.\n\nTire Bmg•I\n\n/111munil)' ComjJtmJ Limited\n\nThe State of Bihat\n\ntJNl t1lhlrs\n\nDas)Actg.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76173, "end_char": 76184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76646, "end_char": 76657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 76783, "end_char": 76801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The marginal note to article 286 is \"Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods'', which, unlike the marginal notes in Acts of the British Parliament, is part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly, prima facie, furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the article."}}, {"text": "section 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77220, "end_char": 77234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77242, "end_char": 77271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77294, "end_char": 77337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Legislatures enacted Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77535, "end_char": 77569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78540, "end_char": 78554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislatures enacted Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Legislatures enacted Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78592, "end_char": 78608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78810, "end_char": 78821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "St ate of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79996, "end_char": 80011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\n; he Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThe St ate of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80289, "end_char": 80300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 81845, "end_char": 81856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A law made by West Bengal without the assent of the Prcsi:knt taxing this sale will he unconstitutional because ( l) it wiJI offend article 286(1) (a) as the sale has taken place outside tlic territory by .virtue of the Explar1'1tion to clause (1) (a), (2) it will also offend article 286(2) as the sale has taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and (3) such law will also be contrary to article 286(3) as the goods are\n\nessential commodities and the President's assent to the law was not obtained as required by clause (3) of article 286."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81963, "end_char": 81977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82108, "end_char": 82122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82240, "end_char": 82254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82379, "end_char": 82390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82548, "end_char": 82562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87285, "end_char": 87296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90291, "end_char": 90305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92073, "end_char": 92087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Stall of Bi/uzr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 93709, "end_char": 93724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J.\n\nThe Bmgfl/\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nv. 1'11.e Stall of Bi/uzr\n\nand others\n\nJJas Actg.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94299, "end_char": 94313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vilas Cashew Nut Factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99645, "end_char": 99669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (supra) at pp."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100006, "end_char": 100017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100154, "end_char": 100165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100934, "end_char": 100945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Europe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 106286, "end_char": 106292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are many conflicting theories: One, which is more popular and frequently put forward and is referred to :irid m:iy, indeed, be urged to have been adopted bv the Constitution in the non-obstante clause of the F:xplanation, favours the place where the property in the goods passes, another which is said to be the\n\nAmerican view and which was adopted in G. Govindaraju/11 Naidu & Co. v. The State of Madras( 1) fixes upon the place where the contract is concluded, a third which prevails in the continental countries of Europe prefers the place where the goods sold are actually deli- Yered, a tourth ooims to the place where the essential ingredients which go to make up a sale are most densely grouped."}}, {"text": "Article 286( 1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106694, "end_char": 106713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107180, "end_char": 107197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlinmunity Company Limittd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 107473, "end_char": 107506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J-\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlinmunity Company Limittd ,- T h6 Stall of Bihar\n\nand ot/; e's\n\nDas Act:."}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112063, "end_char": 112095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nDas Actg.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112530, "end_char": 112541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112649, "end_char": 112663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112738, "end_char": 112752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116097, "end_char": 116108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limi1t~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 116579, "end_char": 116611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limi1t~\n\n\"· The Stale of Billa•\n\nand others\n\nDas Act.~. C.].", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117900, "end_char": 117911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gurgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 119293, "end_char": 119300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take, for instance, a case where both the seller and the buyer reside and carrv on business in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 119381, "end_char": 119386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Let us say that the seller has a godown in the State of Delhi where his goods are stored and that the buyer has also a retail shop at Connaught Circus also in the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Connaught Circus", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 119459, "end_char": 119475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Let us say that the seller has a godown in the State of Delhi where his goods are stored and that the buyer has also a retail shop at Connaught Circus also in the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Connaught", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 120266, "end_char": 120275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a direct result of this sale the seller's gcxlown-keeper, on the presentation of this delivery order, actually deliver_s the goods to the buyer's retail shop at Connaught ircus for consumption in the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Benpal\n\nimmunity Company Limikd\n\nTM State of Bihcr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 121240, "end_char": 121290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nThe Benpal\n\nimmunity Company Limikd\n\nTM State of Bihcr\n\nand othLrs\n\nDm ..4.cl.(·"}}, {"text": "State of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 121425, "end_char": 121439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It these postulates are accepted then by virtue of clause ( 1) (a) read with the Explanation the State of Delhi alone will be entitled to impose a tax on such a sale or purchase and the State of Punjab will be precluded from doing so bv reason of the fictional sitt<S assigned to such a sale or purchose by the Explanation, although the contract was made, price was paid and symbolical or constructive delivery of the goods by the handing over of the delivery order took place in Gurgaon in the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124002, "end_char": 124004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124913, "end_char": 124923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125968, "end_char": 125975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128794, "end_char": 128805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129009, "end_char": 129026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129128, "end_char": 129143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129197, "end_char": 129207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129529, "end_char": 129540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129750, "end_char": 129764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129823, "end_char": 129840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130456, "end_char": 130463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 132051, "end_char": 132065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar is not obliged to levy a sales tax on sales or purchases of goods in respect of which there is competition between out-of-State producers, manufacturers and dealers and the Bihar producers, manufacturers and dealers and, indeed, if it intends to encourage its local manufac!llrers or producers it should not do so."}}, {"text": "Das Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134975, "end_char": 134982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135256, "end_char": 135267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Tho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 135300, "end_char": 135326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If big Bihar purchasers, e.g., Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., who are very heavy consumers of coal, prefer to get their supply of coal from Ranigunge coal fields in West Bengal for consumption in their large factories at Tatanagar in Bihar to getting their supplies from the Jharia coal fields in Bihar and thereby evade sales tax to the detriment of the revenues of the State of Bihar, then again there is Parliament to mitigate such hardship by malting suitable laws in exercise of its power under article 286(2)."}}, {"text": "Tatanagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 135487, "end_char": 135496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If big Bihar purchasers, e.g., Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., who are very heavy consumers of coal, prefer to get their supply of coal from Ranigunge coal fields in West Bengal for consumption in their large factories at Tatanagar in Bihar to getting their supplies from the Jharia coal fields in Bihar and thereby evade sales tax to the detriment of the revenues of the State of Bihar, then again there is Parliament to mitigate such hardship by malting suitable laws in exercise of its power under article 286(2)."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135766, "end_char": 135780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Tho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135887, "end_char": 135898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Tho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135965, "end_char": 135979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Act", "statute": "Tho State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nDas Act"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136016, "end_char": 136027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136069, "end_char": 136088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136236, "end_char": 136250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136734, "end_char": 136745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138391, "end_char": 138405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United Motors (India) Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 141514, "end_char": 141540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For all the foregoing reasons we are definitely of opinion that, until Parliament by law made in exercise of the powers vested in it by clause (2) provides otherwise, no State can impose or authorise the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases of goods when such sales or purchases take place m the course of inter-State trade or commerce and the majority decision ir: Tlie State of Bombay v.\n\nThe United Motors (India) Ltd.\n\n(supra) in so far as it decides to the contrary cannot be accepted as well founded on principle or auth<>rity.", "canonical_name": "United Motors (India) Ltd."}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141878, "end_char": 141903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142600, "end_char": 142612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "By the Bihar Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142860, "end_char": 142890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 143113, "end_char": 143130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period we are concerned with in this appeal is from 26th January 1950 to the 30th September 1951."}}, {"text": "1st October 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 143168, "end_char": 143184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 1st October 1948 and 31st March 1951 which covers the earlier part of the relevant period the clause stood as follows :-\n\n\"Sale\" means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire-purchase or other instalment system of payment shall,\n\nnotwithst:inding the fact that the seller retains a title 5-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nTill &tiff\" Co~\n\nThi Stall of Biltar\n\nand othm\n\nDas A•tg."}}, {"text": "31st March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 143189, "end_char": 143204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 1st October 1948 and 31st March 1951 which covers the earlier part of the relevant period the clause stood as follows :-\n\n\"Sale\" means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire-purchase or other instalment system of payment shall,\n\nnotwithst:inding the fact that the seller retains a title 5-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nTill &tiff\" Co~\n\nThi Stall of Biltar\n\nand othm\n\nDas A•tg."}}, {"text": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 144012, "end_char": 144112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144259, "end_char": 144268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "st April 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 144783, "end_char": 144796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st April 1951 and the 31st March 1952 which covers the latter part of the relevant period it read as follows:- \" 'sale' means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for 'cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire purcha<e or other instalment system of payment shall, notwithstanding the fact that the seller retains a title to any goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale : Provided further that the sale of goods in respect of a forward contract, whether goods under such contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery."}}, {"text": "31st March 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 144805, "end_char": 144820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st April 1951 and the 31st March 1952 which covers the latter part of the relevant period it read as follows:- \" 'sale' means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for 'cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire purcha<e or other instalment system of payment shall, notwithstanding the fact that the seller retains a title to any goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed to be a sale : Provided further that the sale of goods in respect of a forward contract, whether goods under such contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146137, "end_char": 146154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146235, "end_char": 146247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146274, "end_char": 146283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5, 6, 7 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146356, "end_char": 146378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146909, "end_char": 146921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147204, "end_char": 147218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147373, "end_char": 147383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article\n\n286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147510, "end_char": 147522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147571, "end_char": 147582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148268, "end_char": 148279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "is no reason to presume that had the Bihar Legislature known that the provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148929, "end_char": 149020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149839, "end_char": 149847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI J.-I agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached in the judgment just delivered by my Brother S. R. Das.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW.ATI"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150242, "end_char": 150255, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "26th January\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 151557, "end_char": 151575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th October 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, headquarters Patna, wrote to the Appellant to get itself registered under .the Bihar Sales Tax Act and to take necessary steps to deposit the Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar treasury at an early date, contending that all sales in West Bengal in which the goods had been delivered in the State of Bihar as a direct result of the sale for the purpose of consumption in Bihar were leviable to Bihar Sales Tax with effect from the 26th January\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "18th December 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 151699, "end_char": 151717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant denied the right of the State of Bihar to tax the sales effected in West Bengal and by his letter dated the 18th December 1951 the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar sent a notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act to the Appellant calling upon it to apply for registration and to submit the return, showing its turn-over for the period from the 26th January 1950 to the 30th September 1951."}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151800, "end_char": 151813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 152507, "end_char": 152574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar, ultimately by his letter dated the 28th May 1952 rejected the contention of the Appellant and asked it to comply with the notice under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act failing which he threatened to proceed to take steps for assessment to the best of his judgment."}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152711, "end_char": 152724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7th June 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 152897, "end_char": 152910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant thereupon by its letter dated the 7th June 1952 called upon the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar to forthwith rescind and cancel the notice issued under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act as the said notice was ultra vires of the Constitution and also the Bihar Sales Tax Act and was entirely illegal and inoperative."}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153041, "end_char": 153054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153337, "end_char": 153348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Patna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 153749, "end_char": 153806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar, Respondent 1, The Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Patna, Respondent 2 and Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Central Circle, Bihar, Respondent 3 were the opposite parties to the petition."}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154300, "end_char": 154313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154408, "end_char": 154418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 24 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154563, "end_char": 154581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154766, "end_char": 154777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154892, "end_char": 154906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155017, "end_char": 155031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155087, "end_char": 155096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155101, "end_char": 155111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155165, "end_char": 155179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155392, "end_char": 155408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155807, "end_char": 155818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156446, "end_char": 156457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156952, "end_char": 156967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Mysoe", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 157117, "end_char": 157131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing of the appeal before us the State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Calcutta, the State of Madras, the State of Mysoe, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the State ot Orissa, the State of Pepsu, the State of Rajasthan, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Travancore-Cochin, the State of East Punjab and one M. K. Kuriakose applied for and were granted leave to intervene and counsel for the lnterveners appeared before us and urged their respective points of view."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 157137, "end_char": 157159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing of the appeal before us the State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Calcutta, the State of Madras, the State of Mysoe, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the State ot Orissa, the State of Pepsu, the State of Rajasthan, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Travancore-Cochin, the State of East Punjab and one M. K. Kuriakose applied for and were granted leave to intervene and counsel for the lnterveners appeared before us and urged their respective points of view."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 157206, "end_char": 157224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing of the appeal before us the State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Calcutta, the State of Madras, the State of Mysoe, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the State ot Orissa, the State of Pepsu, the State of Rajasthan, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Travancore-Cochin, the State of East Punjab and one M. K. Kuriakose applied for and were granted leave to intervene and counsel for the lnterveners appeared before us and urged their respective points of view."}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 157259, "end_char": 157285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing of the appeal before us the State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Calcutta, the State of Madras, the State of Mysoe, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the State ot Orissa, the State of Pepsu, the State of Rajasthan, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Travancore-Cochin, the State of East Punjab and one M. K. Kuriakose applied for and were granted leave to intervene and counsel for the lnterveners appeared before us and urged their respective points of view."}}, {"text": "State of East Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 157291, "end_char": 157311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing of the appeal before us the State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Calcutta, the State of Madras, the State of Mysoe, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the State ot Orissa, the State of Pepsu, the State of Rajasthan, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Travancore-Cochin, the State of East Punjab and one M. K. Kuriakose applied for and were granted leave to intervene and counsel for the lnterveners appeared before us and urged their respective points of view."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157558, "end_char": 157569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157657, "end_char": 157664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first question as regards the maintainability of a petition for writ under article 226 on the facts disclosed in the petition can be disposed of very shortly in the words of Mahajan, C. J. in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. Tht: State of Madhya Pradesh & Others( 1 ) where he repelled a similar contention urged by the Advocate-General of the State of Madhya Pradesh:-\n\n\"The learned Advocate-General of the State ..... . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh:-", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 157821, "end_char": 157846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first question as regards the maintainability of a petition for writ under article 226 on the facts disclosed in the petition can be disposed of very shortly in the words of Mahajan, C. J. in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. Tht: State of Madhya Pradesh & Others( 1 ) where he repelled a similar contention urged by the Advocate-General of the State of Madhya Pradesh:-\n\n\"The learned Advocate-General of the State ..... . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Raleigh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 157986, "end_char": 157993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "however contended that on the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in Raleigh ln~stment Co.\n\nv. Tht: Governor-General-in-Council( ), jurisdiction to question assessment otherwise than by use of the machinery expressly provided by the Act, was inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay, arising by virtue of the assessment and that the liability to pay the sales tax under the Act is a special liability created by the Act itself which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy which ought to be resorted to, and therefore the remedy by a writ ought not to be allowed to be used for evading the provisions of the Act, especially a fiscal Act ............. : ........... . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. ."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159564, "end_char": 159574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159598, "end_char": 159609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159718, "end_char": 159730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19( 1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160057, "end_char": 160075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160120, "end_char": 160131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160279, "end_char": 160290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160690, "end_char": 160701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 161168, "end_char": 161174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmuniry Compa'!Y Limiud\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "Bengal"}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 161250, "end_char": 161256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nlmmunif:Y Compa1iy Limited ...\n\nThi State of Bilzar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nunder article 226 of the Constitution on the facts disclosed in the appellant's petition,\n\nOn the merits Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing for the appellant urged :- ( 1) That article 286 put a fetter on State Legislature and the explanation did not confer any power on any State Legislature tv levy any taxes but was meant to explain only clause l(a), i.e., what was an outside sale or .", "canonical_name": "Bengal"}}, {"text": "State of Bilzar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 161294, "end_char": 161309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nlmmunif:Y Compa1iy Limited ...\n\nThi State of Bilzar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nunder article 226 of the Constitution on the facts disclosed in the appellant's petition,\n\nOn the merits Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing for the appellant urged :- ( 1) That article 286 put a fetter on State Legislature and the explanation did not confer any power on any State Legislature tv levy any taxes but was meant to explain only clause l(a), i.e., what was an outside sale or .", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161341, "end_char": 161352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 161445, "end_char": 161461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nlmmunif:Y Compa1iy Limited ...\n\nThi State of Bilzar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nunder article 226 of the Constitution on the facts disclosed in the appellant's petition,\n\nOn the merits Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing for the appellant urged :- ( 1) That article 286 put a fetter on State Legislature and the explanation did not confer any power on any State Legislature tv levy any taxes but was meant to explain only clause l(a), i.e., what was an outside sale or .", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161509, "end_char": 161520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161904, "end_char": 161918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162445, "end_char": 162456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162484, "end_char": 162500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162533, "end_char": 162547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162717, "end_char": 162728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162738, "end_char": 162749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163006, "end_char": 163021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163121, "end_char": 163132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "first day of March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 164469, "end_char": 164493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or pur- -chase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes\n\npbce in the course of inter-State trade or commerce : Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which w:is being lawfully le.vied by the Government of any\n\nState immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of March, 1951\"."}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164837, "end_char": 164851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165053, "end_char": 165067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165186, "end_char": 165200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165239, "end_char": 165253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165735, "end_char": 165749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".31st March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 165783, "end_char": 165799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution mav, notwithstanding the provisions of article 286(2), continue to be levied until the .31st March 1951."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165870, "end_char": 165884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tax Act XXIV of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166375, "end_char": 166390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166402, "end_char": 166466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 166561, "end_char": 166576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952 ultra vires the State Legislature and had issued a writ in the nature of mandamus against the State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, directing them to forbear and desist from enforcing the provisions of the said Act against the respondents."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166906, "end_char": 166917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166979, "end_char": 166993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Mukhcrica", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 167122, "end_char": 167131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgment of this Court delivered by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. with which Mukhcrica, J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. concurred held that article 286(l)(a) of the (', onstitution read with the explanation thereto and construed in the light of article 301 ap.d 304 prohibits the taxation of sales or purchases involving inter- Statc elements by all States except the State in which the gOOds arc delivered for the purpose of consumption therein."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 167140, "end_char": 167152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgment of this Court delivered by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. with which Mukhcrica, J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. concurred held that article 286(l)(a) of the (', onstitution read with the explanation thereto and construed in the light of article 301 ap.d 304 prohibits the taxation of sales or purchases involving inter- Statc elements by all States except the State in which the gOOds arc delivered for the purpose of consumption therein."}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167177, "end_char": 167194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167282, "end_char": 167293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The High Court of Bombay had declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167591, "end_char": 167605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168181, "end_char": 168192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168456, "end_char": 168470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168505, "end_char": 168519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168559, "end_char": 168573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168678, "end_char": 168689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168939, "end_char": 168950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169051, "end_char": 169062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169330, "end_char": 169344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170598, "end_char": 170612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171268, "end_char": 171282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171473, "end_char": 171488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172069, "end_char": 172083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172098, "end_char": 172112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172263, "end_char": 172277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172447, "end_char": 172461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172647, "end_char": 172661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172730, "end_char": 172744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\n.lmmunilJI Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 174542, "end_char": 174576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgment stated that the non-obstante clause is inserted in the Explanation simply with a view to make it clear beyond all possible doubt that it is immaterial where the property in the goods passes as it might otherwise\n\nThe Bengal\n\n.lmmunilJI Company Limited\n\ng; The State :f Bihar and others\n\nBhagwati]."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176378, "end_char": 176392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "31st March\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 176922, "end_char": 176938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide and (2) provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on sale or purchase of goods which was being levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be levied until the 31st March\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176959, "end_char": 176976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177102, "end_char": 177116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177454, "end_char": 177468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177540, "end_char": 177554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178203, "end_char": 178217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178225, "end_char": 178239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178708, "end_char": 178722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pataniali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 179719, "end_char": 179735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a divergence of opinion between Pataniali Sastri, C.J., ~.fok herjea, J., Bose, J, and Ghulam Hasan, J, on the one side and S. R Das, J. on the other so far as the construction of the words \"in the course of\" was concerned.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "~.fok herjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 179743, "end_char": 179755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a divergence of opinion between Pataniali Sastri, C.J., ~.fok herjea, J., Bose, J, and Ghulam Hasan, J, on the one side and S. R Das, J. on the other so far as the construction of the words \"in the course of\" was concerned."}}, {"text": "S. R Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 179811, "end_char": 179819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a divergence of opinion between Pataniali Sastri, C.J., ~.fok herjea, J., Bose, J, and Ghulam Hasan, J, on the one side and S. R Das, J. on the other so far as the construction of the words \"in the course of\" was concerned.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179947, "end_char": 179964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180095, "end_char": 180109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180143, "end_char": 180157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 180379, "end_char": 180424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180891, "end_char": 180902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "C.mpanJ Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 183791, "end_char": 183806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.mpanJ Limited\n\nT 1w !"}}, {"text": "Bhagwoli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183830, "end_char": 183838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i\"\".:/,/; ih\"'\n\nBhagwoli J.\n\nthe Explanation has any bearing on that question.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW.ATI"}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184074, "end_char": 184088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184647, "end_char": 184664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184965, "end_char": 184979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185079, "end_char": 185096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 185988, "end_char": 185993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus a dealer in, say, Pepsu who\n\ndelivers gOods to a dealer ir.,"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186792, "end_char": 186803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 187911, "end_char": 187919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the meaning of clause (l)(b)\" ..\n\nIt may be observed that the contentions urged before us by the Appellant are in conformity with the above observations of S.R. Das, J.\n\nNormally speaking the construction put by the majority judgment on the article 286(1), the Explanation thereto and article 286(i) of the Constitution in the Bombay Sales Tax appeal would be the law bind-\n\nThi B1ngol\n\nlllllftllllilw ca,..., Umild\n\nVo Thi $1111 of BW.r -\"\"\"'' B/iogwtdl\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmrmi~ c.,\"ompatt.1, Limited\n\nThi Stale of BihtJr\n\nlld otlidt\n\nBhagwali J.\n\ning on all parties and in the judgment just referrc<l to in the Travancore-Cochin Sales Tax Appeal S. R. Das, r. rightly expressed that decision to be binding on him so long as it stands.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187996, "end_char": 188010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188040, "end_char": 188054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagwali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 188288, "end_char": 188296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the meaning of clause (l)(b)\" ..\n\nIt may be observed that the contentions urged before us by the Appellant are in conformity with the above observations of S.R. Das, J.\n\nNormally speaking the construction put by the majority judgment on the article 286(1), the Explanation thereto and article 286(i) of the Constitution in the Bombay Sales Tax appeal would be the law bind-\n\nThi B1ngol\n\nlllllftllllilw ca,..., Umild\n\nVo Thi $1111 of BW.r -\"\"\"'' B/iogwtdl\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmrmi~ c.,\"ompatt.1, Limited\n\nThi Stale of BihtJr\n\nlld otlidt\n\nBhagwali J.\n\ning on all parties and in the judgment just referrc<l to in the Travancore-Cochin Sales Tax Appeal S. R. Das, r. rightly expressed that decision to be binding on him so long as it stands.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW.ATI"}}, {"text": "S. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 188400, "end_char": 188409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the meaning of clause (l)(b)\" ..\n\nIt may be observed that the contentions urged before us by the Appellant are in conformity with the above observations of S.R. Das, J.\n\nNormally speaking the construction put by the majority judgment on the article 286(1), the Explanation thereto and article 286(i) of the Constitution in the Bombay Sales Tax appeal would be the law bind-\n\nThi B1ngol\n\nlllllftllllilw ca,..., Umild\n\nVo Thi $1111 of BW.r -\"\"\"'' B/iogwtdl\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmrmi~ c.,\"ompatt.1, Limited\n\nThi Stale of BihtJr\n\nlld otlidt\n\nBhagwali J.\n\ning on all parties and in the judgment just referrc<l to in the Travancore-Cochin Sales Tax Appeal S. R. Das, r. rightly expressed that decision to be binding on him so long as it stands.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188655, "end_char": 188672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188702, "end_char": 188716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Btngal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 192581, "end_char": 192587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Btngal\n\nImmunity°!!", "canonical_name": "Bengal"}}, {"text": "State of Bihtir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 192628, "end_char": 192643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihtir\n\nand othws.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Powers", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197521, "end_char": 197527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Powers, J. at page 86 referred to an earlier decision given by him in the case of The Australian Agricultural Co.\n\nv. Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of AtlStralasia(') :-\n\n\"I am at all times prepared to consider the review of any decision of this Court, by a Full Bench called to consider that question, and to reverse any decision if it is shown to be clearly wrong, subject to the well known considerations to be applied to the particular case in question at the time, according to the well known judicial policy of British, Australian and American Courts, and I think of all Courts of Appeal in English-speaking communities\"-except the House of Lords... . . . . . . . \""}}, {"text": "Imperial Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 199343, "end_char": 199362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That instrument is the political compact of the whole of the people of Australia, enacted into binding _law by the Imperial Parliament, and it is the chief and special duty of this Court faithfully to expound and give effect to it according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout precisely as framed."}}, {"text": "Macnaughten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 200518, "end_char": 200529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In doing this, to use the language of Lord Macnaughten in Vacher & Som Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors( 2 ), \"a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret.", "canonical_name": "Macnaughten"}}, {"text": "Higgins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 200877, "end_char": 200884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Higgins, J. at page 160 added:-\n\n\"But the decision is now directly impugned by the claimant ; and it is our duty to reconsider the subject, and to obey the Constitution and the Act rather than any decision of this Court, if the decision be shown to have been mistaken\"."}}, {"text": "lmmuttity Company Limilld", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 201303, "end_char": 201328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lmmuttity Company Limilld\n\nThe Sla11 of Bi/Jlw\n\nONfllfwl\n\nBhagwati ]."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 201854, "end_char": 201867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our Constitution has drawn freely inter ali11 upon the Constitution of the United States and it would be helpful to consider what is the position in the United\n\nStates in regard to the re-consideration of its previous decisions by the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "United\n\nStates", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 201932, "end_char": 201946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our Constitution has drawn freely inter ali11 upon the Constitution of the United States and it would be helpful to consider what is the position in the United\n\nStates in regard to the re-consideration of its previous decisions by the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "s. 205", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203381, "end_char": 203387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203400, "end_char": 203406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Taney", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 205209, "end_char": 205214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be instructive at this juncture to note the following passages to be found in foot-note 3 at p. 825 in the report of this case (') :- ·\n\n\"Compare Taney, Ch."}}, {"text": "S. 393", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205466, "end_char": 205472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 205", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205485, "end_char": 205491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Field", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 206118, "end_char": 206123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Compare Field; J. in Barden v. Northern P.R. Co. ( 1): '\"It is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations."}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 206497, "end_char": 206508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mark Graves v. People of the State of New Yorlc(') Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:-\n\n\"But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it\".", "canonical_name": "Frankforter"}}, {"text": "Stone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 207347, "end_char": 207352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and in United States of America v.\n\nSouth-Eastern Underwriters Association (') iil the dissenting judgment of Stone, C.J. at p. 579:-\n\n\"This Court has never committed itself to any rule or policy that it will not \"bow to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning\" by overruling a mistaken precedent ............ This 1s\n\n(I l 154 U. s. \"BB, 3 ')."}}, {"text": "S. 466, 4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207614, "end_char": 207624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 649", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207636, "end_char": 207642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 533", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207658, "end_char": 207664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Willoughby", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 208595, "end_char": 208605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position has been thus summarised by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States--·.V oL I-Second Edition-at p. 74 :--\n\n\"There are indeed good reasons why the doctrine of stare decisis should not be so rigidly applied to the constitutional as to other laws."}}, {"text": "State ef Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 209865, "end_char": 209879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tire State ef Bihar\n\nfllld others\n\nBhogwati J.\n\nThe Bmf.al\n\nJmm:muy O.mpany Limited ...\n\nTht State of Bihar\n\nal•lh1rs\n\nBhaKUJQli ].", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Bhogwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 209895, "end_char": 209903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tire State ef Bihar\n\nfllld others\n\nBhogwati J.\n\nThe Bmf.al\n\nJmm:muy O.mpany Limited ...\n\nTht State of Bihar\n\nal•lh1rs\n\nBhaKUJQli ]."}}, {"text": "muy O.mpany Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 209924, "end_char": 209943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tire State ef Bihar\n\nfllld others\n\nBhogwati J.\n\nThe Bmf.al\n\nJmm:muy O.mpany Limited ...\n\nTht State of Bihar\n\nal•lh1rs\n\nBhaKUJQli ]."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 210491, "end_char": 210525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the High Court of Australia as well as the Supreme Court of the United States felt themselves free to reconsider their earlier decisions because of the practical impossibility of correcting the erroneous decisions through legislative action."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211679, "end_char": 211690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 211716, "end_char": 211745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 99 and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211875, "end_char": 211894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212275, "end_char": 212291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212436, "end_char": 212447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213270, "end_char": 213281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213600, "end_char": 213616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213704, "end_char": 213715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "List II of the evnth Schedule to the Government of Indja Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213927, "end_char": 213987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214075, "end_char": 214091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of the evnth Schedule to the Government of Indja Act", "statute": "List II of the evnth Schedule to the Government of Indja Act"}}, {"text": "Btngal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 214325, "end_char": 214357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-84 S. C. i.ndia/59\n\nThe Btngal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nT/16 Stal< of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nTM Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThi State of Bihm\n\nand o'thm\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nand the general rule is \"extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur\".", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "State of Bihm", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 214449, "end_char": 214462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-84 S. C. i.ndia/59\n\nThe Btngal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nT/16 Stal< of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nTM Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThi State of Bihm\n\nand o'thm\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nand the general rule is \"extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur\".", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Cranworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 214829, "end_char": 214838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at p. 174 contains the following citation from the speech of Lord Cranworth in Jefferys v.\n\nBoosey( 1 ) :-\n\n\"Prima facie the Legislature of this country must be taken to make laws for its QWn subjects exclusively\"."}}, {"text": "II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 216482, "end_char": 216545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "having existed at the time of the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 216753, "end_char": 216833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217294, "end_char": 217303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There having existed at the time of the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "There having existed at the time of the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 217318, "end_char": 217335, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 217405, "end_char": 217422, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217514, "end_char": 217523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There having existed at the time of the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "There having existed at the time of the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 217538, "end_char": 217555, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218312, "end_char": 218321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 218337, "end_char": 218354, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sales of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 219605, "end_char": 219623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1939] F.C.R. 18", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 222627, "end_char": 222643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1942) F.C.R. 90", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 222654, "end_char": 222670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Benal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 222682, "end_char": 222687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Benal\n\nJmmlJllUy Company LimiUtl\n\n~ The Stau of Bi/tar\n\nand olhI\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nTl1' B'\"$al\n\nIm\"\"\"!'!", "canonical_name": "Bengal"}}, {"text": "Dixon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 223220, "end_char": 223225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The territorial connection or nexus theory was sought to be supported by reference to certain decisions of the High Court of Australia, e.g., The Wanganui Rangitikey Electric Power Board v.\n\nThe Australian Mutual frovident Society(') where Dixon, J. observed :\n\n\"So long as the statute selected some fact or circumstance which provided some relation or connection with New South Wales, and adopted this as the ground of its interference, the validity of an enactment reducing interest would not be open to challenge\"."}}, {"text": "New South Wales", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 223349, "end_char": 223364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The territorial connection or nexus theory was sought to be supported by reference to certain decisions of the High Court of Australia, e.g., The Wanganui Rangitikey Electric Power Board v.\n\nThe Australian Mutual frovident Society(') where Dixon, J. observed :\n\n\"So long as the statute selected some fact or circumstance which provided some relation or connection with New South Wales, and adopted this as the ground of its interference, the validity of an enactment reducing interest would not be open to challenge\"."}}, {"text": "Rich", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 223529, "end_char": 223533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the dissenting judgment of Rich, J. in Broken Hill South Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.)( 2) which stated that :-\n\n\"I do not deny that once any connection with New South Wales appears the legislature of that State may make that connection the occasion or subject of the imposition of a liability."}}, {"text": "Indian Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 224208, "end_char": 224225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was an income-tax case and the dispute related to the claim of the Indian Government to levy income-tax and super tax on the dividends paid to the assessee company (which was a joint stock company incorporated under the English Companies Act having its registered offices in the Isle of Man and its main offices in England) by nine sterling companies, the bulk of whose shares were held by the assesse~ company."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224369, "end_char": 224382, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Isle of Man", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 224420, "end_char": 224431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was an income-tax case and the dispute related to the claim of the Indian Government to levy income-tax and super tax on the dividends paid to the assessee company (which was a joint stock company incorporated under the English Companies Act having its registered offices in the Isle of Man and its main offices in England) by nine sterling companies, the bulk of whose shares were held by the assesse~ company."}}, {"text": "These sterling companies were registered under the English Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224553, "end_char": 224625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 224649, "end_char": 224655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These sterling companies were registered under the English Companies Act and were controlled in London where the Boards of Directors sat, the sare registers were situate and dividends were declared."}}, {"text": "1944 F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 224881, "end_char": 224896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Spens", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 226204, "end_char": 226209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Spens, C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Court further quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Evatt, J. in Trustees."}}, {"text": "Evatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 226328, "end_char": 226333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Spens, C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Court further quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Evatt, J. in Trustees."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 227843, "end_char": 227857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the former case the Court held that where the Imperial Parliament has conferred a power to legislate on a particular topic it\n\ni~ permissible and important in determining the scope and meaning of the power to have regard to what is ordinarily treated as embraced within that topic in the legislative practice of the United Kingdom."}}, {"text": "British legislation and as a matter of construction of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 228240, "end_char": 228328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 228527, "end_char": 228540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The derivation from British India of the major portion of its income for a year gives to a company as respects that year a territorial connection sufficient to justify the company being treated as at home in British India for all purposes relating to taxation on its income for that year from whatever source it may be derived, and if it is so at home in British India it is a person properly subject to the jurisdiction of the Central Indian legislature."}}, {"text": "Central Indian legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 228935, "end_char": 228961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The derivation from British India of the major portion of its income for a year gives to a company as respects that year a territorial connection sufficient to justify the company being treated as at home in British India for all purposes relating to taxation on its income for that year from whatever source it may be derived, and if it is so at home in British India it is a person properly subject to the jurisdiction of the Central Indian legislature."}}, {"text": "(1948] F.C.R. 121", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 229381, "end_char": 229398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 229550, "end_char": 229555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania, C.J. also observed at p. 141 :-\n\n\"As mentioned above, the aspect of it affecting persons who are beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal courts cannot be considered sufficient for the Court to hold it ultra vires."}}, {"text": "Patanjali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 230915, "end_char": 230924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The state of affairs was thus graphically described by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in his judgment in Bombay Sales Tax Appeal(1) at p. 1079 :-\n\n\"In exercise of the legislative power conferred upon them in substantially similar terms by the Government.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 231110, "end_char": 231124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Immunity Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 231503, "end_char": 231527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stau of Bihal\n\nand otherl\n\nBhogwati J.\n\nThe Ben{fal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nT ht State ?", "canonical_name": "Immunity Company Limited"}}, {"text": "Stau of Bihal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 231533, "end_char": 231546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stau of Bihal\n\nand otherl\n\nBhogwati J.\n\nThe Ben{fal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nT ht State ?", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 232819, "end_char": 232839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the States resorting to the territorial connection or nexus theory in the manner aforesaid the courts also appeared to lend their support to the theory and the High Court of Madras in particu Jar in two decisions, Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras(') and C. G. Naidu & Co. v. State of Madras( 2 ), gave its imprimatur to this theorv."}}, {"text": "State of Bih•", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 236016, "end_char": 236029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\n•Immunity Comp1J11y Limilltl\n\nThe State of Bih•\n\nand others\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe&IJgal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bihar\n\nand other,'\n\nBha.11, WQti j.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay( 1 ) has been held by this court to be applicable to sale tax legislation, in its recent decision in the Bombay Sales Ta:r: Art case(2) and its propriety is beyond question.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "BhagwaJi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 236043, "end_char": 236051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\n•Immunity Comp1J11y Limilltl\n\nThe State of Bih•\n\nand others\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe&IJgal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bihar\n\nand other,'\n\nBha.11, WQti j.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay( 1 ) has been held by this court to be applicable to sale tax legislation, in its recent decision in the Bombay Sales Ta:r: Art case(2) and its propriety is beyond question.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW.ATI"}}, {"text": "The&IJgal\n\nImmunity Company Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 236056, "end_char": 236091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\n•Immunity Comp1J11y Limilltl\n\nThe State of Bih•\n\nand others\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nThe&IJgal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bihar\n\nand other,'\n\nBha.11, WQti j.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay( 1 ) has been held by this court to be applicable to sale tax legislation, in its recent decision in the Bombay Sales Ta:r: Art case(2) and its propriety is beyond question."}}, {"text": "Poppatlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236987, "end_char": 236996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be observed that in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal the question of the territorial connection or nexus was not directly in dispute and in Poppatlal's case(') referred to above it was taken as decided by this C->urt in the Bombay Sales Tax Appeal that the theory of territorial connection or nexus was applicable to sales tax legislation.", "canonical_name": "Poppatlal Shah"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239065, "end_char": 239076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239403, "end_char": 239414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240007, "end_char": 240018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Stau of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 240614, "end_char": 240627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TheBmpl\n\nlmmuniry Company LimiUd\n\nThe Stau of Bihar and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nimport of the goods into or export of the goods out of the territory of India; ( 3) The State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce except in so far as the Parliament might by law otherwise provide; and ( 4) The State Legislatures were restrained from imposing a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as had been declared by Parliament by law as essential for the life of the community unless such law had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 241736, "end_char": 241753, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, 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{"in_sentence": "The Rental\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bih11r\n\nand oth4r•\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n'Tiu Bengal\n\nlmmuni?", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 272247, "end_char": 272264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 272984, "end_char": 273001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 273661, "end_char": 273675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 273712, "end_char": 273728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274042, "end_char": 274053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274405, "end_char": 274419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274703, "end_char": 274720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275108, "end_char": 275125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Acts to be found in the Manual of Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 275708, "end_char": 275765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278621, "end_char": 278638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 279813, "end_char": 279858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same is the case with the Supreme Court of the United States of America. ("}}, {"text": "article 145(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280142, "end_char": 280156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280212, "end_char": 280223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Cpurt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 280447, "end_char": 280460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been urged before us that the phrase \"all Courts\" is comprehensive enough to include the Supreme Cpurt."}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280781, "end_char": 280792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 283229, "end_char": 283242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bilur\n\nand olhers\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nTiu Btngal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihm'\n\nand ot/:ers\n\n.7agannac/ftadas ]•\n\ntion is one of constitutional construction, the matter is otherwise.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "article 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284810, "end_char": 284821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285836, "end_char": 285850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 54 and 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286035, "end_char": 286053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286101, "end_char": 286111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286156, "end_char": 286167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286354, "end_char": 286365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286523, "end_char": 286539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286782, "end_char": 286793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengtl.l\n\nImmunit company", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 287676, "end_char": 287701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even as regards the\n\n195.5\n\nThe Bengtl.l\n\nImmunit company d\n\nv. n .. Stau of mna,\n\nand othln\n\nJo~]."}}, {"text": "section 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 288997, "end_char": 289008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Commonwealth of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 289440, "end_char": 289479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, there can be no reason for our adopting a less rigid standard than that adopted by the High Court of Commonwealth of Australia, nor is there any reason for our adopting a standard less rigid thah that of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "Wigg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 290741, "end_char": 290745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the above formulation of their practice, the Privy Council in this case permitted itself to reconsider the previous decision in Wigg's caseC), on two grounds. ("}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290827, "end_char": 290836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 291370, "end_char": 291377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation ( 2 ) the Judicial Committee expressed itself as follows at page 206 :\n\n\"The appellants' first contention is that Russell's c11Je( •) was wrongly decided and ought to be overruled."}}, {"text": "Stale of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 292199, "end_char": 292213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Beng\"l\n\nImmullity Company Limikd\n\nYo The State of Bihar\n\nand othlrs\n\n]agannadhadas .1\n\nTM Bmgal\n\nlmmunif; Y Company Limited\n\nv.· The Stale of Bihar and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nassumed will have been acted on both bv Governments and subjects\".", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Tramways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 292995, "end_char": 293003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Tramways case( ') the position was expressed in the following terms."}}, {"text": "Whybrow", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 294968, "end_char": 294975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"In Whybrow's case( 1 ), the Court consisted of all the Justices of this Court who could sit on the application."}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 296329, "end_char": 296384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nJagannar/hadas J.\n\nTu B'\"t•I\n\nImm1111ill C.mpan7 Limikd v.\n\nTM Siok of Bihar\n\nand \"\"\"' J•t•tlNl<ihadas J.\n\nand the principle indicated therein was reaffirmed.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "TM Siok of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 296458, "end_char": 296474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nJagannar/hadas J.\n\nTu B'\"t•I\n\nImm1111ill C.mpan7 Limikd v.\n\nTM Siok of Bihar\n\nand \"\"\"' J•t•tlNl<ihadas J.\n\nand the principle indicated therein was reaffirmed."}}, {"text": "Williams", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 297522, "end_char": 297530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that of manifest error plus injury to public interest by maintenance of previous decision laid down in the above cases as being the ground on which a reconsideration can be granted was reiterated by Justice Williams in his judgment in Attorney- General for N.S. W. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd.(•)."}}, {"text": "Tumahole", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 301414, "end_char": 301422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the Privy Council, while it reaffirmed the proposition that a prior decision upon a given set of facts ought not to be reopened without the greatest hesitation, explained why they, in fact, differed from the previous one in the following passage :\n\n\"From a perusal of the judgment in Tumahole's case( 2 ), it is apparent that the history of the adop tion and promulgation of the various statutes and proclamations dealing with the effect of the evidence of accomplices in South Africa was only partially put before the Board, and much material which has now been ascertained was not presented to their Lordships on tint occasion."}}, {"text": "South Africa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 301602, "end_char": 301614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the Privy Council, while it reaffirmed the proposition that a prior decision upon a given set of facts ought not to be reopened without the greatest hesitation, explained why they, in fact, differed from the previous one in the following passage :\n\n\"From a perusal of the judgment in Tumahole's case( 2 ), it is apparent that the history of the adop tion and promulgation of the various statutes and proclamations dealing with the effect of the evidence of accomplices in South Africa was only partially put before the Board, and much material which has now been ascertained was not presented to their Lordships on tint occasion."}}, {"text": "T11mahole", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 301876, "end_char": 301885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present case, therefore, is one in which fresh facts have been adduced which were not under consideration when T11mahole's case was decided, and accordingly it is one in which, in their Lordships' view, they are justified in reconsidering the foundations on which that case was determined\"."}}, {"text": "United Motors", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 303322, "end_char": 303335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I should have thought that when the decision in a case so recent as that in the United Motors case( 1 ) given after full consideration, is sought to be challenged, the first question to have been considered was whether or not there were circumstances to justify a reconsideration."}}, {"text": "30th March,\n\n1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 304210, "end_char": 304227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision was given on the 30th March,\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "25th February, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 304312, "end_char": 304331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case itself was heard for 12 working days, i.e., from the 9th February, to the 25th February, 1953."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 304338, "end_char": 304352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India and as many as eight States were permitted to intervene and their arguments were also heard."}}, {"text": "8th May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 305111, "end_char": 305124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But that was a decision given on the 8th May, 1953, more than a month after the judgment in the prior\n\n(I) [1953) S. C. R. 1069."}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nImmuni'l' Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 305235, "end_char": 305268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94\n\nThe Bengal\n\nImmuni'l' Company Limited\n\n~- The Sta;, q/ Bihar\n\nand otheTs\n\nJagannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 305400, "end_char": 305411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited\n\n''• Tht Slal1 of Bilw\n\nand othlrs\n\nJagannadhad.,", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 309023, "end_char": 309034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmnnity Company Limiltd v.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 309968, "end_char": 310003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmnnity Company Limiltd v.\n\nThe State of Bit.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "State of Bit", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 310009, "end_char": 310021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmnnity Company Limiltd v.\n\nThe State of Bit.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Jagannadha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 310037, "end_char": 310047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M\n\nand olhtrs\n\nJagannadha<IU J.\n\ncounter to this.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 312229, "end_char": 312240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 312955, "end_char": 312969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313090, "end_char": 313104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313162, "end_char": 313176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313308, "end_char": 313322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313364, "end_char": 313378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313500, "end_char": 313514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiud", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 314349, "end_char": 314380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiud\n\nThi State of Bihll1'\n\nand others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThi Blngol\n\nlmnumil ComJlal!J J;.;", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "State of Bihll1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 314386, "end_char": 314401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiud\n\nThi State of Bihll1'\n\nand others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThi Blngol\n\nlmnumil ComJlal!J J;.;", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama A yyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 314904, "end_char": 314922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having had the benefit of reading the judgments of my learned brothers, Justice S. R. Das and Justice Venkatarama A yyar, I propose to confine myself mainly to the consideration of the construction of article 286.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315003, "end_char": 315014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315044, "end_char": 315055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315245, "end_char": 315261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315827, "end_char": 315838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 316325, "end_char": 316336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 317651, "end_char": 317668, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 318487, "end_char": 318504, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 318864, "end_char": 318881, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jaganrwtfhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 318981, "end_char": 318995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If I may express this in another way, these Sales-tax Acts purported .to tax\n\nales as being within the State1 with reference to (1) .rit!1s (a:; :i~nmecl) under the Sale of Goods Act, and to-84 s. c tnclhp0\n\nTht Bengal\n\nImm11ni(1 Compan_y L1miltd\n\nThe Stale of Bihar\n\nlltld others\n\nJaganrwtfhadas J.\n\nTh~ 1Je11gal\n\nImmunity\n\nCom~'V Limited v.\n\nT1\"JState of Bihar\n\nand othns\n\nJag41WJl/hadas J.\n\n746 Su-PREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1955J\n\n(2) situs (as probably assumed to be) under the general law."}}, {"text": "Loreburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 319279, "end_char": 319287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is possible that this general law was so assumed with reference to the dictum of Lord Loreburn in Badische Anz'fin Und Soda Fabrik v. Hickson( 1 ) which suggests that the situs of the goods at the time of appropriation of the goods to a particular sale is the situs of the sale.", "canonical_name": "Loreburn"}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 319725, "end_char": 319731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madras and Mysore had an additional Explanation as follows :\n\n\"In case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods are actually produced in the Province at any time, after the contract of sale or purchase in resp.ect thereof was made, the sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the Province, wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have been made, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act\"."}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 320191, "end_char": 320208, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 320310, "end_char": 320366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 323076, "end_char": 323087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bi/uzJ'\n\nand DIM'ls\n\nJ~].", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 323352, "end_char": 323386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195:i\n\nT/18 Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nTM State of Bi/uzJ'\n\nand DIM'ls\n\nJ~]."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 324620, "end_char": 324634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 325121, "end_char": 325138, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325560, "end_char": 325574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325671, "end_char": 325685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325905, "end_char": 325919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325944, "end_char": 325958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 326232, "end_char": 326249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 326369, "end_char": 326380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 326581, "end_char": 326592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 326926, "end_char": 326940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 327038, "end_char": 327049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 327774, "end_char": 327788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jaganaadliodas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 327972, "end_char": 327986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ban, which was for a\n\nTu &Aglll 1,.._,, w,, Ctnnp;;; Tfmw\n\ny, Thi Stall of BWtl\n\nOndolhm\n\nJaganaadliodas J.\n\nTiu Bengal\n\nlmmunitv c.mpany LimiUd\n\nTiu Stale of B; har\n\nand others\n\nJagannadkadas J.\n\ntotally different l?rpose cannot be so construed as to nullify the positive results intended and brought about by article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "Jagannadkadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 328061, "end_char": 328074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ban, which was for a\n\nTu &Aglll 1,.._,, w,, Ctnnp;;; Tfmw\n\ny, Thi Stall of BWtl\n\nOndolhm\n\nJaganaadliodas J.\n\nTiu Bengal\n\nlmmunitv c.mpany LimiUd\n\nTiu Stale of B; har\n\nand others\n\nJagannadkadas J.\n\ntotally different l?rpose cannot be so construed as to nullify the positive results intended and brought about by article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 328193, "end_char": 328207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 328335, "end_char": 328344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To such a situation the principle of harmonious construction would apply as enunciated by Lord Herschell in John Carter Colquhoun v. Henry Brooks(') at page 506 in the following terms :\n\n\"It is beyond dispute that we are entitled and indeed bound when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to shew that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be if considered alone and apart from the rest of the Act\"."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 328836, "end_char": 328853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, as my learned brother, Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, is inclined to think, a sale cannot be said to have occurred in the course of inter-State trade and commerce if the sale follows the completion of the inter- State transportation of goods, as for instance, would be the case when a hawking pedlar brings goods across a State boundary and vends it from door to door in another State, then clearly the fiction which brings about the notional inside sale would by itself be sufficient to take such a sale out of the category \"of the course of inter-State trade and commerce\".", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330350, "end_char": 330364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330398, "end_char": 330415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330547, "end_char": 330562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of BihflJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 332456, "end_char": 332471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of BihflJ'\n\nand others\n\nJagannadhaaas].", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 333521, "end_char": 333525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as U.P. and Bihar are concerned which authorised the manufacturing State as such to levy the tax, it appears to me that if it is borne in mind that this is limited to the sale b1' the\n\nvery manufacturer, this was also not likely to operate as a cumulative point."}}, {"text": "Hence in the light of the detailed scrutiny of the provisions in the various Sales-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 334274, "end_char": 334364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334750, "end_char": 334761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hence in the light of the detailed scrutiny of the provisions in the various Sales-Tax Act", "statute": "Hence in the light of the detailed scrutiny of the provisions in the various Sales-Tax Act"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334885, "end_char": 334896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hence in the light of the detailed scrutiny of the provisions in the various Sales-Tax Act", "statute": "Hence in the light of the detailed scrutiny of the provisions in the various Sales-Tax Act"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 335496, "end_char": 335507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 335584, "end_char": 335595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bihat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 336952, "end_char": 336966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subject to\n\nTill Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limittd\n\nThe State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nJagannaihadas ].", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Jagannaihadas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 336980, "end_char": 336993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subject to\n\nTill Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limittd\n\nThe State of Bihat\n\nand others\n\nJagannaihadas ].", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "Bmgal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 337002, "end_char": 337007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bmgal\n\nlmmunit/ Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nJagamiadhadas J.\n\nthis, even essential goods continue to be, m theory and by Constitution, taxable (by the States themselves) in respect of sales thereof.", "canonical_name": "Bmgal"}}, {"text": "Jagamiadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 337067, "end_char": 337080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bmgal\n\nlmmunit/ Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nJagamiadhadas J.\n\nthis, even essential goods continue to be, m theory and by Constitution, taxable (by the States themselves) in respect of sales thereof.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 337747, "end_char": 337758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338887, "end_char": 338898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339176, "end_char": 339190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339200, "end_char": 339214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339250, "end_char": 339267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 261", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 340970, "end_char": 340981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmuni~ Company Lsmit4d\n\nThe", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 341425, "end_char": 341461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not, however, wish to go into the\n\n19!>5\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuni~ Company Lsmit4d\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuni'l Company Limed\n\nTiu State of Bili.at\n\nand others\n\nJaganNJdhadas J.\n\nmatter further because even if in the course of the administration of sales-tax, of the kind permissible, in the view of article 286 which the prior decision has accepted, there emerges the element of extra-territorial operation of such a tax, that by itself can be no reason for negativing the construction of articles 286( 1) and (2) above indicated.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmuni'l Company Limed\n\nTiu State of Bili.at", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 341511, "end_char": 341563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not, however, wish to go into the\n\n19!>5\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuni~ Company Lsmit4d\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuni'l Company Limed\n\nTiu State of Bili.at\n\nand others\n\nJaganNJdhadas J.\n\nmatter further because even if in the course of the administration of sales-tax, of the kind permissible, in the view of article 286 which the prior decision has accepted, there emerges the element of extra-territorial operation of such a tax, that by itself can be no reason for negativing the construction of articles 286( 1) and (2) above indicated.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "JaganNJdhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 341577, "end_char": 341590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not, however, wish to go into the\n\n19!>5\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuni~ Company Lsmit4d\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuni'l Company Limed\n\nTiu State of Bili.at\n\nand others\n\nJaganNJdhadas J.\n\nmatter further because even if in the course of the administration of sales-tax, of the kind permissible, in the view of article 286 which the prior decision has accepted, there emerges the element of extra-territorial operation of such a tax, that by itself can be no reason for negativing the construction of articles 286( 1) and (2) above indicated.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341716, "end_char": 341727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341906, "end_char": 341922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 342464, "end_char": 342475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "14th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 342819, "end_char": 342834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that we are concerned with is the validity of the steps so far taken by tbe assessment authorities and particularly of the notice dated the 29th May, 1952, which intimates that on non-compliance before the 14th June, 1952, proceedings for assessment on the basis of \"best judgment\" will be made."}}, {"text": "Wrenbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 343373, "end_char": 343381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following passage from Lord Wrenbury's speech at page 56 is instructive:\n\n\"There is a S!!Cond question in the case-namely, whether the appellant has been duly brought within the machinery for assessment provided by the Act."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 343586, "end_char": 343595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 343706, "end_char": 343715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 343721, "end_char": 343730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 345553, "end_char": 345566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limiletl\n\nTh• Stale ef Bihar\n\nand others\n\nJagannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "Bengal Immunity Company Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 345584, "end_char": 345615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tht Bengal Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stale of Bihar\n\nand others\n\n]agannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "agannadhadas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 345650, "end_char": 345662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tht Bengal Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe Stale of Bihar\n\nand others\n\n]agannadhadas ].", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 346070, "end_char": 346087, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 346880, "end_char": 346903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 347356, "end_char": 347434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 347915, "end_char": 347993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 348455, "end_char": 348549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 348687, "end_char": 348696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act,\n\n1930", "statute": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act,\n\n1930"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhuas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 349115, "end_char": 349127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Company L1mittd\n\nTM State of Bih\"'\n\nand olh,, s\n\nJagannadhuas J.\n\nTM Bengai\n\nImmunity ompany Limited v. ht StaU of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nagnnnadhadas J.\n\ntract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "Immunity ompany Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 349143, "end_char": 349166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Company L1mittd\n\nTM State of Bih\"'\n\nand olh,, s\n\nJagannadhuas J.\n\nTM Bengai\n\nImmunity ompany Limited v. ht StaU of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nagnnnadhadas J.\n\ntract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery.", "canonical_name": "Immunity Company Limited"}}, {"text": "StaU of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 349173, "end_char": 349186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Company L1mittd\n\nTM State of Bih\"'\n\nand olh,, s\n\nJagannadhuas J.\n\nTM Bengai\n\nImmunity ompany Limited v. ht StaU of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nagnnnadhadas J.\n\ntract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 349552, "end_char": 349630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 350119, "end_char": 350219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 350345, "end_char": 350354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Goods Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 350812, "end_char": 350827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 351526, "end_char": 351604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "East Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 351652, "end_char": 351663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Explanation 2 : Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the\n\nsal~ of any goods whic!i are actually in East Punjab at the time when the contract of sale (as defined in that Act) in ."}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything m the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 352084, "end_char": 352145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352336, "end_char": 352345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything m the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything m the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AvYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 353182, "end_char": 353199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VENKATARAMA AvYAR J.-The appellant is a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act carrying on business in the manufacture and sale of sera, biological products and medicines.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 353258, "end_char": 353271, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 353748, "end_char": 353761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 353769, "end_char": 353794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th May 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 354206, "end_char": 354219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this the appellant sent a reply on the 8th january 1952 disputing its liability on various grounds, and after further correspondence between the parties which it is needless to set out, the third respondent sent a notice on the 29th May 1952 that if the appellant failed to comply with the notice dated the 18th December 1951 by the 14th June 1952, steps would be taken to assess tax on the basis of best judgment."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 354886, "end_char": 354900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 355363, "end_char": 355380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 355692, "end_char": 355706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PEPSU", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 355928, "end_char": 355933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine out of the ten States, namely Orissa, PEPSU, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore, Rajasthan, Travancore-Cochin and Uttar Pradesh, have intervened and supported the respondents."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 355975, "end_char": 355984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nine out of the ten States, namely Orissa, PEPSU, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore, Rajasthan, Travancore-Cochin and Uttar Pradesh, have intervened and supported the respondents."}}, {"text": "Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 356179, "end_char": 356208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One State, West Bengal, represented by the learned Attorney-General supported the appellant, and so did the Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., and one M. K. Kuriakose."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356423, "end_char": 356440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356588, "end_char": 356602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356651, "end_char": 356665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Btn&ol\n\nl1111nut1ih Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 356673, "end_char": 356700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Btn&ol\n\nl1111nut1ih Company il,,;; ud\n\nTM Slau of Bilutr\n\nand others\n\nThe Bengal\n\n/mnumilv enpm, dmiled\n\nTM Stau qf Bilim\n\nand \"'\"\"' v-. ..."}}, {"text": "Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 356830, "end_char": 356867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357097, "end_char": 357111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357255, "end_char": 357265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358450, "end_char": 358463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358806, "end_char": 358819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 359962, "end_char": 359975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360666, "end_char": 360682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360735, "end_char": 360746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tht &llgal\n\nlmmunitl Company LimitMJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 361141, "end_char": 361177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tht &llgal\n\nlmmunitl Company LimitMJ\n\nT/14 State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\n19$5\n\nTIN .Bmpl\n\nlmmtmily eo..pan, Llmi1'tl\n\nTIN Stale of Bihar\n\nanti ollN'1\n\nY lllkatarama\n\nAY.1\"' J.\n\nthe Indian Companies Act and the question whether a juristic person is a citizen for the purpose ot article 19(1) (g) is still an open one, I would prefer not to rest my decision on this ground."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 361327, "end_char": 361340, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 361416, "end_char": 361429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 361683, "end_char": 361696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 361856, "end_char": 361873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 362751, "end_char": 362765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 363165, "end_char": 363188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 363506, "end_char": 363516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "31st day of March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 363984, "end_char": 364006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,-\n\n(a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods shall not be imposed under this Act-\n\n(i) where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State of Bihar; or\n\n(ii) where rnch sale or purchase takes place in the course of import of the gooJs into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India;\n\n( b) a tax on the sale or purchase of any good' shall not, after the 31st day of March 1951, be imposed where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 364205, "end_char": 364216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(:i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 364461, "end_char": 364479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 364940, "end_char": 364954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 365097, "end_char": 365126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 99( 1) and 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 365257, "end_char": 365283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 367027, "end_char": 367036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide the observations of Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) at pages 682 and 683."}}, {"text": "Venkalarama\n\nAyyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 370022, "end_char": 370040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bih11r\n\nand others\n\nVenkalarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Btngal\n\nlmmunil' Compan, LimiUd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVen.tatarama A.uarJ.\n\nenacted.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "Btngal\n\nlmmunil' Compan, LimiUd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 370049, "end_char": 370080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bih11r\n\nand others\n\nVenkalarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Btngal\n\nlmmunil' Compan, LimiUd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVen.tatarama A.uarJ.\n\nenacted.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 371129, "end_char": 371158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371544, "end_char": 371561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371807, "end_char": 371824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371901, "end_char": 371915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 372128, "end_char": 372145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374167, "end_char": 374184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375163, "end_char": 375174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375401, "end_char": 375418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375707, "end_char": 375721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375790, "end_char": 375804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(J)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376037, "end_char": 376054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376985, "end_char": 377002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 377045, "end_char": 377062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 377317, "end_char": 377334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 378829, "end_char": 378846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 378941, "end_char": 378958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 379366, "end_char": 379377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 379530, "end_char": 379540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In T hakurain Ba/raj Kunwar\n\nv. Rae fagat Pal Singh(') Lord Macnaghten observed :\n\n\"It is well settled that marginal notes to the sections of an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act.", "canonical_name": "Macnaughten"}}, {"text": "Hanworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 380234, "end_char": 380242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide also the observations of Lord Hanworth, M.R., in Nixon v. Attorney-General(')."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381801, "end_char": 381818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381859, "end_char": 381873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382053, "end_char": 382070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382107, "end_char": 382121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382419, "end_char": 382433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382597, "end_char": 382611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382776, "end_char": 382790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383128, "end_char": 383142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383642, "end_char": 383656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383778, "end_char": 383792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383931, "end_char": 383945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384255, "end_char": 384269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384438, "end_char": 384452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384836, "end_char": 384853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384858, "end_char": 384867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 384997, "end_char": 385026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 385112, "end_char": 385141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 385589, "end_char": 385600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 385825, "end_char": 385854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 386323, "end_char": 386354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act of Australia, 1900", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 386380, "end_char": 386402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 386559, "end_char": 386566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In America the authority of the Congress to enact laws on the matters delegated to it under the Constitution is supreme."}}, {"text": "Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 386588, "end_char": 386596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In America the authority of the Congress to enact laws on the matters delegated to it under the Constitution is supreme."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 386930, "end_char": 386939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act of Australia, 1900", "statute": "Act of Australia, 1900"}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 386943, "end_char": 386952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act of Australia, 1900", "statute": "Act of Australia, 1900"}}, {"text": "Pennsylvania", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 387835, "end_char": 387847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pennsylvania\n\n12-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThl&ngal\n\nImmunity Company LimiUd\n\nYo Th• Slau of Biltar\n\nand oli.trs\n\nVenkalarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTh< Bengal\n\nlmmiini!J Company Limittd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand ot11.ers\n\nV en/catarama\n\nAyyar j.\n\nGas Co. v. Public Service Commission(') the question was as to the validity of a statute of New York regu lating the rates which could be charged for sale of natural gas for consumption within the State."}}, {"text": "New York", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 388155, "end_char": 388163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pennsylvania\n\n12-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThl&ngal\n\nImmunity Company LimiUd\n\nYo Th• Slau of Biltar\n\nand oli.trs\n\nVenkalarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTh< Bengal\n\nlmmiini!J Company Limittd\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand ot11.ers\n\nV en/catarama\n\nAyyar j.\n\nGas Co. v. Public Service Commission(') the question was as to the validity of a statute of New York regu lating the rates which could be charged for sale of natural gas for consumption within the State."}}, {"text": "Jamestown", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 388756, "end_char": 388765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gas was transported into the State by pipe lines from outside, and it was accordingly held that the regulation was in respect of inter-State trade and commerce, and was therefore \"subject to applicable Constitutional limitations\" but that the State law was valid because \"the thing which the State Commission has undataken to regulate, while part of inter-State transmission, is lo>al in its nature, and pe; L1ins to the furnishing of natural gas to local consumers within the city of Jamestown, in the State of New York\"."}}, {"text": "Missouri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 388798, "end_char": 388806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Missouri e.t: rel."}}, {"text": "S.23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390176, "end_char": 390180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390242, "end_char": 390248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 507", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390277, "end_char": 390283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provinces by the Govemment of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 392045, "end_char": 392090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392169, "end_char": 392180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provinces by the Govemment of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Provinces by the Govemment of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "S. 319", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392385, "end_char": 392391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provinces by the Govemment of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Provinces by the Govemment of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Bericul\n\nlmmui1ity Company LimihJ", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 392413, "end_char": 392446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "99S.\n\nThe Bericul\n\nlmmui1ity Company LimihJ\n\nThe Slate of JJihar\n\nand otlt.rs\n\nYenkatarama\n\n~Y\"' J.\n\nThe /hnp\n\nImmunity Cotnpa1!v limiJed\n\nThe Stale of BiluJr and ot,, as\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!1'l' ]."}}, {"text": "was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 392614, "end_char": 392690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392728, "end_char": 392745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393021, "end_char": 393035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393227, "end_char": 393244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393249, "end_char": 393263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act", "statute": "There was nothing corresponding to these provisions in the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393704, "end_char": 393718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( l )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393741, "end_char": 393760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393927, "end_char": 393941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 394028, "end_char": 394043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 507", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 394754, "end_char": 394760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 394770, "end_char": 394777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395424, "end_char": 395438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395872, "end_char": 395882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396020, "end_char": 396034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 1 )(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396412, "end_char": 396431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 397643, "end_char": 397654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 397842, "end_char": 397856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398257, "end_char": 398274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398294, "end_char": 398308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398447, "end_char": 398461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398591, "end_char": 398602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398861, "end_char": 398878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398904, "end_char": 398918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400292, "end_char": 400306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400418, "end_char": 400435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400542, "end_char": 400559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400623, "end_char": 400637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400723, "end_char": 400740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401135, "end_char": 401146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401420, "end_char": 401434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401582, "end_char": 401599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401604, "end_char": 401618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401830, "end_char": 401844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401886, "end_char": 401903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401908, "end_char": 401922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401924, "end_char": 401941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401978, "end_char": 401989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 402241, "end_char": 402258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 402296, "end_char": 402310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 402523, "end_char": 402537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 402622, "end_char": 402639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 404261, "end_char": 404272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 404328, "end_char": 404342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rottschaefer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 404787, "end_char": 404799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law (1939 Edition) sale in the course of inter-State commerce is thus defined :\n\n\"The activities of buying and selling constitute inter-State commerce if the contracts thert:for contemplate or necesrarily involve the movement of goods in in- Jer-State Commerce\"."}}, {"text": "Gavit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 405108, "end_char": 405113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law is thus stated by Gavit in \"Commerce Clause\"\n\n(1932 Edn.) :-"}}, {"text": "S. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 405858, "end_char": 405863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bi\\ar\n\nOlld otNrs\n\nTh4 Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 405932, "end_char": 405996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195'.i\n\nTlr• &ngaJ\n\nImmunity Company Limit•J\n\nT ht State of Bi\\ar\n\nOlld otNrs\n\nTh4 Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand otMrs\n\nV 11tkatarama\n\nA\"ar ]."}}, {"text": "11tkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 406031, "end_char": 406042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195'.i\n\nTlr• &ngaJ\n\nImmunity Company Limit•J\n\nT ht State of Bi\\ar\n\nOlld otNrs\n\nTh4 Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar\n\nand otMrs\n\nV 11tkatarama\n\nA\"ar ]."}}, {"text": "Covington", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 406101, "end_char": 406110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but it is not this that is taxed by the city of Covington, nor is such commerce a part of the business that is taxed, or anything more than a preparation for it."}}, {"text": "Kentucky", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 406334, "end_char": 406342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the itinerant vending is concerned the goods might just as well have been manufactured within the\n\nState of Kentucky; to the extent that plaintiffs dispose of their goods in that kind of sales, they make them the subject of local commerce; and this being so, they can claim no immunity from local regulation, whether, the goods remain in original packages or not\"."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 407584, "end_char": 407598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 408511, "end_char": 408520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 408539, "end_char": 408556, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 409325, "end_char": 409336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 409453, "end_char": 409467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Asquith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 410209, "end_char": 410216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be useful in this connection to q\n\n0uote what Lord Asquith observed in dealing with a similar contention in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council(2)."}}, {"text": "S. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 410388, "end_char": 410393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 411293, "end_char": 411307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413069, "end_char": 413080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413259, "end_char": 413270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(L)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413426, "end_char": 413440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413901, "end_char": 413915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U. P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 414087, "end_char": 414092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, if A in Bengal sells to B in Bihar, and if in his turn B sells the same goods to C in U. P. for local consumption, there will be inrer- State commerce under article 286(2) and in the course thereof."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414158, "end_char": 414172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414295, "end_char": 414309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(J)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414497, "end_char": 414514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U.P", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 414621, "end_char": 414624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming next to the sale bv Bihar to U.P .. Bihar will be entitled to tax it under the body of article 286(1) (a) as the ~-ale took place inside its limits."}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414679, "end_char": 414693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 414820, "end_char": 414825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But U. P. will be entitled to tax the sale under the Explanation as it wa~ for mnsumption within that State."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414977, "end_char": 414991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmunitv Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 415112, "end_char": 415144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the effect of the combined operation of both article 286(2) and ::irticlt\" 281l(l)(a) rf\"ad witli the Explanation is that the on Iv State which can tax the sale is .the one m\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunitv Company Limited ..\n\nThe State of Bihnr and ol.iers\n\nVenkataramn\n\nAyyar ]."}}, {"text": "State of Bihnr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 415153, "end_char": 415167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the effect of the combined operation of both article 286(2) and ::irticlt\" 281l(l)(a) rf\"ad witli the Explanation is that the on Iv State which can tax the sale is .the one m\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunitv Company Limited ..\n\nThe State of Bihnr and ol.iers\n\nVenkataramn\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmU11ity Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 415208, "end_char": 415241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nlmmU11ity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and ot.1trs\n\nV enkataram.a\n\nAJ.>ar J.\n\nwhich the goods are sold for local consumption.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 415477, "end_char": 415491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 415722, "end_char": 415736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 415981, "end_char": 415995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 416248, "end_char": 416262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 416487, "end_char": 416501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 416869, "end_char": 416883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 417152, "end_char": 417166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 417678, "end_char": 417688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 417800, "end_char": 417814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418020, "end_char": 418034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418167, "end_char": 418178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418322, "end_char": 418336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418377, "end_char": 418394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418432, "end_char": 418446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418534, "end_char": 418548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418648, "end_char": 418662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengul", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 419661, "end_char": 419667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1955\n\nThe Bengul\n\nImmunity Compa:p Limittd\n\nThe State of Bi!w\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarmnri\n\nA_Y.Yar J.\n\n1955 respect of the matters comprised therein.", "canonical_name": "Bengal"}}, {"text": "State of Bi!w", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 419699, "end_char": 419712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1955\n\nThe Bengul\n\nImmunity Compa:p Limittd\n\nThe State of Bi!w\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarmnri\n\nA_Y.Yar J.\n\n1955 respect of the matters comprised therein.", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 420261, "end_char": 420266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the identity of the subject-\n\nVenkatarama matter of the conflicting provisions, not the identity Ayyar J. of their purpose or angle of vision that is essential for the application of the maxim.", "canonical_name": "Ayyar"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420554, "end_char": 420571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420690, "end_char": 420704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420869, "end_char": 420883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421479, "end_char": 421493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421712, "end_char": 421726, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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"regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423829, "end_char": 423843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424052, "end_char": 424066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 424247, "end_char": 424299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The harmonious construction which the law favours is one which gives operation to both 13-64 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkaJarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nthe provisions at the same time but in their respective spheres.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "VenkaJarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 424312, "end_char": 424323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The harmonious construction which the law favours is one which gives operation to both 13-64 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nThi State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkaJarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nthe provisions at the same time but in their respective spheres.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "Bengal Immunity Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 424339, "end_char": 424370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424531, "end_char": 424545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424681, "end_char": 424695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425093, "end_char": 425107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425409, "end_char": 425423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425456, "end_char": 425470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425550, "end_char": 425564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425781, "end_char": 425795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426304, "end_char": 426318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426391, "end_char": 426405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427068, "end_char": 427079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 301 to 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427156, "end_char": 427175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427185, "end_char": 427199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427441, "end_char": 427455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427611, "end_char": 427625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427667, "end_char": 427681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427802, "end_char": 427816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427848, "end_char": 427865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AYJ'OT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 428954, "end_char": 428960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nV enkaturama\n\nAYJ'OT J.\n\nthe Constitution no State was actually levying a tax on the basis of delivery and therefore the Explanation could have no practical effect even when the President made the order."}}, {"text": "Taifad Subramanya Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 429423, "end_char": 429445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Taifad Subramanya Iyer, counsel for M. K.\n\nKuriakose, one of the intervene.rs, arguing in support of the contention of the appellant that article 286(2) is the controlling provision, suggested a third category of cases wherein the Explanation could operate apart from a law under the saving clause in article 286(2) or the order of the President under the proviso thereto."}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429561, "end_char": 429575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429724, "end_char": 429738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 430053, "end_char": 430067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 430442, "end_char": 430456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Switzerland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 431518, "end_char": 431529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik\n\nv. Hickson( 1 ), there was a contract of sale signed by both the parties in England with reference to goods situated in Switzerland."}}, {"text": "Loreburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 431898, "end_char": 431906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position in law was thus stated by Lord Loreburn, L. C. at page 421 :\n\n\"As I understood him, Mr. Cripps argued that the defendant had 'vended' these goods in England within the terms of the patent.", "canonical_name": "Loreburn"}}, {"text": "Cripps", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 431955, "end_char": 431961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position in law was thus stated by Lord Loreburn, L. C. at page 421 :\n\n\"As I understood him, Mr. Cripps argued that the defendant had 'vended' these goods in England within the terms of the patent."}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 433156, "end_char": 433188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1){1906]A.C. 419 •.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTht Bengal\n\nImmuhit) Compahy Limited\n\nV• Tht State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyaT J.\n\nIn view of these observations, it cannot be contended that the title to th~ goods passed in State A and that State B gets the right to tax by reason of the Explanation.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "AyyaT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 433333, "end_char": 433338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1){1906]A.C. 419 •.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTht Bengal\n\nImmuhit) Compahy Limited\n\nV• Tht State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyaT J.\n\nIn view of these observations, it cannot be contended that the title to th~ goods passed in State A and that State B gets the right to tax by reason of the Explanation.", "canonical_name": "Ayyar"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 433696, "end_char": 433710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 433770, "end_char": 433784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434148, "end_char": 434159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434284, "end_char": 434298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434690, "end_char": 434704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434888, "end_char": 434905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 435979, "end_char": 435993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 436304, "end_char": 436318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 436344, "end_char": 436355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 436600, "end_char": 436614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 436661, "end_char": 436675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437134, "end_char": 437148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437479, "end_char": 437493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 437808, "end_char": 437827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tlie Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkataraina\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmunily Company Limited v.\n\nT1\" Slate of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nacross the State line would have to pay?", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438928, "end_char": 438939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439040, "end_char": 439042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 440707, "end_char": 440721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441046, "end_char": 441057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441217, "end_char": 441234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441430, "end_char": 441441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Iowa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 442768, "end_char": 442781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the State of Iowa imposed a Use Tax on a foreign Company in respect of goods distributed by it for consumption within the State."}}, {"text": "S. 335", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444554, "end_char": 444560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444591, "end_char": 444596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444637, "end_char": 444642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 445466, "end_char": 445483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 445813, "end_char": 445827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayjar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 446958, "end_char": 446975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His argu-\n\nThe Bengdl\n\nlmmrinit) Company Limited 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"S. 659", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 458267, "end_char": 458273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State onBihat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 460488, "end_char": 460501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14-8-1 S. 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(", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "Stale Of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 469403, "end_char": 469417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The &ngai\n\nImmunfty Company Limited\n\nv. 17~ Stale Of Bihar\n\nt1t1d othtr's\n\nP mkatarama\n\nA>J\"' J.\n\nllict of Laws-Restatement of Law\" it is observed that \"a nation has jurisdiction over its nationals aJ.. though not present within the territorial limits of the nation\". (", "canonical_name": "State of BibMr\n\nMruf"}}, {"text": "Wheare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 470127, "end_char": 470133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Volume 15, pages 868-869) \"Extra-territorial Legislation\", says Wheare, \"simply means legislation which attaches significance for courts within the jurisdiction to facts and events occurring outside the jurisdiction\". ("}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 470429, "end_char": 470438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 470440, "end_char": 470457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Uganda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 470924, "end_char": 470930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustration : A (who is a citizen of India) commits a murder in Uganda."}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 472364, "end_char": 472372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Halsbury, L.C. observed tbat the jurisdiction of the colonies to enact laws was confined within their own territories'', and that \"it would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the Colony\" to enact a law in respect of a crime committed outside their territory."}}, {"text": "Newfoundland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 472887, "end_char": 472899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Newfoundland( 2 ), the question was with reference to a law of Newfoundland imposing a tax on telephone companies in respect of cables landed or established in the Colony."}}, {"text": "Macn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 473109, "end_char": 473113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\n\ndisrnsing the scope of these provisions, Lord Macn:tghtcn observed at page 826 :\n\n\"While, of course, it was competent to impose taxation on cables within its territorial jurisdiction, it was not competent for the Government to lay a tax on cables outside its territorial jurisdiction\"."}}, {"text": "Bntgal\n\nImmunity Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 473663, "end_char": 473687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bntgal\n\nImmunity Company pmilld\n\nV; Tire Stale of Bihm\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nT hz Bengal\n\nImmunity Campany Limited\n\nTire Slate of .Biliar\n\nand Others\n\nV m/catarama\n\nAY.J'OT J.\n\nN ad an v. 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["}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 476304, "end_char": 476313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "British North America Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 476317, "end_char": 476342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nadan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 477756, "end_char": 477761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llut there is nothing in the observations in British Coal Corporation v. The King(2) relied on by the appellant, to support the contention that the view expressed in Nadan's case(3 ) was adopted in preference to that taken in Croft v.\n\nDunphy( 1 ) ; in fact there was no decision at all on this point."}}, {"text": "yar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 478288, "end_char": 478291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\n4J>yar J.\n\nT l1e Ben, l!,"}}, {"text": "sections 99(1) and 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 478927, "end_char": 478952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 479120, "end_char": 479130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Charter Act, 1833", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 479138, "end_char": 479155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 479437, "end_char": 479466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 65(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 479527, "end_char": 479540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "In the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 479992, "end_char": 480002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "In the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Charter Act, 1833", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 480010, "end_char": 480027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 65(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 480032, "end_char": 480048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Charter Act, 1833", "statute": "the Charter Act, 1833"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 480056, "end_char": 480085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Then came the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 480234, "end_char": 480271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 99(1) and 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 480283, "end_char": 480308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Government of India Act", "statute": "Then came the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 481031, "end_char": 481041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Government of India Act", "statute": "Then came the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 481066, "end_char": 481076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Government of India Act", "statute": "Then came the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 481092, "end_char": 481121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 481437, "end_char": 481451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "sections 99(1) and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 481571, "end_char": 481593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "sections 99( 1) and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 481973, "end_char": 481996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 482060, "end_char": 482066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scope of the legislative power conferred by sections 99( 1) and 100 is precisely the same as that conferred on the Legislatµres of Canada under sections 91 and 92 of tht; 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and Mitter, J. characterising it as a \"piece of extra-territorial legislation not by a superior or Dominion Legislature but by a subordinate Legislature\"."}}, {"text": "section 99( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 485998, "end_char": 486012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 486017, "end_char": 486028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 486036, "end_char": 486065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 486298, "end_char": 486308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 486325, "end_char": 486354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Messrs Wallace & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 486547, "end_char": 486567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It held a 14/32 share in a firm called Messrs Wallace & Co., which was carrying on business in Bombay."}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 65", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 487211, "end_char": 487227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uthwatt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 487953, "end_char": 487960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Affirming the judgment of the Federal Court, Lord Uthwatt observed that the fact that the appellant \"was a member of the partnership carrying on business in British India\" was irrelevant in .consi(lering whether the legislation was intra vires; that it w:ts to be assumed that there was \"no connection between the Companies and British India except the derivation from British India of the larger part of their income\", and that the validity of the legislation should be determined on that basis."}}, {"text": "section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 489188, "end_char": 489201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 489206, "end_char": 489217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 490292, "end_char": 490299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A. H. W adia\n\nv. I. T. Commissioner, Bombay(1), the question related to the liability of the Gwalior Durbar to be assessed to income-tax in respect of interest received at Gwalior."}}, {"text": "Providenc.e Investment Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 490411, "end_char": 490442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a Company called the Providenc.e Investment Co. Ltd. carrying on business in Bombay."}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 491595, "end_char": 491612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 491946, "end_char": 491959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 491964, "end_char": 491975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 492648, "end_char": 492660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 99(1) and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 492713, "end_char": 492735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 245(1) and 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 493550, "end_char": 493573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 494155, "end_char": 494169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 494964, "end_char": 494978, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 495554, "end_char": 495583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 495592, "end_char": 495613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Centre", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 495673, "end_char": 495679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under these Statutes, the State is not subordinate to the Centre, its authority ' being supreme in respect of the matters entrusted to it."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 495764, "end_char": 495793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 2", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 495984, "end_char": 495999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 18", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 496008, "end_char": 496024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 99(1) and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 496517, "end_char": 496539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Australian High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 497550, "end_char": 497571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question whether States as distinct from the Commonwealth have competence to enart\n\nlaws with extra-territorial operation has also been considered in some of the decisions of the Australian High Court."}}, {"text": "sections 51 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 498368, "end_char": 498386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commonwealth Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 498476, "end_char": 498499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In short, the Commonwealth Parliament may legislate for 'the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to' a large number of subject-matters."}}, {"text": "State of New South Wales", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 498644, "end_char": 498668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, the State of New South Wales may legislate for 'the peace, welfare and good government' of New South Wales."}}, {"text": "sections 99(1) and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 499463, "end_char": 499485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 499532, "end_char": 499544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 500010, "end_char": 500024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V enkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 500641, "end_char": 500659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words \"extra-territorial operation\" are used, as already , stated, in two different senses as connoting firstly, laws in respect of acts or events which take place inside the State but have operation outside, and secondly, laws with reference to the nationals of a State in respect of their acts outside; that in its former sense, the laws are strictly\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe Stalt of BihlW\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe Bengal Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nV enkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nspeaking intra-territorial though loosely termed 'extra-territorial', and that under article 245(1) it is within the competence of the Parliament and of the State Legislatures to enact laws with extra-territorial operation in that sense.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "article 245(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 500749, "end_char": 500763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 500954, "end_char": 500968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 501365, "end_char": 501375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Charter Act, 1833", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 501383, "end_char": 501400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 65(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 501831, "end_char": 501844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Charter Act, 1833", "statute": "the Charter Act, 1833"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 501852, "end_char": 501881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Army Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 502625, "end_char": 502633, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Air Force Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 502642, "end_char": 502655, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Royal Indian Marine Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 502727, "end_char": 502754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) The (Indian Legislature) has power to make laws-\n\n(b) for all subjects of His Majesty and servants of the Crown within other parts of India; and ( c) for all native Indian subjects of His Majesty, without and beyond as well as within British India; and ( d) for the government of officers, soldiers,\n\n(airmen) and followers in His Majesty's Indian forces, wherever they are serving, in so far as they are not subject to the Army Act (or the Air Force Act); and ( e) for all persons employed or serving in or\n\nbelonging to the Royal Indian Marine Service\"."}}, {"text": "section 99(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 502793, "end_char": 502806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 502814, "end_char": 502843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 99(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 504140, "end_char": 504153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 99(1) and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 504253, "end_char": 504275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 504283, "end_char": 504312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 99(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 504499, "end_char": 504512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 504667, "end_char": 504684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "VenkalaTama\n\nAyyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 504854, "end_char": 504872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nImmunity Company Limited ...\n\nTht State of Bihar and others\n\nVenkalaTama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n14th August, 1947, acting under section 9 of the Indian Independence Act the Governor-General issued an Adaptation Order, and therein, for the words \"for the whole or any part of British India or for any Federated State\" were substituted the words \"including laws having extra-territorial operation for the whole or any part of the Dominion\"; and sub-section\n\n(2) was omitted.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 504909, "end_char": 504918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505427, "end_char": 505441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505461, "end_char": 505475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 65(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505494, "end_char": 505507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 505550, "end_char": 505579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 99(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505584, "end_char": 505597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 505605, "end_char": 505634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505791, "end_char": 505805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 245(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505896, "end_char": 505910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 506306, "end_char": 506316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 506382, "end_char": 506392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 286(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508615, "end_char": 508633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508966, "end_char": 508980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Corrlj>any Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 509239, "end_char": 509274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and others\n\nVrnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\n)955\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Corrlj>any Limited\n\nTiu Slate of Bikar and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyy<U' J.\n\norised by the terms of the Explanation.", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 510818, "end_char": 510825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should also be noted that the scope of the presumption that the laws of a State are not intended to operate outside its territory is, as stated by Maxwell, that \"Parliament does not design its Statutes to operate on its subjects beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom\" (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn.,", "canonical_name": "Maxwell"}}, {"text": "Provincial List of the Government of India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 512115, "end_char": 512166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 512325, "end_char": 512341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provincial List of the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "the Provincial List of the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a.)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 512628, "end_char": 512646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provincial List of the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "the Provincial List of the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "section 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 515192, "end_char": 515205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 515213, "end_char": 515236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 515440, "end_char": 515453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "section 39(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 516413, "end_char": 516426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 516709, "end_char": 516719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 516732, "end_char": 516749, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 51(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517917, "end_char": 517930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 518080, "end_char": 518093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Btntal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 518262, "end_char": 518294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of Bi ha~\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThe Btntal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\n..;_ The State of Bihar\n\nand otht1s\n\nVnkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "Parke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 518595, "end_char": 518600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position was well-established in the common law of England, and was thus stated by Parke, B., in James v. Griffin(') in the following terms:\n\n\"The delivery by the vendor of goods sold to a carrier of any description, either expressly or by implication named by the vendee, and who is to carry on his account, is a constructive delivery to the vendee; but."}}, {"text": "James", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 519841, "end_char": 519846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Re Cock(') James, L.J. said :\n\n\"The authorities show that the vendor has a right to stop in transitu until the goods have actually got home into the hands of the purchaser, or of some one who receives them in the character of his servant -or agent\"."}}, {"text": "Brett", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 520142, "end_char": 520147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same case, the position was stated even more fully by Brett, L.J., in the following terms :\n\n\"As soon as the clay was appropriated by the vendors to this contract and was placed on board the ship, the property in it passed to the purchaser and\n\n(1) 2 M. & W. 623; 115 E.R., 906, 910."}}, {"text": "section 32(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 520947, "end_char": 520960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 520976, "end_char": 520993, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 51(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 521024, "end_char": 521037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 521052, "end_char": 521069, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 521336, "end_char": 521350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SrNHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 521782, "end_char": 521787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SrNHA J.-1 have had the advantage of perusing the judgments prepared by my brothers, ."}}, {"text": "N.\n\nBhagwati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 521880, "end_char": 521892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. Das, N.\n\nBhagwati, B.\n\nJagannadhadas and\n\nT. L.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 521894, "end_char": 521911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. Das, N.\n\nBhagwati, B.\n\nJagannadhadas and\n\nT. L.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "T. L.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 521917, "end_char": 521941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. Das, N.\n\nBhagwati, B.\n\nJagannadhadas and\n\nT. L.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar.", "canonical_name": "T. L.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar"}}, {"text": "T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 522220, "end_char": 522243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a careful and anxious consideration of the two viewpoints contained in the judgments respectively of my brother S. R. Das holding that the previous decision of this court in The\n\nState of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(2) should be overruled, and of my brother T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar that it should be followed, I have come to the conclusion that the latter view is more acceptable.", "canonical_name": "T. L.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 522611, "end_char": 522616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal Immunity Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand others\n\nSinha]."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 522806, "end_char": 522817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523204, "end_char": 523215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 523857, "end_char": 523870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons given by my brothers, Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Aiyar, I would agree with them in holding that sufficient grounds have not been made out for overruling that decision which had been taken after hearing all the parties interested in the result of the case.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nJagannadhadas"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 523875, "end_char": 523892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons given by my brothers, Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Aiyar, I would agree with them in holding that sufficient grounds have not been made out for overruling that decision which had been taken after hearing all the parties interested in the result of the case.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 526060, "end_char": 526077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 526982, "end_char": 527014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are also agreed that full effect must\n\nThe Bengal\n\nlmmuniry Company Limited\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nand ot/.trs\n\nSin."}}, {"text": "Btngal Immunity Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 527065, "end_char": 527096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1a J.\n\nTht Btngal Immunity Company Limited v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and othtrs\n\nSinha].", "canonical_name": "Bengal\n\nlmmunit; Company Limiter/\n\nTl11; State of Bihar"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 527949, "end_char": 527966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 528097, "end_char": 528111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 528641, "end_char": 528652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aipr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 529514, "end_char": 529530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view propounded by my learned brother Venkatarama Aipr is thus not inconsistent with the avowed purpose of the Constitution, as expressed in article\n\n301.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "article\n\n301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 529617, "end_char": 529629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nDas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 529791, "end_char": 529798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, the view propounded by my learned brother S.\n\nDas about the actual application of the legal fiction stops short of giving full effect to that fiction."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 529975, "end_char": 529986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 530001, "end_char": 530015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vcnkatarama Aivar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 530122, "end_char": 530139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, for the reasons given by my ieamed brother Vcnkatarama Aivar the hetter view is that clause (2) of article 286 of the Constitutior~ is subject to article 286(1 )(a) read with the Explanation.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 530178, "end_char": 530189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 530225, "end_char": 530243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal\n\nlmm1.nity Co111panr Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 531123, "end_char": 531158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal\n\nlmm1.nity Co111panr Limited\n\nThe Slate of Bihar and others\n\nSinha)."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_67_78_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 s.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSHIROMANJ GURDWARA PARBANDHAK\n\nCOMMITTEE v.\n\nLT. SAR DAR RAGHBIR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n!VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS. VENKATRAMA\n\nAYYAR AND SINHA JJ.j\n\nLimitation-Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925 (Punjab Act VIII of 1925), s. 25-A--Committee constituted prior to the year 1930-Subsequent proceedings-High Couri's decision and notification under s. 17 of the Act-Suit for possession-Starting point for limitation- Ss. 85, 86, 88 of the Act, sc9pe of.\n\nThe plaintiff which is the Committee of Management for all Gurudwaras situated within the Municipal limits of Amritsar, except the Gurudwara Sri Akal Takht Sahib, was constituted prior to the year 1930 and by virtue of s. 85(2) of the Sikh Gurudwaras Act (Punjab Act VIII of 1925) became the Committee concerned with the suit Gurudwara. There were certain procee<iings under the Act in respect of the suit properties which were ultimately decided by the High Court on the 16th June 1936 and the decision was followed by a notification under s. 17 of the Act on the 3rd March 1937. As a result the plaintiff became entitled to get possession of the. saiJ properties by instituting a suit before a tribunal under s. 25-A of the Act within one year from the date_ of the decision or the date of the constitution of the Committee, whichever was later. The present suit was filed on the 25th February 1938 which was beyond one year of the decision and the question was whether the suit can be said to have been instituted within one year of the date of the constitution of the ComJllittee of the Gurudwara concerned, the contention being that the plaintiff must be deemed to have become the committe.: concerned with the suit Gurudwara only on the date of the notification thereof in 1937 under s. 17 of the Act by virtue of the provisions of ss. 86 and 88.\n\nHeld, that the date of the notification in 1937 under s. 17 cannot be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the Committe.: concerned for the purposes of s. 25-A and that the present suit is barred by limitation.\n\nSection 86 does not apply to Gurudwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar specified in s. 85, in respect of which a Committee already exists and by virtue of sub-section (2) of s. 88 the date of the publication of the notification of the Committee which already has been in existence since 1930 will be the date of the constitution of the Committee within the meaning of s. 25-A.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1954.\n\nMarc'lt 24 .\n\n1955 Appeal from the judgment and Decree dated the Shiromani 20th day of June 1950 of the High Court of Judica-\n\nP~:r:/,; J;:k ture for the State of Punjab at Simla in Regular First Committee Appeal No. 73 of 1941 arising out of the Decree dated\n\nL.r. Sarda~ Raghbir the 19th _day of Decemb_er 19~0 of the Sikh Gurnd-\n\nSing/1 and others waras Tribunal, Lahore m Sutt No. 11 of 1938.\n\nGurharhan Singh and R. S.\n\nN11/'/da. for the appellant.\n\nAchhru Ram. (Nau11i1 Lal with him). for the respondents Nos. I and 2.\n\nK. L. Mehta, for the respondents Nos. 3 to 5.\n\n1955. March 24. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal on leave granted by the High Court of Punjab against its judgment affirming the decree of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal dated the 19th December, 1940, dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff in the appeal is the Committee of Management of Sikh Gurdwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar (except the Gurdwara Sri Akal Takhat Sahib, Amritsar). The plaint was filed under section 25-A of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, (Punjab Act VIII of 1925) (hereinafter referred to aS\" the Act) for possession of certain properties situated in Amritsar. marked and bounded as specified in the plaint and purporting to have been declared as a Sikh Gurdwara by the Government of Punjab under section 17 of the Act by means of the notification No. 9-G dated the 3rd March, 1937. The case of the plaintiff-Committee is that thes.e properties were, and were determined to be, a Sikh Gurdwara. by name Gurdwara Bunga Sarkar. by the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal by its decree dated the 4th November, 1935 and confirmed on appeal therefrom by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, on the 16th June. 1936 and that accordingly the Committee was entitled to possession of the properties. The facts that have led up to the present appeal are as follow~: After the Act was passed and within one year of its commencement the then existing non-statutory Shiromani Gurdwarn Parbandhak Committee filed a list under section 1955 3 of th1,; Act claiming the suit properties and certain Shiroma11i other items attached thereto as belonging to the Gurp~, b, f;;'J/;,'.k dvvarn Harmandir Sahib. These properties comprised Committee two items called Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai .Ma_llan Lt. &rd\"~· Raghbir and the shops appurtenant to each of them. Ob1ections Singh mid others were filed to this list by way of two applications r, g 1111~/,~; d~1 s1. under section 8 of the Act claiming these as private properties. One was hy Sardar Balwant Singh dated, the 8th March, I 928 and the other was by Sardar Raghhir Singh dated the 10th March, 1928. Sardar Raghbir Si;1gh claimed the whole of Bunga Sarkar and its appurtenant shops as well as 1I3rd of the Bunga Mai Malian and of the appurtenant shops.\n\nSardar Balwant Singh's claim was confined to l/3rd share; in Bunga Mai Malian anci in the appurtenant shops. The other l I 3rd share in Bunga Mai Mallan was apparently treated by these claimants as belonging to some other person who was not a party to these proceedings. These two applications were forwarded under section I 4 of the Act to the Gurdwara Tribunal for its decision. The parties to these proceedings entered into a compromise on tre 6th Febri1ary, 1930.\n\nThere were two compromises one relating to each of the applications. The net effect of the compromises w::is that some out of the items claimed were admitted to be the private property of the respective claimants and the rest as ivakf hungas for the Y atries to Sri Darbar Sahib, that the non-personal properties were to remain in the management of the claimants, their heirs and representatives as such wakf with certain stipulations as to how that management was to be carried on. The Tribunal disposed of the two applications before them in terms of these compromises. It may be mentioned that though the original list under section 3 of the Act was filed by the then non-statutory Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the compromises were entered into by the Managing Committee of the Gurdwaras within the limits of the Municipal Committee, Amritsar, which presumably had already by then been formed under section 85 of the Act. Now, quite independently of these\n\n10 8 SCI!ND/82\n\n1955 proceedmgs before the Tribunal, and prior to the\n\nShiromo11i filing of the list under section 3 and of the objec- Gurdwara • d Porhandhak twns un er section 5 above referred to. there had Commi11ee been filed a petition under section 7 of the Act,\n\nLt .. sard;; Rag1tb;, sigrie~ by. 55 Sik)ls. claiming these very properties\n\nSmf!h and others as bemg m themselves a Sikh Gurdwara bv name\n\n.Tal!amzadhadar J. Bunga Sarkar !Maharaja Ranjit Singh Saheb) and enclosing a list of properties as belonging thereto under section 7(2) of the Act.\n\nIt does not appear that this petition was brought to the notie; e of the G, trdwara Tribunal when it passed the decree in terms of the compromise with reference to the objections under section 5 of the Act. The petition under section 7 was in the usual course followed by a notification issued by the Government on the 18th February. 1930, under section 7!3) of the Act. This resulted in (I) an objection under section 8 bv the Granthis ohject\\ng that this was not a Sikh Gtirdwara. and (2) two other objections by Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh, already previously above referred to, under section I 0 of the Act claiming the properties as their own and objecting to the claim made that thev were Sikh Gurdwaras. These ohj.; ctions were\n\nfiled on -the 5th April. 1930. It may he noticed that the notification under section 7(3) of the Act was within a few days after the compromise decrees in the proceedings under section 5 of the Act and it does not appear whether the compromises were brought to the notice of the Government or not. Thee objections under section 8 and JO (and presumably also the oetition under section 7) were forwarded to the Tribunal for its decision under secl inn 14 of the Act.\n\nThe petition under section 8 filed by the Granthis was contested by the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee !Statutorv) and after recording some evi- . . dence, the Tribuna 1 came to the conclusion that Bunga Sarkar was a Sikh Gurdwara and declared it as such on the 28th Aug1•st. 1935. On the objections under section I 0. notices were given to the Committee of Management as well as to the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee but they declined to become parties to it. The contest under section JO of the Act\n\nwas only as between the claimants and some of the .Ms Sikhs who filed the petition under section 7. At the Shiro1111111i hearing before the Tribunal both sides relied upon the P~~t,~}'/, t.; previous compromises in support of their respective Com111i11ee claims. The Tribunal . by its decision datd the th Lt. Sarda~ Rag/ibir November, 1935, decided that the properttes which Singh andlothers\n\nhad been declared as the properties of Sardar Raghbir Jagamiadhmlas J.\n\nSingh and Sardar Balwant Singh respectively, should be declared to be their personal properties nd that the rest of the properties claimed to belong to Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Malian should be declared to be Sikh Gurdwaras and as properties appurtenant thereto. It was also declared that these two Gurdwaras and the properties held to be appurtenant to them should vest in the management of Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh by virtue of and as per terms of the compromises. As against these decrees two appeals were presented by the Sikh worshippers to the High Court and the only question that ultimately appears to have been raised was that the direction given by the Tribunal to the effect that the properties should remain in the management of the claimants, Sardar Raghhir Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh, was illegal. The High Court without giving any decision on the legal question s.o raised was of the opinion that it was no function of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal to pass an order on an application made unde1 section I 0 by the claimants that the claimants should manage the properties appurtenant to the Gurdwaras by virtue of the compromises. They thought that the question of right of management should be left open in these proceedings and that the directions in the decree of the Tribunal relating to the\n\nm:rnagement should be deleted therefrom and that the rest of the decrees of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal is to stand. They expressed their conclusion ir the following terms:\n\n\"That portion of the decree of the Sikh Gurdwaras Trihunal which has declared the respondcnts's ri12ht\n\nto manage the Gurdwaras and the properties aooe11<if'ci thereto shall form no part of the Jcree granted hv the Tribunal; the .rest of the decree of the Sikh Gur-\n\n1955 dwaras Tribunal stands, that is to_ say, the properties Siiirouu1ui which have been declared to be. the personal proper- Gurdwwa ties of Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant Parba11dhok\n\ncommittee Singh shall remain their properties and the properties\n\nLt. surd,~: Raglibir \".\".hich have been declare_d to be appendd to the two\n\nSiag/1 \"'\"' 01hm l1urdwaras shall remam the properties of the two\n\nGurdwaras\".\n\nJaga1111adhadas J.\n\nThe High Court also added that, though the proceedings .mentioned the existence of two Gurdwaras by name Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Mallan, the real position seemed to be that there was only one Gurdwara,. viz. Bunga Sarkar, and that Bunga Mai Mallan had no separate existence as a Gurdwara but was a well.-known part of Bunga Sarkar. This decision of the High Court was on the 16th June, 1936. This was followed by notification No. 9-G dated the 3rd March,\n\n1937. under section 17 of the Act which is the foundation of the present suit.\n\nOn these facts a number of contentions were raised by hoth sides before the High Court as well as before us. The Judgment of the High Court as well as the arguments before us have covered a wide range. On the merits, the case for the plaintiff is quite simple.\n\nThe plaintiff says that whatever may .be the position with reference to the earlier compromises\" arrived at between the parties in the proceedings under section 5 of the Act, the later proceedings with reference to those very properties under section 10 of the Act resulted in the judgment of the High Court dated the\n\nllith June 1936. which is conclusive and binding. By virtue of the said judgment and the notification dated the 3rd March, 1937, following thereupon, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the properties by virtue of section 25-A of the Act. On the side of the defendants various objections have been raised which may be summarised as follows: ( l) The proceedin!!S under section 10\" did not result in any specific declaration in favour of the Committee that the properties in dispute in the present suit constituted a Sikh Gurdw::ira or belong to a Sikh Gurdwara. No such declaration can he 'gathered from the decision of the Tribu!l'\\l dated the 4th November. 1935. or from that of\n\nthe High Court on appeal dated the 16th June, 1936. 1955\n\n(2) The Tribunal had no jurisdiction in disposing of s11iruma11i Gurdwara an application under section I 0 of the Act, to give a Parbaud!rak positive declaration that the property in question is co111111ittee a Sikh Gurdwara. Its only function was to decide Lt. sarJd: Raghb whether or not the properties claimed were the pri- Singh 1111'!_ others vate properties of the claimants.\n\nHence even if the Jaga111wdiradas J decision of the Tribunal and of the High Court can be treated as a decision declaring the properties as a Sikh Gurdwara that is not valid and the notification issued thereupon is void. (3) Any such decision would be contrary to section 37 of the Act and also ctrntrary to the princir!es of res judicata and would be. therefore, a nullity on that ground. (4) The conduct of the Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and the concerned Committee of Management, in entering into the conipromises in the proceedings under section 5 of the Act without disclosing the ptndency of the petition filed by the 55 Sikhs under sei:; tion 7 of the Act, followed up by their declining to be\n\nmade parties in the section 10 proceedings and in virtually promoting the contest of the proceedings under sections 8 and 10, was fraudulent. They are accordingly estopped from r.elying on the decree obtained under section 10 proceedings and basing their right to relief thereon. {5) The suit under section 25-A lies only where the decision on an objection under section 10(1) is reached after the notification that the Gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara is published since the section refers to a decision in favour of a\n\n\"Notified Sikh Gurdwara\" implying the pre-existence of such notification. (6) The suit under section 25-A was barred by limitation. (7) The whole appeal abated in the High Court inasmuch as one of the respondents Sardar Balwant Singh died during the pendency of the appeal. His legal representatives were not brought on record in time and the Jjig:h Court declined to excuse the delay and to set aside the abatement, as a resu It of which the entire appeal abated, the claim against both the respondents being joint and not being maintainahle against one only in the absence of\n\n1\"55 the other. In addition to these contentions which Shiromani have been put forward before us and strenuously\n\nP~;'[, i,~J{%k argued by both sides, the. High Court also based its committee decision on the view that section 7 of the Act ass\\1mes\n\nLr. Sardo\"; Raghbir he existence of '.l Gurdwra and that a. noification Singh and others issued under section 7(3) without there bemg m fact a\n\nJa; amiadlwdas J Gurdwara in existence would be ultra vires. In the\n\n present case, in view of the prior proceedings under section 5 and the compromises following the1 eupon, the non-existence of the Gurdwara as claimed in the petition under section 7(1) must be t:iken to have been made out and therefore the notification and all the proceedings following thereupon are illegal and ultra vires.\n\nThough we have heard elaborate arguments fro.m b0th sides on these various contentions, it appeared to ns ultimately that the plea of limitation is decisive\n\nagaint the appellants and that it is unnecessary to expres.< any opinion on any of the other contentions raised. The question of limitation arises with reference to the terms of section 25-A which is as follows:\n\n\"25-A. (I) When it has been decided under the provisions of this Act that a right, title or interest in immovable property belongs to a Notified Sikh Gurdwara, or any person, the Committee of the Gurdwara concerned or the person in whose favour a declaration has been made may, within a period of one year from the date of the decision or the date of the constitution of the Committee, whichever is later, institute a suit before a tribunal claiming to be awarded possessidn of the right, title or interest in the immovable property in question as against the parties to the previous petition, and the tripunal shall if satisfied -that the claim relates to the right, title or interest in tlie immovable property which has been held to belong to the Gurdwara, or to the person in whose favour the declaration has been made. pass a decree for possession accordingly.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act to the contrary, the court-fee payable on the plaint in such suit shall be five rupees\".\n\nThis section provides. for the filing of the suit, the 1955 period of one year from the date of the decision or Sltiromani the date of the constitution of the committee whichp~:;~;;;:k ever is later. Now the date of the decision in this Committee case must be taken to be the date when the High Court Lr. sardd: Rag!thir on appal disposed of the proceedings imder section Singh and others 10, i.e., the 16th June, 1936. The present suit has Jagannadhadas J. been filed on -the 25th February, 1938, i.e., clearly beyond one year of the decision. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the suit can be said to have been within one year from the date of the constitution of the Committee of the Gurdwara concer'ned. Now, one has to turn to sections 85, 86 and 88 of the Act to appreciate which is the Committee concerned with this Gurdwara and what the c.late of its constitution is. Section 85 is as follows On so far as it is relevant):\n\n\"Subject to the provisions _of -section 88, there shall be one committee for the Gurdwaras known as the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, and the Baba Atal Sahib, and all other Notified Sikh Gurdwaras situated Within the municipal hn1111dorie.1 of <A mrirsar other than the Sri AkRI Takht Sahib\".\n\nSection 86 is as follows (in so fay as it is relevant):\n\n\"For every Notified Sikh Gurdwara other than a Gurdwara specified in section 85 a committee shall be constituted after it has been declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act\".\n\nSection 88 is as follows (in so far as it is re.levant):\n\n\"<l l The committees described in sections 85 and 86 shall be constituted as soon as may be after the c0nstitution of the Board. provided that no committee\n\nshall be constituted for any gurdwara under -t-he provisions of this Act unless and until it has been declared to he a Sikh Gurdwara under th~ provisions of this Act.\n\n(2) When all the members of any committee described in section 85 have been elected or co-opted. as the case may be, according to the provisions of that section. the Provincial Government shall notify the fact that the committee has been duly constituted,\n\nS//fr<J111a11i Gurdwara Parbandhak\n\nand the date of the pubfkatio11 of the notificat1011 shalt be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the committee\".\n\nCon11nittcc N · d. . . v. • ow. 1t 1s not 1sputed that the present plaintiff LI. Sardar Raghhirwhich i' the Committee of Management for all the\n\nS111gh and others G j . d . . . . . . __ n.m waras situate within the Mu111cmal limits of Jagmmadhada., J. Amritsar, except the Gurdwara Sri Akai Takht Sahib was constituted prior to the year 1930 and was in fact functioning at the date of the compromises in the section 5 proceedings dated the 6th February, 1930. ft is also not disputed that bv virtue of section 85(2), this committee also became the Committee concerned with the suit Gurdwara, which is admittedly located within the Municipal limits of Amritsar.\n\nBut it is contended for the appellants that this Committee becomes concerned with the suit Gurdwara only from the date when the notification under section 17 is issued, i.e .. from the 3rd March, 1937, and that. therefore, the plaintiff had one year from that elate for the filing of the suit and that in the situation, section 25-A in providing the alternative period of limitation as being \"one year from the date of the constitution of the committee\". must be construed reasonablv as being one year from the elate of the notificatiOn in such a case and that for the purposes of this section, the pre-existing committee must be deemed to have been constituted for the suit Gurdwara only on the date of the notification.\n\nIn support of this contention it has been pointed out that the specific policy of the Act as discfosed in sections 86 and 88 is that no Committee is to be formed for a Gurdwara until after it has been \"declared a Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act. It is accordingly urged that the phrase \"constitution of the committee\" in section 25-A should be construed so as to indioote a point of time not earlier than the notification of the concerned Gurdwara and that in the circumstances and in such cases the date of the notification of the Gurdwara mmt be the date of the comtitution of the concerned committee. It aopears to us, however, that this contention is untenable.\n\nSection 86 in terms relates to a Notified Sikh Gurdwara other than Gurdwaras\n\nspecified in section 85. Hence so far as our !)resent l955 purpose is concerned, the policy uQderlying section 86 Shiromani does not necessarily apply to the Gurdwaras within p~~~'; df:, k the Municipal limits of Amritsar for which a Committee C'ommittee already exists.\n\nMoreover, sub-section (2) Lt. sdrda~ Raghbir of section 88 provides with reference to Committees Singh and others under section 85, that, as soon as all the members Jagam;-;; dhadtts 1. described therein have been elected or co-opted, the fact should be duly notified, and also declares in clear and categorical terms that the date of the publication of the notification shall be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the Committee. In the face of this deeming provision relating to these committees, it is not permissible to impute to such a Committee any other date as the date of its constitution for any of the purposes of the Act and to imply an exception and an addendum to the specific deeming provision.\n\nThis would be legislating. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention of the appellant that the date of the notification under section 17 in the p1esent case should be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the Committee concerned for the purposes of section 25-A. It has been urged that this view deprives the Committee of the benefit of the longer alternative period of limitation and that in a case where no notification under section 17 has been issued until after the expiry of an year from the date of the final decision that the Gurdwara claimed is a Sikh Gurdwara, the remedy under section 25-A would become inapplicable. It may be that an exceptional case of undue delay in the publication of the notification may be a casus omissus but such a delay need not be assumed to be a matter of course.\n\nThat, at any rate, is not the present case where the notification was in fact issued within nine months of the decision of the High Court. The Committee which should have been alert with reference to these matters, had, not only the whole of these nine months to take\n\nstep~ to get the notification published earlier, but, it had three months thereafter to come forward with the present suit.\n\nHowever this may be. we do not consider that there is any question of hardship,\n\n11-R rt INDl82\n\n1955 because obviously section 25-A is only lln enabling Shiromani section providing a cheap remedy by way of a suit\n\nP~t:;:t:, ik before the Tribunal itself. We are clearly of the commime opinion that the present suit under section 25-A is\n\nL S d v. R lb' barred by limitation and on this ground the appeal t. ar ar ag 1 1r f .. 1 Singh and othf'rS must a1 .\n\nJagannadlradas J.\n\nMarch 24\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE ST A TE OF BJHAR v.\n\nM. HOMJ AND ANOTHER\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, .TAGANNADHADAS and SINHA, .T.T.J\n\nSurety bond-Stipulations of a penal nature-Whether should be construed strictly.\n\nIn a s11rety bond the sureties bound themselves for payment of Rs .. 50,000 \"only in case Mr. Ali Khan fails . . . to surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly\". As a result of the constitutional changes the jurisdiction of the Privy Council came to be transferred to the Federal Court, and eventually Ali Khan's appeal to the Privy Council was heard and dismissed by the Federal Court. Thereupon the Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the sureties to produce Aii Khan within three days.\n\nHeld, that the proceedings taken agaiqst the sureties \\Vere entirely .misconceived as the penalty stipulated had not been incurred, in , iew of the terms of the bond set out above.\n\nProvisions in a surety bond which are penal in nature mtist be very strictly construed and there is no room for the application of a legal fiction that the judgment of the Federal Court must be deemed to be the judgment or order contemplated by the parties to the surety bond.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1953.\n\nAppeal under. Article l 34(])(c) of the Constitution from the Judgement and Order dated the 27th March 1953 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\nin Criminal Revision No. 1290 of 1951 <•ri5ing out of", "total_entities": 150, "entities": [{"text": "SHIROMANJ GURDWARA PARBANDHAK\n\nCOMMITTEE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIROMANJ GURDWARA PARBANDHAK COMMITTEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LT. SAR DAR RAGHBIR SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LT. SARDAR RAGHBIR SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jaga1111adhadas", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Limitation-Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 217, "end_char": 240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243, "end_char": 248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 365, "end_char": 370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "Ss. 85, 86, 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 433, "end_char": 447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 85(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 727, "end_char": 750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "16th June 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 943, "end_char": 957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were certain procee<iings under the Act in respect of the suit properties which were ultimately decided by the High Court on the 16th June 1936 and the decision was followed by a notification under s. 17 of the Act on the 3rd March 1937."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1012, "end_char": 1017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "3rd March 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1036, "end_char": 1050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were certain procee<iings under the Act in respect of the suit properties which were ultimately decided by the High Court on the 16th June 1936 and the decision was followed by a notification under s. 17 of the Act on the 3rd March 1937."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1182, "end_char": 1187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "25th February 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1353, "end_char": 1371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was filed on the 25th February 1938 which was beyond one year of the decision and the question was whether the suit can be said to have been instituted within one year of the date of the constitution of the ComJllittee of the Gurudwara concerned, the contention being that the plaintiff must be deemed to have become the committe.:"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1761, "end_char": 1766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 86 and 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1809, "end_char": 1822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1879, "end_char": 1884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1985, "end_char": 1990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2045, "end_char": 2055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurudwaras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2074, "end_char": 2084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 86 does not apply to Gurudwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar specified in s. 85, in respect of which a Committee already exists and by virtue of sub-section (2) of s. 88 the date of the publication of the notification of the Committee which already has been in existence since 1930 will be the date of the constitution of the Committee within the meaning of s. 25-A.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2116, "end_char": 2124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 86 does not apply to Gurudwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar specified in s. 85, in respect of which a Committee already exists and by virtue of sub-section (2) of s. 88 the date of the publication of the notification of the Committee which already has been in existence since 1930 will be the date of the constitution of the Committee within the meaning of s. 25-A.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2138, "end_char": 2143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2422, "end_char": 2427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurharhan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2890, "end_char": 2905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurharhan Singh and R. S.\n\nN11/'/da."}}, {"text": "R. S.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurharhan Singh and R. S.\n\nN11/'/da."}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2947, "end_char": 2957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram. ("}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3018, "end_char": 3029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Mehta, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal on leave granted by the High Court of Punjab against its judgment affirming the decree of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal dated the 19th December, 1940, dismissing the plaintiff's suit.", "canonical_name": "Jaga1111adhadas"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3184, "end_char": 3204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal on leave granted by the High Court of Punjab against its judgment affirming the decree of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal dated the 19th December, 1940, dismissing the plaintiff's suit."}}, {"text": "Committee of Management of Sikh Gurdwaras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3376, "end_char": 3417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff in the appeal is the Committee of Management of Sikh Gurdwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar (except the Gurdwara Sri Akal Takhat Sahib, Amritsar)."}}, {"text": "Akal Takhat Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3483, "end_char": 3500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff in the appeal is the Committee of Management of Sikh Gurdwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar (except the Gurdwara Sri Akal Takhat Sahib, Amritsar).", "canonical_name": "Akal Takhat Sahib"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3540, "end_char": 3550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3560, "end_char": 3584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3587, "end_char": 3610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3818, "end_char": 3838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "marked and bounded as specified in the plaint and purporting to have been declared as a Sikh Gurdwara by the Government of Punjab under section 17 of the Act by means of the notification No."}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3845, "end_char": 3855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4081, "end_char": 4103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal by its decree dated the 4th November, 1935 and confirmed on appeal therefrom by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, on the 16th June."}}, {"text": "4th November, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4128, "end_char": 4146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal by its decree dated the 4th November, 1935 and confirmed on appeal therefrom by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, on the 16th June."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Lahore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal by its decree dated the 4th November, 1935 and confirmed on appeal therefrom by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, on the 16th June."}}, {"text": "16th June.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4231, "end_char": 4241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal by its decree dated the 4th November, 1935 and confirmed on appeal therefrom by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, on the 16th June."}}, {"text": "section 1955", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4549, "end_char": 4561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Punjab Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4974, "end_char": 4976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4984, "end_char": 4993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sardar Balwant Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5054, "end_char": 5074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One was hy Sardar Balwant Singh dated, the 8th March, I 928 and the other was by Sardar Raghhir Singh dated the 10th March, 1928.", "canonical_name": "Sardar Balwant Singh"}}, {"text": "Sardar Raghhir Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5124, "end_char": 5144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One was hy Sardar Balwant Singh dated, the 8th March, I 928 and the other was by Sardar Raghhir Singh dated the 10th March, 1928.", "canonical_name": "Sardar Raghhir Singh"}}, {"text": "10th March, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5155, "end_char": 5171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One was hy Sardar Balwant Singh dated, the 8th March, I 928 and the other was by Sardar Raghhir Singh dated the 10th March, 1928."}}, {"text": "Sardar Raghbir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5173, "end_char": 5187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Raghbir Si;1gh claimed the whole of Bunga Sarkar and its appurtenant shops as well as 1I3rd of the Bunga Mai Malian and of the appurtenant shops.", "canonical_name": "Sardar Raghhir Singh"}}, {"text": "Bunga Mai Mallan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5463, "end_char": 5479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other l I 3rd share in Bunga Mai Mallan was apparently treated by these claimants as belonging to some other person who was not a party to these proceedings."}}, {"text": "Gurdwara Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two applications were forwarded under section I 4 of the Act to the Gurdwara Tribunal for its decision."}}, {"text": "6th Febri1ary, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The parties to these proceedings entered into a compromise on tre 6th Febri1ary, 1930."}}, {"text": "Darbar Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6062, "end_char": 6074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The net effect of the compromises w::is that some out of the items claimed were admitted to be the private property of the respective claimants and the rest as ivakf hungas for the Y atries to Sri Darbar Sahib, that the non-personal properties were to remain in the management of the claimants, their heirs and representatives as such wakf with certain stipulations as to how that management was to be carried on."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6424, "end_char": 6433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6481, "end_char": 6520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that though the original list under section 3 of the Act was filed by the then non-statutory Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the compromises were entered into by the Managing Committee of the Gurdwaras within the limits of the Municipal Committee, Amritsar, which presumably had already by then been formed under section 85 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Municipal Committee, Amritsar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6624, "end_char": 6653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that though the original list under section 3 of the Act was filed by the then non-statutory Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the compromises were entered into by the Managing Committee of the Gurdwaras within the limits of the Municipal Committee, Amritsar, which presumably had already by then been formed under section 85 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6710, "end_char": 6720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6875, "end_char": 6884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6938, "end_char": 6947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7015, "end_char": 7024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7302, "end_char": 7314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7513, "end_char": 7522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7554, "end_char": 7563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18th February. 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7647, "end_char": 7666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition under section 7 was in the usual course followed by a notification issued by the Government on the 18th February."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7674, "end_char": 7683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7739, "end_char": 7748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sardar Raghbir Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7843, "end_char": 7863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and (2) two other objections by Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh, already previously above referred to, under section I 0 of the Act claiming the properties as their own and objecting to the claim made that thev were Sikh Gurdwaras.", "canonical_name": "Sardar Raghhir Singh"}}, {"text": "5th April. 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8096, "end_char": 8111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ctions were\n\nfiled on -the 5th April."}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8159, "end_char": 8171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8259, "end_char": 8268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8402, "end_char": 8411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8459, "end_char": 8468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8568, "end_char": 8577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bunga Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8756, "end_char": 8768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dence, the Tribuna 1 came to the conclusion that Bunga Sarkar was a Sikh Gurdwara and declared it as such on the 28th Aug1•st."}}, {"text": "28th Aug1•st. 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8820, "end_char": 8838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dence, the Tribuna 1 came to the conclusion that Bunga Sarkar was a Sikh Gurdwara and declared it as such on the 28th Aug1•st."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9158, "end_char": 9167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9445, "end_char": 9450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarda~ Rag/ibir November, 1935, decided that the properttes which Singh andlothers\n\nhad been declared as the properties of Sardar Raghbir Jagamiadhmlas J.\n\nSingh and Sardar Balwant Singh respectively, should be declared to be their personal properties nd that the rest of the properties claimed to belong to Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Malian should be declared to be Sikh Gurdwaras and as properties appurtenant thereto.", "canonical_name": "Singh"}}, {"text": "Sardar Balwant Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9545, "end_char": 9565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarda~ Rag/ibir November, 1935, decided that the properttes which Singh andlothers\n\nhad been declared as the properties of Sardar Raghbir Jagamiadhmlas J.\n\nSingh and Sardar Balwant Singh respectively, should be declared to be their personal properties nd that the rest of the properties claimed to belong to Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Malian should be declared to be Sikh Gurdwaras and as properties appurtenant thereto.", "canonical_name": "Sardar Balwant Singh"}}, {"text": "Jaga1111adhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11728, "end_char": 11743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaga1111adhadas J.\n\nThe High Court also added that, though the proceedings .mentioned the existence of two Gurdwaras by name Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Mallan, the real position seemed to be that there was only one Gurdwara,.", "canonical_name": "Jaga1111adhadas"}}, {"text": "Bunga Mai Mallan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11870, "end_char": 11886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaga1111adhadas J.\n\nThe High Court also added that, though the proceedings .mentioned the existence of two Gurdwaras by name Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Mallan, the real position seemed to be that there was only one Gurdwara,."}}, {"text": "16th June, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12126, "end_char": 12141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision of the High Court was on the 16th June, 1936."}}, {"text": "3rd March,\n\n1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12195, "end_char": 12211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9-G dated the 3rd March,\n\n1937."}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12219, "end_char": 12229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12702, "end_char": 12711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12792, "end_char": 12802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12980, "end_char": 12995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of the said judgment and the notification dated the 3rd March, 1937, following thereupon, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the properties by virtue of section 25-A of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13089, "end_char": 13099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13244, "end_char": 13254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13668, "end_char": 13671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaga111wdiradas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14016, "end_char": 14031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence even if the Jaga111wdiradas J decision of the Tribunal and of the High Court can be treated as a decision declaring the properties as a Sikh Gurdwara that is not valid and the notification issued thereupon is void. ("}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14262, "end_char": 14272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14411, "end_char": 14440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) The conduct of the Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and the concerned Committee of Management, in entering into the conipromises in the proceedings under section 5 of the Act without disclosing the ptndency of the petition filed by the 55 Sikhs under sei:; tion 7 of the Act, followed up by their declining to be\n\nmade parties in the section 10 proceedings and in virtually promoting the contest of the proceedings under sections 8 and 10, was fraudulent."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14543, "end_char": 14552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14723, "end_char": 14733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14810, "end_char": 14827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14918, "end_char": 14928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15002, "end_char": 15012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15066, "end_char": 15079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15312, "end_char": 15322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16016, "end_char": 16025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16149, "end_char": 16161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16314, "end_char": 16323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16433, "end_char": 16445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16924, "end_char": 16934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18407, "end_char": 18420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit has Jagannadhadas J. been filed on -the 25th February, 1938, i.e., clearly beyond one year of the decision.", "canonical_name": "Jaga1111adhadas"}}, {"text": "25th February, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18443, "end_char": 18462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit has Jagannadhadas J. been filed on -the 25th February, 1938, i.e., clearly beyond one year of the decision."}}, {"text": "sections 85, 86 and 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18718, "end_char": 18740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18862, "end_char": 18872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18950, "end_char": 18960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baba Atal Sahib", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19054, "end_char": 19069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 85 is as follows On so far as it is relevant):\n\n\"Subject to the provisions _of -section 88, there shall be one committee for the Gurdwaras known as the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, and the Baba Atal Sahib, and all other Notified Sikh Gurdwaras situated Within the municipal hn1111dorie.1 of <A mrirsar other than the Sri AkRI Takht Sahib\"."}}, {"text": "AkRI Takht Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19186, "end_char": 19202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 85 is as follows On so far as it is relevant):\n\n\"Subject to the provisions _of -section 88, there shall be one committee for the Gurdwaras known as the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, and the Baba Atal Sahib, and all other Notified Sikh Gurdwaras situated Within the municipal hn1111dorie.1 of <A mrirsar other than the Sri AkRI Takht Sahib\"."}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19206, "end_char": 19216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19332, "end_char": 19342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19411, "end_char": 19457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19461, "end_char": 19471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "sections 85 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19553, "end_char": 19571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19899, "end_char": 19909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "Sardar Raghhirwhich", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20342, "end_char": 20361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Raghhirwhich i' the Committee of Management for all the\n\nS111gh and others G j .", "canonical_name": "Sardar Raghhir Singh"}}, {"text": "S111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20406, "end_char": 20410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "Jagmmadhada", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20496, "end_char": 20507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n.m waras situate within the Mu111cmal limits of Jagmmadhada.,"}}, {"text": "Akai Takht Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20547, "end_char": 20563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Amritsar, except the Gurdwara Sri Akai Takht Sahib was constituted prior to the year 1930 and was in fact functioning at the date of the compromises in the section 5 proceedings dated the 6th February, 1930.", "canonical_name": "Akal Takhat Sahib"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20669, "end_char": 20678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th February, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20701, "end_char": 20719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Amritsar, except the Gurdwara Sri Akai Takht Sahib was constituted prior to the year 1930 and was in fact functioning at the date of the compromises in the section 5 proceedings dated the 6th February, 1930."}}, {"text": "section 85(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20763, "end_char": 20776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21070, "end_char": 21080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21243, "end_char": 21253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 86 and 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21752, "end_char": 21770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21859, "end_char": 21904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21981, "end_char": 21991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22327, "end_char": 22337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22418, "end_char": 22428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22508, "end_char": 22518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22725, "end_char": 22735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22797, "end_char": 22807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23525, "end_char": 23535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23655, "end_char": 23665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23834, "end_char": 23844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23994, "end_char": 24004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24724, "end_char": 24734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24926, "end_char": 24936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagannadlradas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25062, "end_char": 25076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagannadlradas J.\n\nMarch 24\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.", "canonical_name": "Jaga1111adhadas"}}, {"text": ".TAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25219, "end_char": 25233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE ST A TE OF BJHAR v.\n\nM. HOMJ AND ANOTHER\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, .TAGANNADHADAS and SINHA, .T.T.J\n\nSurety bond-Stipulations of a penal nature-Whether should be construed strictly.", "canonical_name": "Jaga1111adhadas"}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25340, "end_char": 25343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25429, "end_char": 25437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a s11rety bond the sureties bound themselves for payment of Rs .. 50,000 \"only in case Mr. Ali Khan fails . . .", "canonical_name": "Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "Singhbhum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25493, "end_char": 25502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly\"."}}, {"text": "Aii Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25983, "end_char": 25991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the sureties to produce Aii Khan within three days.", "canonical_name": "Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "27th March 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26630, "end_char": 26645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article l 34(])(c) of the Constitution from the Judgement and Order dated the 27th March 1953 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\nin Criminal Revision No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26653, "end_char": 26686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article l 34(])(c) of the Constitution from the Judgement and Order dated the 27th March 1953 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\nin Criminal Revision No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_78_83_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\n1955 because obviously section 25-A is only lln enabling Shiromani section providing a cheap remedy by way of a suit\n\nP~t:;:t:, ik before the Tribunal itself. We are clearly of the commime opinion that the present suit under section 25-A is\n\nL S d v. R lb' barred by limitation and on this ground the appeal t. ar ar ag 1 1r f .. 1 Singh and othf'rS must a1 .\n\nJagannadlradas J.\n\nMarch 24\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE ST A TE OF BJHAR v.\n\nM. HOMJ AND ANOTHER\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, .TAGANNADHADAS and SINHA, .T.T.J\n\nSurety bond-Stipulations of a penal nature-Whether should be construed strictly.\n\nIn a s11rety bond the sureties bound themselves for payment of Rs .. 50,000 \"only in case Mr. Ali Khan fails . . . to surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly\". As a result of the constitutional changes the jurisdiction of the Privy Council came to be transferred to the Federal Court, and eventually Ali Khan's appeal to the Privy Council was heard and dismissed by the Federal Court. Thereupon the Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the sureties to produce Aii Khan within three days.\n\nHeld, that the proceedings taken agaiqst the sureties \\Vere entirely .misconceived as the penalty stipulated had not been incurred, in , iew of the terms of the bond set out above.\n\nProvisions in a surety bond which are penal in nature mtist be very strictly construed and there is no room for the application of a legal fiction that the judgment of the Federal Court must be deemed to be the judgment or order contemplated by the parties to the surety bond.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1953.\n\nAppeal under. Article l 34(])(c) of the Constitution from the Judgement and Order dated the 27th March 1953 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\nin Criminal Revision No. 1290 of 1951 <•ri5ing out of\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COlJRT REPORTS 79\n\nthe Judgment and Order dated the 12th November\n\nJY5S, 1951 of the Court of Sessions Judge, Singhbhum iriTJze State of Bi/tar Criminal Revision No. 16 of 1951.\n\nM. 'f.iomi . A1ahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar (Shyam Nandan Prasad and M. M. Sinha, with him), for the appellant.\n\nS. N. Mukherji, for the respondent.\n\n1955. March 24. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-In this appeal we did not think it necessary to hear the counsel for the respondents on the merits of the decision appealed from in the view we have taken, as will presently appear, of the terms of the surety bond which was being sought to be enforced against the sureties, the respondents in this Court. The surety bond in question was taken in circumstances which clearly appear from the following resolution of the Government of Bihar dated the J 7th October 1946:-\n\n\"Whereas one Maulavi A. Ali Khan, who was convicted under section 120-B read with section 420, Indian Penal Code by the First Special Tribunal, Calcutta and sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees o\"ne lac which conviction and sentence have been subsequently upheid by the Patna High Court, has submitted to the Provincial Government a petition praying for suspension of his sentence in order to enable him to prefer an appeal al!ainst the said conviction and sentence to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.\n\nAnd whereas the Provincial Government have granted the prayer of the petitioner subject to the conditions hereinafter specified which the petitioner has accepted:\n\nNow, therefore. the Governor of Bihar herebv orders that the execution of the aforesaid sentence of Maulavi A. Ali Khan be suspended pending the hearin~ of the proposed appeal to the .Tndicial Committee of the Privy Council on his furnishing securitv worth Rs. 50,000 with two sureties of Rs. 25,000 each to the\n\nand another\n\n1955 satisfaction of either the Sub-Divisional Ofi1cer, The s1;;; e-;, f Bihurlamshedpur or the Deputy Commissioner of Singh- M. omi bhum and undertaking (l) to furnish proof by the 1st and a11ather December, 1946 of his having taken all necessary\n\nSi1tha J. steps for the filing of the appeal and also (2) to surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly. The petitioner, if in custody, may be released if he complies with the above conditions.\n\nBy order of the Governor of Bihar,\n\n(Sd.) T.G.N. Ayyar, Secretary to Government\".\n\nIn pursuance of that resolution the surety bond in question was taken from the respondents. The material portion of the bond (Ex. 2) is in these terms:\n\n\"We, S. T. Karim, son of Abdul Wahab, by caste Mohammedan, by occupation Contractor and Proprietor Jamshedpur and Star Talkies, Jamshedpur, residing at Sakchi, police station Sakchi in Town Jamshedpur, district Singhbhum, (2) Manik Homi, son of late Homi Engineer, by caste Parsee, by occupation zamindar of Mango, residing at Mango, police station Sakchi, district Sii; ighbhum,\n\nStand surety for the amount of Rs. 25,000 only each and bind ourselves to the Government of Bihar of which we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and successors firmly for payment of Rs. 50,000 only in case Mr. Ali Khan fails to furnish proof by the lst December 1946 of his havii1g taken all necessary steps for the filing of the appeal and to surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Comrr.ittee if by the said order or judgment the sentenc.e is upheld either partly or wholly\".\n\nIt is dated the 19th October, 1946. As a result of the constitntional changes the jurisdiction of the Privy Council came to be transferred to the Federal Court by virtue of the Abolition of the Privy Council Juris-\n\n. '\n\ndiction Act (Constituent Assembly Act V of 1949) !!.5.5 which came into force on the 10th October, 1949. As The State of Bihar from that date (\"the appointed day\") all appeals M. Homi pending before the Judicial Committee of the Privy and another Council by virtue of section 6 stood transferred to the SinhaJ.\n\nFederal Court. Ali Khan's appeal to the Privy Council thus got transferred to the Federal Court and in due course was heard by this Court. This Court dismissed the appeal in November 1950. In the meantime Ali Khan, the convicted person, who had gone to London to look after his appeal there, migrated to Pakistan and thus placed himself beyond the jurisdiction of the courts in India. In December 1950 the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum issued notice to the sureties, the respondents, to produce Ali Khan within three days. On their failure to do so, the Deputy Commissione!' called upon the sureties to show cause why their bond should not be forfeited. The sureties raised certain legal objections to the proceedings taken by the Deputy Commissioner. They contended that he had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. The Deputy Commissioner postponed the decision of the preliminary objections and directed that all the. points in controversy shall be _heard and determined at the final hearing. Against that order the respondents moved the Sessions Judge of Singhbhum who by his orders dated the 12th November, 1951 overruled their objections and held that the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. It is not necessary to set out his reasons. The respondents moved the High Court in revision against the orders aforesaid of the Sessions Judge. A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the application holding that the Deputy Commissioner had no such jurisdiction as he purported to exercise in the matter of enforcing the terms of the surety bond against them.\n\nAccordingly, the High Court quashed the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner. Hence this appeal by the State of Bihar .\n\nFrom the terms of the surety bond quoed above it would appear that the sureties bound themselves for\n\n1955 payment of Rs. 50,000 \"only in case Mr. Ali Khan\n\nT!te State of Bi!tarfails ..................... to surrender to the Deputy Com-\n\nM. 'iiomi missioner of Singhbhum within three days of the rea11d aii'ther ceipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the\n\nSinhaJ.\n\nJudicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly\". In view of this clear provision in the bond the term~ of which being penal in nature must be very strictly construed, it cannot be said that the contingencies contemplated by the parties has occurred. There was no judgment or order of the Judicial Committee upholding either in part or in whole the sentence against Ali Khan. As the terms of the bond so construed cannot be said to have been fulfilled, the penalty stipulated has not been incurred. It must therefore be held that the proceedings taken against the respondent; were entirely misconceived. It was in these circumstances that we did not think it necessary to hear the appeal on its merits, that is to say, on the point of Jurisdiction on which the case had been de- Cided by the High Court.\n\nIt was contended by the Advocate-General of Bihar who appeared in support of the appeal that in the events which had happened there could be no judgment or order of the Judicial Committee and that therefore the judgment of this Court, which by virtue of the constiti.; tional changes had come by the jurisdiction vested in the Privy Council, should be deemed to be the udgment or order contemplated by the parties to the surety bond. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention, firstly, because there is no term in the bond to the effect that the surety would be bound by any judgment or order given by such othercourt as may succeed to the jurisdiction then vested in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to. hear the appeal preferred by Ali Khan against his conviction by the courts 'in India; and secondly,\n\nbecause there is no room, while construing the penal clause of a surety bond, for the application of a legal ficrion as suggested on behalf of the appellant. The Government through their legal advisers were 1ot\n\ncircumspect enough to insert any such alternative 195~ clause as would have given the judgment or order of Tlze Sta~;-;,! JJ.ihar this Court the same effect as is contemplated by the M v. . terms of the surety bond quoted above. 011J !,~~;:er\n\nThe appeal must therefore be dismissed in limine.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nN. SATYANATHAN v.\n\nK. SUBRAMANY AN AND OTHERS.\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS AND SINHA JJ.]\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLlll of 1951), s. 7( 4)-Appellant entered into agreel'T}ent. with Central Government for conveying postal articles and mail bags through Motor Vehicle Sel'vtce on certain remuneration-Appellant whether disqualified for election to the House of People under s. 7(d) of .the Act.\n\nThe question for determination in this appeal was whether the appellant was disqualified under s. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for election to the House of the People.\n\nThe material portion of s. 7(d) of the Act reads as follows: \"A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being, a member of either House of Parliament .... (b) if, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefir or on his account, he has any share or interest in a contract for .... the performance of any service undertaken by the appropriate Government\".\n\nThe appellant (a contractor) had entered into an agreement with the Central Government. The relevant portion of the said agreement was as follows: -\n\n\"The contractor has offered to contract with the Governor- General for the provision of a MoMr Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance of all postal articles and mail bags from December 15, 1949 to December 14, 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted the offer.\n\n\"The Government agrees to pay to the contractor Rs. 200 per month during the subsistence of the agreement 'as his remuneration for service to be rendered by him\".\n\nHeld that on the face of it the agreement was between two competent parties with their free consent, and there was a lawful cash consideration for it. The Appellant entered into the agreement with his eyes open knowing full well his rights and liabilities under the same.\n\nSi11/za J\n\nMarch 29", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 63, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255, "end_char": 265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. HOMJ AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 532, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HOMI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 535, "end_char": 546, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 567, "end_char": 572, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SinhaJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 758, "end_char": 766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a s11rety bond the sureties bound themselves for payment of Rs .. 50,000 \"only in case Mr. Ali Khan fails . . .", "canonical_name": "Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "Singhbhum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 822, "end_char": 831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly\"."}}, {"text": "Aii Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1312, "end_char": 1320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the sureties to produce Aii Khan within three days.", "canonical_name": "Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "A1ahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2282, "end_char": 2297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A1ahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar (Shyam Nandan Prasad and M. M. Sinha, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "the State of Bihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2320, "end_char": 2338, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Shyam Nandan Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2340, "end_char": 2359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A1ahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar (Shyam Nandan Prasad and M. M. Sinha, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. M. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2364, "end_char": 2375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A1ahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar (Shyam Nandan Prasad and M. M. Sinha, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Mukherji, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2932, "end_char": 2951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The surety bond in question was taken in circumstances which clearly appear from the following resolution of the Government of Bihar dated the J 7th October 1946:-\n\n\"Whereas one Maulavi A. Ali Khan, who was convicted under section 120-B read with section 420, Indian Penal Code by the First Special Tribunal, Calcutta and sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees o\"ne lac which conviction and sentence have been subsequently upheid by the Patna High Court, has submitted to the Provincial Government a petition praying for suspension of his sentence in order to enable him to prefer an appeal al!ainst the said conviction and sentence to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "Maulavi A. Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2997, "end_char": 3016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The surety bond in question was taken in circumstances which clearly appear from the following resolution of the Government of Bihar dated the J 7th October 1946:-\n\n\"Whereas one Maulavi A. Ali Khan, who was convicted under section 120-B read with section 420, Indian Penal Code by the First Special Tribunal, Calcutta and sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees o\"ne lac which conviction and sentence have been subsequently upheid by the Patna High Court, has submitted to the Provincial Government a petition praying for suspension of his sentence in order to enable him to prefer an appeal al!ainst the said conviction and sentence to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3042, "end_char": 3053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3066, "end_char": 3077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "First Special Tribunal, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3104, "end_char": 3136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The surety bond in question was taken in circumstances which clearly appear from the following resolution of the Government of Bihar dated the J 7th October 1946:-\n\n\"Whereas one Maulavi A. Ali Khan, who was convicted under section 120-B read with section 420, Indian Penal Code by the First Special Tribunal, Calcutta and sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees o\"ne lac which conviction and sentence have been subsequently upheid by the Patna High Court, has submitted to the Provincial Government a petition praying for suspension of his sentence in order to enable him to prefer an appeal al!ainst the said conviction and sentence to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3285, "end_char": 3301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The surety bond in question was taken in circumstances which clearly appear from the following resolution of the Government of Bihar dated the J 7th October 1946:-\n\n\"Whereas one Maulavi A. Ali Khan, who was convicted under section 120-B read with section 420, Indian Penal Code by the First Special Tribunal, Calcutta and sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees o\"ne lac which conviction and sentence have been subsequently upheid by the Patna High Court, has submitted to the Provincial Government a petition praying for suspension of his sentence in order to enable him to prefer an appeal al!ainst the said conviction and sentence to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3726, "end_char": 3731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Governor of Bihar herebv orders that the execution of the aforesaid sentence of Maulavi A. Ali Khan be suspended pending the hearin~ of the proposed appeal to the .Tndicial Committee of the Privy Council on his furnishing securitv worth Rs."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4080, "end_char": 4082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "T.G.N. Ayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4691, "end_char": 4703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.G.N. Ayyar, Secretary to Government\"."}}, {"text": "S. T. Karim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4890, "end_char": 4901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) is in these terms:\n\n\"We, S. T. Karim, son of Abdul Wahab, by caste Mohammedan, by occupation Contractor and Proprietor Jamshedpur and Star Talkies, Jamshedpur, residing at Sakchi, police station Sakchi in Town Jamshedpur, district Singhbhum, (2) Manik Homi, son of late Homi Engineer, by caste Parsee, by occupation zamindar of Mango, residing at Mango, police station Sakchi, district Sii; ighbhum,\n\nStand surety for the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Manik Homi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5111, "end_char": 5121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) is in these terms:\n\n\"We, S. T. Karim, son of Abdul Wahab, by caste Mohammedan, by occupation Contractor and Proprietor Jamshedpur and Star Talkies, Jamshedpur, residing at Sakchi, police station Sakchi in Town Jamshedpur, district Singhbhum, (2) Manik Homi, son of late Homi Engineer, by caste Parsee, by occupation zamindar of Mango, residing at Mango, police station Sakchi, district Sii; ighbhum,\n\nStand surety for the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "19th October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5862, "end_char": 5880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is dated the 19th October, 1946."}}, {"text": "Constituent Assembly Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6080, "end_char": 6104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "10th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6152, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".5.5 which came into force on the 10th October, 1949."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6179, "end_char": 6193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As The State of Bihar from that date (\"the appointed day\") all appeals M. Homi pending before the Judicial Committee of the Privy and another Council by virtue of section 6 stood transferred to the SinhaJ.\n\nFederal Court."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6335, "end_char": 6344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constituent Assembly Act", "statute": "Constituent Assembly Act"}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6632, "end_char": 6638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime Ali Khan, the convicted person, who had gone to London to look after his appeal there, migrated to Pakistan and thus placed himself beyond the jurisdiction of the courts in India."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6683, "end_char": 6691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime Ali Khan, the convicted person, who had gone to London to look after his appeal there, migrated to Pakistan and thus placed himself beyond the jurisdiction of the courts in India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6757, "end_char": 6762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime Ali Khan, the convicted person, who had gone to London to look after his appeal there, migrated to Pakistan and thus placed himself beyond the jurisdiction of the courts in India."}}, {"text": "12th November, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7486, "end_char": 7505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against that order the respondents moved the Sessions Judge of Singhbhum who by his orders dated the 12th November, 1951 overruled their objections and held that the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings."}}, {"text": "State of Bi!tarfails", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8271, "end_char": 8291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 \"only in case Mr. Ali Khan\n\nT!te State of Bi!tarfails ..................... to surrender to the Deputy Com-\n\nM. 'iiomi missioner of Singhbhum within three days of the rea11d aii'ther ceipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the\n\nSinhaJ.\n\nJudicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly\"."}}, {"text": "SinhaJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8474, "end_char": 8481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 \"only in case Mr. Ali Khan\n\nT!te State of Bi!tarfails ..................... to surrender to the Deputy Com-\n\nM. 'iiomi missioner of Singhbhum within three days of the rea11d aii'ther ceipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the\n\nSinhaJ.\n\nJudicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly\".", "canonical_name": "SinhaJ."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10746, "end_char": 10757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS AND SINHA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10759, "end_char": 10772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS AND SINHA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10789, "end_char": 10827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10849, "end_char": 10857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10900, "end_char": 10918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with Central Government for conveying postal articles and mail bags through Motor Vehicle Sel'vtce on certain remuneration-Appellant whether disqualified for election to the House of People under s. 7(d) of .the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11091, "end_char": 11098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11208, "end_char": 11215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11223, "end_char": 11261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11328, "end_char": 11335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "December 15, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12051, "end_char": 12068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the said agreement was as follows: -\n\n\"The contractor has offered to contract with the Governor- General for the provision of a MoMr Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance of all postal articles and mail bags from December 15, 1949 to December 14, 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted the offer."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12072, "end_char": 12089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the said agreement was as follows: -\n\n\"The contractor has offered to contract with the Governor- General for the provision of a MoMr Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance of all postal articles and mail bags from December 15, 1949 to December 14, 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted the offer."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_83_94_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 83\n\ncircumspect enough to insert any such alternative 195~ clause as would have given the judgment or order of Tlze Sta~;-;,! JJ.ihar this Court the same effect as is contemplated by the M v. . terms of the surety bond quoted above. 011J !,~~;:er\n\nThe appeal must therefore be dismissed in limine.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nN. SATYANATHAN v.\n\nK. SUBRAMANY AN AND OTHERS.\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS AND SINHA JJ.]\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLlll of 1951), s. 7( 4)-Appellant entered into agreel'T}ent. with Central Government for conveying postal articles and mail bags through Motor Vehicle Sel'vtce on certain remuneration-Appellant whether disqualified for election to the House of People under s. 7(d) of .the Act.\n\nThe question for determination in this appeal was whether the appellant was disqualified under s. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for election to the House of the People.\n\nThe material portion of s. 7(d) of the Act reads as follows: \"A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being, a member of either House of Parliament .... (b) if, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefir or on his account, he has any share or interest in a contract for .... the performance of any service undertaken by the appropriate Government\".\n\nThe appellant (a contractor) had entered into an agreement with the Central Government. The relevant portion of the said agreement was as follows: -\n\n\"The contractor has offered to contract with the Governor- General for the provision of a MoMr Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance of all postal articles and mail bags from December 15, 1949 to December 14, 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted the offer.\n\n\"The Government agrees to pay to the contractor Rs. 200 per month during the subsistence of the agreement 'as his remuneration for service to be rendered by him\".\n\nHeld that on the face of it the agreement was between two competent parties with their free consent, and there was a lawful cash consideration for it. The Appellant entered into the agreement with his eyes open knowing full well his rights and liabilities under the same.\n\nSi11/za J\n\nMarch 29\n\nThe case was a staightforward illustration of the kind of contract contemplated by s. 7( d) of the Act. At all material times the }If. Satya11athan _ v. appellant had been directly concerned, for his own benefit, in the\n\n/9jj\n\nK. Subramanyan contract of carrying mail bags and postal arti.cles entered into by and others him with the Government in the Postal Department.\n\nSection 7 of the Act is clearly intended to avoid a conflict between public duty and private interests.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 252 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd January 1953 of the Election Tribunal, Yellore in Election Petition No. 35 of 1952.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha and N. H. Hingorani, with him), for the appellant.\n\nC. V. L. Narayan, for respondent No. I.\n\n1955. March 29. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-The only question for determination in this appeal by special leave is whether the appellant is disqualified under section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act) for election to the House of the People, as held by the Election Tribunal, North Arcot, Vellore, by its orders dated the 20th January, 1953 in Election Petition No. 35 ol' 1952.\n\nThe facts of this case are not in dispute and lie vvithin a narrow compass. The appellant and respondents\n\nI to 3 contested the last general elections from the Dharmapuri Parliamentary Constituency in the district of Salem in the State of Madras. Respondents 4 to 10 who were added subsequently by an order of the Tribunal were also candidates for election. Their nominations also had been held to be valid but thev ultimately withdrew their candidature before the polling took place. The appellant was in due course declared to have been elected to the House of the People Thereafter; on the 5th March, 1952 the I st respondent filed an election petition before the Election Commission contesting the appellant's election\n\non the ground that the appellant was disqualified ~:!. under section 7(d) of the Act as, from the date of his . N Satyanathan nomination and until the date of election and after, K. subr;-,,, anyQll the appellant had a contract with the Government of and others India in the Postal Department for the transport of Sinha 1. postal mail which was a service undertaken by the Government of India. At this stage it is necessary to state that it is admitted that the appellant is and\n\nha~ been the holder of a stage carriage service permit\n\n(Ex. B-2) dated the 26th April 1949, issued by the Regional Tramport Authority, Salem, Madras. It was one of the cpnditions of the said permit that if called upon the appellant will enter into an agreement with the Government of India for the . transport of postal articles and mail bags. In pursuance of that obligation the appellant entered into . a registered agreement with the Government o( India on the 16th November 1949 (Ex. A-3) to be noticed in detail heremafter. After the appellant had filed his nomination\n\npaper; the 1st respondent by his petition dated the 28th November 1951 raised the objection to the effect that his nomination should be rejected on the ground that he had entered into a contract with the Government of India for his own benefit for the transport of mail betwc;:en Salem and Yercaud. The Returning Officer for the Dharmapuri Parliamentary Constituency, Salem, by his orders (Ex. A-2) of the same date overruled the objection holding that the service rendered by the appellant of carrying mail is not under an agreement but on an imperative order of the Government under Rule 160-B of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules. Apparently the registered agreement (Ex.\n\nA-3) had not been placed before him.\n\nTo the election petition filed by the 1st respondent the appellant filed his written statement on the 28th May 1952 denying that he was disqualified for election as ~. member of Parliament by virtue of the provisions of section 7(d) of the Act. His contention was that \"it is the exdusive privilege of the Government of India to convey all postal articles from one place to another and it is a normal function of the Government statutorily reserved to itself. There is no justifi-\n\n12-8 SCI/ND/82\n\nN. Satyanatha11\n\nK. Suhramanyan\n\na11d others\n\nSinha J.\n\ncation to regard the carrying of mails from one place to another as the performance of any service undertaken by the Government\". It was further averred on behalf of the appellant that it was not justifiable to regard him as having any interest in a contract for the performance of any service undertaken by the appropriate Government within the mischief of section 7(d) of the Act; and that he had been only carrying out the obligations imposed upon him by Rule 160-B of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act. It was also contended that under article 103 of the Constitution of India the question as to the disqualification Of a member has to be decided by the President whose decision shall be final.\n\nOn those pleadings the following issues were framed by the Election Tribunal:- !. Is the nomination of the 1st respt. invalid because of the prohibition contained in section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, or for any of the reasons set forth in paras. 9 to 11 of the petition?\n\n2. Has this Tribunal no jurisdiction td decide the question as regards the disqualification of the returned candidate, because of article 103 of the Constitution of India? ·\n\nTt is not necessary to refer to the additional issue bearing on the question of limitation arising from an interlocutory application for impleading those candidate~ <respondents 4 to W) whose nomination had heen accepted but who had withdrawn from the contest. Both these issues were decided against the appellant. The Tribunal on a very elaborate discussion of the points raised before it. held that the postal service including the transport of mails is service undertaken by the Central Government within the meaning of section 7(d); that at tlie date of the nomination the appellant was a contractor under the Centr.al Government; that the agreement between the Government and the appellant involved mutual obligations which could rtot be referable to a bare statutory duty on the part of the appellant but that it was the result of mutual assent based upon a free\n\noffer and acceptance; and that the agreement was supported by valid consideration. The Tribunal also held that article 103 of the Constitution was not a bar to its jurisdiction to decide the controversy.\n\nAccordingly it allowed the election petition and held the appellant's election to be void in terms of section\n\n100(1)(c) of the Act, with costs to the respondent.\n\nHence this appeal.\n\nIn this appeal the contentions raised before the Election Tribunal, except the objection to the Tribunal's jurisdiction in view of the provisions of article\n\n103 of the Constitution, have been pressed before us by the learned. counsel for the appellant. It is manifest that the determination of this case must depend upon the true construction and legal effect of the agreement (Ex. A-3) admittedly entered into by the appellant with the Central Government. It is therefore necessary to set out in some detail the revelant clauses of the agreement.\n\nThe appellant (called the \"contractor\") is of the one part and the Governor-General of India of the other. The preamble says-\n\n\"Whereas the said contractor Sri. N. Sathianathan has offered to contract with Governor-General for the provision of a Motor Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance and delivery of all postal articles and mail bags as defined in the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, as amended from time to time, ...... from the 15th day of December 1949 to the 14th day of December 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted such offer upon the terms and conditions hereinafter appearing ...\n\nNow this indenture witnesseth that the contractor in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the premises and of the payments hereinafter agreed to be made to him ...\n\nIt is hereby mutually agreed and declared between and by the part.ies hereto as follows: -\n\nl. Contract to carry: -The contractor shall during the continuance of this contract. that is to say, from the 15th day of December 1949 until the 14th day of December 1952 or until the said contract shall be determined by such notice as is hereinafter men-\n\nN. Sa1ya11a1/11m\n\nK. Subru11ia11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nJV. Satyanathan\n\nK. Suhramanyan and others\n\nSinha J.\n\ntioned or otherwise in (hereinafter referred to as the said contract period) duly and safely convey ......... by means of rpotor vehicles of good and reliable manufacture all postal articles and mail bags ....... \".\n\nBy clause 4 the contractor is permitted to carry passengers and their luggage by bus provided there is accommodation available .and provided that the mail service is not prejudiced in any way.\n\nBy clauses 5 and 6 the contractor is required to maintain in good order and repair a number pf motor buses and their spare parts at his own expense and to bear all municipal and other taxes payaqle in respect of the motor vehicles. Clause 7 contains the schedule of penalties in the event of non-completion of any journey or of delay in completion thereof in accordance with the time table, etc. By clause 8 the contractor is made absolutely liable and responsible for the due and safe custody and delivery in good order and condition of postal articles and mail bags.\n\nBy clause 10 nongazetted postal and telegraph officers travelling on duty on the route allotted to the appellant are declared to be entitled to travel free of all charges and such official passengers shall have precedence over ordinary passengers.\n\nClause 13 provides that the contract shall not be transferred by the contractor to any person or company without the previous consent in writing of the Director-General of Posts & Telegraphs.\n\nBy clause 15 the Government agrees to pay to the contractor Rs. 200 per month during the subsistence of the agreement \"as his remuneration for service to be rendered by him hereunder\". This monthly sum of Rs. 200 is liable to be increased or decreased proportionately to the increase or decrease in the mileage to be covered. Clause 18 is in these terms:-\n\n\"In t\"1e event of the contractor failing to secure a renewal of the permit on the line this contract will automatically terminate on the date up to which the old permit shall be valid and in such case no compensation shall be payable to either party for such termination. This contract may be absolutely determined and put an end to by either of the contracting\n\nparties giving four calendar months notice in writing to the other of his intention so to determine and put an end to the same\".\n\nClause 21 contains the usual arbitration clause to the effect that all disputes and differences arising out of or in any wise touching or concerning the agreement shall be ref erred to the sole arbitration of the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs or his nominee.\n\nIt is also provided that the award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties.\n\nlt will be observed that the agreement set out above is a formally drawn up document which satisfies all the requirements of a contract. It is not the appellant's case that the contract has been vitiated by undue influence, fraud or such other cause. But it has been argued that it was a necessary sequel to the stage carriage permit granted by the Transport Authority undec the Motor Vehicles Act read along with the relevant rules. In this connection reference was made to rule 160-B of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules which is as follows: -\n\n\"It shall be a condition of every stage carriage permit that the holder of the permit shall, if so required by the transport authority which granted the permit, carry mails at such rates and on such terms as the transport authority may fix after consultation with the holder of the permit and the postal authorities concerned\".\n\nThe rule quoted above has apparently been made under the authority of section 48(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is common ground that the agreement aforesaid between the appellant and the Cen tral Government is in pursuance of rule 160-B aforesaid; but it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that though the agreement aforesaid has the \"semblance of a contract\", it is lacking in the \"essential ingredients of a free consensus of acceptance and offer\".\n\nThis argument is based on the further contention that the appellant has been carrying mail on his buses in performance of a statutory .obligation which cannot come within the mischief of\n\n.N. Satya11atlla11\n\nK. Subra111a11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nJI/, Satya1tat/Ju11\n\nK. Subra1na11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nsection 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951. The material portion of the section is in these terms:-.\n\n\"A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member Gf either House of Parliament ......\n\n(b) if, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account, he has any share or interest in a contract for ............ the performance of any services undertaken by the appropriate Government\". It has further been argued alternatively that if the agreement has the force of a contract, it is totally lacking in consideration because the monetary consideration provided for in the agreement is no more than the subsidy already fixed by the Regional Transport Officer by his orqers dated the 23rd July, 1949; that the agreement in question being with a third party, namely, the Governor-General, to render service which was already due to another party, namely, the Transport Authority for the same consideration can not amount to a valid contract supported by consideration; and finally, that the transport of mail is not a \"service undertaken by the Central Government\".\n\nIn our opinion, there is no substance in any one of these contentions. It is true that the appellant entered into the contract aforesaid with the Central Government for the transport of postal articles and mail bags on the 16th November, 1949. From before that date he had been carrying on the business of plying buses on the route allotted to him by the Regional Transport Authority.\n\nBut he entered into the contract with his eyes open and knowing full well his rights and liabilities under the same. No one is compelled to carry on the business of stage carriage service or for the matter of that, of transporting postal articles and mail bags. In terms of the permit, it is open to the Government to call upon a permit holder to undertake the additional burden of carrying postal articles and mail bags which carries with it the additional remuneration to be fixed by the Transport Authority after consultation with the postal authorites and the carrier.\n\nIt is not every stage carriage permit holder who is called upon to do so.\n\nAt the time the appellant entered into the contract with the Government in the postal department he may not have had any idea of standing for election to the House of the People when in future the general elections came to be held. If he wished to steer clear of the difficulty created by section 7 of the Act, he could have given due notice to Government under clause 18 of the contract referred to above. On the expiry of the term of the notice he would have been free to stand for election to a State or Central Legislature.\n\nSection 7 of the Act is clearly intended to avoid a conflict between public duty and private interest.\n\nThe Tribunal discussed a number of authorities with reference to the English and the American Law of Contract for arriving at the conclusion that the agreement between the appellant and the Government of India in the Postal Department had all the ingredients of a valid contract.\n\nThe Tribunal need not have travelled so far afield, especially when the provisions of the Indian Contract Act which govern the case are sufficient to answer all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. On the face of the transaction the agreement was between two competent parties with their free consent. There was no question but that there was lawful consideration. The permit for the stage carriage had been granted by the authority under the Motor Vehicles Act; and the agreement for transport of postal articles and mail bags was between the Government of India in the Postal Department and the appellant for a cash consideration.\n\nBut it was argued that the agreement was in pursuance of a pre-existing obligation imposed by the rule aforesaid framed under the Motor Vehicles Act.\n\nIt is true that the permit does contain a condition that the pel\"mit-holder may be called upon to undertake transport of mail bags and postal articles but that is only a notice to intending applicaots for a stage carriage permit that the grantee of such a permit may have to render that additional service for an additional remuneration if called upon to do so hy the\n\n/955\n\n. \\ ·. Sa1.icnwt/1a11\n\nK. Subramanran\n\nand other.;.\n\nSinha J.\n\n}/. Satyanathan v.\n\nK. Sufwamanyan\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nauthorities of the Postal Department. If any one was not prepared to undertake that additional responsibility, he was free not to make an a\"pplication for such a permit; but that <loes not mean that the agreement actually entered into between the Postal Department and the permit holder is not an independent contract governed by its own special terms. As indicated above, clause 18 has reserved the right to either party to terminate the contract on giving four months' notice. The appellant must be presumed to have known that the agreement that he had entered into with the Postal Department will stand in the way of his running as a candidate for election to the Central or the State Legislature. There was nothing to prevent him from giving the necessary notice to the department and thus terminate his agreement so as to be free to stand as a candidate for elec1ion to the legislature. Section 7 of the Act is intended to ensure that there is no occasion for a conflict between public duty and private interests. The appellant had a clear and free choice before him. If he was anxious to serve the community as a member of the Central Legislature, he had to give up his private gains in the shape of the remuneration for carrying postal articles\n\nand mail bags in his buses.\n\nIt may be that on his terminating the agreement with the postal department he would have to give up his stage carriage permit also but not necessarily so. lf on the same route a number of bus services are permitted to different parties, the Postal Department may choose any one of them to enter into the agreemnt for the carriage of mail bags and postal articles.\n\nBat even if there was only one service for the route in respect of which the appellant held the stage carriage permit, if he had to give up his permit, some other party would take his place for running the bus service and carrying the postal articles and mail bags.\n\nIt was further argued that the appellant had no hand in \"the fixing of the remuneration to be paid by the Postal Department for carrying its mails, etc.\n\nBut it is clear, by a reference to the terms of the rule\n\nquoted above, that the amount of the remuneration had to be fixed by the department after conultation with the carrier. It was always open to the latter to demur to the terms proposed by the department and if he found that the department was not prepared to accept his terms he was not bound to enter into the agreement. The fact that he had agreed to carry postal\n\narticles and mail bags was possibly an additional qualification for him to ohtain a renewal of his permit and thus gave him sn advantage over his competitors.\n\nHence instead of being an additional burden or a handicap to him, it was an additional advantage to him in the matter of getting a renewal of his permit in preference to others.\n\nThe agreement was therefore based on mutual promises, by the appellant to carry the mail bags. etc .. and by the Postal Department to pay him suitable remuneration for the services thus rendered.\n\nIt was further contended on .behalf of the appellant that the Central Government could not be said to have 'undertaken' any 'service' within the meaning of section 7(d) of the Act when it made arrangements for the carriage of mail bags and postal articles through the appellant. It has not been and cannot be contended that the Government is bound in the discharge of its duties as a sovereign state to make provision for postal mail service. The provisions of the Indian Post Office Act, VI of 1898, are only enabling in the sense that they authorize the State agency to have the exclusive privilege of conveying letters, etc. for the convenience of the public and for the benefit of the Government, without making it obligatory upon it to provide every individual and every place with those facilities. It may be that those facilities are being extended from time to time and are being brought nearer to every home but that is only evidence of the fact that the State as a welfare state is anxious to provide for the conveniences of the public in the matter of communications and correspondence. That is to say, the Government in the Postal Department has only undertaken a service to be rendered to the community and that such\n\n13-8 SCI/ND 182\n\n19'5\n\nN. 9'lt)'-*11\n\nK. SllllramM)'1111\n\nlllld otben\n\nSlnflo J,\n\nfl)~\n\nN. Satyt.JM1ho11 v. f(. Subramanyan\n\nand othtrs\n\nSinhs J.\n\nMarch 25\n\na service is not an essential function of a sovereign\n\nstate. It cannot be rainsaid that the Government in the Postal Department is rendering a very useful service and that the appellant has by his contract with the Government undertaken to render that kind of service on a specified route. The present case is a straightforward illustration of the kind of contract contemplated by section 7(d) of the Act.\n\nAt all material times the appellant has been directly concerned, for his own benefit, in the contract of carrying mail bags and postal articles entered into by him with the Government in the Postal Department.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid we have not the least hesitation in holding that the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal are entirely correct.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nA ppeaf dismiu('(f.\n\nU..T.S. CHOPRA\n\nSTATE OF BOMBAY.\n\n[S. R. OAS, BHAGWATI and IMAM JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898), s. 439(1)(2)!6) -Appellant convicted by Magistrate-His appeal to High Court dismissed summarily-After summary dismissal of that appeal Stat.J Government filed revision application to High Court for enhancernent of sentence-Notice issued to appellant to show cause against enhanrnment under s. 439(2)-Whether appellant entitled to show cause ai; ainst his conviction under s. 439!6) of Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe appellant in this appeal was convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, of an offence under s. 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act (Act XXV of 1949) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 250 or in defaulr to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. He preferred an appeal to the Hih Court at Bombay, which was summarily dismissed. After the dismissal of that appeal, the State of Bombay made a revision application to the High Court praying for enhancement of the sentence. Notice was issued to the appellant under s. 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to show cause against enhancement.", "total_entities": 114, "entities": [{"text": "N. SATYANATHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 350, "end_char": 364, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. Satyanatha11", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBRAMANY AN AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 369, "end_char": 395, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBRAMANY AN AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 410, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 412, "end_char": 425, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 430, "end_char": 439, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SINHA JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 442, "end_char": 480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with Central Government for conveying postal articles and mail bags through Motor Vehicle Sel'vtce on certain remuneration-Appellant whether disqualified for election to the House of People under s. 7(d) of .the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 861, "end_char": 868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 876, "end_char": 914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 981, "end_char": 988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "December 15, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1704, "end_char": 1721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the said agreement was as follows: -\n\n\"The contractor has offered to contract with the Governor- General for the provision of a MoMr Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance of all postal articles and mail bags from December 15, 1949 to December 14, 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted the offer."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1725, "end_char": 1742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the said agreement was as follows: -\n\n\"The contractor has offered to contract with the Governor- General for the provision of a MoMr Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance of all postal articles and mail bags from December 15, 1949 to December 14, 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted the offer."}}, {"text": "s. 7( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Subramanyan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2478, "end_char": 2492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satya11athan _ v. appellant had been directly concerned, for his own benefit, in the\n\n/9jj\n\nK. Subramanyan contract of carrying mail bags and postal arti.cles entered into by and others him with the Government in the Postal Department.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBRAMANY AN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623, "end_char": 2632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Election Tribunal, Yellore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2876, "end_char": 2902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd January 1953 of the Election Tribunal, Yellore in Election Petition No."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2941, "end_char": 2957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha and N. H. Hingorani, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2959, "end_char": 2970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha and N. H. Hingorani, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingorani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2975, "end_char": 2990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha and N. H. Hingorani, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. V. L. Narayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3023, "end_char": 3039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. L. Narayan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3248, "end_char": 3260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3268, "end_char": 3306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Election Tribunal, North Arcot, Vellore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3392, "end_char": 3431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-The only question for determination in this appeal by special leave is whether the appellant is disqualified under section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act) for election to the House of the People, as held by the Election Tribunal, North Arcot, Vellore, by its orders dated the 20th January, 1953 in Election Petition No."}}, {"text": "Salem", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3732, "end_char": 3737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and respondents\n\nI to 3 contested the last general elections from the Dharmapuri Parliamentary Constituency in the district of Salem in the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3754, "end_char": 3760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and respondents\n\nI to 3 contested the last general elections from the Dharmapuri Parliamentary Constituency in the district of Salem in the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "5th March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was in due course declared to have been elected to the House of the People Thereafter; on the 5th March, 1952 the I st respondent filed an election petition before the Election Commission contesting the appellant's election\n\non the ground that the appellant was disqualified ~:!."}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4300, "end_char": 4312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Government of and others India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4476, "end_char": 4506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N Satyanathan nomination and until the date of election and after, K. subr;-,,, anyQll the appellant had a contract with the Government of and others India in the Postal Department for the transport of Sinha 1."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N Satyanathan nomination and until the date of election and after, K. subr;-,,, anyQll the appellant had a contract with the Government of and others India in the Postal Department for the transport of Sinha 1.", "canonical_name": "SINHA JJ."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4612, "end_char": 4631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "postal mail which was a service undertaken by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "26th April 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4795, "end_char": 4810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-2) dated the 26th April 1949, issued by the Regional Tramport Authority, Salem, Madras."}}, {"text": "Regional Tramport Authority, Salem", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4826, "end_char": 4860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-2) dated the 26th April 1949, issued by the Regional Tramport Authority, Salem, Madras."}}, {"text": "Government o( India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5157, "end_char": 5176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a registered agreement with the Government o( India on the 16th November 1949 (Ex."}}, {"text": "16th November 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a registered agreement with the Government o( India on the 16th November 1949 (Ex."}}, {"text": "28th November 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5347, "end_char": 5365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the appellant had filed his nomination\n\npaper; the 1st respondent by his petition dated the 28th November 1951 raised the objection to the effect that his nomination should be rejected on the ground that he had entered into a contract with the Government of India for his own benefit for the transport of mail betwc;:en Salem and Yercaud."}}, {"text": "Yercaud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5585, "end_char": 5592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the appellant had filed his nomination\n\npaper; the 1st respondent by his petition dated the 28th November 1951 raised the objection to the effect that his nomination should be rejected on the ground that he had entered into a contract with the Government of India for his own benefit for the transport of mail betwc;:en Salem and Yercaud."}}, {"text": "28th May 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6109, "end_char": 6122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the election petition filed by the 1st respondent the appellant filed his written statement on the 28th May 1952 denying that he was disqualified for election as ~. member of Parliament by virtue of the provisions of section 7(d) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6227, "end_char": 6239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. Satyanatha11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6505, "end_char": 6520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no justifi-\n\n12-8 SCI/ND/82\n\nN. Satyanatha11\n\nK. Suhramanyan\n\na11d others\n\nSinha J.\n\ncation to regard the carrying of mails from one place to another as the performance of any service undertaken by the Government\".", "canonical_name": "N. Satyanatha11"}}, {"text": "K. Suhramanyan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6522, "end_char": 6536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no justifi-\n\n12-8 SCI/ND/82\n\nN. Satyanatha11\n\nK. Suhramanyan\n\na11d others\n\nSinha J.\n\ncation to regard the carrying of mails from one place to another as the performance of any service undertaken by the Government\".", "canonical_name": "K. SUBRAMANY AN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6551, "end_char": 6556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no justifi-\n\n12-8 SCI/ND/82\n\nN. Satyanatha11\n\nK. Suhramanyan\n\na11d others\n\nSinha J.\n\ncation to regard the carrying of mails from one place to another as the performance of any service undertaken by the Government\".", "canonical_name": "SINHA JJ."}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6919, "end_char": 6931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7060, "end_char": 7078, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7132, "end_char": 7153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Election Tribunal:-", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7332, "end_char": 7351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On those pleadings the following issues were framed by the Election Tribunal:- !."}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7439, "end_char": 7451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7459, "end_char": 7497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7720, "end_char": 7741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8269, "end_char": 8281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8727, "end_char": 8738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section\n\n100(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8923, "end_char": 8941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article\n\n103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9154, "end_char": 9166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9642, "end_char": 9647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant (called the \"contractor\") is of the one part and the Governor-General of India of the other."}}, {"text": "N. Sathianathan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9716, "end_char": 9731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sathianathan has offered to contract with Governor-General for the provision of a Motor Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance and delivery of all postal articles and mail bags as defined in the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, as amended from time to time, ...... from the 15th day of December 1949 to the 14th day of December 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted such offer upon the terms and conditions hereinafter appearing ...\n\nNow this indenture witnesseth that the contractor in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the premises and of the payments hereinafter agreed to be made to him ...\n\nIt is hereby mutually agreed and declared between and by the part.ies hereto as follows: -\n\nl. Contract to carry: -The contractor shall during the continuance of this contract.", "canonical_name": "N. Satyanatha11"}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9918, "end_char": 9946, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "15th day of December 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9994, "end_char": 10019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sathianathan has offered to contract with Governor-General for the provision of a Motor Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance and delivery of all postal articles and mail bags as defined in the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, as amended from time to time, ...... from the 15th day of December 1949 to the 14th day of December 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted such offer upon the terms and conditions hereinafter appearing ...\n\nNow this indenture witnesseth that the contractor in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the premises and of the payments hereinafter agreed to be made to him ...\n\nIt is hereby mutually agreed and declared between and by the part.ies hereto as follows: -\n\nl. Contract to carry: -The contractor shall during the continuance of this contract."}}, {"text": "14th day of December 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10027, "end_char": 10052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sathianathan has offered to contract with Governor-General for the provision of a Motor Vehicle Service for the transit conveyance and delivery of all postal articles and mail bags as defined in the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, as amended from time to time, ...... from the 15th day of December 1949 to the 14th day of December 1952 and the Governor-General has accepted such offer upon the terms and conditions hereinafter appearing ...\n\nNow this indenture witnesseth that the contractor in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the premises and of the payments hereinafter agreed to be made to him ...\n\nIt is hereby mutually agreed and declared between and by the part.ies hereto as follows: -\n\nl. Contract to carry: -The contractor shall during the continuance of this contract."}}, {"text": "K. Subru11ia11ya11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10711, "end_char": 10729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that is to say, from the 15th day of December 1949 until the 14th day of December 1952 or until the said contract shall be determined by such notice as is hereinafter men-\n\nN. Sa1ya11a1/11m\n\nK. Subru11ia11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nJV.", "canonical_name": "K. Subru11ia11ya11"}}, {"text": "Satyanathan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10757, "end_char": 10768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satyanathan\n\nK. Suhramanyan and others\n\nSinha J.\n\ntioned or otherwise in (hereinafter referred to as the said contract period) duly and safely convey ......... by means of rpotor vehicles of good and reliable manufacture all postal articles and mail bags ....... \"."}}, {"text": "K. Suhramanyan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10770, "end_char": 10784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satyanathan\n\nK. Suhramanyan and others\n\nSinha J.\n\ntioned or otherwise in (hereinafter referred to as the said contract period) duly and safely convey ......... by means of rpotor vehicles of good and reliable manufacture all postal articles and mail bags ....... \".", "canonical_name": "K. SUBRAMANY AN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11027, "end_char": 11035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11450, "end_char": 11458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11617, "end_char": 11625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11791, "end_char": 11800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12037, "end_char": 12046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12233, "end_char": 12242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12556, "end_char": 12565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13080, "end_char": 13089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13827, "end_char": 13845, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 48(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14392, "end_char": 14405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But it has been argued that it was a necessary sequel to the stage carriage permit granted by the Transport Authority undec the Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "But it has been argued that it was a necessary sequel to the stage carriage permit granted by the Transport Authority undec the Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14413, "end_char": 14431, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Cen tral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14512, "end_char": 14531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that the agreement aforesaid between the appellant and the Cen tral Government is in pursuance of rule 160-B aforesaid; but it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that though the agreement aforesaid has the \"semblance of a contract\", it is lacking in the \"essential ingredients of a free consensus of acceptance and offer\"."}}, {"text": ".N. Satya11atlla11", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14973, "end_char": 14991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument is based on the further contention that the appellant has been carrying mail on his buses in performance of a statutory .obligation which cannot come within the mischief of\n\n.N. Satya11atlla11\n\nK. Subra111a11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nJI/, Satya1tat/Ju11\n\nK. Subra1na11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nsection 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "K. Subra111a11ya11", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14993, "end_char": 15011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument is based on the further contention that the appellant has been carrying mail on his buses in performance of a statutory .obligation which cannot come within the mischief of\n\n.N. Satya11atlla11\n\nK. Subra111a11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nJI/, Satya1tat/Ju11\n\nK. Subra1na11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nsection 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951.", "canonical_name": "K. Subru11ia11ya11"}}, {"text": "K. Subra1na11ya11", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15056, "end_char": 15073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument is based on the further contention that the appellant has been carrying mail on his buses in performance of a statutory .obligation which cannot come within the mischief of\n\n.N. Satya11atlla11\n\nK. Subra111a11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nJI/, Satya1tat/Ju11\n\nK. Subra1na11ya11\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\nsection 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act,\n\n1951.", "canonical_name": "K. Subru11ia11ya11"}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15097, "end_char": 15109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15117, "end_char": 15149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "23rd July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15880, "end_char": 15895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has further been argued alternatively that if the agreement has the force of a contract, it is totally lacking in consideration because the monetary consideration provided for in the agreement is no more than the subsidy already fixed by the Regional Transport Officer by his orqers dated the 23rd July, 1949; that the agreement in question being with a third party, namely, the Governor-General, to render service which was already due to another party, namely, the Transport Authority for the same consideration can not amount to a valid contract supported by consideration; and finally, that the transport of mail is not a \"service undertaken by the Central Government\"."}}, {"text": "16th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16485, "end_char": 16504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the appellant entered into the contract aforesaid with the Central Government for the transport of postal articles and mail bags on the 16th November, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17586, "end_char": 17595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17659, "end_char": 17668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17826, "end_char": 17835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18301, "end_char": 18320, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18668, "end_char": 18686, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18989, "end_char": 19007, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. Subramanran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19408, "end_char": 19422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sa1.icnwt/1a11\n\nK. Subramanran\n\nand other.;.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBRAMANY AN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "clause 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19879, "end_char": 19888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But it was argued that the agreement was in pursuance of a pre-existing obligation imposed by the rule aforesaid framed under the Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "But it was argued that the agreement was in pursuance of a pre-existing obligation imposed by the rule aforesaid framed under the Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20398, "end_char": 20407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22690, "end_char": 22702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22999, "end_char": 23021, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. SllllramM)'1111", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23803, "end_char": 23821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is to say, the Government in the Postal Department has only undertaken a service to be rendered to the community and that such\n\n13-8 SCI/ND 182\n\n19'5\n\nN. 9'lt)'-*11\n\nK. SllllramM)'1111\n\nlllld otben\n\nSlnflo J,\n\nfl)~\n\nN. Satyt."}}, {"text": "N. Satyt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23853, "end_char": 23861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is to say, the Government in the Postal Department has only undertaken a service to be rendered to the community and that such\n\n13-8 SCI/ND 182\n\n19'5\n\nN. 9'lt)'-*11\n\nK. SllllramM)'1111\n\nlllld otben\n\nSlnflo J,\n\nfl)~\n\nN. Satyt.", "canonical_name": "N. Satyanatha11"}}, {"text": "Sinhs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23902, "end_char": 23907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subramanyan\n\nand othtrs\n\nSinhs J.\n\nMarch 25\n\na service is not an essential function of a sovereign\n\nstate.", "canonical_name": "SINHA JJ."}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24304, "end_char": 24316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U..T.S. CHOPRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24752, "end_char": 24766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U..T.S. CHOPRA\n\nSTATE OF BOMBAY."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24768, "end_char": 24783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U..T.S. CHOPRA\n\nSTATE OF BOMBAY."}}, {"text": "S. R. OAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24787, "end_char": 24796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. OAS, BHAGWATI and IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24798, "end_char": 24806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. OAS, BHAGWATI and IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24811, "end_char": 24815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. OAS, BHAGWATI and IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24822, "end_char": 24851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 439(1)(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24869, "end_char": 24881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25159, "end_char": 25168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25241, "end_char": 25247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25254, "end_char": 25280, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25333, "end_char": 25362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in this appeal was convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, of an offence under s. 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act (Act XXV of 1949) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 66(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25384, "end_char": 25392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "Hih Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25629, "end_char": 25648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He preferred an appeal to the Hih Court at Bombay, which was summarily dismissed."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25721, "end_char": 25736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the dismissal of that appeal, the State of Bombay made a revision application to the High Court praying for enhancement of the sentence."}}, {"text": "s. 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25865, "end_char": 25874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25882, "end_char": 25908, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_842_857_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Odobtr 4.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE\n\nARTHUR PAUL BENTHALL.\n\n(l955J\n\n(S. R.\n\nDAs.\n\nAcTING\n\nC. J.,\n\nBHACWATI,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR, JuER IMAM and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nThe Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss. 5 and 6-Expression \"disti11; t matters\" in s. 5 and \"description\" in s. 6-I-Vhethe1 hav~\n\ndiffe1ent connotations-Instrument in question-Whether comprised distinct tnatters. ·\n\nHeld per S. R. DAs, AcTINC C. J.,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR,\n\nJ.\\FER l~:iAM and CttANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR\n\nJJ.\n\n(BH1\\GWATI J. r'issenting) the contention that the word \"matter\" in s. 5 of the l ndian Stamp Act was intended to convey the sarne n1eaning as the word \"description\" in s. 6 is \\Vithout force. In its popular sense, the expression \"distinct matters\" would connote something different from distinct \"categories''. 'fwo transactions might be of the san1e description, but all the same, they might be distinct.\n\nWhen two words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it cannot be maintained that they are used in the same sense and therefore the expression 'distinct matters\" in s. 5 and \"description\" in s. 6 have different connotations.\n\nIt is settled law that when two persons 101n in executing a power of attorney, whether it comprises distinct matters or not will depend on whether the interests of the executants in the subject matter of the power are separate or not. Conversely, if one person holding properties in two different capacities, each unconnected with the other, executes a power in respect of both of then1, the instrument should logically be held to comprise distinct rnatters.\n\nHeld, that the instrument in question, Exhibit A,-the power of attorney-comprised distinct matters within the meaning of s. 5 of the Indian Stamp Act in respect of several capacities of the respon* dent mentioned therein.\n\nPer BttAGWATI J. (dissenting).-The fact that the donor of the power of attorney exe<_:utes it in different capacities is not sufficient to constitute the instrument, one comprising distinct inatters and thus requiring to be stamped with the aggregate amount of the duties with which separate instruments each comprising or relating to one of such matters would be chargeable under the Act, within the mean* ing of s. 5 of the Indian Stamp Act.\n\nThe instrument in question, Exhibit A, does not <umpr.sc distinct matters but comprises one matter only and that matter is the execution of a general power of attorney by the donor in favour of\n\nthe donees constituting the donees his attorneys to act for him in all the capacities he enjoys.\n\nIt is within the very nature of_ the general power of attorney that all the distinct acts which the donor is capable of performing are comprised in one instrument which is executed by him and therefore whatever acts the donor is capable of performing whether in his individual capacity or in his representative capacity as trustee or as executor or administrator are also comprised within the instrument and are not distinct matters to be dealt with as such so as to attract the operation of s. 5 of the Indian Stamp Act.\n\nSecretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v. Alagappa Chettiar I.L.R. [1937] Mad. 553, Ansell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1929] 1 K.B. 608, Reversionary Interest Society v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1906] 22 T.L.R. 740, Davis v. Williams [1804] 104 E.R. 358, Bowen v. Ashley [1805] 127 E.R. 467, Goodson v.\n\nForbes 11815] 128 E.R. 999, Freeman v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1870-71] L.R. 6 Exch. 101, Allen v. Morrison [1828] 108 E.R. 1152, Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46, [ 1886] l.L.R. 9 Mad. 358, Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46, f1891] l.L.R. 15 Mad. 386, Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46, [1892] 2 M.L.J. 178, and Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami, 48 I.A. 302, referred to.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1smcnoN : Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1954.\n\nAppeal hy Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 27th day of June 1952 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 214 of 1951-A reference under s. 57 of the Indian Stamp Act.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (B. Sen and P. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. Chaudhury, (S. N. Mukherjee, B. N. Ghosh and A. K. Basu, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1955. October 4.\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-This appeal raises a question under section 5 of the Indian Stamp Act II of 1899. The respondent was, at the material time, the Managing Director of Messrs Bird and Co. Ltd., and of Messrs F. \\V. Heilgers and Co., Ltd., which were acting as Managing Agents of several Companies registered under the Indian Companies Act. He was also a Director of a number of other Companies, and had on occasions acted as liquidator of some Com-\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBenthall\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue\n\n' Arthur Paul Benthall\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nparnes, as executor or administrator of estates of deceased persons and as trustees of various estates. On 4-7-1949 he applied to the Collector of Calcutta under section 31 of the Stamp Act for adjudication of duty payable on a power of-attorney, marked as Exhibit A in the proceedings, which he proposed to execute. By that power, he empowered .Messrs Douglas Chisholm Fairbairn and John James Brims Sutherland jointly and severally to act for him in his individual capacity and also as executor, administratoi:, trustee, managing agent, liquidator and all other capaCit1es.\n\nThe Collector referred the matter under section 56(~) of the Act to the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, who eventually referred it under section 57 to the High Court of Calcutta stating his own opinion that the stamp duty was payable on the power \"for as many respective capacities as the principal executes the. power\".\n\nThe reference was heard by a Bench consisting of the Chief Jmtice, Das, J. and S. R. Das Gupta, J., who differed in their opinion. The learned Chief Justice with whom Das, J. agreed, heir! that the different capacities of the executant did not constitute distinct matters for purposes of section 5 of the Act, and that the proper duty payable on the instrument was Rs.\n\nIO under article 4S(d) of Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act as amended by section 13 of Bengal Act III of 1922. S. R.\n\nDas Gupta, J. was of the opinion that the different capacities of the executant were distinct matters for the purposes of section 5, and that the instrument was chargeable with the aggregate amount of duty payable if separate instruments were executed in respect of each of those capacities. In the result, the question was answered in accordance with the opinion of the majority in favour of the respondent.\n\nAgainst that decision, the Board of Revenue, West Bengal has preferred this appeal by special leave, and contends that the instrument in question comprises distinct matters, and must be stamped in accordance with section 5.\n\nThe statutory provisions bearing on the question are sections 3 to 6 of the Act. Section 3 is the charging section, and it enacts that subject to certain exempt10ns, every instrument mentioned in the Schedule to the Act shall be chargeable with the duty of the amount indicated therein as the proper duty therefor. Section 4 lays down that when in the case of any sale, mortgage or settlement several instruments are employed for completing the transaction, only one of them called the principal instrument is chargeable with the duty mentioned in Schedule l, and that the other instruments are chargeable each with a duty of one rupee.\n\nSection 5 enacts that any instrument comprising or relating to several distinct matters shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the duties with which separate instruments, each comprising or relating to one of such matters, would be chargeable under the Act. Section 6, so far as is material, runs as follows:\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of the last preceding section, an instrument so framed as to come within two or more of the descriptions in Schedule I, shall, where the duties chargeable thereunder are different, be chargeable only with the highest of such duties\".\n\nThe point for decision in this appeal is as to the meaning to be given to the words \"distinct matters\" in section 5. The contention of the respondent which found favour wich the majority of the learnrcl Judges in the court below is that the word \"matters\" in section 5 is synonymous with the word \"description\" occurring in section 6; and that they both refer to the several categories of instruments which are set out in the Schedule. The argument in support of this contention is this : Section 5 lays down that the duty payable when the instrument comprises or relates t~ distinct matters is the aggregate of what would be payable on separate instruments relating to ea(h of these matters.\n\nAn instrument would be chargeable under section 3 only if it fell within one of the categories mentioned in the Schedule.\n\nTherefore, what is contemplated by section 5 is a combination in one document of different categories of instruments such as sale ancl mortgage, sale and lease or mortgage and lease and the like. But when the category is one\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue v.\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBenthall\n\nV enkataraina\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nTht Mtmbu, Board of Reienue\n\nArthur Paul Benthall\n\nVenkatarama\n\n4_1yar ].\n\nand the same, then section 5 has no application, and as, in the present case, the instrument in question is a power-of-attorney, it would fall under article 48(a) in whatever capacity it was executed, and there being only one category, there are no distinct matters within section 5. . We are unable to accept the contention that the word \"matter\" in section 5 was intended to convey the same meaning as the word \"description\" in section 6.\n\nIn its popular sense, the expression \"distinct matters\" would connote something different from distinct \"categories\".\n\nTwo transactions might be of the same description, but all the same, they might be distinct. If A sells Black-acre to X and mortgages White-acre to Y, the transactions fall under different categories, and they are also distinct matters.\n\nBut if A mortgages Black-acre to X and mortgages Whiteacre to Y, the two transactions fall under the same category, but they would certainly be distinct matters.\n\nIf the intention of the legislature was that the expression 'distinct matters' in section 5 should be understood not in its popular sense but narrowly as meaning different categories in the Schedule, nothing would have been easier than to say so. When two words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense, and the conclusion must follow that the expression \"distinct matters\" in section' 5 and \"descriptions\" in section 6 have different connotations.\n\nIt is urged against this conclusion that if the word \"matters\" in section 5 is construed as meaning anything other than \"categories\" or in the phraseology of section 6, \"descriptions\" mentioned in the Schedule, then there could be no conflict between the two sections, and the clause in section 6 that it is \"subject to the provision of the last preceding section\" would be meaningless and useless. We see no force in this contention. Though the topics covered by sections 5 and 6 are different, it is not difficult to conceive of instruments which might raise questions falling to be determined under both the sections. Thus, if a partnership carried on by members of a family is wound up and the deed of dissolution effects also a partition of the family properties as in Secretary, Board of Revenue v.\n\nAlagappa Chettiar (1 ), the instrument can be viewed both as a deed of dissolution and a deed of partition, and under section 6, the duty payable will be the higher duty as on an instrument of partition.\n\nBut supposing by that very eed one of the members creates a charge or mortgage over the properties allotted to his share in favour of another member for moneys borrowed by him for his cwn purposes, that would be a distinct matter which would attract section 5.\n\nNow, but for the savmg clause, a contention might be advanced that sections 5 and 6 are mutually exclusive, and as the instrument falls within section 6. the only duty payable thereon is as on an instrument of partition and no more. The purpose of the clause in section 6 is to repel any such contention.\n\nConsiderable stress was laid bv Mr. Chaudhury on the scheme of the Act as embodied in sections 3 to 6 as strongly supporting the view that 'matters' m section 5 means the same thing ds 'description m section 6.\n\nHe argued that under section 3 the duty was laid not on all instruments but Qn those which were of the descriptions mentioned in the Schedule, that section 4 enacted a special provision with reference to three of the categories mentioned in the Schedule, sale (conveyance), mortgage and settlement, that if they were completed in more than one instrument, not all of them were liable for the duty specified in the Schedule, but only one of them called the principal document, and that section 6 provided that when the instrument fell under two or more of the categories in the Schedule, the duty payable was the highest payable on any one of them, that thus the categories in the schedule were the pivot on which the entire scheme revolved, and that in construing the section in the light of that scheme, the expression \"distinct matter\" must in the setting be construed as distinct categories.\n\nTo construe \"distinct matters\" as\n\n(I) l.L.R. [1937) Mad. 553.\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenu!\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBmtha/I\n\nJ.,.cnkatararwi\n\nAyyar ].\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue\n\n•• Arthur Paul\n\nBenthall\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA;:yar J.\n\nsomething different from \"distinct categories\" would be, it was argued, to introduce a concept foreign to\n\nthe scheme of the enactment .\n\nThe error in this argument lies in thinking that the object and scope of sections 4 to 6 are the same, which in fact they are not. Section 4 deals with a single transactjon completed in seve1al intrument,. and section 6 with a single transaction which might be viewed as falling under more than one category, whereas section 5 applies only when the instrument comprises more than one transaction, and it is in1material for this purpose whether those transactions are of the same category or of different categories.\n\nThe topics dealt with in the three sections heing thus different, no useful 1mrpose will he server! bv referring to section 4 or section 6 for determining the scope of section 5 or for construing its terms. It is not without significance that the legislature has used three different words m relation to the three sections, 'transaction' in section 4, 'matter' in section 5, :i.nd 'description' in section 6.\n\nIn support of his contention that 'distinct matters' in section 5 meant only different categories, learned counsel for the respondent relied on certain observations in Ansel] v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(').\n\nThere, the instrument under consideration was a deed of settlement which comprised certain Government secunt1es as also other investments, and under the Stamp Act, 1891, it was chargeable with a single duty ad va!orem on the value of all the properties settled.\n\nBv section 74, sub-section (1) of the Finance Act, 1910, voluntary dispositions were chargeable with a higher stamp duty as on a conveyance; but Government securities were exempted from the operation of the section. The question that arose for decision was whether a separate duty was payable in respect of Government stocks under the provisions of the Stamp Act, 1891 over and above what was paid under section 74, sub-section (I) of the Finance Act, 1910 on account of other investments.\n\nAnswering it m the affirmative, Rowlatt, J. observed :\n\n(1) [19°9] 1 K.B. \"\"\"·\n\n\"If two different classes of property are being transferred by the same words of assignment in the same document, and those two different classes of property in the same document are different from the point of view of the Stamp Act and taxation, it seems to me in common sense that they must be distinct matters\".\n\nThe respondent wants to read these observations as meaning that where the matters are not dealt with separately for purposes of stamp duty, then they are not distinct matters. This, however, does not follow.\n\nThe case before the court was one in which the instrument dealt with properties which fell under two categories, and the decision was that they were distinct matters. There is nothing either in the decision or the observations quoted above to support the contention of the respondent that if the instrument comprises matters falling within the same description, it is not to be construed as comprising distinct matters.\n\nReliance was also placed on the observatio•\"; in Reversionary Interest Society v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(1), in which it was held that a statutory declaratic 11 for the purpose of carrying through a transacti0n was liable for a single stamp duty.\n\nThere, the declaration was made by husband and wife, and in view of the purpose for which it had to be used, it was construed as one declaration.\n\nThis is a dcision on the facts, and is not of much assistance.\n\nIn the view, then, that section 5 would apply even when the instrument comprises matters of the same description, the point for decision is whether the instrument proposed to be executed by the respondent is a single power-of-attorney or a combination of several of them. The contention of Mr. Chaudhury is ! 1.at when the executant of one instrument confers on the attorney a general authority to act for him in whatever matters he could act, then there is, in fact, only a single delegation, and that therefore the instrument must be construed as a single power-ofattorney liable for a single duty under article 48( d)\n\nI [1906] 22 T.L.R. 110:\n\ni955\n\nThe Mcmbtr, lioard of Rfvenue\n\nArthur Paul Bmtha/l\n\nVimkatarama\n\nA_ryar ].\n\n'[hf .\\frmbtr, B1ard 11( R~1erwt\n\n\"· Arthur Pau\n\nBfnll, all\n\nV 111katarama\n\nAy; ar ].\n\nof the Schedule. The contention of the appellant, on the other . hanJ, is that though the instrument is executed by one person, if he fills several capacities and the authority conferred is general, there woul,\\ he distinct delegations in respect of each of those capacities, and that the instrument should bear the aggregate of stamp duty payable in respect of each of sEeh capacities: The question is which of these two contentions Li correct . . We are unable to agree with the respondent that when a person executes a power-of-attorney in respect of all the matters in which he could act, it should be held, as a matter of law and without regard to the contents of the instrument, to comprise a single matter .. Whether it relates to a single matter or to distinct matters will, in our opinion. depend on a number of factors such as who are parties thereto, whic'l is t11e ; ubiect-matter on which it operates and so forth. Thus, if A executes one power authorising X to manage one estate and Y to manage another e<tate, there would really be two distinct matters, though there is onlv one instrument executed b•1 one person.\n\nBut if both X and Y are constituted attoneys tG act jointly and severally in respect of both the estates, then there is only one delegation and one matter, and that is specifically provided for in article 48( d ). Conversely, if a number of per:Sons join in executing one instrument, and there is community of interest between them in the subject-matter comprised therein, it will be chargeable with a single duty. This was held .in Davis v. Williams('), Bot1Jet1 v. Ashley('), Goodson v. Forbes(') and others cases. But if the interest• of the executants are separate, the instrument must be construed as comprising distinct matters.\n\nVitle Freeman v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(').\n\nApplying .the, same principle to powers-0f-attornev, it was held in Allen v. Morrison(' ) that when members of a mutual insurance. club executed a single power, it relat.ed to one matter, Lord Tenterdon, C. ). observmg . that \"there was certain I y a community of\n\n(I) [1804] 104 E.R. 358.\n\n( ) [1805] 127 E.R.467, 469.\n\n(3) [1815] 128 E.R. 999, lfl00-1001.\n\n(4) [1870-71] L.R. 6 Exch. 101. \\5) [128] 108 ll.R. 115:, 1153.\n\npurpose actuating all the members of this club\". ln Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46( 1 ) , a powcr-ofattorncy executed by thirty-six persons relation to a fund in which they were jointly mterested was held to comprise a single matter. A similar decision was given in Reference und • .,· Stamp Act, s. 46(2) where a power-of-attorney was executed by ten mirasdars empowering the collection of communal income appurtenant to their mirasi rights. On the other hand, where several donors having separate interests execute a single power-of-attorney with reference to their respective properties as, for example, when A constitutes X as attorney for management of his estate Black-acre and B constitutes the same person as attorney for the management of his estate White-acre, then the instrument must be held to comprise distinct matters. It was so decided in Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46( s ).\n\nThus, the question whether a power-ofattornev relates to distinct matters is one that will have t; be decided on a consideration of the terms of\n\nthe instrument and the nature and the extent of the authority conferred thereby.\n\nIt may be mentioned that questions of this character cannot now arise in England in view of the special prnvision contained in the Finance Act, 1927 (17 & 18, Geo. 5, Ch. 10), section 56 which runs as follows :\n\n\"No instrument chargeable with stamp duty under the heading 'Letter or Power of Attorney and Commission, Factory, Mandate, or other instrument in the nature thereof in the First Schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891, shall be charged with duty more than once by reason only that more persons than one are named in the instrument as donors ar donc:es (whether jointly or severally or otherwise), of the powers thereby conferred or that those powers relate to more than one matter\".\n\nhre is no provision in the statute law of this country similar to the above, and it is significant that it assumes that a power of attorney might consist of distinct matters by reason of the fact that there arc\n\n(I) [1886] I.LR. 9 !Vad. 358.\n\n(2) [1891] l.L.R. 15 Mad. 386.\n\n(3) [1892] 2 M.L.J. 178.\n\nThe ;\\/ember, Board of Revenue\n\nArlhur Paul\n\nBent1all\n\nV tn/.; alarama\n\n.yar J.\n\nil55\n\nThe .\\!ember, Board n._f.Re1em1e\n\n\"· Arthur Paul\n\nBenthall\n\nV rnkatarama\n\n~yyar J.\n\nseveral Jonors or donees mentioned in it, or that. it relates to more than one matter.\n\nNow, considering Exhibit A in the light of the above discussion, the point for determination is whet.her it can be said to comprise distinct matters by reason of the fact that the respondent has executed it in different; capacities. In this form, the question is bereft of authority, and falls to be decided on wellrecognised principles applicable to the nuttcr. It is, >s has been stated above, settled law that when two persons 10111 ifi executing a power-of-attorney, whether it comprises distinct matters or not will depend on whether the interests of the cxecmants in the subject-matter of the power are separate or joint.\n\nConversely, if one person holding properties in two different capacities, each unconnected with the other, executes a power in respect of both of them, the instrument should logically be held to comprise ,\\istinct matters.\n\nThat will he in consonance with the generally accepted notion of what are <fotinct mattero,, and that certainly was the view which the responde; it himself took of the matter when he expressly recited in the power that he executed it both in his individual capacity and in his other capacities. But it is contended by Mr. Chaudhury that the fact that the respondent filled several capacities would not aifect the character of the instrument as relating to a single matter, as the delegation thereuncier extended to whatever the respondent could do, and that it woulcl be immaterial that he held some properties in his individual capacity and some others as trustee or executor, as the legal title to all of them would vest in him equally in the latter as well as in the former capacity. We are concerned, he argued, not with the source from which the title flowed but with the reservoir in which it is now contained.\n\nThis is to attach more importance to the form of the matter than to its substance. When a person is appointed trustee, the legal title to the estate does, under the English law, undoubtedly vest in him; hut then he holds it for the benefit of the cestui que trtut in whom the equitable estate vests.\n\nUnder the\n\nIndian law, it is well established that there can be trusts and fiduciary relations in the nature of trust even without there being a vesting of the legal estate in the trmtee as in the case of mutts and temples.\n\nVidc Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami( 1 ).\n\nIn such cases, the legal title is vested in the institution, the mahant or shebait being the manager thereof, and any delegation of authority by him can only be on behalf of the institution which he represents. When a person possesses both a personal capacity and a representative capacity, such as trustee, and there is a delegation of power by him in both those capacities, the position in law is exactly the same as if different persons ; om m executing a power in respect of matters which are unrelated.\n\nT:1ere being no community of interest between the personal estate belonging to the executant and the trust estate vested in him, they must be held to be distinct matters for purposes of section s: The position is the same when a person is executor or administrator, because in that capacity he represents the estate of the deceased, whose persona is deemed to continue in him for purposes of administration.\n\nIt was finallv contended by Mr. Chaudhurv that if e\\'ery capacity of the donor is to be considered as a distinct matter, we should have to hold that there are distinct matters not only with reference to the capacity of the executant as trustee, executor and so forth, but in respect of every transaction entered into by him in his personal capacity. Thus, it is argued, if he confers on his attorney authority to sell one property, to mortgage another and to lease a third, he would have acted in three different capacities as vendor, mortgagor and lessor, and the instrument will have to be stamped as relating to three distinct matters. 'Phis, he contended, would destroy the very basis of a general power-of-attorney.\n\nThe fallacv in this argument is in mixing up the capacity which a person possesses with acts exercisable by virtue of that capacity.\n\nWhen an executor, for example, sells one property for discharging the debts of the testator and\n\n(!) [1921] 48 I.A. 302.\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul Benthall\n\nV <nkatarama\n\nAy; ar ].\n\nThe ,\\!ember, Board of Revenue\n\nArlhU1' Paul Benthall\n\nV enkalfirama\n\nAyyar].\n\nmortgages another for raising funds for carrying on his business, he no doubt acts in two different transactions; but in respect of both of them, he functions only in his capacity as executor.\n\nIn our opm1on, there is no substance in this contention.\n\nIn the result, we are of the opinion, differing from the majority of the learned Judges of the court below, that the instrument, Exhibit A, comprises distinct matters in respect of the several capacities of the respondent mentioned therein, and that the view taken by the revenue authorities and supported by S. R. Das Gupta, J. is correct. This 3ppeal will accordingly be allowed. The respondent will pay the costs of the appellant here and in the court below.\n\nBHAGWATI J.-I regret I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached in the Judgment just delivered.\n\nWhile agreeing in the main with the construction put upon sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act and the connotation of the words \"distinct matters\" used in section 5, I am of the view that the question still survives whether the instrument in question is a single power ot attorney. or a combination of several of them. The argument which has impressed my Brother Judges forming the majority of the Bench is that though die instrument is executed by one individual, if he fills several capacities and the authority conferred is general, there would be distinct delegations in respect of each of those capacities and the instrument should bear the aggregate of stamp duty payable in respect of each of such capacities.\n\nWith the greatest respect I am unable to accede to that argument. I agree that the question whether a power of attorney relates to distinct matters is one that will have to be decided on the consideration of the terms of the instrument and the nature and the extent of the authority conferred thereby.\n\nThe fact, however, that the donor of the power of attorney executes it in different capacities is not sufficient in my opinion to constitute the instrument, one comprising distinct matters and thus requiring to he\n\nstamped with the aggregate amount of the duties with which separate instruments each comprising or relating to one of such matters would be chargeable under the Act, within the meaning of section 5. The transaction is a single transaction whereby the donor constitutes the donees jointly and severally his attorneys for him and in his name and on his behalf to act for him in his individual capacity and a\\; o in his capacity as managing director, director, managing agent, agent, secretary or liquidator of any company in which he is or may at any time thereafter be interested in any such capacity as aforesaid and also as executor, administrator, trustee or in any capacity whatsoever as occasion shall require. No doubt, different capacities enjoyed by the donor are combined herein but that does not constitute him different individuals thus bringing this instrument within the mischief of section 5. The executants of the instrument are not several individuals but is only. one individual, the donor himself, though he enjoys different capacities. These different capacities have a bearing on the nature and extent of the powers which he could exercise as such.\n\nIn his own individual capacity he could exercise all the powers as the full owner qua whatever right, title and interest he enjoys in the property, whether it be an absolute interest or a limited one; he may be the absolute owner of the property or may have a life interest therein, he may have a mortgagee's interest or a lessee's interest therein, he may be a dominant owner of a tenement or may be a mere licensee; but whatever interest he enjoys in that property will be the subject-matter of the power which he executes in favour of the donee. He may, apart from this individual interest which he enjoys therein, be a trustee of certain property and he may also enjoy the several interests described above in his capacity as such .trustee. It may be that in his turn .hemay be accountable to the beneficiaries for the due administration of the affairs of the trust but that does not mean that he, as trustee, is not entitled to exercise all these powers, the trust property having vested in him, and he being therefore in a position to exercise\n\nThL Member, Board .of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBenthall\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul Benthall\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n856 SUPREME t.:0URT REPORTS [1955]\n\nall these powers in relation thereto. The same would be the position if he were an executor or an administrator of an estate, in possession of the estate of the deceased as such. The property of the deceased would vest in him though his powers of dealing with the same would be circumscribed either by the provisions of the testamentary instrument or the limitations imposed upon the same by law. All these circumstances would certainly impose limitations on his powers of dealing with the properties but that does not detract from the position that he is entitled to deal with those properties and exercise all the powers in relation thereto though with the limitations imposed upon them by reason of the capacities which he enjoys. It follows, therefore, that, though enjoying different capacities, he is the same individual who functions though in different capacities and conducts his affairs in the various capacities which he enjoys but as a single individual. He is not one individual when he is acting in his own individual capacity; he is not another individual when he is acting as a trustee of a particular estate and he is not a third individual when he is acting as an executor or administrator of a deceased person. In whatever capacity he is acting he is the same individual dealing with various affairs with which he is concerned though with the limitations imposed upon his powers of dealing with the properties by reason of the properties having vested in him in different capacities.\n\nI am therefore of the opinion that the instrument in question does not comprise distinct matters but comprises one matter only and that matter is the execution of a general power of attorney by the donor in favour of the donees constituting the donees his attorneys to act for him in all the capacities which he enjoys. The instrument in question cannot be split up into separate instruments each comprising or relating to a . distinct matter in so for as the different capacities of the donor are concerned.\n\nA general power , of attorney comprises all acts which can be done by the donor himself whatever be the capacity or capacities which he enjoys and cannot be split up\n\ninto individual acts which the donor is capable of performing and which he appoints his attorney to <lo for him and in his name and on his behalf. It is within the very nature of the general power of attorney that all the distinct acts which the donor is capable of performing are comprised in the one instrument which is executed by him, and if that is the position, it is but logical that whatever acts the donor is capable of performing whether in his individual capacity or in his representative capacity as trustee or as executor or administrator are also comprised within the instrument and are not distinct matters to be dealt with as such so as to attract the operation of section 5.\n\nI am therefore of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the majority Judges in the High Court of Judioture at Calcutta was correct and would accordingly dismiss this Appeal with costs.\n\nBY THE CouRT.--In accordance with the opinion of the majority the Appeal is allowed with costs here and in the Court below.\n\nJUGAL KISHORE RAMESHW ARDAS v.\n\nMRS. GOOLBAI HORMUSJI\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.\n\nSINHA JJ.)\n\nBombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925 (Bombay Act Vil/ of 1925)-Ss. 3( 4) and 6-Sale and purchase of securities by appellant on behalf of resffondent-Dispute between the parties whether appellant was acting within his authority wl1en he purchased the shares-Relationship between the patties that of principal and agent and, not that of seller and purchaser-Whether falls within purview of s. 6-Contract notes sent by brokers to their constituent-Mere intimations by brnkers to constituent-That contract had been entered into -Arbitration agreement-Essentials thereof-Rules framed by Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association-Complete code by themselves- Rule 167-Whether contract notes void thereunder.\n\nThe appellant-a share-broker carrying on business in the City of Bombay ar.d a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' 17-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe MrmbeT, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBwthall\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nOctobtr 4.", "total_entities": 142, "entities": [{"text": "THE MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ARTHUR PAUL BENTHALL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Arthur Paul\n\nBenthall", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JuER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 194, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 202, "end_char": 218, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233, "end_char": 244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280, "end_char": 284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 584, "end_char": 588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 685, "end_char": 689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1124, "end_char": 1128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1150, "end_char": 1154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1766, "end_char": 1770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1778, "end_char": 1794, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "BttAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1872, "end_char": 1881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per BttAGWATI J. (dissenting).-The fact that the donor of the power of attorney exe<_:utes it in different capacities is not sufficient to constitute the instrument, one comprising distinct inatters and thus requiring to be stamped with the aggregate amount of the duties with which separate instruments each comprising or relating to one of such matters would be chargeable under the Act, within the mean* ing of s. 5 of the Indian Stamp Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2282, "end_char": 2286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2310, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3098, "end_char": 3102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3110, "end_char": 3126, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Reference under Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3582, "end_char": 3607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3609, "end_char": 3614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference under Stamp Act", "statute": "Reference under Stamp Act"}}, {"text": "Reference under Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3670, "end_char": 3675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference under Stamp Act", "statute": "Reference under Stamp Act"}}, {"text": "Reference under Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3704, "end_char": 3729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference under Stamp Act", "statute": "Reference under Stamp Act"}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4033, "end_char": 4038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference under Stamp Act", "statute": "Reference under Stamp Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4046, "end_char": 4062, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (B. Sen and P. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (B. Sen and P. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4119, "end_char": 4129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (B. Sen and P. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Chaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4161, "end_char": 4173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chaudhury, (S. N. Mukherjee, B. N. Ghosh and A. K. Basu, with him) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. Chaudhury"}}, {"text": "S. N. 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may be mentioned that questions of this character cannot now arise in England in view of the special prnvision contained in the Finance Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "First Schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21831, "end_char": 21868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ";\\/ember, Board of Revenue\n\nArlhur Paul", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22440, "end_char": 22479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ;\\/ember, Board of Revenue\n\nArlhur Paul\n\nBent1all\n\nV tn/.; alarama\n\n.yar J.\n\nil55\n\nThe .\\!ember, Board n._f."}}, {"text": "Chaudhurv", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25980, "end_char": 25989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was finallv contended by Mr. Chaudhurv that if e\\'ery capacity of the donor is to be considered as a distinct matter, we should have to hold that there are distinct matters not only with reference to the capacity of the executant as trustee, executor and so forth, but in respect of every transaction entered into by him in his personal capacity.", "canonical_name": "S. Chaudhury"}}, {"text": "nkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26981, "end_char": 26990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Member, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul Benthall\n\nV <nkatarama\n\nAy; ar ]."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27797, "end_char": 27805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI J.-I regret I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached in the Judgment just delivered.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "sections 4, 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27958, "end_char": 27977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28049, "end_char": 28058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29318, "end_char": 29327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30025, "end_char": 30034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arthur Paul\n\nBenthall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31381, "end_char": 31402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be that in his turn .hemay be accountable to the beneficiaries for the due administration of the affairs of the trust but that does not mean that he, as trustee, is not entitled to exercise all these powers, the trust property having vested in him, and he being therefore in a position to exercise\n\nThL Member, Board .of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBenthall\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul Benthall\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n856 SUPREME t.:0URT REPORTS [1955]\n\nall these powers in relation thereto.", "canonical_name": "Arthur Paul\n\nBenthall"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31404, "end_char": 31412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be that in his turn .hemay be accountable to the beneficiaries for the due administration of the affairs of the trust but that does not mean that he, as trustee, is not entitled to exercise all these powers, the trust property having vested in him, and he being therefore in a position to exercise\n\nThL Member, Board .of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBenthall\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul Benthall\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n856 SUPREME t.:0URT REPORTS [1955]\n\nall these powers in relation thereto.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Arthur Paul Benthall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31447, "end_char": 31467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be that in his turn .hemay be accountable to the beneficiaries for the due administration of the affairs of the trust but that does not mean that he, as trustee, is not entitled to exercise all these powers, the trust property having vested in him, and he being therefore in a position to exercise\n\nThL Member, Board .of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBenthall\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nThe Member, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul Benthall\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n856 SUPREME t.:0URT REPORTS [1955]\n\nall these powers in relation thereto.", "canonical_name": "Arthur Paul\n\nBenthall"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34380, "end_char": 34389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judioture at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34480, "end_char": 34515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am therefore of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the majority Judges in the High Court of Judioture at Calcutta was correct and would accordingly dismiss this Appeal with costs."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34774, "end_char": 34791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOOLBAI HORMUSJI\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.\n\nSINHA JJ.)"}}, {"text": "B. P.\n\nSINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34796, "end_char": 34808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOOLBAI HORMUSJI\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.\n\nSINHA JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34815, "end_char": 34860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 3( 4) and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34887, "end_char": 34902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35212, "end_char": 35216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35594, "end_char": 35600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant-a share-broker carrying on business in the City of Bombay ar.d a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' 17-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe MrmbeT, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBwthall\n\nBhagwati ]."}}, {"text": "Native Share and Stock Brokers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35622, "end_char": 35652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant-a share-broker carrying on business in the City of Bombay ar.d a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' 17-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe MrmbeT, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBwthall\n\nBhagwati ]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_857_866_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 857\n\ninto individual acts which the donor is capable of performing and which he appoints his attorney to <lo for him and in his name and on his behalf. It is within the very nature of the general power of attorney that all the distinct acts which the donor is capable of performing are comprised in the one instrument which is executed by him, and if that is the position, it is but logical that whatever acts the donor is capable of performing whether in his individual capacity or in his representative capacity as trustee or as executor or administrator are also comprised within the instrument and are not distinct matters to be dealt with as such so as to attract the operation of section 5.\n\nI am therefore of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the majority Judges in the High Court of Judioture at Calcutta was correct and would accordingly dismiss this Appeal with costs.\n\nBY THE CouRT.--In accordance with the opinion of the majority the Appeal is allowed with costs here and in the Court below.\n\nJUGAL KISHORE RAMESHW ARDAS v.\n\nMRS. GOOLBAI HORMUSJI\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.\n\nSINHA JJ.)\n\nBombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925 (Bombay Act Vil/ of 1925)-Ss. 3( 4) and 6-Sale and purchase of securities by appellant on behalf of resffondent-Dispute between the parties whether appellant was acting within his authority wl1en he purchased the shares-Relationship between the patties that of principal and agent and, not that of seller and purchaser-Whether falls within purview of s. 6-Contract notes sent by brokers to their constituent-Mere intimations by brnkers to constituent-That contract had been entered into -Arbitration agreement-Essentials thereof-Rules framed by Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association-Complete code by themselves- Rule 167-Whether contract notes void thereunder.\n\nThe appellant-a share-broker carrying on business in the City of Bombay ar.d a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' 17-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe MrmbeT, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBwthall\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nOctobtr 4.\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardas v. lt.1rs. Golbai\n\nHormusji\n\nSUPREME COURT REP9RTS [1955]\n\nAssociation-was employed by the respondent for effecting sales and purchases of shares on her behalf.\n\nThe appellant effected purchases of 25 shares of Tata Deferred and 350 shares of Swadeshi Mills to square the outstanding sales of the same number of shares standing in her name and sent the relative contract notes therefor to her. She repudiated the contracts on the grqund that the appellant had not been authorised to close the transactions on the date mentioned by him and asked him to square them at a later date.\n\nThe appellant maintained that the transactions had been closed in accordance with her instructions.\n\nThe appellant referred the dispute for arbitration to the Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association in pursuance of an arbitration clause in the contract notes.\n\nThe respondent refused to submit to arbitration of the association on the ground that the contract notes were void and therefore no arbitration proceedings could be taken thereunder. The arbitrators made an award in favour of the appellant in the absence of the respondent who declined to take part in the proceedings .. 'fhe respondent filed an application for setting aside the award. T.he Bombay High Court held that the con tracts in question were not ready delivery contracts as defined in s. 3( 4) of the Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act VIII of 1925 and that they were accordingly void under s. 6 of the Act and there fore the arbitration clause and the proceeding taken thereunder cul n1inating in the a\\vard were also void.\n\nHeld that apart from the question whether the contracts in question were for ready delivery or not, they were outside he pur\n\nview of s. 6 of Bombay Act Vlll of 1925 because they were not contracts for sale and purchase of securities.\n\nThe dispute between the parties was as to whether the appellant was acting \\vithin the scope of his authority when he purchased the shares.\n\nIf he was .acting within his authority, the respondent was liable to him.\n\nIf those purchases were unauthorised~ the appellant was liable to the respondent for damages. In either case the dispute was one which arose out of the contract of employment of the appellant by the respondent as a broker and not out of any contract of sale or pur chase of securities.\n\nThe relationship between the respondent a.nd the appellant was that of principal and agent, and not that of seller and purchaser.\n\nThe contract notes sent by brokers to their constituents arc not themselves contracts for sale or purchase of securities within s. 6 of the Bombay Act VIII of 1925 but only intimations by the broker to the constituent that such contracts had been entered into on his behalf.\n\nIt is settled law that to constitute an arbitration agreement ill writing it is not necessary that it should be signed by the parties, and that it is sufficient if the terms are reduced to writing and the .agreement of the parties thereto is establishe~.\n\nThe Rules framed by the Native Shares and Stock Brokers' Association, Bombay form a code complete in itself and any question\n\narising with reference to those Rules must be determined on their construction and it would be a mistake to read into them the statutory provisions enacted in the Bombay Act VIII of 1925 and therefore the contract notes cannot be held to be void under Rule 167.\n\nG1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JumsmcTION : Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1953.\n\nOn appeal from the Judgment and decree dated the 29th day of June 1951 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 93 of 1949 arising out of the order dated the 16th September 1949 of the Court of Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay in Award No. 45 of 1949.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (H. /.\n\nUmrigar, Sri Narain Andley, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him), for the appellant.\n\nH. R. Mehervaid and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. 1955.\n\nOctober 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant is a share broker carrying on business in the City of Bombay, and a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association, Bombay. The respondent, Mrs. Goolbai Hormusji, employed him for effecting sales and purchases of shares on her behalf, and on 6-8-1947 there was due from her to the appellant on account of these dealings a sum of Rs. 6,321-12-0.\n\nOn that date, the respondent had outstanding for the next clearance, sales of 25 shares of Tata Deferred and 350\n\nshares of Swadesh Mills. On 11-8-1947, the appellant effected purchases of 25 shares of Tata Deferred and 350 shares of Swadeshi Mills to square the outstanding sales of the respondent, and sent the relative contract notes therefor Nos. 2438 and 2439 (Exhibit A) to her. She sent a reply repudiating the contracts on the ground that the appellant had not been authorised to close the transactions on 11-8-1947, and instructed him to square them on 14-8-1947.\n\nThe appellant, however, declined to do so, maintammg that t lie: tra11sactions had bem closed on 11--8-1947 under he\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardar\n\nMrs. Goolhai\n\n1/ormusji\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. CnJolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\ninstructions of the respondent.\n\nAfter some correspondence which it is needless to refer to, the appellant applied on 21-8-1947 to the Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association, Bombay for arbitration in pursuance of a clause in the contract notes, which runs as follows :\n\n\"In event of any dispute arising between you and me/us of this transaction the matter shall be referred to arbitration as provided by the Rules and Regulations of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association\".\n\nThe Association gave notice of arbitration to the respondent, and called upon her to nominate her arbitrator, to which she replied that the contract notes were void, and that in conseguence, no arbitration proceedings could be taken thereunder.\n\nThe arbitrators, however, fixed a day for the hearing of the dispute, and gave notice thereof to her, but she declined to take any part in the proceedings. On 10-10-1947 they made an award in which, on the basis of the purchases made by the appellant on 11-8-1947 which were accepted by them, they gave credit to the respondent for Rs. 1,847, and directed her to pay him the balance of Rs. 4,474-12-0.\n\nThe respondent then filed the application out of which the present appeal arises, for setting aside the award on the ground, inter alia, that the contracts in question were forward contracts which were void under section 6 of the Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act VIII of 1925, that consequently the arbitration clause was also void and inoperative, and that the proceedings before the arbitrators were accordingly without jurisdiction and the award a nullity.\n\nSection 6 of the Act is as follows :\n\n\"Every contract for the purchase or sale of securities, othr than a ready delivery contract, entered • ruo after a date to be notified in this behalf by the Provincial Government shall be void, unless the same is made subject to and in accordance with the rules duly sanctioned under section 5 and every such contract shall be void unless the same is made between members or through a member of a recognised stockexchange; and no claim shall be allowed in any Civil Court for the recovery of any commission, brokerage, fee or reward in respect of any such contract\".\n\nSection 3(1) defines 'securities' as including shares, and therefore, contracts for the sale or purchase of shares would be void under section 6, unless they were made in accordance with the rules sanctioned by the Provincial Government under section 5. The appellant sought to avoid the application of section 6 on the ground that the contracts in question were 'ready delivery contracts', and fell outside the operation of that section.\n\nSection 3( 4) of Act VIII of 1925 defines 'ready delivery contract' as meaning \"a contract for the purchase or sale of securities for performance of which no time is specified and which is to be performed immediately or within a reasonable time\", and there is an Explanation that \"the question what ts a reasonable time is in each particular case a question of fact\".\n\nThe contention of the appellant was that contracts Nos. 2438 and 2439 were ready delivery contracts as defined in section 3(4), as no time was specified therein for performance.\n\nThe learned City Civil Judge, who heard the application agreed with this contention, and holding that the contracts were not void under section 6 of Act VIII of 1925, dismissed the application.\n\nThe respondent took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Bombay, and that was heard by Chagla, C.J. and Tendolkar, J. They were of the opinion that the contracts in question were not ready delivery contracts as defined in section 3( 4) of the Act, because though no time for performance was specified therein, they had to be performed within the period specified in the Rules and Regulations of the Association, which were incorporated therein by reference, and not \"immediately or within a reasonable time\" as provided in section 3( 4), that they were accordingly void under section 6, and that consequently, the arbitration clause and the proceedings taken thereunder culminating in the award were also void. They accordingly set aside the award as invalid and without jurisdiction. Against tl'ri.<i jutigment, the appellant has preferred this appeal\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas\n\nMrs. Goolbai\n\nHorncusji\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. Gvolbai Hormusji\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nA.var J,\n\non a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c).\n\nIt was argued by the learned Attorney-General in support of the appeal that even apart from the question whether the contracts in question were for ready delivery or not, they would be outside the purview of section 6, because they were not contracts for sale and purchase of securities. This contention was not raised in the courts below, and learned counsel for the respondent objects to . its being entertained for the first time in this Court, as that would involve investigation of facts, which has not been made. But in view of the terms of the contract notes and the admission of tbe respondent in ber petition, we are of opinion that the point is open to the appellant, and having heard counsel on both sides, we think that the appeal should succeed on that point.\n\nThe dispute between the parties is as to whether the appellant was acting within the scope of his authority when he purchased 25 shares of Tata Deferred and 350 shares of Swadeshi Mills on 11-8-1947. If he was acting within his authority, then the respondent was entitled only to a credit of Rs. 1,847 on the basis of the said purchases.\n\nBut if these purchases were unauthorised, the appellant was liable to the respondent in damages. In either case, the dispute was one which arose out of the contract of employment of the appellant by the respondent as broker and not out of any contract of sale or purchase of secunt1es.\n\nThe question of ; ale or purchase would arise between the respondent and the seller or purchaser, as the case may be, with reference to the contract brought about by the appellant.\n\nBut the relationship between the respondent and the appellant was one of principal and agent and not that of seller and purchaser. The contract of employment is no doubt connected; and intimately, With sales and purchases of securities; but it is not itself a contract of-sale or purchase. It is collateral to it, and does not become ipso facto void, even if the contract of purchase and sale with which it is connected is void.\n\nVide the decision of this Court in Kishati Lal and another v Bhantoat Lal('). The legis-\n\n(•l) [J955Jl s.a.R. 439,\n\nlature might, of course, enact that not merely the contract of sale or purchase but even contracts collateral thereto shall be void, in which case the contracts of employment witf, t reference to those contracts would also be void. But that is not what Act VIII of 1925 has done.\n\nSection 6 expressly provides that no claim shall be maintained in a civil court for the recovery of any comm1ss1on, brokerage, fee or reward in respect of any contract for the purchase or sale of securities. That is to say, the bar is to the broker claiming remuneration in any form for having brought about the contract.\n\nBut the contract of employment is not itself declared void, and a claim for indemnity will not be within the prohibition. The question whether contract notes sent by brokers to their constituents are contrar:ts for the sale and purchase of securities within section 6 of Act VIII of 1925, came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court in Promatha Nath v. Batliwalla & Karani(1) and it was held therein that they were not themselves contracts for sale or purchase but only intimations by the broker to the constituent that such contracts had been entered into on his behalf. We agree with this decision.\n\nIt may be argued that if the contract note is only intimation of a sale or purchase on behalf of the constituent, then it is not a contract of employment, and that in consequence, there is no agreement in writing for arbitration as required by the Arbitration Act. But it is settied law that to constitute an arbitration agreement in writing it is not necessary that it should be signed by the parties, and that it is sufficient if the terms are reduced to writing and the agreement of the partie~ thereto is established.\n\nThough the respondent alleged in her petition that she had not accepted the contract notes, Exhibit A, she raised no contention based thereon either before the City Civil Judge or before the High Court, and even in this Court the position taken up by her counsel was that Exhibit A constituted the sole repository of the contracts. and as they were void, there was no arbi-\n\n(1) I.LR. [19.J.2] Hom. 655; A.I.R.194! Dom. 2:'4.\n\nJugal Kis/wre Ramuhwardas\n\nMrs. (; oo/hai\n\nHormwji\n\nVenkatarama\n\n.4y)llT ).\n\nJugal Kis!wr1 Rameshwardas\n\nMrs. Goolbai\n\nHmnusji\n\nV e11katarama ·\n\nAyyar ].\n\ntration clause in force between the parties. We accordingly hold that the contract notes contained an agreement in writing to refer disputes arising out of the employment of the appellant as broker to arbitration, and that they fell outside the scope of section 6 of Act VIII of 1925, that the arbitration proceedings are accordingly competent, and that the award made therein is not open to objection on the ground that Exhibit A is void.\n\nIt was next contended for the respondent that the contract notes were void under Rule 167 of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association, and that on that ground also, the arbitration proceedings and the award were void. Rule 167 so far as it is material is as follows:\n\n\"167. (a) Members shall render contract notes to non-Members in respect of every bargain made for such non-Member's account, stating the price at which the bargain has been made.\n\nSuch contract notes shall contain a charge for brokerage at ratts not less than the scale prescribed in Appendix G annexed to these Rules, or as modified by the provisions of rules 168 and 170(b ). Such contract notes shall show brokerage separately and shall be irr Form A prescribed in Appendix H annexed to these Rules.\n\n( c) No contract note not in one of the printed Forms in Appendix H shall be deemed to be valid.\n\n(g) A contract note referred to in this rule or anv other rule for the time being in force shall be deemed to mean and include a contract and shall have the same significance as a contract\".\n\nForm A in Appendix H referred to in Rule 167(a) contains two columns, one showing the rate at which the securities are purchased or sold and the othc:r, the brokerage. The contract notes sent to the respondent are not in this form. They are in accordance with Form A in Appendix A, and show the r:ites at which the securities are sold or purchased, the brokerage not being seoarately shown. At the foot of the document, there is the following note :\n\n\"This is net contract.\n\nBrokerage is included in 1955 the price\".\n\nThe contention of the respondent is that the contract notes are not in accordance with Form A in Appendix H, as the price and brokerage are not separately shown, and that therefore they are void under Rule 167(c). Now, Rule 167 applies only to forward contracts, and the basis of the contention of the responde; t is that inasmuch as the contract notes, Exhibit A, have been held by the learned Judges of the High Court not to be ready delivery contracts but forward contracts, they would be void under Rule 167(c), even if they were not hit by section 6 of Act VIII of 1925.\n\nThe assumption underlying this argument is that what is not a ready delivery contract under the defmition in section 3 ( 4) of Act VIII of 1925 must necessarily be a forward contract for purposes of Rule 167.\n\nBut that is not correct. The definition of a ready delivery contract in section 3( 4) is only for the purpose of the Act, and will apply only when the question is whether the contract is void under section 6 of that Act. But when the question is whether the contract is void under Rule 167, what has to be seen is whether it is a forward contract as defi-ned or contemplated by the Rule5. The definition in section 3(4) of Act VIII of 1925 would be wholly irrelevant for determining whether the contract is a forward contract for purposes of Rule 167, the decision of which question must depend entirely on the construction of the Rub.\n\nThe relevant Rub are Nos. 359 to 363. Rule 359 provides that \"contract5 other than ready delivery contract5 shall not be made or transacted within or without the ring\". Rule 361 confers on the Board power to specifv which securities shall be settled by the system of Clearance Sheets and which, by the\n\nproces of Tickets.\n\nRules 362 and 363 prescribe the mod us a, erandi to be followed in effecting the settlement. It was with reference to these rules which under the contract notes were to be read as part of the contract. that the learned Judgts held that the contract: were not ready delivery contracts as defined in sec-\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardas\n\nMrs, Goolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVmkatarama\n\n, foar ].\n\nJugal Kishore Rames/iwartJrjs\n\nMrs. Goolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVe11kaltJTama\n\nA\"\"'].\n\ntion 3 ( 4) of Act VIU of 1925.\n\nBut reading the above Rules with Rule 359, there can be no doubt that the contract notes, Exhibit A, would for the purpose of the Rules be ready delivery contracts. Indeed, the form of the contract note>:, Exhibit A, is the one provided under the Rules for ready delivery contracts, whereas Form A in Appendix H is, as already stated, for forward contracts. Thus, contracts which are regulated by Rules 359 to 363 cannot be forward contracts contemplated by Rule 167, and they cannot be held to be void under that Rule. The error in the argument of the respondent is in mixing up two different provisions enacted by two different authorities and reading the one into the other. The rules framed by the Association form a code complete in itself, and any question arising with reference to those rules must be determined on their construction, and it would be a mistake to read into them the statutory provisions enacted in Act VIII of 1925.\n\nIn this view, the contract notes; Exhibit A, cannot be held to be void under rule 167. In the result, we must hold, differing from the learned Judges of the court below, that the arbitration proceedings are not incompetent and that the award made therein is not void on the ground that the contracts containing the agreement are void.\n\nThe respondent contested the validity of the award on several other grounds. They were rejected hy the City Civil Judge and in the view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court that the contract notes were void under section 6 of Act VIII of 1925, they did not deal with them. Now that we have held that the contracts are not void, it is necessary that the appeal should be heard on those points.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the order of the court below, and direct that the appeal he .reheard .in the light of the observations contained herein.\n\nAs the appeal succeeds on a point not taken in the courts below, the parties will bear their own costs throughout.\n\nThe costs of the further hearing after remand will be dealt with by the High C9urt.", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 718, "end_char": 727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judioture at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 818, "end_char": 853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am therefore of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the majority Judges in the High Court of Judioture at Calcutta was correct and would accordingly dismiss this Appeal with costs."}}, {"text": "JUGAL KISHORE RAMESHW ARDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1046, "end_char": 1073, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jug al K ishore Rameshwardas", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MRS. GOOLBAI HORMUSJI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1078, "end_char": 1099, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MRS. GOOLBAI HORMUSJI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1102, "end_char": 1110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1141, "end_char": 1150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1153, "end_char": 1198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 3( 4) and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1550, "end_char": 1554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1932, "end_char": 1938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant-a share-broker carrying on business in the City of Bombay ar.d a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' 17-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe MrmbeT, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBwthall\n\nBhagwati ]."}}, {"text": "MrmbeT, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBwthall\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nOctobtr 4", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2018, "end_char": 2088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant-a share-broker carrying on business in the City of Bombay ar.d a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' 17-84 S. C. lndia/59\n\nThe MrmbeT, Board of Revenue\n\nArthur Paul\n\nBwthall\n\nBhagwati ]."}}, {"text": "Swadeshi Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2361, "end_char": 2375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant effected purchases of 25 shares of Tata Deferred and 350 shares of Swadeshi Mills to square the outstanding sales of the same number of shares standing in her name and sent the relative contract notes therefor to her."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3357, "end_char": 3374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.he Bombay High Court held that the con tracts in question were not ready delivery contracts as defined in s. 3( 4) of the Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act VIII of 1925 and that they were accordingly void under s. 6 of the Act and there fore the arbitration clause and the proceeding taken thereunder cul n1inating in the a\\vard were also void."}}, {"text": "s. 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act VIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3504, "end_char": 3528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3571, "end_char": 3575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Control Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3840, "end_char": 3844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Control Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4704, "end_char": 4708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4716, "end_char": 4739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Native Shares and Stock Brokers' Association, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5132, "end_char": 5184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is settled law that to constitute an arbitration agreement ill writing it is not necessary that it should be signed by the parties, and that it is sufficient if the terms are reduced to writing and the .agreement of the parties thereto is establishe~.\n\nThe Rules framed by the Native Shares and Stock Brokers' Association, Bombay form a code complete in itself and any question\n\narising with reference to those Rules must be determined on their construction and it would be a mistake to read into them the statutory provisions enacted in the Bombay Act VIII of 1925 and therefore the contract notes cannot be held to be void under Rule 167."}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5397, "end_char": 5420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5809, "end_char": 5823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (H. /.\n\nUmrigar, Sri Narain Andley, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Narain Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5872, "end_char": 5885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (H. /.\n\nUmrigar, Sri Narain Andley, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (H. /.\n\nUmrigar, Sri Narain Andley, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5906, "end_char": 5921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (H. /.\n\nUmrigar, Sri Narain Andley, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. R. Mehervaid", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5954, "end_char": 5969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Mehervaid and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5974, "end_char": 5988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Mehervaid and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6190, "end_char": 6241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant is a share broker carrying on business in the City of Bombay, and a member of the Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Goolbai Hormusji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6264, "end_char": 6280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Mrs. Goolbai Hormusji, employed him for effecting sales and purchases of shares on her behalf, and on 6-8-1947 there was due from her to the appellant on account of these dealings a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Goolbai\n\nHorncusji"}}, {"text": "6-8-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6361, "end_char": 6369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Mrs. Goolbai Hormusji, employed him for effecting sales and purchases of shares on her behalf, and on 6-8-1947 there was due from her to the appellant on account of these dealings a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Swadesh Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6589, "end_char": 6602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that date, the respondent had outstanding for the next clearance, sales of 25 shares of Tata Deferred and 350\n\nshares of Swadesh Mills."}}, {"text": "11-8-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6607, "end_char": 6616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11-8-1947, the appellant effected purchases of 25 shares of Tata Deferred and 350 shares of Swadeshi Mills to square the outstanding sales of the respondent, and sent the relative contract notes therefor Nos."}}, {"text": "14-8-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She sent a reply repudiating the contracts on the ground that the appellant had not been authorised to close the transactions on 11-8-1947, and instructed him to square them on 14-8-1947."}}, {"text": "Jugal Kishore Rameshwardar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7157, "end_char": 7183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, however, declined to do so, maintammg that t lie: tra11sactions had bem closed on 11--8-1947 under he\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardar\n\nMrs. Goolhai\n\n1/ormusji\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. CnJolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\ninstructions of the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Jug al K ishore Rameshwardas"}}, {"text": "Goolhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7190, "end_char": 7197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, however, declined to do so, maintammg that t lie: tra11sactions had bem closed on 11--8-1947 under he\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardar\n\nMrs. Goolhai\n\n1/ormusji\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. CnJolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\ninstructions of the respondent."}}, {"text": "CnJolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVenkatarama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, however, declined to do so, maintammg that t lie: tra11sactions had bem closed on 11--8-1947 under he\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardar\n\nMrs. Goolhai\n\n1/ormusji\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. CnJolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\ninstructions of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7281, "end_char": 7286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, however, declined to do so, maintammg that t lie: tra11sactions had bem closed on 11--8-1947 under he\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardar\n\nMrs. Goolhai\n\n1/ormusji\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. CnJolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\ninstructions of the respondent."}}, {"text": "10-10-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8186, "end_char": 8196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10-10-1947 they made an award in which, on the basis of the purchases made by the appellant on 11-8-1947 which were accepted by them, they gave credit to the respondent for Rs."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8643, "end_char": 8652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act VIII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8688, "end_char": 8712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Control Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9220, "end_char": 9229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Control Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9504, "end_char": 9516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Control Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9639, "end_char": 9648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act VIII of 1925", "statute": "Control Act VIII of 1925"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9747, "end_char": 9756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9807, "end_char": 9816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10427, "end_char": 10439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10628, "end_char": 10637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10735, "end_char": 10755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Bombay, and that was heard by Chagla, C.J. and Tendolkar, J. They were of the opinion that the contracts in question were not ready delivery contracts as defined in section 3( 4) of the Act, because though no time for performance was specified therein, they had to be performed within the period specified in the Rules and Regulations of the Association, which were incorporated therein by reference, and not \"immediately or within a reasonable time\" as provided in section 3( 4), that they were accordingly void under section 6, and that consequently, the arbitration clause and the proceedings taken thereunder culminating in the award were also void."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10779, "end_char": 10785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Bombay, and that was heard by Chagla, C.J. and Tendolkar, J. They were of the opinion that the contracts in question were not ready delivery contracts as defined in section 3( 4) of the Act, because though no time for performance was specified therein, they had to be performed within the period specified in the Rules and Regulations of the Association, which were incorporated therein by reference, and not \"immediately or within a reasonable time\" as provided in section 3( 4), that they were accordingly void under section 6, and that consequently, the arbitration clause and the proceedings taken thereunder culminating in the award were also void."}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10796, "end_char": 10805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Bombay, and that was heard by Chagla, C.J. and Tendolkar, J. They were of the opinion that the contracts in question were not ready delivery contracts as defined in section 3( 4) of the Act, because though no time for performance was specified therein, they had to be performed within the period specified in the Rules and Regulations of the Association, which were incorporated therein by reference, and not \"immediately or within a reasonable time\" as provided in section 3( 4), that they were accordingly void under section 6, and that consequently, the arbitration clause and the proceedings taken thereunder culminating in the award were also void."}}, {"text": "section 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10914, "end_char": 10927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11215, "end_char": 11228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11268, "end_char": 11277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jug al K ishore Rameshwardas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11546, "end_char": 11574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against tl'ri.<i jutigment, the appellant has preferred this appeal\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas\n\nMrs. Goolbai\n\nHorncusji\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. Gvolbai Hormusji\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nA.var J,\n\non a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c).", "canonical_name": "Jug al K ishore Rameshwardas"}}, {"text": "Goolbai\n\nHorncusji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11581, "end_char": 11599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against tl'ri.<i jutigment, the appellant has preferred this appeal\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas\n\nMrs. Goolbai\n\nHorncusji\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. Gvolbai Hormusji\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nA.var J,\n\non a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c).", "canonical_name": "Goolbai\n\nHorncusji"}}, {"text": "A.var", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11693, "end_char": 11698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against tl'ri.<i jutigment, the appellant has preferred this appeal\n\nJug al K ishore Rameshwardas\n\nMrs. Goolbai\n\nHorncusji\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardas v.\n\nMrs. Gvolbai Hormusji\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nA.var J,\n\non a certificate under article 133 ( 1) ( c)."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11726, "end_char": 11737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11958, "end_char": 11967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14159, "end_char": 14168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14740, "end_char": 14749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jugal Kis/wre Ramuhwardas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16045, "end_char": 16070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jugal Kis/wre Ramuhwardas\n\nMrs. (; oo/hai\n\nHormwji\n\nVenkatarama\n\n.4y)llT ).", "canonical_name": "Jug al K ishore Rameshwardas"}}, {"text": "Goolbai\n\nHmnusji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16155, "end_char": 16171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jugal Kis!wr1 Rameshwardas\n\nMrs. Goolbai\n\nHmnusji\n\nV e11katarama ·\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "Goolbai\n\nHorncusji"}}, {"text": "e11katarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16175, "end_char": 16186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jugal Kis!wr1 Rameshwardas\n\nMrs. Goolbai\n\nHmnusji\n\nV e11katarama ·\n\nAyyar ]."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16454, "end_char": 16463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Form A in Appendix H referred to in Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17710, "end_char": 17750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18773, "end_char": 18782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18914, "end_char": 18923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19087, "end_char": 19100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19213, "end_char": 19222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19422, "end_char": 19434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goolbai\n\nHormusji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20312, "end_char": 20329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the learned Judgts held that the contract: were not ready delivery contracts as defined in sec-\n\nJugal Kishore Rameshwardas\n\nMrs, Goolbai\n\nHormusji\n\nVmkatarama\n\n, foar ].", "canonical_name": "Goolbai\n\nHorncusji"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21965, "end_char": 21974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_867_871_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 867\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nti.\n\nALI GULSHAN.\n\nIs. R.\n\nDAS,\n\nACTING\n\nC.J.,\n\nBHAGWATI,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]\n\nLu11; titutiun of India-Article 31-Public purpose-Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXlll of 1948), s. 6( 4) (a )-Requisition for a public purpose of certain prrmises by the State of Bombay--For 'housing a member of the rtaff of a foreign consulate' -Whether the requisition was made for a 'public purpose' within the meaning of the Act.\n\nHeld, that the Government of Bombay was entitled, under clause (a) of sub-section ( 4) of s. 6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) to requisition as for a public purpose, certain premises for 'housing a member of the staff of a foreign consulate'.\n\nThe purpose for which the requisition was made was a \"public purpose\" within the meaning of the Act; and the requisition was made in this case more as a State purpose than as a Union purpose.\n\nIn any eYent \"other publiC purpose\", is a category distinct from \"Union purpose\" and \"State purpose\" and the acquisition or requisitioning of property by the State except for rhe purpose of the Union, is within its competence under item 36 of the State List.\n\nAn undertaking may have three different fucets or aspects and may serve the purpose of a State; the purpose of the Union and a general public purpose. Even if one may regard the requisition of a room for the accommodation of a member of a consulate as one appertaining to a Union purpose, it does not necesfarily cease to be a State purpose or a general public purpose. Therefore on this view also, the requisition in the present case must be held to have been validly made.\n\nCourts should lean against a construction which would render words. in a statute mere surplusage.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : No. 229 of 1953.\n\nCivil Appeal\n\nAppeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th December 1952 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 110 of 1952.\n\nM; c. st'alvad; Attoriuy-General of lndi,, (PMttS\n\nOttoher 4 •.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nA. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appcl- !ant.\n\nRajinder Narain for the respondent.\n\n1955. October 4.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AtYAR J.-Was the Government of Bombay entitled, under clause (a) of sub-section ( 4) of section 6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act. XXXIII of 1948), to requisition, as for a public purpose , certain pr<miscs for \"housing a member of the staff of a foreign consulate\"?, is the question we have to consider in this appeal, which has arisen out of a writ petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution by the respon- . dent in the Bombay High Court to restrain the State\n\nof Bombay from taking such action.\n\nOn the hearing of the petition before Tendolkar, J., the State succeeded on the ground that the purpose for which the requisition was made was a \"public purpose\" within the meaning of the Act.\n\nBut, on appeal, it was held that though the requisition was for a public purpose, the requisition order was invalid, as 1 he public purpose must be either a purpose of the Union, or a purpose of the State and in thi• particular case tbc accommodation being required for housing a member of a foceign Consular staff was a Union purpose, which was outside the scope of the powers of the State. Clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section 6, omitting portions unnecessary for our present purposes, runs in these terms:-\n\n\"The State Government may, by order in writing, requisition the premises for the purpose of a State or any other public purpose, and may use or deal with the premises for any such purpose in such manner as\n\nmay' appear to it to be expedient\".\n\nThe. validity of the Act is not questioned as unconstitutional or as beyond the scope of the legislative competence of the State.\n\nAs the premises were required for housing a member of the staff of a Consulate, there can be no doubt that it was wanted for a public purpose.\n\nThe ultimate source of authority to requisition or acquire property is be found in article 31 of the Constitution. The requisition or acquisition must :., e for a public purpose and there must be compensat10n.\n\nThis article applies with equal force to Union legislation and State legislation. Items 33 and 36 of List I & List II 'of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empower respectively Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact laws with respect to them.\n\nThe reasoning by which the learned appellate Judges of the Bombay High Court reached their conclusion is shortly this. There can be no public purpose, which is not a purpose of the Union or a purpose of the State. There are only these two categories to consider under the statute, as the words \"any other purpose\" in the particular context should be read ejusdem generis with \"the purpose of the\n\nState\". The provision of accommodation for a member of the foreign consulate staff is a \"purpose of the Union\" and not a \"purpose of the State\".\n\nWe are unable to uphold this view as regards both the standpoints.\n\nItem 33 in the Union Legislative List (List I) refers to \"acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the Union\". Hem 36 in the State List (List II) relates to \"acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the purposes of ihe Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III\". Item 42 of the Concurrent Legislativ.:: List (List III) speaks of the \"the purpose of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose\". Reading the three items together, it is fairly obvious that the categories of \"purpose\" contemplated are three in number, namely, Union purpose, State purpose, and any other public purpose.\n\nThough every State purpose or Union purpose must be a public purpose, it is easy to think of cases where the purpose of the acquisition or requisition is neither the one nor the other but a public purpose.\n\nAcquisition of sites for the bulding of hospitals or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a public purpose,\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay v.\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiJ!ar J.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nthough it will not strictly be a State or Union purpose. When we speak of a State purpose or a Union purpose, we think of duties and obligations cast on the State or the Union to do particular things for the benefit of the public or a section of the public. Cases where the State acquires or requisitions property to facilitate the coming into existence of utilitarian institutions, or schemes having public welfare at heart, will fall within the third category abovementioned.\n\nWith great respect, we are constrained to say that the ejusdem generis rule of construction, which found favour in the court below for reaching the result that the words \"any other public purpose\" are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has ; carcely any application.\n\nApart from the .fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distiµct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied. If the words \"any other public purpose\" in the Statute in question . have been used only to mean a State purpose, they would become mere surplusage; Courts should lean against such a construction as far as possible.\n\nEven . if it is conceded that the law contemplates only two purposes, namely, State purpose and Union purpose, it is difficult to see how finding accommodation for the staff of a foreign consulate is a Union purpose and not a State purpose.\n\nItem 11 in the Union list specifies \"diplomatic, consular and trade representation\" as one of the subjects within the legislative competence of Parliament, and under article 73 of the Constitution,• the executive power of the Union shall extend to all such matters.\n\nIt can hardly be said that securing a room for a member of the staff of a foreign consulate amounts to providing for consular representation, and that therefore it is a purpose of the Union for which the State cannot legislate. .It was conceded by Mr.\n\nRajinder Narain, Counsel for\n\nthe Respondent, that there is no duty cast upon the Union to provide accommodation for the consulate staff, and this must be so, when we remember that the routine duties of . a Consul in modem times are to protect the interests and promote the commercial affairs of the State which he represents, and that his powers, p:rivileges and immunities are not analogous to those of an ambassador. The trade and commerce of the State which appoints him with the State in which he is located are his primary concern. The State of Bombay is primarily interested in its own trade and commerce and in the efficient discharge of his duties by the foreign consul functioning within the State.\n\nWe are inclined to regard the purpose for which the requisition was made in this case more as a State purpose than as a Union purpose.\n\nIn any event, as already pointed out, \"other public purpose\" is a distinct category for which the State of Bombay can legislate, .as the acquisition or requisitioning of property except ·· for the purposes of the Union, is within its competence under item 36 of the State List.\n\nThere is another way of looking at the question involved.\n\nAn undertaking may have three different facets or aspects, and niay serve the purpose of a State.\n\nthe purpose of the Union and. a general public purpose. ·. Even if one may regard the requisition of a room for the accommodation of a member of a Consulate as one appertaining to a Union purpose, it does not necessarily cease to be a State purpose or a general public purpose.\n\nIn this view also, the requisition in this case must be held to have been validly made.\n\nFor the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed and the order of Tendolkar J. is restored with costs . payable to the appellant by the respondent throughout. ·\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nChandrasekhar a\n\nAryar ].", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "867\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ALI GULSHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ALI GULSHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 177, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Public purpose-Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public purpose-Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948", "statute": "Public purpose-Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 622, "end_char": 626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public purpose-Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948", "statute": "Public purpose-Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 634, "end_char": 667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1942, "end_char": 1963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2143, "end_char": 2159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M; c. st'alvad; Attoriuy-General of lndi,, (PMttS\n\nOttoher 4 •.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nA. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appcl- !"}}, {"text": "A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2174, "end_char": 2182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M; c. st'alvad; Attoriuy-General of lndi,, (PMttS\n\nOttoher 4 •.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nA. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appcl- !"}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2187, "end_char": 2199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M; c. st'alvad; Attoriuy-General of lndi,, (PMttS\n\nOttoher 4 •.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nA. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appcl- !"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2233, "end_char": 2248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajinder Narain for the respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2332, "end_char": 2352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AtYAR J.-Was the Government of Bombay entitled, under clause (a) of sub-section ( 4) of section 6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2364, "end_char": 2384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AtYAR J.-Was the Government of Bombay entitled, under clause (a) of sub-section ( 4) of section 6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2452, "end_char": 2485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2740, "end_char": 2751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2801, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dent in the Bombay High Court to restrain the State\n\nof Bombay from taking such action."}}, {"text": "State\n\nof Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2835, "end_char": 2851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dent in the Bombay High Court to restrain the State\n\nof Bombay from taking such action."}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2916, "end_char": 2925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the hearing of the petition before Tendolkar, J., the State succeeded on the ground that the purpose for which the requisition was made was a \"public purpose\" within the meaning of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3497, "end_char": 3506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4189, "end_char": 4199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4501, "end_char": 4511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Items 33 and 36 of List I & List II 'of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empower respectively Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact laws with respect to them."}}, {"text": "AiJ!ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6223, "end_char": 6229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acquisition of sites for the bulding of hospitals or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a public purpose,\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay v.\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiJ!ar J.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nthough it will not strictly be a State or Union purpose."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acquisition of sites for the bulding of hospitals or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a public purpose,\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay v.\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiJ!ar J.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nAli Gulshan\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nthough it will not strictly be a State or Union purpose.", "canonical_name": "AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8043, "end_char": 8053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8939, "end_char": 8954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bombay is primarily interested in its own trade and commerce and in the efficient discharge of his duties by the foreign consul functioning within the State."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_872_880_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "October 11\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nDAJISAHEB MANE AND OTHERS\n\nti.\n\nSHANKAR RAO VITHAL RAO MANE\n\nAND ANOTHER.\n\n[1955]\n\n[S. R. DAS,\n\nDAS, fAFER\n\nAcTING C. J.,\n\nVIVIAN BosE, iMAM and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nfACANNADHA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India-Arts. 133 and 135-Decree of lower court in respect of properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000 but below Rs. 20,000--Reversed by the High Court on 8-11-1949-High Court g•anted 'leave to appeal on 1-10-1951-Appeal to the Supreme Court -Whether competent-Word \"exercisable\" in Art. 135-Construction of.\n\nThis appeal to the Supreme Court_ was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain im movable properties.\n\nThe suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20-12-1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs. 10,000.\n\nThe decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949.\n\nThe defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6-1-1950 which was granted on 1-10-1951.\n\nOne of the questions for determination was whether Art. 133 of the Constitution applied to the case and the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court.\n\nHeld, that Art. 133 did not apply as it relates expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the \"territory of India''.\n\nHeld further that on the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court as the properties were of the requisite value and on 6-1-1950 a certificate of leave to appeal was bound to be granted.\n\nHeld also that the appeal was competent to the Suprerae Court by virtue of the provisions of Art. 135 of the Constitution as the jurisdiction and powers in relation to the matter in dispute were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under an existing law. inasmuch as the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals from a decree of a High Court which reversed the lower court's decree as regards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000.\n\nThe construction contended for by the respondent that the jurisdiction was exercisable under Art. 135 by the Federal Court only if the matter was actually pending before the Federa~ Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is\n\ntoo narrow and does not give full and proper scope to the meaning of the word 'exercisable' in the Article.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1953.\n\nAppeal under section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code from the Judgment and Decree dated the 8th November 1949 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 195 of 1947 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated 20th December 1946 of the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sholapur\n\nin Special Suit No. 78 of 1945.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (R. A.\n\nGovind, with him) for the appelbnts.\n\nJ B. Dadachanji, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain, for respondents.\n\n1955. October 11.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was. delivered by\n\nCttANDRASEKH.~RA ArYAR J.-This appeal is from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for the possession of certain immovable proper-· ties which w<ts dismissed hv the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sholapur. The value of the properties has been found to be over Rs. 10,000.\n\nThe Original decree was on 20-12-1946. The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff's claim was on 8-11-1949.\n\nThe defendants applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6-1-1950.\n\nThe High Court directed the trial court to find the value of the property which was the subject-matter of the suit at the time of the rnit and on the date of the passing of the decree in appeal. On 22-1-1951 the lower court ascertained the value as stated above.\n\nThe High Court the:cafter granted leave to appeal on 1-10-1951, overrn1ing the objections raised by the plaintiff to the grant of such lt:a-:e.\n\nThe maintainability of this appeal has been questionc.I before us hy Mr. Dadachanji, learned counsel for the respondents. in a somewhat lengthv argument.\n\nHis main contention was tht article LB of the\n\nin--14 S.C. fndia/59\n\nDajisa!1Cb. Mav\n\nand others v.\n\nShtJ11kar Rao Vithal RQ() Mane\n\nand another\n\nDaJisaheb Man~\n\nand othtrs\n\nShanhir Rao V ithal Rao Mane\n\nand arwther\n\nChant/rasekharo\n\nAryar ].\n\nConstitution applies to the case, and as the value is below Rs. 20,0lJO, no appeal can be entertained. It is the correctness of this argument that we have to consider.\n\nOn the date of the decree of the High Court, the defendants had a .vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, as the properties were of the requisite value, and on 6-1-1950 they sought a certificate of leave to appeal, which was bound to be granted.\n\nThe Constitution establishing the Supreme Court as the final appeilate authority for India came into force on 26-1-195().\n\nDid the vested right become extinguished with the abolition of the Federal Court? If the coun to which an appeal lies is altogether abolished without any forum substituted in its place for the disposal of pending matters or for the lodgment of appeals, the vested right perishes no doubt.\n\nWe have therefore rp examine whether the Constitution which rought the Supreme Court into being makes any p.:ovision for an appeal from a reversing decree of the High Court prior to the date of the Constitution respecting properties of the value of Rs. 10,000 and more being\n\nenertained and heard by the Supreme Court.\n\nArticle 135 is in these terms:-\n\n\"Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to which the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do not apply if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matter were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing la\\Vn.\n\nArticle 133 runs as follows:-\n\n\"(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies- ( a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is. not le5s than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; or\n\n(b) that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or ( c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Superme Court; and, where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the court immediately below in ;:ny case other than a case referred to in sub-clause ( c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law ............ \"\n\nIt is reasonably clear that article 133 does not apply to this \"matter\".\n\nThe language is prospective, and the judgment, decree or final order from which the appeal is to be taken is that of a High Court in the territory of India-that is a High Court established under the Constitution.\n\nThe territory of India comprises the territory of the States.\n\nAricle 214 says that there shall be a High Court for each State, and clause (2) thereof provides that \"the High Court ,:xerc; s:ng jurisdicion in relation to any Province immediately bdore the commencement of this Constitution shall be deemed to be the High Court for the corresponding St1te\". \\Ve can compendiously speak of the High Court prior to the Constitution and the\n\nI-Ii?h Court after the Constitution as the P;-ovincial Higi1 Court and the State High Court. A High Court in the territory of India means a State High Court, and J..rticle 133 provides for appeals against any judgment. decree or final order in a civil proceeding of such High Court.\n\nThough article 133 does not apply, we have still to see whether it is a matter as regar<ls which jurisdiction a'!d powers were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nIt is unnecessary to refer in detail to the earlier enactments defining the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, and the Government of India Act, 1935 establishing the Federal Court and conferring a lim; tcd jurisdiction on the same.\n\nIt is sufficient to pohr out that as the law then stood, the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals\n\n1955'\n\nDajisal.eb Mane and ot.\\ers\n\nShankar Rao V iti; al Rao Mmie\n\nand another\n\nChandrasek.\\ara\n\nA!>'ar J.\n\nDajisa'uh Mane\n\nand ot'; ers\n\nShankar Rao Vithal Rao Mane\n\nand anot, ler\n\nr: ;; andrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nfrom a decree of a High Court which reverse<l the lower court's <lecree as re.!,!ards properties of the value of more than Rs. 10,000.\n\nThe aggrieved p.rtv had a right to go before it, without any special leave l:eing granted. It was a matter over which jurisdiction was \"exercisable\" by the Federal Court.\n\nThe construction that it was \"exercisable\" only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XL V of the Civil Procedure Code is too narrow, and doc; 110t give full and prooer scope to the meanin!;( of the word \"exercisable\" in the. article.\n\nPending: matten are dealt with under article 374(2), and we must give some meaning to the provisions of article 135.\n\nAs soon as the decree of the High Court came into existence, the jurisdiction of the F c<leral Court to hear an appeal from that decree became exercisable. provided certain conditions as to security and deposir were complied with, which are not material for 0111 present purpose.\n\nReference may be made here to paragraph 20 of thc- Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, as amended in 195], which provides:\n\n\"Nothing in this Order shall affect the previnm ·• operation of, or anvthing duly done or suffered under, any existing law, or anv right, privilege, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred under any such law ....... .\n\nBy this Order section 110, Civil Procedure Code was adapted to the new situation but the requirement \"' to value was raised from 10,0UO to 20,000.\n\nWhat 1s provided is that this adaptation will not affect the right of appeal already accrued.\n\nIf we accede to the argument urged by the respon dents, we shall be shutting out altogether a large number of appeals, where the parties had an automatic right to go before the Federal Court befor~ the Con::titution and which we must hold was taken a'\"°\"'i from them for no fault of their own, merely bec; use the Supreme Court came into existence in\n\nphce of the Federal Court.\n\nAn interpretation or\n\n~~ ii\n\nconstruction of the provisions of the Constitution which would lead to such a result should be avoided, unless inevitable. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in G1111dapuneedi Tleeranna and three others v. Gundapuneedi China Tl enkanna and seven\n\nothers( 1 ) was a case where the decree of the High Court\n\nmd the application for leave to appeal were both after the Constitution came into force. Whether in all matters where there was a right of appeal under section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code it continues in respect of all suits filed • prior to the Constitution is a question that does not arise for decision now.\n\nOn the merits, the appeal is unassailable. The family whose genealogical tree is given in the opening portion of the judgment of the trial Judge owned what may be compendiously described as Sangam properties and Peta Velapur Mahal properties, and all of them were of the nature of watan. The Sangam Jar., Js were held by the eldest branch represented by Yeshwant Rao (son of Panduranga Rao) bv right of lineal pnmogeniture. When Yeshwant Rao and hi~ widow Tarabai died in November 1924, these properties went to the plaintiff Shankar Rao's branch as the next senior in line. The Peta Velapur Mahal properties were held in three shares by Narsinga R:io, Vithal Rao and Krishna Rao, the fourth brother Shyama Rao having no right as he was insane. Defendants 1. 2 and 3 represent Krishna Rao's br:mch.\n\nAfter Yeshwant Rao's death, Lakshman Rao, the grandfather of defendants 1 and 2, filed a suit No.\n\n1064 of 1925 for a declaration that he was the nearest heir to the Sangam properties, the Peta Velapur Mahal properties and the cash income appertaining to the inamdar's right in Sangam. He got a declaratory decree that he was the nearest heir of th~ dee.eased Yeshwant Rao, and had a right in such capacity to take possession of all the propLrtie~, excluding the inam income and the Sangam laPLls specified in Schedule B of the decree and a small item of prooertv 5ituated in the same vi, llage and specified in Schedule G. As regards the excluded items, Shankar\n\n(1) I.L.R.(r953] Mad. I07J.\n\nDajisa'ieb Mmu\n\nand ot1; m v.\n\nSfignkar Rao Vitf, al Rao M1J11t\n\nand anothc\n\nChand1aukhara\n\nA&ar J.\n\nDaJisaUb Ma•\n\nand ot'.ers\n\nShar.kar Ran Vit'ial Rao Mane\n\nand anothtt\n\nChanttrastkhara\n\nAo/ar J.\n\nRao, the first defendant, (plaintiff in the present suit) was held to be the heir. On appeal to the High Court, the decree of the Subordinate Judge was confirmed, except as regards the cash allowance of three villages Nevare, Tambure and Limbagaon, which was also decbed to belong to Shankar Rao.\n\nAs the decree was only a declaratory decree, a fresh suit had to be filed by Narayana Rao, son of Lakshman Rao, to recover possession of the Peta V elapur Mahal properties at Mahalung, Lavang and Wafegaon. This was Civil Suit No. 2148 of 1936.\n\nRecovery was also sought of some cash and the value of some ornaments and clothes, etc. The claim was resisted by Shankar Rao, and his main plea was tbat in lieu of the properties claimed, a large number of lands at Sangam had originally been given to the plaintiff's branch, and that unless those properties were given back, the plaintiff could not claim to recover the V elapur Mahal properties. The suit ended in a compromise decree. Shankar Rao was to deliver actual possession of the lands to the plaintiff as owner together with costs and meme profits and the plain-· tiff was to abandon the rest of the claim. The decree states, \"The defendant has given up all the contentions in his written statement\".\n\nAfter possession was taken of the V elapur Mahal properties under the decree, the plaintiff, Shankar Rao, brought this suit to recover from defendants 1 and 2 the Sangam lands to which he referred in his earlier written statement alleging that they were gi\\cn to their grandfather in lieu of maintenance. The defendants have made the answer that the items of Sangam lands claimed by the plaintiff were given to their ancestor, Krishna Rao absolutely under the deed of 1867, and that since then they had been in the enjoyment as owners thereof. The Civil Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit finding that the case of the plaintiff to the effect that the lands were given to Krishna Rao for maintenance under the deed of 1867 was unfounded. But on appeal by Shankar Rao (the pbin~ tiff), the High Court reversed this decree construing the deed of 1867 as a deed under which absolute ownership was not transferred to Krishna Rao and that the specified items of Sangam lands were given to hiw provisionally and conditionally till Krishna Rao obtained possession of the Peta V elapur Mahal lands which were then under a mortgage.\n\nV/e have examined the deed closely and do not find any warrant for the view taken by the learned Judges on appeal. The deed is Exhibit No. 35, and it i~; printed at page 63 of the Paper Book. The correctness of the translation is admitted.\n\nIt was executed by Narsinga Rao of the first branch in favour of Krishna Rao of the last branch, predecessor-in-title of defendants 1 to 3.\n\nAfter reciting that Krishna Rao was entitled to a one-third share in the income appertaining to the Deshmuki rent of the family at Peta Vclapur Mahal, it proceeds to say,\n\n\" ........ In lieu of the land of that Mahal and in respect of the cash aliowance of the Haqdari rights we have given to you for a 1/3 share of land of this Mahal the following lands from the village of Sangam which is continued with us by Vadilki right (the right of Primogeniture)\".\n\nThe deed proceeds to set out the items by areas, assessment, and boundaries, and then goes on :\n\n\"In all 6 numbers have been given by us to you in lieu of your entire income from the said Mahal. Now, five and half Pavs out of the said land are in your 'Vahiwat' at present and the remaining land was to have been given over to your vahiwat, but we having formerly mortgaged the said village to Ramch:mdra Pandurang Deshpande, 5 'Pavs' of land is not in your Vahiwat this day. Hence on the expiry of 6 years, the period of the mortgage, you may carry on the entire Vahiwat of the land passed in your favour in writing as aforesaid without any hindrance. We have no claim of inheritance left on the aforesaid land\".\n\nThe 'deed concludes with a provision made for the residence of the donee in an open space in the same village. It further states :\n\n\" ...... There are four shops and a wada at the; Kasha of Velapur, and a one-third share thereof has beeo allotted to your share over which we have no\n\nDajisa.\\eb Mane and others\n\nSho.nkar Rao V it/; aE Rao Man;\n\nand anotlzer\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi)'ar ].\n\nDajisaMJJ Mane\n\nondo hers\n\nSJrankar Rtw V it Ital Rao M, ne\n\nand anot .. er\n\nclaim of inheritance left\".\n\nIt is obvious from this document that the one-third share of Krishna Rao's branch in the Peta Velapm Mahal properties was retained by Narasinga Rao and that in lieu thereof Krishna Rao was given six items of the Sangam properties, the whole of which could not then and there be given over into his possession and management as there was a usufructuary mortgage over a portion of the lands which was to expire after the lapse of six years from that date. The lands referred to as mortgaged are the Sangam lands and not the Peta V elapur Mahal lands as wroPgly assumed by the High Court. There is absolutely nothing said about the properties being given for maintenance to Krishna Rao. On the other hand, in two places we find that any right to inheritance was given up. In fact, this case of the plaintiff was given up before the trial Judge. It is true that there was an exchange of properties, but there is nothing to warrant the view of the learned Judges. that it was provisional or conditional, and that the Sangam lands were to be returned when the Velapur Mahal properties went into the posse:ssion and management of Krishna Rao's branch.\n\nTo say such an arrangement was implied is to ignore the plain terms of the deed.\n\n The properties now in dispute are the items covered by the deed. They did not form the subject-matter of the two previous litigations. Since 1867, the date of Exhibit No. 35 they have always been in the possession of the defendants' branch as owners. 1t must also be remembered that the earlier suits of 1925 and 1936 proceeded on the basis that the defendants' branch was the heir to the properties left by the deceased, Y eshwant Rao.\n\nThere is no other question which arises for discussion or decision. It follows that the trial Judge was right in hok!ing that the plaintiff's claim to recover possession of the suit properties covered by the deed of 1867 was entirely baseless. The decree of the High Court is reversed and that of the trial Judge is restored with costs throughout payable by the plaintiff In the defendants.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "DAJISAHEB MANE AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAJISAHEB MANE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHANKAR RAO VITHAL RAO MANE\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHANKAR RAO VITHAL RAO MANE AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 169, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "iMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 218, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 133 and 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243, "end_char": 260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 470, "end_char": 483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20,000--Reversed by the High Court on 8-11-1949-High Court g•anted 'leave to appeal on 1-10-1951-Appeal to the Supreme Court -Whether competent-Word \"exercisable\" in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525, "end_char": 533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal to the Supreme Court_ was from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for possession of certain im movable properties."}}, {"text": "20-12-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 20-12-1946, the value of properties being found to be over Rs."}}, {"text": "8th November 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 894, "end_char": 911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff's claim was passed on the 8th November 1949."}}, {"text": "6-1-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6-1-1950 which was granted on 1-10-1951."}}, {"text": "1-10-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1029, "end_char": 1038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 6-1-1950 which was granted on 1-10-1951."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1092, "end_char": 1100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1204, "end_char": 1212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Suprerae Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1671, "end_char": 1685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also that the appeal was competent to the Suprerae Court by virtue of the provisions of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1717, "end_char": 1725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2232, "end_char": 2240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2641, "end_char": 2652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Court and that it could not be said to be pending until the appeal is declared admitted under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2963, "end_char": 2977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (R. A.\n\nGovind, with him) for the appelbnts."}}, {"text": "R. A.\n\nGovind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3007, "end_char": 3020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (R. A.\n\nGovind, with him) for the appelbnts."}}, {"text": "J B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3052, "end_char": 3067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J B. Dadachanji, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain, for respondents."}}, {"text": "Narain Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3073, "end_char": 3086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J B. Dadachanji, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain, for respondents."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3091, "end_char": 3106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J B. Dadachanji, Sri Narain Andley and Rajinder Narain, for respondents."}}, {"text": "CttANDRASEKH.~RA ArYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3190, "end_char": 3212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by\n\nCttANDRASEKH.~RA ArYAR J.-This appeal is from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for the possession of certain immovable proper-· ties which w<ts dismissed hv the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sholapur."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sholapur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3372, "end_char": 3410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by\n\nCttANDRASEKH.~RA ArYAR J.-This appeal is from a reversing decree of the Bombay High Court in a suit for the possession of certain immovable proper-· ties which w<ts dismissed hv the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sholapur."}}, {"text": "8-11-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3585, "end_char": 3594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiff's claim was on 8-11-1949."}}, {"text": "22-1-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3873, "end_char": 3882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22-1-1951 the lower court ascertained the value as stated above."}}, {"text": "Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4157, "end_char": 4167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I before us hy Mr. Dadachanji, learned counsel for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Dajisa!1Cb. Mav", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4308, "end_char": 4323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His main contention was tht article LB of the\n\nin--14 S.C. fndia/59\n\nDajisa!1Cb."}}, {"text": "Rao Vithal RQ() Mane", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mav\n\nand others v.\n\nShtJ11kar Rao Vithal RQ() Mane\n\nand another\n\nDaJisaheb Man~\n\nand othtrs\n\nShanhir Rao V ithal Rao Mane\n\nand arwther\n\nChant/rasekharo\n\nAryar ]."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4990, "end_char": 4995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution establishing the Supreme Court as the final appeilate authority for India came into force on 26-1-195()."}}, {"text": "26-1-195", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5015, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution establishing the Supreme Court as the final appeilate authority for India came into force on 26-1-195()."}}, {"text": "Article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5638, "end_char": 5649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5678, "end_char": 5688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 135 is in these terms:-\n\n\"Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to which the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do not apply if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matter were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing la\\Vn."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5828, "end_char": 5839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5843, "end_char": 5854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6044, "end_char": 6055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7043, "end_char": 7054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8032, "end_char": 8043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8362, "end_char": 8391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dajisal.eb Mane", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8606, "end_char": 8621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is sufficient to pohr out that as the law then stood, the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals\n\n1955'\n\nDajisal.eb Mane and ot.\\ers\n\nShankar Rao V iti; al Rao Mmie\n\nand another\n\nChandrasek.\\ara\n\nA!>'ar J.\n\nDajisa'uh Mane\n\nand ot'; ers\n\nShankar Rao Vithal Rao Mane\n\nand anot, ler\n\nr: ;; andrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nfrom a decree of a High Court which reverse<l the lower court's <lecree as re.!,!ards properties of the value of more than Rs."}}, {"text": "Chandrasek.\\ara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8680, "end_char": 8695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is sufficient to pohr out that as the law then stood, the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals\n\n1955'\n\nDajisal.eb Mane and ot.\\ers\n\nShankar Rao V iti; al Rao Mmie\n\nand another\n\nChandrasek.\\ara\n\nA!>'ar J.\n\nDajisa'uh Mane\n\nand ot'; ers\n\nShankar Rao Vithal Rao Mane\n\nand anot, ler\n\nr: ;; andrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nfrom a decree of a High Court which reverse<l the lower court's <lecree as re.!,!ards properties of the value of more than Rs.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasek.\\ara"}}, {"text": "Dajisa'uh Mane", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8708, "end_char": 8722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is sufficient to pohr out that as the law then stood, the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals\n\n1955'\n\nDajisal.eb Mane and ot.\\ers\n\nShankar Rao V iti; al Rao Mmie\n\nand another\n\nChandrasek.\\ara\n\nA!>'ar J.\n\nDajisa'uh Mane\n\nand ot'; ers\n\nShankar Rao Vithal Rao Mane\n\nand anot, ler\n\nr: ;; andrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nfrom a decree of a High Court which reverse<l the lower court's <lecree as re.!,!ards properties of the value of more than Rs."}}, {"text": "andrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8788, "end_char": 8800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is sufficient to pohr out that as the law then stood, the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals\n\n1955'\n\nDajisal.eb Mane and ot.\\ers\n\nShankar Rao V iti; al Rao Mmie\n\nand another\n\nChandrasek.\\ara\n\nA!>'ar J.\n\nDajisa'uh Mane\n\nand ot'; ers\n\nShankar Rao Vithal Rao Mane\n\nand anot, ler\n\nr: ;; andrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nfrom a decree of a High Court which reverse<l the lower court's <lecree as re.!,!ards properties of the value of more than Rs.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasek.\\ara"}}, {"text": "Aryar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8802, "end_char": 8807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is sufficient to pohr out that as the law then stood, the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals\n\n1955'\n\nDajisal.eb Mane and ot.\\ers\n\nShankar Rao V iti; al Rao Mmie\n\nand another\n\nChandrasek.\\ara\n\nA!>'ar J.\n\nDajisa'uh Mane\n\nand ot'; ers\n\nShankar Rao Vithal Rao Mane\n\nand anot, ler\n\nr: ;; andrasekhara\n\nAryar J.\n\nfrom a decree of a High Court which reverse<l the lower court's <lecree as re.!,!ards properties of the value of more than Rs."}}, {"text": "article 374(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9509, "end_char": 9523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9576, "end_char": 9587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10259, "end_char": 10279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11038, "end_char": 11055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in G1111dapuneedi Tleeranna and three others v. Gundapuneedi China Tl enkanna and seven\n\nothers( 1 ) was a case where the decree of the High Court\n\nmd the application for leave to appeal were both after the Constitution came into force."}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11356, "end_char": 11367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Yeshwant Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11874, "end_char": 11886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Js were held by the eldest branch represented by Yeshwant Rao (son of Panduranga Rao) bv right of lineal pnmogeniture.", "canonical_name": "Y eshwant Rao"}}, {"text": "Panduranga Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11895, "end_char": 11909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Js were held by the eldest branch represented by Yeshwant Rao (son of Panduranga Rao) bv right of lineal pnmogeniture."}}, {"text": "Tarabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11976, "end_char": 11983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Yeshwant Rao and hi~ widow Tarabai died in November 1924, these properties went to the plaintiff Shankar Rao's branch as the next senior in line."}}, {"text": "Shankar Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12046, "end_char": 12057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Yeshwant Rao and hi~ widow Tarabai died in November 1924, these properties went to the plaintiff Shankar Rao's branch as the next senior in line.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Rao"}}, {"text": "Narsinga R", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12158, "end_char": 12168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Peta Velapur Mahal properties were held in three shares by Narsinga R:io, Vithal Rao and Krishna Rao, the fourth brother Shyama Rao having no right as he was insane.", "canonical_name": "Narasinga Rao"}}, {"text": "Vithal Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12173, "end_char": 12183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Peta Velapur Mahal properties were held in three shares by Narsinga R:io, Vithal Rao and Krishna Rao, the fourth brother Shyama Rao having no right as he was insane."}}, {"text": "Krishna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12188, "end_char": 12199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Peta Velapur Mahal properties were held in three shares by Narsinga R:io, Vithal Rao and Krishna Rao, the fourth brother Shyama Rao having no right as he was insane."}}, {"text": "Shyama Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12220, "end_char": 12230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Peta Velapur Mahal properties were held in three shares by Narsinga R:io, Vithal Rao and Krishna Rao, the fourth brother Shyama Rao having no right as he was insane."}}, {"text": "Lakshman Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12348, "end_char": 12360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Yeshwant Rao's death, Lakshman Rao, the grandfather of defendants 1 and 2, filed a suit No."}}, {"text": "Sangam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12486, "end_char": 12492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1064 of 1925 for a declaration that he was the nearest heir to the Sangam properties, the Peta Velapur Mahal properties and the cash income appertaining to the inamdar's right in Sangam."}}, {"text": "Shankar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12975, "end_char": 12982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He got a declaratory decree that he was the nearest heir of th~ dee.eased Yeshwant Rao, and had a right in such capacity to take possession of all the propLrtie~, excluding the inam income and the Sangam laPLls specified in Schedule B of the decree and a small item of prooertv 5ituated in the same vi, llage and specified in Schedule G. As regards the excluded items, Shankar\n\n(1) I.L.R.(r953] Mad.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Rao"}}, {"text": "Sfignkar Rao Vitf", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13044, "end_char": 13061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I07J.\n\nDajisa'ieb Mmu\n\nand ot1; m v.\n\nSfignkar Rao Vitf, al Rao M1J11t\n\nand anothc\n\nChand1aukhara\n\nA&ar J.\n\nDaJisaUb Ma•\n\nand ot'.ers\n\nShar.kar Ran Vit'ial Rao Mane\n\nand anothtt\n\nChanttrastkhara\n\nAo/ar J.\n\nRao, the first defendant, (plaintiff in the present suit) was held to be the heir."}}, {"text": "Narayana Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13587, "end_char": 13599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the decree was only a declaratory decree, a fresh suit had to be filed by Narayana Rao, son of Lakshman Rao, to recover possession of the Peta V elapur Mahal properties at Mahalung, Lavang and Wafegaon."}}, {"text": "Lavang", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13695, "end_char": 13701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the decree was only a declaratory decree, a fresh suit had to be filed by Narayana Rao, son of Lakshman Rao, to recover possession of the Peta V elapur Mahal properties at Mahalung, Lavang and Wafegaon."}}, {"text": "Wafegaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13706, "end_char": 13714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the decree was only a declaratory decree, a fresh suit had to be filed by Narayana Rao, son of Lakshman Rao, to recover possession of the Peta V elapur Mahal properties at Mahalung, Lavang and Wafegaon."}}, {"text": "Shankar Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14560, "end_char": 14571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After possession was taken of the V elapur Mahal properties under the decree, the plaintiff, Shankar Rao, brought this suit to recover from defendants 1 and 2 the Sangam lands to which he referred in his earlier written statement alleging that they were gi\\cn to their grandfather in lieu of maintenance.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Rao"}}, {"text": "Narsinga Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15853, "end_char": 15865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was executed by Narsinga Rao of the first branch in favour of Krishna Rao of the last branch, predecessor-in-title of defendants 1 to 3.", "canonical_name": "Narasinga Rao"}}, {"text": "Ramch:mdra Pandurang Deshpande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16827, "end_char": 16857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, five and half Pavs out of the said land are in your 'Vahiwat' at present and the remaining land was to have been given over to your vahiwat, but we having formerly mortgaged the said village to Ramch:mdra Pandurang Deshpande, 5 'Pavs' of land is not in your Vahiwat this day."}}, {"text": "Velapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17338, "end_char": 17345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further states :\n\n\" ...... There are four shops and a wada at the; Kasha of Velapur, and a one-third share thereof has beeo allotted to your share over which we have no\n\nDajisa.\\eb Mane and others\n\nSho.nkar Rao V it/; aE Rao Man;\n\nand anotlzer\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi)'ar ]."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17507, "end_char": 17521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further states :\n\n\" ...... There are four shops and a wada at the; Kasha of Velapur, and a one-third share thereof has beeo allotted to your share over which we have no\n\nDajisa.\\eb Mane and others\n\nSho.nkar Rao V it/; aE Rao Man;\n\nand anotlzer\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi)'ar ].", "canonical_name": "Chandrasek.\\ara"}}, {"text": "Narasinga Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17774, "end_char": 17787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is obvious from this document that the one-third share of Krishna Rao's branch in the Peta Velapm Mahal properties was retained by Narasinga Rao and that in lieu thereof Krishna Rao was given six items of the Sangam properties, the whole of which could not then and there be given over into his possession and management as there was a usufructuary mortgage over a portion of the lands which was to expire after the lapse of six years from that date.", "canonical_name": "Narasinga Rao"}}, {"text": "Peta V elapur Mahal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18162, "end_char": 18181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands referred to as mortgaged are the Sangam lands and not the Peta V elapur Mahal lands as wroPgly assumed by the High Court."}}, {"text": "Y eshwant Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19291, "end_char": 19304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1t must also be remembered that the earlier suits of 1925 and 1936 proceeded on the basis that the defendants' branch was the heir to the properties left by the deceased, Y eshwant Rao.", "canonical_name": "Y eshwant Rao"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_881_887_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 88l\n\nTOPANDAS\n\nti.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF BOMBAY\n\n[BttAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P.\n\nSINHA JJ.]\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 120-A, 120-B-Crimin, i/ conspiracy-Two or more persons must be parties thereto--Onc person alone cannot be held guilty-If other alleged co-conspirators .are acquitted of the charge.\n\nAccording to the definition of criminal conspiracy in s. 120-A .of the Indian Penal Code two or more persons must be parties to such an agreement and one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy for the simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself.\n\nWhere, therefore, 4 named individuals as in the present case were charged with having committed an offence under s. 120-B, I.P.C. and three out of those four were acquitted of the charge, the fourth\n\naccused could not be held guilty of the offence of criminal conspir- \"1cy.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1955.\n\nOn Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 8ih October 1954 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1954 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 6th January 1954 of the Court of the 4th Presidency Magistrate, Bombay in Cases Nos. 639-40/P-1955.\n\nH. f. Umrigar, f. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain for the appellant.\n\nPorus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale for the respon- .dent.\n\n1955. October 14. The Judgment of the Court was .delivered by '\n\nBHAGWATI J.-The accused No. 1, the Appellant before us, and accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were charged that they, at Bombay, between about June 1950 and November 1950, were parties to a criminal conspiracy hy agreeing to do certain illegal acts, to wit: Firstly,\n\nTopanda,\n\n'Th~ State of Bombay\n\nBba, gr~; afi].\n\nthat they used as genuine forged bills of entry which included bills of entry Exhibit Z; Secondly, that they cheated the Deputv Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, by fraudulently and dishonestly inducing him to deliver to the firm of J. Sobhraj & Co., :m import licence bearing No. 248189/48 to import cycles from United Kingdom of the value of Rs. 1,98960; Thirdly, that they cheated the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, by falsely and dishonestly inducing him to deliver to the firm of J. Soblm; & Co.; an import licence bearing No. 203056/48 to impo:t watches from ' Switzerland of the value of Rs. 3,45,325; and Fourthly, that they cheated the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, by fraudulently and dishonestly inducing him to deliYer to the firm of J. Sobhraj & Co., an import licence bearing No. 250288/48 to import artificial silk piece goods from Switzerland of the value of Rs. 12,11,829; and the abovesaid illegal acts were done in purouance of the said agreement and that they thereby committed an offence punishable under ection 120-B of the Inrfon Penal Code. There were also charges against all the accused under section 471 read with section 465 and section 34 and also under section 420 read witli section 34 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of each of the three illegal acts aforesaid.\n\nThe learned Presidency Magistrate. 2ird Court.\n\nEsplamde, Bombav, tried all the accused for the said offences and acquitted all of them. The State of Bombay. thereupon took an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombav, and the High Court reversed the acquittal of accused No. 1 and held him guilty of all the offences with which he had been charged including the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The acquittal of accused 2, 3 and 4 was confirmed .•\n\nThe High Court, even though it acquitted accused 2, 3 and 4 of the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, was of the opinion that the deed of assignment put forward by the accused No. 1 in his defence was a false and fabricated document and the said document along with its accompaniments was\n\nforged or was got forged by or with th~ knowledge or connivance of the accused No. 1 and his co-conspimtors and it was impossible to believe that this conspiracy carried out with such meticulous care could be the work of only accused No. 1.\n\nThere was no evidence on the record to warrant any inference that the accused No. 1 was acting in the matter in collaboration with any other co-conspirators and the only evidence was in regard to the various acts alleged to have been done by accused 2, 3 and 4 in the matter of the conspiracy and the furtherance of the objects thereof. while considering the question of sentence to be passed on the accused No. 1 who, in spite of the circumstances aforesaid. was convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, the High Court obseryed that \"the conspirators, whoever they were, had shown considerable ingenuity and daring in carrying out the object of the conspiracy .and that it felt no hesitation in coming to the conclmion that it was not straitened circumstances or financial difficulties which were the basis of the conspiracy but it was the greed for money on such a large scale as could never be regarded as an extenuating circumstance\".\n\nIt, therefore, directed that the accused No. 1 should undergo rigorous imprisonment for 18 months for the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe application for \\eaye to appeal to this Court filed by accused No. 1 was rejected by the High Court.\n\nThe accmed No. 1 thereupon applied for and obtined\n\nspecial 11.'.ave to appeal against the decision of the High Court. The special leaYe was, however, limited to the question of law, whether the com1ct10n under section 120-B is maintainable in view of the fact that the other alleged conspirators had been acquitted.\n\nThe charge as framed under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was levelled against 4 named indi.· viduals, the accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. It was not a charge aainst them and other persons unknown wit] 1 the resu1t that if accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that charge, there remained only accused No. l and\n\nTopandas v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J•\n\n1955 ropanJ.,,\n\nThe Stall of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nthe question, therefore, arises for our consideration whether, under the circumstances, the accused No. 1 could be convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nCriminal Conspiracy has been defined in section 120-A of the Indian Penal Code :-\"When two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done (i) an illegal act, or (ii) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal con-- spiracy\".\n\nBy the terms of the definition itself there ought to be two or more persons who must be parties to such an agreement and it is trite to say that one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy for the simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself. If, therefore, 4 named individuals were charged with having committed the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, and if three out nf these 4 were acquitted of the charge, the remaining accused, who was the accused No. 1 in the case before us, could never be held guilty of the offence of criminal conspiracy.\n\nIf authoritv for the above proposition were needed, it is to be found in Archbold's Criminal Pleading, faidence and Practice, 33rd edition, page 201, paragraph 361 :-\n\n\"Where several prisoners are included in the same irnlictment, the jury may find one guilty and ocquit the others, and. vice versa.\n\nBut if several are indicted for a riot, and the jury acquit all but two, they must acquit those two also, unless it is charged in the indictment, and proved, that they committed the riot together with some other person not tried upon that indictment. 2 Hawk. c. 47. s. 8. And, if upon an indictment for a conspiracy, the jury acquit all the prisoners but one, they must acquit that one also, unless it is charrred in the indictment, and proved, that he conspired with some other person not tried upon that indictment. 2 Hawk. c. 47. s. 8; 3. Chit. Cr. L., (2nd ed.) 1141; R. v. Thompson, 16 Q.B.D. 832; R. v.\n\nManning, 12 Q.B.D. 241; R. v. Plummer r1902] 2 K.B. 339\". .\n\nTlie Ki11v: v. Plummer ([19021 2 K.B. 339) which is\n\ncited in support of this proposition was a case in which, on a trial of indictment charging three persons jointly with conspiring together, one person had pleaded guilty and a judgment passed against him, and the other two were acquitted. It was held that\n\n1 he judgment passed against one who had pleaded guilty was baci and could not stand.\n\nLord f ustice Wright observed at page 343 :-\n\n\"Then~ is much authority to the effect that, if il1e appellant had pleaded not guilty to the charge of conspiracy. and the trial of all three defendants together had proceeded on that charge, and had resulted in the conviction of the appellant and the acquittal of the only alleged co-conspirators, no judgment could have been passed on the appellant, because the verdict must have been regarded as repugnant in finding that there was a criminal agreement between the appellant and the others and none between them and him: see Harrison\n\nv. Errington (Popham, 202), where upon an indictment of three for riot two were found not guilty and one guilty, and upon error brought it was he1d a \"void verdict'', and said to be \"like. to the case in 11 Hen. 4 c. 2, conspiracy against two, and only one of them is found guilty, it is void, for one alone cannot conspire\".\"\n\nLord Justice Bruce at page 347 quoted with approval the statement in the Chitty's Criminal Law, 2nd ed., V oL III, page 1141 :-\n\n\"And it is holden that if all the defendants mentioned in the indictment, except one, are acquitted, and it is not stated as a conspiracy with certain persons unknown, the conviction of the single defendant will be invalid, and no judgment can be passed upon l:iim\".\n\nThe following observation~ made by Lord jGstice Jruce ate apposite in the context before m :-\n\n\"Thr noint of the passage turns upon the circumstance that the defendants are included in the same\n\nindi-:tment, and I think it logically follows from the naiurc of the offence of conspiracy that, where two or mnre rersons are charged in the same indictment with cornpiracy with one another, and the indictment\n\nTopa11dt1.<\n\nT/:e State of\n\nBomba_v •\n\nBhagwati],\n\nTopo.\"ldas\n\n1he State of Bombay\n\nBhrzgwati ].\n\ncontains no charge of their conspiring with other persons not named in the indictment, then, if all but one of the persons named in the indictment are acquitted, no valid judgment can be passed upon the one remaining person, whether he has been convicted by the verdict of a jury or upon his own confession, because, as the record of conviction can only be made up in the terms of the indictment, it would be inconsistent and contradictory and so bad on its face.\n\nThe gist of the crime of conspiracy is that two or more persons did combine, confederate, and agree together to carry out the object of the conspiracy\".\n\nThis position has also been accepted in India. In Gulab Singh v. The Emperor (A.LR. 1916 All. 141) Justice Knox followed the case of The King v. Plummer, supra, and held that \"it is necessary in a prosecution for conspiracy to prove that there were two or more persons agreeing for the purpose of conspiracy\" and that \"there could not be a conspiracy of one\".\n\nTo similar effect was the judgment in King-Emperor\n\nv. Osman Sardar (A.LR. 1924 Cal. 809) where Chief Ju<tice Sanderson observed that \"the gist of an offence under section 120-B was an alleged agreement between the two accused and when the jury found that one of them was not a party to the agreement and acquitted him of that charge, it followed as a matter of course that the other accused could not be convicted of that charge. The assent of both of them\n\n~'as necessary to constitute tl1c agreement which was the basis of the charge\".\n\nRatanlal in his Law of Crimes, 18th ed., page 270, has summarised the position as it emerges from the above two cases in the manner following :--\n\n\"Where, therefore, three persons were charged with having entered into a conspiracy, and two of them were acquitted, the third person could not be convicted of conspiracy whether the conviction be upon the verdict of a jury or upon his own confes- . ,, s1on .\n\nThe position in law is, therefore, clear that on the charge as it was framed against the accused Nos. l, 2, 3 and 4 in this case, the accused No. 1 could not\n\nbe convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code when his alleged co-conspirators accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that offence.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the conviction of the acoised No. 1 of the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was clearly illegal. The appeal of the accused No. 1 will, therefore, be allowed to the extent that his conviction under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code ::md the sentence of rigorous impri,; onmeut of l 8 months awanletl to him as the result thereof would be quashed. 'Ve are not concerned here with th~ conviction of the accused No. 1 of the offences under section 471 read with section 465 and also his conv; ction for each of the three offences under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the concurrent sen<ences of rigorous imprisonment for one year in respect of each of them passed by the lower Courts upon him in regard to the same.\n\nThese convictions and sentences will of course stand.\n\nPURSHOTTAM GOVINDJI HALAI v.\n\nSf-LS.EE R M. DESAI. ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR\n\nOF BOMBAY & OTHERS. f S. R.\n\nDAs, AcTING C.J.. Vrvr,1\"' BosE,\n\nDAS.\n\nJ,1n1t brA:vr and\n\nCHANDRM'EKHARA\n\nJAGANNADHA-\n\nArYAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 13(1 ), 14, 21-l ndian Income T 11x Act 1922 ,(Act XI of 192:!), s. 46(2)-Whether offends Arts. 13(1), 14 & 21 of the Constitutio11-Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876 (Boml.1y\n\nAct !! of 1876)-IV!ietlier offends Art. 14 of the Co11stitutio11.\n\nThe assessee carrying on business in the City of Bombav was\n\nascsscd to income-tax for the years 1943-44 to 1947-48 and 1951-52 by the Income-tax Officer C-1 \\Vard Bombay.\n\nAs the assessee did not pay the income-tax due the Income-tax Officer issued in April 1951 to the Additional Collector of Bombay a recovery certificate under s. 46(2) nf the Indian Income tax Act, 1922.\n\nIn February 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand an.cl as no payment was made he attached the good will and tenancy rights of the assessee's premises by a warrant of attachment dated 24th March 1954.\n\nTopandas\n\nV• The Stal' of\n\nBombay\n\nBha; wali ].\n\nOctober i-f.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "88l\n\nTOPANDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TOPANDAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ST ATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 422, "end_char": 439, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 741, "end_char": 747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "H. f. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1263, "end_char": 1276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. f. Umrigar, f. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "f. B.\n\nDadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1278, "end_char": 1295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. f. Umrigar, f. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1300, "end_char": 1315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. f. Umrigar, f. B.\n\nDadachanji and Rajinder Narain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1336, "end_char": 1350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale for the respon- .dent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1355, "end_char": 1368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale for the respon- .dent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1458, "end_char": 1469, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2081, "end_char": 2095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "248189/48 to import cycles from United Kingdom of the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2462, "end_char": 2468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,45,325; and Fourthly, that they cheated the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, by fraudulently and dishonestly inducing him to deliYer to the firm of J. Sobhraj & Co., an import licence bearing No."}}, {"text": "J. Sobhraj & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2541, "end_char": 2557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,45,325; and Fourthly, that they cheated the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports, Bombay, by fraudulently and dishonestly inducing him to deliYer to the firm of J. Sobhraj & Co., an import licence bearing No."}}, {"text": "Switzerland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2642, "end_char": 2653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "250288/48 to import artificial silk piece goods from Switzerland of the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2848, "end_char": 2858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2914, "end_char": 2925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2936, "end_char": 2947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2952, "end_char": 2962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2978, "end_char": 2989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3019, "end_char": 3036, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Esplamde", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3142, "end_char": 3150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Esplamde, Bombav, tried all the accused for the said offences and acquitted all of them."}}, {"text": "Bombav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Esplamde, Bombav, tried all the accused for the said offences and acquitted all of them."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3235, "end_char": 3250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombav", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3284, "end_char": 3318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "thereupon took an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombav, and the High Court reversed the acquittal of accused No."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3478, "end_char": 3489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3499, "end_char": 3516, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3652, "end_char": 3663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3690, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4617, "end_char": 4628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4655, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5233, "end_char": 5250, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5570, "end_char": 5581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5704, "end_char": 5715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5742, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6010, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l and\n\nTopandas v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J•\n\n1955 ropanJ.,,\n\nThe Stall of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nthe question, therefore, arises for our consideration whether, under the circumstances, the accused No."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6027, "end_char": 6035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l and\n\nTopandas v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J•\n\n1955 ropanJ.,,\n\nThe Stall of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nthe question, therefore, arises for our consideration whether, under the circumstances, the accused No.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI J."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6236, "end_char": 6247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6257, "end_char": 6274, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6338, "end_char": 6355, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6909, "end_char": 6920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6930, "end_char": 6947, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Archbold", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7219, "end_char": 7227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If authoritv for the above proposition were needed, it is to be found in Archbold's Criminal Pleading, faidence and Practice, 33rd edition, page 201, paragraph 361 :-\n\n\"Where several prisoners are included in the same irnlictment, the jury may find one guilty and ocquit the others, and."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7713, "end_char": 7717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7980, "end_char": 7984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bruce", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9440, "end_char": 9445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Justice Bruce at page 347 quoted with approval the statement in the Chitty's Criminal Law, 2nd ed.,"}}, {"text": "jGstice Jruce", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following observation~ made by Lord jGstice Jruce ate apposite in the context before m :-\n\n\"Thr noint of the passage turns upon the circumstance that the defendants are included in the same\n\nindi-:tment, and I think it logically follows from the naiurc of the offence of conspiracy that, where two or mnre rersons are charged in the same indictment with cornpiracy with one another, and the indictment\n\nTopa11dt1."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10988, "end_char": 10993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position has also been accepted in India."}}, {"text": "Knox", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11055, "end_char": 11059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "141) Justice Knox followed the case of The King v. Plummer, supra, and held that \"it is necessary in a prosecution for conspiracy to prove that there were two or more persons agreeing for the purpose of conspiracy\" and that \"there could not be a conspiracy of one\"."}}, {"text": "Sanderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11419, "end_char": 11428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "809) where Chief Ju<tice Sanderson observed that \"the gist of an offence under section 120-B was an alleged agreement between the two accused and when the jury found that one of them was not a party to the agreement and acquitted him of that charge, it followed as a matter of course that the other accused could not be convicted of that charge."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11473, "end_char": 11484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ratanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11849, "end_char": 11857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ratanlal in his Law of Crimes, 18th ed.,"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12249, "end_char": 12251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12450, "end_char": 12461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12471, "end_char": 12488, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12657, "end_char": 12668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12678, "end_char": 12695, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12817, "end_char": 12828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12838, "end_char": 12855, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13061, "end_char": 13072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13083, "end_char": 13094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13157, "end_char": 13168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13176, "end_char": 13193, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13605, "end_char": 13626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 13(1 ), 14, 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13628, "end_char": 13648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13699, "end_char": 13707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 13(1), 14 & 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13724, "end_char": 13744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13766, "end_char": 13794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13840, "end_char": 13847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876", "statute": "Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876"}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14203, "end_char": 14211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876", "statute": "Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876"}}, {"text": "Indian Income tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14219, "end_char": 14246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Stal' of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14486, "end_char": 14502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Topandas\n\nV• The Stal' of\n\nBombay\n\nBha; wali ]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_887_906_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 887\n\nbe convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code when his alleged co-conspirators accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that offence.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the conviction of the acoised No. 1 of the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was clearly illegal. The appeal of the accused No. 1 will, therefore, be allowed to the extent that his conviction under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code ::md the sentence of rigorous impri,; onmeut of l 8 months awanletl to him as the result thereof would be quashed. 'Ve are not concerned here with th~ conviction of the accused No. 1 of the offences under section 471 read with section 465 and also his conv; ction for each of the three offences under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the concurrent sen<ences of rigorous imprisonment for one year in respect of each of them passed by the lower Courts upon him in regard to the same.\n\nThese convictions and sentences will of course stand.\n\nPURSHOTTAM GOVINDJI HALAI v.\n\nSf-LS.EE R M. DESAI. ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR\n\nOF BOMBAY & OTHERS. f S. R.\n\nDAs, AcTING C.J.. Vrvr,1\"' BosE,\n\nDAS.\n\nJ,1n1t brA:vr and\n\nCHANDRM'EKHARA\n\nJAGANNADHA-\n\nArYAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 13(1 ), 14, 21-l ndian Income T 11x Act 1922 ,(Act XI of 192:!), s. 46(2)-Whether offends Arts. 13(1), 14 & 21 of the Constitutio11-Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876 (Boml.1y\n\nAct !! of 1876)-IV!ietlier offends Art. 14 of the Co11stitutio11.\n\nThe assessee carrying on business in the City of Bombav was\n\nascsscd to income-tax for the years 1943-44 to 1947-48 and 1951-52 by the Income-tax Officer C-1 \\Vard Bombay.\n\nAs the assessee did not pay the income-tax due the Income-tax Officer issued in April 1951 to the Additional Collector of Bombay a recovery certificate under s. 46(2) nf the Indian Income tax Act, 1922.\n\nIn February 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand an.cl as no payment was made he attached the good will and tenancy rights of the assessee's premises by a warrant of attachment dated 24th March 1954.\n\nTopandas\n\nV• The Stal' of\n\nBombay\n\nBha; wali ].\n\nOctober i-f.\n\n1!155\n\nPu.rshotlam Govintlji Halai v.\n\nShrtt B.M, Dtjai, A1ditior.al Colh'Clor of Bomba;·\n\nnnd othtrs\n\nA sale was held in February 1955.\n\nThe sale proceeds not being sufficient to satisfy the assessed t.ax the Additional Collector is.c; ued a notice under s. 13 of the Bombay City Land Rc\\enne Act, ] 876 requiring the assessee to appear hcforc him and show cause \\Vhy he should not be apprehended and confined to civil prison in s:lti:, f;1ction of the said certified dernand. In default of as:; csSee's app':\":arance and showing cause a warrant for his arrest was issued u11der s. 13 of the Bombay Act, 11 of 1876 and he was actually arrested on 1st July 1955.\n\nAn application t{) the Bombay High Court tinder Art. 226 of the Constitution for a \\Vrit in the nature of a writ of habca,• corpus having proved unsuccessful, an application un<lr.r .i\\rt. 32 \\Vas filed in the Supren1e Court for the san1e relief. 1\\vn n1ain points urged on behalf of the assessce were ·\n\n(a) that ~. 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act under which the Income-tax Officer' issued the recoYery certificate to the Additional Collector of Bombay \\Vas void, under Art. 13( l) of the Con'; titutiort in that it offended Art. 21 and Art. 14 of the Constitution;\n\n(b) that s. 13 of the Bombay Land Revenue Act, 1876 (llom hay Act II of 1876) under v:hich the warrant of arrest \\Va~ is:iued by the i\\<lditional Collector was void under Art. 13( 1) of the (on stitution as the same was repugnant to Art. 14 of the Con<:1it11tion.\n\n1-leld (as regards a) (i) that there \\Vas no violation ol fur; da n1ental rig-hts under Art. 21 of the Constitution inas1nuch ;.i-; s. 13 of the Bn1bay Act II of 1876 under which warrant of :nrc-.<; t was issued for the recovery of the de1nand certified under s. 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax A.ct constituted a procedure estahlished by l.:nv.\n\nBoth s. 13 of Bombay Act II of 1876 and s. 46 of the ln:!ian fn .. come-tax Act under which action had been taken against th~ assessee were not void and therefore no question of violation of fuildJ- 1ncntal rights under Art. 21 could arise at all;\n\n(ii) the contention that s. 46(2) of the Indian Inc01nc-~.1:-: Act provides for tv.•o <liffeent and alternative 1nethods of recoYcry of the dues and clothes the Collector 'vith the unfettered and unguiJcd power to apply either of the two nlethods inas1nuch a:; it enables the Col1ector at his will to discri1ninate between t\\VO defaulters \"'ho :ire similarly situated and thus viob.tes the equal protection d:1use of the Constitution V.'as \\Vithout force because sub-section (2) of s. 46 does not prescribe t\\Vo different procedures. The proviso enartcd therein does not indicate a ditferent and alternative n1ode of recoYerv of the certified amount of tax but only confers aJtlitonal\n\npo\\ves on the Collector for the better and more effective application of the only 1node of recoYery authorised by the body of sub-ection\n\n(2) of s. 46 and therefore, there was no question of possibility of discrirninarion at. all;\n\n(iii) the further contention tht s. 46(2) of the Indian Jncoine-\n\n1:1-.: Act viOl:i.tes the equal protection clause of the Constitution and\n\nhas thus become void under Art. 14 of the Constitution as s. 46(2) rrquired the Collector, on receipt of the requisite certificate front\n\nZS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 889\n\nthe. Inc9rne-tax Officer, to recover the amount specified in the certificate as if it were an arrear of the land revenue and there are diffuent laws adopted by different States for the recovery of land revenues and thus 1 here is discrimination on the ground that defaulters :ere treated differently in different States is also without force be- <ause discrimination complained of is a permissible classification and does not offend the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. i 4 as the grouping of the income-tax defaulters in separate categories or dasses State-wise is a territoria 1 classi li.ca ti on which is based on an intelligible differentia and there is a reasonable nexus or co-relation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Income-tax Act. The fact that the income-tax demand is a Union public demand makes no difference in the legal position.\n\nHeld, (as regards b) that the contention that s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 became unconstitutional under Art. 13( 1) of the Constitution in that the procedure prescribed by s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 in respect of a defaulter residing in the City of Bombay was harsher and more drastic than the procedure laid down in s. 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 in respect of a defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay was without force because s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 was amended on 8th October 1954 and a new law laid down a law similar to the law laid down by s. 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 and thus the vice of unconstitutionality 'if any' was removed.\n\nState of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh & Another ([1953] S.C.R. 254), Shaik Ali Ahmed v. Collector of Bombay (1.L.R. 1950 Born. 150),\n\nChiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India ( [ 1950] S.C.R. 869) lludhan Chaudhry and other; v. The Swe of Bih1ir ( \\ 19551 1 S.C.R.\n\n1045), Middleton v. Texas Powe,. and Light Company (249 U.S. 152), Bowman v. Lewis (101 U.S. 22; 25 L.Ed. 689), The State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manoha1 Singhji ([ 19541 S.C.R. 996), Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Another ( [ l 955J 2 S.C.R. 589) and Erimmal Ebrahim l-lajee v. The Collector of Malabar ( [ 1954 J 26 l.T.R. 509), referred to.\n\nORIGINAL 1955.\n\nJURISDICTION : Petitior.\n\nNo. 270 of\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a Writ in the nature o~ Habeas Corpus.\n\nHemendra Shah, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the petitioner.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, ( B. Sen and R. H. Dlzebar, with them) for the respondent No. 1. 19-84 S. C. India/59\n\nPursizottan Govindji Halai\n\nShree B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional ( .'r1l4 leclor of Bo1 •b 1y\n\nand oth11r.r\n\nPurshottam Govi1uiji Halai v.\n\nShrte B. M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay and others\n\n1955. October 14.\n\nDAs AcTG. C.J.-This rule was issued on a petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution by one Purshottam Govind ji Halai, a citizen of India, calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued by this Court directing the Superintendent, House of Correction, Byculla, being the second respondent herein, to produce before this Court one Govindji Deoji Halai, the father of the petitioner, who is also a citizen of India, for the purpose of being released forthwith.\n\nThe facts which are not in dispute may be shortly stated as follows.\n\nThe said Govindji Deoji Halai (hereinafter referred to as the \"assessee\") is the sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style of Indestro Sales and Service Co. at No. 50-52, Lahar Chaw! Street in the City of Bombay. Two private limited companies, namely, Indestro India Ltd., and Indestro Eastern Ltd., also carry on business and have their respective offices in the same premises.\n\nThe assessee is said to have some connection with the two companies the nature of which, however, is not quite clear on the record before us. In respect of his own business of Indestro Sales and Service Co., the assessee was assessed to income-tax for the years 1943-44 to 1947-1948 and !951-1952 by the Third Income-tax Officer, C-1 Ward, Bombay, at and for Rs. 40,178-4-0. The assessee not having paid up the assessed amount of tax the Income-tax Officer on the 10th April 1951 issued to the Additional Collector of Bombay, the first respondent herein, a recovery certificate under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act. It may here be mentioned that the Indestro Eastern, Ltd., was also asessed to income-tax at and for Rs. 1,92,000 and a recovery certificate was also issued by the Income-tax Officer to the Additional Collector of Bombay.\n\nOn the !st February, 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand on the assessee for payment of the assessed amount of tax.\n\nNo payment\n\nhaving been made, the Additional Collector attached the goodwill and tenancy rights in the said premises by a warrant of attachment issued on the 24th March\n\n1954. The sale proclamation was issued on the 15th January 1955. The sale was held on the 25th Febru ary 1955 fetching a price of Rs. 33,000 and it wa6 confirmed on the 30th March 1955. The sale proceeds not being sufficient to satisfy the assessed tax the Additional Collector on the 7th June 1955 issued a notice under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876, requiring the assessee to appear before him in person on the 16th June 1955 and show cause why he, the assessee, should not be apprehended and confined to civil jail in satisfaction of the said certified demand. The assessee did not appear in person on the appointed day but on the next day, the 17th June 1955, an Advocate acting on behalf of the assessee wrote a letter to the Additional Collector purporting to show cause why the assessee should not be arrested and sent to the civil jail. The contentions put forward on behalf of the assessee not being considered satisfacto.-y the Additional Collector on the 30th June 1955 issued a warrant for the arrest of the assessee under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876. The assessee was actually arrested on the 1st July 1955.\n\nOn the 8th July 1955 an application was made by the present petitioner to the Bombay High Court under article 226 complaining of the arrest of his father, the assessee, and praying for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus for the production and release of the assessee. A rule was issued by the High Court but eventually on the 24th August 1955 the High Court (Chagla, C.J. and Desai, J.) discharged the rule. No application was made to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court from the decision of that High Court but on the 2nd September 1955 the present petition was filed in this Court under article 32 of the Constitution for the relief hereinbefore menfr>ne<l. On the 7th September 1955 a rule was issued by this Court on that petition subject to the question of its maintainability in view of the dismissal by the\n\n20-84 S.C. India/59 ·\n\nParshouam Gouindji Halai v.\n\nSkree B.M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Cot. lector ef Bombay and others\n\nDas Actg. c .. J.\n\nPurslwttam Govin.dji Halai v.\n\nShree B.M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Collector of Bombay and others\n\nDas Aclg. c. ].\n\nHigh Court of the petition under article 226 from which no leave to appeal to this Court had been sought or obtained. The rule has now come up before us for hearing. In the view we have taken about the merits of the petition it is not necessary for us to consider the question of its maintainability after the dismissal of the petition under article 226 or to make any pronouncement, on this occasion, on the scope and ambit of article 32 of the Constitution in that situation.\n\nThe principal contentions urged by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner are as follows, namely,-\n\n(a) that section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act under which the Income-tax Officer issued the recovery certificate to the Additional Colle.:tor of Bombay is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution in that the same offends article 22(1) and (2), anicle 21 and article 14 of the Constitution;\n\n(b) that section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 under which the warrant of arrest was issued by the Additional Collector is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution as the same is repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nWe proceed to deal with the objections seriatim.\n\nRe. (a) : Section 46 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act which is impugned before us runs as follows :-\n\n\"46. (1) ......................... .\n\n(2) The Income-tax Officer may forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears due from an assessee, and the Collector, on receipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover from such assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue : Provided that without prejudice to any other powers of the Collector in this behalf, he shall for -the purpose of recovering the said. amount have the powers which under the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908 (Act V of 1908), a Civil Court has for the purpose of the recovery of an amount due under a decree.\n\n\" The first objection to. the above sub-section is that it\n\ncontravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (1) and (2) of article 22. In view of the decision of this Court in the State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh & Another( 1 ) this objection has not been pressed before us and we need say no more about it.\n\nThe second objection to section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act is that it is violative of article 21.\n\nArticle 11 gliarantees that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law.\n\nIn this case the assessee has been arrested and is being detained in jail in execution of a warrant of arrest issued under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 for the recovery of the demand certified under section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. As long as those sections stand no complaint can be made of infringement of article 21, for those two sections constitute a procedure established by law. It is only if those sections are void that the question of violation of the fundamental right under article 21 can arise at all.\n\nWe have, therefore, to pass on to the third objection to section 46(2) founded on article 14 of the Constitution which alone has been strenuously insisted on before us by learned counsel for the petitioner.\n\nArticle 14 is invoked in two ways. It is pointed out that the first part of section 46(2) provides that the Collector, on receipt of a certificate from the Income-tax Officer, shall proceed to recover from the defaulting assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue. It is next said that the proviso to the sub-section invests the CollectOi with all the powers a Civil Court has under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of the recovery of the amount due under a decree. It is submitted that section 46(2) provides for two different and alternative methods of recovery of the dues and clothes the Collector with the power to apply either of the two methods, that is to say, he may issue a warrant of arrest under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 against one defaulter and keep him in detention for a period which may\n\nll)[i953] S.C.R. 254.\n\nPurshottam Govindji H alai v.\n\nShree B.M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Collector of Bombay\n\nand othns\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nPurshottam GoVindji Halai v.\n\nSkree B.M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Collector of Bombay\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\nwork out to be much longer than six months and he may proceed against another defaulter under the Code of Civil Procedure and arrest and detain him for the maximum period of six months.\n\nThe powers that are thus conferred on the Collector by section 46(2) are unfettered and unguided and enable the Collector, at his will, to discriminate between two defaulters who are similarly situated and thereQy violate the behests of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. This argument appears to us to be founded on a misapprehension about the true meaning of section 46(2). On a proper reading, that sub-section does not prescribe two alternative modes of procedure at all. All that the sub-section directs the Collector to do is to proceed to recover the cettified amount as if it were an arrear of land revenue, that is to say, he is to adopt the procedure prescribed by the appropriate law of his State for the recovery of land revenue and that in thus proceeding he is, under the proviso, to have all the powers a Ci vii Court has under the Code.\n\nThe sub-sectioh does not prescribe two separate procedures.\n\nThe statement to the contrary in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shaik Ali Ahmed v. Collector of Bombay(' ) does not appear to us to be correct. In our opinion the proviso does not indicate a different and alternative mode of recovery of the certified amount of tax but only confers additional powers on the Collector for the better and more effective application of the only mode of recovery authorised by the body of sub-section (2) of section 46. Viewed in this light, there is no question of the possibility of any discrimination at all. This part of the argument cannot, therefore, be accepted.\n\nThe other way in which the protection of article 14 is invoked is founded on a comparison of the provisions of the different laws adopted by the different States for the recovery of land revenue. Section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act requires the Collector, on receipt of the requisite certificate from the lncometax Officer, to proceed to recover from the assessee the amount specified in the certificate :is if it were an\n\n(1) I.L.R. [1950] Born. 150, 155.\n\narrear of land revenue. This means that the Collector must take such proceedings as he would have done if he were engaged in recovering land revenue. Thus a Collector in the City of Bombay in recovering the certified amount of income-tax must proceed under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 (Bombay Act II of 1876) and arrest and detain him for the period therein mentioned which, prior to the 8th October 1954, might have worked out to a period much longer than six months. On the other hand, the defaulting assessee in all other parts of the\n\nState of Bombay has to be proceeded against under section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bombay Act V of 1879) under which he cannot be detained for more than the period limited by the Code of Civil Procedure for the detention of a judgment-debtor in execution of a decree for an equal amount of money. So, even in one State there were two procedures to which defaulting assessees could be subjected according as they were in or outside the City of Bombay. A Collector in the State of Madras in recovering the certified amount of income-tax has to proceed under section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Madras Act II of 1864). When the Collector finds that the certified amount cannot be liquidated by the sale of the property of the defaulting assessee and the Collector has reason to believe that the defaulter is wilfully withholding payment or has been guilty of fraudulent conduct in order to evade payment, the Collector may, under section 48 of that Act, cause the arrest and imprisonment of the defaulter, not being a female.\n\nBut that section goes on to say that no person shall be imprisoned for a longer period than two years or for a longer period than six months if the arrear does not exceed Rs. 500 or for a longer period than three months if the arrear does not exceed Rs. 50. A Collector in Wes~. Bengal proceeding to recover the certified amount udder the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 (Bengal Act III of 1913) cannot, under section 31 of that Act, direct the detention of the defaulting assessee in prison for more than six months if the amount is more\n\nPurshottam Govindji Halai\n\nV• Shree B.M. ai,\n\nAdditional Coluctor of Bombay\n\nand othlrs\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\nPW'shottam Gvvindji Halai v.\n\nShre B.M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bomba;\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C.J.\n\nthan Rs. 50 or in other cases for more than six weeks.\n\nThe defaulter in the Punjab cannot, under section 69 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Punjab Act XXVII of 1887), be kept in civil jail for more than one month. Section 148 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (U.P. Act III of 1901) limits the period of detention D 15 days and also exempts many persons, e.g. Talukdars and women, from any imprisonment.\n\nThe Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (Reg. I of 1886) does. not insist on imprisonment at all. A cursory perusal ot the provisions of the different Acts referred to above will at once show that in the matter of recoverv of arrears of land revenue the different States have piescribed different machinery, some obviously harsher than others. The argument is that income-tax being a subject with respect to which the Union alone may make law and the recovery of it being the Union responsibility, the machinery for the recovery of income-tax should be framed on a uniform all-India basis, for to the Union all defaulters who may not pay up the Union demand are similarly situated; but the Indian Income-taX Act by section 46(2) authorises the Collectors in different States to adopt machinery which differs from State to State, so that defaulters are treated differently in different States.\n\nThe contention is that section 46(2) which sanctions such discrimination is clearly violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution and has, therefore, become void under article 13( 1 ).\n\nThe learned Attorney-General appearing for the respond<; pts seeks to meet the aforesaid argument in two ways. In the first place, he urges that the impugned sub-section does not by itself make any discrimination.\n\nAll that it says is that the certified ataount of income-tax is to be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue and there its operation ends.\n\nIn recovering the certified demand the Collector has to have recourse to the machinery av:!ilable to him for enforcing a demand for arrears of land revenue hut the provisions of the State laws which prescribe that machinery are not incorporated in section 46(2).\n\nIf the State laws are discriminato:-y that vice cannot be imputed to section 46(2).\n\nThere is good deal to be said on either side. The State laws prescribe the procedure for the recovery of arrears of land revenue only and they are not, in terms and by themselves, concerned at all with the recovery of income-tax demand.\n\nThat machinery is made . available for the purpose of recovery of income-tax by virtue only of section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. In the matter of recovery of income-tax the Collectors adopt the procedure laid down by the State laws, not because the State laws enjoin them to do so but because section 46(2) directs them to do so. In other words, it is section 46(2) which tells the Collectors of Madras to follow the procedure under section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 as if those provisions are set out in the Indian Income-tax Act in extenso and it tells the Collectors of all other States to adopt the procedure prescribed by their own State laws as if the provisions prescribing that procedure were set out in that section. In such a situation it is a plausible argument to say that all the provisions of all the State laws are, mutatis mutandis, to be read into section 46(2) and that, therefore, if there be any vice of discrimination in the State laws that vice cannot but be regarded as having crept into section 46(2). On the other hand, to hold that all the provisions of all the State laws for recovery of arrtars of land revenue have been referentially. incorporated in section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act will lead us into difficulties.\n\nWill the subsequent amendments of the State laws be also incorporated in section 46(2)?\n\nSection 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act havingincorporated the State laws as they then stood, how can any State Legislature which has no power to make any law \"'.ith respect to income-tax alter or amend section 46(2)? Are the State laws as incorporated in section 46(2) at the time it was enacted to be treated as crystallised and to be applied by the Collectors,\n\nalthough the State laws for the recovery of arrears of J,.nJ revenue may be materially altered by sub-\n\nPurshottam Govindji Halai\n\ny.;..· Skree B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Colkctor ef Born/Jay\n\nand others\n\nDtl.fActg.C.J.\n\nPun hot tam 'Govindji Halai ... :'Shrtt B. M. Dtsai,\n\nAdditional Col~ Jectur of Bombay\n\nand others\n\nIJa1 Actg.C.J.\n\nsequent amendment? These are some of the questions which will have to be answered before we can come to a decision on this point. In the view we take of the second part of the learned Attorney- General's argument to which we shall presently refer it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this part of his argument.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General then argues that assmning that section 46(2) by incorporating the cliff- . ereni State laws which are not uniform has become discriminatory such discrimination' is permissible and does not offend the fundamental right guaranteed bv artic!e 14. This argument appears to . us to be well founded.\n\nThe meaning, scope and effect of the article in question have been explained by this Court in a serie~ of decisions beginning with that in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Tlze Union of India(') and ending with that in Budhan Chowdhury and others v •. The State of Bihar(').\n\nThe following passage in the unanimous judgment of the Full Court in the last mentioned case at p. 1049 briefly summarises the true intendment of the constitutional provision :-\n\n\" .......................... It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,\n\n(i) that the classification must. be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the ol:>-\n\nject sought to be achieved by the statute in question.\n\nThe classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is :also well-established by the decisions of this Court\n\n(1) [1950] S. C.R. 869.\n\n(2) [1955] I S. C.R. 1045.\n\nthat article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure\".\n\nThe respective contentions now put forward as to the validity or otherwise of section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act have to be judged in the light of the principles so laid down by the Full Court.\n\nThe Indian Income-tax Act imposes a liability on persons who are amenable to it to pay the tax assessed against them. The assessed amount is a public demand of the Union and has to be recovered, if not voluntarily paid up. The assessees are scattered all over the Union and machinery has to be devised for that purpose. On looking round the Union finds that there is machinery in every State for recovery of land revenues which are State demands.\n\nEach State in its wisdom has devised a machinery which it has considered appropriate and suitable for the recovery of its own public demand.\n\nAs was said by the Supreme Court of America in Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Company(1)-\n\n\"There is a strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds\".\n\nIt is conceded that each State is well within its rights to devise its own machinery for the recovery of its own public demand and that no person belonging to one State can complain that the law of his State is more rigorous than that of the neighbouring State. The reason is obvious, for the people of one State are not similarly situated as people of another State. Their needs, as understood by their own Legislature, are different from those of the people of other States. If in the matter of recovery of arrears of land revenue defaulters of one State cannot complain of denial of equal protection of the laws on the ground of the difference in the modes of recovery prevailing in other States. can it be said to be unreasonable for the Union to adopt, for the recovery of its public demand from defaulters of each State, the same mode of recovery\n\n(I) 249 U.S. 15'!, 157.\n\nl'W'sholta.Nt GJ,111tiji Hal4i\n\n\"' Shtu B. M. Dual,\n\nAdditional Colil{lor ef Bom~\n\na/Id othArs\n\nDas Adg. C. ].\n\nPurshottam Govindji Halai\n\nSkree B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Collector of Bomba.J\n\nand gthlrs\n\nDas Actg.C.J.\n\nof public demand prevailing in that State?\n\nHere the defaulters are classified on a territorial or geographical basis and this basis of classification has precisely the same correlation to the object of the Indian Income-tax Act as it has to the object of the different Public Demands Recovery Acts. The objects of the two Acts in this behalf are in pari materia and the same considerations must apply to both.\n\nPeople of each State .are familiar with and used to the coercive processes which each State finds it necessary to impose on its own people for the recovery of public demand and there can be no hardship and consequently no objection to their being put to the same processes for the recovery of the public demand of the\n\nUnion.\n\nThe grouping of the income-tax Lcfaulters into separate categories or classes Statewise is certainly a territorial classification which is based on an intelligible differentia and the subjection, for the purposes of the recovery of the certified demand, of, each of such classes of defaulters to the same coercive pre>- cess devised by their own State, on a consideration of local needs, for the recovery of their own public demands, cannot be regarded as bereft of a reasonable nexus or correlation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Indian Income-tax Act any more than it can be so regarded with respect to the respective State laws.\n\nThe fact that the income-tax demand is a Union public demand appears to us to make no difference in the legal position.\n\nThe Indian Income-tax Act classifies people into various groups for the purpose of imposing the tax and taxes them differently. e.g, insurance companies which are taxed differently from an ordinary business concern and in some cases exempts them altogether, e.g., agriculturists and persons with income below a certain level. There can, on the same principle, be no objection to people of a backward area who may be in need of aid in the shape of tax remission to be exempted from taxation either wholly or in part. If this js right when a question of imposition is concerned. it cannot be wrong when the matter is one of recovery.\n\nThe two together illake up the full measure of the\n\nburden and if it is permissible to vary the burden at one end it must be equally valid to vary it at the other for the same or similar reasons.\n\nIt is said that the income-tax demand being a Union demand there should be uniformity in the punishment to be meted out to defaulters and it can be done easily by suitably amending section 46(2) so as to provide for the detention of all defaulters for the same period in all cases in all States. In the first p!ace, it is a fallacy to regard arrest and detention of a defaulter who fails to pay income-tax as -a punishment or penalty for an offence. It is a coercive process for recovery of public demand by putting pressure on the defaulter.\n\nThe defaulter can get himself released bv paying up the dues. In the next place, the Court is only concerned to interpret the law and, if it is valid, to apply the faw as it finds it and not to enter upon a discussion as to what the law should be. The whole problem before us is whether the apparent discrimination can be supported on the basis of a permissible classification.\n\nThe case of Bowman v. Lawis(') is in point. \\Ve do not, however, find it necessary to express any opinion on the extreme contention urged\n\nb~ the learned Attorney-General, on the authority of that decision. that a mere territorial classification, bv itself and without anything else, is enough to place the law beyond the operation of the equal protection clause.\n\nIndeed. in that very case it was recognised that it '>Vas not impossible that a distinct territorial establishmel}t and jurisdiction might be intended as or might have the effect of discrimination against a particular race or class where such race or class should happen to be the principal occupants of the disfavoured area. For the purposes of this case it will suffice to sav that the discrimination complained of is not uncostitutional for the simple reaso'n that the impugned law is based on a territorial classification having a reasonable nexus or correlation between that basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Our decision in The State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singh; i(2) which is relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is easilv (I) 101 U.S. 22; 25 L. Ed 989.\n\n(7) [1954] S. C.R. 996.\n\nPurshottam Govindji Ha/ai\n\n!, I; Shree B. , If. Desai~\n\nAdditional Collector of Bombay\n\nand others\n\nDas Actg. C. ].\n\nPUl'shottam Govindji Halai\n\n\\), Shree B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Collector of Bombay\n\nand othns\n\nDas Mg.C.J.\n\ndistinguishable on facts, for, the law impugned in that case for the first time imposed certain disabilities on Jagirdars of a certain area of the State and there was no evidence that those J agirdars were in any way different from the J agirdars of the other areas of the State. In the present case the classification has been made Statewise and it is clear that in the matter of payment of public. demands of the States the people of different States are not similarly situated and their own States have imposed on them such coerciYe pr<>- cesses as the circumstances and needs of each State require. The law impugned before us has .only :idopted, for its own purpose, the same coercive process which was devised by tbe States for their own purposes which are closely akin or similar to the purpose of the Union. The same or similar considerations apply to both cases. There is the same or similar correlation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved bv the Indian Incometax Act. To deny this power to the Union on constitutional grounds urged before us will lead us to hold that no new offence created by law can be made triable according to the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, for that Code sanctions different modes of trial in different areas, namely, bv a Section 30 Magistrate in some areas, by the Sessions Judge with assessors in certain areas and by .the Sessions Judge with jurors in other areas. Adoption of an existing machinerv devised for a particular purpose cannot. if there be no vice of unconstitutionalitv in the machinery, render it unconstitutional if it is made to subserve a purpose closelv akin or similar to the purpose for which it had been devised. The first objection formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner must, therefore, be rejected.\n\nRe. (b).-As already stated under section 46(2), the Collector, on receipt of the certificate from the Income-tax Officer, has to proceed to recover the certified demand as if it were an arrear of .land revenue.\n\nThis means that the Collector of a particular place has to take steps as indicati; d in the State law relating to the recovcrv of arrears of land revenue. As already stated, _ in the State of Bombay there are two\n\nstatutes regulating the procedure for the recovery of arrears of land revenue according as the defaulter resides in the City of Bombay or in any other area within the State of Bombay. Section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 applies to the City of Bombay and section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 applies to the rest of the State.\n\nPrior to the 8th October 1954 the portion of section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 which is relevant for our present purpose was as follows :-·\n\n•'lf the sale of the defaulter's property shall not produce satisfaction of the demand, it shall be lawful for the Collector to caus<:i him to be apprehended and confined in the civil jail under the rules in force at the Presidencv for the confinement of debtors, for which purpose a certificate of demand under the Collector's signature sent with the .defaulter shall be the sheriff's sufficient warrant, equally with the usual legal process in ordinary cases of arrest in execution of judgment for debt :\n\nProvided, however, cease at any time upon that it shall in no case of the said sum\".\n\nthat such imprisonment shall payment of the sum due, and exceed one day for each rupee\n\nSection 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 which provides for the arrest and detention of the defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay contains the following proviso :-\n\n\"Provided that no defaulter shall be detained in imprisonment for a longer period than the time limited by law in the case of the execution of a decree of a Civil Court for a debt equal in amount to the arrear of revenue due by such defaulter\".\n\nA cursory perusal of the two sections will show at once that the procedure prescribed by section 13 of\n\nt~ Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 for the recovery of arreai; s of land revenue was harsher and more drastic than the procedure laid down in section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 in that a defaulter residing in the City of Bomba.y could be kept in detention for a day for every rupee of the arrears which might considerably exceed the maximum period of six months which is the iperiod\n\nPursh-OUam Govindji Halai v.\n\nShree B. M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay and others\n\nDas Actg. C. J.\n\nPurshotlam Govindji Halai v.\n\nShret B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Collector of Bombay\n\nand others\n\n.Das Actg. C. J.\n\nlimited by the Code of Civil Procedure for the detention of a judgment-debtor in civil jail. The argument is that on the aJvent of the Constitution section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 became void under article 13 ( 1) in that it denied to the Bombay defaulter equality before the law in comparison with the defaulter outside the City of Bombay, for he could be detained for a longer period of time. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to express any opm1on whether the discrimination brought about by the two sections was supportable on the ground of a reasonable classification based on territorial considerations so as not to offend the constitutional inhibition.\n\nAssuming, then, but not . deciding, that section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 became inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 and, therefore, became void to the extent of such inconsistency, it was not, as recently explained by this Court in Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Another( 1 ), obliterated from the statute book for all times or for all purposes or for all people. The effect of article 13 ( 1) is that the law could not stand in the way of the enjoyment of fundamental rights. The law was not dead. Further, the law was amended on the 8th October, 1954 when the proviso to section 13 quoted above was replaced by the following proviso :-\n\n\"Provided that such imprisonment shall cease at any time upon payment of the sum due and that it shall in no case exceed- ( i) A period of six months when the sum due 1s more than Rs. 50; and\n\n(ii) A period of six weeks in any other case\".\n\nThis amendment is nothing less than an enactment of a new pr11vision. It lays down a new law which is similar to the law laid down by section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. Therefore, the disparity that prevailed between the original proviso to section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 and the proviso to section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 is now removed.\n\nThe\n\n(I) [195512 S. C.R. 589.\n\ndisparity between the two provisions as they originally stood being thus eliminated, the vice of unconstitutionalitv is also removed and section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876, as it now stands, cannot be assailed as repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt was faintly suggested that as the assessment proceedings hag been started . and the certificate had been issued by the Income-tax Officer to the Additional Collector of Bombay and the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand and actually attached the properties prior to tl1e amendment; the assessee must be governed by section 13 as it originally stood and not by it as subsequently amended.\n\nWe do not think there is any substance in this contention.\n\nIt is true that the warrant of attachment of the property was issued on the 24th March 1954 but the sale proclamation was issued and the sale was actually held after the date of amendment. The defaulting assessee might have paid up the dues in which case there would have been no occasion for sale.\n\nIt is, therefore, his default that occasioned the sale.\n\nAgain, the sale proceeds might have been sufficient to cover the certified demand, in which case there would have been no occasion for the issue of warrant for his arrest. It is only after the sale proceeds were found to be insufficient to satisfy the assessed amount and the assessee failed to pay up the balance that the question of the arrest of the defaulter arose. By that time section 13 had been amended and the warrant of arrest was issued on the 7th June 1955, that is to say, long after the amendment of the section.\n\nIn our opinion, the second ground urged by the learned coumel must also he negatived.\n\nWe may mention that our attention was drawn to the decision of the Madras High Court in Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee v. The Collector of Malabar(') but learned counsel could not rely upon it as an authority as it was itself under appeal before this Court.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this application must be dismissed.\n\nii) [1954] 26 I. T. R. 509.\n\nPurshottam Govindji Halai v.\n\nShre• B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Collector •f Bo,,..ay\n\nand otkn\n\nDas Actg.C.J.\n\nPurshottam Gf)l)indJi Halai v.\n\nSkree B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Col~ lector of Bombay\n\nand others\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar. J.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-I agree rather reluctantly. The reluctance is not because there is anything in the reasoning of the judgment pronounced just now by my Lord which does not appear to be sound but because I am not happy about the result.\n\nWe have to face and accept wholly different consequences for non-payment of income-tax according as the assessee belongs to one State or another. The nature of the tax is one and the same, and it is levied under a single Central Act, and yet the ultimate coercive processes for recovery differ in nature and extent between State and State.\n\nWe have to attribute to the legislature a rational classification based on geographical areas, the susceptibilities of people in those areas, and their reactions to the adoption of methods of recovery.\n\nFor arrest and detention, wilful default or fraudulent conduct is required in Madras. In Assam, there can be no imprisonment at all.\n\nThe periods of detention vary between Bengal, U.P. and the Punjab. Taluqdars in U.P. are completely exempt. Are we to assume that people in Madras are more amenable and generally ready and willing to pay as compared with those in Bombay wno are a tenacious lot and must be subjected to a longer process of detentive coercion? hre the Taluqdars in U.P. exempt from arrest because of possible political repercussions if such influential persons are subjected to such treatment? What is the rationale in providing different periods of detention for Bengal and the Punjab?\n\nWe must be in a position to postulate some reasonable basis for the differentiation and we cannot ge~ away - from this necessity by vague references to the wisdom of the legislature or by indulging in pure speculation as to what might have been at the back of its mind. Speaking broadly, for the enforcement of the levy of a central tax like the Income-tax there should be uniformity of procedure .and identity of consequences from non-payment. The machinery for recovery might be different between the several States but the defaulting assessees must be put on the same footing as regards the penalties.\n\nBut the law as it now stands can be supported on the grounds mentioned by my Lord and I do not propose to differ.\n\nGIPN-86-84 S. c. 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act V of 1879", "statute": "Bombay Act V of 1879"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act II of 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6848, "end_char": 6869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "8th October 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6885, "end_char": 6901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13( 1) of the Constitution in that the procedure prescribed by s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 in respect of a defaulter residing in the City of Bombay was harsher and more drastic than the procedure laid down in s. 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 in respect of a defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay was without force because s. 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 was amended on 8th October 1954 and a new law laid down a law similar to the law laid down by s. 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 and thus the vice of unconstitutionality 'if any' was removed."}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act II of 1876", "statute": "Bombay Act II of 1876"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act V of 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6978, "end_char": 6998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7385, "end_char": 7391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act V of 1879", "statute": "Bombay Act V of 1879"}}, {"text": "S. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7417, "end_char": 7422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act V of 1879", "statute": "Bombay Act V of 1879"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7764, "end_char": 7774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act V of 1879", "statute": "Bombay Act V of 1879"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7782, "end_char": 7803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hemendra Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7848, "end_char": 7861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hemendra Shah, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7866, "end_char": 7879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hemendra Shah, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hemendra Shah, /. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7922, "end_char": 7936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, ( B. Sen and R. H. Dlzebar, with them) for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7965, "end_char": 7980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, ( B. Sen and R. H. Dlzebar, with them) for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8012, "end_char": 8018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, ( B. Sen and R. H. Dlzebar, with them) for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dlzebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8023, "end_char": 8036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, ( B. Sen and R. H. Dlzebar, with them) for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. M. Desai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8131, "end_char": 8142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19-84 S. C. India/59\n\nPursizottan Govindji Halai\n\nShree B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional ( .'r1l4 leclor of Bo1 •b 1y\n\nand oth11r.r\n\nPurshottam Govi1uiji Halai v.\n\nShrte B. M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay and others\n\n1955.", "canonical_name": "B. M. 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"end_char": 8458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.-This rule was issued on a petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution by one Purshottam Govind ji Halai, a citizen of India, calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued by this Court directing the Superintendent, House of Correction, Byculla, being the second respondent herein, to produce before this Court one Govindji Deoji Halai, the father of the petitioner, who is also a citizen of India, for the purpose of being released forthwith."}}, {"text": "Govindji Deoji Halai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8719, "end_char": 8739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.-This rule was issued on a petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution by one Purshottam Govind ji Halai, a citizen of India, calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued by this Court directing the Superintendent, House of Correction, Byculla, being the second respondent herein, to produce before this Court one Govindji Deoji Halai, the father of the petitioner, who is also a citizen of India, for the purpose of being released forthwith."}}, {"text": "Indestro Sales and Service Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9069, "end_char": 9099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Govindji Deoji Halai (hereinafter referred to as the \"assessee\") is the sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style of Indestro Sales and Service Co. at No."}}, {"text": "Indestro India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9195, "end_char": 9214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two private limited companies, namely, Indestro India Ltd., and Indestro Eastern Ltd., also carry on business and have their respective offices in the same premises."}}, {"text": "Indestro Eastern Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9220, "end_char": 9241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two private limited companies, namely, Indestro India Ltd., and Indestro Eastern Ltd., also carry on business and have their respective offices in the same premises."}}, {"text": "Third Income-tax Officer, C-1 Ward,", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9627, "end_char": 9662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "951-1952 by the Third Income-tax Officer, C-1 Ward, Bombay, at and for Rs."}}, {"text": "10th April 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9787, "end_char": 9802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee not having paid up the assessed amount of tax the Income-tax Officer on the 10th April 1951 issued to the Additional Collector of Bombay, the first respondent herein, a recovery certificate under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "section 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9907, "end_char": 9920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9942, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indestro Eastern, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 10000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may here be mentioned that the Indestro Eastern, Ltd., was also asessed to income-tax at and for Rs."}}, {"text": "st February, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10174, "end_char": 10191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st February, 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand on the assessee for payment of the assessed amount of tax."}}, {"text": "24th March\n\n1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No payment\n\nhaving been made, the Additional Collector attached the goodwill and tenancy rights in the said premises by a warrant of attachment issued on the 24th March\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "15th January 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10519, "end_char": 10536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale proclamation was issued on the 15th January 1955."}}, {"text": "25th Febru ary 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10563, "end_char": 10582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale was held on the 25th Febru ary 1955 fetching a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10794, "end_char": 10804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10812, "end_char": 10846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th June 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11462, "end_char": 11476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contentions put forward on behalf of the assessee not being considered satisfacto.-y the Additional Collector on the 30th June 1955 issued a warrant for the arrest of the assessee under section 13 of the Bombay 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Texas Power and Light Company(1)-\n\n\"There is a strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds\"."}}, {"text": "S. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30405, "end_char": 30410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shtu B. M. Dual", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30455, "end_char": 30470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nt GJ,111tiji Hal4i\n\n\"' Shtu B. M. 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Revenue Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41138, "end_char": 41148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "8th October, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41295, "end_char": 41312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the law was amended on the 8th October, 1954 when the proviso to section 13 quoted above was replaced by the following proviso :-\n\n\"Provided that such imprisonment shall cease at any time upon payment of the sum due and that it shall in no case exceed- ( i) A period of six months when the sum due 1s more than Rs."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41333, "end_char": 41343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41774, "end_char": 41785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41793, "end_char": 41823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41897, "end_char": 41907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41915, "end_char": 41949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41969, "end_char": 41980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41988, "end_char": 42018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42204, "end_char": 42214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42222, "end_char": 42256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42311, "end_char": 42321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42673, "end_char": 42683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "24th March 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42883, "end_char": 42898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the warrant of attachment of the property was issued on the 24th March 1954 but the sale proclamation was issued and the sale was actually held after the date of amendment."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43547, "end_char": 43557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7th June 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43619, "end_char": 43632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that time section 13 had been amended and the warrant of arrest was issued on the 7th June 1955, that is to say, long after the amendment of the section."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43846, "end_char": 43863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may mention that our attention was drawn to the decision of the Madras High Court in Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee v. The Collector of Malabar(') but learned counsel could not rely upon it as an authority as it was itself under appeal before this Court."}}, {"text": "Skree B. M. Desai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44267, "end_char": 44284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nPurshottam Gf)l)indJi Halai v.\n\nSkree B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Col~ lector of Bombay\n\nand others\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar.", "canonical_name": "Skree B. M. Desai"}}, {"text": "A!Jar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44349, "end_char": 44354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nPurshottam Gf)l)indJi Halai v.\n\nSkree B. M. Desai,\n\nAdditional Col~ lector of Bombay\n\nand others\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA!Jar."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44360, "end_char": 44380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-I agree rather reluctantly.", "canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45237, "end_char": 45242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Assam, there can be no imprisonment at all."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45320, "end_char": 45326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The periods of detention vary between Bengal, U.P. and the Punjab."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45328, "end_char": 45332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The periods of detention vary between Bengal, U.P. and the Punjab."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45341, "end_char": 45347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The periods of detention vary between Bengal, U.P. and the Punjab."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_907_919_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE STATE CF MADRAS AND ANOTHER v.\n\nV. SRINIV ASA A YYANGAR.\n\n[N. H. BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nB. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nMadras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, (Madras Act XXVI of 1948), s.1(3)(4), s. 3(b)-Madras Estates Land Act I of 1908, s. 3(2)-Notification under s. 1(4) of Madras Act XXVI of 1948-Comprising a part of village-Darmila or post-settlement inam in respect of portion of village-Whether the part vests in the Stat!! under s. 3(b) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948-Estate within the meaning of s. 1 (3) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 read with s. 3(2) of Madras Act I of 1908-Whether includes part of th& estate-Compensation to Darmila Inamdar-Darmila minor inam- W hether protected by s. 20 of the Act XXVI of 1948.\n\nAt the time of passing of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Madras Act XXVI of 1948), a 15/16th portion of village Karuppur situated within the Zamindari of Ramanathapuram was held by the inamdars under a pre-settlement grant confirmed by the British Government, the estate being permanently settled in 1802.\n\nThe remaining one-sixteenth portion was held by the holders of darmila or post-settlement inams made by the proprietor of the estate.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by s. 1 ( 4) of. the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 the State of Madras issued a notification dated 22nd \\'..!gust 1949 bringing the Act into force as\n\nregard~ the Ramanatha;,, uram estate from 7th Seot 0 'Tlber 1949, the latter Zamindari including one-sixteenth part of Laruppur village. \" )e respondent-the holder of the one-sixteenth inam-contended\n\ntfat ur.der s. 1 ( 3) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 the State of Madras had power to notify only what would be estates as defined in s. 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act I of 1908 and that onesixteenth part of the village of Karuppur included in the notification was 1wt an estate as dcfir.e<l in that section and the notification was therefore ultra vires.\n\nHeld (repelling the contention) that when th<': <larmila inam does not relate to the entire village but only to a fraction of it, it must be held to retain its chara:ter as part of the estate in the hands of tl1e inamdar al'.d when the est:.c1te is notified under s. 1 ( 4) of the Madras Act XXVI of i 948 the inam will vest in the State under s. 3 ( b) of the Madras Act XXVI of l 948 and therefore one-sixteenth portion of the village of Karuppur forming a darmila inam will vest in the State.\n\nUnder the provisions of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 the darmila minor inamdar is entitled to claim compensation for the ttansfer of his portion of the estate to the Government. 3-85 S.C. lndia/59.\n\nOctober 21.\n\nThe State of Madras and another v.\n\nV. Srinivasa Ayyangar\n\nDarmila 1ninor inam is not protected by s. 20 of the Act.\n\nB1\"o1hmayya v. Achiraju ( [19~2] I.LR. 45 Mad. 716) and Narayana~·:i'j<! v. Suryanarayudu ( f 19391 66 1.1\\. 278)) referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRrsmcnoN : Civil Appeal No. 219 of 1954.\n\nOn appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 4t:1 day of April 1952 of the Madras High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 8302 of 1950.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the appellant.\n\nR. Kesava Iyengar, (M. S. K. Iyengar, with rum) for the respondent.\n\n1955.\n\nOctober 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This appeal raises a question of considerable importance as to the rights of holders of darmila or post-settlement inams of portions of a village under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras Act XXVI of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The subject-matter of this appeal is an onesixteenth share in the village of Karuppm situated within the ambit of the Zamindari of Ramanatha puram. The holders of this ancient Zamindari were, during the 18th Century, the virtual rulers of that part of South India, and were known as Sethupathis or the Lords of Rameswaram and the adjacent isles and seas.\n\nIn 1757 Muthu Bijaya Ragunatha, the then Rajah of Ramanathapuram, made a grant of the whole of the village of Karuppur to a number of persons for various charitable purposes.\n\nIn 1802, the estate was permanently settled and an rstimrari sanad was issued in favour of the Rajah. Before that date, the donees under the grant of 1757 representing an one-sixteenth share had abandoned the village, and in consequence, the inam had eo extanti been resumed.\n\nAt the permanent settlement, thi• one-sixteenth part was included in the assets of the\n\nZamindari, and taken into the account in fixing the peishkush thereon.\n\nSubsequent to the permanent settlement, on some date which does not appear on the record, Rani Mangaleswari, the then holder of the Zamindari, made a fresh grant of the one-sixteenth part which had been resumed, to the inamdars who held the remaining 15/16th portion of the village under the grant of 1757.\n\nOn 31-12-1863 the Inam Commissioner confirmed the grant of 1757, and issued an inam certificate in respect of the 15/16th portion of the village. The position, therefore, when the Act was passed was that while a 15/16th portion was held by the inamdars under a pre-settiement grant confirmed by the British Government, the remaining one-sixteenth portion was held under post-settlement grant made by the proprietor of the estate.\n\nThe Act came into force on 19-4-1949. Under section l ( 4) of the Act, certain sections thereof were to come into force at once and the other sections on such date as the Government might by notification appoint in respect of any zamindari; under-tenure, or inam estate.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the appellant issued a notification on 22-8-1949 bringing the Act into force as regards tht Ramanathapuram estace from 7-9-1949.\n\nAmong the villages mentioned as comprised in the Zamindari was \"Karuppur (part)\" described as an under-tenure.\n\nIt is common ground that the part referred to in this notification is the one-sixteenth part, which forms the subject-matter of this appeal.\n\nThe respondent who represents the holders of this inam filed the application out of which the present appeal arises, under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the notification dated 22-8-1949 as ultra vires. The ground of attack was that under section 1(3) of the Act, the State had power to notify only what would be estates as defined in section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908\n\n(Madras Act I of 1908), and that the part of the village of Karuppur included in the notification was not an estate as defined in that section. Section 3(2) of Act I of 1908, so far as is material, is as follows :\n\nThe State of Madras and another v.\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\n,4.Y)'angar\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nThe State of Madras and another v.\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nA)!Yangar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nM•' J.\n\n\"Estate\" means-- ( a) any permanentiy settled estate or temporarily settled zamindari ;\n\n(b) any portion of such permanently settled estate or temporarily settled zainindari which 1s separately registered in the office of the Collector ; ( c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir ; ( d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors m title of the grantee or grantees.\n\n* * • * ( e) any portion consisting of one or more villages of any of the estates specified above in .clauses (a),\n\n(b) and ( c) which is held on a permanent undertenure\".\n\nThe contention of the respondent was that as the grant in question related only to a fraction of a village, it could not be notified as an under-tenure, as under section 3(2) ( e) an under-tenure would be an estate only if it related to a whole village or villages. The appellant conceded that the inam in question was not an under-tenure as defined in section 3(2)(e), as it comprised only part of a village, but contended that even though it was not in itself an estate, it vn1s, nevertheless, {Jart of the Zamindari of Ramanathapuram, being a post-settlement grant of portion of a vilbge comprised therein, and that when that estate was notified, the entiretv of it including the inam i11 question must. vest in the Government under section 3 (b) of the Act. The respondent demurred to this contention.\n\nIn addition, he raised the further contention that even if post-settlement minor inams were within the operation of the Act, they would be protected by section 20 of the Act, which runs as follows:\n\n\"20(1) In cases not governed by sections 18 and 19, where, before the notified date, a landholder has created any right in any land (whether by way of lease or otherwise) including rights in any forest,\n\nmines dr minerals, quarries, fisheries or ferries, the transaction shall be deemed to be valid ; and all rights and obligations arising thereunder, on or after the notified date, shall be enforceable by or against the Government : Provided that the transaction was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time :\n\nProvided further that any such right created on or after the 1st day of July 1945 shall not be enforceable against the Government, unless it was created for a period not exceeding one year : Provided also that where such right was created for a period exceeding one year, unless it relates to the private land of the landholder within the meaning of section 3, clause (10), of the Estates Land Act, the Government may, if, in their opinion, it is in the public interest to do so, by notice given to the person concerned, terminate the right with effect from such date as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than three months from the date thereof\".\n\nThe argument of the respondent was that a postsettlement minor inam would be a right in land created by a landholder falling within section 20, that the notification of the estate under section 1(3) would not ipso facto divest the inamdar of his title to the lands, and that he would be entitled to hold them subject to any action that might properly be taken by the State under section 20.\n\nThe learned Judges of the Madras High Court agreed with the appellant that post-settlement minor inams fell within the operation of the Act ; but they accepted the contention of the respondent that they were governed by section 20 of the Act.\n\nAs it was common ground that the State had not proceeded under that section, they held that the notification was ultra vires, and accordingly quashed the same in so far as it related to the inam forming part of Karuppur village. The appellant applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court against this decision, and though the value of the subject-matter was far below the appeaiable limit, the learned Judges granted a certificate under article 133(l)(c) on the\n\n19'55\n\nThe Stau of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanothn\n\nY. Sriniua.ro\n\nbangar\n\nYmkatarama\n\n41,., J.\n\nground that the question involved was one of great public importance. That is how the appeal comes before us.\n\nTwo questions arise for decision in this appeal : (1) Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 ? (2) If they are, are they governed by section 20 of the Act ?\n\nOn the first question, the appellant does not contend that the inam in question is in itself an estate as defined in section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act and liable as such to be notified under the Act.\n\nHis contention is tllat when the Zamindari of Ramanathapuram was notified-and there is no dispute that it was validly notified, as it was a permanently settled estate falling within section 3(2) (a) of the Madras Estates Land Act-minor post-settlement inams of lands within the Zamindari would vest in the State as part of the Zamindari under section 3(b) of the Act. Section . 3(b) is, omitting what is not material, as follows :\n\n\"With effect on and from the notified date and save as otherwise expressly provided in mis Act, ....... . . . . . . . the entire estate . ... shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them, free of all encumbrances\".\n\nThe point for decision is whether post-settlement minor inams are parts of the estate out of which they were granted. If they are, then they will vest in the Government under section 3(b ). If they are not, they will remain unaffected by the notification of the parent estate.\n\nThe status of holders of these inams had been the subject of considerable divergence of judicial opinion in the Madras High Court. To appreciate this, reference must be made to the following definition of 'landholder' in section 3(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act:\n\n\"Landholcicr\" means a person owning an estate or part thereof and includes every person entitled to collect the rents of the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of any transfer from the owner or his predecessor-in-title or of any order of a competent\n\nCourt or of any provision of law\".\n\nLeaving out the inclusive portion of the definition as not relevant to the present question, it will be seen that owners of parts of an estate would also be landholders. The question then arose for decision whether darmi!a minor inamdars were landholders as defined in section 3(5). of the Estates Land Act. If they were, the tenants would acquire occupancy rights under section 6, and proceedings against them could be taken only in the revenue courts and not in the civil courts, and in general, the rights and obligations of the inamdar and the tenants would be governed by the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act. One view was that as the inamdars had to pay quit rent or jodi to the grantors, their, status could not be that of owners and therefore they could not be said to own parts of an estate. The contrary view was that the inamdars were in substance owners of the lands granted to them, and that the liability to make a fixed annual payment did not detract from their character as owners, and they would be landholders owning parts of an estate. In view of this conflict of opinion, the question was referred to the decision of a Full Bench in Brahmayya v. Achiraju(t ), which held by a majority that minor darmila inamdars were landholders as defined in section 3(5) of the Estates Land Act.\n\nThis decision was based both on the ground that the inamdars were in the position of owners of parts of an estate and that they were also persons entitled to collect rent, within the inclusive portion of the definition. · In Narayanaraju v. Suryanarayudu( 2 ), the question whether the grantee of a portion of a village subsequent to the settlement was a landholder as defined in section 3(5) came up for decision before the Privy Council.\n\nAfter reviewing the authorities and the conflicting views expressed therein, the Board agreed with the opinion expressed by the majority of the learned Judges in Brahmayya v. Achiraju( 1 ), and held that the\n\ngrantee of a post-settlement minor inam would be a landholder on both the grounds mentioned in their\n\n(!I [1922] I.L.R. 45 Mad. 716.\n\n(2) [1939] 66 I.A. 278.\n\nThe Slate of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTM StaJe of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\njudgments.\n\nThey discarded \"the doctrine that so long as the zamindar reserves any mterest, however insignificant, the permanent grantee from him cannot be the owner'', and observed that the words \"part of the estate\" occurring in the definition must be given their prima facie meaning. The Board felt greater difficulty in accepting the view that the inamdar was a landholder entitled to collect rent within the inclusive portion of the definition.\n\nBut they expressed themselves satisfied on either ground that \"the Full Bench decision of 1922 represents a careful and reasonable solution of a stubborn ambiguity in the Act, and that it ought not now to be overruled having regard to the time which has elapsed and to the character of the interests affected thereby\". Thus, it was settled law in Madras at the time when Act XXVI of\n\n1948 was passed that minor darmila inamdars were owners of parts of an estate. Construing section 3(b) in the light of the law as then accepted, when a notified estate vests in its entirety in the State under that prov1S1on, a minor darmila inam which forms part of it must also vest in it.\n\nSri R. Kesava Ivengar learned counsel for the respondent, argued that decis; ons on section 3(5) ot the Madras Estates Land Act on the meaning of the word 'landholder' as defined therein, could not he usefully referred to for construing the true scope of section 3(b) of Act XXVI of 1948, as the definition in the Madras Estates Land Act was only for purposes of settling the right5 of landlords and tenants, and would be irrelevant for determining the rights of the inamdar as aga; nst the State. But the ground of the decision in Bralzmayya v. Ac!ii•aju(') and Narayanaraju v. Suryanarayudu(') is that the grantee of the inam is in the position of an owner of the part of the estate granted to him, and that would be relevant when the controversy is as to his true status, whether the dispute is between the landlord and the tenant or between the inamdar and the State. If the inamdar is owner in relation to his tenants, it would be illogical to hold that he is not that, in relation to (!) [1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 716.\n\n(2) [1939) 66 I.A. 278.\n\nthe State. The question is, in our opinion, concluded by section 2(8) of Act XXVI of 1948 which defines a landholder as including a darmila inamdar, and that is a statutory recognition of the doctrine laid down in Brahmayya v.\n\nAchiraju (1) and Narayanaraju v.\n\nSuryanarayudu(2) that darmila inamdars are owners of parts of an estate. The result then is that when the <larmila inam does not relate to the entire village but only to a fraction of it, it must be held to retain its character as part of the estate in the hands of the inam<lar, and when the estate is notified under section 1 ( 4) of the Act, the inam will vest in the State under section 3(b).\n\nIt is next argued for the respondent that the Act makes no provision for award of compensation to minor darmila inamdars, and that as a statute is not to be construed as taking away the property of any person unless there is a provision for payment of compensation therefor, these inams should be held to be outside the operation of the Act. Reference was made in this connection to section 45 of the Act under which the compensation payable in respect of an impartible estate-and Ramanathapuram is oneis to be apportioned dfter payment of debts among the members of the family. It is said that under this section the respondent would have no right to share in it. This contention is clearly erroneous. The material provisions relating to the award of compensation are sections 25, 27, 37 and 44.\n\nUnder section 25, the compensation is to be determined for the estate as a whole and not separately for each of the interests therein. Section 27 lavs down how the basic income in the case: of zamindari.s is to be fixed.\n\nUnder section 27(i), it has to include one-third of the gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of all lands in the estate, and under section 27(iv) \"one-third of the average net annual miscellaneous revenue derived from all other sources in the estate specified in section 3 (b) \".\n\nThus, the income from the lands comprised in the minor inam which is a part of the estate is included in the total income of the zamindari. Under section (I) [1922] I.L.R. 45 Mad. 716.\n\n(2) [1939] 66 I.A. 278.\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa Ayyangar\n\nVenkataramQ\n\n,4.yyar ].\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nY. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangllf'\n\nYenkatarama\n\nAyyar ],\n\n37, the compensation payable in respect of an estate is calculated in terms of the basic income on the scale prescribed therein: Section 44 enacts that the Tribunal is to \"apportion this compensation among the principal landholder and any other persons whose rights or interests in the estate stand transferred to the Government' under section 3(b )\". There cannot be any doubt on . these provisions that the darmila minor inamdar is a person who is entitled to claim compensation for the transfer of his portion of the estate to the Government. Then comes section 45 on which the respondent bases his contention.\n\nThat applies only to the distribution of the compensation determined under section 44 as payable to the principal landholder, when he is the holder of an impartible estate.\n\nIt leaves untouched the rights of minor darmila inamdars to claim compensation under section 44. The contention of the respondent that the Act provides no compensation to them, and that they should therefore be held to fall outside the Act must accordingly be rejected. ·\n\n(2) That brings us on to the second question whether a post-settlement minor inam is a right in land created by a landholder within the intendment of section 20 of the Act. At the very outset, it seems somewhat inconsistent to hold that a darmila minor inam is patt of an estate, and also that it is governed by section 20. If it is part of an estate, it must automatically vest in the Government under section 3(b ). But if it falls within section 20, the title to it will continue to stand in the inamdar with a right in the.\n\nGovernment to take action underthe third proviso, subject to the conditions laid down therein. It was argued for the respondent that section 3 operates on its own terms only \"save as otherwise expressly provided herein\", and that section 20 was such a prov1s10n.\n\nIt is somewhat difficult to follow this argument, because if section 20 applied to darmila minor inams, then they could never fall within the operation of section 3'(b ). And how is . this result to be reconciled with the conclusion that they are parts of\n\nthe estate, and that the inamdar is a landholder for purposes of the Act ?\n\nBut it is argued for the respondent that the words \"rights in land created by landlord\" are of the widest import and would take in d; irmila minor inams. The point for decision is whether this contention is correct.\n\nWe start with this that a darmila minor inamdar is a landholder as defined in section 2(8) of the Act, and he is that, by reason of his being the owner of a part of the estate. Can such a person be held to be one who has obtained a right in the land from the landholder within section 20 ? The Act makes a clear distinction between estates held by landholders and rights and interests held by other persons in or over estates.\n\nSection 3(b) enacts that when there is a notification under section 1 ( 4), the entire estate shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in it.\n\nWe have held that the part of the estate belonging to a darmila inamdar would vest in the Government.\n\nSection 3 ( c) provides that on notification all rights in or over the estate shall cease and terminate.\n\nSection 3(b) and section 3(c) deal with two distinct matters which may respectively be described in broad terms as ownership of the estate and rights in or over estate not amountir.g to ownership, and these two categqries are mutually exclusive. Now, turning to section 20, it protects rights in land by way of lease or otherwise created by the landholder before the notified date. In this context, and having regard to the distinction between estates under section 3 (b) and rights over estates under section 3 ( c), the rights mentioned in section 20 can only refer to the rights dealt with in section 3(c), and not to ownership which is within section 3 (b). When, therefore, the transaction for which protection is claimed under section 20 is one which vests ownership of the estate or a portion thereof in the transferee, it will fall outside the section.\n\nIn other words, section 20 has no application to transactions by which a person becomes a lanr1holder by reason of ownership of even a part of the estate being transferred to him, and that being the character of a darmila minor inam it is not pro-\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinfoasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nThe State of .. \\1.adras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\ntected by section 20.\n\nThere are also indications in the language of section 20 pointing to the same conclusion.\n\nSection 20(2) provides that the persons whose rights are terminated under the proviso to section 20(1) shall be entitled to compensation having regard to the value of the right which is terminated and the unexpired portion of the period for which the right is created.\n\nThese words are more appropriate to connote rights which are to be exercised for specified periods, such as lease or contract for the exploitation of mines or forests for a term than \"ownership of the estate\".\n\nThere is one other consideration, which lends support to this conclusion. The object of the Act was to establish direct relationship between the State and the tillers of the soil, and to abolish all intermediate tenures.\n\nIn Madras, the rights and obligations of intermediate tenure holders were regulated by the Madras Estates Land Act, and under that Act the intermediaries consisted not merely of the holders .of the estates as defined in section 3(2) of that Act but also holders of post-settlement minor inams as settled by decisions of the highest authority. If the purpose of the Act is to be fully achieved, it would be necessary to abolish not merely estates as defined in section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act but also darmila minor inams. But jf the co11tention of the respondent is to be accepted, it is only the estates mentioned in section 3(2) that will, on notification, vest in the Government and not the minor i nams.\n\nThese will continue to be held by the inamdars under section 20 until they are terminated in accordance with the proviso tl1erein, and survve as islets in the landscape even after the parent estates have .disappeared from the scene. The legislation must to this extent be held to have failed to achieve its purpose.\n\nAnd this is not all. If the contention of the respondent is correct, then the minor inamdars will not mere! y be unaffected by the Act but will actually be better off for it. Under section 3 (a) of the Act, the Madras Estates Land Act stands repealed on and from the notified date, and as it is by virtue of this\n\nAct that the tenants became entitled to occupancy rights, the inamdars would, on notification, be free to eject tenants. and settll:'. their own terms with them. \\Ne cannot accede to a contention which results not merely in the frustration of the object of the Act but further produces consequences, the reverse of what were intended. On the other hand, the contention of the appellant that minor inams fall outside section 20 and would vest straightaway in the State under section 3 (b) will have the effect of extinguishing the rights of the inamdars, and enabling the State to issue ryotwari pattas to the tenants in oceupation. We prefer to accept this contention, as it fully effectuates the intention of the legislature. In the result, we must hold that the one-sixteenth portion of the village of Karuppur forming a darmila inam will vest in the Government under section 3 (b) of the Act, and that the only right of the inamdars is to share in the compensation under the terms of the Act. The petition of the respondent in so far as it relates to this inam must be dismissed.\n\nThis appeal is accordingly allowed, and in accordance wit~1 the terms of the certificate granting leave, the appellant will pay the costs of the respondent in this Court. The parties will be:.ir their own costs in the court below.\n\nANANDA BEHERA AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R. DAs, AcnNG C. J.,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\n]AGAN-\n\nNADHADAS,\n\nJAFF.R IM.'\\M and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.] Ft; ndamental Rights, Enforcement of-Oral sale of fishery rights for future years by owner of estate before it vested in the State by legislation-Nature of such rights-Profit a prendre, if immovable property requiring registered imtrument for transfer-Such sale, if creates any right to property-Non-recognition by the State, if transgresses any fundamental 1ights-Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1) (/), 31(1)-0rissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (Orissa Act I of 1952) -Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 54.\n\nThi Stat• of Madras and\n\nanothu\n\nV. Srinivcstt\n\nAyyangar\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyar].\n\nOctob., 2 7.", "total_entities": 151, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE CF MADRAS AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SRINIV ASA A YYANGAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. SRINIVASA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. H. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. 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K. T. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3169, "end_char": 3183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3213, "end_char": 3231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3236, "end_char": 3249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Kesava Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3281, "end_char": 3298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Kesava Iyengar, (M. S. K. Iyengar, with rum) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "R. Kesava Iyengar"}}, {"text": "M. S. 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Iyengar, with rum) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3657, "end_char": 3680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karuppm", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The subject-matter of this appeal is an onesixteenth share in the village of Karuppm situated within the ambit of the Zamindari of Ramanatha puram."}}, {"text": "South India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3971, "end_char": 3982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The holders of this ancient Zamindari were, during the 18th Century, the virtual rulers of that part of South India, and were known as Sethupathis or the Lords of Rameswaram and the adjacent isles and seas."}}, {"text": "Muthu Bijaya Ragunatha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4083, "end_char": 4105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1757 Muthu Bijaya Ragunatha, the then Rajah of Ramanathapuram, made a grant of the whole of the village of Karuppur to a number of persons for various charitable purposes."}}, {"text": "Rani Mangaleswari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4778, "end_char": 4795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent to the permanent settlement, on some date which does not appear on the record, Rani Mangaleswari, the then holder of the Zamindari, made a fresh grant of the one-sixteenth part which had been resumed, to the inamdars who held the remaining 15/16th portion of the village under the grant of 1757."}}, {"text": "31-12-1863", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4999, "end_char": 5009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-12-1863 the Inam Commissioner confirmed the grant of 1757, and issued an inam certificate in respect of the 15/16th portion of the village."}}, {"text": "19-4-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5454, "end_char": 5463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act came into force on 19-4-1949."}}, {"text": "22-8-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5791, "end_char": 5800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the appellant issued a notification on 22-8-1949 bringing the Act into force as regards tht Ramanathapuram estace from 7-9-1949."}}, {"text": "7-9-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5871, "end_char": 5879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the appellant issued a notification on 22-8-1949 bringing the Act into force as regards tht Ramanathapuram estace from 7-9-1949."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6259, "end_char": 6270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6410, "end_char": 6422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6506, "end_char": 6518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6526, "end_char": 6555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act I of 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6558, "end_char": 6578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6701, "end_char": 6713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act I of 1908", "statute": "Madras Act I of 1908"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3(2) of Act I of 1908, so far as is material, is as follows :\n\nThe State of Madras and another v.\n\nV. 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Srinivasa\n\nA)!Yangar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nM•' J.\n\n\"Estate\" means-- ( a) any permanentiy settled estate or temporarily settled zamindari ;\n\n(b) any portion of such permanently settled estate or temporarily settled zainindari which 1s separately registered in the office of the Collector ; ( c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir ; ( d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors m title of the grantee or grantees."}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7811, "end_char": 7823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8002, "end_char": 8017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8385, "end_char": 8394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8608, "end_char": 8618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 18 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8687, "end_char": 8705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st day of July 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9243, "end_char": 9263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In addition, he raised the further contention that even if post-settlement minor inams were within the operation of the Act, they would be protected by section 20 of the Act, which runs as follows:\n\n\"20(1) In cases not governed by sections 18 and 19, where, before the notified date, a landholder has created any right in any land (whether by way of lease or otherwise) including rights in any forest,\n\nmines dr minerals, quarries, fisheries or ferries, the transaction shall be deemed to be valid ; and all rights and obligations arising thereunder, on or after the notified date, shall be enforceable by or against the Government : Provided that the transaction was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time :\n\nProvided further that any such right created on or after the 1st day of July 1945 shall not be enforceable against the Government, unless it was created for a period not exceeding one year : Provided also that where such right was created for a period exceeding one year, unless it relates to the private land of the landholder within the meaning of section 3, clause (10), of the Estates Land Act, the Government may, if, in their opinion, it is in the public interest to do so, by notice given to the person concerned, terminate the right with effect from such date as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than three months from the date thereof\"."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9532, "end_char": 9541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 9988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10032, "end_char": 10044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10225, "end_char": 10235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10264, "end_char": 10281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the Madras High Court agreed with the appellant that post-settlement minor inams fell within the operation of the Act ; but they accepted the contention of the respondent that they were governed by section 20 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karuppur village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10693, "end_char": 10709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As it was common ground that the State had not proceeded under that section, they held that the notification was ultra vires, and accordingly quashed the same in so far as it related to the inam forming part of Karuppur village."}}, {"text": "article 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10934, "end_char": 10951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Stau of Madras", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10971, "end_char": 10985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court against this decision, and though the value of the subject-matter was far below the appeaiable limit, the learned Judges granted a certificate under article 133(l)(c) on the\n\n19'55\n\nThe Stau of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanothn\n\nY. Sriniua.ro\n\nbangar\n\nYmkatarama\n\n41,.,", "canonical_name": "State of .. \\1.adras and"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11051, "end_char": 11066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court against this decision, and though the value of the subject-matter was far below the appeaiable limit, the learned Judges granted a certificate under article 133(l)(c) on the\n\n19'55\n\nThe Stau of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanothn\n\nY. Sriniua.ro\n\nbangar\n\nYmkatarama\n\n41,.,", "canonical_name": "State of .. \\1.adras and"}}, {"text": "Ymkatarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11103, "end_char": 11113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court against this decision, and though the value of the subject-matter was far below the appeaiable limit, the learned Judges granted a certificate under article 133(l)(c) on the\n\n19'55\n\nThe Stau of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanothn\n\nY. Sriniua.ro\n\nbangar\n\nYmkatarama\n\n41,.,"}}, {"text": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11290, "end_char": 11356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11410, "end_char": 11420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act", "statute": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act"}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11552, "end_char": 11564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act", "statute": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Ramanathapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11692, "end_char": 11706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His contention is tllat when the Zamindari of Ramanathapuram was notified-and there is no dispute that it was validly notified, as it was a permanently settled estate falling within section 3(2) (a) of the Madras Estates Land Act-minor post-settlement inams of lands within the Zamindari would vest in the State as part of the Zamindari under section 3(b) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11828, "end_char": 11840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act", "statute": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act"}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11989, "end_char": 12001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act", "statute": "Are post-settlement minor inams within the operation of Madras Act"}}, {"text": "section 3(b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12483, "end_char": 12496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12807, "end_char": 12819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13419, "end_char": 13431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13521, "end_char": 13530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14423, "end_char": 14435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14842, "end_char": 14854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Slate of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15275, "end_char": 15290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Slate of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nTM StaJe of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nV. Srinivasa\n\nAyyangar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "State of .. \\1.adras and"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16230, "end_char": 16236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, it was settled law in Madras at the time when Act XXVI of\n\n1948 was passed that minor darmila inamdars were owners of parts of an estate."}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16357, "end_char": 16369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Kesava Ivengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16563, "end_char": 16580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri R. Kesava Ivengar learned counsel for the respondent, argued that decis; ons on section 3(5) ot the Madras Estates Land Act on the meaning of the word 'landholder' as defined therein, could not he usefully referred to for construing the true scope of section 3(b) of Act XXVI of 1948, as the definition in the Madras Estates Land Act was only for purposes of settling the right5 of landlords and tenants, and would be irrelevant for determining the rights of the inamdar as aga; nst the State.", "canonical_name": "R. 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{"document_id": "1955_2_919_924_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 919\n\nAct that the tenants became entitled to occupancy rights, the inamdars would, on notification, be free to eject tenants. and settll:'. their own terms with them. \\Ne cannot accede to a contention which results not merely in the frustration of the object of the Act but further produces consequences, the reverse of what were intended. On the other hand, the contention of the appellant that minor inams fall outside section 20 and would vest straightaway in the State under section 3 (b) will have the effect of extinguishing the rights of the inamdars, and enabling the State to issue ryotwari pattas to the tenants in oceupation. We prefer to accept this contention, as it fully effectuates the intention of the legislature. In the result, we must hold that the one-sixteenth portion of the village of Karuppur forming a darmila inam will vest in the Government under section 3 (b) of the Act, and that the only right of the inamdars is to share in the compensation under the terms of the Act. The petition of the respondent in so far as it relates to this inam must be dismissed.\n\nThis appeal is accordingly allowed, and in accordance wit~1 the terms of the certificate granting leave, the appellant will pay the costs of the respondent in this Court. The parties will be:.ir their own costs in the court below.\n\nANANDA BEHERA AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R. DAs, AcnNG C. J.,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\n]AGAN-\n\nNADHADAS,\n\nJAFF.R IM.'\\M and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.] Ft; ndamental Rights, Enforcement of-Oral sale of fishery rights for future years by owner of estate before it vested in the State by legislation-Nature of such rights-Profit a prendre, if immovable property requiring registered imtrument for transfer-Such sale, if creates any right to property-Non-recognition by the State, if transgresses any fundamental 1ights-Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1) (/), 31(1)-0rissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (Orissa Act I of 1952) -Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 54.\n\nThi Stat• of Madras and\n\nanothu\n\nV. Srinivcstt\n\nAyyangar\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyar].\n\nOctob., 2 7.\n\nAnanda Behera and anathtr v.\n\nThe State of Orissa and another\n\nThe petitioners obtained oral licenses for catching and appropriating fish fron1 specified sections of the Chilka Lake from its proprietor, t!e ]aja of Parikud, on payn1ent of heavy sums and obtained receipts in accordance with the prevailing practice. This was before the passinz of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951 by which ownership of the estate vested in the State of Orissa.\n\nThe licenses, however, were in respect of years subscriuent to such vesting. The State of Orissa refused to recognise them and \\Vas seeking to re~ au'.::tion the rights of fishery. The petitioners contended that it had thereby infringed or was abot to infringe their fu0damental rights under Arts. lY(l)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution and claimed that the tronsactions being sales of future goods, namely, the fish, the Act which •vas confined to imtnovable property had no application.\n\nHeld, that the right sought to be acquired by the petitioners by their several purchases was not in respect of any future goods as claimed by the; n but was a license to enter on the land coupled with a grant to catch and carry away the fish, in other i; vords, a profit a prendre \\vhich is imn1ovable property \\Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act read with s. 3(25) of the General Clauses Act.\n\nAccordingly s. 54 of the former Act applies.\n\nThat as the sale of the profit a prendre in the present case was valued at n1ore than one hundred rupees and was effected without \\vriting and registration it contravened s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, and so no title or interest therein passed to the petitioners and consequently, they had no fundamental rights to enforce.\n\nFir1n Chhotabhai Jethahai Patel & Co. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, ( [ 1953 J S.C.R. 476), distinguished and held inapplicable.\n\nThat it \\ras not necessary in the present case to decide whether the contract \\vas property \\Vithin the 1l1eaning of Arts. 19(1)(£) and 31 ( 1 ), but assuming it to be so, the State has not taken such pro~ perty away from the petitioners or prevented them from acquiring, holding or disposing '-of it.\n\nThe State merely refuses to recognise the contract and refuses to consider itself bound by it.\n\nThat may give a cause of action for a suit on the contract but no fundamental right arises as the State has qot confiscated or acquired or taken possession of the contract as such by clai1ning any benefits under it.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. 286 of 1955.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nH. Mahapatra and G. C. Mathur, for the peti- . tioners.\n\nC K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhple, with him), for respondent No. L ·\n\n1955.\n\nOctober 27.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered hy BosE J.-This jurlgment will also govern Petitions Nos. 287, 288, 289 and 304 of 1955.\n\nWe will set out the facts in Petition No. 286 of 1955. The others follow the same pattern.\n\nThe dispute is about fishery rights in the Chilka lake which is situate in what was once the estate of the Raia of Parikud. This estate vested in the State of Orissa under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951\n\n(Orissa Act I of 1952) on 24-9-1953 and has now ceased to exist in its original form.\n\nThe Act came into force on 9-2-1952.\n\nThe further facts are set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the petition in the following terms :\n\n\"That the petitioners carry on the business of i:atching and selling fish particularly from fisheries within the said lake.\n\nThat long before the vesting of the estate the petitioners had entered into contracts with the exproprietor and had obtained from the latter, on payment of heavy sums, licences for catching and appropriating all the fish from the fisheries detailed in the schedule given in the accompanying affidavit and had obtained receipts on payment in accordance with the prevailing practice\".\n\nThe lake is divided into sections and this petition is concerned with four of them. The licenses relating to them were purchased as follows :\n\n1. On 30-7-50 for rights in Gerasar\n\nPrawn for 1955-56\n\n2. On 2-8-50 for rights in Jayamal\n\nPrawn for 1955-56\n\n3. On 18-9-51 for rights in Solakudi\n\nPrawn for 1955-56\n\n4. On 6-5-52 for rights m Jayamal\n\nChungudi for (1956-57 (1957-58 (1958-59 It will be seen that though the licenses were acquired before the estate vested in the State of Orissa they\n\nAnanda Behera\n\nand another v.\n\nThe Stale of Orissa\n\nand another\n\nA.nanda Behtra\n\ntutd anothlr\n\nThe Stat• of Orissa ad another\n\nBost].\n\nwere for future years, all after the date of vesting.\n\nThe State of Orissa refused to recognise these licenses and were about to re-auction the rights when the petitioners filed the present petition seeking writs under article 32 on the ground that their fundamental rigius under articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) were, or were about to be, infringed.\n\nThe first question that we have to determine is whether the petitioners acquired any rights or interests in \"property\" by their several \"purchases\", as articles 19(1) (f) and 31(1) are dependent on that.\n\nIn their petition the petitioners claim that the transactions were sales of future goods, namely of the fish in these sections of the lake, and that as fish is moveable property Orissa Act I of 1952 is not attracted as that Act is confined to immoveable property.\n\nWe agree with the learned Solicitor-General that if this is the basis of their right, then their petition under article 32 is mis.conceived because until any fish is actually caught the petitioners would not acquire any property in it.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the lake is immoveable property and that it formed part of the Raja's estate.\n\nAs such it vested in the State of Orissa when the notification was issued under the Act and with it vested the right that all owners of land have, to bar access to their land and the right to regu1.ate, control and sell the fisheries on it: If the petitioners' rights are no 1noe t1\"m the right to obtain future goods under the Sale of Gooch Act, then that is a purely personJ.1i-1gl1t ::irising out of contract to \\vhich the State of Orissa is not a party and in any event a\n\nre!usal to perfor1n the co~1tract tl1at gives rise to that right may amount to a breach of contract but cannot be regarded as a breach of any fundamental right.\n\nBut though that is how the matter is put in the petition, we do not think that is a proper approach to this case.\n\nThe facts disclosed in paragraph 3 of the petition make it clear that what was sold was the right to catch and carry away fish in specific sections of the lake over a specified future period.\n\nThat amounts to\n\na license to enter on the land coupled with a grant to catch and , carry away the fish, that is to say, it is a profit a prendre : see 11 Halsbury's Laws of England, (Hailsham Edition), pages 382 and 383. In England this is regarded as an interest in land ( 11 Halsbury's Laws of England, page 387) because it is a right to take some profit of the soil for the use of the owner of the right (page 382). In India it is regarded as a benefit that arises out of the land and as such is immoveable property.\n\nSection 3(26) of the General Clauses Act defines \"immoveable property\" as including benefits that arise out of the land. The Transfer of Property Act does not define the term except to say that immoveable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. As fish do not come under that category the definition in the General Clauses Act applies and as a profit a prendre is regarded as a benefit arising out of land it follows that it is immoveable property within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nNow a \"sale\" is defined as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised. As a profit a prendre is immoveable property and as in this case it was purchased for a price that was paid it requires writing and registration because of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. If a profit a prendre is regarded as tangible immoveable property, then the \"property\" in this case was over Rs. 100 in value. If it is intangible, then a registered instrument would be necessary whatever the value. The \"sales\" in this case were oral : there was neither writing nor registration.\n\nThat being the case, the transactions passed no title or interest and accordingly the petitioners have no fundamental right that they can enforce.\n\nIt is necessary to advert to Firm Chhotabhai Jethabai Patel & Co. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(1) and explain it because it was held there that a right to \"pluck, collect and carry away\" tendu leaves does not give the owner of the right any proprietary interest in the land and so that sort of right was not an \"en-\n\n(!) [1953) S.C.R. 476. 4-85 S. C. India/59\n\nAnanda B11ur11\n\nam/ anolhlr\n\nThi Stall of Oriss11\n\nand anolh1r\n\nBoSI].\n\n.Atwula Bllrno\n\naNl anotlllr\n\nThi Stou of Ori.rsa\n\nad an\"\"6r\n\nBou].\n\ni:umbrance\" within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act. But the contract there was to \"pluck, collect and carry away\" the leaves. The only kind of leaves that can be \"plucked\" are those that are growing on trees and it is evident that there must be a fresh crop of leaves at periodic intervals. That would make it a growing crop and a growing crop is expressly exempted from the definition of \"immoveable property\" in the Transfer of Property Act. That case is distinguishable and does not apply here.\n\nIt was then argued that a contract is \"property'' within the meaning of articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1).\n\nAgain, we need not decide this bacause even if it be assumed that it is that kind of property the State of Orissa has not taken the petitioners' contract away from them or prevented them from \"acquiring, holding or disposing\" of it. They are free to sue on it or to assign it if they want. The State merely says, as any other person might say : \"I was not a party to that contract.\n\nNeither its rights nor its liabilities have devolved on me and I refuse to recognise it or to assume the obligations of either contracting party\".\n\nIf the State is wrong in its attitude that may give rise to a suit against it for damages for breach of contract or possibly, (though we do not say it would), . to a right to sue for specific performance ; but no question under articles 19(1) (f) and 31(1) can arise because the State has not ccnfis.cated or acquired or taken possession of the contract as such. If it had it would have claimed the benefits under it. It would have taken the money that the petitioners paid to the Raja from the Raja or demanded it over again from the petitioners. But it is not doing that. It simply refuses to recognise the existence of the contract.\n\nThe petition fails and is dismissed with costs.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 452, "end_char": 462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510, "end_char": 519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karuppur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, we must hold that the one-sixteenth portion of the village of Karuppur forming a darmila inam will vest in the Government under section 3 (b) of the Act, and that the only right of the inamdars is to share in the compensation under the terms of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 906, "end_char": 915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ANANDA BEHERA AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1352, "end_char": 1377, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANANDA BEHERA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1379, "end_char": 1410, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1413, "end_char": 1422, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1438, "end_char": 1449, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1506, "end_char": 1511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ANANDA BEHERA AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n[S. R. DAs, AcnNG C. J.,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\n]AGAN-\n\nNADHADAS,\n\nJAFF.R IM.'\\M and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1882, "end_char": 1903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1905, "end_char": 1916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1935, "end_char": 1962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Act I of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1964, "end_char": 1984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1987, "end_char": 2011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2026, "end_char": 2031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Ananda Behera", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2127, "end_char": 2140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda Behera and anathtr v.\n\nThe State of Orissa and another\n\nThe petitioners obtained oral licenses for catching and appropriating fish fron1 specified sections of the Chilka Lake from its proprietor, t!e ]aja of Parikud, on payn1ent of heavy sums and obtained receipts in accordance with the prevailing practice.", "canonical_name": "ANANDA BEHERA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2161, "end_char": 2176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda Behera and anathtr v.\n\nThe State of Orissa and another\n\nThe petitioners obtained oral licenses for catching and appropriating fish fron1 specified sections of the Chilka Lake from its proprietor, t!e ]aja of Parikud, on payn1ent of heavy sums and obtained receipts in accordance with the prevailing practice.", "canonical_name": "State of Orissa"}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2661, "end_char": 2676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Orissa refused to recognise them and \\Vas seeking to re~ au'.::tion the rights of fishery."}}, {"text": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3382, "end_char": 3432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3(25)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3459, "end_char": 3478, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3493, "end_char": 3498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3698, "end_char": 3703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3711, "end_char": 3735, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)(£) and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4110, "end_char": 4131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Vithin the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4666, "end_char": 4676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H. Mahapatra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Mahapatra and G. C. Mathur, for the peti- ."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4758, "end_char": 4770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Mahapatra and G. C. Mathur, for the peti- ."}}, {"text": "C K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4798, "end_char": 4811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhple, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4843, "end_char": 4857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhple, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhple", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4862, "end_char": 4875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhple, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "This estate vested in the State of Orissa under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Act I of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "24-9-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5392, "end_char": 5401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This estate vested in the State of Orissa under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951\n\n(Orissa Act I of 1952) on 24-9-1953 and has now ceased to exist in its original form."}}, {"text": "9-2-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act came into force on 9-2-1952."}}, {"text": "30-7-50", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6243, "end_char": 6250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30-7-50 for rights in Gerasar\n\nPrawn for 1955-56\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Gerasar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6265, "end_char": 6272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30-7-50 for rights in Gerasar\n\nPrawn for 1955-56\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Stale of Orissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6624, "end_char": 6639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6-5-52 for rights m Jayamal\n\nChungudi for (1956-57 (1957-58 (1958-59 It will be seen that though the licenses were acquired before the estate vested in the State of Orissa they\n\nAnanda Behera\n\nand another v.\n\nThe Stale of Orissa\n\nand another\n\nA.nanda Behtra\n\ntutd anothlr\n\nThe Stat• of Orissa ad another\n\nBost].", "canonical_name": "State of Orissa"}}, {"text": "A.nanda Behtra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6654, "end_char": 6668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6-5-52 for rights m Jayamal\n\nChungudi for (1956-57 (1957-58 (1958-59 It will be seen that though the licenses were acquired before the estate vested in the State of Orissa they\n\nAnanda Behera\n\nand another v.\n\nThe Stale of Orissa\n\nand another\n\nA.nanda Behtra\n\ntutd anothlr\n\nThe Stat• of Orissa ad another\n\nBost].", "canonical_name": "ANANDA BEHERA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6943, "end_char": 6953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7004, "end_char": 7031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7223, "end_char": 7237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Orissa Act I of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7454, "end_char": 7474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act I of 1952", "statute": "Orissa Act I of 1952"}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7909, "end_char": 7924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As such it vested in the State of Orissa when the notification was issued under the Act and with it vested the right that all owners of land have, to bar access to their land and the right to regu1.ate, control and sell the fisheries on it: If the petitioners' rights are no 1noe t1\"m the right to obtain future goods under the Sale of Gooch Act, then that is a purely personJ.1i-1gl1t ::irising out of contract to \\vhich the State of Orissa is not a party and in any event a\n\nre!usal to perfor1n the co~1tract tl1at gives rise to that right may amount to a breach of contract but cannot be regarded as a breach of any fundamental right."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9005, "end_char": 9012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That amounts to\n\na license to enter on the land coupled with a grant to catch and , carry away the fish, that is to say, it is a profit a prendre : see 11 Halsbury's Laws of England, (Hailsham Edition), pages 382 and 383."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9254, "end_char": 9259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India it is regarded as a benefit that arises out of the land and as such is immoveable property."}}, {"text": "Section 3(26)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9353, "end_char": 9366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9374, "end_char": 9393, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9478, "end_char": 9502, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9687, "end_char": 9706, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9854, "end_char": 9878, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10130, "end_char": 10140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10148, "end_char": 10172, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ananda B11ur11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10983, "end_char": 10997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4-85 S. C. India/59\n\nAnanda B11ur11\n\nam/ anolhlr\n\nThi Stall of Oriss11\n\nand anolh1r\n\nBoSI]."}}, {"text": ".Atwula Bllrno", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11055, "end_char": 11069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Atwula Bllrno\n\naNl anotlllr\n\nThi Stou of Ori.rsa\n\nad an\"\"6r\n\nBou]."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11580, "end_char": 11604, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11733, "end_char": 11760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12522, "end_char": 12536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_925_938_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nMATAJOG DOBEY\n\nH. C. BHARI\n\n(WITH CONNECTED APPEAL)\n\n[S. R. DAs, AcT!NG C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 14--Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 197-Whether ultra vires the Constitution-Sanction\n\nundr:r s. 197-Reasonable connection between the act and discharge of Official duty-Need for sanction-When to be considered-Power conferred or duty imposed-Implies power of employing all means for execution thereof.\n\n1n pursuance of a search warrant issued under s. 6 of the Taxa- 'tion on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 authorising four Officials to search two premises in Calcutta, they went there and forcibly broke open the entrance door of a flat in one case and the lock of the door of a room in the other case.\n\nOn being challenged by the darwan and the proprietor of the respective premises they were alleged to have tied the darwan with a rope, causing him injuries and to have assaulted the proprietor mercilessly with the help of two policemen and kept him in a lock up for some hours.\n\nTwo separate complaints-one by the darwan and the other by the proprietor-under ss. 323, 342, etc., of the Indian Penal Code were instituted before two different Magistrates.\n\nThe common question for determination in both the complaints was whether under the circumst:rnces sanction was necessary under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nHeld that sa.nction was necessary as the assault and the use of criminal force related to the performance of the official duties of the accused within the meaning of s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nArt. 14 does not render s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ultra vires as the discrimination on the part of the Government to grant sanction against one public servant and not against another is based on a rational classification.\n\nA discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and abuse of power is not easily to be assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official.\n\nIn the matter of grant of sanction under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty.\n\nIn other words there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge -0f official duty ; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the\n\nOctohr 31\n\nMoJajoz Dobey\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\naccuserl could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.\n\nThe need for sanction under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done orpurported to be done in the discharge of official duty ; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry, or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction.\n\nWhether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of .the case.\n\nWhere a power i!; conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as arc reasonably necessary for such execution, because it is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command .\n\n. Gill and another v. The King, (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 41, Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown, (1939) F.C.R. 159, 178, Albert West Meads v.\n\nThe King, (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 185, Lieutenant Hector Thomas Huntley v. The King-Empero1, (1944) F.C.R. 262, Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay. (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1177, Amrik Singh v. The State of PEPSU, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1302, Sarjoo Prasad v. The King-Emperor, (1945) F.C.R. 227, /ones v. Owen,\n\n(1823) L.J. Reports (K.B.) 139 and Hatton v. Truby. (1897) L.R. 2 Q.B.D. 452, referred to.\n\nCRIMIN AL\n\nAPPELLATE f URISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 67 and 68 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 4th July 1952 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 312 of 1952 arising out of the Order dated the 12th March 1952 of the Court of Presidency Magistrate at Calcutta m Case No. C/2867 of 1950.\n\nS. C. Isaacs ( C. P. Lal with him) for the !ant in both appeals.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General ofi India A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale with him) for the dents in both appeals.\n\nappel-\n\n(Porus respon-\n\n1955. October 31. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCttANDRASEKHARA A1YAR J .-These appeals come before us on special leave to appeal granted under article 136 of the Constitution against two orders of the Calcutta High Court dismissing Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 559 of 1951 and 312of 1952 preferred by the appellants respectively.\n\nIn Criminal Revision Petition No. 559 of 1951, the High Court (Harries, C.J. and Banerjee, J.) confirmed .an order made by a Presidency Magistrate discharging the accused on the ground of want of sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nIn Criminal Revision Petition No. 312 of 1952, Lahiri ; and Guha, JJ. set aside an order made by another Presidency Magistrate that no sanction was required and they quashed the proceedings against the accused.\n\nThe incidents which gave rise to the two complaints are closely inter-related and can be set out briefly.\n\nIn connection with certain proceedings pending before the Income Tax Investigation Commission it was found necessary to search two premises-17, Kalakar Street and 36, Armenian Street to inspect, take copies and secure possession of certain books, papers and documents believed to be in them. A warrant was issued by the Commission for this purpose in favour of four persons, namely, H. C. Bhari, A. D. De, A. K.\n\nBose and P. Mukherjee, to carry out the search.\n\nThe authorised officials went to the Kalakar Street premises, third floor on the morning of December\n\n1950.\n\nMatajog Dobey, (Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 67), the darwan of Kashiram Agarwala, says that when he found them forcibly breaking open the entrance door of the flat he challenged them and requested them to desist. They paid no heed to him, broke open the door, went inside and interfered with some boxes and drawers of tables. They tied him with a rope and assaulted him causing injuries. On these facts, he filed a complaint on 27-12-1950 against H.C. Bhari and three others (names unknown) under sections 323, 341, 342 and 109, Indian Penal Code.\n\nMatajog Do61.1\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\nMolqjog Dobf!!\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\nClumdraukhara\n\n.diJ'M J.\n\nThe four officials and some policemen raided the Armenian Street premises on the evening of 26-12-1950.\n\nNandram Agarwala (father of Kashiram Agarwala) came to the place and found that they had forcibly opened the lock of the door of the room in which there were several books and papers, which they were collecting and packing into bundles for removal. He protested, pointed out that their actions were illegal and oppressive, and he wanted a proper search list to be prepared and proper receipts to be given to him for the books and documents sought te> be seized and removed.\n\nThereupon, rwo policemen held him down and he was assaulted mercilessly, kicked, dragged downstairs, put in a police van, and taken to the Burra Bazar thana, where he was assaulted again before being sent to the hospital. He was brought back and kept in the lock up till midnight when he was released on bail. Setting out these facts, he looged a complaint against the four officials, other subordinates and police officers whose names he did not then know but could supply later. The offences mentioned in the complaint are sections 323, 342 and 504, Indian Penal Code. Later, the names e>f two police officers were given-Bibhuti Chakravarti and Nageswar Tiwari.\n\nThe two complaints were sent over for judicial inquiry to two different magistrates.\n\nOn 21-2-1951, the magistrate held on Agarwala's complaint that a prima facie case had . been made out under section 323 against all the four accused and under section 342 against the two policemen. On this report, summonses were directed to issue under section 323 against all the accused.\n\nOn 1-5-1951, two prosecution witnesses were examined in chief and the case stood adjourned to 22-5-1951.\n\nIt was on this latter date that the !st accused Bhari filed a petition, taking the objection of want of sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. The objection was uphdd and all the accused discharged on 31-5-1951.\n\nNandram Agarwala went up to the High Court in revmon, but the order of the Presidency Magistarte was affirmed.\n\nIn Matajog Dobey's complaint, after the termination of the inquiry, process was issued .only against Bhari under sections 323 and 342, Indian Penal Code for 22-12-1951.\n\nAfter some adjournments, accused filed on 26-2-1952 a petition as in the other case rais.- ing the same objection. The magistrate on whose fiie the case was pending overruled the objection and directed that the , case should proceed. Accused Bhari took the matter on revision to the High Court and succeeded.\n\nIn Nandram Agarwala's case (Criminal Revision Petition No. 559 of 1951) Chief Justice Harries and Banerjee, J. held that the test formulated by the Privy Council in Gill's case(1) applied and that on a fair reading of the complaint, bereft of exaggerations and falsehoods, the officers could reasonably claim that what they did was done by them in the exercise of their official duty. In Matajog Dobey's case (Criminal Revision Petition No. 312 of 1952), the learned Judges (Lahiri and Guha, JJ.) came to the same conclusion in these words : \"From the nature of the allegations therefore against the petitioner, it is abundantly clear that there was something in the acts alleged against him which attached them to the official character of the petitioner, that is, which attached them to his official character in holding the search\".\n\nMr. Isaacs, learned counsel for the appellants in the two appeals, challenged the soundness of these conclusions and advanced three categorical contentions. on their behalf. Firstly, an act of criminal assault or wrongful confinement can never be regarded as an act done while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty ; secondly, that in a case where the duty is clearly defined by statute and warrant of authority, such acts could never come within the scope\n\nof employment ; and thirdly, that in any case it was the duty of the court to allow the prosecution to proceed and not stifle it in limine. He also urged that as the entry on the 23rd December was into a wrong place, P-17, Kalakar Street, and not 17, Kalakar Street which was the authorised premises, the search was illegal from the commencement. He raised the\n\n(l) [1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 41.\n\nMotsjot Dobt'.;\n\nH.C. IJMri\n\nMatajog Dobey\n\nH. C. Bhari\n\nC!iandra.rtkhara\n\n.A.iJar ].\n\nconstitutiona:. point that on Income (!Pvestigation 1947) and section 197, ultra vires, as they were and offenJed article 14 of\n\nsection 5 ( 1) of . the Taxation Commission) Act (XXX of Criminal ProceJure Code were discriminatory in their nature, the Constitution .\n\nIn the course of his arguments, he referred to section 6 sub-sections (7) and (9) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act (XXX of 1947) and rule 10 and the search warrant that was issued under them. His main argument was that there was no power conferred by statute or under common law on the authorised officials to assault or use force in the execution of their duty and any such acts must therefore be deemed to be entirely outside the scope of their employment.\n\nHe drew our attention to the sections of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to searches and quoted two old English cases to reinforce this position.\n\nThe search warrant is in these terms : \"Warrant of Authorisation under sections 6(7) and 6(9) and Rule 8.\n\nTaxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947.\n\nWhereas . information has been laid before the Commission and on the consideration thereof the Commission has been led to believe that certain books, documents and papers, which are or may be relc\\'ant to procce<lings under the above Act in the cases compendiously known as the S. Jhabbarmull group\n\n(R.\n\nC. No. 313) and connecteJ cases have been kept dnJ are to be foun<l in (i) the third floor, 17, Kalakar Street, Calcutta (ii) 47, Khengraputty Street, Calcutta-7, and (iii) the second floor and adjoining rooms, 36, Armenian Street, Calcutta, compound, offices and out-houses or other places in that locality.\n\nThis is tG authorise and require you, Sri H. C. Bhari, AuthoriseJ Official, Income-tax Investigation Commission,\n\n(a) to enter anJ search with such agsistance of police officers as may be required, the said premises -0r any other place or places where you may have\n\nreason to believe that such books, documents or papers may be found ;\n\n(b) to place identification marks on such books, documents and papers as may be found and as you may consider relevant to the proceedings aforesaid and to make a list thereof together with particulars of the identification marks ; ( c) to make copies or extracts from such books, documents and papers ; ( d) to seize such books, documents and papers and take possession thereof ; and ( e) to exercise all other powers and duties under the said sections and the Rules relating thereto\".\n\nStraightaway, it may be conceded that the warrant set out above specifies precisely the scope of the .duties entrusted to the authorised officials. Whether they took any policemen with them even at the commencement or whether they were only sent for when resistance was offered is not clear.\n\nThis, however, .does not matter as the warrant authorises police assistance at the search.\n\nThe version of the complainants as to what happened at the search is set out in the two complaints. The story of the accused is found in the petitions filed by Bhari urging the objection under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. Details about the occurrences were also elicited at the two judicial enquiries. There are two medical certificates specifying the injuries found on Nandram Agarwala and Matajog Dobey.\n\nThe minor contentions may be disposed of at the outset. Even if there was anything sound and substantial in the constitutional point about the vires of section 5 ( 1) of the Act, we declined to go into it as it was not raised before the High Court or in the grounds of the petition for special leave to appeal.\n\nArticle 14 does not render section 197, Criminal Procedure Code ultra vires as the discrimination is based upon a rational classification.\n\nPublic servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of official duties while ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard. It was argued that\n\nMatajog Dobe_,\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\nChnndrasekhara\n\nAjyar J.\n\n19M\n\nMot<Jo11 Dob,,\n\nH, G. B/ul.ri\n\nCllM4tWtk!orro\n\nAiyar :J.\n\nsection 197, Criminal Procedure Code vested an absolutely arbitrary power . in the government to grant or withhold sanction at their sweet will and pleasure, and the legislature did not lay down or even indicate any guiding principles to control the exercise of the discretion. There is no question of any discrimination. between one person and another in the matter of taking proceedings against a public servant for an act done or purporting to be done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties. No one can take such proceedings without such sanction. If the Govern, ment gives sanction against one public servant but declines to do so against another, then the government servant against whom sanction is given may possibly complain of discrimination.\n\nBut the petitioners who are complainants cannot be heard to say so for there is no discrimination as against any complainant. It has to be borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the government a!1d not i'1 a minor official. Further, we are not now concerned with any such question. We have merely to see whether the court could take cognisance of the case without previous sanction and for this purpose the court has to find out if the act complained against was committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Once this is settled, the case proceeds or is thrown out. Whether sanction is to be accorded or not is a matter for the government to consider.\n\nTheabsolute power to accord or withhold sanction conferred on the government is irrelevant and foreign to the duty cast on the court, which is the ascertainment of the true nature of the act.\n\nThe objection based on entry into the wrong premises is of no substance ; it is quite probable that the warrant specified 17 instead of P. 17 by a bona fide mistake or error ; or it may be that the party madean honest mistake.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the account books, etc., were found in P. 17, the premises raided.\n\nSlightly differing tests have been laid down in thedecided cases to aseertain the scope and the meaning of the relevant words occurring in section 197 of the Code ; \"any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty\". But the difference is only in language and not in substance. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence ; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty.\n\nThere must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits.\n\nWhat we must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation.\n\nIn Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown(1), Sulaiman, J. observes:\n\n\"The section cannot be confined to only such acts\n\na5 arc done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor is it necessary to go to the length of saying that the act constituting the offence should be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction\".\n\nThe interpretation that found favour with Varadachariar, J. in the same case is stated by him in these terms at page 187 : \"There must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it\".\n\nIn affirming this view, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observe in Gill's case(s) \"A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the\n\ndischarg~ of his official duty, if l.lis act is such as to\n\n(l) f1939] F.G, R. 159, 178.\n\n(2) tl948] L.tl. 7~ I.A. H.\n\nMattljog Doi# v H.C. Bfiari\n\nChandrasekfttwc\n\nA!Yat' J.\n\n-MtJtajog Dobty\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\nl C Jumdras1khara\n\nA!Jar ].\n\nlie within the scope of his official duty .... The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office\". Hori Ram's case( 1) is referred to with approval in the later case of Lieutenant Hector Thomas Huntley v. The King-Emperor(') but the test laid down that it must be established that the act complained of was an official act appears to us unduly to narrow down the scope of the protection afforded by section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code as defined and understood in the earlier case. The decision in Meads\n\nv. The King(') does not carry us any further ; it adopts the reasoning in Gill's case(').\n\nThere are two cases of this Court to which reference may be made here. In Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay('), Bose, J. observes as follows : \"Now it is obvious that if section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly, it can never be applied, for of course, it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharged of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The section has content and its language must be given meaning\". The question of previous sanction also arose in Amrik Singh v. The State of PEPSU('). A fairly lengthy discussion of the authorities is followed up with this summary : \"If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under section 197 (I) would be necessary ; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required\".\n\nThe result of the foregoing discussion is this : There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty ; the act must bear such\n\n(I) [1939) F.C.R. 159, 178.\n\n(2) [1944) F.C.R. 262.\n\n(3) [1948] L.R. 75 I.A. 185.\n\n\\4! [1948) L.R. 751.A. 41.\n\n(5) [1955] I S.C.R. 1177, 1186. (6J [1955] l S.C.R. 1302, 1307, 1308.\n\nrelation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.\n\nIs the need for sanction to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained ? At first sight, it seems as though there is some support for this view in Hori Ram's case and also in Sarjoo Prasad v. The King-Emperor( 1 ). Sulaiman, J. says that as the prohibition is against the institution itself, its applicability must be judged in the first instance at the earliest stage of institution.\n\nVaradachariar, J. also states that the question must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceeding. But a careful perusal of the later parts of their judgments shows that they did not intend to lay down any such proposition. Sulaiman, J. refers (at page 179) to the prosecution case as disclosed by the complaint or the police report and he winds up the discussions in these words : \"Of course, if the case as put forward fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in execution of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped and the complaint dismissed on that ground\". The other learned Judge also states at page 185, \"At this stage we have only to see whether the case alleged ag:iinst the appellant or sought. to be proved against him relates to acts done or purporting to be done by him in the execution of his duty\". It must be so. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings.\n\nThe complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty ; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction.\n\nWhether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage.\n\nThe necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case.\n\n\\Ve are not prepared to concede in favour of the\n\n(I) [1945] F.C.R. 227.\n\nMatajog Doh.,\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\nChandrasekhara;\n\nAryar].\n\nMatajog Dobey\n\nH. C. Bhari\n\nChandrasekhar a\n\nAjyar J.\n\nappellants the correctness of the extreme proposition advanced by Mr. Isaacs on their behalf that when obstruction is laid or resistance offered against an authorised and therefore lawful search, the officials conducting the search have no right to remove or cause to be removed the obstruction or resistance by the employment of reasonable force, and their remedy is only to resort to the police or the magistracy with a complaint. Such a view would frustrate the due discharge to the official duty and defeat the very object of the search, as the books, etc. might be secreted or destroyed in the interval ; and it would encourage obstruction or resistance even to lawful acts. It may be that more than reasonable force is used to clear the obstruction or remove the resistance, but that would be a fit subject-matter for inqmry during the proceedings ; it would not make the act of removal improper or unlawful. It is a matter for doubt if Chapter V and VII of the Criminal Procedure Code can be read as an exhaustive enumeration of all the powers of a search party. Anyhow, section 6, sub-section (9) of the Investigation Commission Act makes the provisions relating to searches applicable only \"so far as they can be made applicable\".\n\nThe two English cases relied on are scarcely of any help. In Jones v. Owen('), a rather startling view was taken that a power to apprehend a person for a statutory offence did not include a power to move that person gently aside. Hatton v. Treeby(') was a case where the Act of Parliament which created a new offence did not in itself provide for a power of detention of the offender.\n\nWhere a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution . . If in the exercise of the power or the performance\n\n(1) (1823) L.J. Reports (KB) 139; 2 D. & R. 600.\n\n(2) (1897] L.R. 2 Q.B.D. 452.\n\nof the official duty, improper or unlawful obstruction or resistance is encountered, .. there must be the right to use reasonable means to remove the obstruction or overcome the resistance.\n\nThis accords with om monsense and does not seem contrary to any principle of law. The true position is neatly stated thus in Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Ed., at page 312 : \"It is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command\".\n\nLet us however assume that Mr. Isaacs is right in his contention. Still, it can be urged that the accused could claim that what they did was in the discharge of their official duty. The belief that they had a right to get rid of the obstruction then and there by binding down the complaints or removing them from the place might be mistaken, but, surely, it could not be said that their act was necessarily ma/a fide and so entirely divor.ced from or unconnected with the discharge of their duty that it was an independent act maliciously done or perpetrated.\n\nThey could reasonably claim that what they did was in virtue of their official duty, whether the claim is found ultimately to be well-founded or not.\n\nReading the complaints alone in these two cases, even without the details of facts as narrated by the witnesses at the judicial inquiries, it is fairly clear that the assault and use of criminal force, etc. alleged against the accused are definitely related to the performance of their official duties.\n\nBut taken along with them, it seems to us to be an obvious case for sanction. The injuries-a couple of abrasions and a swelling on Nandram Agarwala and two ecchymosis on Matajog-indicate nothing more than a scuffle which is likely to have ensued when there were angry protests against the search and a pushing aside of the protestors so that the search may go on unimpeded.\n\nMr. Isaacs finally pointed out that the fourth accused Nageswar Tewari was a constable and the case should have been allowed to proceed against him at least. This question arises only in Nandram Agarwala's case. The Magistrate who dismissed the cori-\n\nMaiqjo6 Dsbf.1\n\nH. C. Bluzri\n\nClrmldrasiklwa\n\nAjy\"' ].\n\nMatajog Dobey\n\nH. C. B/UJri\n\nChandrast/chara\n\nAi1ar ].\n\nplaint took the view that there was no use in proceeding against him alone, as the main attack was directed against the Income-Tax Officials.\n\nNo such grievance was urged, before the High Court and it is. not raised in the grounds for special leave.\n\nWe hold that the orders of the High Court are correct and dismiss these two appeals.\n\nMERLA RAMANNA\n\nfl.\n\nNALLAPARAJU AND OTHERS.\n\n[BHAGWATI,\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nB. P. SINHA JJ.1\n\nCourt, Pou1er of-Suit to set aside sale held in excessive execution of the decree-Afaintainability-Plaint, if may be treated as an execution application-Lin1itation-lnherent jurisdiction of court to whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the decree is transferred-Failure to raise objection at the earliest stage-Waiver-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), s. 47-lndian Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art;. 165, 166, 181.\n\nThe appellant \\Vas the assignee of a mortgage dated 14-12-1911~ cxec.itcd by A, \\.vhich con1prised lands belonging to the mortgagor and also a mortgage executed by the respondents in his favour on 19-7-1909. 1\"he app..:llant instituted a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge of l(akina<la, for the recovery of the arpount due on the mortgage, dated 14-l~-1911, and prayed for sale of the hypotheca. 1\"he respondents were impfcaded as defendants but did not appear.\n\nThe s1_1!t \\Vas <lccreed ex parte, an<l in execution of the decree, the propcrtie'> of th~ respondents, 1nortgage<l to A on 19-7-1909, were brought t0 saie, an<l pun.:haseJ !:y the decree-hol<ler.\n\nThe respondents then instituted the present suit in the District Court of East\n\n(odavari \\vhich then had jurisdiction O\\'Lr the properties in suit, for a declaruion that the decree obtained by the appellant \\Vas fraudulent and inupcrative and could not affect their title. The plaint was later on a1nended and a prayer added that the properties might be partitioned and the respondents put in separate possession of their\n\nsbre. The trial Judge dis1nisscd the suit and the District Court in appeal affirn1ed his decision. Before the High Court in second appeal it \\Va.s contendL:l for the first time that the decree in question did not diect a sale of the mortgaged properties but a sale of the mortgagee's rights under the mortgage deed dated 19~7-1909 and as such the sale of the properties v.'a::; void.\n\nThe High Court having called for a finding from the District Court as to what was sold, it was", "total_entities": 137, "entities": [{"text": "MATAJOG DOBEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MATAJOG DOBEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. C. BHARI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "H. C. 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Bhari\n\naccuserl could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty."}}, {"text": "H.C. Bhari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2531, "end_char": 2541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge -0f official duty ; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the\n\nOctohr 31\n\nMoJajoz Dobey\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\naccuserl could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.", "canonical_name": "H. C. Bluzri"}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2725, "end_char": 2751, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 41", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3951, "end_char": 3973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1939) F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4004, "end_char": 4021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1944) F.C.R. 262", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4139, "end_char": 4156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1955) 1 S.C.R. 1177", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4213, "end_char": 4233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1955) 1 S.C.R. 1302", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4270, "end_char": 4290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1945) F.C.R. 227", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4327, "end_char": 4344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. C. Isaacs", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4802, "end_char": 4814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs ( C. P. Lal with him) for the !"}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs ( C. P. Lal with him) for the !"}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4868, "end_char": 4882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General ofi India A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale with him) for the dents in both appeals."}}, {"text": "India A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4906, "end_char": 4920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General ofi India A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale with him) for the dents in both appeals."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4925, "end_char": 4938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General ofi India A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale with him) for the dents in both appeals."}}, {"text": "CttANDRASEKHARA A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5067, "end_char": 5088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCttANDRASEKHARA A1YAR J .-These appeals come before us on special leave to appeal granted under article 136 of the Constitution against two orders of the Calcutta High Court dismissing Criminal Revision Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5163, "end_char": 5174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5221, "end_char": 5240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCttANDRASEKHARA A1YAR J .-These appeals come before us on special leave to appeal granted under article 136 of the Constitution against two orders of the Calcutta High Court dismissing Criminal Revision Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5418, "end_char": 5425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "559 of 1951, the High Court (Harries, C.J. and Banerjee, J.) confirmed .an order made by a Presidency Magistrate discharging the accused on the ground of want of sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5436, "end_char": 5444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "559 of 1951, the High Court (Harries, C.J. and Banerjee, J.) confirmed .an order made by a Presidency Magistrate discharging the accused on the ground of want of sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5579, "end_char": 5602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Guha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "312 of 1952, Lahiri ; and Guha, JJ."}}, {"text": "Income Tax Investigation Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5982, "end_char": 6017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In connection with certain proceedings pending before the Income Tax Investigation Commission it was found necessary to search two premises-17, Kalakar Street and 36, Armenian Street to inspect, take copies and secure possession of certain books, papers and documents believed to be in them."}}, {"text": "H. C. Bhari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6307, "end_char": 6318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A warrant was issued by the Commission for this purpose in favour of four persons, namely, H. C. Bhari, A. D. De, A. K.\n\nBose and P. Mukherjee, to carry out the search.", "canonical_name": "H. C. Bluzri"}}, {"text": "A. D. De", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6320, "end_char": 6328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A warrant was issued by the Commission for this purpose in favour of four persons, namely, H. C. Bhari, A. D. De, A. K.\n\nBose and P. Mukherjee, to carry out the search."}}, {"text": "A. K.\n\nBose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6330, "end_char": 6341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A warrant was issued by the Commission for this purpose in favour of four persons, namely, H. C. Bhari, A. D. De, A. K.\n\nBose and P. Mukherjee, to carry out the search."}}, {"text": "P. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6346, "end_char": 6358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A warrant was issued by the Commission for this purpose in favour of four persons, namely, H. C. Bhari, A. D. De, A. K.\n\nBose and P. Mukherjee, to carry out the search."}}, {"text": "Matajog Dobey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6495, "end_char": 6508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Matajog Dobey, (Appellant in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "MATAJOG DOBEY"}}, {"text": "Kashiram Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6563, "end_char": 6580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "67), the darwan of Kashiram Agarwala, says that when he found them forcibly breaking open the entrance door of the flat he challenged them and requested them to desist."}}, {"text": "27-12-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6928, "end_char": 6938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts, he filed a complaint on 27-12-1950 against H.C. Bhari and three others (names unknown) under sections 323, 341, 342 and 109, Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "H.C. Bhari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6947, "end_char": 6957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts, he filed a complaint on 27-12-1950 against H.C. Bhari and three others (names unknown) under sections 323, 341, 342 and 109, Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "H. C. Bluzri"}}, {"text": "sections 323, 341, 342 and 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6997, "end_char": 7027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7029, "end_char": 7046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "H.C. Bhari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7093, "end_char": 7103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.C. Bhari\n\nClumdraukhara\n\n.diJ'M J.\n\nThe four officials and some policemen raided the Armenian Street premises on the evening of 26-12-1950.", "canonical_name": "H. C. Bluzri"}}, {"text": "Nandram Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7236, "end_char": 7252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandram Agarwala (father of Kashiram Agarwala) came to the place and found that they had forcibly opened the lock of the door of the room in which there were several books and papers, which they were collecting and packing into bundles for removal."}}, {"text": "sections 323, 342 and 504", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8236, "end_char": 8261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8263, "end_char": 8280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bibhuti Chakravarti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8334, "end_char": 8353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, the names e>f two police officers were given-Bibhuti Chakravarti and Nageswar Tiwari."}}, {"text": "Nageswar Tiwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8358, "end_char": 8373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, the names e>f two police officers were given-Bibhuti Chakravarti and Nageswar Tiwari.", "canonical_name": "Nageswar Tiwari"}}, {"text": "21-2-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8465, "end_char": 8474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21-2-1951, the magistrate held on Agarwala's complaint that a prima facie case had ."}}, {"text": "Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8499, "end_char": 8507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21-2-1951, the magistrate held on Agarwala's complaint that a prima facie case had ."}}, {"text": "section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8570, "end_char": 8581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8621, "end_char": 8632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8715, "end_char": 8726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "1-5-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8756, "end_char": 8764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1-5-1951, two prosecution witnesses were examined in chief and the case stood adjourned to 22-5-1951."}}, {"text": "22-5-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8847, "end_char": 8856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1-5-1951, two prosecution witnesses were examined in chief and the case stood adjourned to 22-5-1951."}}, {"text": "Bhari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8907, "end_char": 8912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st accused Bhari filed a petition, taking the objection of want of sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 8989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8991, "end_char": 9014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31-5-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9074, "end_char": 9083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objection was uphdd and all the accused discharged on 31-5-1951."}}, {"text": "Matajog Dobey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Matajog Dobey's complaint, after the termination of the inquiry, process was issued .only against Bhari under sections 323 and 342, Indian Penal Code for 22-12-1951.", "canonical_name": "MATAJOG DOBEY"}}, {"text": "sections 323 and 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9333, "end_char": 9350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "22-12-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9355, "end_char": 9365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Matajog Dobey's complaint, after the termination of the inquiry, process was issued .only against Bhari under sections 323 and 342, Indian Penal Code for 22-12-1951."}}, {"text": "26-2-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9410, "end_char": 9419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some adjournments, accused filed on 26-2-1952 a petition as in the other case rais.- ing the same objection."}}, {"text": "Gill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9843, "end_char": 9847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "559 of 1951) Chief Justice Harries and Banerjee, J. held that the test formulated by the Privy Council in Gill's case(1) applied and that on a fair reading of the complaint, bereft of exaggerations and falsehoods, the officers could reasonably claim that what they did was done by them in the exercise of their official duty."}}, {"text": "Lahiri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10153, "end_char": 10159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "312 of 1952), the learned Judges (Lahiri and Guha, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10519, "end_char": 10525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Isaacs, learned counsel for the appellants in the two appeals, challenged the soundness of these conclusions and advanced three categorical contentions."}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I.A. 41", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11370, "end_char": 11385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11537, "end_char": 11548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11589, "end_char": 11599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11604, "end_char": 11613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "XXX of Criminal ProceJure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11654, "end_char": 11684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11789, "end_char": 11798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XXX of Criminal ProceJure Code", "statute": "XXX of Criminal ProceJure Code"}}, {"text": "drew our attention to the sections of the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12229, "end_char": 12294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 6(7) and 6(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12449, "end_char": 12471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He drew our attention to the sections of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "He drew our attention to the sections of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Calcutta-7", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12999, "end_char": 13009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "313) and connecteJ cases have been kept dnJ are to be foun<l in (i) the third floor, 17, Kalakar Street, Calcutta (ii) 47, Khengraputty Street, Calcutta-7, and (iii) the second floor and adjoining rooms, 36, Armenian Street, Calcutta, compound, offices and out-houses or other places in that locality."}}, {"text": "H. C. Bhari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13200, "end_char": 13211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is tG authorise and require you, Sri H. C. Bhari, AuthoriseJ Official, Income-tax Investigation Commission,\n\n(a) to enter anJ search with such agsistance of police officers as may be required, the said premises -0r any other place or places where you may have\n\nreason to believe that such books, documents or papers may be found ;\n\n(b) to place identification marks on such books, documents and papers as may be found and as you may consider relevant to the proceedings aforesaid and to make a list thereof together with particulars of the identification marks ; ( c) to make copies or extracts from such books, documents and papers ; ( d) to seize such books, documents and papers and take possession thereof ; and ( e) to exercise all other powers and duties under the said sections and the Rules relating thereto\".", "canonical_name": "H. C. Bluzri"}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14560, "end_char": 14571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14573, "end_char": 14596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14935, "end_char": 14944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15095, "end_char": 15105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15122, "end_char": 15133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15135, "end_char": 15158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Matajog Dobe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15414, "end_char": 15426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued that\n\nMatajog Dobe_,\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\nChnndrasekhara\n\nAjyar J.\n\n19M\n\nMot<Jo11 Dob,,\n\nH, G. B/ul.ri\n\nCllM4tWtk!orro\n\nAiyar :J.\n\nsection 197, Criminal Procedure Code vested an absolutely arbitrary power .", "canonical_name": "MATAJOG DOBEY"}}, {"text": "Ajyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15458, "end_char": 15463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued that\n\nMatajog Dobe_,\n\nH.C. Bhari\n\nChnndrasekhara\n\nAjyar J.\n\n19M\n\nMot<Jo11 Dob,,\n\nH, G. B/ul.ri\n\nCllM4tWtk!orro\n\nAiyar :J.\n\nsection 197, Criminal Procedure Code vested an absolutely arbitrary power ."}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15531, "end_char": 15542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15544, "end_char": 15567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17788, "end_char": 17799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18182, "end_char": 18193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sulaiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18901, "end_char": 18909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown(1), Sulaiman, J. observes:\n\n\"The section cannot be confined to only such acts\n\na5 arc done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty."}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19384, "end_char": 19397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The interpretation that found favour with Varadachariar, J. in the same case is stated by him in these terms at page 187 : \"There must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it\"."}}, {"text": "Hori Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20180, "end_char": 20188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hori Ram's case( 1) is referred to with approval in the later case of Lieutenant Hector Thomas Huntley v. The King-Emperor(') but the test laid down that it must be established that the act complained of was an official act appears to us unduly to narrow down the scope of the protection afforded by section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code as defined and understood in the earlier case."}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20480, "end_char": 20491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20816, "end_char": 20820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay('), Bose, J. observes as follows : \"Now it is obvious that if section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly, it can never be applied, for of course, it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be."}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20874, "end_char": 20885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20893, "end_char": 20919, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21613, "end_char": 21624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1939) F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22025, "end_char": 22042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1944) F.C.R. 262", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22054, "end_char": 22071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 75 I.A. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22085, "end_char": 22101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 227", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24328, "end_char": 24345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Matajog Doh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24348, "end_char": 24359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Matajog Doh.,", "canonical_name": "MATAJOG DOBEY"}}, {"text": "H. C. Bhari\n\nChandrasekhar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24416, "end_char": 24442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Matajog Dobey\n\nH. C. Bhari\n\nChandrasekhar a\n\nAjyar J.\n\nappellants the correctness of the extreme proposition advanced by Mr. Isaacs on their behalf that when obstruction is laid or resistance offered against an authorised and therefore lawful search, the officials conducting the search have no right to remove or cause to be removed the obstruction or resistance by the employment of reasonable force, and their remedy is only to resort to the police or the magistracy with a complaint."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25534, "end_char": 25543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25975, "end_char": 25985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hatton v. Treeby(') was a case where the Act of Parliament which created a new offence did not in itself provide for a power of detention of the offender."}}, {"text": "Broom", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26899, "end_char": 26904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The true position is neatly stated thus in Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Ed.,"}}, {"text": "Matajog", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28280, "end_char": 28287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injuries-a couple of abrasions and a swelling on Nandram Agarwala and two ecchymosis on Matajog-indicate nothing more than a scuffle which is likely to have ensued when there were angry protests against the search and a pushing aside of the protestors so that the search may go on unimpeded.", "canonical_name": "MATAJOG DOBEY"}}, {"text": "Nageswar Tewari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28540, "end_char": 28555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Isaacs finally pointed out that the fourth accused Nageswar Tewari was a constable and the case should have been allowed to proceed against him at least.", "canonical_name": "Nageswar Tiwari"}}, {"text": "H. C. Bluzri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28753, "end_char": 28765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Magistrate who dismissed the cori-\n\nMaiqjo6 Dsbf.1\n\nH. C. Bluzri\n\nClrmldrasiklwa\n\nAjy\"' ].", "canonical_name": "H. C. Bluzri"}}, {"text": "MERLA RAMANNA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29186, "end_char": 29199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MERLA RAMANNA\n\nfl."}}, {"text": "NALLAPARAJU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29206, "end_char": 29217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NALLAPARAJU AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29243, "end_char": 29260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[BHAGWATI,\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nB. P. SINHA JJ.1\n\nCourt, Pou1er of-Suit to set aside sale held in excessive execution of the decree-Afaintainability-Plaint, if may be treated as an execution application-Lin1itation-lnherent jurisdiction of court to whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the decree is transferred-Failure to raise objection at the earliest stage-Waiver-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), s. 47-lndian Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art;."}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29266, "end_char": 29277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[BHAGWATI,\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nB. P. SINHA JJ.1\n\nCourt, Pou1er of-Suit to set aside sale held in excessive execution of the decree-Afaintainability-Plaint, if may be treated as an execution application-Lin1itation-lnherent jurisdiction of court to whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the decree is transferred-Failure to raise objection at the earliest stage-Waiver-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), s. 47-lndian Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art;."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29606, "end_char": 29629, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29647, "end_char": 29652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29660, "end_char": 29674, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30187, "end_char": 30189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19-7-1909", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30307, "end_char": 30316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The s1_1!t \\Vas <lccreed ex parte, an<l in execution of the decree, the propcrtie'> of th~ respondents, 1nortgage<l to A on 19-7-1909, were brought t0 saie, an<l pun.:haseJ !:"}}, {"text": "District Court of East\n\n(odavari", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30437, "end_char": 30469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents then instituted the present suit in the District Court of East\n\n(odavari \\vhich then had jurisdiction O\\'Lr the properties in suit, for a declaruion that the decree obtained by the appellant \\Vas fraudulent and inupcrative and could not affect their title."}}, {"text": "19~7-1909", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31125, "end_char": 31134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the High Court in second appeal it \\Va.s contendL:l for the first time that the decree in question did not diect a sale of the mortgaged properties but a sale of the mortgagee's rights under the mortgage deed dated 19~7-1909 and as such the sale of the properties v.'a::; void."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_938_954_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Matajog Dobey\n\nH. C. B/UJri\n\nChandrast/chara\n\nAi1ar ].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1955J\n\nplaint took the view that there was no use in proceeding against him alone, as the main attack was directed against the Income-Tax Officials.\n\nNo such grievance was urged, before the High Court and it is. not raised in the grounds for special leave.\n\nWe hold that the orders of the High Court are correct and dismiss these two appeals.\n\nMERLA RAMANNA\n\nfl.\n\nNALLAPARAJU AND OTHERS.\n\n[BHAGWATI,\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nB. P. SINHA JJ.1\n\nCourt, Pou1er of-Suit to set aside sale held in excessive execution of the decree-Afaintainability-Plaint, if may be treated as an execution application-Lin1itation-lnherent jurisdiction of court to whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the decree is transferred-Failure to raise objection at the earliest stage-Waiver-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), s. 47-lndian Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art;. 165, 166, 181.\n\nThe appellant \\Vas the assignee of a mortgage dated 14-12-1911~ cxec.itcd by A, \\.vhich con1prised lands belonging to the mortgagor and also a mortgage executed by the respondents in his favour on 19-7-1909. 1\"he app..:llant instituted a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge of l(akina<la, for the recovery of the arpount due on the mortgage, dated 14-l~-1911, and prayed for sale of the hypotheca. 1\"he respondents were impfcaded as defendants but did not appear.\n\nThe s1_1!t \\Vas <lccreed ex parte, an<l in execution of the decree, the propcrtie'> of th~ respondents, 1nortgage<l to A on 19-7-1909, were brought t0 saie, an<l pun.:haseJ !:y the decree-hol<ler.\n\nThe respondents then instituted the present suit in the District Court of East\n\n(odavari \\vhich then had jurisdiction O\\'Lr the properties in suit, for a declaruion that the decree obtained by the appellant \\Vas fraudulent and inupcrative and could not affect their title. The plaint was later on a1nended and a prayer added that the properties might be partitioned and the respondents put in separate possession of their\n\nsbre. The trial Judge dis1nisscd the suit and the District Court in appeal affirn1ed his decision. Before the High Court in second appeal it \\Va.s contendL:l for the first time that the decree in question did not diect a sale of the mortgaged properties but a sale of the mortgagee's rights under the mortgage deed dated 19~7-1909 and as such the sale of the properties v.'a::; void.\n\nThe High Court having called for a finding from the District Court as to what was sold, it was\n\nfound by that Court that the decree had really directed a sale of the mortgagee's rights and not of the properties mortgaged and that there was excessive execution. It was, however, of opinion that the point should have been taken before the executing court and .the suit in so far a:; it claimed relief on the basis of excessive execution was barred under s. 4 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court declined to entertain the objection that the suit was barred under s. 47 as it had not been taken in the written statement and was raised for the first time in second appeal, and decreed the respondent's suit.\n\nIt was contended for the appellant that the High Court should have entertained the objection and held that the suit was so barred.\n\nHeld, that the appellant should be permitted to raise the contention.\n\nThe point relating to excessive execution had never been specifically raised except before the High Court and the allegations in the plaint were vague and obscure. It is a pure question of law which requires no further investigation of facts and was understood and debated as such by the parties before the District Court.\n\nThat it was well settled that the question whether an execution sale was in excess of the decree and. therefore, not warranted by it could be raised as between the parties only by an application under s. 47 of the Code before the executing court and not by a separate suit. f. Marret v. Md. K. Shira.zi & Sons\n\n(A.LR. 1930 P. C. 86), Venknt.?chalapathy Ai yen v. Perumal Ai yen ( [ 1912] M.W.N. 44 ), Biru Mahata v. Shyama Charan Khawas ( f18951 I.LR. 22 Cal. 483), Abdul Karim v. Islamunnissa Bibi (f19161 I.LR. 38 All. 339) and Lakshminarayan v.\n\nLaduram\n\n( [ 1931 J A.LR. 1932 Born. 96), approved.\n\nThat the court, however, had the power to treat the plaint in the suit as an application under s. 4 7 subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction.\n\nThat he application was not barred under Art. 165 as it applied only to applications for restoration to possession by persons other than judgment-debtors and had no application to the present case.\n\nVachali Rohini v. Kombi Aliassan ( [ 1919] I.LR. 42 Mad. 753 ), Ratnam Aiyar v. Krishna Doss Vital Doss ( [1897] I.LR. 21 Mad. 494), Rasul v. Amina ([1922] I.LR. 46 Born. 1031) and Bahir Das\n\nv. Girish Chandra ([1922] A.LR. 1923 Cal. 287), approved.\n\nNor could Art. 166 apply since it had application only where the sale was voidable and not void and had to be set aside. That the article applicable to a case of a void sale such as the present was Art. l R 1 of the Indian Limitation Act . . Seshaf!iri Rao v. Srinivasa Rao (f 1919] I.LR. 43 Mad. 313), Ra7agopaltt'r v. Ramanujachariar ([1923] l.L.R. 47 Mad. 288), Monmothanath Chose v. Lach mi Devi ( [1927] I.LR. 55 Cal. 96), Nirode Kali Roy v. Hart:ndra Nath (I.L.R. [1938] 1 Cal. 280), and 5-85 S.C. Iudia/59\n\nM1rla RamaMa v.\n\nN allapcraju\n\nand otkrs\n\nMn/a Ra...,...\n\nNollaparaju\n\nand oJ/rlr.s\n\nMa We Gyan v. Maung Than Byu (A.LR. 1937 Rang. 126), ap proved.\n\nThat the starting point of limitation for an application under Art. 181 would be the date of dispossession by the purchaser and not the date of the void sale which had no existence in law and the plaint in the present suit, treated as an application, having been filed within 3 years of such dispossession was in time.\n\nChengalraya v. Kollapuri (A.LR. 1930 Mad. 12), approved. 1'hat the District Court of East Godavari to \\vhose jurisdiction the properties had been transferred before the present suit was instituted had by reason of such transfer acquired an inherent jurisdiction over them and if it entertained an application for executior, with reference to them such action was no more than an irregula.r /\n\nassumption of jurisdiction and no objection to jurisdiction having been taken by the appellant at the earliest opportunity he must be deemed to have waived it and, consequently, there was no legal bar to treating the plaint as an execution application under s. 47 of the Code.\n\nBalakrishnayya v. Linga Rao (I.L.R. [1943] Mad. 804), applied.\n\nCasela w discussed.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 183 of 1952.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 16th day of February, 1950 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 1826 of 1945 from Original Decree dated the 16th March, 1945, of the Court of District Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry in A.S. No. 32 of 1943 arising out of the Decree dated the 31st October, 1942, of the Court of Sub-Judge, Rajahmundry in Suit No. 17 of 1940 and O.S. No. 39 of 1939.\n\nB. Somayya (K. R. Chaudhury and Naunit Lal, with him) for the appellant.\n\nK. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, (K. R. Krishnaswamy, with him) for respondents Nos. 1 to 4.\n\n1955.\n\nNovember 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-This IS an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Madras High Court in a second appeal which reversed the concurrent judgments of the .courts below, and granted a decree\n\nin favour of the respondents for partition and possession of 126 acres 33 cents out of a parcel of land of the extent of 503 acres 18 cents in the village of Kalavacherla and of 10 acres 12 cents out of a parcel of land of the extent of 40 acres 47 cents in the village of Nandarada, with mesne profits, past and future.\n\nAll these lands measuring 543 acres 65 cents were purchased by five co-sharers on 5-6-1888 under two sale deeds, Exhibits P and P-1. One of these shares of the extent of about 218 acres was, at the mateiral dates, held in common by· two brothers, Rangaraju and Kumara, the former owning 136 acres 45 cents and the latter 81 acres 45 cents.\n\nOn 19-8-1908 Kumara executed a simple mortgage, Exhibit Q, over 81 acres 45 cents belonging to him for Rs. 1,000 in favour of Nallapparaju, who with his undivided brother, Achutaramaraju, held a share in the two parcels of land aforesaid in Kalavacherla and Nandarada.\n\nOn 19-7-1909 both Rangaraju and Kumara executed a mortgage, Exhibit A, for Rs. 2,000 over all the 218 acres belonging to them in favour of Achutaramaraju. On 4-6-1910 Kumara again created a mortgage over 81 acres 45 cents belonging to him, Exhibit Q-1 for Rs. 2,500 in favour of Achutaramaraju. On 14-12-1911 Achutaramaraju executed a mortgage for Rs. 14,000 in favour of one Merla Agastayya, Exhibit C, over the properties which he held in full ownership as co-sharer, and also the mortgage right which he -held over the properties belonging to Rangaraju and Kumara under the three mortgage deeds, Exhibits Q, A and Q-1. On 29-8-1920 Kumara sold the 81 acres 45 .cents belonging to him and comprised in the mortgages aforesaid to Achutaramaraju for Rs. 11,000 as per Exhibit G, and thereby the two deeds, Exhibits Q and Q-1 became completely discharged and Exhibit A to the extent of the half share of Kumara. The position then was that Achutaramaraju became the owner of 81 acres 45 cents out of the properties mortgaged under Exhibit A, and continued to be a simple mortgagee as regards the rest of them to the extent of half the amount due therein.\n\nBy virtue of section 70 of the Transfer of\n\nMerla RmnanM\n\nN allaparaju\n\nand others\n\nV1nkatarama\n\nAJ7ar ].\n\nMtr[a Ramantt4.\n\nN al/a/)araju\n\nmu/ others\n\nVtnkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nProperty Act, the sale under Exhibit G would enure for the benefit of the mortgagee, Merla Agastayya, being an accession to the interest of his mortgagor.\n\nOn 20-1-1924 the representatives of Merla Agastayya assigned their interests in the mortgage, Exhibit C, to the present appellant, who instituted O.S.\n\nNo. 25 of 1927 on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada to recover the amount due thereon by sale of the hypotheca. Achutaramaraju, the mortgagor, and the members of his family were defendants 1 to 4 in that suit. Kumara was impleaded as the 14th defendant and Rangaraju and his son as defendants 15 and 16. In the plaint, it was alleged that the properties comprised in the mortgage deed, Exhibit C, consisted of the properties belonging to the mortgagors in full ownership as co-sharers and also of the mortgage right under Exhibits Q, A and Q-1.\n\nThen there was an allegation that defendants 1 to 4 had themselves purchased the mortgaged properties \"towards discharge of the first defendant's mortgage debts\".\n\nAs a statement of fact, this was not accurate, because the purchase by Achutaramaraju was only of 81 acres 45 cents belonging to Kumara and the remaining properties continued to be held by Rangaraju, and Achutaramaraju was only a mortgagee thereof under Exhibit A.\n\nThere were the further allegations that defendants 14 to 16 were impleaded as parties because they were in possession of the properties, and that they were the predecessors-in-title in respect of the properties which were mortgaged under Exhibits Q, A and Q-1. Then there was the general prayer for the sale of the properties.\n\nThe mortgagors, defendants 1 to 4, entered into a compromise with the plaintiff, while defendants 14 to 16 remained ex parte.\n\nOn 31-1-1931 the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise as against defendants 1 to 4 and ex parte as against defendants 14 to 16, and a final decree was passed on 6-11-1932. On 23-8-1934 the decree-holder filed E.P. No. 99 of 1934 praying for the sale of the hypotheca including the properties mentioned in Exhibit A.\n\nDefendants 15 and 16 then intervened, and filed an objection to\n\ntheir being sold on the ground that the mortgage had been discharged in 1923, and that the ex parte decree against them had been obtained fraudulently.\n\nThis application was rejected by the Subordinate Judge on 26-8-1935, and an appeal against this order to the High Court, Madras was also dismissed on 1-9-1938.\n\nMeanwhile, 163 acres 18 cents out of the properties mortgaged under Exhibit A, of which 81 acres 86} cents belonged to Rangaraju, were brought to sale. on the 14th and 15th April, 1936, and purchased by the decree-holder himself. The sale was confirmed on 26-6-1936, and possession taken on 15-12-1936. But before possession was taken, on 14-12-1936 Rangaraju and his sons instituted O.S. No. 268 of 1936 in the District Munsif's Court, Rajahmundry for a declaration that tl1e decree in O.S. No. 25 of 1927 had been obtained fraudulently, and that the decree-holder was not entitled to execute the decree as against their properties.\n\nAn objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Munsif to try this suit, and eventually, the plaint was returned to be presented to the proper court. Thereupon, they instituted on 7-8-1939 the present suit, 0.S. No. 39 of 1939 on the file of the District Court, East Godavari for a declaration that the decree in 0.S. No. 25 of 1927 was obtained by suppressing service of summons, and was therefore void and .could not affect their title to 136 acres 45 cents which were mortgaged under Exhibit A. The suit was transferred to the court of the Subordinate Judge of Rajahmundry, and was numbered as O.S. No. 79 of 1940.\n\nIn his written statement, the appellant denied that the decree in O.S. No. 25 of 1927 was obtained fraudulently, and contended that the present suit was barred by limitation. He also pleaded that as he had purchased the properties in execution of the decree and obtained possession thereof, the suit which was one for a bare declaration that the decree was void and inexecutable was not maintainable.\n\nIt must be mentio;1ed that while 81 acres 86! cents of land belonging to Rangaraju and his sons had been sold on the 14th and 15th April, 1936, their remaning properties of the\n\nMerla Rsmimna , ..\n\nNal/llparqju\n\nand othns\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMerla Ramanna\n\nNaUaparaju\n\nand others\n\nVfnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nextent of 54 acres 58i cents were sold after the institution of O.S. No. 268 of 1936 in the court of the District Munsif, Rajahmundry. In view of the objections aforesaid, the plaintiffs amended the plaint by adding a prayer that 136 acres 45 cents out of the total of 543 acres 65 cents in schedule A and belonging to them might be partitioned and put in their separate possession.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge of Rajahmundry dismissed the suit on the ground that no fraud had been established, and that the suit was barred by limitation in so far as it sought to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud. The plaintiffs appealed against this judgment to the District Court of East Godavari, which by its judgment dated 16th March, 1945 affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge.\n\nThe plaintiffs then preferred Second Appeal No. 1826 in the High Court, Madras. There, for the first time the contention was pressed that the decree in O.S.\n\nNo. 25 of 1927 on its true construction directed a sale only of the mortgage rights which Achutaramaraju had over the A schedule properties, and that the sale of the properties themselves in execution of that decree was in excess of what the decree had directed, and was therefore void, and that the plaintiffs were accordingly entitled to recover possession of those properties ignoring the sale.\n\nSatyanarayana Rao, J. who heard the appeal, construed the plaint as sufficiently raising this question and issue (2) (b) as covering this contention, and accordingly directed the District Judge to return a finding on the question as to whether the sale of the properties was warranted by the terms of the decree. The bistrict Judge of East Godavari to whom this issue was referred, held that the decree directed the sale of only the mortgage rights of Achutaramaraju under Exhibit A, and that the sale of the properties themselves was not in accordance with the decree.\n\nBut he further held that this was an objection relating to the execution of the decree. which could be agitated only before the executing court, and that a separate suit with reference to that matter was barred under section 47, Civil\n\nProcedure Code. On this findings, the second appeal came up for final disposal before Satyanarayana Rao, J. who agreed with the District Judge that the sale of the properties was not authorised by the decree, and was therefore void.\n\nBut he declined to entertain the objection that the suit was barred bv section 47, Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that it had not been taken in the written statement, and was a new contention preferred for the first time at the stage of second appeal.\n\nIn the result, he granted a decree for partition and delivery qf 136 acres 45 cents out of the properties mentioned in schedule A to the plaintiffs, and mesne profits, past and future. Against this judgment, the defendant prefers the present appeal, and insists that the suit is liable to be dismissed as barred by s'ection 47, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant, it was contended by Mr. Somayya that the question whether having regard to section 47 the suit was maintainable was argued before the learned Judge before he called for a finding, and that it ought to have been therefore considered on the merits, and that, in any event, as it was a pure question of law and went to the root of the matter, it ought to have been entertained. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar vehemently contends that as the objection to the maintainability of the suit based on section 47 was not taken in the written statement, the learned Judge had a dis.cretion whether he should permit the point to be raised for the first time in second appeal or not, and that we should not interfere with the exercise of that discretion in special appeal. The basis on which the suit has now been decreed is that the decree in O.S. No. 25 of 1927 properly construed directed only a sale of mortgage rights under Exhibit A and not of the properties, but it must be conceded that this point does not distinctly emerge on the face of the plaint.\n\nIt is true that there are allegations therein which might be read as comprehending that question, but they are vague and elusive, and what is more, . this contention was not argued either in the court of the\n\nM<rla Ramanna\n\nN allaparaju and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nMirta Ramanna\n\nJV allajJMaju\n\nand others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nSubordinate Judge of Rajahmundry or in the District Court of East Godavari, and it is only in second appeal that the question appears to have been first thought of in this form. Though we are not prepared to say that the allegations in the plaint are not suiliciei:t to ·-:over this point, we are of the opinion that they are so obscure that it is possible that the appellant might have missed their true import, and omitted to plead in answer thereto that the suit was barred by section\n\n47. Apart from this, it is to be noted that this point does not involve any fresh investigation of facts.\n\nIndeed, when the matter was before the District Judge in pursuance of the 01\"' er of the High Court calling for a finding, coum\" [ on both sides understood it as involving a decisill11 on this point as well, and the argument proceeded on the footing that i.t was a pure question of law involving no further enquiry on facts.\n\nWe have therefore permitted the appellant to raise this contention.\n\nMr. Somayya for the appellant does not challenge the fine.ling of the District Court confirmed by the High Court that the decree directed only the sale of the mortgage rights of Achutaramaraju under Exhibit A, but he contends that the sale in execution of that decree of not merely the mortgage rights unc.ler Exhibit A but of the properties themselves was excessive execution against which the judgment-debtc:ir was entitled to obtain relief by application to the execution court, and that a separate suit with reference thereto would be barred under section 47, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nIt is well settled that when a sale in execution of a decree is impugned on the ground that it is not warranted by the terms thereof, that question could be agitated, when it arises between parties to the decree, only by an application under section 47, Civil Prnrcdure Code and not in a separate suit.\n\nIn /. Marret v. Md. K. Shirazi & Sons('} the facts were tl 1at Jil order was made by the execution court directing, contrary to the terms of the decree, payment of a certain fund to the decree-holder. A separate suit\n\n(l) A.!.R. 1930 P.C. 86.\n\nhaving been instituted by the judgment-debtor for recovery of the amount on the ground that the payment was not in accordance with the decree, it was held by the Privy Council that the action was barred under section 47. A case directly in point is Venkatachalapathy Aiyen v. Perumal Aiyen(1 ). There, the suit was to enforce a mortgage which related both to properties held in ownership by the mortgagor and mortgage rights held by him. In execution of the decree passed therein, the properties themselves and not merely the mortgage rights wer sold. The judgment-debtor then sued for a declaration that what was sold was only the mortgage right and to recover possession of the properties. It was held that such a suit was barred under section 47. Vide also the decisions in Biru Mahata v.\n\nShyama Charan Khawas( 2 ), Abdul Karim v. Islamunnissa Bibi( ) and Lakshminarayan\n\nv. Laduram(').\n\nThe position is, in our opinion, too well settled to be open to argument, and it must accordingly be held that the present suit is barred under section 47, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThat, however, does not conclude the matter. Section 47, clause (2) enacts that \"the Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under this section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding .... \". Under this provision, this Court has the power to treat the plaint presented on 7-8-1939 as an application under section 47 provided that on that date an application for the relief claimed was not barred by limitation, and provided further that the court in which it was filed was competent to execute the decree. On the question of limitation, the relevant dates are the 14th and 15th April, 1936, when 81 acres 86t cents belonging to the plaintiffs were sold, and 15th December, 1936, when possession was taken thereof through court. As regards the remaining properties, the exact date on which they were sold does not appear on the record, but it is sufficient for the present purpose that it was subsequent to the institution of O.S. No. 268 of 1936 on\n\n(1) [1912] M.W.N. 44.\n\n(2) [1895] I.L.R. 22 Cal. 483.\n\n(3) [1916] I.L.R. 38 All. 339.\n\n(4) [1931] A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 96.\n\nMerltJRant1JMa\n\nN al/a para ju\n\nandothm\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMeria l/amamuJ\n\nN al/aparajo\n\ntint! others\n\nY enkata,.ama\n\nA\"ar ].\n\nthe file of the District Munsif's Court Rajahmundry, which was on 14-12-1936.\n\nNow, the point for determination is whether the pbint was barred by limitation either under article 165 or article 166 of the Indian Limitation Act, if it is treated as an execution application presented on 7-8-1939, or whether it was in time under article 181.\n\nUn<ler article 165, an application by a person dispossessed of immovable properties and disputing the right of the decree-holder or purchaser at an execution sale to be put in possession must be filed within 30 days of dispossession. If this is the article applicable to the present proceedings, then it must be held that the plaint treated as an execution application was filed out of time. Jn Vachali Rohini v. Kombi\n\nAliassan('), a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held, dissenting from the view previously expressed in Ratnam Aiyar v. Krishna Doss Vital Doss( 2 ) and following Abdttl Karim v. Mt. lslamunnissa Bibi('), that this article applies only to applications for being restored to posession by persons other than judgment-debtors, as under Order XXI, rule 100, Civil Procedure Code and that applications by judgmentdebtors claiming relief on the ground that their properties had been erroneously taken in execution of the decree are not governed by it. This view was approved and followed in Rasul v. Amina(') and Bahir Das v. Glrish Chandra('). We are of the opinion that the law has been correctly laid down in the above decisions, and that in accordance therewith, the present proceedings are not barred by article 165.\n\nComing next to article 166, an application by a judgment-debtor to set aside a sale in execution of a decree has, under that article, to be filed within 30 -days of the sale. If the present proceedings are governed by this article, there can be no question that they are barred by limitation. But then, there is abundant authority that article 166 applies only when the sale is one which has under the law to be\n\n(1) [1919l I.L.R. 42 Mad. 753.\n\n(2) [1897] I.L.R. 21 Mad. 494.\n\n(3) [1916 !.L.R. 38 All. 339.\n\n(4) [1922] !.L.R. 46 Born. !031.\n\n(5) [1922] A.J.R. 1923 Cal. 287.\n\nset aside as for example, under Order XXI, rules 89, 90 and 91, but that it has no application when the sale is inoperative and void.\n\nIn Seshagiri Rao v.\n\nSrinivasa Rao(1 ), the appellant was a party to the suit, but the decree had exonerated him from liability.\n\nIn execution of the decree, his three-fourths' share in the properties was sold on 26-1-1910 and purchased by the decree-holder and possession delivered to him on 16-12-1910.\n\nThe appellant then filed a suit on 25-7-1911 to set aside the sale on the ground that it was in contravention of the decree and therefore void.\n\nAn objection having been taken by the defendant that the suit was barred under section 47, the court, while upholding the same, held that the plaint could be treated as an application under that section if it was in time as an execution :i.pplication, and the question arose for decision whether the application was governed by article 166 or article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act.\n\nIt was held that as the sale was a nullity, it ha<l not to be set aside under the law, and therefore the article applicable was article 181 and not article 166. This statement of the law was approvcc\\ by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rajagopa!ier v.\n\nRamanujachariar( 2 ). A similar decision was given in Manmothanath. Chose v. Lachmi Devi( ), wherein it was observed by Page, J. that the sale being 'ioid need not have been set aside at all, and the or<ler to be passed was \"in substance merely a declaration that the sale was null and of no effect\".\n\nThe question whether an application by a judgmentdebtor for setting aside a sale on the ground that there was excessive execution and that the sale of his properties was in consequence void was governed by article 166 or article 181 came up directly for consideration in Nirode Kali Roy v. Harendra Nath(4 ). In holding th:it the application was governed by article 181, B. K. Mukherjea, J.~ (as he then was) observed that \"article 166 must be confined to cases where the sale is voidable only and not void when the execution sale is a nullity, if a party files an application under\n\n(l) [1919] I.L.R. 43 Mad. 313.\n\n(3) [1927] I.L.R. 55 Cal. 96.\n\n(2) [1928] I.L.R. 47 Mad. 288.\n\n(4) [1938] I.L.R. I Cal. 280.\n\nMerla &manna\n\nN al la para ju\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nM1rla Ramanna\n\nNa//aparaju\n\nand othn-1\n\nYenkatarama\n\nAyyar).\n\nsection 47 to have it pronounced a nullity or for setting it aside for safety's sake to avoid future difficulties, the proper article would be article 181 and not article 166 of the Indian Limitation Act\". The decisions in Seshagiri Rao v.\n\nSrinivasa Rao( ) and Rajagopalier v.\n\nRamanujachariar( ) were again followed in Ma_ We Gyan v. Maung Than Byu(8), wherein it was held that if the execution sale was void, it was not necessary for the applicant to have it set aside, and that even if there was such a prayer, that would not affect the real nature of the application which was really \"for an order directing the respondent to .deliver property on the ground that there was no valid\n\nsale\". We are in agreement with these decisions, and hold that when a sale in execution is inoperative and void, an application by a judgment-debtor to have it declared void and for appropriate reliefs is governed by article 181 and not article 166. On the findings of the courts below that the decree in O.S. No. 25 of 1927 properly construed authorised only the sale of the mortgage rights of Achutaramaraju under Exhibit A and not the lands which were the subject-matter of that mortgage, the respondents were entitled to apply to the court for delivery of possession of the properties wrongly sold through process of court and delivered to the appellant, and such an application would be governed by article 181.\n\nThen, there is the further question whether applying article 181, the plaint presented on 7-8-1939 was within time under that article. As already stated, 81 acres 58! cents were sold on the 14th and 15th April,\n\n1936. If the starting point of limitation is the date of sale, then the application must be held to be barred, unless the period during which the suit was pending in the court of the District Munsif, Rajahmundry, is deducted under section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. But if limitation is to be reckoned from the date of dispossession, then the application would clearly be in time. Under article 166, an application to set aside a sale must be presented within 30 days thereof.\n\n(I) [1919] I.L.R. 43 Mad. 313.\n\n(2) (1923] l.L.R. 47 Mad. 288.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1937 Rang. 126.\n\nBut if the sale in question was void, and for that reason article 166 becomes inapplicable, then the date of the sale must vanish as the starting point of limitation, as it has no existence in law.' It is not until the purchaser acting under colour of sale interferes with his possession that the person whose properties have been sold is really aggrieved, and what gives him right to apply under article 181 is such interference or dispossession and not the sale. As observed in Ma We\n\nCyan v. Maung Than Byu(1 ), such an application is really one for an order for redelivery of the properties wrongly taken possession of by the purchaser. If that is the correct position, the right to apply arises by reason of dispossession and not of sale, and the starting point for limitation would be the date of dispossession. It was so held in Chengalraya v. Kollapuri ( 2).\n\nThere, the properties of a party to the suit who had been exonerated by the decree were sold in execution of that decree on 8-1-1918 and purchased by the decree-holder.\n\nIt was found that he took . actual possession of the properties in 1919.\n\nOn 23-11-1921 the representatives in interest of the exonerated defendant commenced proceedings to recover possession of the properties from the decree-holder purchaser on the ground that the sale under which he claimed was void. It was held that the proper article of limitation applicable was article 181, and that time commenced to run under that article from the date not of sale but of actual dispossession, and that the proceedings were accordingly in time. We agree with this decision, and hold that an application by a party to the suit to recover possession of properties which had been taken delivery of under a void execution sale would be in time under article 181, if it was filed within three years of his dispossession.\n\nTherefore, there is no legal impediment to the plaint filed on 7-8-1939 being treated as an application under section 47, on the ground that it is barred by limitation.\n\nThe next question for consideration is whether the present suit was filed in a court which had jurisdiction to execute the decree in O.S. No. 25 of 1927.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1937 Rang. 126\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 12.\n\nMfr/a Raman11a\n\nNllllaparaju\n\nand ot/rns\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nMtrla Ramanna\n\nNallaparaju\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!)'ar J.\n\nThat was a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada, whereas the present suit was filed in the District Court, East Godavari to which the court of the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada is subordinate.\n\nSection 38, Civil Procedure Code provides that a decree may be executed either by the court which passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution. The District Court of East Godavari is neither the court which passed the decree in O.S. No. 25 of 1927 nor the court to which it had been sent for execution.\n\nBut it is common ground that when the pre- Godavari, it had jurisdiction over the properties, sent suit was instituted in the District Court, East which are the subject-matter of this suit. It is true that by itself this is not sufficient to make the District Court of East Godavari the court which passed the decree for purpose of section 38, because under section 37, it is only when the court which passed the decree has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it that the court which has jurisdiction over the subject-matter when the execution application is presented can be considered as the court which passed the decree. And it is settled law that the court which actually passed the decree does not lose its jurisdiction to execute it, by reason of the subject-matter thereof being transferred subsequently to the jurisdiction of another court.\n\nViele Seeni Nadan v. Muthuswamy Pillai('), Masrab Khan v.\n\nDebnath Mali( ) and fagannath v. fchharam ( ).\n\nBut does it follow from this that the District Court, East Godavari has no jurisdiction to entertain the execution application in respect of the decree in O.S. No. 25 of 1927 passed by the court of the Subordinate Judge, Kakinada ?.\n\nThere is a long course of decisions in the High Court of Calcutta that when jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of a decree is transferred to another court, that court is also competent to entertain an application for execution of the decree.\n\nVide Latchman v.\n\nMadan Mohun('), fahar v. Kamini Devi(') and Udit Narayan v. Mathura Prasad('). But in Ramier v. (!) [!9!9] T.L.R. 42 Mad. 82!. F.B.\n\n(2) [!9<2] l.L.R. I Cal. ?89.\n\n13) A.LR. 1925 Born. 414. (ll [1880] l.L.R. 6 Cal. 513\n\n(5) [1900] I.L.R. 28 C,!. 238.\n\n(6) [1908] l.L.R. 35 Cal. 974.\n\nMuthukrishna Ayyar( 2), a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has taken a different view, and held that in the absence of an order of transfer by the court which passed the decree, that court alone can entertain in application for execution and not the court to whose jurisdiction the subject-matter has been transferred. This view is supported by the decision in Masrab Khan v. Debnath Mali( ). It is not necessary in this case to decide which of these two views is . correct, because even assuming that the op1mon expressed in Ramier v. Muthukrishna Ayyar( 1 ) is correct, the present case is governed by the principle laid down in Balal(rishnayya v. Linga Rao( 3 ). It was held therein that the court to whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the decree is transferred acquires inherent jurisdiction over the same by reason of such transfer, and that if it entertains an execution application with reference thereto, it would at the worst be an irregular assumption of jurisdiction and not a total absence of it, and if objection to it is not taken at the. earliest opportunity, it must be deemed to have been waived, and cannot be raised at any later stage of the proceedings. That precisely is the position here. We have held that the allegations in the plaint do raise the question of excessive execution, and it was therefore open to tlte appellant to have . raised the plea that the suit was barred by section 47, and then, there could have been no question of waiver.\n\nWe have, it is true, permitted the appellant to raise the contention that the present suit is barred by section 47, and one of the reasons therefor is that the allegations in the plaint are so vague that the appellant might have missed their true import. But that is not a sufficient ground for relieving him from the consequence which must follow on his failure to raise the objection in his written statement. We agree with the decision in Balakrishnayya v. Linga Rao(3 ), and hold that the objection to the District Court entertaining an application to execute the decree in 0.S.\n\nNo. 25 of 1927 is one that could be waived and not\n\n(I) 1932 I.L.R. 55 Mad. 801. !2) I.L.R. 1942 I Cal. 289.\n\n(3) l.L.R. 1943 Mad. 804.\n\nMerla Ramanno\n\nNallaparaju and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA)!Yar J.\n\nMala Ramanna\n\nNallaparaft\n\nand otlurs\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA.x>\"' J.\n\nhaving been taken in the written statement is not now available to the appellant. There is thus no legal bar to our treating the plaint presented by the respondents on 7-8-1939 as an execution application under section 47, and in the interests of justice, we direct it to be so treated. But this should be on terms. We cannot ignore the fact that it is the gross negligence of the respondents at all stages that has been responsible for all the troubles. They did not appear in the suit, and put forward their rights under Exhibit A.\n\nThey intervened at the stage of execution, but their complaint was mainly that the ex parte decree had been obtained by fraud, a plea which has now been negatived. Even in this suit, they did not press the plea on which they have succeeded until they came to the . High Court. Under the circumstances, we think it just that they should be deprived of all claims for mesne profits down to this date.\n\nIn the result, treating the plaint as an execution application, we direct that the properties mentioned in schedule A to the plaint be partitioned and the respondents put in possession of 126 acres 33 cents in Kalavacherla village and of 10 acres 12 cents in Nandarada village in proceedings to be taken in execution of this order.\n\nThe respondents will be entitled to their share of the net income attributable to 136 acres 45 cents aforesaid from this date down to the date on which they are put in separate possession thereof.\n\nSubject to the modification of the decree of the court below as stated above, this appeal will stand dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their own costs throughout.", "total_entities": 155, "entities": [{"text": "Matajog Dobey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Matajog Dobey\n\nH. C. B/UJri\n\nChandrast/chara\n\nAi1ar ]."}}, {"text": "MERLA RAMANNA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 424, "end_char": 437, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Merla Ramanna\n\nNaUaparaju", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NALLAPARAJU AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 466, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NALLAPARAJU AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 470, "end_char": 478, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 504, "end_char": 519, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 844, "end_char": 867, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 885, "end_char": 890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 898, "end_char": 912, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "14-12-1911~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1001, "end_char": 1012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant \\Vas the assignee of a mortgage dated 14-12-1911~ cxec.itcd by A, \\.vhich con1prised lands belonging to the mortgagor and also a mortgage executed by the respondents in his favour on 19-7-1909."}}, {"text": "19-7-1909", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1146, "end_char": 1155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant \\Vas the assignee of a mortgage dated 14-12-1911~ cxec.itcd by A, \\.vhich con1prised lands belonging to the mortgagor and also a mortgage executed by the respondents in his favour on 19-7-1909."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1425, "end_char": 1427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Court of East\n\n(odavari", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1675, "end_char": 1707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents then instituted the present suit in the District Court of East\n\n(odavari \\vhich then had jurisdiction O\\'Lr the properties in suit, for a declaruion that the decree obtained by the appellant \\Vas fraudulent and inupcrative and could not affect their title."}}, {"text": "19~7-1909", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2363, "end_char": 2372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the High Court in second appeal it \\Va.s contendL:l for the first time that the decree in question did not diect a sale of the mortgaged properties but a sale of the mortgagee's rights under the mortgage deed dated 19~7-1909 and as such the sale of the properties v.'a::; void."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2880, "end_char": 2884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2890, "end_char": 2917, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3873, "end_char": 3878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4477, "end_char": 4485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4896, "end_char": 4904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5109, "end_char": 5123, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nollaparaju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5458, "end_char": 5469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "280), and 5-85 S.C. Iudia/59\n\nM1rla RamaMa v.\n\nN allapcraju\n\nand otkrs\n\nMn/a Ra...,...\n\nNollaparaju\n\nand oJ/rlr.s\n\nMa We Gyan v. Maung Than Byu (A.LR.", "canonical_name": "Nllllaparaju"}}, {"text": "Art. 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5613, "end_char": 5621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Court of East Godavari", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'hat the District Court of East Godavari to \\vhose jurisdiction the properties had been transferred before the present suit was instituted had by reason of such transfer acquired an inherent jurisdiction over them and if it entertained an application for executior, with reference to them such action was no more than an irregula.r /\n\nassumption of jurisdiction and no objection to jurisdiction having been taken by the appellant at the earliest opportunity he must be deemed to have waived it and, consequently, there was no legal bar to treating the plaint as an execution application under s. 47 of the Code."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6521, "end_char": 6526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Casela", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6605, "end_char": 6611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Casela w discussed."}}, {"text": "Court of District Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6894, "end_char": 6947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1826 of 1945 from Original Decree dated the 16th March, 1945, of the Court of District Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry in A.S. No."}}, {"text": "B. Somayya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7115, "end_char": 7125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (K. R. Chaudhury and Naunit Lal, with him) for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (K. R. Chaudhury and Naunit Lal, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7147, "end_char": 7157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (K. R. Chaudhury and Naunit Lal, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7189, "end_char": 7216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, (K. R. Krishnaswamy, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. R. Krishnaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7219, "end_char": 7237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, (K. R. Krishnaswamy, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-This IS an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Madras High Court in a second appeal which reversed the concurrent judgments of the .courts below, and granted a decree\n\nin favour of the respondents for partition and possession of 126 acres 33 cents out of a parcel of land of the extent of 503 acres 18 cents in the village of Kalavacherla and of 10 acres 12 cents out of a parcel of land of the extent of 40 acres 47 cents in the village of Nandarada, with mesne profits, past and future.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7428, "end_char": 7445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-This IS an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Madras High Court in a second appeal which reversed the concurrent judgments of the .courts below, and granted a decree\n\nin favour of the respondents for partition and possession of 126 acres 33 cents out of a parcel of land of the extent of 503 acres 18 cents in the village of Kalavacherla and of 10 acres 12 cents out of a parcel of land of the extent of 40 acres 47 cents in the village of Nandarada, with mesne profits, past and future."}}, {"text": "Nandarada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7822, "end_char": 7831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR J.-This IS an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Madras High Court in a second appeal which reversed the concurrent judgments of the .courts below, and granted a decree\n\nin favour of the respondents for partition and possession of 126 acres 33 cents out of a parcel of land of the extent of 503 acres 18 cents in the village of Kalavacherla and of 10 acres 12 cents out of a parcel of land of the extent of 40 acres 47 cents in the village of Nandarada, with mesne profits, past and future."}}, {"text": "5-6-1888", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7953, "end_char": 7961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these lands measuring 543 acres 65 cents were purchased by five co-sharers on 5-6-1888 under two sale deeds, Exhibits P and P-1."}}, {"text": "Rangaraju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8118, "end_char": 8127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of these shares of the extent of about 218 acres was, at the mateiral dates, held in common by· two brothers, Rangaraju and Kumara, the former owning 136 acres 45 cents and the latter 81 acres 45 cents.", "canonical_name": "Rangaraju"}}, {"text": "Kumara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8132, "end_char": 8138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of these shares of the extent of about 218 acres was, at the mateiral dates, held in common by· two brothers, Rangaraju and Kumara, the former owning 136 acres 45 cents and the latter 81 acres 45 cents.", "canonical_name": "Kumara"}}, {"text": "19-8-1908", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 19-8-1908 Kumara executed a simple mortgage, Exhibit Q, over 81 acres 45 cents belonging to him for Rs."}}, {"text": "Kumara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8225, "end_char": 8231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 19-8-1908 Kumara executed a simple mortgage, Exhibit Q, over 81 acres 45 cents belonging to him for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Kumara"}}, {"text": "Nallapparaju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8338, "end_char": 8350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 in favour of Nallapparaju, who with his undivided brother, Achutaramaraju, held a share in the two parcels of land aforesaid in Kalavacherla and Nandarada.", "canonical_name": "Nallapparaju"}}, {"text": "Achutaramaraju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8384, "end_char": 8398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 in favour of Nallapparaju, who with his undivided brother, Achutaramaraju, held a share in the two parcels of land aforesaid in Kalavacherla and Nandarada."}}, {"text": "Kalavacherla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8453, "end_char": 8465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 in favour of Nallapparaju, who with his undivided brother, Achutaramaraju, held a share in the two parcels of land aforesaid in Kalavacherla and Nandarada."}}, {"text": "Rangaraju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8500, "end_char": 8509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 19-7-1909 both Rangaraju and Kumara executed a mortgage, Exhibit A, for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Rangaraju"}}, {"text": "-6-1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8641, "end_char": 8648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4-6-1910 Kumara again created a mortgage over 81 acres 45 cents belonging to him, Exhibit Q-1 for Rs."}}, {"text": "14-12-1911", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8780, "end_char": 8790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14-12-1911 Achutaramaraju executed a mortgage for Rs."}}, {"text": "Merla Agastayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8858, "end_char": 8873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14,000 in favour of one Merla Agastayya, Exhibit C, over the properties which he held in full ownership as co-sharer, and also the mortgage right which he -held over the properties belonging to Rangaraju and Kumara under the three mortgage deeds, Exhibits Q, A and Q-1."}}, {"text": "29-8-1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9107, "end_char": 9116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29-8-1920 Kumara sold the 81 acres 45 .cents belonging to him and comprised in the mortgages aforesaid to Achutaramaraju for Rs."}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9649, "end_char": 9659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-1-1924", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9969, "end_char": 9978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20-1-1924 the representatives of Merla Agastayya assigned their interests in the mortgage, Exhibit C, to the present appellant, who instituted O.S.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "31-1-1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11577, "end_char": 11586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-1-1931 the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise as against defendants 1 to 4 and ex parte as against defendants 14 to 16, and a final decree was passed on 6-11-1932."}}, {"text": "6-11-1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11742, "end_char": 11751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-1-1931 the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise as against defendants 1 to 4 and ex parte as against defendants 14 to 16, and a final decree was passed on 6-11-1932."}}, {"text": "23-8-1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11756, "end_char": 11765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23-8-1934 the decree-holder filed E.P. No."}}, {"text": "26-8-1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12174, "end_char": 12183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was rejected by the Subordinate Judge on 26-8-1935, and an appeal against this order to the High Court, Madras was also dismissed on 1-9-1938."}}, {"text": "High Court, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12225, "end_char": 12243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was rejected by the Subordinate Judge on 26-8-1935, and an appeal against this order to the High Court, Madras was also dismissed on 1-9-1938."}}, {"text": "1-9-1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12266, "end_char": 12274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was rejected by the Subordinate Judge on 26-8-1935, and an appeal against this order to the High Court, Madras was also dismissed on 1-9-1938."}}, {"text": "14th and 15th April, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12436, "end_char": 12461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the 14th and 15th April, 1936, and purchased by the decree-holder himself."}}, {"text": "26-6-1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12533, "end_char": 12542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale was confirmed on 26-6-1936, and possession taken on 15-12-1936."}}, {"text": "15-12-1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12568, "end_char": 12578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale was confirmed on 26-6-1936, and possession taken on 15-12-1936."}}, {"text": "14-12-1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12616, "end_char": 12626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before possession was taken, on 14-12-1936 Rangaraju and his sons instituted O.S. No."}}, {"text": "District Munsif's Court, Rajahmundry", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12689, "end_char": 12725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "268 of 1936 in the District Munsif's Court, Rajahmundry for a declaration that tl1e decree in O.S. No."}}, {"text": "7-8-1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13116, "end_char": 13124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, they instituted on 7-8-1939 the present suit, 0.S. No."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Rajahmundry", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13479, "end_char": 13511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 of 1927 was obtained by suppressing service of summons, and was therefore void and .could not affect their title to 136 acres 45 cents which were mortgaged under Exhibit A. The suit was transferred to the court of the Subordinate Judge of Rajahmundry, and was numbered as O.S. No."}}, {"text": "Merla Ramanna\n\nNaUaparaju", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14203, "end_char": 14228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cents of land belonging to Rangaraju and his sons had been sold on the 14th and 15th April, 1936, their remaning properties of the\n\nMerla Rsmimna , ..\n\nNal/llparqju\n\nand othns\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMerla Ramanna\n\nNaUaparaju\n\nand others\n\nVfnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nextent of 54 acres 58i cents were sold after the institution of O.S. No.", "canonical_name": "Merla Ramanna\n\nNaUaparaju"}}, {"text": "16th March, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14983, "end_char": 14999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs appealed against this judgment to the District Court of East Godavari, which by its judgment dated 16th March, 1945 affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge."}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15604, "end_char": 15621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satyanarayana Rao, J. who heard the appeal, construed the plaint as sufficiently raising this question and issue (2) (b) as covering this contention, and accordingly directed the District Judge to return a finding on the question as to whether the sale of the properties was warranted by the terms of the decree."}}, {"text": "bistrict Judge of East Godavari", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15921, "end_char": 15952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bistrict Judge of East Godavari to whom this issue was referred, held that the decree directed the sale of only the mortgage rights of Achutaramaraju under Exhibit A, and that the sale of the properties themselves was not in accordance with the decree."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16392, "end_char": 16402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16411, "end_char": 16425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16716, "end_char": 16726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil\n\nProcedure Code", "statute": "Civil\n\nProcedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16728, "end_char": 16748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17231, "end_char": 17251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Somayya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17306, "end_char": 17313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant, it was contended by Mr. Somayya that the question whether having regard to section 47 the suit was maintainable was argued before the learned Judge before he called for a finding, and that it ought to have been therefore considered on the merits, and that, in any event, as it was a pure question of law and went to the root of the matter, it ought to have been entertained.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17357, "end_char": 17367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17691, "end_char": 17711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar vehemently contends that as the objection to the maintainability of the suit based on section 47 was not taken in the written statement, the learned Judge had a dis.cretion whether he should permit the point to be raised for the first time in second appeal or not, and that we should not interfere with the exercise of that discretion in special appeal."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17798, "end_char": 17808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "rla Ramanna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18565, "end_char": 18576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this contention was not argued either in the court of the\n\nM<rla Ramanna\n\nN allaparaju and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "Merla Ramanna\n\nNaUaparaju"}}, {"text": "N allaparaju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18578, "end_char": 18590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this contention was not argued either in the court of the\n\nM<rla Ramanna\n\nN allaparaju and others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "Nallapparaju"}}, {"text": "Mirta Ramanna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18627, "end_char": 18640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mirta Ramanna\n\nJV allajJMaju\n\nand others\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nSubordinate Judge of Rajahmundry or in the District Court of East Godavari, and it is only in second appeal that the question appears to have been first thought of in this form.", "canonical_name": "Merla Ramanna\n\nNaUaparaju"}}, {"text": "section\n\n47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19173, "end_char": 19184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20236, "end_char": 20246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20248, "end_char": 20268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20513, "end_char": 20523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Prnrcdure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20525, "end_char": 20545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21028, "end_char": 21038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Prnrcdure Code", "statute": "Civil Prnrcdure Code"}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21557, "end_char": 21567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21855, "end_char": 21865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21867, "end_char": 21887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21935, "end_char": 21945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22240, "end_char": 22250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "15th December, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22593, "end_char": 22612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question of limitation, the relevant dates are the 14th and 15th April, 1936, when 81 acres 86t cents belonging to the plaintiffs were sold, and 15th December, 1936, when possession was taken thereof through court."}}, {"text": "MerltJRant1JMa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23005, "end_char": 23019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MerltJRant1JMa\n\nN al/a para ju\n\nandothm\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMeria l/amamuJ\n\nN al/aparajo\n\ntint!"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23059, "end_char": 23064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MerltJRant1JMa\n\nN al/a para ju\n\nandothm\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMeria l/amamuJ\n\nN al/aparajo\n\ntint!"}}, {"text": "article 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23308, "end_char": 23319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23323, "end_char": 23334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23349, "end_char": 23363, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23465, "end_char": 23476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23486, "end_char": 23497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24259, "end_char": 24279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24708, "end_char": 24719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24737, "end_char": 24748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25058, "end_char": 25069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "26-1-1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25646, "end_char": 25655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of the decree, his three-fourths' share in the properties was sold on 26-1-1910 and purchased by the decree-holder and possession delivered to him on 16-12-1910."}}, {"text": "16-12-1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25726, "end_char": 25736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of the decree, his three-fourths' share in the properties was sold on 26-1-1910 and purchased by the decree-holder and possession delivered to him on 16-12-1910."}}, {"text": "25-7-1911", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25774, "end_char": 25783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then filed a suit on 25-7-1911 to set aside the sale on the ground that it was in contravention of the decree and therefore void."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25963, "end_char": 25973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26212, "end_char": 26223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26227, "end_char": 26238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26253, "end_char": 26267, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26398, "end_char": 26409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26418, "end_char": 26429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27040, "end_char": 27051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27055, "end_char": 27066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27192, "end_char": 27203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. K. Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27205, "end_char": 27220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In holding th:it the application was governed by article 181, B. K. Mukherjea, J.~ (as he then was) observed that \"article 166 must be confined to cases where the sale is voidable only and not void when the execution sale is a nullity, if a party files an application under\n\n(l) [1919] I.L.R. 43 Mad."}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27258, "end_char": 27269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Merla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27544, "end_char": 27549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Merla &manna\n\nN al la para ju\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nM1rla Ramanna\n\nNa//aparaju\n\nand othn-1\n\nYenkatarama\n\nAyyar)."}}, {"text": "manna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27551, "end_char": 27556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Merla &manna\n\nN al la para ju\n\nand others\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nM1rla Ramanna\n\nNa//aparaju\n\nand othn-1\n\nYenkatarama\n\nAyyar)."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27672, "end_char": 27682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27815, "end_char": 27826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27835, "end_char": 27846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27861, "end_char": 27875, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28577, "end_char": 28588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28597, "end_char": 28608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29064, "end_char": 29075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29131, "end_char": 29142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th and 15th April,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29268, "end_char": 29288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cents were sold on the 14th and 15th April,\n\n1936."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29521, "end_char": 29531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29546, "end_char": 29560, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29683, "end_char": 29694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29923, "end_char": 29934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30262, "end_char": 30273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8-1-1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30857, "end_char": 30865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the properties of a party to the suit who had been exonerated by the decree were sold in execution of that decree on 8-1-1918 and purchased by the decree-holder."}}, {"text": "23-11-1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30980, "end_char": 30990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23-11-1921 the representatives in interest of the exonerated defendant commenced proceedings to recover possession of the properties from the decree-holder purchaser on the ground that the sale under which he claimed was void."}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31272, "end_char": 31283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31642, "end_char": 31653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31823, "end_char": 31833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nllllaparaju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32107, "end_char": 32119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mfr/a Raman11a\n\nNllllaparaju\n\nand ot/rns\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nMtrla Ramanna\n\nNallaparaju\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!)'ar J.\n\nThat was a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada, whereas the present suit was filed in the District Court, East Godavari to which the court of the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada is subordinate.", "canonical_name": "Nllllaparaju"}}, {"text": "Mtrla Ramanna\n\nNallaparaju", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32156, "end_char": 32182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mfr/a Raman11a\n\nNllllaparaju\n\nand ot/rns\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nMtrla Ramanna\n\nNallaparaju\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!)'ar J.\n\nThat was a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada, whereas the present suit was filed in the District Court, East Godavari to which the court of the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada is subordinate."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32196, "end_char": 32207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mfr/a Raman11a\n\nNllllaparaju\n\nand ot/rns\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nMtrla Ramanna\n\nNallaparaju\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAJ!)'ar J.\n\nThat was a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada, whereas the present suit was filed in the District Court, East Godavari to which the court of the Subordinate Judge of Kakinada is subordinate.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR"}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32429, "end_char": 32439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32441, "end_char": 32461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "District Court, East", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32874, "end_char": 32894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is common ground that when the pre- Godavari, it had jurisdiction over the properties, sent suit was instituted in the District Court, East which are the subject-matter of this suit."}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33080, "end_char": 33090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33106, "end_char": 33116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33986, "end_char": 34008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a long course of decisions in the High Court of Calcutta that when jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of a decree is transferred to another court, that court is also competent to entertain an application for execution of the decree."}}, {"text": "Muthukrishna Ayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34489, "end_char": 34507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muthukrishna Ayyar( 2), a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has taken a different view, and held that in the absence of an order of transfer by the court which passed the decree, that court alone can entertain in application for execution and not the court to whose jurisdiction the subject-matter has been transferred."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35901, "end_char": 35911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36073, "end_char": 36083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Merla Ramanno", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36690, "end_char": 36703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Merla Ramanno\n\nNallaparaju and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA)!Yar J.\n\nMala Ramanna\n\nNallaparaft\n\nand otlurs\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA.x>\"' J.\n\nhaving been taken in the written statement is not now available to the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Merla Ramanna\n\nNaUaparaju"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36729, "end_char": 36740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Merla Ramanno\n\nNallaparaju and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA)!Yar J.\n\nMala Ramanna\n\nNallaparaft\n\nand otlurs\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA.x>\"' J.\n\nhaving been taken in the written statement is not now available to the appellant.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR"}}, {"text": "Mala Ramanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36753, "end_char": 36765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Merla Ramanno\n\nNallaparaju and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA)!Yar J.\n\nMala Ramanna\n\nNallaparaft\n\nand otlurs\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA.x>\"' J.\n\nhaving been taken in the written statement is not now available to the appellant."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37026, "end_char": 37036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kalavacherla village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37960, "end_char": 37980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, treating the plaint as an execution application, we direct that the properties mentioned in schedule A to the plaint be partitioned and the respondents put in possession of 126 acres 33 cents in Kalavacherla village and of 10 acres 12 cents in Nandarada village in proceedings to be taken in execution of this order."}}, {"text": "Nandarada village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38009, "end_char": 38026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, treating the plaint as an execution application, we direct that the properties mentioned in schedule A to the plaint be partitioned and the respondents put in possession of 126 acres 33 cents in Kalavacherla village and of 10 acres 12 cents in Nandarada village in proceedings to be taken in execution of this order."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_94_164_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "fl)~\n\nN. Satyt.JM1ho11 v. f(. Subramanyan\n\nand othtrs\n\nSinhs J.\n\nMarch 25\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 955]\n\na service is not an essential function of a sovereign\n\nstate. It cannot be rainsaid that the Government in the Postal Department is rendering a very useful service and that the appellant has by his contract with the Government undertaken to render that kind of service on a specified route. The present case is a straightforward illustration of the kind of contract contemplated by section 7(d) of the Act.\n\nAt all material times the appellant has been directly concerned, for his own benefit, in the contract of carrying mail bags and postal articles entered into by him with the Government in the Postal Department.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid we have not the least hesitation in holding that the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal are entirely correct.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nA ppeaf dismiu('(f.\n\nU..T.S. CHOPRA\n\nSTATE OF BOMBAY.\n\n[S. R. OAS, BHAGWATI and IMAM JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898), s. 439(1)(2)!6) -Appellant convicted by Magistrate-His appeal to High Court dismissed summarily-After summary dismissal of that appeal Stat.J Government filed revision application to High Court for enhancernent of sentence-Notice issued to appellant to show cause against enhanrnment under s. 439(2)-Whether appellant entitled to show cause ai; ainst his conviction under s. 439!6) of Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe appellant in this appeal was convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, of an offence under s. 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act (Act XXV of 1949) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 250 or in defaulr to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. He preferred an appeal to the Hih Court at Bombay, which was summarily dismissed. After the dismissal of that appeal, the State of Bombay made a revision application to the High Court praying for enhancement of the sentence. Notice was issued to the appellant under s. 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to show cause against enhancement.\n\nl9SS\n\nU.J.~. Chdp-a\n\n.v.\n\nHeld that the summary dismissal of the appeal preferred by the appellant did not preclude him from taking advantage of the provisions of s. 439(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and showing cause against his conviction when he was subsequently called upon to show cause why the sentence imposed on him should not be en-\n\nSlale of Bombay\n\nhanced.\n\nPer DAS J.-Sub-section (6) of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers a new and a valuable right on the accused. The language used in sub-section (6) does not, in terms, place any fetter on the right conferre~ _by it on the accused. This new right is not expressed to be co!1dmoned or cnrolled by ay thing that may have happened pnor to the rev1s10n apphcanon under sub-section ( 1) for enhancement of sentence. Therefore, whenever there is an application for enhancement of sentence, a notice must issue under sub-section (2) to the accused person to show cause and whenever such notice is issued, the accused person must, under sub-section (6), be given an opportunity, in showing cause against enhancement, also to show cause against his convictiop.\n\nIt is not correct to say that sections 421, 435 & 439 of the Code give the court a discretion not to decide the appeal or revision brought before it. The discretion conferred on the High Court does not authorise it to say that it will not look at the appeal or revision.\n\nThe Court's bounden duty is to look into the appeal or revision and dedde it, although in the process of arriving at its decision it has a very wide discretion.\n\nThere is no reason for holding that there is a merger or replacement of the Judgment of the trial Court into or by the Judgment of the High Court only when the appeal or revision is heard on notice to the respondent and either allowed wholly or partially or dismissed but not when it is heard without notice to the respondent and dismissed summarily; for this purpose it makes no difference whether the dismissal is summary or otherwise, and there is a judgment of the High Court in all the three cases. The only difference in substance is that in the first two cases the judgment is final qua both parties while in the third case, i.e., when an appeal or revision by the accused is summarily dismissed without issuing notice to the State, the judgment is final only qua the accused who preferred the appeal or revision. This is based not on any technical doctrine of res judicata, for there is none in criminal cases, but on the general principle of finality of judgment. In the first two cases there can, after the judgment, be no further application by the State for enhancement of sentence and therefore no question of the application of section 439(6) can arise. In the last case, i.e., in case of summary dismissal the Judgment not being final qua the State, the State may apply for enhancement of sentence and if it does the accused becomes entitled again to show cause~ against his conviction also by reason of the special provisions of section 439( 6).\n\nPer BllAGWATI and IMAM JJ.-A Judgment pronounced by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional\n\nJ9jj\n\nU.J.S. <:Mya\n\n• Y.\n\nSlot< of .........,,\n\njurisdiction after issue oi a notice and a full hearing in the presence of both the parties ¥.'ould certainly be arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and all arguments and would therefore be a final judgment and such judgment when pronounced would replace the ju_dgment of the lower court, thus constituting the only final judgment to be executed m accordance with law by the court below. When however a petition of appeal pr<!- sented by a convicted perrnn from jail is summarily dismissed under s. 421 or a revision application made by him is dismissed summarily or in limine without hearing him or his pleader what the High Court does in such a case is to rl!f use to entertain the petition of appeal or the revision application and the order passed by the High Court-\"dismissed or rejected\" cannot be said to be an expression of the opinion of the court arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and all the arguments.\n\nNo notice for enhancement of sentence can be issued by the High Court when a judgmont is pronounced by it after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties either in exercise oi its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction. Such notice for cnhanccincnt of sentence can be issued by it either suo motu or at the instance of an interested party when the judgment of the lower court suhsim and is not replaced by its O\\VO judgment given in th!.! cxen:be of its appellate or re•isional juri; diction, When the Judgment of the lower\n\ncourt has been under it~ scrutiny on notice being issued to 1 he opposite party and on a full hearing acrnrdecl to both the P\"rtics notice for enhancement of sentence 1...u1 only be isued by ir befCJr:! it pronounces its judgmenc replacing that of the lower court. When such hearing is in progre$; it is incumbent upon the High (ourt or the opposite party to m\"ke up its mind before the judgment is pronounced whether a notice for enhancement of sentence should issue to the accused.\n\nCase-law discussed.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1954.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th August, 1953, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 518 of 1953 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 9th December, 1952, of the Court of Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, in Case No. 3442/P of 1952.\n\nS. P. Verma, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Poms A. Mehta and P.O. Cokhale, with hirnl, for the respondent.\n\n1955. March 25. The following Judgments were delivered.\n\nU.J.S. Chapra\n\nDAS J.-The appellant before us was on the 9th State of Bombay December, 1952 convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, 13th Court, Bombay, of. an offence under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act (Act XXV of 1949) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 250 or to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month.\n\nThe appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay but his appeal was summarily dismissed by a Bench of that Court on the 19th January 1953. After the dismissal of that appeal the State of Bombay made a Criminal Revision application to the High Court for enhancement of the sentence. Notice having been issued to the appellant under section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned counsel for the appellant claimed the appellant's right under section 439(6) to show cause against his conviction. This tl1c High Court did 11ot permit him to do. The High Court, however, did not think fit to make any order for enhancement of sentence. On an application made on behalf of the appellant the High Court of Bombay has given leave to the appellant to appeal to this Court and granted a certificate of fitness under article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution of India.\n\nThe question for our consideration in this appeal is whether the summary dismissal of the appeal preferred by the appellant precluded him from taking advantage of the provisions of section 439(6) of the 'Code of Criminal Procedure when he was subsequently\n\ncalled upon to show cause why the sentence imposed\n\nupon him should not be enhanced. The question depends for its answer upon a true construction of section 439. That section, so far as it is material for our present purpose, reads asfoJI.ows: -\n\n\"439. (1) Jn the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discre-\n\nU.J.S.CMp/'a\n\nState <If Bombay\n\nDasJ.\n\ntion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a Court by section 338, and may enhance the sentence; and when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by section 429.\n\n(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.\n\n(3) ......................... ..\n\n(4) ............................ ..\n\n(5) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed.\n\n(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, any convicted person to whom an opportunity has been given under sub-section (2) of showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced shall, in showing cause, be entitled also to show cause against his conviction\".\n\nFor a correct appreciation of the real meaning, import and scope of the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 439 it will be necessary to bear in mind its historical background. In England there is no provision for an appeal by the Crown either against an order of acquittal or for the enhancement of sentence.\n\nThere the person convicted has a right of appeal both against his conviction and the sentence imposed upon him. Under the English criminal procedure, therefore, the question of enhancement of sentence only comes before the.Court of Criminal Appeal when there is an appeal by the convicted accused. In this country the provisions relating to the Court's power of enhancement of sentence have undergone radical changes from time to time. Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861 prohibited any appeal from acquittal.\n\nExpress power was given to the appellate Court to reduce the sentence (sections 425 and 426) and like power was given to the Sudder Court as a Court of revision (sections 405 and 406). I find no provision\n\n1955 in that Code authorising the Sudder Court to enhance the sentence.\n\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure of u;1.s~, Chopra\n\n1872. however, by section 272 permitted the Governsrare qf Bombay ment to file an appeal from acquittal. This as DasJ. repeated in <; ection 417 of the Code of 1882 which corresponds to section 417. of the present Code. Section 280 of the Code of 1872 expressly authorised all appellate Courts to enhance the sentence. This power of enhancement. however. was taken away from the appellate Courts by section 423 of the Code of 1882 now reproduced in section 423 of the present Code and was vested in the High Court under section 439 of the Code of 1882 to be applied in exercise of its revisional power. This has been continued in our present section 439.\n\nThis shows that the Legislature thought that this extraordinary power should be exercised only hy the High Court and no other Court. A practice, however. appears to have grown up that in cases coming up before it for enhancement of sentence the High Court accepted the conviction as conclusive and proceeded to consider the question of enhancement of sentence on that basis. (See Emperor v. Chi1110 Bhairava (') ). Then came Act XVIII of 1923 which. by section 119. amended section 439 by adding the present sub-section (6) and also amended section 369 by substituting the words \"save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, or. in the case of a High Court established by Royal Charter. by the Letters Patent of such High Court. no Court\" for the words \"No Court other than a High Court\" with which the section formerly opened. The results of these amendments were W to make the judgment or order of the High Court passed in exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction final which it was not under section 369 as it originally stood and to make this finality subject to the other provisions of the Code or of the Letters Patent of the High Court and (ii) to nullify the practice referred to above and to give a statutory right to an accused person who was threatened with the risk of having the sentence imposed on him by the trial Court or the lower appel-\n\n[I 908] 1.L.R. 32 Dom. J 62.\n\n/9SS\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nStare of Bomba)'\n\nDasJ.\n\nate Court enhanced by the High Court~\")~ exercise of its rcvisional jurisdiction suo motu .or at the instance ?f the State or in exceptional cases even of any .other mterested person. Sub-sectioQ (6), therefore, confer~ a .new nd a very valuable right on the subject winch 1s es1gncd to be a safeguard against the State or other interested person making frivolous revision apphcatLon for enhancement of sentence. The State or the person interested must, if they ask for an enhancement of sentence, be prepared to face the risk of the accused being altogether acquitted. It is the price or quid pro quo which the State or other interested person must be prepared to pay for the right or privilege of making an application for enhancement of sentence. The language used in sub-section (6) does not, in terms, place any fetter on the right conferred by it on the accused. This new right is not expressed to he conditioned or controlled by anything that may have happened prior to the rivision application under sub-section (I) for enhancement. of sentence. The section quite clearly says that whenever there is an application for enhancement of sentence a notice must issue under sub-section (2) to the accused person to show cause and whenever such notice is issued the accused person must, under sub-section (6), be given an opportunity, in showing cause against enhancement, also to show cause against his conviction. The sub-section does not say that he will have this right to show cause against his conviction only if he has not already done so. If the accused person appealed against his conviction and sentence to an appellate Court not being a High Court and lost that appeal after a full hearing in the presence of his opponent it must be conceded that he has had an opportunity to show cause against his conviction but nobody will contend that that circumstance will prevent him from having another opportunity of showing cause agaist his conviction and sentence either by a substantive application initiated by himself under sub-section ( 1) or by way of defending himself when the State or other interested person applies to the High Court in revision under section 439(1) for enhancement of\n\nsentence and a notice is issued on him under section 1955 439(2). (See Kala v. Emperor (') ). Enhancement of U.JS. Chopra sentence is undoubtedly an encroachment upon the State 0/&mbay liberty of the subject and a very serious matter for -- an accused person and the Legislature may quite pro- Das!. perly have thought that whenever an accused person is sought to be laid open to the risk of having his sentence enhanced, the question of the legality and propriety of his conviction should be re-examined by the High Court in the context of this new jeopardy, irrespective of anything that might have happened prior to the application for enhancement of sentence and the issuing of the notice on the accused to show cause. Indeed, there is. in sub-section (6) itself, an indication in that behalf. This sub-section is to operate \"notwithstanding anything contained in this section\". fn some of the decisions (e.g. Emperor v.\n\nJorablwi ('), Crown v. Dhanna Lal ('), Emperor v.\n\nInderchand (') and King v. Nga Ba Saing 0 ) it has been said that the 11011 ohstante clause refers only to sub-section (5).\n\nI find it difficult to accept this limited construction as correct.\n\nSub-section (5) only says that where an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. The idea is that if a person has a right of appeal he must first pursue that' remedy. In other words, sub-section (5) is a disabling provision.\n\nBy providing tliat no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of a person who, having a right of appeal, does not avail himself of it, the sub-section precludes such a person from initiating proceedings by way of revision. When the accused person under sub-section (6) shows cause against his conviction he himself initiates no proceedings but only exercises the right to show cause against his conviction which is given to him because somebody else has taken proceedings against him for enhancement and a notice has been issued on him under subsection (2).\n\nIn such a &ituation the accused person\n\n(l) A.LR. 1929 Lah. 584.\n\n(2) [1926] I.L.R. SO Bom. 785.\n\n(3) [1929] I.L.R. 10 Lah. 241.\n\n(4) A.J.R. 1934 B'Jm. 471. (S) A.I.R. 1939 Rang. 392. 14-8 SCl/ND/82\n\nU .. T.S. Chopra v.\n\nSJae of Bonihay\n\nDasi.\n\nis '?n the defensive and the act of showing cause agamst proeedings initiated against him cannot properly be said to be proceedings \"at his instance\" which the High Court, by sub-section (5), is enjoined not to entertain. Strictly speaking sub-section (6) needs no exen)ption from sup-seCtion (5). In any event and assuming that the act of showing cause against his conviction under sub-section (6) is tantam01mt t11 an application in revision ini.tiated by him and such application is saved from the operation of sub-section (5) by the non obstante clause, of sub-section (6) r do not see any reason for holding that the non ohstante clause of sub-section (6) is concerned only with sub-section (5). Although in showing cause against his conviction under sub-sedion (6) the accused person can urge all that he could do in an appeal. if not more. this act of showing cause is, nevertheless, in form at least, a continuation and indeed an integral part of the proceedings in revision initiated by the Court suo motu or by the State or any other interested party. The general rule is that the exercise of re,•-'isional power is entirely a matter of discretion which is to be exercised by the High Court not capriciously but on sound judicial principles. Indeed, sub-section (I) itself lays stress oil this aspect of the matter by te use therein of the words \"in its discretion\". The 11011 ohstante clause may well have been designed to emphasise that the new right conferred by sub-section (6) is a matter of right and does not rest entirely on mere discretion of the Court. Further the non obstante clause has a special significance even in a case where the accused person has already had an opportunity, by means of an appeal or revision filed by him in the High Court, to show cause against his conviction.\n\nUnder sub-section (1) there can be a revision only of the judgment or order of Criminal Courts inferior to the High Court and it does not sanction any revision of the judgment or order of the High Court itself. Therefore, where the accused person has . unsuccessfully challenged the. legality or pi:opriety of his conviction in an appeal or revision application made by him before the High\n\nCourt he cannot again initiate a substantive applica- 1955 tion before the High Court under section 439(1) of the u.1.s. Chopra Code to re-examine his conviction or sentence, for State of Bombay\n\nthat will be to ask the Court to revise its own previous judgment or order, which the High Court cannot do under section 439(1). But suppose that the dismissal of the appeal or revision application made by the accused takes place in such circumstances that it still leaves it open to the State or other interested person to apply in revision for enhancement of the sentence and proceedings are initiated hy the Court or the State for enhancement of sentence under section 439(1) and notice is issued on the accused under section 439(2), there is nothing in subsection (6) which, in terms, prevents the accused, in that situation, to again show cause against his conviction and sentence.\n\nThe only argument that may, in those circumstances, be advanced with some semblance of plausibility is that to let the accused person to again challenge his conviction or sentence under sub-section (6) is to cut across the provisions of sub-section (1) and in effect to permit the accused to ask the High Court to revise its previous order although no substa11tive application could be initiated by him under sub-section (1). It may well be that the non obstante clause in sub-section (6) was also designed to negative such an argument. Although ordinarily no substantive application can be initiated by an accused person, whose appeal or revision application has once been dismissed by the High Court, for revision or review of that order of dismissal, I can find no difficulty in construing and reading section 439<6) RS giving to the accused person, who is faced with the risk of having his sentence enhanced, a second opportunity to do what he had previously failed to do. In other words, I see no incongruity in the Legislature giving a new right of revision to the accused person as a wapon of defence in the context of a new off ensive taken by the State against him. Even if the act of shmying cause under sub-section (6) is to be regarded as a revision, there was nothing to prevent the Legislature, in the interest of the liberty of the\n\nDasJ.\n\n19S\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\n\"· State of Bombay\n\nDasJ.\n\nsubject, to provide for a limited right of revision of the judgment or decision or order of the High Court itself.\n\nIn my judgment that is what the Legislature has done by adding sub-section (6) to section 439 and the non obstante clause is intended to meet and repel the objection that may possibly have been taken on the score that, under sub-section (!), there can be no revision by the High Court of its own order. In my opinion, so iong as proceedings may be taken against the accused person for enhancement of his sentence and so long as notice may be issued on him to show cause against enl1ancement, so Jong must he have. in showing cause a, gainst enhancement of sentence, the right, under sub-section (6), tb show cause against his conviction, irrespective of anything that may have happened previously. That is how I read the sub-section. Indeed, in Emperor v. Mangal Naran (') McLeod, C. J ., went further and expressed the view that if, after an appeal had been heard on its merits and dismissed, a notice to enhance sentence was issued, the accused would still have the right to show cause against his conviction although any attempt to set aside his conviction would not have much chance of success.\n\nFor reasons to be stated hereafter I would rather say that in such a situation no application for enhancement would lie at all and that consequently no question would arise of th.e accused .person exercising his right under sub-section (6). Tliis aspect of the matter that I am trying to indicate and emphasise does not appear to have bee.n sufficiently adverted to in the subsequent decisions of the different High Courts in India except in one decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High CourL It will be convenient at this stage to refer to tbose decisions.\n\nIn Emperor v:Jorabhai (supra! the accused person was convicted by the Sessions Judge. He preferred an appeal to the High Court and a Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal on merits after full hearing of both sides after notice of appeal had been served on the State. After the delivery of the judgment an oral application was made to the Bench by\n\n(I) (1924] I.L.R. 49 Bom. 4SO.\n\nthe Government pleader for the enhancement of the 19;5 sentence. Notice was issued to the accused under sec- U.J.s. Chopra tion 439(2) of the Code. The accused claimed the State 0/&,,,, bay right, under sub-section (6) to challenge his conyiction.\n\nDasi It was held by Fawcett and Madgavkar, JJ:, that sec- tion 439(6) did not justify that would be tantamount to a rehearing of the appeal on merits.\n\nIn the case of Ramlakhan Chaudhury v. Emperor(') the accused's appeal had been previously dismissed after a ft.Jll hearing and following the decision in Emperor v. Jorabhai (supra) it was held that the accused could not, under section 439(6), challenge the correctness of his conviction for the second time while showing cause against enhancement of sentence. The same principle has been extended to cases where the appeal of the accused person had been previously dismissed by the Hgh Court summarily but after hearing the accused or his advocate. (See Emperor\n\nv. /Jatubai( 2), Emperor v. Haji Khamoo('), King v. Nga Bu Saing (supra), Emperor v. Naubat(') ), to cases where the jail appeal of the accused had previously been dismissed summarily without hearing the accused or his advocate (see Emperor v. Koya Partab('), Empemr v. Abdul Qayaum('), Ramchand v. Hirata!(') and State v. Bhavani Shankar(') ) and to cases of dismissal of revision petition filed by the accused after hearing the advocate (see In re Saiyed Anif Sahib('), Emperor v. Sher Singh(''), Crown v. Dhanna Lal (supra)) and also to the case of an accused whose revision petition has been summarily dismissed (see Emperor v. lnderchand (supra)). It has been held that for the purposes of section 439(6) it makes no different whether the judgment or order of dismissal was made by the High Court in appeal or in revision, or whether the appeal ()r revision was dismissed summarily or after a full hparing on notice to the State or other interested party and that any dismissal of the appeal or\n\n(1) [1931) I.L.R. to Pat. 872.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1927 Born. 666.\n\n(3) A.J.R. 1936 Sind 233.· (4) I.L.R. (1945) All. 527.\n\n(5) [1930] I, L.R. 54 Boni. 822.\n\n(6) A.I.R. 1933 All. 485.\n\n(7) A.I.R. 1942 All. 339.\n\n(8) I.L.R. [1952] 2 IW. 716 ..\n\n(9) A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 993.\n\n(10) [1927)1.L.R. 8 Lah. 521.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\n\" State 'If Bombay\n\nDasi.\n\nrevision prevents the accused person from availing himself of the benefit of section 439(6). In two cases Emperor v. Lukman (') and Emperor v. Shidoo(') the Sind Court took up an intermediate position that the accused person whose appeal had been dismissed summarily or after full hearing could not challenge his conviction for the second time except to the extent that the conviction was not founded on legal evidence or was manifestly erroneous. In other words, he could only go up to what was ordinarily permitted in a revision. These two decisons appear to me, with respect, to be illogical and I need say no more about them.\n\nIn the other cases noted above it has been quite definitely held that the accused person whose appear or revision application has been previously dismissed, summarily or after a full hearing, is not entitled, when called upon to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced, to question the correctness of his conviction for the second time. In other words, the previous dismissal, according to these decisions, is an adjudication by the High Court of the correctness of his conviction and on the principle of finality of judgment embodied in sections 369 and 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that adjudication cannot be called in question under section 439(6). It has been pointed QJJt in several cases (Crown v. Dhanna Lal (supra), Emperor v. lnderchartd\n\n(supra) and King v. Nga Ba Saing (supra) ) that subsection (6) opens with the words \"notwithstanding anything contained in this section\" and not with the words \"nothwithstanding anything contained in this Code\" and from this the inference has been drawn that while the sub-section is to operate notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (5) it cannot override the other provisions of the Code, and, therefore, the operation of sub-section (6) is .conditioned or controlled by the principle of finality of judgment embodied in sction 369 and section 430. Some learned Judges have expressed the view (see In re Saiyed A nif Sahib (supra), Crown v. Dhanna Lal (supra) that the words \"unless he has already done so\" are to be read in sec-\n\n(1) A.l.R. 1927 Sind 39. (2l A.I.R. 1929 Sind 26.\n\ntion 439 (6), for this is to be implied from the prei 9ss sumption of finality. In some cases see Emperor v.\n\nU.J.s. Chopra Sher Singh (supra) and Nam Lakhan v. Emperor State o1\"Bombay (supra)) the decision has been placed also on the --- ground of the inherent incapacity of one Judge of the DasJ.\n\nHigh Court to reconsider the decision of another Judge of that Court. It is necessary to examine these grounds a little closely to ascertain their validity.\n\nIn order to appreciate the true meaning and exact scope of sections 369 and 430 on which the argument of finality of judgment is founded it, is necessary to keep in view the general scheme of the Code. Part VI of the Code deals with \"Proceedings in Prosecutions\". Chapter XV lays down the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in Inquiries and Trials. I pass qver Chapters XVI to XVIII. Chapter XIX prescribes rules for the framing and joinder of charges. Chapters XX to XXIII deal with different kinds of trials, e.g., trial of summons cases, warrant cases, summary trials and trials before High Courts and Courts of Session.\n\nChapter XXIV contains general provisions as . to Inquirie~ and Trials.\n\nMode of taking al,'ld recording evidence is prescribed by the sections grouped to:. gether in Chapter XXV. Then comes Chapter XXVI which is headed \"Of the Judgment\". Section 369 is one of the sections included in this chapter. Chapter xxvn provides for the submission of death sentences for the confirmation of the High Court.\n\nRulei: relating to the execution, suspension, remission and commutations of the sentences are to be found in Chapters XXVIII and XXIX. Part VI ends with\n\n~ Chapter XXX which is. not material for our present purpose. Part VII deals with \"Appeal, Reference and\n\nRevision\". Chapter XXXI is concerned with Appeals and we find section 430 in this chapter. Chapter XXXII provides for reference and revision, section 439 being one of the sections included in this chapter.\n\nIn view of the scheme summarised above there can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of. the sei;· tions collected in Chapter XXVI are concerned with\n\njudgments pronounced by the trial Court. This conclusion is certainly reinforced by the language of some\n\n19'5\n\nU .J:S. Chopra\n\nStai. qf Bombay\n\n/Jt#J.\n\nof these sections. Thus section 366 which is the very first section in this chapter refers to \"The .iudgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction.\" Section 367 provides what must be contained in \"every such judgment\", that is to say judgment in an original trial. Section 369 runs as follows:\n\n~369. Court not to alter Judgment.-Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other Jaw for the time being in force or, \"in the case of a High Court by the Letters Patent Or other instrument constituting such High Court'', no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall. alter or review the same, except .to correct a clerical error\".\n\nThe opening words \"save as otherwise provided by this Code ...... constituting such High Court\" were added by section 119 of the Amending Act XVIII of 1923 and were further adapted by Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. There can be no question that the finality embodied in this section is only in relation to the Court which pronounces the judgment, for it forbids the Court, after it has signed its judgment, to alter or review the same. In other words, after pronouncing the judgment the Court that pronounces it become~\n\nfunctus officio. There is indication in the Code' itself that the purpose of section 369 is not to prescribe a general rule of finality of all judgments of all Criminal Courts but is only to prescribe finality for the judgment of the trial Court so far as the trial Court is concerned.\n\nThat this section does not, by itself, app!y to the judgment of an appellate Court is quite obvipus, because if it did, there would have been no necessity for enacting section 424 specifically making the rules contained in Chapter XXVL which includes section 369, applicable to the judgment of any appellate Court other than High Court, nor for again prescrihing by section 430 a rule of finality for judgments and orders passed by an appellate Court.\n\nTt, therefore, follows that while, subject to the other provisions of the Code or any other law and of the Letters Patent, the finality of section 369 attaches to the judgments pronounced by all trial Courts includin2 the High Court. in the exercise of its original criminal\n\njurisdiction it certainly has no bearing on the question of finality of appellate judgments which is srci fically provided by section 430 of 'the C0de. Again, the rule of finality embodied in section 369 cannot, in terms, apply to the orders ma.de by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, for section 442 of the Code which requires the result of the revision proceedings to be certified to the Court by which the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or passed refers to it as its \"decision or order\" and not \"judgment\". It is significant that section 425 which requires the result of appeal to be certified to the lower Court refers to it as its \".iudgment or order\".\n\nAll these considerations herein alluded to quite clearly establish that section 369 cannot in any manner control section 439(6). Jn any case, section 369 is \"subject to the other provisions of the Code\" and I see no reason why section 439(6) should not be regarded as one of such other provisions. It cannot be overlooked that the words \"subject to the other provisions of the Code, etc.\" were introduced into section 369 at the same time as sub-section (6) was added to section 439.\n\nAs I read the new sub-section, it is a substantive statutory right conferred on the subject and full effect should be given to it unless there is any insuperable difficulty in the way of doing so. If section 369 were susceptible of as wide a meaning as is read into it, namely, that it applies to all judgments of all Courts, original, appellate or revisional, I would, in that case, hold that that meaning must be taken as cut down, by reason of the words \"subject to the other provisions of the Code, etc.\" by the mandatory nrovisions of section 439(6). In other words, section\n\n43916) must be read as controlling section 369 rather than the other way about. Finally, section 369 being suhiect to the other provisions of the Code must be read as subject to section 430 and as the finality enshrined in the latter section does not attach to\n\ncleciions or orders made in revision by reason of Chr:tpter XXXIT being expressly excepted from its oneration, the rule of finality embodied in section 369, even if it be as wide as it is contended to be,\n\n15-8 SCI/ND182\n\n19.55\n\nUJ.S. ChOJ!f\" v.\n\nStatd oJ BOmbfly\n\nDasJ.\n\nIJJ S. Chopra v.\n\nState of.-Bo1.11bay\n\nDasi.\n\ncannot affect cases provided for in Chapter XXXII.\n\nI now pass on to section 430 which is also relied on as furnishing a principle of finality which is supposed to control the operation of section 439(61.\n\nSection 430, in terms, applies to \"judgments and orders\" passed by an appellate Court. Jt has no application to \"decisions or orders\" made by the High Court in revision; It has been contended that the exception made in section 430 in respect of cases provided for in Chapter XXXII only exempts the judgments or orders of an appellate Court other than a High Court from the rule of finality embodied in section 430 because they are made revis!lble by the High Court under section 439(1).\n\nSection 439(1) does not contemplate or permit judgments or orders made by the .High Court in exercise of its original or appellate criminal jurisdiction to be rev.ised by the High Court.\n\nAs; therefore, the appelate judgments or orders of the High Court cannot, under section 439(1), be made the subject-matter of any revision application. such appellate judgments or orders did not fall within the exception made in section 430 and were accordingly left subject to the rule of finality embodied therein. Two answers occur to me. If the effect of the new subsection (6), as I have already explained, is to confer a new right on an accused person notwithstanding anything contained in section 439(1), that is to say, if sub-section (6) is read, as I think it should be. as a >tatutory provision expressly making the judgmer)t ur decision or order of the High Court passed in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction subject. for the purpose of the protection of an accused person whose appeal or revision had been previously dismissed. to re-examination bv the High Court only as and .when he is subsequently faced with an application for enhancement of sentence, then such judgment, decision or order of the High Court does, as a result of section 439(6), become the subject-matter of a case provided for in Chapter XXXII of the Code.\n\nIn other words, the scope of Chapter XXXII having been enlarge9 by the addition of sub-section\n\n(6) to section 439, the scope of tlie exception to section 430 must also stand enlarged so as to inclcde t9s5 within the exception whatev.er, after the amt..ndment u:1.s. Chopra of section 439, may come within Chapter XXXII and, Start bfombay therefore, cases now coming within that Ghapter must Ii -:, stand free from the rule of finality embodied in secas • tion 430. The other answer is to be found in two of the decisions of the Allahabad High Court, namely, Emperor, v. Abdul Qayum (supra) and Ram Chand v.\n\nHirala/(1) where it has been held that section 430 by its own terms saves the revisional power of the High Court to enhance the sentence. ln each of these cases the jail appeal filed by the accused had been dismissed by the High Court summarily. If the rule of finality of appellate judgments does not attach to the summary dismissal of the jail appeal by the High Court so as to prevent the State from invoking its revisional power to enhance the sentence, surely the accused's right t0 show cause against his conviction under section 439(6), which is consequential and arises only upon a rule for enhancement being issued under section 439(2) and is, therefore, a part of the revisional proceedings for enhancement of sentence, must, on a parity of reasoning be also free from the same principle of finality.\n\nIt, therefore, follows that section 439(6) is not, in terms, controlled by section 369 or section 4.30.\n\nWhether the sub-section is controlled by the general principle of finality of judgments and if so to what extent are different questions which will be discussed later.\n\nThe seconcl ground on which some of the decisions\n\nrst, namely, the inherent incapacity of one Judge of the High Court to reconsider the decision of another Judge of the High Court may .-easily be disposed of.\n\nThe theory of . inherent incapacity must give way to the statutory capacity conferred by section 439(6).\n\nIf on a true contruction a statute states, expressly or by necessary mtendment, that one Judge or one Bench .shall have jurisdiction and power to decide s0methmg, the theory of inherent incapacity of such\n\n.Tudg~ or Bench cnot. invoked to prevent the exercise of such .iunsd1ction and power merely on\n\n(0 A.J.R. 1942 All. 339.\n\n/9SI\n\nU J.S. c•a v. .\n\nSta~ qf Bombay\n\nDasi,\n\nthe ground that the decision which may be arrived at in exercise of this new jurisdiction or power may run counter to the previous decision arrived at by another Judge or Bench in exercise of another jurisdiction or powt<_r. I see no reason why section 439(6) may not be read as a provision which, by necessary implication, enables the High Court to re-examine its own previous order on the happening of certain contingencies, namely, upon the_ accused person, whose appeal or revision has been dismissed, being faced with the risk of having his sentence enhanced and a notice being issued to him for enhancement.\n\nTo reinforce the argument that section 439(6) is controlled by sections 369 and 430 reference has been made to section 423(2) and it has been contended, on the authority of various decisions, that the right given by section 439(6) is not absolute but is controlled by the provisions of section 423(2) which lay down some limitations in the matter of appeal from convictions in a jury trial. Even on that topic some learned Judges have taken divergent views. It is not necessary, on this occasion, to express any opinion on that question and I reserve my right to examine the position as and when an occasion may; arise in future.\n\nEven if . section 439(6) is controlled by section 423(2), that circumstance certainly does not indicate when and under whatcircumstances the right unde(r section 439(6) may be availed of. In any case, that consideration has no bearing on the argument of finality of judgments sought to be founded on sections 369 and 430.\n\nIt will be convenient at this stage fo refer to the decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Atta Mohammad(') and to deal witli the argument founded on and developed from some of the reasonings adopted by the learned Judges constituting that Full Benc; h. In that case the revision application of the accused had been dismissed in limine by the High Court.\n\nSubsequently the Crown applied for enhancement of sentence. Notice having been issued under sub-section (2) of section 439 the accused\n\n(I) [1943] !.L.R. 25 Lah. 391.\n\nperson claimed the right, under sub-section (6), to 1955 show cause against his conviction in spite of the fact IJ; J.s. a.,, a that his revision application had been dismissed. The State of 'Bm•y\n\nAdvocate for the Crown relied on the cases re(erred DasJ. to above and contended that the order of dismissal of the l\\_evision application by the High Court was final as regards the correctness of the conviction, that that order could not again be revised by the High Court, that the accused was no longer entitled to challenge his conviction and that it made no difference that' his revision petition had been dismissed in limine. The Full Bench overruled the earlier decision of the Court in Crown v. Dha1111a Lal (supra) and held that the accused was, in the circumstances of the case. entitled to show cause against his conviction, notwithstanding the fact that his application for re' ision had been dismissed in li111i11e. The rcasnning adopted by Blacker, J ., was shortly as follows: That\n\n;111 order dismissing a revision petition in limine is an ordrr made under section 435 and not under section\n\n43~; that such an order is not a judgment and, therefore, tht: principle of finality embodied in section 369 docs not appiy to such an order, because such a dismissal only meant that the Judge saw no adequate grounds disclosed in the petition or on the face of the judgment for proceeding any further; that, in the picturesque language of the learned Judge, in such a dismissal \"there is no finding or decision unless it can be called a decision to decide to come to no decision\"; that the jurisdiction exercised by the Court under section 439(6) was appellate jurisdiction and that an order of acquittal thereunder did not amount to a review of an order of dismissal under section 435; and\n\nfinally that if the order under section 435 was a judgment or if an order of acquittal under section 439(6) was a review of such judgment, such review was not barred by section 369, because of the saving provisions with which the section begins. Mahajan, J., as he then was, put in the forefront of his judgment the view that section 439(6) which was introduced by amendment in 1923 gave a new and unlirhited right\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bo1nbay\n\nDasJ.\n\nto the subject; that the Judge hearing the application for enhancement was bound to go into the facts to satisfy himself as to the correctness of the conviction; that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction was a mere matter of favour and a dismissal in /imi11e of such application amounted only to a refusal to look into the record and was in no sense a judgment. Ram Lall, J., did not deliver any separate judgment but concurred generally with the other learned Judges.\n\nIt will be noticed that this decision of the Lahore High Court rests mainly on two grounds, namely, (!) that in a dismissal of a revision application in limille there is no finding or decision at all and that it is nothing more than a refusal to send for the records or to look into the matter and is, therefore, not a judgment, and (2) that, in any case, section 439(6) gives a\n\nnw statutory right to the accused person to challenge the legality or propriety of his conviction, although his previous application for revision of the order of the lower Court had been dismissal in limine and that such a review of that dismissal order is not barred by section 369 because of the saving provision at the beginning of that section. The Full Bench expressly declined to express any opinion as to the effect of dismissal nf an appeal on the right given by sub-section (6). The orinciple of the first ground of the Lahore Full Bench decision has, however, been extended by the Rajasthan High Court in The State v.\n\nBhawani Shankar (supra) to a case where the respondent's jail appeal had been summarily dismissed.\n\nAccording to Wanchoo, C.J., the accused, whose jail appeal had been dismissed summarily, was in the same position as the accused, whose revision petition had been dismissed in limine, for he too could not be said to have had an opportunity of showing cause against his conviction. The learned Chief Justice, however, did not desire to go further and expressed the view that if an appeal were dismissed summarily bnt after hearing the party or his pleader the accused could not claim to have a second opportunity to challenge his conviction under section 439(6), because in that case he had been heard and, therefore, had had an opportunity to show cause against his conviction when his appeal had been summarily dismissed.\n\nU.J.S, Clwpra v.\n\nIt will be recalled that in Emperor v. Jorahhai State 0!.__BombaY.\n\n(supra) and the other cases which followed it it DasJ. ; was said that for the purposes of determining the applicability of section 439(6) it made no difference in principle whether the proceeding filed by the accused which had been dismissed was an appeal or a revision or whether the aismissal was summary or after a full hearing and that in none of such cases could the accused person claim a second opportunity to question the legality or propriety of his conviction when he was subsequently called upon to show cause why the sentence passed on him should not be enhanced. In the Lahore Full Bench case and the Rajasthan case referred to above a distinction has, however, been made between a summary dismissal and a dismissal after a full hearing of the appeal or revision filed by the accused. In my judgment there is a substantial distinction between these two kinds of dismissals as regards their effect on the rights of accused persons as I shall presently indicate.\n\nI am, however, unable to accept the argument adopted by the Lahore Full Bench that a summary dismissal of a revision application filed by the accused must be regarded as an order made under section 435 and not one under section 439, that such a summary dismissal is nothing more than a refusal on the part of the High Court to go further or to look into the application and that in such a dismissal there is no finding or decision at all. Far less am I able to accede to the proposition that a summary dismissal of a jail appeal also stands on the same footing. Sections 421, 435 and 439 undoubtedly vest a very wide discretion in the Court.\n\nDiscretion, as Lord Halsbury,\n\nL.C. said. in Sharp v. Wakefie!d<1), means sound discretion guided by law. It inust be governed by rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion; according to law and not by humour or caprice. It\n\nmut not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but must be legal and regular. This discretion is given to the\n\n(I) L.R. [1891] A.c. 173 at p. 179.\n\n/955\n\nU .J.S. Chopra\n\n•• S1111,. •f Bombay\n\nDasJ.\n\nHigh Court for the purpose of dealing with and disposing of the proceeding brought before it and not for not deciding it. The primary and paramount duty of the Court is to decide the apoeal or revisi<'n and it is to exercise its discretion in so deciding it. Jn deciding the appeal or revision the High Court may\n\nchnose which of its powers it will exercise if the circumstances of the case call for such exercise. In a clear case. apparent on the grounds of appeal or revision or on the face of the judgment appealed from or sought to be revised it may cnme to the conclusion that the case has no merit and does not call for the exercise of any of its powers in which case it may dismiss it summarily. If, however, it has any doubt, it may call for the record or may admit it and issue notice to the respondent and decide it after a full hearing in the presence of all parties. Bnt decide it must at one stage or the other. The discretion conferrecl on the High Court does not authorise it to say that it will not look at the appeal or the revision. The court's bounden duty is to look into the appeal or revision and decide it, although in the process of arriving at its decision it has very wide discretion.\n\nWhen the Court summarily dismisses an appeal whether without hearing the accused or his pleader as in the case of a jail appeal or after hearing the accused or his pleader but before issuing any notice to the respondent as in an appeal presented bv the accused or his pleader. the Court does decide the appeal. It is indeed a very serious thing to say that sections 421. 435 or 439 give the Court a discretion not to decide the appeal or revision brought before it and J, for one, am not prepared to countenance and much less encourage such an idea. In my judgment a summary clismissal of an appeal or revision does involve an adjucfication by the High Court just as a dismissal after a full hearing loes. The only difference. as we shall presently see. is as to the respective nature. scope and effect of the two ad_judications.\n\nrt has been said that when an appeal or revision is dismissed after a full hearing by the High Court the judgment of the lower Court merges in the High Court\n\njudgment and the High Court judgment replaces the judgment of the lower Court and becomes the only operative judgment but that when the appeal or revision is summarily dismissed by the High Court there is, in such a dismissal, no finding or decision which can replace the judgment of the lower Cort.\n\nIt is, therefore, said that there can be no showing cause against his conviction under sub-section (6) in the first case, for it will involve a revision of the High Court's decision but the position will be otherwise in the second case where the dismissal was summary.\n\nThis argument appears to me to be untenable and fallacious. Section 425 of the Code requires that whenever a case is decided on appeal by the High Court under Chapter XXXI it must certify its judgment or order to the Court by whicb the finding, sentence or order appealed against was recorded or passed and that that Court shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the judgment or order of the High Court and that, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance the1ewith. Likewise, section 442 requires that when a case is revised under Chapter XXXII by the High Court, it shall, in the manner provided by section 425, certify its decision or order to the Court by which the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or passed and that that Court shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the decision so certified and that, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith. This certificate is sent in every case, whether the appeal or revision is disposed of summarily or after a full hearing. Where an appeal or revision is disposed of after a full hearing on notice to the respondent nd\n\nallowed wholly or in part it becomes ex facie obvious that the judgment appealed against or sought to be revised has been altered by the judgment or decision of the High Court on appeal or revision and a note is made in the record of 'this alteration.\n\nBut when an appeal or revision is dismissed after full hearing and the sentence is maintained there is outwardly no change in the record when the certificate is sent by the High Court but nevertheless there is an adjudica-\n\n16-s/SCI/ND1s2\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bomlta)'\n\nDasi.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v.\n\nState qf Bombay\n\nDasJ.\n\ntion by the High Court. In the first case it is judgment of acquittal or reduction of sentence and in the second case it is a judgment of conviction. Likewise, when an appeal or revision is summarily dismissed, such dismissal maintains the judgment or order of the lower Court and a note is made of such dismissal in the\n\nncord and in the eye of the law it is the judgment of the High Court that prevails. To the uninstructed mind the change may be more easily noticeable in the first case than in the other two cases but on principle there is no difference. I can see no reason for holding that there is a merger or replacement of judgment only in the first two cases and not in the last one. In my opinion, it makes no difference whether the di8missal is summary or otherwise, and there is a judgment of the High Court in all the three cases.\n\nIt is at once urged that if the summary dismissal of an appeal or revision is also a judgment then the rule of finality prescribed by sections 369 and 430 will at once apply to it and a cunning accused may by putting up an obviously untenable appeal or revision and procuring an order of summary dismissal of it, prevent the State or any other interested party from making an application for enhancement of the sentence. The apprehension, to my mind, is unfounded for reasons more than one. When an appeal or revision is filed by an accused person he sets out his grounds in detail, challenging both his conviction and sentence.\n\nFrom the very nature of things he does not raise any question of enhancement of the sentence.\n\nAt that stage no notice or rule having been issued the respondent is not before the Court to raise the issue of enhancement. So the summary dismissal only confirms the conviction and decides that the Court sees no ground for reducing the sentence. It is in no sense a decision that the sentence should not be enhanced for that issue was not before the Court at all and so it has been said, I think rightly, in several cases, [e.g. Jn re Syed Anif Sahib (supra)], Emperor v.\n\nJorabhai (supra) and Emoeror v. lnderchand (suora)].\n\nThe fact the High Court simply dismisses the appeal or revision summarily without issuinp; the notice on\n\nthe accused under section 439(2) for showing cause 1955 aaainst enhancement is a clear indication that the U.J.S. Chopra IDgh Court has not considered the question of en- State o/ilombay hancement. It is true that the rule of finality prescribed by section 430 applies to the appellate judgment of the High Court, subject to the exception regarding\n\nDasJ.\n\ncases falling within Chapter XXXII. It is also true that although the revisional power is not expressly or in terms controlled either by section 369 or section 430, the general principle of finality of judgments attaches to the decision or order of the High Court passed in exercise of its revisional powers.\n\nBut this finality, statutory or general, extends only to what is actually decided by the High Court and no further. When an appeal or revision by the accused is allowed after a full hearing on notice to the respondent the conviction and sentence must be regarded as having been put in issue and finally decided. When the accused person in the presence of the State claims an acquittal or reduction of his sentence, the State ought then and there to apply for enhancement of sentence and its failure to do so cannot but be regarded as abandonment of the claim. The acceptance by the High Court of the appeal or revision on notice to the respondent and after a full hearing is, therefore, nothing less than a Judgment of acquittal or a judgment for reduction of sentence.\n\nOn the other hand, the dismissal by the High Court of an appeal or revision after such a full hearing amounts to a judgment of conviction. In both cases the judgment is final as regards both the accused and the respondent as regards the conviction as well as the sentence in all its aspects, namely, reduction or enhancement. In that situation no further question of revision can arise at the instance of either party. There can be no further application by the accused challenging his conviction or sentence. Nor can there be any further application by the State for enhancement of the sentence, for that dent prayed for acquittal or reduction of sentence and not having then been raised it cannot be raised ouestion could have been and should have been raised when the accused person in the presence of the respont9ss subsequently and consequently no question can u. r.s. Chopra arise for the exercise of right by the accused Sime o}iiombay under section 439(6).\n\nThis result is brought about -·- not by any technical doctrine of constructive res\n\nD:ISJ. judicata which has no application to criminal cases but on the general principle of finality of judgments.\n\nThe summary dismissal of an appeal or revision by the accused, with or without hearing him or his pleader but without issuing notice to the respondent is, so far as the accused is concerned, a judgment of conviction and confirmation of his sentence and he can no longer initiate revision petition against his conviction or sentence. The judgment or decision is a final judgment qua the a1 cused person, for otherwise he cou!d go on making uccessive appeals or revision applications which ob> ously he cannot be permitted to do.\n\nBut the State or other interested person who has not been ser.red with any notice of the appeal or revision cannot be precluded, by the summary dismissal of the accused's appeal or revision, from asking for enhancement, for in that situation the State or the complainant not being present the question of enhancement was not in issue before the Court and the summary disrrussal cannot be regarded as an adjudication on the question of r.nhancement. That question not having been put in issue and not having been decided by the High Court, the finality attaching to the summary dismissal as against the accused does not affect the position.\n\nThis, I apprehend, is the true distinction between a summary dismissal of an appeal or revision and a dismissal of it after a full hearing.\n\nThe cases of Emperor v. Jorabhai (supra) and the other cases following it overlooked this vital distinction as also its effect on the new statutory right conferred on the accused person by section 439(6) and they cannot be accepted as correct decisions. In those cases where the appeal or revision filed by the accused had been dismissed after a full hearing in the presence of the State and where there was no application by the State or other interested party for enhancement of sentence during\n\nthe pendency of that appeal or revision it should have\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRElE COURT REPORTS 121\n\nbeen held that the dismissal must be regarded as a judgment which was final as against both parties on both pomts, conviction and sentence and there could be no further application for the enhancement of sentence and consequently no question of the accused having a further opportunity of showing cause against his conviction could arise.\n\nIn the cases where the appeal or revision filed by the accused had been s11~ marily dismissed without notice to the respondent, 1t should have heen held that although such dismissal was final as against the accused it did not preclude the State or the complainant, who was not a party to the dismissal, from applying for enhancement of sentence and that as soon as an application for enhancement was made subsequently and a notice was issued to the accused, the latter, faced with the risk of having his sentence enhanced, at once became entitled, under section 439(6), in showing cause against the enhancement of sentence, also to show cause against his conviction. The Lahore Full Bench case has decided, inter alia that while the dismissal of the accused's revision application in limine does not prevent the State from subsequently applying for enhancement ot the sentence, section 439(6) gives the accused a fresh right to challenge his conviction when a notice for enhancement is issued to him. That part of the decision may well be sustained on this ground as explained above but, with great respect, I do not agree with their view that the accused in that case had the second right because the summary dismissal of his revision was not a judgment at all or was not final even as regards him.\n\nThe Rajasthan High Court's decision in so far as it extended the principle to the dismissal of a jail appeal without hearing the accused or his pleader under section 421 may also be supported on the ground I have mentioned.\n\nA Bench of the Lahore High Court in The Crown v. Ghulam Muhammad(') has held that where the accused's revision application had been dismissed on notice to the respondent and after a full hearing and the State sub-\n\n(I) Pak. L. R.[1950] Lah. 803.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v.\n\nState of Bombay\n\nDasi.\n\n1955 sequently applied for enhancement of sentence, the u.J.s. Chopra accused person could again show cause against his Stare 0J\"\"Bombay convicion. With great respect I think that the better -- reasomng would have been to say that such a dismissal\n\nDasJ. of the revision after a full hearing was a judgment final against both parties on both points of conviction ancl sentence and that as the State did not, during the pendency of that revision, apply for revision it had, after that dismissal which became a final judgment, no right subsequently to apply for enhancement of sentence and consequently no notice under section 439(2) could issue and no question could arise for the accused person asserting his right under section 439(6).\n\nFor reasons discussed above I have to hold that the summary dismissal of the appeal filed by the appellant in the High Court was a judgment of conviction by the High Court and was final so far as the appel- Iant was concerned and he could not initiate any further revision application either against his conviction or for reduction of sentence after that dismissal but that it was not final so far as the State was concerned and the State was entitled to apply in revision for enhancement of sentence. For reasons already stated I must further hold that as soon as the State applied for enhancement and a notice was issued on the appellant he became entitled under section 439(6) to again challenge his conviction. As I have said this suh-sectton gives a new and valuable weapon of defence to an accused person who is placed in fresh jeopardy by reason of an enhancement application having been filed against him and a notice to show cause having been issued to him. I find nothing in sections 369 and 430 to cut down that right.\n\nThe previous dismissal of his appeal had no bearing on the ne\\\\< situation created by the enhancement application which the Legislature, in enacting section 439(6), may well and properly have thought to be sufficiently serious to deserve and require a thorough, re-examination by the High Court of the conviction itself in this new context. There is nothing in principle that I can see which should prevent that sub-section from giving a fresh right to the accused whose appeal or revision has been summarily dismissed to def end himself by challenging his conviction when a notice for enhancement is issued to him.\n\nIn my judgment, for the reasons stated above, this appeal should be allowed and the matter should go back to the High Court so that the State's applicatio'l for enhancement may be dealt with according to law after giving the appellant an opportunity to show cause against his conviction.\n\nBHAGWATI J. delivered the judgment of Bhagwati and Imam, JJ .-This appeal on certificate under article J 34(1)(c) of the Constitution raises an important question as to the right of a convicted person to show cause against his conviction while showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced under section 439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe appellant was charged before the Presidency Magistrate, 13th Court, Bombay with having committed an offence punishable under section 66(b) of the Bombay Act XXV of 1949 inasmuch as he was found in possession of one bottle of Mac Naughtons\n\nCanadian Whisky (Foreign) containing 8 drams valued at Rs. 20.\n\nHe was convicted by the learned Presidency Magistrate and was sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 250 in default rigorous imprisonment for one month. He presented his petition of appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay through his advocate.\n\nThis petition of appeal was however summarily dismissed by the High court after hearing the advocate on the 19th January 1953. On the 18th Mav 1953 a criminal revision application for enhancement of senten~ was filed by the State and a rule was granted by the Vacation Judge on the 12th June 1953. This rule came for hearing and final disposal before a Division Bench of the High Court on the 26th August 1953. After hearing the Government Pleader in support of the rule the Court was not satisfied that there was a case for enhancement of sentence.\n\nThe learned counsel for the Appellant then wanted to argue for an acquittal\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v •.\n\nState of Bombay\n\nDasi.\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1955\n\n1955 relying upon the provisions of section 439(6) of the U.J.S. Chopra Criminal Procedure Code. Relying however upon the Stateo}Bomboy decisions of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v.\n\nBh-- Jorablzai('), and Emperor v. Kaya Partab('), as also ogwattJ.\n\nEmperor v. Jnderchand('), the Court did not allow the learned counsel to argue that the order of conviction itself could not be sustained. The application for enhancement of sentence was thereupon dismissed and the rule was discharged. The appellant applied for leave to appeal to this Court on the 15th October J 953. The Division Bench of the High Court, hearing the application stated the point which arose for determination as under:-\n\n\"Whether a summary dismissal of an appeal preferred by an accused person precludes him from taking advantage of the provisions of section 439( 6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when he is subsequently called upon to show cause why the sentence imposed upon him should not be enhanced\" It pointed out that the consistent view taken by the Bombay High Court in this matter had been accepted by the Allahabad and the Patna High Courts in Emperor v. Naubat(') and Ramlakhan Chaudhury v. Emperor(') but the view taken by the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Atta Muhammad('), though not directly in point prim a f acie lent support to the contention urged by the learned counsel for the Appellant.\n\nA certificate was therefore granted to the Appellant that it was a fit case for appeal to this Court.\n\nIt will be convenient at this stage to briefly indicate the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code which will fall to be considered. Section 417 provides for ar. appeal on behalf of the State Government to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. Sections 419, 420, 421, 422 and 423 Prescribe the procedure in cases of appeals. Section 419 deals with petitions of appeal presented by the appellant or his pleader and section 420 with petitions of appeal\n\n(!) r1926] I.LR. 50 Born. 783.\n\n(2) f1930j 32 Born. L.R. 1286.\n\n(3) [1934 36 Born. L.R. 954.\n\n(4) I.LR. 1945 Allahabad 527.\n\n15) r193Il I.LR. 10 Patna 872. !6J [1943] l.L.R. 25 Lahore 391 (F.B.\n\npresented when the appellant is in jail. Section 421 provides for summary dismissal of these appeal!l if the Appellate Court considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, save that no appeal presented by the appellant or his pleader is to be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same, and the Court might also before dismissing an appeal summarily call for the record of the case though not bonnd to do so. If the Appellate Court doec; not dismiss the appeal summarily, notice of appeal is to be given to the appellant or his pleader or to such officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf, under section 422 and the powers of the Appellate Court in dismissing the appeal are laid down in section 423, the only relevant provision for the present purpose being that in an appeal from a conviction the Appellate Court might with or without the reduction in sentence and with or without altering the finding alter the nature of the sentence but ....................... . not so as to enhance the same. Section 430 incorporates the rule as to the finality of the judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon appeal except in cases provided for in section 417 which relates to appeals on behalf of the Government in cases of acquittal and Chapter XXXII which reltes to reference and revision. Section 435 deals with the exercise of the revisional powers inter alia by the High Court to call for the records of the inferior criminal courts for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Courts.\n\nSection 438 provides for a reference by the lower Appellate Court to the High Court recomm:)nding that a sentence which has been imposed on a convicted person be reversed or altered. Section 439 with which we are immediately concerned is couched in the following terms:-\n\n(1) In the case of anv proceeding the record of which has been called for bv itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its\n\n17-8 SCI/ND/82\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. CltO[Na\n\n\"· State of Bombq\n\nBltopotU.\n\nJ!J3S\n\nUJ.$. ChP, pra\n\nS-e! Boml>ay\n\nllJ.\n\nknowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a Court by section 338, and may enhance the sentence; and when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in manner provided by section 429.\n\n(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.\n\n15) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed.\n\n(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section. any convicted person to whom an opportunity has been given under sub-section 12) of showing came why his sentence should not be nhanced shall. in showing cause, be entitled also to show cause against his conviction.\n\nSection 440 lays down that no party has any. right to be heard either personally or by pleader before any Court when exercising its powers of revision provided however that tbe Court may if it thinks fit, when exercising such powers hear any party either personally. or by pleader and nothing in that section shall be deemed to affect section 439(2) above.\n\nA person convicted of an offence may file in the Hiil:h Court a petition of appeal or an ;1pplication for revision challenging his conviction and the sentence passed upon him. The petition of appeal mav be presented by him from jail or may be presented bv him to the High Court in person or through his nleader.\n\nAn application for revision also mav be similarly presented by him to the High Court. A petition of appeal presented by him from jail or presented by him in person or through his pleader as aforesaid mav be summarily dismissed by the High Court after perming\n\nthe same if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering. the latter after giving him or\n\nhis pleader a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same and in appropriate ('ases after calling for the record of the case. A notice of appeal may issue only if the High Court does not dismiss the appeal summarily and in that event only there would be a full hearing of the appeal in the presence of both the parties In the case of an application for revision also the same may be dismissed summarily and without even hearing the party personally or by pleader. If however the Court deems fit to issue notice to the opposite party there would be a full hearing in the presence of both the parties. These proceedings would normally be concerned with the question whether the conviction can be sustained and the sentence passed upon the convicted person be set aside or reduced. There would be no question here of the enhance111ent of the sentence. The question of enhancement of the sentence would only arise when the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 4390) thought it necessary to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence to the convicted person.\n\nEven through the Court exercising its powers of revision would not be bound to hear any party personally or by pleader no order under section 439(1) enhancing the sentence could be made to the pre.iudice of the accused unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. Jn that event simultaneously with the opportu11ity given to him under sub-section (2) of showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced he would be entitled in showing cause also to show cause against his conviction by virtue of the provision of section 439(6).\n\nThe exercise of this right of also showing cause against his conviction may arise in 4 different types of cases:\n\n(I) Where his petition of appeal has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be;\n\n(2) When his appeal has been dismissed after a full hearing following upon the notice of appeal being issued to the opposite party;\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v.\n\nStat~ of Bombay\n\nJlhagwati J.\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. Cltapra\n\nStare of Jlombtzy\n\nBJraiwotiJ.\n\n(3) When his application for revision has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be; an_d\n\n(4) Where his application for revision has been dismissed after a full hearing following upor1 a notice issued to the opposite party.\n\nWhen the High Court issues a notice for enhancement of sentence it is exercising its revisional jurisdiction and the question that arises for consideration is whether in one or more of the cases above referred to the High Court has jurisdiction to issue the notice of enhancement of sentence and the convicted person is entitled while showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced also to show cause against his conviction.\n\nThe view taken by the Bombay High Court in the cases noted above has been that in all the four cases mentioned above the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against his <.:onviction and that he is not entitled to a further or second opportunity of doing so while showing cause why his sentence should not be enlianccd. It has not made any distinction between the exer<.:ise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction by the High Court nor between appeals or revision applications dismissed summarily or in limine and appeals or revision applications dismissed after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties.\n\nIt has also extended the same principle to a reference made under section 438 and an order passed by the High Court thereupon-\"No order on reference\", without even issuing notice to the applicant at whose instance the Sessions Judge made the reference. (Vide Emperor v.\n\nNandlal Chunilal Bodiwafa(')).\n\nThe Allahabad and the Patna High Courts have followed this view of the Bombay High Court in the decisions above referred to and the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Dhanalaf(') also followed the same. But this decision of the Lahore High Court was overruled by a Special Bench of that Court in Emperor v. A Ila\n\n(ll [1945] 48 Bombay L.R. 41 (F.B.).\n\n(2) [1928] l.L.R. JO Lahore 241.\n\nMohammad('). The Special Bench held that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is entirely discretionary, that an application for revision is entertained as a matter of favour, that no party is entitled to be heard either himself or by pleader when the Court is exercising its revisional jurisdiction and that therefore a dismissal of an application for revision in limine tantamounts to a refusal by the Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction and the convicted person under those circumstances is at all events entitled while showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced also to show cause against his conviction. It went to. the length of holding that section 439(6) confers upon ·the convicted person an unfettered and unlimited right of showing cause against his conviction, which right cannGt be taken away unless there is a judgment in rem which only would operate a~ a bar to the decision of the same matter when it arises in the exercise of what is in effect the cxer.cise of the onlinary appellate jurisdiction. The Rajasthan High Court in: State v.\n\nJJhawa11i Shankar(') has drawn a. distinction between cases where the accused has not been heard at all and given no opportunity to show cause against his conviction his jail appeal having been dismissed under section 421 or his revision application having been dismissed without hearing him and cases where he has already been heard _and given an opportunity to show cause against his cQnviction whether it be in appeal or in revision and whether his dismissal is summary or on the merits and held that in the former cases he is entitled to ask the Court to hear him and thus allow him to show cause against his conviction under section 439(6) if a notice of enhancement is issued to him.\n\nThe principle as to the finality of criminal judgments has also been invoked while considering this question. This principle has been recognised by this Court in Janardan Reddy & Others v. The State n.f\n\n(l} f19-411 I.L.R. 25 L1h. 391 (F.B.).\n\n(2) I.L.R [1952] 2 R<1h; tbn 7lli.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState '![ Bombay\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nU:J S. Chopra\n\nStu1 e of Bonrbay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nHyderabad & Others(') at page 367 where Faz! Ali, J. observed:-\n\n\"It is true that there is no such thing as the principle of constructive res judicata in a criminal case, but there is such a principle as finality of judgments, which applies to criminal as well as civil cases and is implicit in every system, wherein provisions are to be found for correcting errors in appeal or in revision. Section 430, Criminal Procedure Code ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... has given express recognition to this principle of finality by providing that \"Judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon appeal shall be final, except in cases provided for in section 417 and Chapter XXXII\".\"\n\nSection 417 relates to appeals on behalf of Government in cases of acquittal by any Court other than a High Court and Chapter XXXII relates to reference and revision which also are powers exercised by the High Court over the judgments or orders of inferior Courts. thus exduding from the purview of this exception all judgments and orders passed by the High Court as an Appellate Court. Section 430 does not in terms give finality to the judgments of the High Court passed in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, but the same principle would apply whether the High Court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction or its revisional jurisdiction, because in either case the High Court which is the highest Court of Appeal in the State would have pronounced its judgment. which judgment would replace the judgment of the lower Court and would be final. Even while exercising its revisional powers under section 439 the High Court exercises any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 and it is in effect an exercise of the appellate jurisdiction though exercised in the manner indicated therein. This principle of finality of criminal judgments therefore would equally apply when the High Court is exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Once such a judgrnent has been pronounced by the High Court either in the exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction no review or\n\n(I) 1951 S.C.R. 344.\n\nrevision can be entertained against that judgment and there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which would enable even the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction over the same. The judgment of the High Court would replace that of the lower Court which would no longer be'Subsisting but would be replaced by the High Court judgment and thus it is only the High Court judgment which would be final and would have to be executed in accordance with law by the Courts below. Sectbn 425 requires that whenever a <;:ase is decided on appeal by the High Court it should certify its judgment or order to the Court by which the finding, sentence or order appealed against was recorded or passed and the Court to which the High Court certifies its judgment or order shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the judgment or order of the High Court and, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith.\n\nSection 442 similarly provides .that when a case is revised under Chapter XXXII by the High Court it shall in the same manner certify its decision or order to the Court by which the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or passed and the Court to which the decision or order is so certified shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the decision so certified and, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith. These provisions are enacted because the High Court itself does not execute or carry into effect the sentences or orders passed against the convicted persons but the work of such execution has necessarily to be done in conformity with the sentences or orders passed by the High Court by the Courts which originally passed the same. Nevertheless the latter Courts execute or carry into etf ect the sentences or orders which are ultimately passed by the High Court and are invested with finality.\n\nIn. these cases there is no occasion at all for the exercise of the revisional powers by the High Court under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. That jurisdiction can only be exercised by the High Court when the record of the proceedings of Subordinate Courts has been called for\n\nU.J.S. Clzopra\n\nState of Bomhay\n\nB/iagwa t i-; f.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nV, State of Bo1nbay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nby itself or the case has been reported to it for orders or has otherwise come to its knowledge and the High Court sun motu or on the application of the party interested thinks it fit to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence.\n\nThis is a clear exercise of t11e revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and can be exercised by it only qua the judgments of the lower Courts and certainly not qua its own judgments which have replaced those of the lower Courts.\n\nThe Criminal Procedure Code unlike the Civil Procedure Code does not define \"judgment\" but there are observations to be found in a Full Bench decision of the Mad; as High Court in Emperor v. Chinna Kaliappa Gounden and anotherC), discussing the provisions of section 366 and section 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code and laying down that an order of dismissal under section 203 is not a judgment within the meaning of section 369: The principle of aurrefois acquit also was held not to apply as there. was no trial when the complaint was dismissed under section 203 with the result that the dismissal of a complaint under section 203 was held not to operate as a bar to the rehearing of the complaint by the same Magistrate even when such order of dismissal had not been set aside by a competent authority. Section 366 lays down what the language and contents of a judgment are to be and section 367 provides that the judgment is to contain the decision and the reasons for the decision and unless and until the judgment pronounced by the Court complied with these requirement~ it would not amount to a judgment and such a judgment when signed would not be liable to be altered or reviewed except to correct a clerical error by virtue of the provisions of section 369 save as therein provided. These observations of the Madras High Court were quoted with approval by Sulaiman, J. in Dr.\n\nHori Rain Singh v. Emperor('). He observed that the Criminal Procedure Code did not define a judgment but various sections of the Code suggested what it meant.\n\nHe then discussed those sections and concluded that ''judgment\" in the Code meant a judg-\n\n(ll [1905] I.L.R. 29 Mad, 126. (2)A.I.R. 1939 Federal Court 43.\n\nment of conviction or acquittal. Reference was then made to the 6bservations of Sri Arnold White, C.J. in Emperor v. Chinna Kaliappa Gounden & another(') which were followed hy another Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Emperor v. Maheshwara Kondaya(') and it was held that an order of discharge was not a judgment as \"a judgment is intended to indicate the final order in a trial terminating in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused\". A Full Bench of\n\nthe Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Nandlal Chunilal Bodiwala(') pronounced that a judgment is the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and all the arguments. It was pointed out that sections 366 and 367 applied to the judgments of the trial Court and section 424 dealing with the judgments of the Appellate Courts provided that the rules relating to the judgments of a Trial Court shall apply so far as may be practicable to the judgment of any Appellate Court other than a High Court. It followed therefore that there was no definite rule as to what the judgment of a High Court acting in its appellate as well as its revisional jurisdiction should contain. It was quite natural because the judgment of the High Court in its criminal jurisdiction was ordinarily final and did not therefore require the statement of any reasons whether the High Court was exercising its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The judgment howsoever pronounced was however the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and all the arguments and would therefore either be a judgment of conviction or acquittal and where it would not be possible to predicate of the prono1mcement that it was such an expression of opinion the pronouncement could certainly not be taken as the judgment of the High Court.\n\nA judgment pronounced by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after issue of a notice and a full hearing in the presence of both the parties would certainly be arrived at after\n\n(I) [1905] LL.R. 29 Mad. 126.\n\n(2) [19J8] I.L.R. 31 Madras 543. ·\n\n(3) [1945] 48 Born. L.R,. 41 (F.B.)\n\n18-8 SCI/ND/82\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v.\n\nState ef Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nu J.S. cliop, ra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\ndue consideration of the evidence and all the arguments and would therefore be a judgment and such judgment when pronounced would replace the judgment of the lower Court, thus constituting the judgment of the High Court the only final judgment to be executed in accordance with law by the Court below.\n\nWhen however a petition of appeal presented by a convicted person from jail is summarily dismissed under section 421 or a revision application made by him is dismissed summarily or in limine without hearing him or his pleader what the High Court does is to refuse to entertain the petition of appeal or the criminal revision and the order passed by the High Court -\"dismjssed or rejected\" cannot be said to be the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and all the arguments. It is a refusal to admit the appeal or the criminal revision so that notice be issued to the opr.osite party and the matter be decided after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties. It would be only after the appeal or the criminal revision was admitted that such a notice would issue and the mere refusal by the High Court to entertain the appeal or the criminal revision would certainly not amount to a judgment. The same would be the position when a reference was made by the lower Court to the High Court under section 438 and the High Court on perusing the reference made an order-\"no order on the reference\"-as the High Court on a consideration of the terms of the reference must have come to the conclusion that no prima facie case has been made out to warrant an interference on its part. If the High Court thought that it was a prima facie case for its interference it, would certainly entertain the reference and issue a notice to the parties concerned to show cause why the judgment and order passed by the lower Court should not be revised.\n\nWhen a petition of appeal is presented to the High Court by the convicted person or his pleader section 421 provides that no such appeal should be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of\n\nthe same and the High Court might before dismissing an appeal under that section, call for the record of the case but would not be bound to do so. Even in such a case the hearing accorded to the appellant or his pleader would be with a view to determine whether there was prima f acie case made out to warrant its interference in appeal. The appellant or his pleader would be heard in support of that position and if he satisfied the High Court that there was a prim a f acie case for its interference the High Court would admit the appeal and order a notice to issue to the opposite party in which event the appeal would be decided after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties.\n\nThe calling for the records of the case also though not compulsory but discretionary with the Court would be for this very purpose, viz., to determine whether a prima facie case for its interference was made out.\n\nThe whole purpose of the hearing accorded to the appellant or his pleader even after calling for the records of the case would be to determine whether a prima facie case for its interference was made out and it would not be within the province of the Court at that stage to fully consider the evidence an the record and hear arguments from the appellant or his pleader with a view to determine whether the conviction , could be sustained or the sentence passed upon the accused could be reduced. The setting aside of the conviction and the reduction, if any, in the sentence could only be determined by the Court after notice was issued to the opposite party and a full hearing took place in the presence of both the parties. Even in the case of a summary dismissal o( a petition of appeal under these circumstances the position would certainly not be any different from that which obtains in the case of a summary dismissal of the petition of appeal presented by the convicted person from jail or the summary dismissal of an application for criminal revision made by him or on his behalf to the High Court. In all ihese cases there will be no judgment of the High Court replacing the judgment of the lower Court and the action of the High Court would only amount to a refusal by the High Court to admit the\n\nU J:S. l1wpra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBlragwati J.\n\npetition of appeal or the criminal revision and issue notice to the opposite party with a view to the final determination of the questions arising in the appeal or the revision. The order dismissing the appeal or criminal revision summarily or in fimine would no doubt be a final order of the High Court not subject to review or revision even by the High Court itself but would not tantamount to a judgment replacing that of the lower Court. The convicted person would be bound by that order and would not be able to present another petition of appeal or application for criminal revision challenging the conviction or the sentence passed upon him by the lower Court. But such order would not have the effect of replacing the judgment or order of the lower Court which would in that event be subject to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the instance of the State or an interested party. In the cases (]) & (3) noted above therefore there being no judgment of the High Court replacing the judgment of the lliwer Court section 439(]) would operate and the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction either suo 11Jotu or on the application of the interested party would be in a position to issue the notice of enhancement of sentence which would require tu be sc:rvcd on the accused under section 439!2) so that. he would have an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. In that event the convicted person in showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced would also be entitled to show cause against his conviction.\n\nIt follows therefore that in the case of a summary dismissal or a dismissal i11 limi11e of petitions of appeaf or applications for criminal revision even if the convicted person or his pleader has been heard by the High Court with a view to determine if there is a prima facie case for its interference, the convicted person to whom an opportunity has been given under section 439(2) of showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced would in slimvin!} cause he entitled also to show cause <1gainst his conviction. The\n\nsame would also be the position when a reference made by the lower Court to the High Court under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code is rejected by the High Court without issuing notice to the parties concerned by merely ordering-\"no order on the reference\". In cases where the petition of appeal or the application for criminal revision is admitted by the High Court and a notice is issued to the opposite party and the High Court maintains the conviction with .or without reducing the sentence passed upon the accused the judgment of the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction would replace the judgment of the lower Court and there would be no occasion at all for the exercise by the High Court of its revisional powers under section 439(1) which can only be exercised qua the judgments of the lower Courts mid certainly not qua its own judgments. The cases (2) & (4) noted above would therefore be outside the purview of section 439(1). If that is so there would be no question of giving the accused an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his defence under section 439(2) and the provisions of section 439(6) would certainly not come into operation at all. If no notice of enhancement of sentence could issue under these circumstances no question at all could arise of the convicted person showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced and being entitled in showing cause also to show cause against his conviction. ·\n\nIt follows by way of a necesary corollary that no notice for enhancement of sentence can be issued by the High Court when a judgment is pronounced by it after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction. Such notice for enhaneement of sentence can be issued by it either suo motu or at the instance of an interested party when the judgment of the lower Court subsists and is not replaced by its own judgment in the exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction. When the judgment of the lower Court has been under its scrutiny on notice being issued to\n\nU.J .S. Cito pr a v. ., State of Bombay\n\n.Bhagwatil.\n\nU.J.S, Chopra\n\nv St11t• of mbay\n\n•hatrwaJi J.\n\nthe opposite party and on a full hearing accorded to both the parties notice for enhancement of sentence can only be issued by it before it pronounces its j udgment replacing that of the lower Court. When such hearing is in progress it is incumbent upon the High Court or the opposite party to make up its mind before such judgment is pronounced whether a notice for enhancement of sentence should issue to the accused. There would be ample time for the opposite party to make up its mind whether it should apply for a notice of .enhancement of the sentence.\n\nThe High Court also on a perusal of the record and after hearing the arguments addressed to it by both the parties would be in a position to make up its mind whether it should issue such notice to the accused.\n\nBut if neither the opposite party nor the High Court does so before the hearing is concluded and the judgn1ent is pronounced it will certainly not be open to either of them to issue such notice for enhancement of sentence to the accused, because then the judgment of the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction would replace that of the lower Court and section 439(1) would have no operation at all. Even in the case of a reference by the lower Court under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code the High Court if it did not summarily rcjci.:t such a reference would issue notice to the parties concerned and then there would be occasion for it either suo nwtu or on the application of an interested party to issue a notice of enhancement of sentence before the\n\nhearin~ was concluded and a judgment was pronounced by it. The procedure obtaining in the several High Courts to the effect that notice for enhancement of sentence can issue even after the appeal or the application for criminal revision is disposed of by the High Court and judgment pronounced thereupon is not correct and is contrary to the true position laid down above.\n\nIt was contended that the non-obstante clause in section 43916), viz. \"notwithstanding anything contained in this section\" was meant to confer upon the convicted person a right to show cause against his\n\nconviction in those cases where a notice to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced was issued against him, whatever be the circumstances under which it might have been issued.\n\nOnce you had a notice for enhancement of sentence issued against the convicted person this right of showing cause against his conviction also accrued to him and that right could be exercised by him even though he had on an earlier occasion unsuccessfully agitated the maintainability of his conviction either on appeal or in revision. This non-obstante clause could not, in our opinion, override the requirements of section 439(1) which provides for the exercise of revisional powers by the High Couxrt only qua the judgments of the lower Courts. Section 439(6) would not come into operation unless a notice for enhancement was issued under section 439(2) and a notice for enhancement of sentence under section 439(2) could not be issued unless and until the High Court thought it fit to exercis~ its revisional powers under section 439(1) qua the judgments of the lower Courts. The High Court has no jurisdiction to exercise any revisional powers qua its own judgments or orders, the same being invested with finality and otherwise being outside the purview of the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, and the only purpose of the 11011-ohstante clause in section 439(6) can be to allow the convicted person also to show cause against his conviction when he is showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced in spite of the prohibition contained in section 439(5).\n\nWhere an appeal lies under the Code and no appeal is brought no proceedings by way of revision can be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. If the convicted person could have filed an appeal but had failed to do so he could certainly not approach the High Court in revision and ask the High Court to set aside his conviction. If he could not file application in revision he could not show cause against his conviction under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and it was in order to remove this disability that the 11011-obstante clause in section 439(6) was enacted so that when the High\n\nU.J.S. Clwpr\"\n\nSta/IJ •/Bomba)\n\n/Jltfllwoti J.\n\nU./.S. Chopra V.\n\nState 'Qf.8omba)'\n\nJJJ1agw1W\"J.\n\nCourt was exercising its revisional jutisdiction the convicted person could show cause against his conviction in spite of the fact that otherwise he could not have been able to do so, he not having appealed when an appeal lay and therefore not being entitled to file an application in criminal revision and challenge the validity or maintainability of his conviction. Section 439(6) therefore confers on the convicted person a right which he can exercise in the event of a notice for enhancement of sentence being issued against him in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court in spite of the fact that he was not entitled to question the validity or maintainability of his conviction in a substantive application for criminal revision filed by him for the purpose and this right is available to him only if the High Court exe\\cising its revisional jurisdiction under section 439(1) thinks it fit to issue a notice of enhancement of sentence against him under section 439(2) and in that event he has the right also to show cause against his conviction when showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced.\n\nWe shall now review the decision of the various High Courts to which our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel appearing before us. Turning first to the decisions of the Bombay High Court we were referred to Emperor v. Chinto Bhairava('), a decision given in the year 1908 which recognised the invari- ' able practice of that Court for over 25 years according to which the accused in showing cause why the sentence should not be enhanced was not .allowed to discuss the evidence and satisfy the Court that he had been wrongly convicted. The practice of the Court in such cases was to accept the conviction as conclusive and to consider the question of enhancement of sentence on that basis. It was open to the accused to apply for revision of the conviction, but having failed to avail himself of that, he could not be permitted to assail the conviction in a proceeding where the sole question was whether the sentence passed by the lower Court was adequate or not. It may be\n\n(1) [1908] I.L.R. 32 Born. 162.\n\nnoted that this decision was in the year 1908 long before the amendment of section 439 of the Crin1inal Procedure Code by Act XVIII of 1923 b:, auding subsection (6) thereto.\n\nThe next decision to which we were referred was Emperor v. Mangat Naran('). In that case simultaneously· with the admission of an appeal filed by the accused the Court issued a notice for enhancement of sentence. When the appeal and the notice came for hearing together before the Division Bench the Court observed that such a practice was not desirable. It was likely to produce an impression on the mind of an illiterate accused in jail that it was proposed to enhance the sentence because he had appealed.\n\nMacLeod, CJ. there expressed an opinion that if after an appeal had been heard on its merits and disn11ssed a notice to enhance the sentence was issued, the accused had still the right to show cause against his conviction,· though any attempt to set aside the conviction would not have much chance .of success. He however expressed his preference in favour of the old practice, viz first to deal with the appeal and then to consider whether a notice to enhance should issue. No question had arisen for consideration of the Court in that case as to the true construction of the provision of section 439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the only question considered by the Court there was what should be the proper procedure to be adopted when issuing a notice for enhancement of sentence, whether it should be issued simultaneously with the admission of the appeal or after the appeal was finally heard and disposed of. ·\n\nThis opinion expressed by MacLeod, CJ. was therfore treated as obiter in Emperor v. Jorabhai Kisanbhai('). The question that arose for consideration of the Court in that case was whether after an appeal of an accused person against his conviction and sen~ tence bad been dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court and a notice to enhance the sentence was issued on an application on behalf of the Government the application for enhancement of sentence could be\n\n(I) [1924] 27 Dom. L R. 3SS.\n\n19-8 SCJ/ND/82\n\n(2) [1926] I.L.R. SO Bom. 7.83.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState ef Bombay\n\nBhagwatl l.\n\nIJ, J.S. Chopra v.\n\nState af Bombay\n\n/lhalfWatiJ.\n\nheard on its merits by another Division Bench of the High Court treating the conviction as correct or the accused was under such circumstances not entitled under section 439(6) to be re-heared on the merits of his conviction.\n\nThe appeal filed by the accused against his conviction and sentence had been dismissed on the 7th April, 1926. After judgment was delivered by the Court, the Government Pleader applied orally for issue of a notice for enhancement and that application was granted. The application was heard on the 17th June 1926 and it was urged on behalf of the accused that the only proper procedure was to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence before the appeal had been actually disposed of and that once the appeal was disposed of by the Court there was no legal power to enhance the sentence under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThat contention was negatived the Court observing that so far as the point of procedure was concerned there was no hard and fast rule as to the appropriate time for the issue of notice of enhancement of sentence by the High Court and resorting to the principle of the finality of judgments as regards the accused being concluded by the judgment of the High Court dismissing his appeal and confirming the sentence passed upon him. The _judgment there was interpreted as confirming the conviction and rejecting the appeal as to the sentence in the sense that it saw no reason to reduce it and that was not treated as a decision that the-sentence should not be enhanced if a pror procedure was taken such as the Code allowed for the purpose and therefore so far as the judgment went there was nothing which in any way tied the hands of the Court. Sections 369 and 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code were referred to and the Court held that the observations of MacLeod, C.J. in Emperor v.\n\nMangat Naran(') above referred to were obiter dicta not binding upon them and the application must be heard on the merits treating the conviction as correct in view of the dismissal of the appeal.\n\nIt is no doubt true as observed by Madgavkar, J.\n\n(I) [1924] 27 Dom. L.R. 355.\n\nin regard to the practic~ as to the proper time for issuing of the notice of enhancement that the question of adequacy of punishment is, in the first instance, a matter for the Government and for the District Magistrate.\n\nFrom the time when the sentence is passed, and at all events up to the time when an appeal is admitted and notice is received, it is open to Government to consider the sufficiency of a sentence and before hearing of the appeal, to apply to the High Court for enhancement of the sentence if they are so advi'sed. In that event the appeal as well as the notice of enhancement would be heard together and the Court hearing the appeal would apply its mind not only to the question whether the conviction should be confirmed but also to the question whether the sentence should be reduced or enhanced as the case may be. It is only in rare instances that the High Court considers for itself the question of enhancement of sentence and only if no action has been taken by the Government and if the High Court thinks that the interests of justice imperatively demand it. In such a case it would be a matter for consideration by the High Court whether it should issue notice at the very time of the admission or whether it should do so whik disposing of the appeal on the merits as to the conviction.\n\nThe observations of the learned Judge however in so far as they seem to suggest that the appeal should be disposed of first and the question of enhancement of sentence should be considered by the. same Bench immediately afterwards or that the notice for enhancement could be issued by the Court after the disposal of the appel on the merits as to conviction do not take into account the fact that after the judgment is pronounced and the conviction is confirmed involving as a necessary corollary thereof the confirming of the sentence passed upon the accused also if the same is not reduced, the judgment of the High Court replaces that of the lower Court and the exercise of any revisional powers by the High Court by way of enhancement of the sentence is necessarily eschewed. These revisional powers could only be exercised by the High Court qua the judg-\n\n19S5\n\nU.J.S ChtJpra\n\nState of Bomboy\n\n8ftagwtJti J.\n\n19SS\n\nUJ.S. Chopra\n\nSta,. of &mlxty\n\nBhagwati.J.\n\nment of the lower Court and once that judgment is replaced by the judgment of the High Court, the High Court has no further powers to review or revise its own judgment and enhance the sentence which is thus passed by it upon the accused. The principle as to the finality of judgments applied by the Court by virtue of the provisions of section 369 and section 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code should not have been confined merely to the question of confirming the conviction but also should have been extended to the confirming of the sentence in so far as the High Court did rtot see any reason to reduce to sentence already passed by the lower Court upon the accused.\n\nWhen the High Court hears the appeal on its merits it does not apply its mind only to the question whether the conviction should be confirmed but also applies its mind to the adequacy of the sentence passed upon the accused by the lower Court. In thus apP, lying its mind to the question of sentence it also considers whether the sentence passed upon the accused by the lower Court is adequate in the sense that it is either such as should be reduced or is such as should be enhanced. The questions of the reduction of the sentence or enhancement of the sentence are not to be viewed as if they fall into water-tight compartments and the mind of the Court hearing the appeal on merits is directed to the consideration of the matter in all its aspects including the confirming of the conviction ancl the reduction or enhancement of the sentence as the case may be. The principle of finality of judgments should therefore be extended not only to the question of the confirming of the conviction but also to the question as to the adequacy of the sentence, whether the sentence which is passed upon the accused by the lower Court should be reduced, confirmed or enhanced.\n\nOnce therefore the judgment of the High Court replaces that of the lower Court there is no question which can ever arise of the exercise by the High Court of its revisional powers under section 469(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the proper procedure therefore if the High Court thought it fit either suo motu or on the application of the interested party\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORfS 145\n\nto issue the notice of enhancement of sentence, is lo issue the said notice before the hearing of the appeal is concluded and the judgment of the High Court in appeal is pronounced. We are therefore of the opinion that the decision reached by the High Court of Bombay in Emperor v. JorabhaiC) was not correct in so far as it held that the notice of enhancement could be issued by the High Court at the instance of the Government after the dismissal of the appeal on merits. The notice for enhancement issued in that case was not competent and should not have been issued at all by the High Court.\n\nThe decision in Emperor v. Jorabhai(') was followed in Emperor v. Koya PartabO which extend ell the same prindple to an appeal which had been presented from jail and was summarilv dismissed under section 421 oi the Criminal Proccduie Code. While dismissing the saml'. the Court issued a noticl'. for cnh<incement. .Whc11 the notice came for hearing the accused contended that he was entitled to be heard on the merits as to whether he should ha\\'e been convicted or not\n\nrelying upon the provisions of section 4J9((1). Beaumont. C..J. relied upon the provisions of cction UO and observed that the accused was not at liberty to be heard on the merits. The judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing the appeal on the 9th .lunt: 1930 was a llnal order which the Court was not at liberty to differ from and the 11m1-obstm1te clause in section 439(6) did not entitle the accused to go behind section 430 and to show cause against his conviction after his appeal had been dismissed. The learned Chief Justice followed the decision in Emperor v. Jorah!wi()\n\nand observed that the only distinction between that case and the one before him was that that case had\n\nbeen heard on the merits and not summarily dismissed. But in his view that distinction was not one of principle. We are of the opinion that tht order which had been pronounced by the Court of Appeal on the 9th June 1930 was not a judgment of the High Court which rcpbccd thit of the lower Court and\n\n(I) [1926] I.LR. 50 Bom. 783.\n\n(2) [1930] 32 Bom. LR. 12s0.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nSlate qf Bombay\n\nB/iagwati J.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nStat~ of Bo11iy\n\nBhagwati J.\n\neven though it might come within the description of an order within the meaning of section 430 it was not a judgment within the meaning of the term set out above and not being a judgment was no bar to the accused showing cause also against his conviction when showing cause against the notice for enhancement.\n\nThe matter was one falling within the category of case No. I noted above and it was open to the accused even though his petition of appeal from jail was summarily dismissed under section 421 to urge while showing cause against the notice of enhancement of sentence also to show cause against his conviction. This decision was therefore in our opinion incorrect and the accused ought to have been heard on the merits as to whether he should have been convicted or not.\n\nEmperor v. Ramachandra Shankarshet Urm•amei') was a case where the High Court admitted the appeal and at the same time issued a notice to the accused for enhancement of sentence. The observations of Mac- Lcod, J. in Emperor v. Mangat Nara11(') were followed in spill! of the fact that they had been held obiter by the Division Bench of the Court in Emperor v. Jurabhai('). Emperor v. JorabltaiCJ was also referred to and it was held that it was neither necessary nor desirable for the High Court to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence at the time of admission of the appeal.\n\nIt was however observed that it was open to consider the question of enhancement of sentence after the appeal had been heard. If those observations were meant to convey that the question of enhancement of sentence could be considered after the appeal had been disposed of and judgment was pronounced by the High Court we do not agree with the same.\n\nBut if they were meant to convey tht the High Court could hear the accused on the question of enhancement of the sentence at the same time when his appeal was heard, before pronouncement of the judgment on the question of the conviction and the\n\n(I) fl9J2l )5 Jlom. L.R. 174.\n\n(2) [19241 27 Il<•m. L.R 355.\n\n(3) [1926) i.L.R. 50 Bom. 783.\n\nsentence passed upon him, they were perfectly in order.\n\nThe decision in Emperor v. lnderchandC) extended the principle enunciated in Emperor v. Jorabhai(') further by applying it to a case where an application for revision by the accused against his conviction and sentence had been dismissed by the High Court. In that case the accused had filed an application for revision which was summarily dismissed by the Vacation Judge on the, 30th April, 1954. After such summary dismissal of the application the Government filed the criminal revision application for enhancement of sentence. The Division Bench held that the criminal revision application of the accused having been fully disposed of by the learned Vacation Judge there was a valid order of dismissal,. that section 430 debarred the accused from having that order of dismissal reviewed by the High Court that the right conferred by section 439(6) could not give an accused person a right to be heard against his conviction if such a right was in conflict with the other provisions of the Code, that under section 369 the Court had no power to alter the decision of the learned Vaca- tion Judge dismissing the revision petition filed by the accused and that if the accused had already unsuccessfully exercised his right of appeal or revision to the High Court he was not entitled in a subsequent application by the Government for enhancement of sentence to ask the High Court to go once more into the merits of the case and to set aside the conviction which the same Court had previously confirmed either in appeal or on a revision application.\n\nDivatia, .J. was conscious of the somewhat anomalous position so far as the accused was concerned and referred to the observations of the Court in Emperor v. Babu Pandurang Mhaske(') where it was stated and rightly that where the High Court itself wanted to enhance the sentence, in order that the accused might have the right to challenge his conviction before the same bench which was hearing either the appeal or the\n\n( 1) [1934] 36 Bom. L.R. 954. (') ff 926] I.LR. 50 Born. 783.\n\n( 3) [I 934] 36 Born. L.R. 382.\n\nU.J.S. Chopm\n\nStaf'e of Bomb{, y\n\nBharwariJ.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nStat~ of Bo1nhay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\napplication for enhancement, it was proper that the application for enhancement should be heard before the appeal was finally decided, so that the accused might he heard at the very time when the auestion of enhancement was before the Court.\n\nWhile approving of these observations the learned Judge however observed that it was possible only in a case where the High Court itself wanted to enhance the sentence and gave notice to the accused and\n\nnt so in a case where Government approached the\n\nHigh Court by way of a revisional application as it was entitled to do under section 439(1 ).\n\nGovernment might approach the High Court in revision under section 439( I) at any time within six months after the decision of the lower Court and in the meanwhile the accused might have come to the High Court and his application might have been rejected. That might result in this that the conviction might be confirmed by one Bench or a single Judge as might happen in a particular case and the application for enhancement might be heard by another Bench. But, so far as the provisions of the section were concerned, whatever might be the anomaly in this procedure, the learned Judge did not think that the inconvenience or hardship to the accused should lead the Court to construe section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a manner which, according to the view of the learned Judge, was not intended by the Legislature. These observations however did not take count of the fact that if a petition of appeal or a criminal revision application filed hv the accused was dismissed summarily or in !imine tl; ere was no question of a judgment of the High Court replacing that of the lower Court and the order of the High Court merely amounted to a refusal by it to interfere either in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction which order though final and not being susceptible of review or revision by the High Court itself, did not amount to a judgment of the High Court barring the application of section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nIn that event the judgment of the lower Court not being replaced by a\n\njudgment of the High Court it could be the subject matter of criminal revision at the instance of the Government in the matter of the enhancement of the sentence and all the provisions of section 439 would then come into operation. The High Court would be bound then under section 439(2) to give an opportu\n\nnity to the accused to be heard in his defence before the sentence passed upon him by the lower Court was enhanced and the accused would under section 439(6) be entitled in showing cause against the notice of enhancement also to show cause against his conviction. This decision of the High Court therefore was incorrect and the accused ought to have been allowed in spite of the summary dismissal of his application in revision to show cause against his conviction while showing cause against the notice for enhancement.\n\nOne more decision of the Bombay High Court may be referred to and that is Emperor v. Nandlal Chunilal Bodiwafa('). That was a case where the Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad had at the instance of the petitioner made a reference to the High Court recommending that the Additional Magistrate had no jurisdiction, power or authority to pass the order complained against and that the High Court should quash the same. On the reference coming before the High Court the foHowing order was passed without issuing notice :-\"no order on this reference\". The petitioner thereupon filed a criminal revision application to the High Court praying that the order of the Additional District Magistrate be quashed. This revision application came for hearing before a Division Bench and the Court requested the Chief Justice to constitute a Full Bench to consider the following point:\n\n\"When on a reference made by the Sessions Judge under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a Division Bench of this Court passes an order without issuing notice, viz., 'No order on this reference', whether the applicant at whose instance the Sessions Judge made the reference is entitled to make an application in revision to this Court in the same\n\n\\ 1) f1945] 48 Bom. LR. 41 (F.B.).\n\n20-1' SCI/ND/82\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwatl J.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState o}· Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nmatter, in view of the provisions of section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code?\"\n\nThe application was heard by a Full Bench and it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that when the High Court without issuing notice to the applicant disposed of the reference made by the Sessions Judge by stating \"no order on the reference\" there was no judgment given on the merits. The order of the Court only meant that the Court would not allow the matter to be brought before it on the recommendation of the Sessions Judge and merely disposed of it on that view. If a mere order of disposal of a reference or revision application amounted to a judgment the party in whose favour a reference was made by the Sessions Judge would be deprived of the right he had of approaching the High Court in revision against the order, if the Court disposed of the matter in the manner it had done in that case. This argument was repelled by the Full Bench. It held that section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code debarred the petitioner from making the criminal rev1s10n application, that the order of the High Court passed upon the reference amounted to a judgment within the meaning of that term in section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code and after it was signed it could not be altered or reviewed in a subsequent application for revision and that even though the Division Bench of the High Court passed the order \"no order on this reference\" without issuing notice to the applicant, the applicant in whose favour the Sessions Judge made a reference was not entitled to make an application in revision to the High Court in the same matter. Even though this conclusion was reached by the Full Bench they observed that they were not unaware that the applicant had a grievance that his position had been worsened and not improved by the Sessions Judge being in his favour, because if the recommendation of the Sessions Judge was turned down without hearing the petitioner, as had happened in that oase he was worse off, while if the Sessions\n\nJudge would have been against him he could have still applied to the High Court in revision\n\nand got an opportunity to put his case before the High Court.\n\nThis was recognised no doubt as an anomaly but it was caused by the provision of rule 26 of the Appellate Side Rules of the Bombay High Court which compelled a party to apply to a lower revisional Court before applying in revision to the High Court. This disability which the petitioner suffered from was emphasised in that if the Sessions Judge had dismissed his application he could then have applied to and argued his case before the High Court, but because the Sessions Judge was in his fovour and had therefore got to make a reference to the High Court recommending it to set aside the order and because the High Court was not satisfied with the reasons for the recommendation, and disposed of it without issuing a rule, the petitioner was debarred from urging his arguments before the High Court. It might be that the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for the recommendation might be weak or might be insufficient, whereas the petitioner, if he appeared might be able to urge cogent an<l sufficient reasons for setting aside the original order. In spite of pointing out this disability the only recommendation which was made by the Full Bench was that the Rule 26 of the Appellate Side Rules should be properly amended so as to issue notice to all the parties concerned when a reference was made by a Sessions Judge recommending the setting aside of an order of the Trial Court. We are of the opinion that the Full Bench should not have stopped short at pointing out this disability which the applicant suffered from but should have gone further and held that the order passed by the High Court on the reference, though final under section 430 of the Crimmal Procedure Code was not a judgment within the meaning of that term and therefore did not debar the applicant from making the criminal revision application which he did under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Such an order did not amount to a judgment within the definition thereof given by the Full Bench itself which was: \"a judgment is the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after the consideration of the\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombuy\n\nB/1agwati J.\n\nU.J.S. ChlJPTa\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwatil.\n\nevidence and of the arguments\" as pointed out eariier in the course of this judgment. We are of the opinion that this decision of the Bombay High Court was also incorrect.\n\nEmperor v. Jorabhai(') was followed by the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Dhanala/('). In that case a revision petition filed on a behalf of the convicted person was dismissed after hearing counsel.\n\nSubsequently a report of the Sessions Judge was received and the learned Judge who had dismissed the revision petition issued a notice for enhancement of sentence and the Court held that section 439(6) was meant to give an accused person to whom a notice for enhancement was issued and who had not appealed or if no appeal lay had not applied for revision of his conviction, an opportunity to question the correctness of his conviction if it was proposed to enhance his sentence. But if a petition for revision against his conviction by a convict had been rejected by a Judge of the High Court and a notice had subsequently been issued to him to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced the convict was barred from showing cause aginst his conviction and the fact that the previous order dismissing the revision was passed without issuing notice to the opposite party made no difference to the position. The Court also invoked the principle of the finality of judgments and further held that the words \"unless he had already done so\" though not occurring at the end of the sub-section were to be presumed to be implied from the ordinary presumption as to the finality of orders in criminal revision proceedings. In arriving at this conclusion Addison, J. observed:-\n\n\"In the present case there has been a judgment of this Court on the very full revision application brought by the convict.\n\nBy that judgment the petition was dismissed and the conviction confirmed.\n\nUnder section 369. Criminal Procedure Code that judg- 1nent cannot be reviewed. It is a final judgment of this Court. and in my opinion the provisions of sub-\n\n<'1 fl926] l.L.R 50 B •. m. 7.<1. (') [1928] J.L.R. 10 Lah. 241.\n\nsection (6), section 439, do not give the convict another opportunity in these circumstances to be heard as regards his conviction''.\n\nThere was no justification whatsoever for reading the words \"unless he had already done so\" in the section and the reasoning adopted by the learned Judge in our opinon wrongly invested the order passed by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction dismissing the application without issuing a notice to the opposite party with the character of a judgment which could only be enjoyed by it if it had been pronounced after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties after notice issued to the opposite party. Then the pronouncement of the High Court would have been a judgment replacing the judgment of the lower Court and not subject to the exercise of any revisional jurisdiction under section 4390) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Where the petition for revision against his conviction presented by the convict had been rejected by the High Court in liminc the order passed by the High Court did not tantamount to a judgment which would debar the convict from showing cause against the conviction when showing cause against a subsequent notice for enhancement of sentence issued by the High Court.\n\nThe learned Judge further observed:\n\n\"There appears to be no distinction between dismissing a revision petition in limine or after notice.\n\nThe judgment is in either case an effective and final judgment of the Court. In this respect there is no difference between a revision petition and a memorandum of appeal. ............. .In these circumstances I can see no force in the argument that an order dismissing a revision petition without issuing notice is different from an order after the issue of notice, or that there is any distinction between a judgment of this Court passed on the revision side and one on the appellate side\".\n\nWhile agreeing with the observations of the learned Judge that for the purposes of section 439(1) there was no distinction between a judgment of\n\nU J.s. Chopa\n\n\"· Siate of Bombqy\n\nB/1qwaa J.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nSlate of Bo111hay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nthe High Cour.t passed on the 'revision side 4nd one on the appellate side we are of the opinion that there is a real distinction between orders dismissing a revision petition or a petition of appeal in /imine without issuing notice to the opposite party and judgments pronounced by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties after the issue of notice. The latter are judgments in the true sense of the term which debar the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThis decision of the Lahore High Court was however overruled by a Special Bench of that Court in Emperor v. Atta Mohammad('). A criminal revision application had been dismissed in limine and thereafter a notice for enhancement of sentence was issued by the High Court. The decision of that Conrt in Emperor v. Dhanalal(') following Emperor v. Jorublwi(') was cited as debarring the accused from showing cause against his conviction and Blacker, .I. before whom the matter was argued in the first instance recommended a reference to a larger Bench and the reference came up for hearing and Jina! disposal before a Special Bench of the Court. It was held that the accused was entitled to show cause against his conviction notwithstanding the fact that his petition for revision of the order by which he was convicted had already been dismissed in limine under section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question whether an order under section 435 was a judgment was discussed by Blacker, .J. while pronouncing the judgment of the Special Bench. He referred to the case of Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor(') above referred to and quoted with approval the observations of Sulaiman, .J. that every order in a criminal matter was not a judgment and that 'judgment' in the Criminal Procedure Code meant a judgment of conviction or acquittal. Applying this definition the learned Judge observed : -\n\n(') [.19-nl I.L.R. 25 L:th. 391 (I' B.). (\") 11928] I.LR. JO Lahore 241. (\") (1926) I.LR. 50 Born. 783.\n\n(') A.TR 1939 F.C. 43.\n\n\"It will be seen that an order under section 435 can with difficulty be called a judgment. All that a Judge does at this preliminary . stage is either to send for the records of the lower Court with a view to exaniining them under section 439(1) or to refuse to do so. It is difficult to see how the latter qm possibly be called a judgment of conviction. When such an order consists of the one word 'Dismissed' can it necessarily be taken as a judicial pronouncement that in the opinion of the Judge the respondent was rightly convicted upon the evidence? It seems to me that all that it means is that the Judge sees no adequate ground disclosed in the petition or on the face of the judgment for proceeding further\".\n\nThis reasoning in our opinion was quite sound. But the learned Judge proceeded further to make a distinction between the summary dismissal of a petition of appeal under section 421 and the summary dismissal of a criminal revision application under section 435 stating that the reasons for which the High Court would summarily dismiss an appeal were very different from those for which it would refuse to interfere in revision, and in the case of appeal it would only do so when the material before it was sufficient to satisfy it beyond any doubt of the accused's guilt, whereas, on revision the High Court would not interfere merely because it did not agree on every point with the Court below, as long as the Courts below have come to a reasonable decision on the evidence. This distinction in our opinion does not affect the position that the order pronounced by the High Court dismissing the petition of appeal or a criminal revision application in limine without issuing notice to the opposite party is merely an order dismissing the same on the ground that there is no prima facie case for interference of the High Court and does not amount to a judgment pronounced by the High Court after full hearing in the presence of both the parties which only can debar the High Court from exercising its revisional jurisdiction under section 439(1). Mr.\n\nJustice Mahajan as he then was delivered a concurring judgment but went a step further and observed that\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwa#J.\n\nU..l.S. Ch•pra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBha,•arl J.\n\nthe true interpretation of section 439(6) was that it gave an unlimited right to the accused to whom a notice of enhancement was issued under section 439(2) to show cause against his conviction and the Judge was bound to go into the evidence with a view to find for himself whether the conviction could be sustained. This right accrued to the convict on service of notice of enhancement of sentence and could not be negatived by anything that had preceded the issue of that notice. It was the Judge hearing the enhancement petition who had to give an opportunity to the convict to challenge his conviction before him and to satisfy him that the conviction was unsustainable.\n\nThat Judge could not substitute for his satisfaction the satisfaction of some other Judge in the matter. It was a condition precedent to the passing of a prejudicial order against an accused person that he had another opportunity of establishing his innocence, even if he had failed to do so before. The learned Judge rightly observed that an order made in the exercise of an extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction, unless it be a .iudgment in rem, could not in any way operate as a bar to the decision of the same matter when it arose in the exercise of ordinary appellate jurisdiction, and that therefore an order dismissing a criminal revision application 'in limine could not amount to a .iudgment of the High Court.\n\nThe learned Judge then invoked the principle of the finality of judgments and observed: -\n\n\"On the other hand if the view be correct that all orders passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction whether they be of dismissal of the petition in limine, or otherwise take away the right of the convict to challenge his conviction in view of section 369, Criminal Procedure Code as in such cases a decision given already cannot be altered or reviewed, then I do not see how for purposes of enhancement of • the sentence, the previous decision can be altered.\n\nAny Judge deciding a petition for revision under section 43.:,( 11 must consider the propriety of the sentence as well as the propriety and legality of the conviction, and in my opinion he must be presumed to\n\nhave done so. If a previous decision on the question of conviction bars the applicability of section 439(6), it also bars the power to enhance the sentence. Once it has been held that the sentence was proper, it cannot be enhanced. I have not been able to see the ratio decidendi of the decisions which take the view, that the question of enhancement of the sentence is something distinct and separate from that of conviction, and that the question of the adequacy and pr0priety of sentence which comes before the court on a petition for re\\, ision presented by the accused is a matter different from the matter of enhancement.\n\nThe Judge has to see if a proper sentence has been passed before he decides the case, and the questicm whether a sentence passed is adequate or inadequate cannot be split up in two different compartments.\n\nThe question is only one of the quantum of punishment and such a question can only be decided but once. Therefore in my view either there is no power of re-revision in the High Court, in that case there is no power to enhance the sentence on a separate petition made for the purpose; or there is such a power in that case it is available to the Crown as well as to the accused\".\n\nThis reasoning again was in our opinion sound but led only to the conclusion that therewas no power of re-revision in the High Court and in that case there was no power to enhance the sentence on a separate petition made for the purpose. The learned Judge therefore ought to have held that if the order dismissing the criminal revison petition in limine tantamounted to a judgment pronounced -by the High Court it was not open to the High Court to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence subsequently under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nHaving held however that the order dismissing the criminal revision application in limine was merely an order and not a judgment pronounced by the High Court and also having held that the High Court was entitled to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence under section 439(] ), under those circumstances the only logical conclusion to which the Court could come\n\n21--8 SCI/ND/82\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v.\n\nState .ef BQmbay\n\nBhogwa!il.\n\nU J.S. Chopra\n\nState qf Bomba.v\n\nB'1111wati J.\n\nwas that under section 439(6) the accused while showing cause against the enhancement of sentence was entitled also to show cause against his conviction.\n\nMr. Justice Mahajan confined his decision only to the case of a dismissal of a criminal revision application in limine and left open the question whether a decision on the Appellate Side of the High Court would bar the exercise of the right under section 439(6) inasmuch as no arguments were heard on the point. The principle of this judgment in our opinion is not confined merely to cases where a criminal revision application has been dismissed in !imine but also extends to cases where a petition of appeal whether presented from jail or presented to the Court by the appellant or his pleader has been similarly dismissed summarily or in !imine without issuing notice to the opposite party and also to cases of references made by the lower Courts to the High Court where the High Court has merely passed an order without issuing notices, to any of the parties concerned-\"no order on this reference\".\n\nThe Patna High Court in Ramlakhan Chaudhry v.\n\nThe King-Emperor(') followed both these dec.isions Emperor v. Jorabhai(') and Emperor v. Dha11a!af(') in holding that the dismissal of an appeal by the High Court did not debar it from subsequently enhancing the sentence in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction after issuing notice to the accused. In that case an appeal had' been dismissed after full hearing by the High Court.\n\nAt the hearing of the appeal however the Court asked the counsel for the accused to show cause why the sentence passed upon them should not be directed to run consecutively thus in effect issuing a notice for enhancement of the sentence. When the matter came on for hearing it was contended on behalf of the accused that with the disposal of the appeal the Bench and indeed the High Court was functus officio and had no jurisdiction to hear the matter at all. This contention was repelled by observing that the appellate judgment was not concerned with the\n\n(I) [1931] I.L.R. 10 Pa'na 872.\n\n(2) [1926] J.L.R. 50 Born. 783.\n\n(3) (1928] I.L.R. 10 Lahore 241.\n\nquestion of enhancement of the sentence which only arose in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and the sentence to be revised and enhanced was the sen\" tence passed not by the High Court but by the Court of Sessions. These observations run counter to the observations of Mr. Justice Mahajan which we have quoted above and ignores the fact 'that once the High Court pronounced its judgment in the appeal after fuli hearing in the presence of both the parties the j11dgment of the High Court replaced that of the lowe1 Court and the High Court had thereafter no power to issue a notice of enhancement of sentence purporting to exercise the revisional powers vested in it under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which could be exercised only qua the judgments of the lower Courts and not its own .iudgments.\n\nThe Allahabad High Court also in Emperor v.\n\nNauhar(') followed the decisions of that Court which had approved of and followed Emperor v. Jorabhai(') and repelled the contention which had been urged on behalf of the accused that the application in revision filed bv the Government for enhancement of their sentence \"was inco)npetent, because their appeal from their convictions had been dismissed by the Court and it was not open to them again to show cause against their convictions. The decisions above referred to were held by the Court to be an authority for the proposition that the Court could under the circumstances proceed to consider whether the sentence imposed upon the accused should be enhanced, even though it was not open to the accused to show cause against their conviction. This decision was in our opinion not correct for the simple reason that once the judgment of the Appellate Court replaced that of the lower Court it was not competent to the High Court to issue H notice for enhancement of sentence in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 439(1) and no question could therefore arise of the accused being called upon to show cause why their sentence should not be enhanced.\n\n(I) I.LR. 1245 Allah:•bad 527.\n\n(2) [1926 I I. LR. 50 B.im. 7~3.\n\nU.J.S. Clioprtt\n\n\"· Stille ef Bombay\n\nBl1a1wd1i J.\n\n1'155 The High Court of Rajasthan in The State v. u.J.s .. cllorra Bhawani Shankar(') tried to reconcile the various sr 1 , J8 ba point~ of view above noted by laying stress on the\n\n~ • __ •m Y aspect of the accused having ha.d an opportunity to\n\nBhagwali J. 5hovv cause against his conviction and it observed that where an accused person had already been heard and thus given an opportunity to show cause against his conviction, whether it be in appeal or in revision and whether the dismissal was summary or on the merits, he could not be heard against his conviction a second time under section 439(6) as the principle of finality of orders in criminal proceedings would apply.\n\nBut if the accused had not been heard at all and given no opportunity to show cause against his conviction and his jail appeal had been dismissed under section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or his revision had been dismissed without hearing, he was entitled to ask the Court to hear him and th us allow him to show cause against his conviction under section 43916). if a notice of enhancement was issued to him.\n\nThe real question however in our opinion is not whether an opportunity has been given to the :accused to show cause against his conviction at any time but whether the High Court is entitled to exercise its revisional powers under section 439( l) and issue a notice of enhancement of sentence upon the accused.\n\nIf the accused had an opportunity of showing c<)use\n\ndgainst his conviction either in an appeal or a criminal revision application filed by him or on his behalf and the conviction was confirmed on a full hearing in the presence of both the parties after the issue of the requisite notice by the Court to the opposite party the judgment of the High Court would replace that of the lower Court which judgment could not be reviewed or revised by the High Court at all in exercise of its revisional powers under section 43911 l. If however an order dismissing the petition of appeal or criminal revision application or even a reference made bv the lower Court was made dismissing the same sumn1arily or in limine without issuing notice to the opposite party or the parties concerned it v; ould tanta-\n\n(ll J.L.R. [1952] 2 Rnjasihnn 716.\n\nmount to the High Court not entertaining any of these proceedings on the ground that no prima f acie case had been made out for the interference of the Court. If such a prima facie case had Been made out the High Court would admit the appeal or the revision application or entertain the reference and hear the matter fully in the presence of both the parties, ultimately pronouncing its judgment which would take the place of the judgment of the lower Cqurt which would certainly not be subject to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. We are of the opinion that the conclus10n reached by the High Court of Rajasthan was correct and the accused in that case was rightly allowed by it to show cause against his conviction in spite of his petition of appeal from jail having been dismissed by it summarily, though we differ from the reasomng adopted by the Court in reaching that conclusion. Section 439(6) gives the accused a right to show cause against his conviction. It does not merely give him an opportunity to show cause against the same. The opportunity is given to him w show cause against the enhancement of sentence under section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and once he has got that opportunity, while showing cause against the enhancement of his sentence he has a right to show cause against his convictiou which right he can exercise whether he had on an earlier occasion an opportunity of doing so or not. The real test is not whether the accused ha~ had an opportunity of showing caue agaist his conviction but whether a judgment ot the High Court pronounced after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties after notice issued in that behalf has replaced the judgment of the lower Court. Jf the judgment of the lower Court is so replaced there is no occasion at all for the exercise of the revisional powers under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. If however no such judgment has replaced that of the lower Court the\n\nHiqh Court has got the power to issue a notice for enhancement of the sentence and the accused lias, in\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nv. .\n\nStat~ of Bombay\n\nB/iagwali J.\n\n162 -SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1955) \\ 1ass spite of whatever has hppened in the past, while showing cause against the notice of enhancement also U.J. S. Chopra th . ht h . h. . . v. e rig to s ow cause agamst 1s convICt10n.\n\nState of Bombay__ The right which is thus conferred upon the accused under section 439(6) cannot be taken away by having BhaguatiJ. resort to the principle of finality of judgments incor-\n\n- porated in-section .. 369 of the Criminal Procedure\n\nCode. As _we have observed above that principle comes into operation when once a judgment of thet High Court has replaced that of the lower Court and in those cases the High Court would not be competent tci review or revise its own judgment. The High Court would also not be then entitled to issue any notice for.enhancement of sentence in the exercise of its revisional powers under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. - \\Vhere however th-e High Court_ in exercise of its revisional power over the judgments of the lower Courts under section 439(1) issues a notice for enhancement of sentence and gives an opportunity to the accused of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence under section 439(2) the right which is given by section 439(6) to him also to show cause against his conviction comes into existence and this right of his cannot be negatived by having resort to the provisions of either section 369 or section 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 369 in terms provides, \"save as otherwise provided in this Code\" and section 439(6) would be an otherwise provision which is saved by this non-obstante clause appearing in section 369. It is significant to note that both these amendments, the one in section 369 and the other in section 439 were enacted by section II9 of Act XVIII of 1923 and the very purpose . of these simultaneous amendments would appear to be to effectuate the right given to the accused to show cause against his conviction as enacted in section 439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code. - It may also be noted that the right which is thus conferred on the accused under section 439(6) is not an unlimited or unfettered right as observed by l\\Ir.\n\nJustice- l\\Iahajan in Emperor v. Atta .!tfohammad(').\n\n(I) (1943] I.LR. 25 Lah. 391 (F.Il.).\n\n. -\n\nIn the case of trials by jury where an accused person\n\nh<!s been convicted on the verdict of a jury and is called upon under section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced he is entitled under section 439(6) to show cause against his conviction, but only so far as section 423(2) of the Code allows and has not an unlimited right of impugning the conviction on the evidence. It has been held by the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. BlzishwanathC) that the combined efTect of sections 43916) and 423(2) is to entitle the accused to question the conviction by showing only that the Judge misdirected the jury or that the jury misunderstood the law laid down by the Judge in hi~ charge.\n\nA similar conclusion was reached by the majorit;.y of the Judges in The Superintendent and Rememhrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal 'v. Jnanendra Nath Ghose & Another('), where it was held that a person who had been convicted on his own plea of \"guilty\" under section 271 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in showing cause against a notice for enhancement of sentence, could only while showing cause against his conviction attack the propriety or legality of sentence but could not withdraw the plea of 'guilty' or go behind such a plea as a confession of the facts charged.\n\nThere are no doubt two other judgments, one of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Ramchandra Shankarshet Uravane(') and the other of the Rangoon High Court in Nga Ywa and another v. King- Emperor(') which appear to run counter to the ratio decidendi of these decisions of the Allahabad and the Calcutta High CourJs respectively but we are not called upon to resolve that conflict if any. Suffice it so say that the right which . is conferred on the accused of sh0wing cause against his conviction under section 439<6l of the Criminal Procedure Code is a right which accrues to him on a notice for enhancement of sentence being served upon him and he is entitled to exercise the same irrespective of what has happened in the past unless and until there is a judgment of the\n\n(1) T.L.R. 1937 Al!l1:ibad 308.\n\n(3) [1932) 35 Bom. LR. 174:\n\n(2) J3 Calcutta W.N. 509.\n\n(4) [1934}1 L.R. 12 Rangoun 616.\n\nU J.S. Chopra\n\nI/, Sttne df Bombay\n\nBhagwa1 i J.\n\n. ·• ' \\ \\ .\n\n 1955 High Court already pronounced against his conviction after a full hearing in the presence of both the parties . u.!.s~hoJ>ra on notice being issued by the High Court in that bestate of &mbay half.· This right of his is not curtailed by anything contained in the earlier provisions of section 439 nor BhagwatiJ. by anything contained in either section 369 or section ·· 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nA}ril 6\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that the decision reae, hed by the High Court of Bombay in the case under appeal was wrong and must be reversed. We accordingly allow the appeal and remand the matter back to the High Court ofJudicatureatBombaywith . a direction that it shall allow the Appellant to show cause'against his conviction and dispose of the same ticcording tq law. ·· ·\n\nBY THE CouRT.-The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court of Bombay is . set aside, and thematter is sent back to the High Court with a direction that it shall allow the appellant an opportunity to show cause against his conviction and dispose of the matter according to law. .\n\nl\\IAHARAJ UMEG SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF BOl\\IBAY AND OTHERS.\n\n[l\\ImrnERJEA, C.J., DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\n AYYAR and JAFE~ lllIAM JJ.]\n\nBombay Merged Territories and Areas (J agirs Abolition) Act, 1953 (Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954)-Whether ultra vires-Agreement of Merger with, and letters of guarantee to, .Rulers of States by the G<YL- . ernment of India-Clause 5 of the letters of guarantee-Scope-Legislative powers of States under Article iU6 of the Constiiution-Limita• tion• thereon-Article'363 of the Constitution-Bar to Courts' jurisdiction-Fundamental rights-Articles 14, 19(1)(/), 31(2) of Con stitution-Applicability in view of Article 81-A(2)( a). · ·\n\nUnder Article 246(2) and (3) of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State has plenary powers to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to\n\nhe Co11stitutio11.\n\nThe legislative competence of the State Legisl~·", "total_entities": 434, "entities": [{"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 488, "end_char": 500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 952, "end_char": 967, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "State of Bo1nbay", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 982, "end_char": 990, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BhaguatiJ.", "offset_not_found": 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Abdul Qayum (supra) and Ram Chand v.\n\nHirala/(1) where it has been held that section 430 by its own terms saves the revisional power of the High Court to enhance the sentence."}}, {"text": "section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39403, "end_char": 39414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXII of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39892, "end_char": 39906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39994, "end_char": 40008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40204, "end_char": 40218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40251, "end_char": 40262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40266, "end_char": 40275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40750, "end_char": 40764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40920, "end_char": 40922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U J.S.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41101, "end_char": 41107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/9SI\n\nU J.S. c•a v. .", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41386, "end_char": 41400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41787, "end_char": 41801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 369 and 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41819, "end_char": 41839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41867, "end_char": 41881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41972, "end_char": 41986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42042, "end_char": 42056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42397, "end_char": 42411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42429, "end_char": 42443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42541, "end_char": 42555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 369 and 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42687, "end_char": 42707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42794, "end_char": 42811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be convenient at this stage fo refer to the decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Atta Mohammad(') and to deal witli the argument founded on and developed from some of the reasonings adopted by the learned Judges constituting that Full Benc; h. In that case the revision application of the accused had been dismissed in limine by the High Court."}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43202, "end_char": 43213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43441, "end_char": 43446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of 'Bm•y\n\nAdvocate for the Crown relied on the cases re(erred DasJ. to above and contended that the order of dismissal of the l\\_evision application by the High Court was final as regards the correctness of the conviction, that that order could not again be revised by the High Court, that the accused was no longer entitled to challenge his conviction and that it made no difference that' his revision petition had been dismissed in limine.", "canonical_name": "State"}}, {"text": "Blacker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44211, "end_char": 44218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rcasnning adopted by Blacker, J .,"}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44330, "end_char": 44341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44356, "end_char": 44367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44462, "end_char": 44473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44897, "end_char": 44911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45039, "end_char": 45050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45089, "end_char": 45100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45150, "end_char": 45164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45226, "end_char": 45237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45303, "end_char": 45310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J., as he then was, put in the forefront of his judgment the view that section 439(6) which was introduced by amendment in 1923 gave a new and unlirhited right\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bo1nbay\n\nDasJ.\n\nto the subject; that the Judge hearing the application for enhancement was bound to go into the facts to satisfy himself as to the correctness of the conviction; that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction was a mere matter of favour and a dismissal in /imi11e of such application amounted only to a refusal to look into the record and was in no sense a judgment."}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45383, "end_char": 45397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.J.S. Chopra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45473, "end_char": 45486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J., as he then was, put in the forefront of his judgment the view that section 439(6) which was introduced by amendment in 1923 gave a new and unlirhited right\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bo1nbay\n\nDasJ.\n\nto the subject; that the Judge hearing the application for enhancement was bound to go into the facts to satisfy himself as to the correctness of the conviction; that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction was a mere matter of favour and a dismissal in /imi11e of such application amounted only to a refusal to look into the record and was in no sense a judgment.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "State of Bo1nbay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45488, "end_char": 45504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J., as he then was, put in the forefront of his judgment the view that section 439(6) which was introduced by amendment in 1923 gave a new and unlirhited right\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bo1nbay\n\nDasJ.\n\nto the subject; that the Judge hearing the application for enhancement was bound to go into the facts to satisfy himself as to the correctness of the conviction; that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction was a mere matter of favour and a dismissal in /imi11e of such application amounted only to a refusal to look into the record and was in no sense a judgment.", "canonical_name": "State of Bo1nbay"}}, {"text": "Ram Lall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45878, "end_char": 45886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lall, J., did not deliver any separate judgment but concurred generally with the other learned Judges."}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46342, "end_char": 46356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46637, "end_char": 46648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 46957, "end_char": 46977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The orinciple of the first ground of the Lahore Full Bench decision has, however, been extended by the Rajasthan High Court in The State v.\n\nBhawani Shankar (supra) to a case where the respondent's jail appeal had been summarily dismissed."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47108, "end_char": 47115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Wanchoo, C.J., the accused, whose jail appeal had been dismissed summarily, was in the same position as the accused, whose revision petition had been dismissed in limine, for he too could not be said to have had an opportunity of showing cause against his conviction."}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47641, "end_char": 47655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48029, "end_char": 48043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48489, "end_char": 48495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Lahore Full Bench case and the Rajasthan case referred to above a distinction has, however, been made between a summary dismissal and a dismissal after a full hearing of the appeal or revision filed by the accused."}}, {"text": "Lahore Full Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 48941, "end_char": 48958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am, however, unable to accept the argument adopted by the Lahore Full Bench that a summary dismissal of a revision application filed by the accused must be regarded as an order made under section 435 and not one under section 439, that such a summary dismissal is nothing more than a refusal on the part of the High Court to go further or to look into the application and that in such a dismissal there is no finding or decision at all."}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49071, "end_char": 49082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49101, "end_char": 49112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 421, 435 and 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49443, "end_char": 49468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49544, "end_char": 49552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Discretion, as Lord Halsbury,\n\nL.C. said."}}, {"text": "U .J.S. Chopra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49919, "end_char": 49933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/955\n\nU .J.S. Chopra\n\n•• S1111,.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "S1111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49938, "end_char": 49943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51533, "end_char": 51545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52797, "end_char": 52808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 442", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53242, "end_char": 53253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53366, "end_char": 53377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.J.S. Chopra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54381, "end_char": 54394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But when an appeal or revision is dismissed after full hearing and the sentence is maintained there is outwardly no change in the record when the certificate is sent by the High Court but nevertheless there is an adjudica-\n\n16-s/SCI/ND1s2\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bomlta)'\n\nDasi.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. 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59057, "end_char": 59071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60773, "end_char": 60787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61587, "end_char": 61590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62069, "end_char": 62083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62393, "end_char": 62407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62974, "end_char": 62985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63947, "end_char": 63961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64051, "end_char": 64065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64733, "end_char": 64747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 369 and 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65053, "end_char": 65073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65248, "end_char": 65262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66043, "end_char": 66051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI J. delivered the judgment of Bhagwati and Imam, JJ .-This appeal on certificate under article J 34(1)(c) of the Constitution raises an important question as to the right of a convicted person to show cause against his conviction while showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced under section 439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code.", "canonical_name": "BhaguatiJ."}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66056, "end_char": 66060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI J. delivered the judgment of Bhagwati and Imam, JJ .-This appeal on certificate under article J 34(1)(c) of the Constitution raises an important question as to the right of a convicted person to show cause against his conviction while showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced under section 439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code.", "canonical_name": "IMAM JJ."}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66309, "end_char": 66323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66486, "end_char": 66499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XXV of 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66507, "end_char": 66529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12th June 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67235, "end_char": 67249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th Mav 1953 a criminal revision application for enhancement of senten~ was filed by the State and a rule was granted by the Vacation Judge on the 12th June 1953."}}, {"text": "26th August 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67346, "end_char": 67362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule came for hearing and final disposal before a Division Bench of the High Court on the 26th August 1953."}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67690, "end_char": 67704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chopra Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67719, "end_char": 67749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th October J 953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68207, "end_char": 68225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant applied for leave to appeal to this Court on the 15th October J 953."}}, {"text": "section 439( 6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68478, "end_char": 68493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chopra Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Chopra Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 68687, "end_char": 68704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench of the High Court, hearing the application stated the point which arose for determination as under:-\n\n\"Whether a summary dismissal of an appeal preferred by an accused person precludes him from taking advantage of the provisions of section 439( 6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when he is subsequently called upon to show cause why the sentence imposed upon him should not be enhanced\" It pointed out that the consistent view taken by the Bombay High Court in this matter had been accepted by the Allahabad and the Patna High Courts in Emperor v. Naubat(') and Ramlakhan Chaudhury v. Emperor(') but the view taken by the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Atta Muhammad('), though not directly in point prim a f acie lent support to the contention urged by the learned counsel for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Allahabad and the Patna High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 68745, "end_char": 68780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench of the High Court, hearing the application stated the point which arose for determination as under:-\n\n\"Whether a summary dismissal of an appeal preferred by an accused person precludes him from taking advantage of the provisions of section 439( 6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when he is subsequently called upon to show cause why the sentence imposed upon him should not be enhanced\" It pointed out that the consistent view taken by the Bombay High Court in this matter had been accepted by the Allahabad and the Patna High Courts in Emperor v. Naubat(') and Ramlakhan Chaudhury v. Emperor(') but the view taken by the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Atta Muhammad('), though not directly in point prim a f acie lent support to the contention urged by the learned counsel for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69288, "end_char": 69299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 419, 420, 421, 422 and 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69470, "end_char": 69505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69551, "end_char": 69562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69640, "end_char": 69651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69914, "end_char": 69925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70575, "end_char": 70586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70667, "end_char": 70678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70977, "end_char": 70988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71131, "end_char": 71142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71276, "end_char": 71287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71627, "end_char": 71638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71810, "end_char": 71821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 423, 426, 427 and 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72277, "end_char": 72307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 338", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72325, "end_char": 72336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72504, "end_char": 72515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72999, "end_char": 73009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 440", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73147, "end_char": 73158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73482, "end_char": 73496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4390", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75183, "end_char": 75195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75424, "end_char": 75438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75862, "end_char": 75876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jlhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76307, "end_char": 76316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The exercise of this right of also showing cause against his conviction may arise in 4 different types of cases:\n\n(I) Where his petition of appeal has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be;\n\n(2) When his appeal has been dismissed after a full hearing following upon the notice of appeal being issued to the opposite party;\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v.\n\nStat~ of Bombay\n\nJlhagwati J.\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. Cltapra\n\nStare of Jlombtzy\n\nBJraiwotiJ.\n\n(3) When his application for revision has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be; an_d\n\n(4) Where his application for revision has been dismissed after a full hearing following upor1 a notice issued to the opposite party."}}, {"text": "U.J.S. Cltapra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76327, "end_char": 76341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The exercise of this right of also showing cause against his conviction may arise in 4 different types of cases:\n\n(I) Where his petition of appeal has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be;\n\n(2) When his appeal has been dismissed after a full hearing following upon the notice of appeal being issued to the opposite party;\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v.\n\nStat~ of Bombay\n\nJlhagwati J.\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. Cltapra\n\nStare of Jlombtzy\n\nBJraiwotiJ.\n\n(3) When his application for revision has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be; an_d\n\n(4) Where his application for revision has been dismissed after a full hearing following upor1 a notice issued to the opposite party.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "BJraiwotiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76362, "end_char": 76373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The exercise of this right of also showing cause against his conviction may arise in 4 different types of cases:\n\n(I) Where his petition of appeal has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be;\n\n(2) When his appeal has been dismissed after a full hearing following upon the notice of appeal being issued to the opposite party;\n\nU.J.S. Chopra v.\n\nStat~ of Bombay\n\nJlhagwati J.\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. Cltapra\n\nStare of Jlombtzy\n\nBJraiwotiJ.\n\n(3) When his application for revision has been summarily dismissed either without hearing him or after hearing him or his pleader as the case may be; an_d\n\n(4) Where his application for revision has been dismissed after a full hearing following upor1 a notice issued to the opposite party."}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77793, "end_char": 77804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79103, "end_char": 79117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79719, "end_char": 79730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80139, "end_char": 80153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J S. Chopra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80527, "end_char": 80538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nU:J S. Chopra\n\nStu1 e of Bonrbay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nHyderabad & Others(') at page 367 where Faz!"}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80612, "end_char": 80620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nU:J S. Chopra\n\nStu1 e of Bonrbay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nHyderabad & Others(') at page 367 where Faz!"}}, {"text": "Section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80964, "end_char": 80975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80977, "end_char": 81000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81238, "end_char": 81249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81272, "end_char": 81283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81659, "end_char": 81670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82175, "end_char": 82186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 423, 426, 427 and 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82264, "end_char": 82294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 442", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83681, "end_char": 83692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84741, "end_char": 84755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.J.S. Clzopra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84924, "end_char": 84938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That jurisdiction can only be exercised by the High Court when the record of the proceedings of Subordinate Courts has been called for\n\nU.J.S. Clzopra\n\nState of Bomhay\n\nB/iagwa t i-; f.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nV, State of Bo1nbay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nby itself or the case has been reported to it for orders or has otherwise come to its knowledge and the High Court sun motu or on the application of the party interested thinks it fit to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "State of Bomhay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84940, "end_char": 84955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That jurisdiction can only be exercised by the High Court when the record of the proceedings of Subordinate Courts has been called for\n\nU.J.S. Clzopra\n\nState of Bomhay\n\nB/iagwa t i-; f.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nV, State of Bo1nbay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nby itself or the case has been reported to it for orders or has otherwise come to its knowledge and the High Court sun motu or on the application of the party interested thinks it fit to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence."}}, {"text": "section 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85748, "end_char": 85759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85764, "end_char": 85775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85856, "end_char": 85867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85908, "end_char": 85919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86044, "end_char": 86055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86112, "end_char": 86123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86297, "end_char": 86308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86378, "end_char": 86389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86746, "end_char": 86757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 86810, "end_char": 86827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations of the Madras High Court were quoted with approval by Sulaiman, J. in Dr.\n\nHori Rain Singh v. Emperor(')."}}, {"text": "Sulaiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86857, "end_char": 86865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations of the Madras High Court were quoted with approval by Sulaiman, J. in Dr.\n\nHori Rain Singh v. Emperor(')."}}, {"text": "observed that the Criminal Procedure Code did not define a judgment but various sections of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86912, "end_char": 87012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arnold White", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87279, "end_char": 87291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was then made to the 6bservations of Sri Arnold White, C.J. in Emperor v. Chinna Kaliappa Gounden & another(') which were followed hy another Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Emperor v. Maheshwara Kondaya(') and it was held that an order of discharge was not a judgment as \"a judgment is intended to indicate the final order in a trial terminating in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused\"."}}, {"text": "sections 366 and 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87904, "end_char": 87924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He observed that the Criminal Procedure Code did not define a judgment but various sections of the Code", "statute": "He observed that the Criminal Procedure Code did not define a judgment but various sections of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 424", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87973, "end_char": 87984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He observed that the Criminal Procedure Code did not define a judgment but various sections of the Code", "statute": "He observed that the Criminal Procedure Code did not define a judgment but various sections of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89894, "end_char": 89905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90842, "end_char": 90853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91477, "end_char": 91488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 93867, "end_char": 93882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In all ihese cases there will be no judgment of the High Court replacing the judgment of the lower Court and the action of the High Court would only amount to a refusal by the High Court to admit the\n\nU J:S. l1wpra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBlragwati J.\n\npetition of appeal or the criminal revision and issue notice to the opposite party with a view to the final determination of the questions arising in the appeal or the revision.", "canonical_name": "State of Bo1nbay"}}, {"text": "Blragwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93929, "end_char": 93938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In all ihese cases there will be no judgment of the High Court replacing the judgment of the lower Court and the action of the High Court would only amount to a refusal by the High Court to admit the\n\nU J:S. l1wpra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBlragwati J.\n\npetition of appeal or the criminal revision and issue notice to the opposite party with a view to the final determination of the questions arising in the appeal or the revision.", "canonical_name": "BllAGWATI"}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94810, "end_char": 94821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(])", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95036, "end_char": 95050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95316, "end_char": 95327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95959, "end_char": 95973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96214, "end_char": 96225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96885, "end_char": 96899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97081, "end_char": 97095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97243, "end_char": 97257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97280, "end_char": 97294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99507, "end_char": 99521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99611, "end_char": 99622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43916", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100344, "end_char": 100357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101104, "end_char": 101118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101235, "end_char": 101249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101329, "end_char": 101343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101391, "end_char": 101405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101513, "end_char": 101527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101848, "end_char": 101862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102048, "end_char": 102062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102517, "end_char": 102531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102643, "end_char": 102657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chopra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102748, "end_char": 102754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If he could not file application in revision he could not show cause against his conviction under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and it was in order to remove this disability that the 11011-obstante clause in section 439(6) was enacted so that when the High\n\nU.J.S. Clwpr\"\n\nSta/IJ •/Bomba)\n\n/Jltfllwoti J.\n\nU./.S. Chopra V.\n\nState 'Qf.8omba)'\n\nJJJ1agw1W\"J.\n\nCourt was exercising its revisional jutisdiction the convicted person could show cause against his conviction in spite of the fact that otherwise he could not have been able to do so, he not having appealed when an appeal lay and therefore not being entitled to file an application in criminal revision and challenge the validity or maintainability of his conviction."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 102759, "end_char": 102764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If he could not file application in revision he could not show cause against his conviction under section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and it was in order to remove this disability that the 11011-obstante clause in section 439(6) was enacted so that when the High\n\nU.J.S. Clwpr\"\n\nSta/IJ •/Bomba)\n\n/Jltfllwoti J.\n\nU./.S. Chopra V.\n\nState 'Qf.8omba)'\n\nJJJ1agw1W\"J.\n\nCourt was exercising its revisional jutisdiction the convicted person could show cause against his conviction in spite of the fact that otherwise he could not have been able to do so, he not having appealed when an appeal lay and therefore not being entitled to file an application in criminal revision and challenge the validity or maintainability of his conviction.", "canonical_name": "State"}}, {"text": "Section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103160, "end_char": 103174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103681, "end_char": 103695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103773, "end_char": 103787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105021, "end_char": 105032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Procedure Code by Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105050, "end_char": 105071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "MacLeod", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105632, "end_char": 105639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MacLeod, CJ."}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106222, "end_char": 106236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107363, "end_char": 107377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th June 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 107725, "end_char": 107739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was heard on the 17th June 1926 and it was urged on behalf of the accused that the only proper procedure was to issue a notice for enhancement of sentence before the appeal had been actually disposed of and that once the appeal was disposed of by the Court there was no legal power to enhance the sentence under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108020, "end_char": 108031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 369 and 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108909, "end_char": 108929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.J.S ChtJpra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 111512, "end_char": 111525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These revisional powers could only be exercised by the High Court qua the judg-\n\n19S5\n\nU.J.S ChtJpra\n\nState of Bomboy\n\n8ftagwtJti J.\n\n19SS\n\nUJ.S. Chopra\n\nSta,.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "State of Bomboy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 111527, "end_char": 111542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These revisional powers could only be exercised by the High Court qua the judg-\n\n19S5\n\nU.J.S ChtJpra\n\nState of Bomboy\n\n8ftagwtJti J.\n\n19SS\n\nUJ.S. Chopra\n\nSta,.", "canonical_name": "State of Bo1nbay"}}, {"text": "UJ.S. Chopra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111565, "end_char": 111577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These revisional powers could only be exercised by the High Court qua the judg-\n\n19S5\n\nU.J.S ChtJpra\n\nState of Bomboy\n\n8ftagwtJti J.\n\n19SS\n\nUJ.S. Chopra\n\nSta,.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111945, "end_char": 111956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111961, "end_char": 111972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 469(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113638, "end_char": 113652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.C.R.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 113817, "end_char": 113823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Once therefore the judgment of the High Court replaces that of the lower Court there is no question which can ever arise of the exercise by the High Court of its revisional powers under section 469(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the proper procedure therefore if the High Court thought it fit either suo motu or on the application of the interested party\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORfS 145\n\nto issue the notice of enhancement of sentence, is lo issue the said notice before the hearing of the appeal is concluded and the judgment of the High Court in appeal is pronounced."}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114646, "end_char": 114657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114952, "end_char": 114962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114969, "end_char": 114977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beaumont."}}, {"text": "9th .lunt: 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 115166, "end_char": 115181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing the appeal on the 9th .lunt: 1930 was a llnal order which the Court was not at liberty to differ from and the 11m1-obstm1te clause in section 439(6) did not entitle the accused to go behind section 430 and to show cause against his conviction after his appeal had been dismissed."}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115282, "end_char": 115296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115338, "end_char": 115349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th June 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 115812, "end_char": 115825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of the opinion that tht order which had been pronounced by the Court of Appeal on the 9th June 1930 was not a judgment of the High Court which rcpbccd thit of the lower Court and\n\n(I) [1926] I.LR."}}, {"text": "section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116141, "end_char": 116152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116548, "end_char": 116559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mac- Lcod", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117037, "end_char": 117046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations of Mac- Lcod, J. in Emperor v. Mangat Nara11(') were followed in spill!"}}, {"text": "30th April, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 118547, "end_char": 118563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the accused had filed an application for revision which was summarily dismissed by the Vacation Judge on the, 30th April, 1954."}}, {"text": "section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118879, "end_char": 118890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119003, "end_char": 119017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119176, "end_char": 119187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Divatia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119716, "end_char": 119723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Divatia, .J. was conscious of the somewhat anomalous position so far as the accused was concerned and referred to the observations of the Court in Emperor v. Babu Pandurang Mhaske(') where it was stated and rightly that where the High Court itself wanted to enhance the sentence, in order that the accused might have the right to challenge his conviction before the same bench which was hearing either the appeal or the\n\n( 1) [1934] 36 Bom."}}, {"text": "U.J.S. Chopm", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 120233, "end_char": 120245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.J.S. Chopm\n\nStaf'e of Bomb{, y\n\nBharwariJ.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nStat~ of Bo1nhay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\napplication for enhancement, it was proper that the application for enhancement should be heard before the appeal was finally decided, so that the accused might he heard at the very time when the auestion of enhancement was before the Court.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "section 439(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120898, "end_char": 120913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120975, "end_char": 120990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121600, "end_char": 121611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122333, "end_char": 122347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122640, "end_char": 122651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122725, "end_char": 122739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122903, "end_char": 122917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 123423, "end_char": 123450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was a case where the Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad had at the instance of the petitioner made a reference to the High Court recommending that the Additional Magistrate had no jurisdiction, power or authority to pass the order complained against and that the High Court should quash the same."}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124201, "end_char": 124212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State o}· Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 124617, "end_char": 124633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20-1' SCI/ND/82\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwatl J.\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState o}· Bombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nmatter, in view of the provisions of section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code?\"", "canonical_name": "State of Bo1nbay"}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124685, "end_char": 124696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125599, "end_char": 125610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125830, "end_char": 125841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128471, "end_char": 128482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128671, "end_char": 128685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombuy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 128955, "end_char": 128970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an order did not amount to a judgment within the definition thereof given by the Full Bench itself which was: \"a judgment is the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after the consideration of the\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombuy\n\nB/1agwati J.\n\nU.J.S. ChlJPTa\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwatil.", "canonical_name": "State of Bo1nbay"}}, {"text": "U.J.S. ChlJPTa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 128986, "end_char": 129000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an order did not amount to a judgment within the definition thereof given by the Full Bench itself which was: \"a judgment is the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after the consideration of the\n\n19SS\n\nU.J.S. Chopra\n\nState of Bombuy\n\nB/1agwati J.\n\nU.J.S. ChlJPTa\n\nState of Bombay\n\nBhagwatil.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129592, "end_char": 129606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Addison", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130658, "end_char": 130665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In arriving at this conclusion Addison, J. observed:-\n\n\"In the present case there has been a judgment of this Court on the very full revision application brought by the convict."}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130887, "end_char": 130898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130900, "end_char": 130923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131120, "end_char": 131131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 4390", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131955, "end_char": 131967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133086, "end_char": 133100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U J.s. Chopa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133149, "end_char": 133161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While agreeing with the observations of the learned Judge that for the purposes of section 439(1) there was no distinction between a judgment of\n\nU J.s.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133815, "end_char": 133829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134721, "end_char": 134732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134801, "end_char": 134812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135424, "end_char": 135435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135618, "end_char": 135632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136275, "end_char": 136286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136354, "end_char": 136365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137437, "end_char": 137451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137686, "end_char": 137700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137801, "end_char": 137815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139397, "end_char": 139408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139410, "end_char": 139433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139664, "end_char": 139674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139918, "end_char": 139932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141550, "end_char": 141564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(] )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141862, "end_char": 141877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U J.S. Chopra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142029, "end_char": 142042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U J.S. Chopra\n\nState qf Bomba.v\n\nB'1111wati J.\n\nwas that under section 439(6) the accused while showing cause against the enhancement of sentence was entitled also to show cause against his conviction.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142092, "end_char": 142106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142479, "end_char": 142493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 143140, "end_char": 143156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Patna High Court in Ramlakhan Chaudhry v.\n\nThe King-Emperor(') followed both these dec.isions Emperor v. Jorabhai(') and Emperor v. Dha11a!af(') in holding that the dismissal of an appeal by the High Court did not debar it from subsequently enhancing the sentence in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction after issuing notice to the accused."}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144908, "end_char": 144922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146128, "end_char": 146142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.J.S. Clioprtt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 146338, "end_char": 146353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.J.S. Clioprtt\n\n\"· Stille ef Bombay\n\nBl1a1wd1i J.\n\n1'155 The High Court of Rajasthan in The State v. u.J.s .. cllorra Bhawani Shankar(') tried to reconcile the various sr 1 , J8 ba point~ of view above noted by laying stress on the\n\n~ •  •m Y aspect of the accused having ha.d an opportunity to\n\nBhagwali J. 5hovv cause against his conviction and it observed that where an accused person had already been heard and thus given an opportunity to show cause against his conviction, whether it be in appeal or in revision and whether the dismissal was summary or on the merits, he could not be heard against his conviction a second time under section 439(6) as the principle of finality of orders in criminal proceedings would apply.", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 146400, "end_char": 146423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.J.S. Clioprtt\n\n\"· Stille ef Bombay\n\nBl1a1wd1i J.\n\n1'155 The High Court of Rajasthan in The State v. u.J.s .. cllorra Bhawani Shankar(') tried to reconcile the various sr 1 , J8 ba point~ of view above noted by laying stress on the\n\n~ •  •m Y aspect of the accused having ha.d an opportunity to\n\nBhagwali J. 5hovv cause against his conviction and it observed that where an accused person had already been heard and thus given an opportunity to show cause against his conviction, whether it be in appeal or in revision and whether the dismissal was summary or on the merits, he could not be heard against his conviction a second time under section 439(6) as the principle of finality of orders in criminal proceedings would apply."}}, {"text": "Bhagwali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146637, "end_char": 146645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.J.S. Clioprtt\n\n\"· Stille ef Bombay\n\nBl1a1wd1i J.\n\n1'155 The High Court of Rajasthan in The State v. u.J.s .. cllorra Bhawani Shankar(') tried to reconcile the various sr 1 , J8 ba point~ of view above noted by laying stress on the\n\n~ •  •m Y aspect of the accused having ha.d an opportunity to\n\nBhagwali J. 5hovv cause against his conviction and it observed that where an accused person had already been heard and thus given an opportunity to show cause against his conviction, whether it be in appeal or in revision and whether the dismissal was summary or on the merits, he could not be heard against his conviction a second time under section 439(6) as the principle of finality of orders in criminal proceedings would apply.", "canonical_name": "BhaguatiJ."}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146980, "end_char": 146994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147224, "end_char": 147235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43916", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147428, "end_char": 147441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147721, "end_char": 147736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43911", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148310, "end_char": 148323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149180, "end_char": 149194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149581, "end_char": 149595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149822, "end_char": 149836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150537, "end_char": 150551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.J. S. Chopra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150956, "end_char": 150970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stat~ of Bombay\n\nB/iagwali J.\n\n162 -SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1955) \\ 1ass spite of whatever has hppened in the past, while showing cause against the notice of enhancement also U.J. S. Chopra th .", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151111, "end_char": 151125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BhaguatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151157, "end_char": 151167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Bombay The right which is thus conferred upon the accused under section 439(6) cannot be taken away by having BhaguatiJ. resort to the principle of finality of judgments incor-\nporated in-section .. 369 of the Criminal Procedure\n\nCode.", "canonical_name": "BhaguatiJ."}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151664, "end_char": 151678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151826, "end_char": 151840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151997, "end_char": 152011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152040, "end_char": 152054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152212, "end_char": 152223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152227, "end_char": 152238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152271, "end_char": 152282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152348, "end_char": 152362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152451, "end_char": 152462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152529, "end_char": 152540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152558, "end_char": 152569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152790, "end_char": 152804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152920, "end_char": 152934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153221, "end_char": 153235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153342, "end_char": 153356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153414, "end_char": 153428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 43916", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153626, "end_char": 153640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 271", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154093, "end_char": 154104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rangoon High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 154549, "end_char": 154567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are no doubt two other judgments, one of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Ramchandra Shankarshet Uravane(') and the other of the Rangoon High Court in Nga Ywa and another v. King- Emperor(') which appear to run counter to the ratio decidendi of these decisions of the Allahabad and the Calcutta High CourJs respectively but we are not called upon to resolve that conflict if any."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 154688, "end_char": 154697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are no doubt two other judgments, one of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Ramchandra Shankarshet Uravane(') and the other of the Rangoon High Court in Nga Ywa and another v. King- Emperor(') which appear to run counter to the ratio decidendi of these decisions of the Allahabad and the Calcutta High CourJs respectively but we are not called upon to resolve that conflict if any."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High CourJs", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 154706, "end_char": 154726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are no doubt two other judgments, one of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Ramchandra Shankarshet Uravane(') and the other of the Rangoon High Court in Nga Ywa and another v. King- Emperor(') which appear to run counter to the ratio decidendi of these decisions of the Allahabad and the Calcutta High CourJs respectively but we are not called upon to resolve that conflict if any."}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154915, "end_char": 154926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 155255, "end_char": 155263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "174:\n\n(2) J3 Calcutta W.N. 509."}}, {"text": "U J.S. Chopra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 155309, "end_char": 155322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U J.S. Chopra\n\nI/, Sttne df Bombay\n\nBhagwa1 i J.\n\n. ·• ' \\ \\ .", "canonical_name": "U.J.S. Clioprtt"}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155663, "end_char": 155674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155679, "end_char": 155689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This right of his is not curtailed by anything contained in the earlier provisions of section 439 nor BhagwatiJ. by anything contained in either section 369 or section ·· 430 of the Criminal Procedure Code.", "canonical_name": "BhaguatiJ."}}, {"text": "section 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155722, "end_char": 155733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court ofJudicatureatBombaywith .", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 156005, "end_char": 156042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly allow the appeal and remand the matter back to the High Court ofJudicatureatBombaywith ."}}, {"text": "l\\IAHARAJ UMEG SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 156464, "end_char": 156484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l\\IAHARAJ UMEG SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF BOl\\IBAY AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOl\\IBAY AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 156501, "end_char": 156529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l\\IAHARAJ UMEG SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF BOl\\IBAY AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "l\\ImrnERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156533, "end_char": 156544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[l\\ImrnERJEA, C.J., DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\n AYYAR and JAFE~ lllIAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156552, "end_char": 156555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[l\\ImrnERJEA, C.J., DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\n AYYAR and JAFE~ lllIAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156567, "end_char": 156578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[l\\ImrnERJEA, C.J., DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\n AYYAR and JAFE~ lllIAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156581, "end_char": 156586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[l\\ImrnERJEA, C.J., DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\n AYYAR and JAFE~ lllIAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAFE~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156591, "end_char": 156596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[l\\ImrnERJEA, C.J., DAS, BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA\n\n AYYAR and JAFE~ lllIAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 156677, "end_char": 156701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156828, "end_char": 156836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954", "statute": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19(1)(/), 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157039, "end_char": 157067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954", "statute": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954"}}, {"text": "Article 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157110, "end_char": 157120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954", "statute": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954"}}, {"text": "Article 246(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157142, "end_char": 157156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954", "statute": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157307, "end_char": 157323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954", "statute": "Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_955_976_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBRAJNANDAN SINHA v.\n\nJYOTI NARAIN.\n\n[BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nPublic Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (XXXVII of 1850)-A Commissioner appointed thereunder-Whethef a court within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (XXXII of 1952).\n\nHeld, that a Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (XXXVII of 1850) is not a court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (XXXII of 1952).\n\nShell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation ([1931] A.C.275), Huddart, Parker&Co. v. Moordead([1909] 8C.L.\n\n330) Rex v. Electricity Commissioners ( [ 1924 J 1 K.B. 171 ), Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. ([1950] S.C.R. 459), Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay ([1953] S.C.R. 730), Cooper\n\nv. Wilson ([1937] 2 K.B. 309), S.A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India and Another ( [ 1954 l S.C.R. 1150), Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson ([1892] 1 Q.B. 431), Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby ([1873] L.R. 8 Q.B. 255), Kapur Singh\n\nv. fagat Narain (A.LR. 1951 Punjab 49) and M. V. Raiwade v. Dr.\n\nS. M. Hassan, (A.LR. 1954 Nag. 71), referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1954.\n\nAppeal under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution from the judgment and order dated the 12th January 1954 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 10 of 1953.\n\nC. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (Balbhadra\n\nPrasad Sinha and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the appellant.\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas,\n\n(R.\n\nPatnaik, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1955. November 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBttAGWATI J.-This appeal with certificate under article 134( 1) ( c) of the Constitution arises out of an application under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts 6-85 S. C. India/59\n\nNoD1mb1r 8.\n\nBrqjnandon Sillho\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nAct (XXXII of 1952) and section 8 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act\n\n(XXXVII of 1850) read with article 227 of the Constitution filed by the respondent against the appellant in the High Court of Judicature at Patna and raises an importl\\Ilt question as to whether the Commissioner appointed under Act XXXVII of 1850 is a Court.\n\nThe respondent is a Member of the Bihar Civil Service (Executive Branch). The State Government received reports to the effect that the respondent had been guilty of serious misconduct and corrupt practices in the discharge of his official duties while employed as Sub-Divisional Officer at Aurangabad and they accordingly decided that an inquiry into the truth of the various charges against him should be made under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Act XXXVII of 1850, hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran who was the then Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gaya, and was thereafter the District and Sessions Judge of that place was appointed Commissioner under the Act for making the inquiry. Gaya was fixed as the venue of the inquiry and the State Government also ordered that, during the pendency of the inquiry, the respondent will remain under suspension.\n\nThe Government made the appointment aforesaid after obtaining the concurrence of the High Court on its administrative side which was obtained on the condition that an extra-temporary post of Additional District and Sessions Judge was created by the Government for the period Mr. Saran was occupied with the inquiry.\n\nThe appointment was made on the 2nd June 1952 and it was expected that Mr. Saran would be able to complete the inquiry during a period of three months. The respondent, however, adopted dilatory tactics. He made various representations to the Government, one on the 6th June 1952 demanding that a Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner under the Act to make the inquiry against him and that inquiry be made at Patna and not at Gaya, another on the 10th July 1952 protesting agaimt the appointment of Mr. Saran\n\nas Commissioner to hold the inquiry against him and demanding that a confirmed District and Sessions Judge be appointed as Commissioner in his place, and a third on the 17th November 1952 in which he requested the Government to appoint three Commissioners instead of one for holding the inquiry against him and also to pay the entire cost of his defence at the same rates at which the Special Public Prosecutor engaged by the Government was being paid and also to reimburse other incidental expenses to be incurred by him. All these representations were turned down by the Government.\n\nBeing thus thwarted in his attempts to put off the inquiry on some pretext or the other, the respondent tried to evade the same and failed and neglected to reply to the queries made from him by the Commissioner. The Commissioner also could not communicate to him the orders passed by him from time to time because the respondent did not stay at the he.:idquarters and did not leave his proper address for communication either at Gaya or at Motihari. On the 24th November 1952 the Commissioner passed an order calling upon the parties to attend the hearing of the proceedings before him on the 8th December 1952 and forwarded a copy of this order to the appellanr for communication to the respondent. The District Magistrates of Champaran and Gaya who were requested to serve a true copy of the order upon the respondent could not do so as he was available neither at Motihari nor at Gaya and it was with great difficulty that he could be traced at Patna and the order served upon him. On the 18th December 1952, the Commissioner passed another order recording that he was feeling great difficulty in contacting the respondent and in communicating his orders to him.\n\nHe observed that this was a highly undesirable state of affairs and that it was necessary that his orders should be communicated to the respondent as early as possible. A copy of this order was forwarded by the Commissioner to the appellant along with his letter dated the 20th December 1952 for information and doing the needful. The appellant thereafter wrote the letter complained against to\n\nBr~Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhogwatiJ.\n\nBrl!fattmdM Sinka\n\nJyoli NOl'din\n\nBhagwati ].\n\nthe Commissioner on the 26th December 1952 being D.O. No. II/3C-306/52A-11614 which ran as under:-\n\n\"Dear Mr. Saran, I am desired to refer to your memo. No. 8266 dated the 26th November 1952 and to say that Government are anxious not to allow Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and delay the progress of the inquiry against him. I am to request you to be vigilant against such tac.tics adopted by Mr. Narayan.\n\nYours sincere! y, (Sd.) B. N. Sinha\".\n\nThe Commissioner acknowledged receipt of this letter by his D.O. letter No. 244, dated the 5th January 1953 stating that he would not allow the respondent to adopt any dilatory tactics and delay the progress of the inquiry against him.\n\nOn the 2nd February 1953, the respondent filed a petition before the Commissioni; r stating inter alia that he had not been able to engage any lawyer or counsel for want of necessary papers and copies and prayed for an adjournment of the inquiry. He also prayed for starting a contempt of Court proceeding against the appellant but the Commissioner rejected both his prayers. The order which was passed by the Commissioner . on these applications may as well be set out in extenso inasmuch as it has a bearing on the question whether the appellant was guilty of contempt of Court for having addressed the letter complained against to him :-\n\n\"3-2-53. Another point raised in the first petition of the accused was that Mr. B. N. Sinha, Deputy Secretary to Government in addressing his D.O. letter No. 11614, dated the 26th of December, 1952, was guilty of contempt because he had interfered in my judicial discretion. I do not find anything in this letter from which it can be inferred that the author of the letter intended to influence me in the exercise of my judicial function. This letter was sent to me in reply to my memo. No. 8266 dated 26-11-1952 whereby I had forwarded a copy of my order dated 24-11-1952 for communication to Mr. Narayan. Mr;\n\nB.N. Sinha wrote in his letter dated the 26th of December 1952 that Government are anxious not to allow Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and to delay the progress of the inquiry. Now it is to be noted that Mr. Narayan in paragraph 11 of his petition has himself charged the State Government for delaying the inquiry and thereby causing harassment to him. Therefore, it is obvious that both parties, that is, the State and the accused are anxious that the inquiry should be expedited so what Mr. B. N. Sinha meant by writing the D.O. was that the inquiry should be expedited. This cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed to mean that the aforesaid officer in any way tried to influence me in the discharge of my judicial functions.\n\nFor these reasons I rejected the two prayers contained in the first petition of Mr. J. Narayan\".\n\nThe respondent thereafter started proceedings in contempt against the appellant in the High Court of Judicature at Patna. A Rule was issued by the High Court against the appellant which was heard and finally disp0sed of on the 12th June 1954. The High Court was:; of the opinion that the Commissioner appointed miaer Act XXXVII of 1850 was a Court, that the Courf was subordinate to the High Court, that the lettet complained against amounted to a contempt ~£.Court and that the appellant was guilty of such contempt. It accordingly sentenced the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 250 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. The appellant obtained a certificate under Article 134( 1) ( c) of the Constitution from the High Court. The certificate was, however, limited to the question as to whether the Commissioner appointed under the Act is a Court.\n\nAt the hearing before us, the appellant filed a petition for urging additional grounds which included inter alia the ground that the High Court erred in holding that the Commissioner appointed under the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act for the mere reason that its orders are open to be reviewed\n\nBrajrumdan Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwali].\n\nBrqjnant!an Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwati].\n\njudicially in exercise of the power vested in the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution and also the ground that the High Court erred in holding that the letter complained against tended to interfere with or obstruct the course of justice and constituted contempt of Court.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General for the appellant contended in the first instance that the Commissioner appointed under the Act is not a Court. He next contended that even if he is a Court, he is not a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act.\n\nHe lastly contended that the letter complained against did not tend to interfere with or obstruct the course of justice and did not constitute contempt of Court.\n\nPrior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, there was in existence in India the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926). The various States also had their corresponding enactments. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) and the corresponding enactments in the States of Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan and Travancore-Cochin and the Saurashtra Ordinance II of 1948 were repealed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and a uniform Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts was enacted which extended to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In section 2 of the Act, \"High Court\" was defined as meaning the High Court for a Part A State or a Part B State and including the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in a Part C State. Section 3 of the Act enacted :-\n\n\"3. ( 1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section\n\n(2) every High Coun shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority,· in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself.\n\n(2) No High Court shall take cognisance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an\n\noffence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (Act\n\nXLV of 1860)\".\n\nThe word \"Court\" was not defined in the Act and the expression \"Courts subordinate to the High Courts\" would prima f acie mean the Courts of law subordinate to the High Courts in the hierarchy of Courts established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the Union.\n\nIt would be relevant, however, to notice the definitions of \"Court\" available elsewhere.\n\nCoke on Littleton and Stroud defined the word \"Court\" as the place where justice is judicially administered.\n\nAccording to Stephen, \"In every Court, there must be at least three .constituent parts-the actor, reus and judex ; actor or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done ; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it ; and the judex, or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, 8n<l to determine the law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and by its officers to apply, the remedy\".\n\nSection 3 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872) defines \"Courts\" as including all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence.\n\nThis definition, however, has been held to be not exhaustive but framed only for the purpose of Indian Evidence Act and is not to be extended where such an extension is not warranted.\n\nSections 19 and 20 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XL V of 1860) define the. words \"Court\" and the \"Court of Justice\" as under :-\n\n\"Section 19. The word 'Judge' denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person-who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment.\n\nB nan dan Sinha v.\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwali\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwaJi].\n\nSection 20. The words \"Court of .Justice\" denote a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially''.\n\nThe pronouncement of a definitive judgment is thus considered the essential sine qua non of a Court and unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of persons it cannot be predicated that he or they constitute a Court.\n\nThe Privy Council in the case of Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation ( 1 ) thus defined \"Judicial Power\" at page 295 :-\n\n\"Is this right ? What is \"judicial power\" ? Their Lordships are of opinion that one of the best definitions is that given by Griffith, C. J. in Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead (') where he says: \"I am of opinion that the words 'judicial power' as used in section 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exer.cise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action\".\n\nTheir Lordships further enumerated at page 297 certain negative propositions in relation to this subject :- \"l. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision ;\n\n2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath ;\n\n3. Nor l>-ecause two or more contending parties appear before 1. .between whom it has to decide ;\n\n4. Nor bec'1\\Jse it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects ;\n\n5. Nor because there 1s an appeal to a Court ;\n\n6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body.\n\nSee Rex v. Electricity Commissioners( )\"\n\n(I) [1931] A.C. 275.\n\n(2) [1909] B C.L.R. 330, 357.\n\n(3) [1924] I K.B. 171.\n\n' •\n\nand observed at page 298 :\n\n\"An admiqistrative tribunal may act judicially, but still remairt an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so-called.\n\nMere externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a Co.urt of Judicial power\".\n\nThe same principle was reiterated by this Court in Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. (1) and Maqbool Hussain v. The \"State of Bombay( 2 ) where the test of a judicial tribunal as laid down in a passage from Cooper v. Wilson ( 3) was adopted by this Court :-\n\n\"A true judicial decision presupposes an ex1stmg dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requjsites :-(1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute ; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence ; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties ; and ( 4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in disput..: and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law\".\n\nMaqbool Hussain's case, above referred to, was followed by this Court in S. A. Venkataraman v. The\n\nUnion of India and Another\\ ) where a Constitution Bench of this Court also laid down that both finality and authoritativeness were . the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in th~ strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are\n\n(I) [1950] S.C.R.459.\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. 730.\n\n(3) [1937] 2 K.B. 309. 340.\n\n(4) [1954] S.C.R. 1150.\n\nBrqjnatidtm Sinha\n\nv. ]Jou Narain\n\nBhagwati].\n\nBrajnandan Sinlla\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwaliJ.\n\nthe essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.\n\nIt was, however, urged by Shri Purshottam Tircamdas for the respondent that the word \"Court\" should not be limited to a Court of Justice or a Court of law but should be construed in a wide sense, including within the connotation, other Courts which, though not Courts of Justice, were nevertheless Courts according to law and he relied upon a decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Royal Aquariun and . Stemmer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson ( ) and the observations of Fry, L.J. at page 446 therein :\n\n\"I do not desire to attempt any definition of a \"court\". It is obvious that, according to our law, a court may perform various functions.\n\nParliament is a court. Its duties as a whole are deliberative and . legislative : the duties of a part of it only are judicial.\n\nIt is nevertheless a court. There 1 are many other courts which, though not Courts of Justice, are nevertheless courts according to our law. There are, for instance, courts of investigation, like the coroner's court. In my judgment, therefore, the existence of the immunity claimed docs not depend upon the question whether the subject-matter of consideration is a Court of Justice, but whether it is a Court in law.\n\nWherever you find a Court in law, to that the law attaches certain privileges, among which is the immunity in question\".\n\nThe question involved in that case was whether the defendant was entitled to absolute immunity from action for anything done by him while performing his duty as a member of the County Council in dealing with the applications for licences for music and dancing. It was coptended on behalf of the defendant that he was exercising a judicial function when he spoke the words complained of and therefore was entitled to absolute immunity in respect of anything he said. The argument that \"wherever you find a Court in law, to that the law attaches certain privileges among which is the immunity in question\" was used on behalf of the defendant and Fry, L. J. dealt with th: same as under at page 447 :-\n\n(1) [1892] l Q.B.431.\n\n\"It was said that the existence of this immunity 1s based on considerations of public policy, and that, as a matter of public policy, wherever a body has to decide questions, and in so doing has to act judicially, it must be held that there is a judicial proceeding to which this immunity ought to attach. It seems .to me that the sense in which the word \"judicial\" is used in that argument is this : it is used as meaning that the proceedings are such as ought to be conducted with the fairness and impartiality. which characterize proceedings in Courts of Justice, and are proper to the functions of a judge, not that the members of the supposed body are members of a Court. Consider to what lengths the doctrine would extend, if this immunity were applied to every body which is bound to decide judicially in the sense of deciding fairly and impartially.\n\nIt would apply to assessment committees, boards of guardians, to the Inns of Court, when considering the conduct of one of their members, to the General Medical Council when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man, and to all arbitrators.\n\nIs it necessary, on grounds of public polit.:y, that the doctrine of immunity should be carried as far as this ? I say not. I say that there is ample protection afforded in such cases by the ordinary law of privilege. I find no necessity or propriety in carrying the doctrine so far as this argument requires\" .\n\n. Lord Esher, M. R. expressed himself as follows while dealing with this argument at page 442 :-\n\n\"It is true that, in respect of statements made in the course of proceedings before a Court of Justice, whether by judge, or couQsel, or witnesses, there is an absolute immunity from liability to an action. The ground of that rule is public policy. It is applicable to all kinds of Courts of Justice ; but the doctrine has been carried further ; and it seems that this immunity applies wherever there is an authorized inquiry which, though not before a Court of Justice, is before a tribunal which has similar attributes. In the case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby( 1 ) the doctrine was extended\n\n(I) L.R. 8 Q.B. 255; L.R. 7 H.L. 744.\n\nBrajnanda11 Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nBr'!jnant!an Sinha\n\nv. ]7oli Narain\n\nBh•gwali J.\n\nto a military court of inquiry. It was so extended on the ground that the case was one of an authorized inquiry before a tribunal acting judicially, . that is to say, in a manner as nearly as possible similar to that in which a Court of Justice acts in respect of an inquiry before it. This doctrine has never been extended further than to Courts of Justice and tribunals acting in a manner similar to that in which such Courts act.\n\nThen can it be said that a meeting of the county council, when engaged in considering applications for licences for music and dancing, is such a tribunal ? It is difficult to say who are to be considered as judges acting judicially in such a case\".\n\nThe case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby(') was a case where immunity was claimed by a witness who had given evidence before a military. Court of inquiry.\n\nThe case went to the House of Lords and the Lord Chancellor, in his speech at page 754, in 7 H.L. 744 observed:-\n\n\"Now, my Lords, adopting the expressions of the learned Judges with regard to what I take to be the settled law as to the protection of witnesses in judicial proceedings, I certainly am of opinion that upon all principles, and certainly. upon all considerations of convenience and of public policy, the same protection which is extended to a witness in a judicial proceeding who has been examined on oath ought to be extended, and must be extended, to a military man who is called before a Court 0f Inquiry of this kind for the purpose of testifying there upon a matter of military discipline connected with the army\".\n\nBoth these cases, the one before the Court of Appeal and the other before the House of Lords, were concerned with the extension of the principle of immunity of members of a tribunal or witnesses in judicial proceedings and the Courts logically extended the principle of immunity beyond the Courts of Justice to tribunals or bodies of persons functioning in a manner and according to procedure which was assimilated to a judicial inquiry. The extension of the\n\n(I) L.R. 8 Q.B. 255; L.R. 7 H.L. 744.\n\nimmunity to such tribunals or bodies would not, however, constitute them Courts of Justice or Courts of law.\n\nThe position is thus summarised in the following passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 8, page 526 :-\n\n\"Many bodies are not courts, although they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as assessment committees, guardians committees, the Court of referees constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts to decide claims made on the insurance funds, the benchers of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the General Medical Council, when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man\".\n\nWe must, therefore, fall back upon the tests laid down above for determining what is a Court strictly so-called within the connotation of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act. It would be appropriate at this stage to note the relevant provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act (XXXVII of\n\n1850) which would fall to be considered for determining whether the Commissioner appointed under the Act is a Court or not.\n\nThe Act was passed for regulating inquiries into the behaviour of public servants and the preamble runs :-\n\n\"Whereas it is expedient to amend the law for regulating inquiries into the behaviour of public servants not removable from their appointments without the sanction of Government, and to make the same uniform throughout India ; It is enacted as follows:-\" Section 2 requires the articles of charges to be drawn out and a formal and public inquiry to be ordered whenever the Government shall be of opinion that there are good grounds for making a formal and public inquiry into the truth of any imputation of misbehaviour by any such person. The inquiry may be committed under section 3 either to the Court,\n\nBrajntwlQfl SiMa\n\nJyoti N orain\n\nBhagwati].\n\nBrq/Mll4oo Siltlra ..\n\nJyotfNarain\n\nB/UJgwati j.\n\nBoard or other authorities to which the person accused is subordinate or to any other person or persons specially appointed by the Government, Commissioners for the purpose. Sections 4 to 7 contain provisions in regard to the conduct of the prosecution and section 8 prescribes the powers of the Commissioners.\n\nThis section has been particularly relied upon as constituting the Commissioners a Court, and runs as under :-\n\n\"Section 8. The comm1ss1oners shall have the same power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and shall have the same powers fot the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other persons resides, on whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme Court of Judicature thereto.\n\nWhen the commission has been issued to a court, or other person or persons having power to issue such process in the exercise of ' their ordinary authority, they may also use all such power for the purposes of the commission\".\n\nSection 9 prescribes a penalty for disobedience to process issued as aforesaid for the purpose of the commission and sections 10 to 20 prescribe the procedure to be followed in the conduct of the inquiry. It may be noted that this procedure is assimilated as far as possible to the conduct of a prosecution in a Criminal Court of law and the person accused is given the fullest opportunity to enter upon his defence and lead evidence in ordr to clear himself of the charges levelled against him. Sections 21 and 22 lay down the functll)ns of the Commissioners in regard to the report to be mad~ by them to the Government of their .proceedings under the commission and the powers of\n\nis.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS %9\n\nthe Government to pass final orders on such reports.\n\nThese sections have an important bearing on the question before us and they enact :-\n\n\"Section 21.-After the close of the inquiry the comm1ss1oners shall forthwith report to Government their proceedings under the commission, and shall send with the record thereof their opinion upon each of the articles of charge separately, with such observations as they think fit on the whole case.\n\nSection 22.-The Government, on consideration of the report of the commissioners, may order them to take further evidence, or give further explanation of their opinions. It may also order additional articles of charge to be framed, in which case the inquiry into the truth of such additional articles shall be made in the same manner as is herein directed with respect to the original charges. When special commissioners have been appointed, the Government may also, if it thinks fit, refer the report of the commissioners to the Court or other authority to which the person accused is subordinate, for their opinion on the case ; and will finally pass such orders thereon as appear just and consistent with its powers in such cases\".\n\nThese provisions were considered by this Court in the case of S. A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India and Another( 1 ). The question that arose for consideration there was whether an inquiry made and concluded under the Act amounted to prosecution and punishment for an offence as contemplated under article 20(2) of the Constitution. Articles of charge had been framed against the petitioner in that case and evidence had been led both by the prosecutor and by the defence arid witnesses on both sides were examined on oath and cross-examined and re-examined in the usual manner. The Commissioner had found, on a consideration of the evidence, that some of the charges had been ,:J\"oved against the petitioner and had submitted a report to that effect to the Govvernment. The President had accepted the opinion of the Commissioner and, in view of the findings on\n\nU) [1954] S.C.R. 1150.\n\nBrandtm Sin/ia\n\nv. ]µti Narain\n\nB/iagwati ].\n\nBrtgnll1llhn S'rn!ra\n\nv. ]1.tiNMaio\n\nB,.,,_. ].\n\nthe several charges arrived at by the latter, was provisionally of the opinion that the petitioner should be dismissed.\n\nOpportunity was given to the petitioner under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and after considering his representation and after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, the President finally decided to impose the penalty of dismissal upon him and he was according! y dismissed. After his dismissal, the police submitted a charge-sheet against him before the Special Judge. Sessions Court, Delhi, charging him with offences under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and upon that summons were issued by the learned Judge directing the petitioner to appear before his Court. The petitioner thereupon challenged the legality of this proceeding in a writ petition contending that the proceedings were without jurisdiction inasmuch as they amounted to a fresh prosecution for offences for which he had been prosecuted and punished already.\n\nWhile considering whether under the circumstances there had been a violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, this Court scrutinised the provisions of the Act and t)te position of the Commissioner appointed thereunder. Justice Mukherjea, as he then was, delivered the judgment of the Court and observed at page 1159 :-\n\n\"As the law stands at present, the only purpose, for which an enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850 could be made, is to help the Government to come to a definite conclusion regarding the misbehaviour of a public servant and thus enable it to determine provisionally the punishment which should be imposed upon him, prior to giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, as is required under article 311(2) of the Constitution. An enquiry under this Act is not at all compulsory and it is quite open to the Government to adopt any other method if it so chooses. It is a matter of convemence merely and\n\nnothing else. It is against this background that we will have to examine the material provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 and see whether from the nature and result of the enquiry which the Act contemplates it is at all possible to say that the proceedings taken or concluded under the Act amount to prosecution and punishment for a criminal\n\noffence.\" ; and at page 1160 :-\n\n\"A Commissioner appointed under this Act has no duty to investigate any offence which is punishable under the Indian Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act and he has absolutely no jurisdiction to do so. The subject-matter of investigation by him is the truth or otherwise of the imputation of misbehaviour made against a public servant and it is only as instances of misbehaviour that the several articles of charge are investigated, upon which disci- plinary action might be taken by the Government if it so chooses. The mere fact that the word \"prosecution\" has been used, would nol make the proceeding before the Commissioner one for prosecution of an offence. As the Commissioner has to form his opinion upon lgal evidence, he has been given the power to summon witnesses, administer oath to them and also to .compel production of relevant documents. These may be some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, but they cannot make the proceeding anything more than a mere fact finding enquiry. This is conclusively established by the provisions of sections 21 and 22 of the Act. At the close of the enquiry, the Commissioner has to submit a report to the Government regarding his finding on each one of the charges made.\n\nThis is a mere expression of opinion and it lacks both finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. The opinion is not even binding on the Government. Under section 22 of the Act, the Government can, after receipt of the report, call upon the Commissioner to take further evidence or give further explanation of his opinion.\n\nWhen Special Commissioners are appointed, their report could be referred to the court or other authority\n\n7-85 S.C India/59\n\nBrajnandan Sinha v.\n\nJyoti JV arain\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\nv . . Jyoti Narain\n\nB!iagwati J.\n\nto which the officer concerned is subordinate for further advice and after taking the opinion of the different authorities and persons, the Government has to decide finally what action it should take\".\n\nThe Court. was no doubt concerned in that case with finding whether the inquiry before the Commissioner was tantamount to a prosecution of the petitioner.\n\nWhile .considering the same, however, the position of the Commissioner was discussed and the conclusion to which the Court came was that he was a mere fact finding authority, that the report made by the Commissioner to the Government was merely his expression of opinion and it lacked both finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. This conclusion is sufficient to establish that the Commissioner appointed under the Act was not a Court and his report or findings were not a definitive judgment or a judicial pronouncement inasmuch as they were not binding and authoritative and lacked finality. We are also of the same opinion.\n\nApart from. the above considerations which weighed with the Court in that case. we have also the provisions of section 8 of the Act itself which go to show that the Commissioners are given certain powers of the Civil and Military Courts in regard to punishing contempts and obstruction to their proceedings, summoning of witnesses, compelling the production of documents and for service of their process as also the same protection as Zila and City Judges. The very fact that this provision had got to be enacted shows that the position of the Commissioners was not assil)'lilated to that of Judges and that they did not constitute Courts of Justice or Courts of law but were mere fact finding tribunals deriving whatever powers they could exercise under the very terms of the Act which created them.\n\nThe power of punishing contempts and obstruction -to their proceedings as is given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was also similar in its nature and the very nature and extent of the power indicated that they were not Courts in the ordinary sense of the term, No such provision would have been\n\nnecessary to be enacted if in fact they were constituted Courts of Justice or Courts of law and it_ is no argument to say that these provisions were enacted even though they were not strictly necessary merel~· for the sake of abundant caution or clarification of\n\nthe position. We are of the opinion that the Commissioner appointed under the Act, having regard to the circumstances above set out, does not constitute a Court within the meaning of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act.\n\nOur attention was, however, drawn by Shri Purshottam Tricamdas to a decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kapur Singh v. fagat Narain( ). That was a case directly in point and on all fours with the case before us. The learned Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court had been appointed a Commissioner under the Act in the matter of an inquiry against Sardar Kapur Singh, I.C.S., and Lala Jagat Narain, the editor, printer and publisher of an Urdu Daily newspaper published at Jullundur called The Hindu Samachar, was called upon to show cause why he should not be punished under section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act with regard to a leading article which appeared in his name in the issue of the paper dated the 12th March 1951.\n\nA preliminary objection was taken on his behalf that the Court had no jurisdiction to take proceedings against him for contempt and the argument was that the Court of the Commissioner appointed to hold an inquiry under the Act was not a Court and in any event was not a Court subordinate to the High Court. Mr. Justice Falshaw who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at page 50 in connection with this argument : \"The Public Servants (Inquiries) Act itself seems clearly to indicate that a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed under the Act constitute a Court as they are given all the powers of a Court regarding the summoning of witnesses and other matters, and the only ground on which the learned counel for the respondent could base his argument that the Com- :missioner does not constitute a Court was that he can\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 49\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nB/iagwali J.\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\n\\\".\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nB!iagwaJi],\n\nfive no final decision, but merely has to draw up a teport giving his findin gs on the charge or charges against the respondent, which is to be forwarded to the Government. In my opinion, however, this fact\n\n:lone is not sufficient to make the Commissioner or Commissioners any thing other than a Court and ir is to be noted that the definition of Court in section 3, Evidence Act, is very wide indeed as it reads :\n\n\"'Court' includes all Judges and Magistrates and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take\n\nevidence\".\n\nThe learned Judges there relied upon the definition of Court given in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act which, as has already been noted, is £ramed only for the purposes of the Act and is not to be extended where such an extension is not warranted.\n\nThis definition does not help in the determination of the question whether the Commi~· sioners appointed under the Act constitute a Court and the attentio11 of the learned Judges was not drawn to the position that finality and authoritativeness are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the decision reached by the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court in that case was wrong and cannot help the respondent.\n\nOur attention was also drawn to another decision of the Nagpur High Court in M. V. Rajwade v. Dr.\n\nS. M. Hassan( 1 ). The question which came to be considered by the Court in that case was whether a commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 was a Court within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and while considering the provisions of that Act, the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court incidentally considered the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act,\n\n1850. They rightly observed that \"the term 'Court' 1-ias not been defined in the Contempt --£ Courts Act, 1952.\n\nThe Act, however, does contemplate a 'Court of Justice' which as defined in section 20, Indian Penal Code, 1860, denotes 'a judge who is empowend by law to act judicially'. The least that is requirf'.d of a Court is the capacity to ddiver a \"definitive judg-\n\n(t) A.I.R. 1954 N\"-g. 71.\n\nment'', and ur.less this power vests in a tribunal in any particular case, the mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the power to administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a Court'', and came to the conclusion that the commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is not a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The learned Judges were merely considering the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and were not concerned with the construction of the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 and whatever obsen-1tions they made in regard to the provisions or the latter Act by way of comparing the same with the provisions of the former which they were there considering would not have the effect of putting cr1 the provisions of the latter Act a construction which would be any avail to the respondent before us. The\n\nrati0 which was adopted by the learned Judges was quite correct but it appears that they digressed into a consideration of the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 in order to emphasize the character and position of the commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 ev\":n though it\" was not strictly necessary for the purpose of arriving :it their decision, though it must be mentioned that while discussing the nature and function of the commission they expressed themselves correctly as under:-\n\n\"The Commission governed by the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is appointed by the State Government \"for the information of its own mind'', in order that it should not act, in exercise of its executive power, \"otherwise than in accordance with the dictates of justice & equity\" in ordering a departmental enquiry against its officers.\n\nIt is, therefore, a fact finding body meant only to instruct the mind of the Government without producing any docummt of a judicial nature\".\n\nWe are of the opinion that neither of these cases which have been relied upon l-y hri I-urshottam Tricamdas is of any help to the respondent or detracts\n\nBrl!feandan Sinha\n\nJyoti J( araiR\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n!955\n\nBraj'ft01fdan Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJo\n\nfrom the true position as we have laid down above.\n\nThe only conclusion to which we can come on a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the Act is that the Commissioner appointed under the Act is not a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.\n\nIn view of the conclusion reached above, we do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the Commissioner appointed under the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act.\n\nNor do we think it necessory to express any opinion as to whether the letter complained against constituted a contempt of Court.\n\nWe may, however, note in passing that the circumstances under which the letter came to be addressed by the appellant to the Commissioner, the terms thereof and the order which was passed by the Commissioner on the application made by the respondent to proceed against the appellant in contempt on date the 2nd February 1953 lend support to the argument which was advanced on behalf of the appellant that the letter complained against did not constitute contempt of Court.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the appeal will be allowed, the order passed against the appellant by the Court below will be set aside and the original Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 10 of 1953 filed by the respondent in the High Court of Judicature at Patna will stand dismissed. The fine if paid will be refunded.", "total_entities": 163, "entities": [{"text": "BRAJNANDAN SINHA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Brajnandan Sinlla", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JYOTI NARAIN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jyoti Narayan", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Commissioner appointed thereunder-Whethef a court within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 431, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1264, "end_char": 1281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1430, "end_char": 1441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (Balbhadra\n\nPrasad Sinha and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1473, "end_char": 1487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (Balbhadra\n\nPrasad Sinha and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Balbhadra\n\nPrasad Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1516, "end_char": 1539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (Balbhadra\n\nPrasad Sinha and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1544, "end_char": 1557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (Balbhadra\n\nPrasad Sinha and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1590, "end_char": 1610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas,\n\n(R.\n\nPatnaik, with him) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "I-urshottam Tricamdas"}}, {"text": "R.\n\nPatnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1614, "end_char": 1625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas,\n\n(R.\n\nPatnaik, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BttAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1720, "end_char": 1729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBttAGWATI J.-This appeal with certificate under article 134( 1) ( c) of the Constitution arises out of an application under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts 6-85 S. C. India/59\n\nNoD1mb1r 8."}}, {"text": "article 134( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1768, "end_char": 1783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1844, "end_char": 1853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brqjnandon Sillho", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brqjnandon Sillho\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nAct (XXXII of 1952) and section 8 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act\n\n(XXXVII of 1850) read with article 227 of the Constitution filed by the respondent against the appellant in the High Court of Judicature at Patna and raises an importl\\Ilt question as to whether the Commissioner appointed under Act XXXVII of 1850 is a Court."}}, {"text": "Jyoti Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1933, "end_char": 1945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brqjnandon Sillho\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nAct (XXXII of 1952) and section 8 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act\n\n(XXXVII of 1850) read with article 227 of the Constitution filed by the respondent against the appellant in the High Court of Judicature at Patna and raises an importl\\Ilt question as to whether the Commissioner appointed under Act XXXVII of 1850 is a Court.", "canonical_name": "Jyoti Narayan"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1983, "end_char": 1992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2060, "end_char": 2071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2145, "end_char": 2178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brqjnandon Sillho\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nAct (XXXII of 1952) and section 8 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act\n\n(XXXVII of 1850) read with article 227 of the Constitution filed by the respondent against the appellant in the High Court of Judicature at Patna and raises an importl\\Ilt question as to whether the Commissioner appointed under Act XXXVII of 1850 is a Court."}}, {"text": "Ilt question as to whether the Commissioner appointed under Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2201, "end_char": 2264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Aurangabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government received reports to the effect that the respondent had been guilty of serious misconduct and corrupt practices in the discharge of his official duties while employed as Sub-Divisional Officer at Aurangabad and they accordingly decided that an inquiry into the truth of the various charges against him should be made under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Act XXXVII of 1850, hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran who was the then Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gaya, and was thereafter the District and Sessions Judge of that place was appointed Commissioner under the Act for making the inquiry."}}, {"text": "Anjani Kumar Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2835, "end_char": 2853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government received reports to the effect that the respondent had been guilty of serious misconduct and corrupt practices in the discharge of his official duties while employed as Sub-Divisional Officer at Aurangabad and they accordingly decided that an inquiry into the truth of the various charges against him should be made under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Act XXXVII of 1850, hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran who was the then Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gaya, and was thereafter the District and Sessions Judge of that place was appointed Commissioner under the Act for making the inquiry."}}, {"text": "Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gaya", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2871, "end_char": 2915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government received reports to the effect that the respondent had been guilty of serious misconduct and corrupt practices in the discharge of his official duties while employed as Sub-Divisional Officer at Aurangabad and they accordingly decided that an inquiry into the truth of the various charges against him should be made under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Act XXXVII of 1850, hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran who was the then Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gaya, and was thereafter the District and Sessions Judge of that place was appointed Commissioner under the Act for making the inquiry."}}, {"text": "Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3495, "end_char": 3500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government made the appointment aforesaid after obtaining the concurrence of the High Court on its administrative side which was obtained on the condition that an extra-temporary post of Additional District and Sessions Judge was created by the Government for the period Mr. Saran was occupied with the inquiry."}}, {"text": "2nd June 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3565, "end_char": 3578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appointment was made on the 2nd June 1952 and it was expected that Mr. Saran would be able to complete the inquiry during a period of three months."}}, {"text": "6th June 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3798, "end_char": 3811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made various representations to the Government, one on the 6th June 1952 demanding that a Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner under the Act to make the inquiry against him and that inquiry be made at Patna and not at Gaya, another on the 10th July 1952 protesting agaimt the appointment of Mr. Saran\n\nas Commissioner to hold the inquiry against him and demanding that a confirmed District and Sessions Judge be appointed as Commissioner in his place, and a third on the 17th November 1952 in which he requested the Government to appoint three Commissioners instead of one for holding the inquiry against him and also to pay the entire cost of his defence at the same rates at which the Special Public Prosecutor engaged by the Government was being paid and also to reimburse other incidental expenses to be incurred by him."}}, {"text": "Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3829, "end_char": 3895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3956, "end_char": 3961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made various representations to the Government, one on the 6th June 1952 demanding that a Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner under the Act to make the inquiry against him and that inquiry be made at Patna and not at Gaya, another on the 10th July 1952 protesting agaimt the appointment of Mr. Saran\n\nas Commissioner to hold the inquiry against him and demanding that a confirmed District and Sessions Judge be appointed as Commissioner in his place, and a third on the 17th November 1952 in which he requested the Government to appoint three Commissioners instead of one for holding the inquiry against him and also to pay the entire cost of his defence at the same rates at which the Special Public Prosecutor engaged by the Government was being paid and also to reimburse other incidental expenses to be incurred by him."}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made various representations to the Government, one on the 6th June 1952 demanding that a Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner under the Act to make the inquiry against him and that inquiry be made at Patna and not at Gaya, another on the 10th July 1952 protesting agaimt the appointment of Mr. Saran\n\nas Commissioner to hold the inquiry against him and demanding that a confirmed District and Sessions Judge be appointed as Commissioner in his place, and a third on the 17th November 1952 in which he requested the Government to appoint three Commissioners instead of one for holding the inquiry against him and also to pay the entire cost of his defence at the same rates at which the Special Public Prosecutor engaged by the Government was being paid and also to reimburse other incidental expenses to be incurred by him."}}, {"text": "10th July 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3994, "end_char": 4008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made various representations to the Government, one on the 6th June 1952 demanding that a Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner under the Act to make the inquiry against him and that inquiry be made at Patna and not at Gaya, another on the 10th July 1952 protesting agaimt the appointment of Mr. Saran\n\nas Commissioner to hold the inquiry against him and demanding that a confirmed District and Sessions Judge be appointed as Commissioner in his place, and a third on the 17th November 1952 in which he requested the Government to appoint three Commissioners instead of one for holding the inquiry against him and also to pay the entire cost of his defence at the same rates at which the Special Public Prosecutor engaged by the Government was being paid and also to reimburse other incidental expenses to be incurred by him."}}, {"text": "17th November 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4226, "end_char": 4244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He made various representations to the Government, one on the 6th June 1952 demanding that a Judge of the High Court be appointed as Commissioner under the Act to make the inquiry against him and that inquiry be made at Patna and not at Gaya, another on the 10th July 1952 protesting agaimt the appointment of Mr. Saran\n\nas Commissioner to hold the inquiry against him and demanding that a confirmed District and Sessions Judge be appointed as Commissioner in his place, and a third on the 17th November 1952 in which he requested the Government to appoint three Commissioners instead of one for holding the inquiry against him and also to pay the entire cost of his defence at the same rates at which the Special Public Prosecutor engaged by the Government was being paid and also to reimburse other incidental expenses to be incurred by him."}}, {"text": "Motihari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5083, "end_char": 5091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner also could not communicate to him the orders passed by him from time to time because the respondent did not stay at the he.:idquarters and did not leave his proper address for communication either at Gaya or at Motihari."}}, {"text": "24th November 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th November 1952 the Commissioner passed an order calling upon the parties to attend the hearing of the proceedings before him on the 8th December 1952 and forwarded a copy of this order to the appellanr for communication to the respondent."}}, {"text": "8th December 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5236, "end_char": 5253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th November 1952 the Commissioner passed an order calling upon the parties to attend the hearing of the proceedings before him on the 8th December 1952 and forwarded a copy of this order to the appellanr for communication to the respondent."}}, {"text": "District Magistrates of Champaran and Gaya", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5347, "end_char": 5389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrates of Champaran and Gaya who were requested to serve a true copy of the order upon the respondent could not do so as he was available neither at Motihari nor at Gaya and it was with great difficulty that he could be traced at Patna and the order served upon him."}}, {"text": "18th December 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5635, "end_char": 5653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th December 1952, the Commissioner passed another order recording that he was feeling great difficulty in contacting the respondent and in communicating his orders to him."}}, {"text": "Jyoti Narayan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6536, "end_char": 6549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8266 dated the 26th November 1952 and to say that Government are anxious not to allow Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and delay the progress of the inquiry against him.", "canonical_name": "Jyoti Narayan"}}, {"text": "Narayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6699, "end_char": 6706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am to request you to be vigilant against such tac.tics adopted by Mr. Narayan.", "canonical_name": "J. Narayan"}}, {"text": "B. N. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6733, "end_char": 6744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Sinha\".", "canonical_name": "B. N. Sinha"}}, {"text": "2nd February 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6992, "end_char": 7009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2nd February 1953, the respondent filed a petition before the Commissioni; r stating inter alia that he had not been able to engage any lawyer or counsel for want of necessary papers and copies and prayed for an adjournment of the inquiry."}}, {"text": "3-2-53", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7628, "end_char": 7634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on these applications may as well be set out in extenso inasmuch as it has a bearing on the question whether the appellant was guilty of contempt of Court for having addressed the letter complained against to him :-\n\n\"3-2-53."}}, {"text": "26th of December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7802, "end_char": 7824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11614, dated the 26th of December, 1952, was guilty of contempt because he had interfered in my judicial discretion."}}, {"text": "26-11-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8129, "end_char": 8139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8266 dated 26-11-1952 whereby I had forwarded a copy of my order dated 24-11-1952 for communication to Mr. Narayan."}}, {"text": "24-11-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8189, "end_char": 8199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8266 dated 26-11-1952 whereby I had forwarded a copy of my order dated 24-11-1952 for communication to Mr. Narayan."}}, {"text": "B.N. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8239, "end_char": 8249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr;\n\nB.N. Sinha wrote in his letter dated the 26th of December 1952 that Government are anxious not to allow Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and to delay the progress of the inquiry.", "canonical_name": "B. N. Sinha"}}, {"text": "26th of December 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8280, "end_char": 8301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr;\n\nB.N. Sinha wrote in his letter dated the 26th of December 1952 that Government are anxious not to allow Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and to delay the progress of the inquiry."}}, {"text": "J. Narayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9076, "end_char": 9086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons I rejected the two prayers contained in the first petition of Mr. J. Narayan\".", "canonical_name": "J. Narayan"}}, {"text": "12th June 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9317, "end_char": 9331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Rule was issued by the High Court against the appellant which was heard and finally disp0sed of on the 12th June 1954."}}, {"text": "Article 134( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9788, "end_char": 9803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10268, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Brajrumdan Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10330, "end_char": 10346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing before us, the appellant filed a petition for urging additional grounds which included inter alia the ground that the High Court erred in holding that the Commissioner appointed under the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act for the mere reason that its orders are open to be reviewed\n\nBrajrumdan Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwali]."}}, {"text": "Jyoti Narain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10348, "end_char": 10360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing before us, the appellant filed a petition for urging additional grounds which included inter alia the ground that the High Court erred in holding that the Commissioner appointed under the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act for the mere reason that its orders are open to be reviewed\n\nBrajrumdan Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwali].", "canonical_name": "Jyoti Narayan"}}, {"text": "article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10486, "end_char": 10497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10904, "end_char": 10988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11154, "end_char": 11212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11240, "end_char": 11278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11358, "end_char": 11386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11451, "end_char": 11460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) and the corresponding enactments in the States of Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan and Travancore-Cochin and the Saurashtra Ordinance II of 1948 were repealed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and a uniform Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts was enacted which extended to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11462, "end_char": 11475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) and the corresponding enactments in the States of Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan and Travancore-Cochin and the Saurashtra Ordinance II of 1948 were repealed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and a uniform Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts was enacted which extended to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11477, "end_char": 11483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) and the corresponding enactments in the States of Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan and Travancore-Cochin and the Saurashtra Ordinance II of 1948 were repealed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and a uniform Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts was enacted which extended to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11485, "end_char": 11490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) and the corresponding enactments in the States of Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan and Travancore-Cochin and the Saurashtra Ordinance II of 1948 were repealed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and a uniform Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts was enacted which extended to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan and Travancore-Cochin and the Saurashtra Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11492, "end_char": 11552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11585, "end_char": 11613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11783, "end_char": 11800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) and the corresponding enactments in the States of Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan and Travancore-Cochin and the Saurashtra Ordinance II of 1948 were repealed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and a uniform Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts was enacted which extended to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11805, "end_char": 11814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11987, "end_char": 11996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12506, "end_char": 12523, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Littleton", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12927, "end_char": 12936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coke on Littleton and Stroud defined the word \"Court\" as the place where justice is judicially administered."}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12941, "end_char": 12947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coke on Littleton and Stroud defined the word \"Court\" as the place where justice is judicially administered."}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13042, "end_char": 13049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Stephen, \"In every Court, there must be at least three .constituent parts-the actor, reus and judex ; actor or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done ; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it ; and the judex, or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, 8n<l to determine the law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and by its officers to apply, the remedy\"."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13501, "end_char": 13510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13518, "end_char": 13537, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13779, "end_char": 13798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 19 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13868, "end_char": 13886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13894, "end_char": 13911, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13998, "end_char": 14008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14557, "end_char": 14567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Griffith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15334, "end_char": 15342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships are of opinion that one of the best definitions is that given by Griffith, C. J. in Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead (') where he says: \"I am of opinion that the words 'judicial power' as used in section 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property."}}, {"text": "section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15467, "end_char": 15477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maqbool Hussain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17945, "end_char": 17960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maqbool Hussain's case, above referred to, was followed by this Court in S. A. Venkataraman v. The\n\nUnion of India and Another\\ ) where a Constitution Bench of this Court also laid down that both finality and authoritativeness were ."}}, {"text": "Brqjnatidtm Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18643, "end_char": 18660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brqjnatidtm Sinha\n\nv. ]Jou Narain\n\nBhagwati]."}}, {"text": "Jou Narain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18666, "end_char": 18676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brqjnatidtm Sinha\n\nv. ]Jou Narain\n\nBhagwati]."}}, {"text": "Brajnandan Sinlla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18690, "end_char": 18707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brajnandan Sinlla\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwaliJ.\n\nthe essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.", "canonical_name": "Brajnandan Sinlla"}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tircamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18816, "end_char": 18836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, urged by Shri Purshottam Tircamdas for the respondent that the word \"Court\" should not be limited to a Court of Justice or a Court of law but should be construed in a wide sense, including within the connotation, other Courts which, though not Courts of Justice, were nevertheless Courts according to law and he relied upon a decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Royal Aquariun and .", "canonical_name": "I-urshottam Tricamdas"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19163, "end_char": 19170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, urged by Shri Purshottam Tircamdas for the respondent that the word \"Court\" should not be limited to a Court of Justice or a Court of law but should be construed in a wide sense, including within the connotation, other Courts which, though not Courts of Justice, were nevertheless Courts according to law and he relied upon a decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Royal Aquariun and ."}}, {"text": "Fry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19275, "end_char": 19278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stemmer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson ( ) and the observations of Fry, L.J. at page 446 therein :\n\n\"I do not desire to attempt any definition of a \"court\"."}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22280, "end_char": 22285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Esher, M. R. expressed himself as follows while dealing with this argument at page 442 :-\n\n\"It is true that, in respect of statements made in the course of proceedings before a Court of Justice, whether by judge, or couQsel, or witnesses, there is an absolute immunity from liability to an action."}}, {"text": "Brajnanda11 Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23002, "end_char": 23019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brajnanda11 Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nBr'!jnant!an Sinha\n\nv. ]7oli Narain\n\nBh•gwali J.\n\nto a military court of inquiry.", "canonical_name": "Brajnandan Sinlla"}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23035, "end_char": 23045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brajnanda11 Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nBr'!jnant!an Sinha\n\nv. ]7oli Narain\n\nBh•gwali J.\n\nto a military court of inquiry.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "7oli Narain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23071, "end_char": 23082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brajnanda11 Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nBr'!jnant!an Sinha\n\nv. ]7oli Narain\n\nBh•gwali J.\n\nto a military court of inquiry."}}, {"text": "Bh•gwali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23084, "end_char": 23092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brajnanda11 Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nBr'!jnant!an Sinha\n\nv. ]7oli Narain\n\nBh•gwali J.\n\nto a military court of inquiry."}}, {"text": "Court strictly so-called within the connotation of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26041, "end_char": 26138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26749, "end_char": 26758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court strictly so-called within the connotation of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Court strictly so-called within the connotation of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27069, "end_char": 27078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court strictly so-called within the connotation of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Court strictly so-called within the connotation of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 4 to 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27370, "end_char": 27385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27453, "end_char": 27462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27621, "end_char": 27630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27753, "end_char": 27790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Zila", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28039, "end_char": 28043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The comm1ss1oners shall have the same power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and shall have the same powers fot the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other persons resides, on whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme Court of Judicature thereto."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28336, "end_char": 28344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The comm1ss1oners shall have the same power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and shall have the same powers fot the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other persons resides, on whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme Court of Judicature thereto."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28346, "end_char": 28352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The comm1ss1oners shall have the same power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and shall have the same powers fot the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other persons resides, on whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme Court of Judicature thereto."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28356, "end_char": 28362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The comm1ss1oners shall have the same power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and shall have the same powers fot the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other persons resides, on whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme Court of Judicature thereto."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28381, "end_char": 28394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The comm1ss1oners shall have the same power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given to Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and shall have the same powers fot the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other persons resides, on whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme Court of Judicature thereto."}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28647, "end_char": 28656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code", "statute": "Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code"}}, {"text": "sections 10 to 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28764, "end_char": 28781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code", "statute": "Civil and Criminal Courts by the Code"}}, {"text": "Sections 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29143, "end_char": 29161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29506, "end_char": 29516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29806, "end_char": 29816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30842, "end_char": 30855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1.tiNMaio", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31503, "end_char": 31512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brtgnll1llhn S'rn!ra\n\nv. ]1.tiNMaio\n\nB,.,,_. ]."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31693, "end_char": 31704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Special Judge. Sessions Court, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32095, "end_char": 32131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After his dismissal, the police submitted a charge-sheet against him before the Special Judge."}}, {"text": "sections 161 and 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32166, "end_char": 32186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32194, "end_char": 32211, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32216, "end_char": 32228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32236, "end_char": 32264, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32762, "end_char": 32775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32914, "end_char": 32923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Mukherjea, as he then was, delivered the judgment of the Court and observed at page 1159 :-\n\n\"As the law stands at present, the only purpose, for which an enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850 could be made, is to help the Government to come to a definite conclusion regarding the misbehaviour of a public servant and thus enable it to determine provisionally the punishment which should be imposed upon him, prior to giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, as is required under article 311(2) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33402, "end_char": 33416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34121, "end_char": 34138, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34146, "end_char": 34174, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35072, "end_char": 35090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35448, "end_char": 35458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brajnandan Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35742, "end_char": 35758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Special Commissioners are appointed, their report could be referred to the court or other authority\n\n7-85 S.C India/59\n\nBrajnandan Sinha v.\n\nJyoti JV arain\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\nv . .", "canonical_name": "Brajnandan Sinlla"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35779, "end_char": 35787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Special Commissioners are appointed, their report could be referred to the court or other authority\n\n7-85 S.C India/59\n\nBrajnandan Sinha v.\n\nJyoti JV arain\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\nv . .", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Jyoti Narain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35816, "end_char": 35828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jyoti Narain\n\nB!iagwati J.\n\nto which the officer concerned is subordinate for further advice and after taking the opinion of the different authorities and persons, the Government has to decide finally what action it should take\".", "canonical_name": "Jyoti Narayan"}}, {"text": "B!iagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35830, "end_char": 35839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jyoti Narain\n\nB!iagwati J.\n\nto which the officer concerned is subordinate for further advice and after taking the opinion of the different authorities and persons, the Government has to decide finally what action it should take\"."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36992, "end_char": 37001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37802, "end_char": 37834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "are of the opinion that the Commissioner appointed under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38297, "end_char": 38361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Court within the meaning of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38435, "end_char": 38509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38554, "end_char": 38574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was, however, drawn by Shri Purshottam Tricamdas to a decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kapur Singh v. fagat Narain( ).", "canonical_name": "I-urshottam Tricamdas"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38616, "end_char": 38633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was, however, drawn by Shri Purshottam Tricamdas to a decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Kapur Singh v. fagat Narain( )."}}, {"text": "Sardar Kapur Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38880, "end_char": 38898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court had been appointed a Commissioner under the Act in the matter of an inquiry against Sardar Kapur Singh, I.C.S., and Lala Jagat Narain, the editor, printer and publisher of an Urdu Daily newspaper published at Jullundur called The Hindu Samachar, was called upon to show cause why he should not be punished under section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act with regard to a leading article which appeared in his name in the issue of the paper dated the 12th March 1951."}}, {"text": "Lala Jagat Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38912, "end_char": 38929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court had been appointed a Commissioner under the Act in the matter of an inquiry against Sardar Kapur Singh, I.C.S., and Lala Jagat Narain, the editor, printer and publisher of an Urdu Daily newspaper published at Jullundur called The Hindu Samachar, was called upon to show cause why he should not be punished under section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act with regard to a leading article which appeared in his name in the issue of the paper dated the 12th March 1951."}}, {"text": "Jullundur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39005, "end_char": 39014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court had been appointed a Commissioner under the Act in the matter of an inquiry against Sardar Kapur Singh, I.C.S., and Lala Jagat Narain, the editor, printer and publisher of an Urdu Daily newspaper published at Jullundur called The Hindu Samachar, was called upon to show cause why he should not be punished under section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act with regard to a leading article which appeared in his name in the issue of the paper dated the 12th March 1951."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39108, "end_char": 39117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court within the meaning of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Court within the meaning of the term as used in the Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39121, "end_char": 39143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "12th March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39240, "end_char": 39255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court had been appointed a Commissioner under the Act in the matter of an inquiry against Sardar Kapur Singh, I.C.S., and Lala Jagat Narain, the editor, printer and publisher of an Urdu Daily newspaper published at Jullundur called The Hindu Samachar, was called upon to show cause why he should not be punished under section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act with regard to a leading article which appeared in his name in the issue of the paper dated the 12th March 1951."}}, {"text": "Falshaw", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39577, "end_char": 39584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Falshaw who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at page 50 in connection with this argument : \"The Public Servants (Inquiries) Act itself seems clearly to indicate that a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed under the Act constitute a Court as they are given all the powers of a Court regarding the summoning of witnesses and other matters, and the only ground on which the learned counel for the respondent could base his argument that the Com- :missioner does not constitute a Court was that he can\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 49\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nB/iagwali J.\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\n\\\"."}}, {"text": "Act itself seems clearly to indicate that a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39713, "end_char": 39810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Brajnandan Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40118, "end_char": 40134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Falshaw who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at page 50 in connection with this argument : \"The Public Servants (Inquiries) Act itself seems clearly to indicate that a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed under the Act constitute a Court as they are given all the powers of a Court regarding the summoning of witnesses and other matters, and the only ground on which the learned counel for the respondent could base his argument that the Com- :missioner does not constitute a Court was that he can\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 49\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\nJyoti Narain\n\nB/iagwali J.\n\nBrajnandan Sinha\n\n\\\".", "canonical_name": "Brajnandan Sinlla"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40571, "end_char": 40580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act itself seems clearly to indicate that a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed under the Act", "statute": "Act itself seems clearly to indicate that a Commissioner or Commissioners appointed under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40823, "end_char": 40832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40840, "end_char": 40859, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41512, "end_char": 41529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was also drawn to another decision of the Nagpur High Court in M. V. Rajwade v. Dr.\n\nS. M. Hassan( 1 )."}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41686, "end_char": 41718, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41753, "end_char": 41762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The question which came to be considered by the Court in that case was whether a commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "statute": "The question which came to be considered by the Court in that case was whether a commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41770, "end_char": 41798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42068, "end_char": 42084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42163, "end_char": 42173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act, 1952", "statute": "Courts Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42175, "end_char": 42198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42677, "end_char": 42709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42719, "end_char": 42779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "learned Judges were merely considering the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42785, "end_char": 42878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43584, "end_char": 43616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Commission governed by the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43854, "end_char": 43913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "I-urshottam Tricamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44415, "end_char": 44436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of the opinion that neither of these cases which have been relied upon l-y hri I-urshottam Tricamdas is of any help to the respondent or detracts\n\nBrl!feandan Sinha\n\nJyoti J( araiR\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n!", "canonical_name": "I-urshottam Tricamdas"}}, {"text": "Jyoti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44502, "end_char": 44507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of the opinion that neither of these cases which have been relied upon l-y hri I-urshottam Tricamdas is of any help to the respondent or detracts\n\nBrl!feandan Sinha\n\nJyoti J( araiR\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44827, "end_char": 44849, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45068, "end_char": 45090, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_977_983_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAJ BAHADUR KANWAR RAJ NATH\n\nAND OTHERS\n\nPRAMOD C. BHATT, CUSTODIAN OF\n\nEVACUEE PROPERTY.\n\nLB. K. MuKHERJEA C. J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR ana\n\nJAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nEvacuee Property-Lease granted by Custodian-Notice to cancel-Custodian's power-Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950), s. 12(1).\n\nBy s. 12, sub-s. 1, of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950) as amended by Act XLII of 1954, \"notwithst:; nding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Custodian may cancel any allotment or terminate any lease or ainend the terms of any lease or agreement under which any evacuee property is held or occupied by a person, whether such allotment, lease or agreement was granted or entered into before or after the commencement of this Act\".\n\nThe respondent who was the Custodian of evacuee property gratned a lease to the appellants and subsequently issued a notice to them, among other things, calling upon them to show cause why the lea:-c should not be cancelled for committing breaches of the conditions on which the proprties had been leased to them. The appellants contended that the respondent had no power to cancel the lease on the ground that under s. 12( 1) of the Act the power of the Custodian to cancel the lease could be exercised only so as to override a bar imposed by any law but not the contract nder which the lease was held and relied on the language of the non-obstante clause contained in the section.\n\nHeld, that the operative portion of the section which confers power on the Custodian to cancel a lease is unqualified and absolute and could not be abridged by reference to the non-obstante clause which was only inserted ex abundanti cautela with a view to repel a oossible contention that the section does not by implication repeal •tatutes conferring rights on lessees.\n\nObservations in Aswini Kumar Chose v. Arabinda Bose ([1953]\n\n\".C.R.\n\nI, 21, 24) and Dominion of India v. Shrinbai A. Irani ([1955] I S.C.R. 206, 213), on the scope of a non-obstante clause. •die•.! on.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION ; Civil Appeal No. 205 of 1954.\n\nOn appeal from the judgment and order dated the\n\nN001mber 10.\n\n!955\n\nRai Bahatlur Kanwar Rqj }lath\n\nand olherJ\n\nPrarnod C. Bhatt,\n\nCUJtodian of Evacuee Prop.rty\n\n13th April 1954 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 49 of 1954 arising out of the order dated the 31st day of March 1954 of the said High CoUrt exercising its Ordinary Original Jurisdiction in Misc.\n\nPetitien No. 55 of 1954.\n\nK. T. Desai, P. N. Bhagruati, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, for the appellants.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Silicitor-General of India, (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him), for. the respondent. 1955.\n\nNovember 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This appeal raises a question as to the powers of a Custodian of Evacuee Property to cancel a lease granted by him unrkr section 12 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (XXXI of 1950), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Messrs Abdul Karim and Brothers owned, along with certain other properties which are not the subject-matter of the present appeal, three mills with bungalows and chawls at Ambernath in Thana District and the Bobbin Factory at Tardeo in , Bombay.\n\nThey have migrated to Pakistan, these properties were declared by a notification dated 12-9-1951 issued under section . 7 of the Act as evacuee property, and under section 8 ( 1) of the Act, they became vested in the respondent as the Custodian for the State. The appellants are displaced persons, and on\n\nJQ.:8-1952 the respondent entered into an agreement with them, Exhibit A, which is, as aptly characterised by learned counsel for the appellants, of a composite character, consisting of three distinct matters. There was, firstly, a demise under which the mills and the factory in question were leased to the appeallants for a period of five years on the terms and conditions set out therein.\n\nSecondly, there was a sale of the stock of raw materials, unsold finished goods, spare parts, cars, trucks and other movables which were in the mills and the factory, with elaborate provisions for the determination and payment of the price therefor in\n\ndue course. And thirdly, there was an agreement to sell the mills and the factory to the appellants in certain events and subject to certain conditions.\n\nThere was also a clause for ref erring the disputes between the parties to arbitration.\n\nIn pursuance of this agreement, the appellants were put in possession of the mills and the factory on 31-8-1952.\n\nOn 12-2-1954 the respondent issued a notice to the appellants, Exhibit C, wherein he set out that the appellants had systematically committed breaches of the various terms on which the properties had been leased to them, and called upon them to show cause why the lease should not be cancelled and why they should not be evicted. The notice then went on to state that the respondent considered it necessary to issue certain directions for the \"preservation of the demised premises and the goods and stock in trade, etc., lying in the demised premises\", arid the appellants were accordingly required not to remove the stock or raise any money on the security thereof, and to send daily reports to the Custodian, of the transactions with reference thereto. Presumably, these directions were given under section 10 of the Act.\n\nOn 13-2-1954 the appellants appeared before the respondent, and contended that he had no authority to issue the notice in question under section 12, and that it was therefore illegal. Apprehending that the lease might be cancelled, and that they might be evicted, the appellants filed on 16-2-1954 the application out of which the preseht appeal arises, for a writ of certiorari for quashing the notice, Exhibit C, and for a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent from taking any further action pursuant thereto.\n\nIn support of the petition, the appellants urged that section 12 under which the respondent purported to act authorised the cancellation of only leases granted by the evacuee and not by the Custodian himself, and that no directions could be given under section 10 as it applied only to properties of the evacuee, and that by reason of the sale, the movables in question had become the property of the appel-\n\nRai Bohadur Aanwar Raj Nath\n\nand otMrs\n\nPramod C. Bhatt,\n\nCttStodian of E1JOCU11• Prop.rl.1\n\nVenkatararna\n\n, War].\n\nRoi ll1d1tul18 Kt111warRiijNa0\n\nmu/ others\n\nPranwd c. llha#,\n\nCwtodian of 11•-· Proper<]\n\nV1nk<zlarama\n\nJIJ!)'ar ].\n\n!ants. The petition was heard by Tendolkar, J., who stated the points for determination thus : ( 1) \"Whether the Custodian has power under section 12 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to terminate a lease granted by himself, and\n\n(2) Whether the directions given by the Custodian are beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon him by section 10 of the said Act ?\" On the first question, he held that section 12 applied only to leases granted by the evacuee and not by the Custodian, and that therefore the notice, Exhibit C, was ultra vires the powers of the Custodian under that section. On the second question, he held that section 10 applied only to properties of the evacuee, and that the movables in respect of which directions were given, ceased to be the property of the evacuee by reason of the sale in favour of the appellants, and that in consequence, the directions with reference to them were unauthorised. In the result, the application was allowed.\n\nThe respondent took the matter in appeal, and that was heard by Chagla, C.J. and Dixit, J.\n\nBy their judgment dated 13-4-1954, they held that on the plain language of section 12 it would apply whenever there was a lease, and that lease was in respect of property belonging to the evacuee, that there was no warrant for imposing a further limitation on that section that that lease should also have been granted by the evacuee, and that accordingly the Custodian had power to issue the notice, Exhibit C, for cancelling the lease. As regards movables, however, they agreed with Tendolkar, J. that for the reasons given by him the Custodian had no authority under section\n\n10 to issue any directions with reference thereto. The appeal was accordingly allowed in so far as it related to the lease but dismissed as regards movables.\n\nAgainst this judgment, the appellants have preferred this appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court under article 133(1) (b), and the only point that arises for determination therein is as to whether the Custodian has the power under section 12 to\n\ncancel a lease granted by himself and not by the evacuee. But that question is no longer open to argument, as there has been subsequent to the decision of the court below legislation which concludes the matter.\n\nSection 5 of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954 (XLII of 1954) enacts the following Explanation to section 12 of Act XXXI of 1950 :\n\n\"In this sub-section 'lease' includes a lease granted by the Custodian and 'agreement' includes an agreement entered into by the Custodian\" And it provides that the Explanation \"shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have bel'n inserted\" in the section.\n\nMr. Desai, learned counsel for the appellant~, concedes that this amendment which is retrospective in operation would govern the rights of the parties in the present appeal, and that under the section as it now stands, the Custodian has the power-and had always the power-to cancel leases created not merely by the evacuees but also by himself. But he contends that this power could be exercised only so as to override a bar imposed by any law but not the contract under which the lease is held, and this result flows according to him from the language of the nonobstante clause, which is limited to anything contained in any other law for the time being in force\", and does not include \"or any contract between the parties\".\n\nThis was a contention which was open to the appellants on the terms of the section as it stood even before the amendment, but it was not put forward at any stage prior to the hearing of this appeal and that by itself would be sufficient ground for declining to entertain it which it may be noted is now sought to be raised by a supplemental proceeding under Order 16, rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules. On thl' merits also it is without any substance.\n\nThe section expressly authorises the custodian to vary the terms of the lease, and that cannot be reconciled with the contention of the appellants that it confers no authority on him to go back upon his own contracts. The operative portion of the section which confers power OD\n\nRai Bahatlur Kanwar Roj Noth\n\nand othlrs\n\nPramod C. BhlaJ,\n\nCustodian of Exacute Properly\n\nV enkalarama\n\nAyyar}.\n\n.Rai BaiuidUT Kanwar Rllj NaJh\n\nand others\n\nPramod C. Bhatt,\n\nCustodian of Evacuee l'ToJMrl7\n\nYe nkatarama\n\nAyyar].\n\nthe Custodian to caned a lease or vary the terms thereof is unqualified and absolute, and that power cannot be abridged by reference to .the provision that it could be exercised \"notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force\".\n\nThis provision is obviously intended to repel a possible ct>ntention that section 12 does not by implication repeal statutes conferring rights on lesees, and cannot prevail as against them and has been inserted ex abundanti cautela.\n\nIt cannot be construed as cutting down the pbin meaning of the operative portion of the section. Vide the observations in Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabi11da Bose(1 ) and the Dominion of India v. Shrinbai A. Irani(') on the scope of a non-obstante clause.\n\nWe must accordingly hold that the respondent was acting within his authority in issuing Exhibit C in so far as it concerned the lease granted in favour of the appellants.\n\nIt was next contended by Mr. Desai that even if the Custodian had the power under section 12 to cancel the lease in favour of the appellants, he had no power under that section to cancel the agreement to sell the mills and the factory to them, which was one of the matters contained in Exhibit A, that the notice, Exhibit C, was to that extent without jurisdiction, and that the respondent should accordingly be prohibited from cancelling that portion of Exhibit A in pursuance of Exhibit C. But the notice in terms refers firstly to the lease which it is proposed to cancel, and secondly to the movables in respect of which certain directions were given. In their petition under article 226, it was the validity of the notice, Exhibit C, with reference to these two matters that the appellants challenged. Tendolkar, J. stated in his judgment-and quite correctly-that these were the two points that arose for determination. The question of the rights of the appellants in so far as they related to the purchase by them of the mills and the factory was not raised in the petition, and no contentions were put forivard in support thereof at any. stage of\n\nthe proceedings. It is for the first time in the argu-\n\n(1) (1953] S.C R 1, 21, 24.\n\n(2) (1955) 1 S.C.R. 206,213.\n\nment before us that those rights are sought to be\n\nagitated. Under the circumstances, we must decline to consider them. It will be suflicient if we observe that the rights of the appellants, if any, other than those arising out of the lease, are left open to the determinati9n of the appropriate authorities, and that nothing in our decision should be taken as a pronouncement on those rights.\n\nIn the result, the apal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nSHRIMATI VIDYA VERMA, THROUGH NEXT\n\nFRIEND R. V. S. MANI v.\n\nDR. SHIV NARAIN VERMA.\n\n[S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI. fAGANNADHA\n\noAs and B. P. SINHA JJ.l\n\nFundamental Ri[!ht, Infringement of-Detention by private person-ls.iue of writ-Power of Supreme Court-Constitution of [ndia,\n\nArts. 21, 3:t.\n\nNo question of infringement of any fundamental right under Art. 21 arises where the detention complained of is by a private per- >On and not by a State or under the authority or orders of a State. and the Supreme Court will not, therefore, entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus, under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nConsequently a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus founded on Art. 21 and directed against a father for alleged detention of his daughter does not lie.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88) and P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank. of India ([1952] S.C.R. 391), relied on.\n\nORIGINAL JuR1so1cT10N : Petition No. 262 of 1955.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for a Writ in the nature of Habeds Corpus.\n\nR. V. S. Mani. the next friend, in person.\n\nM. C. Setal.vad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him).\n\nN aunit Lal, for the respondent.\n\nRaj Bahadur Kanwar Raj .Nath\n\nand 0th.rs\n\nPramod C. Bhatt., Custodian of Evacuee Properey\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].\n\n.November 11", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "RAJ BAHADUR KANWAR RAJ NATH\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJ BAHADUR KANWAR RAJ NATH\n\nAND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRAMOD C. BHATT, CUSTODIAN OF\n\nEVACUEE PROPERTY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRAMOD C. BHATT, CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LB. K. 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Bhatt,\n\nCUJtodian of Evacuee Prop.rty\n\n13th April 1954 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "RAJ BAHADUR KANWAR RAJ NATH\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Prarnod C. Bhatt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2271, "end_char": 2287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "955\n\nRai Bahatlur Kanwar Rqj }lath\n\nand olherJ\n\nPrarnod C. Bhatt,\n\nCUJtodian of Evacuee Prop.rty\n\n13th April 1954 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Prarnod C. Bhatt"}}, {"text": "K. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2550, "end_char": 2561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Desai, P. N. Bhagruati, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. N. Bhagruati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2563, "end_char": 2578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Desai, P. N. Bhagruati, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2580, "end_char": 2594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Desai, P. N. Bhagruati, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2599, "end_char": 2614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Desai, P. N. Bhagruati, Rameshwar Nath and Rajinder Narain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2637, "end_char": 2651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Silicitor-General of India, (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him), for."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2682, "end_char": 2696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Silicitor-General of India, (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him), for."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2701, "end_char": 2713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Silicitor-General of India, (Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, with him), for."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abdul Karim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3069, "end_char": 3080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs Abdul Karim and Brothers owned, along with certain other properties which are not the subject-matter of the present appeal, three mills with bungalows and chawls at Ambernath in Thana District and the Bobbin Factory at Tardeo in , Bombay."}}, {"text": "Ambernath", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3234, "end_char": 3243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs Abdul Karim and Brothers owned, along with certain other properties which are not the subject-matter of the present appeal, three mills with bungalows and chawls at Ambernath in Thana District and the Bobbin Factory at Tardeo in , Bombay."}}, {"text": "Thana District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3247, "end_char": 3261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs Abdul Karim and Brothers owned, along with certain other properties which are not the subject-matter of the present appeal, three mills with bungalows and chawls at Ambernath in Thana District and the Bobbin Factory at Tardeo in , Bombay."}}, {"text": "Tardeo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3288, "end_char": 3294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs Abdul Karim and Brothers owned, along with certain other properties which are not the subject-matter of the present appeal, three mills with bungalows and chawls at Ambernath in Thana District and the Bobbin Factory at Tardeo in , Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3300, "end_char": 3306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs Abdul Karim and Brothers owned, along with certain other properties which are not the subject-matter of the present appeal, three mills with bungalows and chawls at Ambernath in Thana District and the Bobbin Factory at Tardeo in , Bombay."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3331, "end_char": 3339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have migrated to Pakistan, these properties were declared by a notification dated 12-9-1951 issued under section ."}}, {"text": "12-9-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3396, "end_char": 3405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have migrated to Pakistan, these properties were declared by a notification dated 12-9-1951 issued under section ."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3473, "end_char": 3482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31-8-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4606, "end_char": 4615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this agreement, the appellants were put in possession of the mills and the factory on 31-8-1952."}}, {"text": "12-2-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4621, "end_char": 4630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12-2-1954 the respondent issued a notice to the appellants, Exhibit C, wherein he set out that the appellants had systematically committed breaches of the various terms on which the properties had been leased to them, and called upon them to show cause why the lease should not be cancelled and why they should not be evicted."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5419, "end_char": 5429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13-2-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5446, "end_char": 5455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13-2-1954 the appellants appeared before the respondent, and contended that he had no authority to issue the notice in question under section 12, and that it was therefore illegal."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5580, "end_char": 5590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16-2-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5731, "end_char": 5740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apprehending that the lease might be cancelled, and that they might be evicted, the appellants filed on 16-2-1954 the application out of which the preseht appeal arises, for a writ of certiorari for quashing the notice, Exhibit C, and for a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent from taking any further action pursuant thereto."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6019, "end_char": 6029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6218, "end_char": 6228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pramod C. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6414, "end_char": 6429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the petition, the appellants urged that section 12 under which the respondent purported to act authorised the cancellation of only leases granted by the evacuee and not by the Custodian himself, and that no directions could be given under section 10 as it applied only to properties of the evacuee, and that by reason of the sale, the movables in question had become the property of the appel-\n\nRai Bohadur Aanwar Raj Nath\n\nand otMrs\n\nPramod C. Bhatt,\n\nCttStodian of E1JOCU11• Prop.rl.1\n\nVenkatararna\n\n, War].", "canonical_name": "Prarnod C. Bhatt"}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was heard by Tendolkar, J., who stated the points for determination thus : ( 1) \"Whether the Custodian has power under section 12 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to terminate a lease granted by himself, and\n\n(2) Whether the directions given by the Custodian are beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon him by section 10 of the said Act ?\""}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6746, "end_char": 6756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6764, "end_char": 6808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6956, "end_char": 6966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7022, "end_char": 7032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7650, "end_char": 7656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent took the matter in appeal, and that was heard by Chagla, C.J. and Dixit, J.\n\nBy their judgment dated 13-4-1954, they held that on the plain language of section 12 it would apply whenever there was a lease, and that lease was in respect of property belonging to the evacuee, that there was no warrant for imposing a further limitation on that section that that lease should also have been granted by the evacuee, and that accordingly the Custodian had power to issue the notice, Exhibit C, for cancelling the lease."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7667, "end_char": 7672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent took the matter in appeal, and that was heard by Chagla, C.J. and Dixit, J.\n\nBy their judgment dated 13-4-1954, they held that on the plain language of section 12 it would apply whenever there was a lease, and that lease was in respect of property belonging to the evacuee, that there was no warrant for imposing a further limitation on that section that that lease should also have been granted by the evacuee, and that accordingly the Custodian had power to issue the notice, Exhibit C, for cancelling the lease."}}, {"text": "13-4-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7702, "end_char": 7711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent took the matter in appeal, and that was heard by Chagla, C.J. and Dixit, J.\n\nBy their judgment dated 13-4-1954, they held that on the plain language of section 12 it would apply whenever there was a lease, and that lease was in respect of property belonging to the evacuee, that there was no warrant for imposing a further limitation on that section that that lease should also have been granted by the evacuee, and that accordingly the Custodian had power to issue the notice, Exhibit C, for cancelling the lease."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7753, "end_char": 7763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section\n\n10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8248, "end_char": 8259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8530, "end_char": 8544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8658, "end_char": 8668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8885, "end_char": 8894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9010, "end_char": 9020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9312, "end_char": 9317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Desai, learned counsel for the appellant~, concedes that this amendment which is retrospective in operation would govern the rights of the parties in the present appeal, and that under the section as it now stands, the Custodian has the power-and had always the power-to cancel leases created not merely by the evacuees but also by himself."}}, {"text": "Order 16, rule 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10393, "end_char": 10409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10417, "end_char": 10430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was a contention which was open to the appellants on the terms of the section as it stood even before the amendment, but it was not put forward at any stage prior to the hearing of this appeal and that by itself would be sufficient ground for declining to entertain it which it may be noted is now sought to be raised by a supplemental proceeding under Order 16, rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules."}}, {"text": "Rai Bahatlur Kanwar Roj Noth", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10767, "end_char": 10795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The operative portion of the section which confers power OD\n\nRai Bahatlur Kanwar Roj Noth\n\nand othlrs\n\nPramod C. BhlaJ,\n\nCustodian of Exacute Properly\n\nV enkalarama\n\nAyyar}.", "canonical_name": "RAJ BAHADUR KANWAR RAJ NATH\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Pramod C. BhlaJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10809, "end_char": 10824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The operative portion of the section which confers power OD\n\nRai Bahatlur Kanwar Roj Noth\n\nand othlrs\n\nPramod C. BhlaJ,\n\nCustodian of Exacute Properly\n\nV enkalarama\n\nAyyar}.", "canonical_name": "Prarnod C. Bhatt"}}, {"text": ".Rai BaiuidUT Kanwar Rllj NaJh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10881, "end_char": 10911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Rai BaiuidUT Kanwar Rllj NaJh\n\nand others\n\nPramod C. Bhatt,\n\nCustodian of Evacuee l'ToJMrl7\n\nYe nkatarama\n\nAyyar]."}}, {"text": "Pramod C. Bhatt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10925, "end_char": 10940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Rai BaiuidUT Kanwar Rllj NaJh\n\nand others\n\nPramod C. Bhatt,\n\nCustodian of Evacuee l'ToJMrl7\n\nYe nkatarama\n\nAyyar].", "canonical_name": "Prarnod C. Bhatt"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11334, "end_char": 11344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12001, "end_char": 12011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12599, "end_char": 12610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1955) 1 S.C.R. 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13163, "end_char": 13182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SHRIMATI VIDYA VERMA", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13644, "end_char": 13664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMATI VIDYA VERMA, THROUGH NEXT\n\nFRIEND R. V. S. MANI v.\n\nDR."}}, {"text": "SHIV NARAIN VERMA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13709, "end_char": 13726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIV NARAIN VERMA."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13730, "end_char": 13739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13741, "end_char": 13752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI. fAGANNADHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13754, "end_char": 13774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI."}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13784, "end_char": 13795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fAGANNADHA\n\noAs and B. P. SINHA JJ.l\n\nFundamental Ri[!ht, Infringement of-Detention by private person-ls.iue of writ-Power of Supreme Court-Constitution of [ndia,\n\nArts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 21, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13928, "end_char": 13939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14003, "end_char": 14010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14244, "end_char": 14251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14304, "end_char": 14311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14371, "end_char": 14378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14655, "end_char": 14665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14730, "end_char": 14743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setal.vad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14774, "end_char": 14789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setal.vad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him)."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14819, "end_char": 14831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setal.vad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him)."}}, {"text": "N aunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14864, "end_char": 14875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N aunit Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Raj Bahadur Kanwar Raj .Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14898, "end_char": 14926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Bahadur Kanwar Raj .Nath\n\nand 0th.rs\n\nPramod C. Bhatt.,", "canonical_name": "RAJ BAHADUR KANWAR RAJ NATH\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14989, "end_char": 15006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Custodian of Evacuee Properey\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_983_987_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 983\n\nment before us that those rights are sought to be\n\nagitated. Under the circumstances, we must decline to consider them. It will be suflicient if we observe that the rights of the appellants, if any, other than those arising out of the lease, are left open to the determinati9n of the appropriate authorities, and that nothing in our decision should be taken as a pronouncement on those rights.\n\nIn the result, the apal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nSHRIMATI VIDYA VERMA, THROUGH NEXT\n\nFRIEND R. V. S. MANI v.\n\nDR. SHIV NARAIN VERMA.\n\n[S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI. fAGANNADHA\n\noAs and B. P. SINHA JJ.l\n\nFundamental Ri[!ht, Infringement of-Detention by private person-ls.iue of writ-Power of Supreme Court-Constitution of [ndia,\n\nArts. 21, 3:t.\n\nNo question of infringement of any fundamental right under Art. 21 arises where the detention complained of is by a private per- >On and not by a State or under the authority or orders of a State. and the Supreme Court will not, therefore, entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus, under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nConsequently a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus founded on Art. 21 and directed against a father for alleged detention of his daughter does not lie.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88) and P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank. of India ([1952] S.C.R. 391), relied on.\n\nORIGINAL JuR1so1cT10N : Petition No. 262 of 1955.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for a Writ in the nature of Habeds Corpus.\n\nR. V. S. Mani. the next friend, in person.\n\nM. C. Setal.vad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him).\n\nN aunit Lal, for the respondent.\n\nRaj Bahadur Kanwar Raj .Nath\n\nand 0th.rs\n\nPramod C. Bhatt., Custodian of Evacuee Properey\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar ].\n\n.November 11\n\nShrimati Vi<lya V mna, through\n\nLnext friend R., V. S. Mani v.\n\nDr. Shiv Narain\n\nVerma\n\n1955. November 11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J .-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was presented by Mr. R. V. S. Mani, an advocate of the Nagpur High Court, on behalf of Shrimati Vidya Verma and was directed against her father Dr.\n\nShiv Narayaq Verma of Nagpur.\n\nMr. Mani had no power of attorney from the lady and when the office pointed out that he could not present a petition without producing the necessary authority he amended the petition and described himself as the next friend of the lady.\n\nWhen the matter first came up for hearing we directed a notice to issue to the father but later the same day it was brought to our notice that the opposite party was not either the Union of India or a State, nor wa~ it some official acting under the orders of one or the other, but a private person. The question therefore arose of our power under article 32 to issue a writ of. this kind against a private party. Ac- . cordingly, before the notice was sent out we recalled it and set the matter down for further hearing.\n\nMr. Mani appeared again on the appointed date and was robed as he had been on the previous occasion.\n\nHe was asked to clarify his position and when he said he had no power of attorney and explained that he was appearing in a private capacity as next friend he was told that at the next hearing he must address the Court without his robes.\n\nHe was also warned that if he lost he might have to bear the costs of the other side personally.\n\nAfter hearing Mr. Mani for a time we decided to fix a date for the hearing of a preliminary question only, namely, whether a fundamental right is involved when the detention complained of is by a private person and not by a State or under the authority or orders of a State. We directed that notices be issued to the .opposite party as well as to the Attorney-General of India.\n\nAt the adjourned hearing Mr. Mani appe; ired in person, unrobed as directed, but with the advocate on\n\nrecord sitting by his side. He asked for permission to address us himself. We declined to hear him unless he discharged the advocate on record. He did that on the spot and then proceeded to address us in person.\n\nAs the question that arises here has been discussed at length in two earlier decisions of this Court we need not examine the matter in any detail.\n\nThe fundamental right that is said to be infringed is the one conferred by article 21 : the right to personal liberty. In A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras( 1 ) four of the six learned Judges who were in that case held that the word \"law\" in article 21 referred to State-made law and not to law in the abstract. They rejected the contention that this was the same as the due process clause in the American Constitution. One learned Judge dissented and one expressed no opinion on this point. Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was) said at page 204 that as a rule constitutional safeguards are directed against the State and its organs and that protection against violation of rights by individuals musf be sought in the ordinary law ; and S. R. Das, J. dealing with the question of preventive detention said at page 324 that article 21 protects a person against preventive detention by the executive with1mt the sanction of a law made by the legislature.\n\nThis principle was applied to articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) by a Bench of five Judges in P. D. Shamdasani\n\nv. Central Bank of India( ) who held that violation of rights of property by a private individual is not within the purview of these articles, therefore a person whose rights of property are infringed by a private individual must seek his remedy under the ordinary law and not under article 32. Article 21 was not directly involved but the learned Judges referring to article 31(1) said at page 394:\n\n~'It is clear that it is a declaration of the fundamental right of private property in the same negative form in which article 21 declares the fundamental right to life and liberty. There is no express reference to the State in article 21. But could it be\n\n(; U [195!>] S.C.R. 88.\n\n(2) [195i] S.C.R. 391,\n\nShrimati V idya Verma, through\n\nnext friend R. V. S. Mani v.\n\nDr. Shio Narain\n\nVmna\n\nBost].\n\nSkrimati Vid;'a Verma. through\n\nntxtfriend R. V. S. Mani\n\nDr. Shiv Narain\n\nVerma\n\nBose].\n\nsuggested on that account that that article was intended to afford protection to life and personal liberty against violation by private individuals ? The words 'except by procedure established by law' plainly exclude such a suggestion\".\n\nThey held that the language of article 31 ( 1) was similar and decided that article 31(1) did not apply to invasions of a right by a private individual and consequently no writ under article 32 would lie in such a case. For the same reasons we hold that the present petition which is founded on article 21 does not lie under article 32. It is accordingly dismissed.\n\nAs regards costs Mr. Mani has no power of attorney and has chosen to appear as next friend despite the warning given to him at the last hearing.\n\nThis is the fourth time the matter is being agitated in the Courts. The first attempt was an application under section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code made by the person who, according to Mr. Mani, is the husband of the lady in whose interests he says he is acting. It was filed on 10-9-1954 and asked for a search warrant for the recovery of the lady. The application was dismissed and a revision filed against the order of dismissal also failed.\n\nThe same gentleman then applied to the High Court at Nagpur on 18-10-1954 under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Judges examined the lady, who is 25 years old, in person, on 20-10-1954 and on the strength of her statement, which they recorded, they held that she was not under any restraint either in the house or outside and so dismissed the application on 10-11-1954.\n\nMr. Mani then took up the cudgels and filed a second petition in the High Court on 6-12-1954, also under section 491. The learned Judges again examined the lady, this time on two successive days. On 20-12-1954 she said that she did not want to live with her father but wanted to live with her uncle at Waraseoni.\n\nShe appeared again the next day and clarified this by saying that she would go to her uncle in the company of her father. She said that she had no discomfon in living witn her father but was not at ease with him\n\n-\"·\n\nand \\vould have more peace of mind with her uncle.\n\nShe also said :\n\n\"I have no need of any counsel and have nothing to talk to Shri R. V. S. Mani\".\n\nThe girl was allowed to go to her uncle. Mr. Mani then applied for leave to withdraw the petition. This was allowed on 24-1-1955 and no order was made about costs.\n\nThen cam:e the present -petition on 22-8-1955. The petition does not discl05e that Mr. Mani . made any attempt to consult the person who he says is the husband of the lady (a fact which is disputed and on which we express no opinion) nor does it show that he made any attempt to contact either th~. lady or her father or even her uncle. He has had three hearings in this Court despite the warning he was given about costs and the learned - Attorney-General - was also asked by us to appear. When the arguments were fully concluded and Mr. Mani found that we were against him he adopted the same tactics as in the Nagpur High Court and asked for permission to withdraw the petition.\n\nThat was refused. We invited him to show cause why he should not be made to pay the costs and have heard all he has to say. _ In the circumstances set out above, we fed this is a case in which he should be made to pay the costs personally.\n\nWe dismiss the petition and direct that Mr. Mani pay the costs of the opposite party personally in addition to those of the learned Attorney-General and that he bear his own, also personally. •\n\n8-3> :;.c. India.(59\n\nShrimali Vidya Vtrma, through\n\nmxlfriend R. V. S. !1.fani v.\n\nDr. S/, iD Narain\n\nVerma\n\nBost].", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "SHRIMATI VIDYA VERMA, THROUGH NEXT\n\nFRIEND R. V. S. MANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 491, "end_char": 547, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRIMATI VIDYA VERMA, THROUGH NEXT FRIEND R>V>S MANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHIV NARAIN VERMA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 556, "end_char": 573, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Shiv Narayaq Verma", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 577, "end_char": 586, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 588, "end_char": 599, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 609, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 631, "end_char": 645, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 21, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 850, "end_char": 857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 996, "end_char": 1009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the Supreme Court will not, therefore, entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus, under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1091, "end_char": 1098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1151, "end_char": 1158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1218, "end_char": 1225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1502, "end_char": 1512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1577, "end_char": 1590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani.", "canonical_name": "R. V. S. Mani"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setal.vad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1621, "end_char": 1636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setal.vad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him)."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1666, "end_char": 1678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setal.vad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him)."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1683, "end_char": 1697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setal.vad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him)."}}, {"text": "N aunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1711, "end_char": 1722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N aunit Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Raj Bahadur Kanwar Raj .Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1745, "end_char": 1773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Bahadur Kanwar Raj .Nath\n\nand 0th.rs\n\nPramod C. Bhatt.,"}}, {"text": "Pramod C. Bhatt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1787, "end_char": 1802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Bahadur Kanwar Raj .Nath\n\nand 0th.rs\n\nPramod C. Bhatt.,"}}, {"text": "Shrimati Vi<lya V mna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1872, "end_char": 1893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".November 11\n\nShrimati Vi<lya V mna, through\n\nLnext friend R., V. S. Mani v.\n\nDr. Shiv Narain\n\nVerma\n\n1955.", "canonical_name": "Shrimati Vi<lya V mna"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2056, "end_char": 2066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shrimati Vidya Verma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2216, "end_char": 2236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was presented by Mr. R. V. S. Mani, an advocate of the Nagpur High Court, on behalf of Shrimati Vidya Verma and was directed against her father Dr.\n\nShiv Narayaq Verma of Nagpur.", "canonical_name": "Shrimati Vi<lya V mna"}}, {"text": "Shiv Narayaq Verma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2278, "end_char": 2296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was presented by Mr. R. V. S. Mani, an advocate of the Nagpur High Court, on behalf of Shrimati Vidya Verma and was directed against her father Dr.\n\nShiv Narayaq Verma of Nagpur.", "canonical_name": "Shiv Narayaq Verma"}}, {"text": "Mani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2313, "end_char": 2317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mani had no power of attorney from the lady and when the office pointed out that he could not present a petition without producing the necessary authority he amended the petition and described himself as the next friend of the lady."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2728, "end_char": 2742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter first came up for hearing we directed a notice to issue to the father but later the same day it was brought to our notice that the opposite party was not either the Union of India or a State, nor wa~ it some official acting under the orders of one or the other, but a private person."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2895, "end_char": 2905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3879, "end_char": 3884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We directed that notices be issued to the .opposite party as well as to the Attorney-General of India."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4426, "end_char": 4436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4596, "end_char": 4606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4846, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was) said at page 204 that as a rule constitutional safeguards are directed against the State and its organs and that protection against violation of rights by individuals musf be sought in the ordinary law ; and S. R. Das, J. dealing with the question of preventive detention said at page 324 that article 21 protects a person against preventive detention by the executive with1mt the sanction of a law made by the legislature."}}, {"text": "S. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5092, "end_char": 5101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was) said at page 204 that as a rule constitutional safeguards are directed against the State and its organs and that protection against violation of rights by individuals musf be sought in the ordinary law ; and S. R. Das, J. dealing with the question of preventive detention said at page 324 that article 21 protects a person against preventive detention by the executive with1mt the sanction of a law made by the legislature.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5178, "end_char": 5188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5339, "end_char": 5366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5697, "end_char": 5707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5709, "end_char": 5719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5934, "end_char": 5944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6043, "end_char": 6053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shiv Narain\n\nVerma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "through\n\nntxtfriend R. V. S. Mani\n\nDr. Shiv Narain\n\nVerma\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "Shiv Narayaq Verma"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6573, "end_char": 6583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6618, "end_char": 6631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6725, "end_char": 6735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6837, "end_char": 6847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6867, "end_char": 6877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7166, "end_char": 7177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10-9-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7340, "end_char": 7349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was filed on 10-9-1954 and asked for a search warrant for the recovery of the lady."}}, {"text": "High Court at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7546, "end_char": 7566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same gentleman then applied to the High Court at Nagpur on 18-10-1954 under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "18-10-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7570, "end_char": 7580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same gentleman then applied to the High Court at Nagpur on 18-10-1954 under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7587, "end_char": 7598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-10-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7704, "end_char": 7714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges examined the lady, who is 25 years old, in person, on 20-10-1954 and on the strength of her statement, which they recorded, they held that she was not under any restraint either in the house or outside and so dismissed the application on 10-11-1954."}}, {"text": "10-11-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7888, "end_char": 7898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges examined the lady, who is 25 years old, in person, on 20-10-1954 and on the strength of her statement, which they recorded, they held that she was not under any restraint either in the house or outside and so dismissed the application on 10-11-1954."}}, {"text": "6-12-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7984, "end_char": 7993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mani then took up the cudgels and filed a second petition in the High Court on 6-12-1954, also under section 491."}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8006, "end_char": 8017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-12-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8100, "end_char": 8110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20-12-1954 she said that she did not want to live with her father but wanted to live with her uncle at Waraseoni."}}, {"text": "Waraseoni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8203, "end_char": 8212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20-12-1954 she said that she did not want to live with her father but wanted to live with her uncle at Waraseoni."}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8566, "end_char": 8579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She also said :\n\n\"I have no need of any counsel and have nothing to talk to Shri R. V. S. Mani\".", "canonical_name": "R. V. S. Mani"}}, {"text": "24-1-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8702, "end_char": 8711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was allowed on 24-1-1955 and no order was made about costs."}}, {"text": "-8-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8786, "end_char": 8793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then cam:e the present -petition on 22-8-1955."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9361, "end_char": 9378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the arguments were fully concluded and Mr. Mani found that we were against him he adopted the same tactics as in the Nagpur High Court and asked for permission to withdraw the petition."}}, {"text": "Shrimali Vidya Vtrma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9889, "end_char": 9909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India.(59\n\nShrimali Vidya Vtrma, through\n\nmxlfriend R. V. S. !", "canonical_name": "Shrimati Vi<lya V mna"}}]}
{"document_id": "1955_2_988_994_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "Octobtr 28\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955]\n\nRAJA BAHADUR KAMAKSHYA NARAIN\n\nSINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE COLLECTOR AND DEPUTY COMMIS-\n\nSIONER OF HAZARIBAGH AND OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nBihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihor Act XXX of 1950), ss. 3(1), 4(a), 4(h), 5, 7-Buildings standing on the land comprised in\n\nthe estate-Transfer after the first day of January, 1946-Estate notified as having become vested in the State-Notice to the transferee under s. 4(h)-Notification purporting to vest in the State the transferred properties-Validity-S. 4(h ), whether ultra vires.\n\nOn the 29th of December, 1947, petitioner No. I executed a lease to C (a company) of certain properties consisting of land• and buildings comprised in the estate belonging to him.\n\nSubsequently, in 1949 he executed a deed of settlement whereby he transferred the properties to three trustees, namely, himself and petitioners 2 and 3. Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950) came into force on the 25th of September, 1950, and on the 3rd of November, 1951, the State of Bihar issued a notification under s. 3( I) of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No. I had passed to and become vested in the State. A notice under s. 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to C and on the 4th of March, 1954, the State GoYCrrunent issued a notification under s. 3(1) purporting to vest in the State the properties in question. It was contended for the petitioners that the buildings standing on the land comprised in the notified estate did not vest in the State, on the ground (I) that the estate of the petitioner No. I did not vest in the State under s. 3 of the Act but by virtue of the provisions of s. 4, (2) that the definition of \"estate\" in the Act speaks of land only and not of any building on it, (3) that on the date of vesting, the buildings were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate within the meaning of>. 4(a), and (4) thats. 4(h) is ultra vires the Constitution as it iiuposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to realise rent from the company.\n\nHeld, that (1) , vhether the estate of petitioner No. 1 vested in the State by reason of the publication of the notification under s. 3 or by virtue of the provisions of s. 4 was of little consequence as in either case a vesting took place ;\n\n(2) although in the definition of \"estate\" the word land is uoed and there is no mention of the word building, the provisions of ss: .._, 5 and 7 sho'v the intention of the legislature to include something more than merely the land of a notified estate as vesting in the State.\n\nUnder s. 4(a), buildings of a certain description and other things vest in the State absolutely on the publication of a notification under s. 3. Under ss. 5 and 7, the buildings mentioned therein are deemed to be settled by the State with the intermediary and this could only be on the supposition that the buildings vested in the State, the intermediary being a settlee under the State ;\n\n(3) ss. 4(a) and 4(h) must be read together. Under. s. 4(h), the use to which the building was put previous to its transfer after the first day of January, 1946, and not thereafter was what the Collector was concerned with and not to what use it had been put after its transfer after the. first day of January, 1946. If a transfer was made after the first day of January, 1946 of a building comprised in the notified estate which was used immediately previous to the date of transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate the transfer would be liable to be annulled under s. 4(h) and the building would vest absolutely in the State on the publication of the notification and the provisions of s. 4(a) must be read accordingly ; and\n\n( 4) the Collector's powers under s. 4(h), wide as they are, are not quite so absolute or arbitrary as suggested. S. 4(h) is a part of a validly enacted law of acquisition of estates and is an integral part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate takes place.\n\nThe Act or s. 4(h) of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners, therefore, does not arise. The Act including s. 4(h) of it, is protected by Art. 31-A of the Constitu ti on.\n\nORIGINAL\n\nJURISDICTION ; Petition No 217 of 1955.\n\nUnder article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the petitioners.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, (Bajrang Sahai and S.\n\nVerma, with him), for respondent No. 2.\n\n1955. October 28.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deJ.ivered by\n\nIMAM J.-The pet1t1oners have .filed this application under article 32 of the Constitution claiming that the buildings and lands as set out in the Schedule annexed to the petition and marked \"A\" . (hereinafter referred to as the disputed properties) did not vest in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the\n\nRaja Bahadur\n\nKamalc.rhya Narain Singh\n\nand others~\n\nThe Collector and Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh and ot/ters\n\nRaja Bahat!ur\n\nKamakshya Narain Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe Collector and Depu'.'Ji Commissioner 1f Hazaribaglt anc? others\n\nlmam].\n\nBihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was at one time the owner of the disputed properties which lie within Touzi No. 28 of the Collectorate of Hazaribagh. On the 29th of December, 1947 petitioner No. 1 as owner leased out the disputed properties to a Company known as Mineral Deveiopment Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company).\n\nThe company took possession of the disputed properties and has been paying rent. On the 7th of April, 1949 petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity executed a deed of settlement whereby he transferred the disputed properties to three trustees, namely, himself and petitioners 2 and 3. The Company has been paying rent to the trustees since then.\n\nThe Act came into force on the 25th of September,\n\n1950. On the 3rd of November, 1951 the State Government issued a notification under section 3(1) of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity specified therein had passed to and become vested in the State. On the 26th of October, 1953 a notice under section 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to the Company, and on the 4th of March, 1954 the State Government issued a notification under section 3(1) of the Act purporting to vest in the State the propc:ties covered by the above-mentioned deed of settlement and anothe~ deed of settlement with which we are not concerned. The Company instituted a title suit No. 33 of 1951 aga; nst the State of Bihar in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh basing its claim on a mining lease executed by petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity the genuineness of which was challenged by the State.\n\nPetitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was made a party to this suit.\n\nThe Company also instituted a title suit No. 9 of 1954 against the State of Bihar to which petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was made a party challenging the legality of the issue of notice dated 25-10-1953 under section 4 (h) of the Act. On the 11th of November, 1954 the State of Bihar filed title suit No. 53 of 1954 to which the Company,\n\npetitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity, the three trustees and others were made part!cs.\n\nBy this suit the State of Bihar challenged the genuineness of the lease in favour of the Company and the deed of settlement in favour of the trustees.\n\nThe real question for deternfr:iation it, what vested in the State on the publication of the notifcation under section 3 and by virtue of the provisions of section 4(a) of the Act? According to Mr. Chatterjee the disputed properties did not vest in the State, whatever else may have.\n\nHaving regard to the definition of \"estate\" in the Act, if anything vested in the State on the publication of a notification it was the land comprised in the notified estate.\n\nAlthough the disputed properties stood on the land in the notified estate, they did not vest in the State, because the definition of \"estate\" speaks of land only and not of any building on it.\n\nThe notification under section 3 was a mere declaration and actual vesting took place under section 4(a).\n\nOn the date of vesting the disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1, who had parted with his right, title and iHterest therein long before the Act was enacted and the publication of the notification under section 3.\n\nMr. Sinha on behalf of the State of Bihar, on. the other hand, contended that on a perusal of the provisions of sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Act, it would appear that the Act contemplated something more than the land in an estate vesting in the State and the disputed properties could and did vest in the State on the publication of the notification under section 3.\n\nIn our opinion, it is of little consequence in the present case whether the notified estate vested in the State by reason of the public:ition of the notification under section 3 or by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Act, becaue in either case a vesting did t:ike place. Although the word land is used in the definition of \"estate'', the provisions of sections 4, 5 and 7 show the necessary intentio)l to include something more than the land when an estate vests in the State. Under section 4(a) it is not only the\n\nRaja Bahadur\n\nK amllkslrJa Narain Singh and otMrs ....\n\nThe Collector and Depu!Y Ccmmissioner nf Hazarihagh '!!'~ _ot/v.rs\n\nImam].\n\nRaja Bahadur\n\nK amllkshya }{ arain Sinth\n\nand others\n\nT/1' Ccl11etor and Inpuiy Ccm>nissioner of Hari\n\nl11igh and others\n\nImam].\n\nestate but also buildings of a certain description and other things which vest in the State absolutely on the publication of a notification under section 3.\n\nUnder sections 5 and 7 the buildings mentioned therein also vest in the State, because the buildings in question are deemed to be settled by the State with the intermediary in possession. This could only be on the supposition that these buildings vested in the .State and the person in possession held the same as settlee under the State.\n\nIn the present case on the date of the publication of the notification under section 3 the disputed properties were said to be in the possession of the Company as lessee and the petitioner No. 1 had no right, title or interest therein as he had transferred his lessor's reversion to trustees by a deed of settlement.\n\nWe may assume, therefore, that on the date of publication of the notification tl1e disputed properties were not used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1.\n\nIt becomes, therefore, necessary to interpret the word \"used\" occurring in section 4(a). It is to be noticed that this clause of section 4 does not expressly state that a building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent must be so used at the date of the publication of the notification. In this clause the words \"used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate\" must be read in the light of the provisions of section 4(h) where similar words are employed. Under section 4(h) the Collector has the power to make inquiries in respect of any transfer of any kind of interest in any building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate, if the transfer had been made at any time after the first day of January,\n\n1946. If on due inquiry the Collector is satisfied that such transfer was made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act or causing loss to the State or obtaining higher compensation, then the Collector may, after giving notice to the parties concerned and hearing them and with the previous sanction of the State Government, annul the transfer and dissess the person claiming under it. These prov1s1ons clearly indicate that if any building was used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent and such building had been transferred after the first day of January, 1946, the transfer could be annulled if the circumstances mentioned in section 4(h) had been established. That is to say, under these provisions the use to which the building was put previous to its transfer after the first day of January, 1946 and not thereafter was what the Collector was concerned with and not to what use it had been put after its transfer after the first day of January, 1946. To hold otherwise would be to make the provisions of section 4(h) meaningless. When a proprietor transfers any such building, it necessarily follows that the building thereafter was not .used by him as office or cutcherv for the collection of rent of his estate. If the transfr was made before the first day of January, 1946 the provisions of section 4(h) would not apply and such a transfer would not be liable to be annulled and the building so transferred would not vest in the State on the date of the publication of the notification covering the estate on which such building stands. If, on the other hand, this transfer was made after the first day of January, 1946, a building comprised in a notified estate, which was used immediately previous to the date of the transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate the transfer would be liable to be annulled under section 4(h) and it would vest absolutely in the State on the publication of the notification and the provisions of section 4(a) must be read accordingly.\n\nIt would be unreasonable to construe the provisions of section 4(a) in the way suggested by Mr. Chatterjee. The scheme of the Act has to be borne in mind and the provisions of sections 4(a) and 4(h) have to be read together. The petitioners had not asserted in their petition that the disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1 before the first of January, 1946 or before the lease in favour of the Company.\n\nOn behalf\n\nRqja Bahadur\n\nKamaksh\"a Narain Singh\n\n; and others\n\nThe Collector and Depu{Y Commissioner of Hazaribagh and others\n\nImam].\n\nRaja Bafiadur\n\nKamaks4Ja Narain Sing!i\n\nand otitrs\n\nv The r;,., fleetor arid Deputy CJmmissioatr of Hazaribagll and :)t.1.ers '-- Imam].\n\nof the State, on affidavit, it has been stated that the disputed properties were all along used as cutchcry before the creation of .the lease and that they were not being used in connection with any mining operation. In our opinion, if as a re.suit of the inquiry under section 4(h) the transfer of the disputed properties by the petitioner No. 1 is annulled the disputed properties must be regarded as having vested in the State, because they were used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent previous to the transfers made by the petitioner 1'1o. 1.\n\nIt was next contended that section 4(h) is ultra vires the Constitution, because it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitio11ers to realize rent trom the Company, as the transfer in its favour was imperilled by the notice issued to it under section. 4(h).\n\nNo appeal or review was provided in the Act against the order of the Collector issuing notice or an order of annulment made by him. The Collector was left with absolute power to annul a transfer and to dispossess a person in possession thereunder.\n\nSection 4(h), however, does direct' the Collector to give reason.able notice to the parties concerned and to hear them. Such annulment or dispossession which he may order, must be with the previous sanction of the State Governrrient and he is compelled to do so on terms which may appear to him fair and equitable.\n\nThe power is, therefore, not quite so absolute or arbitrary as suggested.\n\nAssuming, however, that the Collector has very wide powers, it is to• be remembered that section 4(h) is a part of the law of acquisition of estates as enacted by the Act and is an integral part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate takes place. The Act is a valid lavr of acquisition and its v1hole purpose may be defeated unless there was some such provision as\n\ncontaind in section 4(h). The Act being a law for acquisition of estate the question of it or section 4(h) of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioners does not arise.\n\nIn any c\\e11t the Act including sect!on 4(h) is . protectd by ; irticle 31-A of the Constitution.\n\nThe petition is accordingly dismissed with cqsts.", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA BAHADUR KAMAKSHYA NARAIN\n\nSINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA BAHADUR KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COLLECTOR AND DEPUTY COMMIS-\n\nSIONER OF HAZARIBAGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COLLECTOR AND DEPUTY COMMIS SIONER OF HAZARIBAGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 169, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 195, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 225, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 254, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 257, "end_char": 285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihor Act XXX of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 287, "end_char": 308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3(1), 4(a), 4(h), 5, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 311, "end_char": 337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihor Act XXX of 1950", "statute": "Bihor Act XXX of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 524, "end_char": 531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihor Act XXX of 1950", "statute": "Bihor Act XXX of 1950"}}, {"text": "S. 4(h )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 613, "end_char": 621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihor Act XXX of 1950", "statute": "Bihor Act XXX of 1950"}}, {"text": "29th of December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 652, "end_char": 674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th of December, 1947, petitioner No."}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 979, "end_char": 1007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1009, "end_char": 1030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th of September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950) came into force on the 25th of September, 1950, and on the 3rd of November, 1951, the State of Bihar issued a notification under s. 3( I) of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No."}}, {"text": "3rd of November, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1091, "end_char": 1112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950) came into force on the 25th of September, 1950, and on the 3rd of November, 1951, the State of Bihar issued a notification under s. 3( I) of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No."}}, {"text": "s. 3( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950", "statute": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1288, "end_char": 1295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950", "statute": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950"}}, {"text": "4th of March, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1351, "end_char": 1369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notice under s. 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to C and on the 4th of March, 1954, the State GoYCrrunent issued a notification under s. 3(1) purporting to vest in the State the properties in question."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1421, "end_char": 1428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950", "statute": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1716, "end_char": 1720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950", "statute": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950", "statute": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2339, "end_char": 2343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2736, "end_char": 2743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2869, "end_char": 2873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 5 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2881, "end_char": 2892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4(a) and 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3124, "end_char": 3141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3172, "end_char": 3179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3728, "end_char": 3735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3849, "end_char": 3856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3923, "end_char": 3930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4003, "end_char": 4010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4172, "end_char": 4179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4314, "end_char": 4321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4345, "end_char": 4352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4436, "end_char": 4446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4454, "end_char": 4475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Vir Sen Sawhney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4539, "end_char": 4554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4559, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, (Vir Sen Sawhney and Ganpat Rai, with him), for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, (Bajrang Sahai and S.\n\nVerma, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bajrang Sahai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4623, "end_char": 4636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, (Bajrang Sahai and S.\n\nVerma, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nVerma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4641, "end_char": 4650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, (Bajrang Sahai and S.\n\nVerma, with him), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deJ.ivered by\n\nIMAM J.-The pet1t1oners have .filed this application under article 32 of the Constitution claiming that the buildings and lands as set out in the Schedule annexed to the petition and marked \"A\" . ("}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4809, "end_char": 4819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Collector and Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5120, "end_char": 5167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter referred to as the disputed properties) did not vest in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the\n\nRaja Bahadur\n\nKamalc.rhya Narain Singh\n\nand others~\n\nThe Collector and Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh and ot/ters\n\nRaja Bahat!ur\n\nKamakshya Narain Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe Collector and Depu'.", "canonical_name": "Collector and Depu'.'Ji Commissioner 1f Hazaribaglt"}}, {"text": "Kamakshya Narain Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5196, "end_char": 5218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter referred to as the disputed properties) did not vest in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the\n\nRaja Bahadur\n\nKamalc.rhya Narain Singh\n\nand others~\n\nThe Collector and Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh and ot/ters\n\nRaja Bahat!ur\n\nKamakshya Narain Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe Collector and Depu'."}}, {"text": "Collector and Depu'.'Ji Commissioner 1f Hazaribaglt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5236, "end_char": 5287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter referred to as the disputed properties) did not vest in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the\n\nRaja Bahadur\n\nKamalc.rhya Narain Singh\n\nand others~\n\nThe Collector and Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh and ot/ters\n\nRaja Bahat!ur\n\nKamakshya Narain Singh\n\nand others\n\nThe Collector and Depu'.", "canonical_name": "Collector and Depu'.'Ji Commissioner 1f Hazaribaglt"}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5309, "end_char": 5337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mineral Deveiopment Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5651, "end_char": 5675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 as owner leased out the disputed properties to a Company known as Mineral Deveiopment Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company)."}}, {"text": "7th of April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th of April, 1949 petitioner No."}}, {"text": "25th of September,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act came into force on the 25th of September,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6204, "end_char": 6216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "26th of October, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6372, "end_char": 6393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th of October, 1953 a notice under section 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to the Company, and on the 4th of March, 1954 the State Government issued a notification under section 3(1) of the Act purporting to vest in the State the propc:ties covered by the above-mentioned deed of settlement and anothe~ deed of settlement with which we are not concerned."}}, {"text": "section 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6805, "end_char": 6819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 of 1951 aga; nst the State of Bihar in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh basing its claim on a mining lease executed by petitioner No."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6827, "end_char": 6869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 of 1951 aga; nst the State of Bihar in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh basing its claim on a mining lease executed by petitioner No."}}, {"text": "25-10-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7298, "end_char": 7308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in his individual capacity was made a party challenging the legality of the issue of notice dated 25-10-1953 under section 4 (h) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7315, "end_char": 7324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11th of November, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7348, "end_char": 7370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th of November, 1954 the State of Bihar filed title suit No."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7803, "end_char": 7812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7848, "end_char": 7860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7890, "end_char": 7900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Chatterjee the disputed properties did not vest in the State, whatever else may have."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8370, "end_char": 8379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8439, "end_char": 8451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8744, "end_char": 8753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8760, "end_char": 8765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sinha on behalf of the State of Bihar, on."}}, {"text": "sections 4, 5 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8868, "end_char": 8887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9110, "end_char": 9119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9290, "end_char": 9299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9334, "end_char": 9343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 4, 5 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9486, "end_char": 9505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9617, "end_char": 9629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Bahadur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9782, "end_char": 9794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Bahadur\n\nK amllkshya }{ arain Sinth\n\nand others\n\nT/1' Ccl11etor and Inpuiy Ccm>nissioner of Hari\n\nl11igh and others\n\nImam].", "canonical_name": "Raja Bafiadur"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10058, "end_char": 10067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10076, "end_char": 10092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10487, "end_char": 10496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11024, "end_char": 11036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11078, "end_char": 11087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11414, "end_char": 11426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11467, "end_char": 11479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "first day of January,\n\n1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11725, "end_char": 11752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 4(h) the Collector has the power to make inquiries in respect of any transfer of any kind of interest in any building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate, if the transfer had been made at any time after the first day of January,\n\n1946."}}, {"text": "section 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12413, "end_char": 12425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12794, "end_char": 12806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "first day of January, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13039, "end_char": 13065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the transfr was made before the first day of January, 1946 the provisions of section 4(h) would not apply and such a transfer would not be liable to be annulled and the building so transferred would not vest in the State on the date of the publication of the notification covering the estate on which 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{"document_id": "1955_2_995_1006_EN", "year": 1955, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nCORPORATION OF CALCUTT A\n\nfl.\n\nMULCHAND AGARWALLA.\n\n[VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM JJ.]\n\nCalcutta Mtmicipal Act, 1923, (Bengal Act III of 1923), ss. 363, 488 and Rule 62 of Schedule XVII-Prior proceedings taken by Corporation of Ca; cutta unda s. 488 read with Rule 62 of Schedule XVII -Whethe1 a bar to the subsequent proceedings under s. 363 of the Act -Inconvenience to n.::ighbours-Whethcr relevant for making an order for demolition under s. 363 of the /lct-Proceedmgr on the same facts competent to be taken under two different sections providing different penalties-Whether distinct proceeaings-Word \"may\" in s. 363 of the Act, whether means \"shall\" -Discretion vested in the Magistrate under s. 363-0rder passed by an authority er.trusted with discretion to pass such order-When liable to be interfered with by the appellate Court.\n\nThe Corporation of Calcutta is not precluded from taking\n\nprocedings under s. 363 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 by reason of its having taken proceedings prior thereto under s. 488 cf the Act read with Rule 62 of Schedule XVII.\n\nThe question of inconvenience to neighbours is not relevant for the purpose of deciding whether an order for demolition should he made under s. 363 of the Act. \\Vhen the Legislature provides th:it on the same facts proceedings could be t:iken under two different sections ahd the penalties provided in those sections are not the same, it obviously intends to treat them as distinct, and, therefore, where no question under s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure arises, proceedings taken under one section cannot be treated as falling within the other.\n\nThe word \"may\" in s. 363 of the Act does not mean \"shall\" and the Magistrate has under that section discretion whether he should pass an order for demolition or not.\n\nIt is a well-settled principle that when the legislature entrusts to an authority the power to pass an order in its discretiq, n an order passed by that authority in exercise of that discretion is/ in general, not liable to be interfered with by an appellate court, unless it can\n\nbe shown to have been based on some mistake of facts or misapprehension of the principles applicable thereto.\n\nIn the present case, however, the orders of the courts below were based on mistakes and misdirections and therefore could Pot h~ supported.\n\nBut the Supreme Court did not think this to be a fit case for an order for the demolition of the buildings in view of certain special circumstances, viz., (I) though s. 363(2), which directs that no appli-\n\nNoutmber 17.\n\nCorp\"alionfo\n\nCalcutta\n\nMule hand Agarwalla\n\ncation for demolition shall be instituted after the lapse of five ycan from the date of the work, did not, in terms, apply as the proceedings had been started in time, it was nearly five years since the building had been completed and the intere\"s of the public did not call for its demolition, and (2) the appeal came on a certificate granted under art. 134(J)(c) with a view to obtaining the decision of the Supreme Court on certain questions of importance.\n\nAbdul Samad v. Corporation of Calcutta ([1905] 1.L.R. 33 Cal. 287), referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1954.\n\nAppeal under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constiru.. tion of India from the Judgment and order dated the 19th January 1954 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 865 of 1953 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 29th April 1953 of the Court of Third Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta in Case No. 108-A of 1951.\n\nN. C. Chatter#, (S. K. Bose and Sukumar Ghose, with him) for the appellant.\n\nG. P. Kar, (A. K. Mukherjee and D. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the respondent. 1955.\n\nNovember 17.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.--This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta affirming the order of the Municipal Magistrate, whereby he dismissed an application filed by the appellant under section 363 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for demolition of certain constructions on the ground that they had been erected without the previous permission of the authorities and in contravention of the prescriptions laid down in the building rules.\n\nThe respondent is the owner of house No. 36, Armenian Street, Calcutta. On 28-10-1950 the Building Inspector of the Corporation discovered that some new masonry structures were being constructed on the fifth storey of that house. A notice under section 365 of the Act was immediately served on the respondent directing him to stop forthwith further constructions pending an application to the Magistrate under section 363 of the Act. What followed thereon is graphically described by the learned Chief Justice of the High Court in his order dated 9-4-1954 granting leave to appeal to this Court, as a hide-and-seek game. On receipt of the notice, the respondent stopped the work for a few days, and thereby lulled the Building Inspector into the belief that no further cbnstructions would be made. When the Inspector ceased to inspect the premises daily, the respondent resumed the work, and on 7-11-1950 when the Inspector came again on the scene, he found that the construction was being proceeded with.\n\nA police constable was then posted for watch under section 365\n\n(3) of the Act, and he continued there till 10-11-1950, on which date the respondent wrote to the Corporation that he would not proceed further with the construction.\n\nThe police watch was thereupon withdrawn on the respondent paying Rs. 40 being the charges payable therefor. On 7-12-1950 the Inspector again inspected the premises, and found that the construction was being proceeded with, and had a constable posted again for watch.\n\nOn 13-12-1950 the appellant. lodged a complaint before the Magistrate under section 488 read with Rule 62 of Schedule XVII charging the respondent with constructing two rooms in the fifth storey without obtaining permission.\n\nSection 488(1) (a) enacts that whoever commits any offence by .contravening any provisions of any of the sections or rules of the Act mentioned in the first column of the table annexed thereto, shall be punished with fine as specified in the said table. Rule 62 provides that the erection of a new building shall not be commenced unless and until the Corporation have granted written permission for the execution of the same.\n\nThe complaint was heard on 11-4-1951.\n\nThe respondent pleaded guilty, and was fined Rs. 200.\n\nWhile the proceedings under section 488 were pending before the Magistrate, the Corporation would appear to have examined the nature of the constructions put up by the respondent, and found that they contravened Rules 3, 14, 25 and 32 of Schedule XVII,\n\nCalcutta\n\nMulchand AgarwaUa\n\nV enka14ram/J\n\nAJyar ].\n\nCorporation:ttf\n\nCalcutta\n\nMutchand <'1%arwalla .-- v enkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand decided to take action under section 363. They accordingly issued a notice to the respondent to show cause why action should not be taken under that section. The respondent appeared by counsel on 13-2-1951, ar, d after hearing him, the appellant decided on 6-3-1951 to move the court for an order under section 363, and the petition out of which the present appeal arises, was actually filed on 4-4-1951.\n\nThere was delay in serving the respondent, and after he was actually served which was on 17-9-1951, the case underwent several adjournments, and finally on 29-4-1953 the Magistrate passed an order dismissing the petition. There was no dispute that the building rules had been contravened. The Magistrate, however. held that he had a discretion under section 363 whether he should direct demolition, and that this was not a fit case in which an order should be made for demolition, because the constructions being on the fifth storey could not obstruct light and air and thereby inconvenience the neighbours, and there was no complaint from the residents of the locality, and that as the respondent had already been fined in proceedings under section 488, an order for demolition would be to penalise him twice over for the same offence.\n\nAgainst this order, the appel!ant preferred a revision to the High Court of Calcutta. That was heard bv K. C. Chunder, J. He agreed with the Magistrate that ''nder sectior, 363 the court had a discretion whether it should order demolition or not, and that as the Corporation had taken proceedings under section 488 and was content to have a fine imposed on the respondent for breach of Rule 62, it would be unjust to permit it thereafter to start proceedings under section 363 for the further relief of demolition of the bu; Jclfog. He also commented on the undue delay on the part of the Corporation in taking out the application, and took into account the fact that no complaint had been received from the locality.\n\nIn the result, he dismissed the revision.\n\nThe appellant applied under article 134(1) ( c) for leave to appeal to this Court. Chakravarti, C. J. and\n\nS. R. Das Gupta, J. who heard this application, considered that two questions of general importance arose on which it was desirable to have the decision ot this Court, viz., (1) whether the Corporation was precluded from taking proceedings under section 363 of the Act by reason of its having taken proceedings prior thereto under section 488 of the Act read with Rule 62 of Schedule XVII, and (2) whether the qu:::stion of inconvenience to neighbours was relevant for the purpose of deciding whether an order for demolition should be made under section 363 of the Act. They accordingly granted leave under article 134 (l)(c), and that is how the appeal is now before us.\n\nThe first question that arises for our determination is whether the present proceedings under section 363 ar::: barred by reason of the application whith was hled under section 488. It is conceded that there is notnmg express in the statute enacting such a bar, but it is contended that it is to be implied from the proviso to section 363 that \"where the Corporation have instituted proceedings under section 493, no appiication shall be made under this section\". Admittedly, the appellant instituted no proceedings under section 493 ; but it is argued that proceedings under section 488 substantially fall within section 493, and that the proviso should therefore be held to be applicable. Under section 493, if the erection of any new building is commenced without obtaining the written permission of the Corporation, the owner of. the building shall be liable to a fine which may extend up to Rs. 500. Then, there is a proviso that where an application had been made under section 363, no proseeding shall be instituted under this section. This corresponds to the proviso to section 363set out above, and reading the two provisions, it is clear that the proceedings under the two sections are mutually exclmive. Now, the contention of the respondent is that a prosecution under section 488 for breach of rule 62 of Schedule XVII is, in essence, a p;-o<ecution under section 493( a), and that, therefore, the proviso to section 363 becomes applicable. We are\n\nCorporation of Calcutta v.\n\nMulchand Agarwal/a\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nCaltutta\n\nMulchand Agarwalla\n\nY enkataroma\n\n.dyyarj.\n\nunable to agree with this contention. When the Legislature provides that on the same facts proceedings could be taken under two different sections and the penalties provided in those sections are not the same, it obviously intends to treat them as distinct, and, therefore, where no question under section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure arises, proceedings taken under one section cannot be treated as falling within the other. The penalty prescribed in section 488 for breach of rule 62 of Schedule XVII is fine up to the limit of Rs. 200, whereas the penalty provided for the same offence under section 493(a) is fine which may extend to Rs. 500. It will not therefore be in consonance with the intention of the Legislature to hold that proceedings under section 488 are in substance the same as proceedings under section 493, so as to be subject to the disability enacted in the proviso to section 363. If the intention of the Legislature was that proceedings taken under section 488 read with rule 62 of Schedule XVII should bar proceedings under section 363, it could have said so expressly as it did with reference to proceedings taken under section 493. To accede to the contention of the respondent would be to read into section 363 limitations which are not to, be found there. We cannot accept such a construction.\n\nIt was next argued by learned counsel for the respondent that it was open to the Corporation to have asked for demolition of the building in the proceedings taken by it under section 488, and as it did not ask for it and was content with the imposition of fine, it was precluded from claiming that relief in the present proceedings. This argument is based on section 536, which is as follows :\n\n\"When under this Act or under any rule or bylaw made thereunder any person is liable, in respect of any unlawful work,- ( a) to pay a fine, and\n\n(b) to be required to demolish the work, a Magistrate may, in his discretion and subject to the provisions of sections 363, 364 and 493, direct the said person to pay the fine and also to demolish the work\".\n\nIn his order dated 9-4-1954, the learned Chief Justice expressed a doubt whether the Corporation could apply for a demolition order, when instituting an application under section 488 for breach of Rule 62 of\n\nSchedule XVII.\n\nWe are inclined to share this doubt.\n\nWhat Rule 62 prohibits is the erection of a building without permission, and under that Rule, the breach is complete when the erection has commenced, without reference to whether the construction is being carried on or completed. A question of demolition cannot therefore arise with reference to a breach of Rule 62. It can arise only when the construction of the building is carried on or completed otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the permission or in breach of any of the provisions of the Act or the rules.\n\nNow, in the table annexed to section 488, while a breach of Rule 62 of Schedule XVII is made punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 200, there is no similar provision with reference to breach of Rules 3, 14, 25 and 32 of that Schedule. But there is, instead. a provision that when a direction is asked for under section 363(1) for demolition, an order can be passed imposing fine which may extend to Rs. 250. Under that section, it should be noted, an application for an order for demolition can be made on three grounds, viz., (1) that the erection of building has been commenced without permission, (2) that it has been carried on or completed otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the permi; sion, or (3) that it has been carried on or completed in breach of the provisions contained in the Act or the rules. But there is this difference between an application based on ground No. 1 aforesaid and one founded on grounds Nos. 2 and 3, that while a question of demolition cannot arise with reference to the former when the charge is commencement or the construction without permissionand at that stage no question of demolition of a building necessarily arises, it does arise as regards the latter.\n\nTherefore, when an application is made under section 488, whether an order could be made under section _536 for demolitio'.1 will depend on the ground on which it is founded. And, where, as in the\n\nCa/&utta\n\nMale hand Agtzru1al/a\n\nV mkatara,,,.\n\n, V)'ar J.\n\n1955 <\n\nCorporatio1t of•\n\nCalcutta - v.\n\nMulchand Agarwalla\n\nV\"\"\"4taroma\n\nAyyar J.\n\npresent case, the application was based solely and exclusively on a. breach of Rule 62 of Schedule XVII, no order could have - been passed for demolition under section 536.\n\nIt is immaterial for the present purpose that. the building had . been completed when the order was passed on 11-4-1951 on the application under section 488, because the power to pass an order under •ection 536 would depend on what the charge as actually laid in the petition was and not on what it might have been.\n\nBut even if the Magistrate had the power under section 536 to order demolition of the building, .. we cannot hold that the appellant is precluded from asking for such an order under section 363 merely by reason of the fact that the Magistrate had failed to pass such an order, -or even that the Corporation . did not ask for it in the prior proceedings. -There is ' no question of the application of any principle . of -constructive res judicata, and there is nothing in the statute which bars the appellant from claiming relief under section 363. \\Ve cannot therefore uphold the contention that the appellant is precluded in any manner by the prior proceeding.s taken under section 488 from instituting the present petition under section 363.\n\nIn this view, the point for decision is whether the order passed by the Municipal Magistrate and affirmed by the learned Judge in revision is open to attack on the merits. The respondent contends that the Magistrate has under section 363 a discretion whether he should pass an order for demolition or not, and that this Court should not in appeal interfere \\vith the exercise of that discretion especially when it has been concurred in by the High Court. Now, the langua'ge of section 363 is that the Magistrate may pass an order for demolition of the building, and though the word 'may' mig!it in some contexts be constructed as meaning 'shall', that is not the sense in which it is used in section 363. We agree with the resp_ondent that section 363 does not require that when a building is shown to have been erected without permission or completed otherwise than in ac- . cordance with the terms of the permission or in breach\n\nof the building rules, an order for its demolition should be made as a matter of course. In our opinion, it does give the Magistrate a discretion whether he should or should not pass such an order. That was the construction put in Abdul Samad v. Corporation of Calcutta( 1 ) on section 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, (Bengal Act III of 1899) which com\".sponds to section 363 of the present Act on language which is, so far as the present matter is concerned, the same.\n\nIn re-enacting the present section in the same terms as section 449 of Bengal Act III of 1899, it must_ be\n\ntaken that the legislature has accepted the interpretation put on them in Abdul Samad v. Corporation of Ca!cutta(\n\n1 ) as correctly representing its intention.\n\nIt >hould accordingly be held that the word 'may' in sectio11 363 does not mean \"shall'', and that the Magisstrate has under that section a discretion whether he should pass an order for demolition or not.\n\nThen the question is whether thr exercise of that discretion by the courts below is open to review by this Court. It is a well-settled principle that when the legislature entrusts to an authority the power to pass an order in its discretion, an order passed by that authority in exercise of that discretion is, in general, not liable to be interfered with by an appellate court, unless it can be shown to have been based on some mistake of fact or misapprehension of the principles applicable thereto.\n\nThe appellant contends that the orders under appeal are based on mistakes and misapprehepsions, and are therefore liable to b('. re:ersed, and that contention must now be examined.\n\nThe grounds on which the orders of the courts below are based -are (1) that there has been considerable delay on the part of the appellant in moving in the matter, (2) that as in the proceedings taken under section 488 the respondent has been fined, an order for demolition was not called for, anci (3) that the breach of the building rules has not resu:ted in any inconvenience to the public, nor has there been ar.y complaint from the residents of the locality about this. The materials placed before us do not show (I) [1905] I. L.R. 33 Cal. 287. g-85 S. C. India/59\n\nCalcutta\n\nMulchanJ Agarwalla\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nCorpMatioa of\n\nCalcutta\n\nMulch and Agarwalla\n\nV tnkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nthat there has been any great delay on the part of the appellant. The learned Judge has stated that the present proceedings for demolition were taken subsequent to the imposition of fine on 11-4-1951 in the proceedings under section 488.\n\nThis is a mistake.\n\nThe proceedings under section 363 had been commtnced as early as February 1951 when notice was issued to the , respondent under the provisions of that section, and the petition was actually filed in court on 4-4-1951. It is true that the proceedings were pending for nearly two years before the Magistrate, but as observed by the learned Chief Justice, far from the Corporation being responsible for it, it appears to have been the victim of delay on the part of the respondent.\n\nBoth the courts below have main! y based their order on the fact that the Corporation having taken proceedings under section 488 and a fine having been imposed on the respondent, it would be unjust to impose a further penalty for the same offence by way of demolition. The assumption on which this reasoning rests is that the charge on which the present proceedings have been taken is the same as that on which the petition under section 488 was laid.\n\nBut, as already pointed out, that is not correct, The proceedings under section 488 were taken for erecting a building without permission, whereas the present proceedings are taken substantially for breaches of the building rules, which are quite independent of the charge under Rule 62, and the respondent is therefore not punished twice over for the same default.\n\nThe learned Judge observes that this was not a fit case for exercising the discretion in favour of the appellant, becaus~ in the prior proceedings under section 488, it did not ask for an order for demolition, nor was such an order made by the Magistrate. That is obviously with refernece to section 536 which we have held to be inapplicable to the present case. Moreover, when that section enacts that the Magistrate could both impose a fine and order demolition of the building, that clearly indicates that the fact that a fine has been imposed should not by itself and without more, be taken as sufficient ground for refusing demolition.\n\nThe courts below were also influenced by the fact that there was no complaint from the neighbours about the erection of the building. It must be remembered that the building rules are en;1cted generally for the benefit of the public, and where those rules have been violated and proceedings are taken for an order for demolition o£ the building under section 363, what has to be decided is whether the breaches are of a formal or trivial character, in which case the imposition of a fine might meet the requirements of the case, or whether they are serious and likely to affect adversely the interests of the public, in which case it would be proper to pass an order for demolition.\n\nWhether there has been a complaint from the public • would not as such be material for deciding the question, though if there was one, it would be a piece of evidence in deciding whether the interests of the public have suffered by reason of the breaches.\n\nThe pcsition, therefore, is that the orders of the courts below are based on mistakes and misdirections, and cannot be supported. The conduct of the respondent in adopting a hide-and-seek attitude in completing the construrions in deliberate defiance of the law calls for severe action. It would be most unfortunate, and the interests of the public will greatly suffer, if the notion were to be encouraged that a person might with impunity break the building rules and put up a construction and get away with it t1Il payment of fine.\n\nAll this would be good justificatiGu for making an order for demolition. But then, it is now nearly five years since the building was completed, and though section 363(2) which directs that no application for demolition shall be instituted after a lapse of. five years from the date of the work does not, in terms, apply as the proceedings have been started in time, we do not feel that after the laose of all this time, an order for demolition is called • for in the interests of the public. We also take into account the bet that the orders in question would not have come before us in the normal course by way of appeal,\n\nCorporatio11 of\n\nCalcutta\n\nMule hand Agarwal/a\n\nY mkatarama\n\nAyyar].\n\nCorPcration of\n\nCalcutta\n\nMule hand Agarwal/a\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nNovember 23.\n\nwere it not that the appellant desired that the decision of this Court should be obtained on certain questions of importance, and that purpose has been achieved. On a consideration of all the circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case in which we should pass an order for demolition. We should, however, add that we find no justification for the strictures passed on the appellant by the court below.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nIN THE MATTER OF\n\nD AN ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT. •\n\n[B. K. MuKHERJEA, C. J., S. R. DAs and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.)\n\nBar Councils Act-Misconduct in capacity other than professional -Jurisdiction of Court-Bar Councils Act (XXXVIII of 1926), s. JO-Supreme Court Rules, Order IV, Rule 30.\n\nSection 10 of the Bar Councils Act confers on the Court juris~ diction to take disciplinary_ action against an Advocate not merely for professional misconduct but any other misconduct committed in any other capacity as well and leaves it to the Court's discretion to t2ke such action as it thinks fit in any suitable case.\n\n< The Advocate-General of Bombay v. Three Advocates ([1934] I.LR. 59 Born. 57), In the matter of an Advocate ([1936] I.L.R. 63 Cal. 867) and In re a Pleader (I.L.R. [1943] Mad. 595), referred to.\n\nIn re Thomas fames Wallace ([1866] L.R. I P.C. 283), and In re an Advocate of Benares (A.LR. [1932] All. 492), held inapplicable.\n\nConsequently, in a case where an Advocate figuring as an accused in a case under the Bombay Prohibiti9n Act was persistently rud!! to and contemptuous of the trial Magistrate and did all in his po\\ver to hold up the trial and bring the administration of justice into contempt, he ~'<ls guilty of misconduct and as such was liable to be suspended from practice.\n\nD in person\n\nC. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, as amicus curiae.", "total_entities": 144, "entities": [{"text": "MULCHAND AGARWALLA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MULCHAND AGARWALLA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Calcutta Mtmicipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bengal Act III of 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 363, 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Act III of 1923", "statute": "Bengal Act III of 1923"}}, {"text": "Schedule XVII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211, 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