2 s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 243

of nationalisation of text books. The learned counsel 1955 appearing in these cases have adopted in their entirety Rai Sahib Ram the arguments that have been advanced by Mr. Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur amt others in Petition No. 652 of 1954 and no fresh or additional v. argument has been put forward by any one of them. The SfrJJe of Punjab This beiqg the position the decision in Petition M11k;;;;;; a c..1.

No 652 of 1954 will govern these petitions also and they will stand dismissed but we would make no order as to costs.

SHIVA JUTE BALING LTD. v.

HINDLEY & CO. LTD.

[BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA C.J. and SUDHI

RANJAN DAS J.].

Appeal by Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution- Procedure to be followed on grant of such leave-Supreme Court Rules, rules 8, 9, 12 and 13 of Order Xlll--Circumstances warranting action against an Appellant for rescinding special leave--Civil Procedure Code, Order XLV, rule 8-"Admission" of appeal to Supreme Cowt-Applicability to appeals under article 136 of Constitution-Extent of Rule 9, Order XIII, of Supreme Court Rules- Rules and Practice of High Collrts-Formal motion in High Court for "admission" of appeal when special le1we was granted under article 136-Whether necessary--Calcutta High Court (Original Side) Rules, rule 9 of Chapter 32-Scope of.

By an order dated May 25, 1~54, the Supreme Court granted the petitioners in the case special leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court at Caleutta. In accordance wi:h the order, the pt'titioners furnished the security amounts directed to be deposited within the time specified in the order. The Registrar of the High Court did not iSS\le. any notice of admission of appeal to be served by the Appellant's Solicitor on the Respondents as envisaged in rule 9 of Order. XIII, S.C.R. Nor did the Appellant following the practice of the High Court, move that C.ourt for "admission" of the appeal until January U, 1955. The Respondents first mo\ed the High Co4rt complail).ing of dault on the part of the appellants in due prosecution of the appeal and latter moved the Supreme Court for action under rule 13 df Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules. The application in the High Court was therefore kept pending.

Held: Afer the grant of $pecial leave under article 136, the Registrar of the Supreme Court transmits, in accordance with the

Shiva Jafe Baling [Jti.

Hindle)' 11nd

Co.UJ.

provisions of rule 8 of Order Xlll of the Supreme CQurt Rules, a certified copy of the Supreme O>un's order to the Court or tribunal appealed from.

Rule 9 of Order XIIl of the Supreme Court Rules enjoins upon rhe Court or tribunal appealed from to act, in the absence of any special directions in the order, iu accordance with the provisions contained in Order XL V of the Civil Proa:dure Code, so far as 'they are applicable. Accordingly the Coun or Tribunal to which the order is transmitted receives deposits on account•of security for the Respondents' costs, printing costs, and any other deposits if so ordered hy the Supreme Coun, and sets about preparing the record of the appeal for transmission to the Supreme Court. Therefore, action under rule 13 of Order XIlI, S.C.R. for rescinding the order granting special leave cannot be initiated unless the Court or tribunal appealed from reports to the Supreme Court that the appellant has not been diligent in taking steps to enable that Court to carry out the directions, if any, contained in the order of the Supreme Court and to act in.accordance with the.provisions of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code so far. as applicable to appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution.

In view of rule 9 of Order XIIl of the Suercme Court Rules, the o.pplication of Order XLV of the Code of Civil Procedure to appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution is restricted. The. Court or tribunal appealed from, no doubt, bas to carry out the directions contained in the order granting special leave, . and to receive the security for the Respondents' costs and other necessary deposits, bui once the security is furnished and the other deposits are made, the formality of "admission" envisaged by rule 8 of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is nnnecessary, because in such cases the order granting special leave by itself operates as an admission of the appeal as soon as the conditions in the order relating to the furnishing of security or malcing of deposits are complied with. Appeals under Article 136 thus stand on a different foonng from appeals on grant of certificate by the High Court itself. In the latter case, the

Hih Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter until it admits the appeal under rule 8 of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code.

Ruic 9 of ihe Chapter 32 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court envisages "admission" of appeals to the Supreme Court whether by an older of the Supreme Court or under Order XL V of the Civil Procedure Code. And when an appeal arising from an order made by the Supreme c.oart under Article 136 of the Constitution, has been. so "admitted", the said rule enjoins upon the Rcgisttar to issue notice 11f such admission for service by the appel- !ant on the Respondents. In cases where special leave has been granted by the Supreme Coun, it is not necessary for the appellant to move the High Court appealed fiom for the formal admission of his appeal. As the order granting special leave itself lays down the conditions to be fulfilled by the appellants, the admission will be regarded as final only when the directions are complied with and n,

soon as this is Jone it would be the duty of the Registrar to issue a notice of rhe admission of the appeal for service upon the respondents.

In default of the issue of such notice, the appellant cannot be hdu responsible for !aches in the prosecution of his appeal with

regatu to the steps required to be taken after the admission of his ppeal.

CIVIL APPELLATF JURISDICTION: In the matter of !Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 230 of 1953.

Rajinder Narain for the Respondents.

N. C. Chatterjee (Sukumar Ghose with him) for the Appellants.

1955. April 5. The Order of the Court was delivered by

MUKHERJEA C. J.-This is an application by the respondents in Special Leave Petition No. 230 of 1953, praying for . summons to the appellants to show

caue why the special leave obtained by the latte1 should not be rescinded in accordance with the provision of Order XTTJ, rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules.

The appeal is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High C::ourt affirming, on appeal, a decision of a single Judge sitting on the Original Side of that Court. The appellants, having been refused certificate by the High Court, presented before us an application under article 136 of the Ccmstitution and special leave to appeal was granted to them by an order of this Court dated the 25th Mav 1954. By that order the appellants were required to furnish security for costs amounting to Rs. 2,500 within six weeks and the enforcement of the award. which was the subject-matter of the appeal, was stayed on condition that the appellants deposited in Court a sum of Rs. 28,000 within f.our weeks from the date of the order. On the 15th of June 1954 the Registrar of this Court transmitted to the OriJ?inal Side of the Calcutta High Court certified copies of the order granting soecial leave and also of the pecial leave netition with a request that these documents miglit he included in the orinted records of the case. It is nol disnutcrl that in -pursuance of the directions riven

J~-.'.l srr 1ND'g2

]95>

Shiva Jute BoUnK:Ltd.

Hindley and Co. Ltd.

195:J

Shiva Jute Bali11g Ltd,

Hi11dt, z: mid

Co. td.

Mukherjta C. J.

by this Court the appellants did deposit the amount required as security for costs and also the sum of Rs. ;28,000 within the time mentioned in the order. On the 29th November I 954 the respondents' Solicitors in Calcutta wrote a letter to the Registrar of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court complaining of delay on the part of the appellants in prosecuting the appeal. It was stated inter alia that although , six months had elapsed since special leave was granted by this Court, the respondents were not served with notice of the admission of the appeal and no steps were taken by the appellants to get the records printed or transmitted to this Court. In reply to this letter the Registrar informed the respondents' Solicitors that according to the practice of the Calcutta High Court it was incumbent on the appellants to make a formal application to the Appellate Bench of the Court for declaring the appeal finally admitted, and this was to be done on notice to the other parties under Order XL V, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code and on filing in Court a copy of the order of the Supreme Court granting special leave to appeal as well as the application upon which such order was made. Unless and until an order was made by the High Court declaring the appeal to be admitted. no action could be taken by the office in the matter.

Thereupon on the I Ith of January I 955 an application was filed by the appellants praying that leave might be given to them to file the certified copy of the special leave petition and also that of the order passed upon it and that the appeal might be finally admitted. This application came up for hearing bef0re the learned Chief Justice and Lahiri, J. of the Calcutta High Court and on the 20th of January 1955 the learned Judges made the following order: . "In this matter special _leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was )l:ranted by that Court on the 25th May 1954. On the 21st June following, the Appellant furnished the necessary security. It was then the dutv of the Appellant to take the nece3sary steos

for the final admission of the aooeal in order that the nrcparation of the Paper Book might thereafter be

undertaken. Under the Rules and practice of this Cou!'t the step to be taken is that the Appellant to the Supreme Court should make an application for leave to file the certified copy of the petition for Special Leave and also a certified copy of the order granting Special Leave which have been filed along with the present application .................... .

When the matter came up for hearing on the last occasion we enquired whether the Appellants had any explanation to give for the delay which had occurred. It was said that the certified copy of the application for Special Leave had been obtained only recently. It was however not explained why when an application for a certified copy of the order was made a similar application for a certified copy of the petition also could not be made.

In all the circumstances we consider it right that the disposal of the present application should stand over for a month in ord.er that the respondents may take such steps as they desire to take before the Supreme Court".

The above facts and order of the High Court were communicated to the Registrar of this Court by Shri

Rajinder Narain, Advocate for the respondents, by his letters dated the 17th and 31st of January 1955 and on the basis of the facts stated above, he requested that action should be initiated by the Registrar against the appellants for non-prosecution of the appeal. The Registrar told the learned Advocate that he had not received any report from the High Court regarding any ]aches on the part of the appellants and without any such report, it was not possible for him to take any action in the matter. The Advocate himself, it was said, was quite at liberty to make a formal application to the Court in such way as he considered proper. The views thus expressed by the Registrar of this Court were communicated by him to the Registrar of the High Court, Originai Side, Calcutta. On the 4th March 1955 Shri Rajinder Narain filed a formal petition addressed to the Registr:; r allc~!ing inordinate delay on the part of the appclLrnts in filing in the High Court certified copies of

Shiva Jllle Bal;,,, Lid.

Hindky u11d Co. l.td.

Nukherjea C. J.

Shi-va Jute lln/i#J! Ltd.

"· Hindley aud

Co. Ltd.

Muk!terjea C.J;

lbc Special Leave petition and the order made by this <'iwrt thereupon and praying that summons might be issued to the appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for non-prosecution. Before the Registrar could take any further steps in the matter, the application of the appellants for final admission of the appeal made in the High Court came up for further consideration before the Appellate Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Lahiri and on the 7th March, l 955 the learned Judges made an order directing, for the reasons given therein, adjournment of the application for admission of the :appeal before them, sine die pending orders which this Court might pass on the application of the respondents. The application of the respondents which purports to have been made under Order XTIJ. rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules was referred by the Registrar for orders to the Court and it has now come up for hearing before us.

Shri Rajinder Narain appearing in support of the petition has contcndcd before us that the appellants wert; guilty of serious ]aches inas111ud1 as they did nol file in' the High Court, till 8 months after the special leave was granted, 1.:opics of the special leave petition as well as of the order passed Ul'Oll it; nor did they make an application to the Appellate flcnch for admission of the appeal without which no further step& could be taken in the matter of printing and transmission of the record. As the appellants could not give any satisfactory explanation for this inordinate delay on their part, the special leave, it is arguecl, should be rescinded. Mr. Chatterjee, who appeared for the appellants, has contended on the other hand that in a case like the one before us where the appeal has come up to this Court by special leave and not by a certificate granted by the High Court. there was no duty cast upon the appellants to make a formal application in the High Court for final admission of the appeal or to file therein certified copies of the special leave petition and the o.-der made thereupon.

His argument is that under Order XXXH. n•le 9 of the Ori.l!inal Side Rules of the (\1k11tt;1 lligh Court. ;1

Supreme Court appeal must be deemed to have been 1955 admitted by the very order of this Court granting Shiva Jute special leave and as soon s the appellants have car- Dalii~ Ltd. ried out the directions of the Supreme Court regarding Hindley and furnishing of security or making of other deposits as co. Ltd. the case may be, it is incumbent upon the Registrar lluklleriea c. 1. to issue a notice of the admission of the appeal for service upon the respondents. Such notice indeed has got to be served by the appellants' attorney; but as no notice was at all issued by the Registrar in the present case as is contemplated by rule 9 of Order XXXII of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, no blame could attach to the appellants for not taking further steps in the matter. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee appears to u, s to be wellfounded and as it seems to us that doubts have arisen at times regarding the precise procedure to be followed in cases where an appeal comes to this Court by special leave granted under article 136 of' the Constitution, it is necessary to examine the provisions bearing upon it as arc contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court or of the High Court concerned read along with the relevant provisions of the Ci"Vlil Pro- :cedurc Code.

Ordinarily when a High Court grants a certificate giving leave to a party to appeal to this Court, it is that Court which retains full control and juris<liction over the subsequent proceedings relating to the prosecution of the appeal till the appeal is finally admitted.

It is for the High Court to see that its directions are carried out regarding the furnishing of security <1>r the making of deposit and when these conditions are ful- filled, it has then to declare the appeal finally admitted undet Order XLV, rule !S of the Civil Procedure Code.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court begins after the appeal is finally admitted. When however the appeal comes to this Court on the strength of a special leave granted by it, the position is different. In such cases the order of the Supreme Court granting special leave by itself operates as an admission of the appeal as soon as the conditions in the ordr relating to fur-

Shi11t1 Jute Buliug Ltd. v.

Hindley and co. ltd.

l\fukllcrjca C. J.~•

nishing of security or making of a deposit arc complied with. T'hat this is the true position will be clear from the procedurg1l provisions contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court as well as of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court.

Order XIII, rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules lays down:

"After the grant of special leave to appeal by the Court, the Registrar shall transmit a certified copy of the order to the court or tribunal appeaied from"'

Rule 9 then says: "On receipt of the said order, the court or tribunal appealed from shall, in the absence of any special directions in the order, act in accordance with the provisions contained in Order XL V of the Code, so far as applicable".

It is to be noted here that although this rule does refer tc the provisions of the Order XL V of the Civil Procedure Code, these provisions l(Lre to be followed only so far as they are applicable. lt is surely the duty of the High Court to sec that security is furnished or a deposit is made in accordance with the directions of the Supreme _Court and these directions are to be found in the order of the Supreme Court .which the Registrar is bound to transmit to the High Court under Order Xlll, rule 8 of our Rules. We do not think it is necessary for the appeliants to Ille afresh a copy of the Supreme Court order or the petition upon which it was made in order that they may form part of the record of the Supreme Court appeal.

They would come in the record as soon as they arc transmitted by the Registrar in accordance with the rnlc of our Court mentioned above and would have to he included in the Paper Book when it is printed, The Registrar of the High Court undoubtedly took

thes<: orders as part of the record without the appellants' filing them afresh, for he accepted the security and deposit of other moneys from the appellants on

th~ basis of these orders. If there was any failure on the part of the appellants to furnish the security or to mke the deposit in the way indicated in the order r.1' the Supreme Court. it would have been the dutv nf the Registrar of the High Comt to intim;, fe these

facts to the Registrar of the Supreme C0urt and the latter thereuoon could take steps for revoking the special leave-· as is contemplated by Order XllI, rule 12 of our Rules. ln our opinion, it is also not necessary for the apoellants to make a formal application for admission of the appeal in cases where spci.:i<tl leave has been granted by the Supreme Court;

and thi~ appears clear from the provisions of Order XXXIL rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calc1itta High Court which runs as follows:

"9. On the admission of an appeal to the Supreme Court whether by the order of this Court under Order XLV, rule 8 of the Code, or by an order of the Supreme Court giving the appellant Special Leave to Appeal, but subject in the latter case to the carrying out of the directions of the Supreme Court as to the security and the deposit of the amount reqt!ired by rule 5, notice of such admission shall be issued by the Registrar for service on the respondent on the record, whether he shalt have appeared on the hearing of the application for a certificate under Order XLV. rule 3 of the Code, or not. Such notice shall be , served by the attorney for the appellant and an A Jtidavit of due service thereof shall be filed by such attorney immediately after such service"_

Toe opening words of this rule plainly indicate that there could be admission of , appeal either by order of the High Court under Order XLV, tule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code or by the order of the Supreme Court 1tself giving special leave to appeal. (As the order :granting special leave itself lays down the conditions to he fulfilled bv the aooellar1ts. the admission will be

re_garded as finaJ only when the directions are complied \v1th and as soon as this is done it would be the dutv of the Registrar to issue a notice of the admission o-f the appeal for service upon he respondents).

This r:otice i~ to be served by the attorney for the appellants and an affidavit of due service shall be filed bv hini immediately after the service is effected. ·

Tn the present case the Registrar. Original Side of

th,~ Cakutta High Court should have issued a notice of

!955

Shim .lute

Baling Ltd. v.

Hindlev and

C11. itd.

¥, ukherjea C. .!.

Shh•a Jute Baling ltd.

Hindley and

Co. Lrd.

Mukherjea C. J.

April 15

the admission of the appeal to be served upon the respondents as soon as the security for costs and other deposits of money were made by the appellants. This was not done as the procedure to be followed was not correctly appreciated. It is true that the appellants remained idle for a considerable oeriod of time even after they furnished security ancf did not take any steps towards printing of the record.

But as there was an initial irregularity in the matter of issuing a notice under Order XXXIJ, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, we are unable to hold that the appellants were guilty of any !aches for which the special leave deserves to be rescinded. The resnlt is that the application of the respondents is dismissed. The Registrar, Original Side of the Calcutta High Court, will now issue a notice under Order XXXrI. rule 9 of the Original Side Rules and prompt steps should be taken by the appellants towards nrinting and transmission of the record to this Court.

We make no order as to costs of this application.

THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS v.

ASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD. [ s. R. DAS, BHAGWATI and SINHA JJ.]

The Trade Marks Act 1940 (Act V of 1940), s. 13--Meanin}? and scope of-Registration subiect to disclaimer-S. 76-Appeal to the High Court-When can the Hiflh Court interfere-Registrar, discretion of-Proper approach in such a case.

The exercise of the power conferred on the Registrar by s. 13 of the Trade Marks Act is alwavs a matter of discretion to be exercised, not capriciously or arbitrarilv but, according to sound principles laid down for the exercise of all judicial discretion.

The existence of the two jurisdictional facts referred to in clauses (a) and lb) of s. 13 and the finding that the trade mark contains pans or matters to the: exclusive use of which the proorietor is not entitled does not condude the matter and it must further be cmblished that some good !?l'OUnd exists for the imposition of n disclaimer and the tribunal will exercise the discretionary power for good cause shown.

Rai Sahib Ram

Pathak Jaw4ya Kapur

SHIVA JUTE BALING LTD

HINDLEY & CO. LTD

BIJAN KUMAR MuKHERJEA C.J.

RANJAN DAS J.

Article 136

article 136

Supreme Court Rules

article 136

May 25, 1~54,

Supreme Court

High Court at Caleutta

Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules

article 136

Shiva Jafe Baling

Order Xlll of the Supreme CQurt Rules

Order XIIl of the Supreme Court Rules

Supreme Coun

Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code

Article 136

Order XIIl of the Suercme Court Rules

Order XLV of the Code

Article 136

Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code

Article 136

Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code

Calcutta High Court

Supreme c.oart

Article 136

Rajinder Narain

N. C. Chatterjee

Sukumar Ghose

MUKHERJEA

Supreme Court Rules

Calcutta High C::ourt

article 136

25th Mav 1954

15th of June 1954

Shiva Jute Bali11g Ltd

29th November I 954

Calcutta

I Ith of January I 955

Lahiri

20th of January 1955

Rajinder Narain

4th March 1955

Muk!terjea

7th March, l 955

Chatterjee

Shiva Jute

Order XXXII of the Original Side Rules

article 136

Order XL V of the Code

Supreme _Court

Calc1itta High Court

REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS

ASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD

BHAGWATI

SINHA

Trade Marks Act 1940

s. 13

S. 76

s. 13

Trade Marks Act

s. 13


Shh•a Jute Baling ltd.

Hindley and

Co. Lrd.

Mukherjea C. J.

April 15

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1955]

the admission of the appeal to be served upon the respondents as soon as the security for costs and other deposits of money were made by the appellants. This was not done as the procedure to be followed was not correctly appreciated. It is true that the appellants remained idle for a considerable oeriod of time even after they furnished security ancf did not take any steps towards printing of the record.

But as there was an initial irregularity in the matter of issuing a notice under Order XXXIJ, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, we are unable to hold that the appellants were guilty of any !aches for which the special leave deserves to be rescinded. The resnlt is that the application of the respondents is dismissed. The Registrar, Original Side of the Calcutta High Court, will now issue a notice under Order XXXrI. rule 9 of the Original Side Rules and prompt steps should be taken by the appellants towards nrinting and transmission of the record to this Court.

We make no order as to costs of this application.

THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS v.

ASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD. [ s. R. DAS, BHAGWATI and SINHA JJ.]

The Trade Marks Act 1940 (Act V of 1940), s. 13--Meanin}? and scope of-Registration subiect to disclaimer-S. 76-Appeal to the High Court-When can the Hiflh Court interfere-Registrar, discretion of-Proper approach in such a case.

The exercise of the power conferred on the Registrar by s. 13 of the Trade Marks Act is alwavs a matter of discretion to be exercised, not capriciously or arbitrarilv but, according to sound principles laid down for the exercise of all judicial discretion.

The existence of the two jurisdictional facts referred to in clauses (a) and lb) of s. 13 and the finding that the trade mark contains pans or matters to the: exclusive use of which the proorietor is not entitled does not condude the matter and it must further be cmblished that some good !?l'OUnd exists for the imposition of n disclaimer and the tribunal will exercise the discretionary power for good cause shown.

Por the prorcr understanding and carrying into effect the provisions of s. 13 it is ncc.:ssary to bear in mind that rhe section confides a discretionuy power in the 'tribunal' which by vir•ue of s. 2( n) means the Registrar or, as the case may be, the Court before which the proceeding con<crned is pending.

Assuming but not deciding that in dealing with an appeal under s. 76 of the Act from the

dcisions of the Registrar under s. 13 of the Act the High Court is not fettered by reason of the Registrar, on the hearing before him, h:iving exercised his discretion and the High Court may exercise its own discretion, just as it could if rhe proceedings had been -taken initially before it, it must be remembered that it is the Registrar to whom in the first instance is committed the discretionary power.

If that au•hority has exercised his discretion in good faith and not in violation of any Jaw such exercise of discretion should not be interfered wi1h by the High Court merely on the ground that, in the opinion of th::: High Court it could have been exercised differently or even that the High Court would have exercised it differently, had the matter been brought before it in the first instance. The proper approach in such a cse is for the High Court to consider whether 'lie Regitrar llas really gonl' so irrong as to make it nrcessary to inter/ ere with his discretion.

The real purpose of requiring a disclaimer is to define the rights of the proprietor under registration so as to minimise, even if it •annot wholly eliminate, the possibility of extravagant and unauthorised claims being made on the score of registration of the trade marks.

The proviso to s. 13 preserves intact any right which the proprietor may otherwise under any other law have in relation to the mark or any part thereof.

The disclaimer is only for the purposes of the Act.

It does not affect the rights of the proprietor except

.uch as arise out of registration. That is to say, the special advantages which the Act gives to the proprietor by reason of the registration of his trade mark do not extend to the parts or matters which he disclaims.

Held, that considering all the circumstances of the present case

th~ Registrar had not gone so wrong as to make it necessary for the High Court to interfere with his discretion. If it were to be regarded as a mtter of exercise of discretion by the High Court as .to whether a ~1sclaimer should be iposed or not, it is quite clear that the attention of the High Court was no~ drawn to an important considei:ati.on, namely, the trong possibility of the respondent company ~!a1Ing a s.tnnory nght to the !ord 'Shree' by virtue of the re~1strat1on of its trade mark and sub1ect others to infringement act10ns onlv on the strenth of the registration and without proof of facts which it would have otherwise to establish in order to succeed in a passing off action or a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the High Court cannot be said to have properly exercised its discrt:'tion.

33-8 SCI/ND182

/955

Thr Registrar of Trade Marks V.

Ashok Chandra

Rakhlt Ltd.

1955 Sharp v. Wakefield (L.R. 1891 A.C. 173), Albert Baker Co.'s The R 11;, rrar of Application and Aerated Bread Company's Application In re (L.R.

Trad~ Marks [1908] 2 Ch. 86; 25 R.P.C. 513), In the matter of an application by v. the Diamond T. Motor Car Co, ([1921] 38 R.P.C. 373 at 379), Eno 'As/10k Chandra

v. Dunn (L.R. [1890] 15 A.C. 252; 7 R.P.C. 311), In the matter of Rakhit ltd., an application by F. Reddaway & Co. Ltd. ([1926] 44 R.P.C. 27), Smokeless Powder Co.'s Trade In re (LR. [1892] 1 Ch. 590; 9 R.P.C. 109), Greers Ltd. v. Pearman and Gorder Ltd. ([ 1922] 39 R.P.C. 4-09), Cadbury Brothers' Application In re (L.R. [1915] 2 Ch. 307; 32 R.P.C. 456), De Cordova and others v. Vick Chemical Coy. ([1951] 68 R.P.C. 103), Pinto v. Badman (8 R.P.C. 181 ), Apollinaris Company's Trade Marks (L.R. [1891] 2 Ch. 186) and Clement & Cie In re (L.R. [1900] I Ch. 114), referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.

I 16 of 1953.

Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd day of August 1951 of the High Court of Judica ture at Calcutta in Appeal No. 112 of 1950 arising out of the order dated the 24th day of March I 950 of the Registrar of Trade Marks in the matter of Registered Trade Mark No. 3815.

C: K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India K. S.

Shavakasha and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant.

S. C. Isaacs, (P. K. Ghosh, with him) for the respondents.

1955. April 15. The Judp; ment of the Court was delivered by

DAS J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order pronounced on the 23rd August 1951 by a Division Bench of the High Court at Calcuttil in Appeal No. 112 of 1950 reversin~ the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks dated the 24th March. 1950 whereby he had rectified the register by inserting a disclaimer of the word "Shree" forming part of the repondent company's registered trade mark No. 3815.

The material facts are as follows: Jn the year 1897 one Durga Charan Rakhit (since deceased) adnpted as his trade mark in respect of the <?hee produced and marketed by him a device which, with some :; light modification not materially altering its essential

features, was, on the application of the respondent company, registered as its trade mark No. 3815. rhat mark was and is a device consisting of the word "Shree" written on the top in bold Bengali character, having below it an ornamental figure with the word "Shree" written in the centre in small Deva :Nagri character. The word "TRADE" written in English in an inclined manner on the left hand side of the ornamental figure and the word "MARK" written in English in an inclined manner on the right hand side of the ornamental figure and the words "Shree Durga Charan Rakhit" written at the bottom in Bengali characters. The ornamental figure referred to above consists of a triangle over which is another inverted triangle and in the centre the word "Shree'', in small

Deva Nagri character as mentioned above, the whole of the saia ornamental figure being enclosed in a circle outside which are twelve ornamental petals. In the affidavit affirmed by Malli Nath Rakhit, a director of the respondent company and filed in these proceedings, this mark has throughout been referred to as "the said mark SREE". The said Durga Charan Rakhit having subsequently been adjudged insolvent all his properties including the goodwill of his ghee business and the said mark vested in the Official Assignee of Calcutta. On the 15th January 1915 the goodwill of the said business including the 'laid mark was sold by the Official Assignee by public auction and one Hem Dev Konch, a minor, was declared as the highest bidder and purchaser. A notice of the said sale wa~ advertised in the Calcutta Exchange Gazette on. the 25th January 1915 by an attorney acting on behalf of the purchaser. On the 27th January 1915 the said sale was confirmed by a Deed of assignment executed by the Official Assignee. On the 22nd August 1917 Haripriya Konch, the father and natural guardian of the minor purchaser, acting as such and on behalf of the minor. conveyed to one Ashok Chandra Rakhit, son of the said Ourga Charan Rakhit. the .goodwill of the business including the ri!!ht. title and interest in the said mark and the said

Ashok Chandra Rakhit carried on the said business

Tlzc Reginrar of

Trade Marks v.

As/wk Chandra

Rak/1it Ltd.

DasJ.

1955 and marketed ghee under the said mark. On the J 5th

J"he Registrur ef September 1926 the said Ashok Chandra Rakhit Trade Marks caused the fact of his ownership of the said mark to A1hok "c1ia11dra be advertised in the Calcutta Exchange Gazette and llakhlt Ltd. on the 22nd December 1926 caused to he registered DasJ. with the Registrar of Assurances of Calcutta a declaration of his ownership of the said mark. In 1932 the respondent company was incorporated as a private limited company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and the said Ashok Chandra Rakhit assigned the goodwill of his said business and his right, title and interest in the said mark to the respondent company.

In 1933 the respondent company's said mark was registered in the Trade Mark Registry at Hong-Kong under the provisions of the Hong-Kong Trade Marks Ordinance, 1909 and the fact of such registration was published in the Straits Settlements Government Gazette. In 1934 two persons, Rajendra Prasad and Dilliram, were, on complaint, made on behalf of the respondent company, convicted by the Chief Presidcm.:y Magistrale of Calcutta under section 4l'6. Indian Penal Codt\ for infringing the said mark and such conviction was uphelci by thr.

Calcutta High Court.

In 1935 one Chiranjilal Sharma was, on like complaint, convicted by the Chief Presidency Magistrale for infringement of the said mark. The volume. of lhc respondent company's business in ghee done under the said mark is said to be considerable. the annual turn over varying front Rs. 10.00,000 to Rs. 15,00,000, and the annual cost of advertisement being anything between Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 39,000/-. It is also said that the ghee marketed by the respondent company and .its predecessors is well known by the said mark and

is always asked for under the name "Shree".

The Indian Trade Marks Act, 1940 having been 1•ought intoforce in 1942 the respondent company on the 21st August 1942 filed an application for the registration of its said mark under the Act. By his letter dated the 29th November 1943 the Registrar proposed that there should be a disdaimer of the word "Shree". T:1e respondent company by its

' • / \

agents' letter dated the 15th February 1944 intimated to the Registrar that it could not agree to the proposal as "the trade mark Shree is very important in the device" and "the ghee is commonly designated by the trade mark Shree". The respondent company also submitted an affidavit affirmed by one Bidyut Bikash Rakshit, a director of the respondent company, in support of its objection. The Registrar not having then pressed his proposal for disclaimer the respondent company's said mark was duly registered as trade mark No. 3815. •

It appears that subsequently the Registrar found that the word "Shree" was used by Hindus as a11 auspicious symbol and placed even on letter heads and that consequently it was not adapted to distinguish within the meaning of the Act. In course of time, therefore, a pradice became established in the

Registry whereby the word "Shree" was either ref use~ registration as a trade mark or a disclaimer was enforced if it were made a part of a trade mark. So infkx111k 11ad Ileen this practice that barring this particular trade mark No. 3815 there was no other trade mark containing the word ''Shrce" which had been registered without a disclaimer of the word "Shree". Naturally this circumstance was bound to be regarded as an invidious discrimination and, indeed, pointed reference is said to have been made to it and it was suggested that the Registry should deal impartially and uniformly with all applications in matters relating to practice. This aspect of the matter having been pressed upon the Registrar he took steps under section 46(4) of the Trade Marks Act.

1940 and on the 8th March 1947 issued a notice calling upon the respondent company to show cause why the register should not be rectified by entering a disclaimer of the exclusive right in regard to the wurd "Shree". The respondent company showed cause by filitH! an affidavit affirmed by Malli Nath Rakhit to which reference has been made. After hearing learned connsel for the respondent company the Re_!!istrar came to the conclusion that the word "Shree" was

Tile Registrar <!f

Trade Mark>

As/10k Cluuulra

Rak/lit Ltd.

Das J.

1955 not adapted to distinguish and, for reasons slated in 1/re Registrar ,1/ his judgment delivered on the 24th March 1950, Trade Marks 'directed rectification of .the register by inserting a

As/wk 'c1wadru disclaimer of the word "Shree' in the following Rakhit Ltd. tern1s;

D, bJ. "Registration of this Trade Mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the word 'Shree' ".

Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the respondent company preferred an appeaJ to the High Court at Calcutta under section 76 o( the Act. The Hit!h Court also took the view that "Shree" was a word which had numerous meanings and that it would be impossible for any trader to contend that he had an exclusive right to the use of such a word. But the High Court went on to hold that there was no ground whatsoever for the order made by the Registrar as the respondent company had never claimed that it had any right to the exclusive use of the word

"Shree' . .In the result, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Regist rnr n:cli- !'ving the register.

Being. of the opinion that the;: point involved was a novel one in this country aud wa:. ot importance and would aliect the attitude of the Hcgistrar in future cases, the Hign Court certified that it was a fit l'asc for appeal to this Court under i\rticlc 13311 )(c) of the Constitution. Hence the prc'<:nt appeal by the Registrar.

The order of rectification of the register by inserting n disclaimer was made by the Registrar under section 13 read with section 46(4) of the Trade Marks Act.

1940. Section 13 runs as follows:

"13. Registralion subject to disclaimer: --If a trade mark containsla) any part not separately registered as a trade mark in the name of the proprietor. or for the separate registration of which no application has been made. or

(b) any matter common to the trade, or otherwise of a non-distinctive character. the trih1mal. in deciding whether the tracle mark <h11l he entered or shall.remain on the register. may require. as a condition of its being on the register. that

the proprietor shall either disclaim any right to the txciusive use of such part or of all or any portion of such. matter, as the case may be, to the exclusive use of which the tribunal holds him not to be entitled, or

make such other disclaimer as the tribunal may consider necessary for the purpose of defining the rights of the proprietor under the registration:

Provided that no disclaimer shall affect any rights of the proprietor of a trade mark except such as arise out of the registration of the trade mark in respect of which the disclaimer is made".

At the outset it will be noticed that the power of the tribunal to require a disclaimer is conditioned and made dependent upon the existence of one of two things which are set out in clauses

(a) and (b) and which have been called the jurisdictional facts. It is only on the establishment of one of the two jurisdictional 'facts that the Registrar's jurisdiction regarding imposition of a disclaimer arises. Before, however. he may exercise his discretion he must find and hold that there are parts or matters included in the trade mark to the exclusive use of which the proprietor is not entitled and it is only after this finding is arrived at that the Reistrar becomes entitled to exercise his discretion. In cause of the argument it was at one time contended that upon the establishment of the requisite jurisdictional fact and upon the finding that the proprietor ws not entitled to the exclusive use of any particular part or matter contained in the trade mark the Registrar became entitled, without anything more, to require a disclaimer of that oart or matter. This extreme position, however, was not mnintained in the end and it was conceded, as indeed it had to be. that the exercise of the power conferrecl on the Registrar by this section always remained a matter of discretion to be exercised. not capriciously or arbitrarilv but, according to sound princiole.s l?id down for the exercise of all judicial discretion.

(See the observations of Lord Halsburv. L.C .. in Sharn

v. WaT(PfiP!d (').) As the hw of Trwie M11rks adooted in onr .Act mcrdv reproduces the Frn2lih Law with

(l) L.R. 1891A.C.173 at p. 179.

The Registrar a/.

Trade Marks v. • Ashok Cha11dra

Rakhit Ltd.

Das.J.

195!_ onl)· slight modifications, a reference to the judicial The Regi . .-rrar of decisions on the corresponding section of the English

Trade Mark• Act is apposite and must be helpful. Section 15 of A.rlwk "c1w11dro the English Act of 1905 which later on was reproduced

 Rakhi1 Lid. in section 14 of the English Act of 1938 and which Dns.r. corresponds to our section 13, was considered by the High Court in England in In re Albert Baker Co.'s Application and Jn re Aerated Bread Company's Application(') which is commonly called the A.B.C. case. fn that case Eve, J. found on the evidence that Albert Baker Company were widely known as

"A.B.C." or "A.B. & Co." but that the letters ·"A.B.C." did not exclusively indicate their goods and that those letters being common to the trade they were not entitled to the exclusive use of those letters.

Nevertheless the learned Judge did not hold that that finding alone concluded the matter. Said the learned Judge:

"The first observation which it occurs to me to make is that the object of the Legislature was to relieve traders from the necessity of disclaiming, and I think it follows from this that the condition is one for the imposition of which some good reason ought to be established rather than one which ought to be imposed, unless some good reason to the contrary is made out. This conclusion is, I think, fortified by the frame of the section, which is in an enabling form empowering the tribunal to impose the condition-a power which, I conclude, the tribunal would only exercise for good cause shewn."

It follows from what has been stated above that the existence of one of the two jurisdictional facts referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of section 13 and the.finding that the trade mark contains parts or matters to the exclusive use of which the proprietor is not entitled does not conclude the matter and it must further be established that some good reason exists for the imposition of a disclaimer and the tribunal will only exercise the discretionary power for gl'od canse shown.

(I) L.R [1908] 2 Ch. 86: ~5 R.P.C 51 J.

The second thing to be borne in mind, if the provisions ot section 13 are to be properly understood and carried into effect, is that the section confides a discretionary power in t:1e "tribunal" which, by virtue

of section 2(n), means the Registrar or, as the case nuy be, the Court before which the proceeding concerned is pending. An application for the rectification of the register may, under sub-sections (1) and

(2) of section 46, be made either to the Registrar or the High Court and sub-section (4) of that section, under which the present proceedings were initiated hy the Registrar, authorises both the High Court and the Registrar to take proceedings suo motu. In view of the fact that discretion is given also to the High Court under section 13 a question may be raised as to whether the observations made by P.O. Lawrence, J. in In the matter of an application by the Diamond T.

Motor Car Co.0 namely, that in dealing with an appeRl from the Registrar's decision under section 8(2) of the English Act of 1919 the High Court is not fetterred by reason of the Registrar on the hearing before him having exercised his discretirm, apply to our High Court hearing appeals under section 76 of our Act from Decisions of the Registrar given under section 13 of our Act and whether in that situation our High Court may exercise its own discretion iust as it could if the proceedings had initially been taken before it. Assuming, but without deciding, that they do apply, it must, nevertheless, be remembered, adapting the language of Lord Macnaghten in Eno v. Dunn(') that it is the Registrar "to whom in the first instance .is committed the discretionary power". If that authority has exercised his discretion in good faith and not in violation of any law such exercise of discretion should not be interfered with by the High Court merely on the ground that, in the opinion of the High Court. it could have been exercised differentiy or even that the High Court would have exercised it differently. had the matter been brought hefore it in the first instance. The propr approach in

(1) [19211 38 R.P.C. 373 nt p. :179. (21 L.R. r~8901 15 A.C. 25~ at p. 263: 7 R.P.C. 311 at p. 318.

H-f, SCI•ND'82

/95.~

The Regi.vtrar t•f

Trad~ MarkJ ·

As/wk Chandra Rakhit Ltd.

Dasi.

1955 such a case is for the High Court to consider, as said The Reg; sirar of by Lord Dunedin in In ihe matter of an application hy Trade Mark..

F. Reddaway & Co Ltd.('), "whether the Registrar Ashok Chandra had really gone so wrong as to make it necessary to Rakhit Ltd. interfere with his discretion".

DasJ.

Tht third thing to note is that the avowed purpose of the section is not to confer any direct benefit on the rival traders or the general public but to define the rights of the proprietor under the registration.

The registration of a trade mark confers substantial advantages on its proprietor as will appear from the sections grouped together in Chapter IV under the heading "Effect of Registration". It is, however, a notorious fact that there is a tendency on the part of some proprietors to get the operation of their trade marks expanded beyond their legitimate bounds. An illustration of an attempt .of this kind is to be found in In re Smokeless Powder Co.'s Trade Mark('). Temptation has even led some proprietors to make an exaggerated claim to the exclusive use of parts or matters contained in their trade marks in spite of the fact that the:v had expressly disclaimed the exclusive use of those parts or matters. Reference may be made to Greers Ltd. v. Pearman and Corder Ltd.(') commonly called the "Banquet" case. The real purpose of requiring a disclaimer is to define the rights of the proprietor under the registration so as to minimise. even if it cannot wholly eliminate, the possibility of extravagant and unauthorised claims being made on the score of registration of the trade marks.

/ The last feature of the section is its proviso. That proviso preserves intact any right which the proprietor may otherwise under any other law have in relation to the mark or any part thereof. The disclaimer is only for the purposes of the Act. 1t do(!s not affect the rights of the proprietor except such as arise out of registration. That is to say, the special advanta?es which the Act gives to the proprietor by reason of the registration of his trade mark do not extend to the

(I) [1926] 44 R.P.C. 27 at p. 36.

(2) L.R. [1R92] 1Ch.590; 9.R.J.'.C. 109.

(l) [1922] l9"R.P.C. 406.

parts or matters which he disclaims. In short, the disclaimed parts or matters are not within the protection of the statute.

That ciicumstance, however, does not mean that the proprietor's rights, if any, with respect to those parts or matters would not be protected otherwise than under the Act. If the proprietor has acquired any right by long user of those parts or matters in connection with goods manufactured or sold by him or otherwise in relation to his trade, ht may, on proof of the necessary facts, prevent an infringement of his rights by a passing off action or .a prosecution under (he Indian Penal Code. Disclaimer does not affect those rights in any way.

Keeping, then, in view the meaning and scope of section 13 of our Trade Marks Act, 1940 and its underiying purpose as discussed above we proceed to consicler whether in the circumstances of the present case the Registrar had exercised his discretion properly in inserting in the register a disclaimer of the word "Shree· It has not been disputed that the respondent company's registered trade mark No. 3815 is a distinctive device properly registrable under section 6 of tht Act. It is also a fact that it contains, as its prominent part, the word "Shree'' which is not separately registered as a trade mark in the name of the respondent company and, indeed, no applica.tion had heen made by it for the separate registration of that Word. There can, therefore, be no doubl as to the existenct: of the jurisdictional fact referred to in clause

(a) of that section. Further, the Registrar found as a fact, for reasons stated by him, that the word "Shree" was not adapted to distinguish, which means that it did not pass the test for registrability laid down in section 6 and in particular in sub-section (3) thereof. The High Court also unequivocally took the view that "Shree" is a word which had numerous meanings and that it would be impossible for any trader to contend that he had an exclusive right to the use of such a word. It, therefore. follows that the respondent company's trade mark was concurrenflv held to have contained matters of a non-distinctive character and consequently the second juris-

The Registrar of Trade Marks V.

As/wk Chandra

Rakhit Ltd.

Das!.

1955 dictional fact was also present in this case. It, never- The Registrar of theless, appeared to the High Court that there was Trade /tfarks no ground whatsoever for the order made by the

Ashok Chandra Registrar. The High Court read the decision of the Rak/ut Ltd.

R t d 1 h d d

Das J. eg1s rar as procee mg on y on w at was escnbe as an inflexible practice established in the Registry whereby the word "Shree" was either refused registration as a trade mark or a disclaimer was enforced if it wa' a part of a trade mark and in this view the case appeared to the High Court to be indistinguishable from the case of In re Cadbury Brothers' A pplication(1).

That case was decided under section 9 of the English Act of 1905. Clause (5) of section 9 was then expressed in language which is somewhat different from clause (5) of section 6 of our Act. Under section 9(5) of the English Act of 1905 a name, signature or word or words otherwise than such as fell within the description in the preceding paragraphs 1 to 4 could not. except by the order of the Board of Trade or by the Court, be deemed a distinctive mark: Tudor' heing a surname did not fall within clause (4) of that English Act and. therefore, the Regis1rar had no power to register it as a distinctive mark under clause (5).

Such being the position, the then Registrar of Trade Marks in England adopted a practice that wherever a mark contained a name which did not come within clause ( 4) and which he had no power to register under clause <5). there must be a disclaimer of that word without going into any investigation as to its distinctiveness. The Registrar in that case declined to register the mark only because it contained a name \"hich could not be registered alone by him under section 9(5), without deciding whether that word was a matter of a distinctive or non-distinctive character, in pursuance of the inflexible practice that he had adc>pted. namely, of refusing registration in the absence of a disclaimer. This decision of the Registrar wa~ overruled by Sargant, J. The learned Jud!!e. on the materials before him, came to the conclusion that the word 'Tudor' was not common to t'ie trnde

(ll T-.R. [19151 2 C11. 307: 32 R.P.C. 456.

and that the word as it had been used hy the applicants in relation to chocolates was not a matter of non-distinctive character and that it had denoted their goods. Consequently, the jurisdiction to impose a disclaimer did not arise under clause (b) of section 15 of the English Act of 1905. The jurisdiction, if at all, could, therefore, arise only under clause (a), namely, that the trade mark contained parts not separately registered by the properietor as trade marks.

Having come to the conclusion that the word 'Tudor' was a matter of distinctive character as it denoted the goods of the applicant's manufacture, the Court might have disposed of the cas.e on the short ground that, on that finding, the applicant was entitled to the exclusive use of that name in connection with chocolates and like goods and, therefore, no question of requiring a disclaimer could, in that situation, arise at all.

Treating the matter, however, as stil! one of discretion, the learned Judge had to take into account the commercial case made on behalf of the applicants, namely, that they would, by disclaiming any right to the exclusive use of the word Tudor', practically be inviting the public to disregard such common law rights as they had acquired to the use of the name 'Tudor' and held that to impose a disclaimer of that word, in spite of the finding as to its distinctiveness in relation to the goods of the applicant0, would be to drive the applicants to take innumerable passing off actions.

The facts of that case appears to us to be cleady distinguishable from those of the case now before us.

Here the concurrent finding of the Registrar and the High Court is that the word "Shree" is not adapted to distinguish and is not a word to the exclusive use of which any trader may claim the right. In the face of this finding the consideration of the possibility that a disclaimer may drive the respondent company to a crop of passing off actions was not so relevant or urgent as it was in the Tudor case. In view of the finding in the present case the respondent company CG\1!0 well he left. as it was in fact left, to protect its

Tile Registrar of Trade Marks

v Ashok Cliandra

Rak/iit Ltd.

Dasi.

1955 rights by other proceedings, e.g., passing off actions The R;;;;;;; rar of or prosecutions which, by reason of the proviso, were Trade Marks open to be taken by it, if the necessary facts to As!iok ~Jumdra support such proceedings which were not before the

Rakhit Ltd.

Registrar could be satisfactorily established.

Da:.J.

Further, it is not quite correct to say that the Registrar, like his English counterpart, had based his decision entirely on what has been called his invariable practice. It is no doubt true that the Registrar did, in this case, lay considerable stress on that aspect of the matter and may even be said to have some what over emphasized the practice of his Registry but it is not correct to say that his decision was entirely founded on that practice alone. The materials before the Registrar, appearing on the affidavit filed on beh'aif ot the respondent company, clearly indicated that the respondent company was claiming a proprietary right to the name "Shree''. Indeed, it called its mark as "the said mark Shree" throiaghoqt the affidavit and claimed that the said mark "Shree" was well known in the market and that its ghee was asked for and sold under the said mark "Shree": The two prosecutions launched by it and the other facts mem" tioned in the main aflidavit and the two supporting

afildavit~ of two retail dealers and summarised at the beginning of this judgment clearly indicate that it was claiming the right to the exclusive use of. the word "Shree" and, indeed, in its agents' letter of the 15th February 1944 objecting to any disclaimer of that word, it was referred to "as trade mark Shree" and it was said to be "very important in the devise".

In other words, they put forward the claim that "Shree'' itself was also its trade mark, apart from the device as a whole and that it was an important feature. of its device.

It is, therefore, not at all surprising that learned. counsel appearing for the respondent company before the Registrar, when asked as to how his client could possibly be affected by disclaiming the word "Shree", said frankly that it was far easier to be successful in a{I infringement action than in a passing off action. This clearly indic;11cd that the respondent company did not want any .other

merchant to use the word "Shree" in his trade mark in respect of ghee and that the respondent company t.houghc that the registration of its trade mark with the word "Shree" contained in it would, per se, give it a right also to that word and .that its intention was to launch infringement actioris under the Act against any other trader who might happen to use the word "Shree" either alone or as part of his trade mark in respect of ghee.

Further, the Registrar may well have thought that the fact that all other traders who had got their trade marks containing the word "Shree"

registered had had to submit to a disclaimer of the word "Shree" whereas the respondent company had got its trade mark containing the word "Shree" registered without a disclaimer was calculated to cause embarrassment to. other traders and might conceivably encourage tbe respqndent company to contend that the registration of its trade mark by itself and without further evidence gave it a properietary right to the exclusive use of the word "Shree". The respondent company may also find some encouragement from the observations of .Lord Radcliffe in DeCordova and others' v. Vick Chemical Coy.(') namely, that if a word forming part of a mark has come in trade to be used to identify the goods of the owner of the mark, it i~ an infringement of the mark itself to use that word as the mark or part of the mark of another trader, for confusion is likely to result. These considerations may reasonably have led the Registrar to require a disclaimer.

None of these considerations arose or were adverted to in the Tudor case and this circumstance quite clearly distinguishes the. present case from that case.

It is true that where a distinctive label is registered as a whole, such registration cannot possibly give any

exclusive statutory right to the oroprietor of the trade mark to, the use of any particular word or name contained therein anart from the mark a.,; a whole.

As said by Lwd Esher in Pinto v. Badmanr> : ·

"The truth is that the label does not consist of

(1) [19Sll 68 R.P.C.103 at p. 106.

(2) 8 R.J'.C. 181 at p. 191.

The Registrar ef

Trade Marks

\', Ashok Chandra

Rakhit Ltd.

DasJ.

1955 each particular part of it, but consists of the comhi-

The Re1ir.;, rar qf nation of them all",

Trade Marks

Ashok Chandra

Rakhit ltd.

Das.I.

Observations to the same effect will be found also in ln re Appo//inaris Company's Trade MarksC), !11 rl!

Smokeless Powder Co. (supra), In re C/emem and Cid') and In re Alben Baker & Company {supra) and finally in the Tudor rnse referred to above which was decided by Sargant, .T.

This circumstance, however, does not necessarily mean that in such a case disclaimer will always be unnecessary. It is significant that one of

th~ facts which give rise to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to impose disclaimer is that the trade mark ccntains parts which are not separately registered.

It is, therefore, clear that the section itself contemplates that there may be a disclaimer in respect of paris contained in a trade mark registered as a whole although the registration of the mark as a whole does not confer. any statutory right with respect to that part.

As we have already stated the possibility of the proprietor attempting to expand the operation of his trade mark cannot be ignored or overlooked. It ls a thing which must be taken into consideration by the tribunal-be it the Registrar or the Court--in deciding upon the way it should exercise the discretionary power conferred on it. Reference has beef) made by

the Hi!.!h Court to the observations of Eve, .T. in the A.B.c: case referred to above and the question has been posed as to whether any good cause had been shown for the necessity of disclaimer in this case. The High Court answers the question immediately by saying that it did not think that any cause had been shown beyond the desirability of having a uniform practice. This, as we have already stated, is not quite correct. for apart from the :l)ractice the Registrar did advert to the other important consideration, namelv. that on the evidence before him and the

sttenient of counsel it was quite clear that the reason for resisting the disclaimer in this particular case was that the company thought. erroneously no doubt but

(I) L.R. f1R91l 2C'h. 1R6.

(2) L.R. [1900] 1Ch.114.

quite seriously, that the registration of the trade mark as a whole world, in the circumstances of this case, give. it a right to the exclusive use of th.! word "Shree" as if separately and by itself it was also its registered trade mark and that it would be easier for it to be successful in an infringement action than in a passing off action.

It was precisely the possibility of such an extravagant and untenable claim that called for a disclaimer for the purpose of defining the rights of the respondent company under the registration.

This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been pressed before or adverted to by the High Court.

Considering all the circumstances discussed above, we are not of opinion that the Registrar had gone so wrong as to have made it necessary for the High Court to interfere with his discretion.

It is were to be regarded as a matter of exercise of discretion by the High Court as to whether a disclaimer should be imposed or not, it is quite clear that the attention of the High Court was not drawn to an important consideration, namely, the strong possibility of the respondent company claiming a statutory right to the word ''Shree" by virtue of the registration of its trade mark and subject others to infringement actions only on the strength of the registration and without proof of facts which it would have otherwise to establish in order to succeed in a passing off action or a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code and. the ref ore. the Hih Court cannot be said to have properly exercised its discretion.

The result. therefore, is that this appeal must he allowed and the respondent company must pav the appellant's costs in this Court and in the High Court.

3$-8 SCIINDIS2

The Registrur of

TrQde Marks v.

Ashok Cna11dra

Raklzit Ltd.

DasJ.

Calcutta High Court

THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS

ASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD

s. R. DAS

BHAGWATI

SINHA JJ.

Trade Marks Act 1940

s. 13

S. 76

s. 13

Trade Marks Act

s. 13

s. 13

s. 2( n)

s. 76

s. 13

s. 13

Indian Penal Code

Albert Baker Co.

Rakhit ltd

High Court of Judica ture at Calcutta

K. Daphtary

K. S.

Shavakasha

R. H. Dhebar

S. C. Isaacs

P. K. Ghosh

DAS J.-This

24th March. 1950

Durga Charan Rakhit

Malli Nath Rakhit

Calcutta

15th January 1915

Hem Dev Konch

25th January 1915

27th January 1915

22nd August 1917

Haripriya Konch

Ashok Chandra Rakhit

Ourga Charan Rakhit

Chandra

Rak/1it Ltd.

Indian Companies Act, 1913

Rajendra Prasad

Dilliram

section 4

Chiranjilal Sharma

Indian Trade Marks Act, 1940

Bidyut Bikash Rakshit

section 46(4)

Trade Marks Act

8th March 1947

High Court at Calcutta

section 76

section 13

section 46(4)

Trade Marks Act

Section 13

Halsburv. L.C

Ashok Cha11dra

Rakhit Ltd.

Section 15

section 14

section 13

England

Albert Baker Co.

Eve

Albert Baker Company

section 13

section 13

section 2(n)

section 46

section 13

P.O. Lawrence

Diamond T.

Motor Car Co.0

section 8(2)

section 76

section 13

Macnaghten

Dunedin

Ashok Chandra

Rakhit Ltd.

Smokeless Powder Co.

Indian Penal Code

section 13

Trade Marks Act, 1940

section 6

section 6

Rak/ut Ltd.

section 9

section 9

section 6

section 9(5)

section 9(5)

Sargant

section 15

As!iok ~Jumdra

Radcliffe

Lwd Esher

Eve

Indian Penal Code