{"document_id": "1954_1_1005_1046_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT i, EPORTS 1005\n\nexisted in the other parts of Rajasthan. This difference between the two parts did not justify that such progressive and ameliorative measures for the welfare of the people existing in a particular area should be done away with and the State be brought down to the level of the unprogressive States.\n\nThe judgment shows that the Bench far from going back on its previous view adhered to it and expressly distinguished the case under appeal before us on its special facts.\n\nAs a result of the foregoing discussion we hold that the view taken by the High Court is correct. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS\n\nENDOWMENTS, MADRAS\n\nti.\n\nSRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA SW AMIAR\n\nOF SRI SHIRUR MUTT.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN,\n\nBHAGW~TI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, arts. 19(1)(f), 25, 26, 27-Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951), ss. 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69, 76--Whether ultra vires the Constitution-Work \"property\" in art 19(1) (f) meaning of-Tax and fee, meaning of-Distinction bet1vcen.\n\nHeld, that ss. 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951) are ultra vires arts. 19(\\)(f), 25 and 26 of the Constitution cf India.\n\nSection 76( I) of the Act is void as the provision relating to tlie payment of annual contribution contained in it is a tax and not a fee and so it was beyond the legislative competence of the Madras\n\nStac Legislature to enact such a provision.\n\nThat on the facts of the present case the imposition under s. 76( I) of the Act, although it is a tax, does not come within the hitter part of art. 27 because the t>bject of the contribution under the section is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu reli gion or any denomination under it but the proper administration\n\not rc.li!i:1ras\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirlha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukherjea ].\n\narticle which, it is said, is intended to protect religious freedom only so far as individuals are concerned, can be invokecl in favour of an institution or organisatic\"1 '\n\nWitI1 rcgar'~ to article 26, the contention is that a Math does not come within the description of a religious denomination as provided for in the article and even if it does, what cannot be interfrrd with is its rigl1t to manage its own affairs in matters of religion only and nothing else.\n\nIt is said, that the word \"religion\", as used in this article, should be taken in its strict etymological sense as distinguished from any kind of secular activity which may be connected in some way with religion but doe& not form an essential part of it. Reference is made in this ccnnection to clause (2) (a) of article 25 ar.d clause ( d) of article 26.\n\nWe will take up these points for consideration one after another.\n\nAs regards the property rights of a Mathadhipati. it may not be possible to say in view of the pronouncemens of the Judicial Committee, which have been accepted as good law in this country ever since 1921, that a Mathadhipati ho:ds the Math property as a life tenant or that his positio'1 is similar to that of a Hi11du wdow in respect to her husband's estate or of an English\n\nBishop holding a benefice.\n\nHe is certainly not a trustee in the strict sense. He may he, as the Privy Council('), says, a manager or custodian of the institution who has to discharge the duties of a trustee and is answerable as such; but he is not a mere manager and it would not be ; ight to describe Mahantship as a mere office.\n\nA superior of a Math has not only duties to discharge in connection with the endowment but he\n\nhas a personal interest of a beneficial character which is sanctioned by custom. and is much larger than that of a Shebait in the debutter property It was held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court('), that Shebaitship itself is property, and this decision was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh v.\n\nLal Behary('), and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata ('),\n\n(t) Vide Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami, 48 I. A. ::;02 .'.2', ''i.--1(' .\\fonahai v. Bhupendra 6n Cal. 452. is\" 63 r. A. 448. 14' 7or.A.57.\n\nThe effect of the first two decisions, as the Privy Council pointed out in the last case, was to emphasise the proprietary element in the Shebaiti right' and to show that though in some respects an anomaly, it was anomaly to be accepted having been admitted into Hindu law from an early date.\n\nThis view was adopted in its entirety by this court in Angurbala v. Debabrata (' ) and what was said in that case in respect to Shebaiti right could, with equal propriety, be applied to the office of a Mahant.\n\nThus in the conception of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together and neither . can be detached from the other.\n\nThe personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his large powers of disposal and administration and his right to create derivative tenures in respect to endowed properties; and these and other rights of a similar character in vest the office of the Mahant with the character of proprietary right which, though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right.\n\nIt is true .that the Mahantship is not heritable like ordinary property, but that is because of its peculiar nature and the fact that the office is generally held by an ascetic, whose connection with his natural family being completely cut off, the ordinary rules of succession do not apply.\n\nThere is no reason why the word \"property\", as used in article 19(1)\n\n(f) of the Constitution, should not be given a liberal and wide connotation and should not be extended to those well recognised types of interest which have the insignia or characteristics of proprietary right. As said above, the ingredients of both office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together in the rights of a Mahant and the Mahant has the right to cnjov this propertv or beneficial interest so long as he is entitled to hold his. office.\n\nTo take away this beneficial interest and leave him merely to the discharge of his duties would be to destroy his character as a Mahant altogether.\n\nIt is true that the beneficial interest which he enjoys is appurtenant to his duties ·\n\n(1) [1951) S.C.R. 1125\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endow~\n\nments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukherjeaJ.\n\nTm Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endow•\n\nments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nand as he is in charge of a public institution, reasonable restrictions can always be placed upon his rights in the interest of the public.\n\nBut the restrictions would cease to be reasonable if they are calculated to make him unfit to discharge the duties which he is called upon to discharge.\n\nA Mahant's duty is not simply to manage the temporalities of a Math.\n\nHe is the head and superior of spiritual fraternity and the purpose of Math is to encourage and foster • spiritual training by maintenance of a competent line of teachers who could impart religious instructions to the disciples and followers of the Math and try to strengthen the doctrines of the particular school or order, of which they profess to be adherents. This purpose cannot be served if the restrictions are such as would bring the Matha proper and to propagate or disseminate his ideas for the edification of others. A question is raised as to whether the word \"persons\" here means individuals only or includes corporate bodies as well. The question, in our opinion, is not at all relevant for our present purpose. A Mathadhipati is certainly not a corporate body; he is the head of a spiritual fraternity and by virtue of his office has to perform the duties of a religious teacher.\n\nIt is his duty to practise and propagate the religious tenets, of whi.ch he is an adherent and if any provision of law prevents him from propagating his doctrines, that would certainly affect the religious freedom which is guaranteed to every person under article 25. Institution as such cannot practise or propagate religion; it can be done only by individual persons and whether these persons propagate their personal views or the tenets for which the institntion stands is really immaterial for purposes of article 25.\n\nIt is the propagation of belief that is protected, no matter whether the propagation takes place in a chnrch or monastery, or in a temple or parlour meeting.\n\nAs regards article 26, the first question -Is, what is the precis~ meaning or connotation of the expression\n\n!954\n\nTiu Commissioner, HikdU. &ligious Endow.\n\nmmts, .Madras v.\n\nSr£ Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar\n\nof Sri Shirur Mutt.\n\nMuk,,, rjea ].\n\nThe Commisp sioner, Hindu Religious Endow•\n\nments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukheT, J°taJ.\n\n\"religious denomination\" and whether a Math could come within this expression.\n\nThe word \"denomination\" has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean \"a collection of individuals classed together under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name.\" It is well known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of theological teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers since then.\n\nAfter Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu rdigion that we find in India at t:1e prrs\"nt ,_cc_; Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name,-in many cases it is the name of the founder,-and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation.\n\nThe followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madliwacharya and other religious teachers.\n\nIt is a fact well established by tradition that the eight Udipi Maths were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in question is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a section of the followers of Madhwacharya.\n\nAs article 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination but also a section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fratrnity represented by it can legitimately come within the purview of this article.\n\nThe other thing that remains to be considered in regard to article 26 is, what is the scope of clause (b) of the article which speaks of management \"of its own affairs in matters of religion I\" The language undoubted! y suggests that there could be other affairs of a religious denomination or a section thereof which are not matters of religion and to which the guarantee given by this clause would not apply.\n\nThe question is, where is the line to be drawn between what are matters of religion and what are not?\n\nIt will be seen that besides the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, which is given by clause (b ), the next two clauses of article 26 guarantee to a religious denomination the right to acquire and own property and to administer such property in accordance with law.\n\nThe administration of its property by a religious denomination has thus been placed on a different footing from the riglit to manage its own affairs in matters of religion The latter is a fundament:il right which no legisla_ture can take away, whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the legislature can validly impose.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or inst!tution are not matters of religion to which clause (b) of the article applies.\n\nWhat then are matters of religion?\n\nThe word \"religion\" has not been defined in the Constitution and it is a term which is hardly msceptible of any rigid definition.\n\nIn an American case('), it has been said \"that the term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relation to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being ¥id character and of ooedience to His wi!I.\n\nIt is often confounded with cultus of fOrm or worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter.\" We do not think that the above definition can be regarded as either precise or adequate. Articles 25 and 26 of our Constitution are based for the most part upon article 44(2) of the Constitution of Eire and we have great doubt whether a definition of \"religion\" as Jiiven above could have been in the minds of our\n\nContitution-makers when they framed the Constitution.\n\nReligion is certain! y a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are wdl known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is notlllng el6e but a:\n\n(1) Vide Da11is v. Benso,,, 133 U.S. at 34Q.\n\nr he Commis~ .sinner, Hindu Religious Endour ·\n\nmtnts, Madras\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt.\n\nMuklzerjea ].\n\nThe Commis .. sioner, Hindu Religious EndoW\"\"\n\nnients, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukhrr}ta J.\n\ndoctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress.\n\nThe guarantee under our Constitution not only protects the freedom of religious opinion but it protects also acts done in pursuance of a religion and this is made clear by the use of the expression \"practice of religion\" in article 25.\n\nLatham C. J. of the High Court of Australia while dealing with the provision of section 116 of the Australian Constitution which inter alia forbids the Commonwealth to prohibit the \"free exercise of any religion\" made the IO!lowing weighty observations ( 1 ) :\n\n\"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil Government should not interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion.\n\nIt appears to me to be difficult to rnaintai1' this distinction as relevant to the interpretation of section 116.\n\nThe section refers in express terms to the exercise of religion, and therefore it is intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion. Thus the section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It protects also acts done in pursuance of religious belief as part of religion.\" .\n\nThese observations apply fully to the protection of religion as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.\n\nRestrictions by the State upon free exercise of religion are permitted both under articles 25 and 26 on grounds of public order, morality and health.\n\nClause (2) (a) of article 25 reserves the right of the State to regulate or restrict an economic, financial, political and other secular activities which may be associated with religions practice and there is a further right given to the State by. sub-clause (b) under which the State can\n\n(1) Vide Adelaide Company v. The Commonwtalth 67 C.1;-.R. 116, 127.\n\nlegislate for social welfare and reform even though by so doing it might interfere with religious practices.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General lays stress upon clause\n\n(2) (a) of the article and his contention is that all secular activities, which may be associated with religion but do not really constitute an essential part of it, are amenable to State regulation.\n\n' The contention formulated m such broad terms cannot, we think, be supported.\n\nIn the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.\n\nIf the tenets of any\n\neligious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the da'y, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are leligious practise.s and sho.uld be regarded as matters of\n\nreligion within the meaning of article 26(b ). What article 25(2) (a) contemplate.s is not regulation by the State of religious practices as such, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when they run coun'ter to public order, health and morality, but regulation of activities which are economic, commercial or political in their character though they are associated with religious practices.\n\nWe may refer in this connection to a few American and Australian cases, all of which arose out of the activities of persons connected with the religious association known as \"Jehova's - Witnesses.\" This association of persons loosely organised throughout Australia, U.S.A. and other countries regard the literal interpretation of the Bible as fundamental to proper religious beliefs. This belief in the supreme authority of the Bible colours many of their political ideas.\n\nThey refuse to take oath of allegiance to the king or other constituted\n\nTill Commis- Sioner, Hindu Religious EndoWments, Madras\n\nSri Laksltmindra Thirlha SWamiiJr\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMuk/,, rjea J.\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri l.akshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\n... Mutt.\n\nM1•kherj, a J.\n\nhuman authority and even to show m\\Pect to the national flag, and they decry all wars between nations and all kinds of war activities.\n\nIn 1941 a company of \"Jehova's Witnesses\" incorporated in Australia commenced proclaiming and teaching matttrs which were prejudicial to war activities ancl the defence of the Commonwealth and steps were taken against them under the National Security Regulations of the State.\n\nThe legality of the action of the Government was questioned by means of a writ petitiQn before the High Court and the High Court held that the action of the Government was. justified and that section 116, which guaranteed freedom of religion under the Australian Constitution, was not in any way infringed by the National Security Regulations(').\n\nThese were undoubtedly political activities though arising out of religious belief entertained by a particular community.\n\nIn such cases, as Chief Justice Latham pointed out, the provision for protection of religion was not an absolute protection to be interpreted and applied independently of other provisions of the Constitution.\n\nThese privileges must be reconciled with the right of the State to employ the sovereign power to ensure peace, security and orderly living without which constitutional guarantee of civil liberty would be a mockery.\n\nThe courts of America were at one time greatly agitated over the question of legality of a State regulation which required the pupils in public schools on pain of compulsion to participate in a daily ceremony of saluting the national flag, while reciting in unison, a pledge of allegiance to it in a certain set formula.\n\nThe question arose in Minersville School District, Board of Education, etc. v. GobitiI(2 ). In that case two small children, Lilian and William Gobitis, were expelled from the public school of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part of the daily exercise.\n\nThe Gobitis family were affiliated with \"Jehova's Witnesses\" and had been\n\n127. • (1) Vide Adelaide Company\n\nv. The Commonwealt.>:,\n\n67 C.L.R. 11\n\n(•) 310 U.S. 586.\n\n• f ' • ,< : ,.' • ,: ~ . j ' ' ' ' 1027\n\nbrought up conscientipusly to belive that such .a gesture of respect for the flag was . forbidden by the scripture.\n\nThe point for decision by the Supreme Court Was whether the requirement of participation in such a ceremony 'exacted froin a child, who refused upon sincefr eligtous ground, li1fringed the liberty of religion guaranteed by the First arid the Fourteenth ' Amendments?\n\nThe court held' by a majority that it did not and . that it' was within the province of the 'legislature and ffie school authorities to adopt appropriate means\n\nto evoke and foster a sentiment of national unity amongst the children in public schools.\" The Supreme Court, however, changeCl their views on this identical point in the later case of West .Virginia State Board of Education v: Barnett'e(1 ). 'There it was held overruling the earlier decision referred to above' that the ' actioh of a State iri making it compulsory for children in public schools to salute the 'flag and pledge allegiance constituted a violation of the First and the Fourteenth Ame1idinents. This difference 'in judicial' opinion brings out forcibly 'the difficult task 'wliich a court has fo perform in cases of this type where the freedom or re'ligious\n\nconvictions genuinely entert:iined by . men come ihto conflict with the proper political attitude which is expected from. citizens in matters' of unity and solidarity of the State organization. ·· • ' ' .. - ' ' As regards •commercial activities, which are. prompted by religious beliefs, we can, cite .. the , case of Murdock v.\n\nPennsylvania ( ) .\n\nHere . alo the petitioners . were \"Jehova's Witnesses\" and they went about from door .to door in the city of Jeannette distributing . literature aµd S0liciting people to purchase certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by :.the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society. A )11unicipal ordinance required religious colporteurs to pay a licence tax as a\n\ncondition to the pursuit of their activities. The. petitioners were convicted and fined. for violation of the ordinance.. It was held that the ordinance in question was invalid .under the Federal COnstitution as.. constituting a:denial of freedom. of speech, press am;! religion;\n\n(1) 319 U.S. 624. .. '\n\n(2) 319 U.S. 105. 7-97 S. C. India/59\n\n195'4\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras .v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutJ.\n\nMukherjea J'.\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Rtligious Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar ; of Sri Shirur\n\nli!utt.\n\nMukheljea J.\n\nand it was held further that upon the facts of the case it could not be said that \"Jehova's Witnesses\" were engaged in a commercial rather than in a religious venture.\n\nHere again, it may be pointed out that a contrary view was taken only a few years before in the case of /ones v. Opelika( 1 ), and it was helmmissioner is invested ' with powers io pass orders, but orders can be\n\npssed .. ' 'orily for the purposes specified . ln. the section and not for interference with the rights of the Mahant as are sanctioned by usage . or for lowering his position as the spiritual head of.· the institution; The saving\n\npro~!siol\\ co; itained in section 91 of . the . Act makes the pos1t:Jon qmte clear. An apprehension that the powers\n\nconferred by this section may be abused in individual cases .. rdoes not make the provision itself bad or invalid inJaW;•,11 .L . ..We agree, however, with the High Court in the view taken :brit about .. section 21.\n\nThis section empowers the Commissioner antl> his. subordinate officers and also\n\npersons'~ authorised by them t-0 ente, r the premises af\n\ni.·:·;_ .. 1-''!··J1,: . ~:.ti:·;· ljl ~--· .. _ .... -·, \"'.•' ,. _,.i, ;1 .\n\n1,;_) ·;,:>Jlt~!_, !~,; '\"t~!/\").i<'. _((· ~'!.)._.:,.·,..~ ):1 i:.l -i.•1.•J-, .r; '1'\",\";\".;7\n\n' , .. '' ' '\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'l:; S 1031\n\n. . . . ,\n\n. I . , , any religious institution or . place . of worship for the .purpose of exercjsing any power conferred or any duty imposed by or under the Act. . It .is well known that there could be no such thing as an unregulated and unrestricted right of en.tty in a public temple or other .religious institution, for persons. who are not connected with . the spiritual . functions thereof.. It is: a , traditional custom universally observed , not to allow. access to any \"Outsider to the partip, ilarly, . sacred parts of a temple. as for example, the place where the deity is ' located.\n\nThere are .. also fixed hours of worship and rest for the idol when, no disturbance. by . any member of the public .is alloweq. . Section 21,. ! it is. : to .• be noted, does,· not\n\nconfine the right of. entry .. to the outer portion :of. the premises; it does not even exclude .the inner sanctliary \"the Holy of Holies\".-· as it.is .said, the sanctity of .which is. zealously .preserved .. r .It clots not say that• . the entry may be made . after due . notice 'to the head, of the .institution. and a.t, such , hqurs which would.notihterfere . with the. due .observance of.the rites and. ceremonies in .the institiition .. W, e think that: as ,·, the. sectibn:stands,\n\n:it interferes with the . . fundmental . rights of the Mathadhipati and the denomination of which he is head . guaranteed under arti.cks 25. and 26 of .the, Constitution.\n\nDur attention qas .. been drawn , in. this , ronnection. to section 91 of the Act which, it is,. said, provides a sufli- .cient safeguard .. against_. any abuse of.power under section 21.\n\nWe cannot agree with this contention,. Clause\n\n(a) of section 91 excepts .. from the saving ... clause all express provisions 0f the : .4ct .. within which the: , provi- . sion of section . 21 would -have t0 . be included., Clause\n\n(b) again. does not say anything about cuom or , usage obtaining .. in an institution and it . does not indicate by whom aqd , in what. manner the question of -interference with the religious . and .. spiritual functions. of the Math\n\nwould . be decided . in .ceof any. dispute arising, regarding , it.\n\nIn our.. opinion, section 21 has .been .. (ightly-.held to. be .invalid. . .\n\nSection 23 imposes a d\\ltY, upon the trustees, to obey .all.lawful , orders issued by.tlie .. Commissioner.,; or any . subordinate authority under the provisions of' the Act.\n\nNo exception can be taken to the section if those\n\nTlze Commis-\n\n, sioner, Hindu Religio'us Endow ..\n\nents, MadrtlJ\n\nSri L\"akshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMuklierjea J.\n\n19~4\n\nThe Commissfoner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMut~.\n\nMukhf the primary ; duties of a Mahant to discharge. . The next thing . that strikes one is, hether snciion . i~ nece'ssary' if ' die\" trustee\n\nTht Commiisioner, Hindu &ligious Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukherjea]~\n\n71ze Commissioner, Hindu .Religious Endow\n\nments, Madras v . . Sri Lakshmindra\n\nThirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMuklu:rjea J.\n\n; i • ' :wants to spend . the money for p.urposes other than. those specified in section 59(1)?\n\nIf the answer. is in the negative, the whole objett of the. section becomes meaningless. ' . If, on the other hand, , the implication ' of the\n\nsection is' that the surplus ' can be spent only for the purposes specified ih section 59(1) and that too with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner, it undoubtedly places a'burdensome restriction upon ·the .property -rfghts of the Mahant which are sanctioned by usage and ' which would have the. effeet of impairing his\n\ndignityand efficiency as .. the head of the institution.\n\nWe think 'that sections 30(2} and 31 have bee!1'rightly held to be invalid by the High• Court.\n\nSections 39 and 42, -as said already, are not applicable to' Maths:• and hence can be left.· out of consideration.\n\nSection 53 has been condemned by the High Court merely on . the ground that the court has ample jurisdiction to provide . f6t the contingencies that this section is intended to meet.\n\nBut that surely cannot prevent :a competent legisla\"ture from legislating on the topic,' provided it can do so with6ut violating any of the fundamental 'rights guaranteed by the Constitu- '\"tion. - We are unable to agree with the High Court on\n\n- this point. ·There seems to be nothing' wrong or unreasonable in section 54 of the' Act -which provides.for fixing. the. standand scale of. expenditure .•. The propo-- sals .for • this purpose, wquld have to b_e submitted by .. the trustee; .. , they are. then to. he published and sugges- . tions invited from , persons .. having interest in the :amendment.\n\nThe Commissioner. is. to scrutinise the original proposals . and the. suggestions received. and . if in his opinion a. modification, .of the scale .is necessary, he has to submit -a report . to the Government, whose . decision will be final.\n\nThis we consider to be quite a reasonable and salutary . provisioµ. _\n\nSection. 55 .. deals with a . Mahant's power. over Pathakanikas or personal gifts.\n\nOrdinarily a .• Mehant has absolute. power of disposal over such .. gifts, . though if he dies. without making any disposition, it. is reckoned as the property of the.Math _and goes , to the succeed- . ing Mahan(.\n\nThe first clause . .of section, 55 Jays down that such Pathakanikas shall be spent only for the\n\n,> ', \\\n\n'1,:' purposes .\")(the Math, This is an unwarranted restricuon on . the property right of -the, Mahant. . It may be that according , to . customs prevailing• in a particular institution, such. .personal .. gifts .. are , regarded .. as gifts to the institution. itself and • the Mahant rece-1ves .them only ·; as , the -representative., of the institution;. but . the general , rule.-is .othel'.V(ise.\n\nAs section SS ( 1) _does . , not say eputy Commissioner. ' Section '89 provides for penalties foi' refosal by the trustee to comply with the p'rov!sions of the . Act.• If the objectionable' J?brtions ·.· of the Act\" are eliminated, the portion 'that Terriains 'will' be perlectly valid nd, for violation' of these valid 'provisions; penalties can legitimately be, prolded.\n\nSection, 99 vesti an qveralt revisioriaJ. power iri 'the Government. 'TJiis, In our opinion, is 'beneficial to' the frus'tee~' for hi:', will' have ah' opportunity' to' approach' ihe' Gclvtrnm~'rit' in'' case. ' df any\n\ni:reiibri!y, er; or or c,~ssion ina?e , by th~ Commissioner or any other subordm:ite officer. ' . . ·, ' . ' ') '' ., ' '\"' ' \"' :'' ,, . .. . ,' .' 1:; . . . ;. \"\n\nT~+~ 9n1y o\\her . pfiint tha~ , req~es . c011sidertion is d).e , c; onstitutio11al,,')'.~.\\ic\\ity 1 • .o~. section .,76, .qf , t~~, Act which, JUJlS % follow\"\": . \" ,,., , , ., , .... \"76.\n\n(1) In respect of the services ren ~. 1, : · .( 4), 'the .. Government .shall. pay the salaries, allowances, . pensions' and •. other. ''beneficial .' remuneration of .the .Commissioner; •Deputy .. ·, Commissioners, ·:Assistant Commissioners n all religious i institutioris, r the maximum\n\n of. which is fixed at 5 per cent. of the inl:ome: derived by , them. The Government is to frame rules for the purposes of fixing rates within, the:' permissibre maximums .-and •.the section ... expressly;. ··.states that•. the levy is. in\n\nrespect . of the :services rendered by the Government . and . its officers.\n\nThe validity -of .the provision has been .attacked on a.:two-fold .. ground:· tl1e . first is, that the\n\n.. contribution 1s really a . tax . and as such it was beyond the legislative competence .of the State Legislature to . , eqaq .. such . pr9yisi9n.\n\nThe otl; te~ is, that the. cqntribu- ,. tion being a: ta/!''. pr impmitioq, .th, e .PFOceed~ f .which are specifically. appropriated for . the maintenance of a particular religion or religiol!s denomination, it . comes 'within thi(mischid bf article 27. of the Constitution :afidis.hence, vord; .. , ·· .·.r~. · ':_ 1 i:,;.\n\nI)· ·•· .. <· :.ri i( .n ·.-·:·:·.· ·. .-,_i. ·: t \"\"1: ;-·· r•, .... ,. -\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RF:C . _,, s 1039\n\nI' 1,- So far as the first ground is concerned, it is not disputed that the legislation in the present case is covered· by entries. 10 and 28 of List III iir Schedule VII of the Constitution. If the cbntributioh payable under section 76 of the Act is a \"'fee'', it may come under entry 47 .of the Concurrent List which deals with \"fees\" in respect of any of the matters included in that list. .On the other hand, if. it . is a tax, as this particular tax has not been provided for in any specific entry in any of the three lists, it could come only under entry 97 of List I or article . 248 ( 1) of the Constitution. and in either view the Union Legislature alone\" would be competent to legislate .upon it. On behalf 'of the appellant,- the contention raised is that the contribution levied is a fee ·. and not tax and the learned Attorney- General, who' appeared for. the Union of India as intervener in this as well as in the other connected appeals,. made •a' strenuous attempt to support this position. .The point is certainly not free from doubt and requires careful considration. ·\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has argued in the first' place that our Constitution makes a clear distinction between taxes and Jees. •It is true, as he -has -pointed out, that there . are: a number of entries in List I of the\n\nSeventh Schedule which relate to taxes and duties of various sorts; whereas the 'last. entry; namely entry 96, speaks of \"fees\"· in respect .. of .any-.of the matters dealt with: in the list.\n\nExactly the. same is with regard 'to entries 46 to. 62 .in Lisr II all of which relate to taxes and here again ' the last entry .deals only with \"fees\"\n\nleviable . in respect. of . the different matters specified in the list. It appears that articles 110 and 119 . of the Constitution which deal with \"Money Bills\" . lay down expressly that a bill will not be deemed to be a \"Money Bill\" by reason .. only that it provides for the imposition of , fines ...... or for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees . for .. services, rendered, whereas a bill dealing with imposition : or regulation of a tax. will always . be. a rMoney . ' Bill .. Article 277 also mentions taxes, cesses and fees separately:• clt is not dear,· however,. whether the word \"tax\" as used in article 265 has not been used in the wider sense as including. all orher ,, ;,., ~\" .,. . .,\\ ·~·.·· . ,.. ,,,,,'\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endow~\n\nments, Madras\n\n\"· Sri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar.\n\n.of-Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukherjea ].\n\nTheCommisM\n\nsiomr, Hindu Religious Endow~\n\nments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukherJea J.\n\nimpositions like cesses and fees; and that at least seems to be the implication of clause (28) of article 366 which defines taxation as including the imposition of a.ny . tax or impost, whether general, local or special. It seems to us that though levying of fees is only a particular form of the exercise of the taxing power of the\n\nState, our Constitution has placed fees under a separate category for purposes of legislation and at the end of each one of the three legislative lists, it has given a power to the particular legislature to legislate on the imposition of fees in respect to every one of the items dealt with in the list itself. Some idea as to what fees are may be gathered from clause (2) of articles llO and 119 referred to above which speak of fees for licences and for services rendered.\n\nThe question for our consideration really is, what are the indicia or special characteristics that distinguish a fee from a tax proper?\n\nOn this point we have been referred to several authori\n\nties by the learned counsel appearing for the different parties including opinions expressed by writers of recognised treatises on public finance.\n\nA neat definition of , what \"tax\" means has been given by Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia in Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board('). \"A tax\", according to the learned Chief Justice, \"is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered\".\n\nThis definition brings out, in our opinion, the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in a general sense, are included within iL It is said that the essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it is imposed under statutory power without the taxpayer's consent and the payment is enforced by law (' ).\n\nThe second characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for pµblic purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on .the payer of the tax.\n\nThis is expressed by saying that the levy of taxed is fot the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the\n\n(1) 6o C.L.R. 263, 276.\n\n(2) Vide Lowd Mai; iand Dairy v. Crystal Dairy.Ltd., [1933] A .. d .. a.\n\nobject of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual, there is, as it is said, no element of quid pro quo between the taxpayer and the public authority (1 ) • Another feature of the taxation is that as it is a part of the common burden, the quantum of imposition upon the taxpayer depends generally upon his capacity to pay.\n\nComing now to fees, a 'fee' is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency.\n\nThe amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed.\n\nOrdinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay(').\n\nThese are undoubtedly some of the general characteristics, but as there may be various kinds of fees, it is not possible to formulate a definition that would be applicable to all cases.\n\nAs regards the distini::tion between a tax and a fee, it is argued in the first place on behalf of the respondent that a fee is something voluntary which a person has got to pay if he wants certain services from the Government; but there is no obligation on his part to seek such services and if he does not want the services, he can avoid the obligation.\n\nThe example given is oi a licence fee.\n\nIf a man wants a licence that is entirely his own choice and then only he has to pay the fees, but not otherwise.\n\nWe think that a careful examination will reveal that the element of compulsion or coerciveness is present in all kinds of imposition, though in different degrees and that it is not total! y absent in fees.\n\nThis, therefore, cannot be made the sole or even a material criterion for distinguishing a tax from fees.\n\nIt is difficult, we think, to conceive of a tax except, it be something like a poll tax, the incidence of which falls on all persons within a State.\n\nThe house tax has to be paid only by those who own houses, the land tax by those who possess lands, municipal .taxes or rates will fall on those who have properties within a\n\n(r) See Findlay Shirras on '•Sc:iehce of Public Finance\", Vol. I, p. :203.\n\n(2) Vide Lutz on \"Pµblic Finance\" p. !2I5.\n\nTheCommis-- sioner, Hindu R, Jigious :Endow\n\nments, Madras\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt\n\nMuk\"-erfea ].\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu\n\nReligioti~ Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof-Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n~' . . . .. '\n\nmunicipality. Persons, who do not have houses, lands or properties within municipalities, would not have to pay these taxes, but nevertheless these impositions come within' the 'Category of ti:!.'< es 1 and\" nobody cart say that it is a choice of'these\" people to own\" lands or-houses or specified kinds' of properties, so that there is no compulsion orr them to' pay taxes :it all. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is enforceable by law against a 'man in spite of his unwillingness 'or want of consent; and this element. is 'present' in 'ta:ie5 . as well' as in fees.\n\nOf course in some cases whether\" a man would come Within', , . the 'category of a .-serviCe receiver. may be a matter of . his choice, ' but that . by'' itself would . not constitute a' major test which can ' be taken: as the criterion of this species .of imposition. The distinction betWeeri a tax and a fee , lies'' primarily ill the fact ' that\n\na tax .is levied as a part of 'a common burden, while a fee is a payment for 'a special benefit or privilege. Fees confer a special capacity, although the. special advantage, as for example in the case of 'registration fees for documents \"'or 'marrfage lieel)ces, . is secondary. to the primary nibtive of regulation in the public iriterest(' ).\n\nPµblic interest seems to be at ' the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is some !; pecial benefit which the individual receives.· · As Seligman says, it' is the special ben'efir acctuirig to the individual which is the 'reason for payment 'in the case of fees; 'in the case of a tax,\n\nthe particular advantage if\" it exists at all is an incidental result of State action(). , ' If, as 'we 'hold, a fee is regarded as a sort of ret:Urn or consideration for services rendered, it is absolutely necessary 'that 'the ' levy of fees should, on the face of the legislative provision, be co-related to the expenses incurred by Governrrtent 1in rendering the services. As. indicated. in artide 110 ·rt; p. 408. : : ' \" .. ' ' ! 'l -· .,,_ ,, .\n\nheavy or moderate from that person in return for the privilege that is conferred.\n\nA most common illustration c of this type of cases is furnished by the licence fees fpr\n\nmotor vehicles.\n\nHere the costs incurred by the Governi=nt in maintaining an office or bureau for the granting of licences may be very small and the amount of imposition that is levied is based really not upon the costs incurred by the Government but upon the benefit that the individual receives.\n\nIn such cases, according to all the writers on public finance, tlie tax element is predominant(1), and if the money paid by licence holders goes for t'1e upkeep of roads and other matters .. of general public lJ' .. 'Y, the licence fee cannot but b~ regarded 'as a tax.\n\nIn the other class of cases, the Government does some po~tive work for the benefit of persons and the money is taken as the return for the work done or services rendered.\n\nIf the money thus paid is set apart and appropriated specifically for the performance of such work and is not merged in the public revenues for the benefit of the general public, it could be counted as fees and not a tax.\n\nThere is really no generic difference between the tax and fees and as said by Seligman, the taxing power of a State may manifest itself in three different forms known respectively as special assessments, fees and taxes ( 2 ).\n\nOur Constitution has, for legislative purposes, made a uistinction between a tax and a fee and while there are various entri s in the legislative lists with regard to various forrr. of taxes, there is an entry at the end of each one c' the three lists as regards fees which could be levied in respect of any of the matters that is included in it. The implication seems to be that fees ha>1e special reference to governmental action undertaken -in respect to any of these matters. Section 76 of the Madras Act speaks definitely of the contribution being levied in respect to the services rendered by, the Government; so far it has the appearance of . fees. It is true that religious institutions do not want : hese services to be rendered to them and it\n\n(1) Vide Sc'igrpan's Essays on~Taxation, p. 409. (2)\"lbid., p 406.\n\nQ-~7 S, Q, Indi~[53\n\nThe Commis.\n\nsioner, l/indu 1 Religious EndOlllments, Madras '\n\nv • Sri Lakshmindra 'Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof SrilShirur\n\nMutt. -i Mukhn)eaJ,\n\n• I\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\nMukher}ta J.\n\nmay be that they do not consider the State interference to be a benefit at all.\n\nWe agree, however, with the learned Attorney-General that in the present day concept of a State, it cannot be said that services could be rendered by the State only at the request of those who require these services.\n\nIf in the larger interest of the public, a State considers it desirable that some special service should be done for certain people, the people must accept these services, whether willing or not (').\n\nIt may be noticed, however, that the contribution that has been levied under section 76 of the Act has been made to depend upon the capacity of the payer and not upon the quantum of benefit that is supposed to be conferred on any particular religious institution.\n\nFurther the institutions, which come under the lower income group and have income less than Rs. 1,000 annually, are excluded from the liability to pay the additional charges under clause (2) of the section.\n\nThese are undoubtedly some of the characteristics of a 'tax' and the imposition bears a close analogy to income-tax.\n\nBut the material fact which negatives the theory of fees in the present case is that the money raised by levy of the contribution is, not ear-marked or specified for defraying the expenses that the Government has to incur in performing the services. All the collections go to the consolidated fund of the State and all th(· expenses have to be met not out of these collections but out of the general revenues by a proper method of .appropriation as is done in case of other Government expenses.\n\nThat in itself might not be conclusive, but in this case there is total absence of any co-relation between the expenses incurred bv the Government and the amount raised hy contribution under the provision of section 76 and in these circumstances the theory of a return or counter-payment or quid pro quo cannot have any possible application to this case.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the contribution levied under section 76 is a tax and not a fee and consequently it was beyond the power of the State Legislature to enact this provision.\n\n(t) Vide Findlay Shirras on \"Science of public Financ.-;\" Vol. f. p. 202.\n\nIn view of our decision on this point, the' other ground hardly requires consideration.\n\nWe will indicate, however, very briefly our opinion on the second point raised.\n\nThe first contention, which has been raised by Mr. Nambiar in reference to article 27 of the Constitution is that the word \"taxes\", as used therein, is not confined . to taxes proper' but is inclusive of_ all other impositions like ceses, fees,· etc. We do not think it necessary to decide this point in the present case, for in our opinion on the facts of the present case, the Imposition, although it is a tax, does not come within the purview of the latter part of the article at all.\n\nWhat is forbidden by the article is the specific appropriation of the proceeds of any tax in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.\n\nThe reason underlying this provision is obvious.\n\nOurs being a secular State and there being freedom of religion . guaranteed by the Constitution, both to individuals and to groups, it is against the policy of the Constitution to pay out of public funds any money for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.\n\nBut . the object of the contribution under section 76 of the Madras Act is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or any denomination within it.\n\nThe purpose is to see that religious trusts and institutions, wherever they exist, are properly administered.\n\nIt is a secular administration of the religious institutions that the legislature seeks to control and the object, as enunciated in the Act, is to ensure that the endowments attached to the religious institutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for the purposes for which they were founded or exist.\n\nThere is-no question of favouring any particular religion or religious denomination in such cases. Jn our opinion, article 27 of the Constitution is not attracted to the facts of the present case. , The result, therefore, is that in our opinion sections 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 are the only sections which should be declared invalid as conflicting with the fundamental rights of the respondent as Mathadhipati of the Math in question and\n\n• •\n\n)954\n\nThe Commissioiier~ Hiridu ReligiOUs Endowments, M ddias\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thiiilia Swa'niiar\n\nof Sri ShirUr\n\nMutt.\n\nJ{ukherjea J.\n\nThe Commis\n\nsiontr, Hindu Reli'gious Endow\n\nrnents, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\n!954\n\nMarch 16.\n\nsection 76 ( 1) is void as beyond the legislative competence of the Madras. State Legislature.\n\nThe rest of the Act is to be regarded as. valid.\n\nThe decision of the High Court will be modified to this extent, but as the judgment of the High Court is affirmed on its merits the appeal will stand dismissed with costs to the respondent.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nMAHANT SRI JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS\n\nAND ANOTHER v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, and GHULAM HAsAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, arts. 19(1)(1), 25, 26, 27-0rissa Hindtt Religious Endowments Act, 1939, as amended by Amending Act II of 1952, ss. 38 and 39 and proviso to s. 46-Whether ultra vires the Constitution-Section 49 of the Act-Whether ultra vires art. 27.\n\nHeld, that ss. 38 and 39 and the proviso to s. 46 of the Orissa Hindu Religious. Endowments Act, 1939 as amended by the Amending Act II of 1952 arc ultra vim arts. 19(1)(£), 25 and 26 of the Constitution.\n\nThe annual contribution provided in s. 49 of the Act is in the nature of a fee and not a tax and therefore it was \\Vithin the competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact such a provision.\n\nFurther an imposition like this is not hit by art. 27 of the Consti tution because the object of the contribution under s. 49 is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or of any denomi, nation within it but the proper administration of religious trusl; and institutions wherever they exist.\n\nCivil , Appeal No. 38 of 1953 referred to.\n\nOruGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. 405 of 1953, Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for\n\ntle enforcement of Fundamental Rights and\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1cT10N : Case No. 1 of 1950.", "total_entities": 340, "entities": [{"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT i, EPORTS 1005\n\nexisted in the other parts of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 701, "end_char": 713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS\n\nENDOWMENTS, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 716, "end_char": 769, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TheCommis-- sioner, Hindu R, Jigious :Endow\n\nments, Madras", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA SW AMIAR\n\nOF SRI SHIRUR MUTT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 776, "end_char": 828, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA SWAMIAR OF SRI SHIRUR MUTT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 832, "end_char": 850, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 858, "end_char": 867, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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{"in_sentence": "It may be stated at the outset that the petition was filed at a time when the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (Act II of 1927), was in force and the writ was prayed for against the Hindu Religious Endowments Board constituted under that Act, which was the preaecessor in authority ."}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6185, "end_char": 6195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chidambaram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6329, "end_char": 6340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was directed to be heard along with two other petitions of a similar nature relating to the temple at Chidambaram in the district of South Arcot and questions were raised in all of them regarding the validity of Madras Act II of 1927, hereinafter referred to as the Earlier Act."}}, {"text": "Arcot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was 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the present appeal is concerned, the material facts may be shortly narrated as follows: The Math, known as Shirur Math, of which the petitioner is the superior or Mathadhipati, is one of the eight Maths situated at Udipi in the district of Souh Kanara and they are reputed to have been founded by Shri Madhwacharya, the well-known exponent of dualistic theism in the Hindu Religion."}}, {"text": "Madhwacharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7973, "end_char": 7985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the present appeal is concerned, the material facts may be shortly narrated as follows: The Math, known as Shirur Math, of which the petitioner is the superior or Mathadhipati, is one of the eight Maths situated at Udipi in the district of Souh Kanara and they are reputed to have been founded by Shri Madhwacharya, the well-known exponent of dualistic theism in the Hindu Religion.", "canonical_name": "Madliwacharya"}}, {"text": "God Krishna", "label": 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"start_char": 8410, "end_char": 8416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides these eight Maths, each one of which is presided over by a Sanyasi or Swami, there exists another ancient religious institution at Udipi known as Shri Krishna Devara Math, also established by Madhwacharya which is supposed to contain an image of God Krishna originally made by Arjun and miraculously obtained from a vessel wrecked at the coast of Tulava."}}, {"text": "Shri Krishna Math", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no Mathadhipati in the Shri Krishna Math and its affairs arc managed by the superiors of the other eight Maths by turns and the custom is that tbe Swami of each of these eight Maths presides over the Shri Krishna Math in turn for a period of two years in every sixteen years."}}, {"text": "Krishna Math", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8632, "end_char": 8644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no Mathadhipati in the Shri Krishna Math and its affairs arc managed by the superiors of the other eight Maths by turns and the custom is that tbe Swami of each of these eight Maths presides over the Shri Krishna Math in turn for a period of two years in every sixteen years."}}, {"text": "Southern India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8899, "end_char": 8913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appointed time of change in the headship of the Shri Krishna Math is the occasion of a great festival, known as Pariyayam, when a vast concourse af devotees gather at Udipi from all parts of Southern India, and an ancient usage imposes a duty upon the Mathadhipati to feed every Brahmin that comes to the place at that time."}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10038, "end_char": 10048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Swami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10078, "end_char": 10083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, functioning under the Earlier Act of 1927, intervened at this stage and in exercise of its powers under section 61-A of the Act called upon the Swami to appoint a competent manager to manage the affairs of the institution."}}, {"text": "Lakshminarayana Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10234, "end_char": 10253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners' case is that the action of the Board was instigated by one Lakshminarayana Rao, a lawyer of Udipi, who wanted to have control over the affairs of the Math."}}, {"text": "Udipi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10267, "end_char": 10272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners' case is that the action of the Board was instigated by one Lakshminarayana Rao, a lawyer of Udipi, who wanted to have control over the affairs of the Math."}}, {"text": "Sripath Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10395, "end_char": 10408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in pursuance of the direction of the Board, one Sripath Achar was appointed an agent and a Power of Attorney _was executed in his favour on the 24th of December, 1948.", "canonical_name": "Sripath Achar"}}, {"text": "24th of December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10491, "end_char": 10513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in pursuance of the direction of the Board, one Sripath Achar was appointed an agent and a Power of Attorney _was executed in his favour on the 24th of December, 1948."}}, {"text": "Maham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10669, "end_char": 10674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agent, it is alleged by the petitioner, wanted to have his own way in all the affairs of the Math and paid no regard whatsoever to the wishes of the Maham."}}, {"text": "26th of September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10807, "end_char": 10830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this state of affairs the Swami, on the 26th of September, 1950, served a notice upon the agent terminating his agency and calling upon him to hand over to the Mathadhipati all account papers and vouchers relating to the institution together with the cash in hand."}}, {"text": "Mathadhipati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10927, "end_char": 10939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this state of affairs the Swami, on the 26th of September, 1950, served a notice upon the agent terminating his agency and calling upon him to hand over to the Mathadhipati all account papers and vouchers relating to the institution together with the cash in hand.", "canonical_name": "Mathadhipati"}}, {"text": "4th of October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11275, "end_char": 11295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 4th of October, 1950, the petitioner filed a suit against the agent in the Sub- Court of South 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Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras"}}, {"text": "Lakshmitidra Thirtha Swamiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11811, "end_char": 11839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195~\n\nTht Commissioner, Hindu &li.gfous Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmitidra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "Sripath Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11968, "end_char": 11981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Sripath Achar anticipating this suit filed an application to the Board on the 3rd of October, 1950, complaining against the cancellation of the Power of Attorµey and his management of the Math.", "canonical_name": "Sripath Achar"}}, {"text": "24th of October", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12272, "end_char": 12287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board on the 4th October, 1950, issued a notice 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and that a scheme should be framed for the administration of its affairs."}}, {"text": "21st of December", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13283, "end_char": 13299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that date at the request of the counsel for the Swami, it was adjourned to the 21st of December, following."}}, {"text": "8th of December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13320, "end_char": 13341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th of December, 1950, an application was filed on behalf of the Swami praying to the Board to issue a direction to the agent to hand over the account papers and other documents, without which it was not possible for him to file his objections."}}, {"text": "10th of January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13655, "end_char": 13676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the lawyer appearing for the Swami was unwell, the matter was again adjourned till the 10th of January, 1951."}}, {"text": "13th of_ January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14048, "end_char": 14070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th of_ January, 1951, the Swami, it appears, sent a written\n\nexplanation to the Board, which the latter admittedly received on the 15th."}}, {"text": "24th of January, .1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14194, "end_char": 14216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th of January, .1951, the Swami received a notice from the Board stating inter alia that the Board was satisfied that in the interests of proper administration of the Math and its endowments, the settlement of a scheme was necessary A draft scheme was sent along with the notice and if the petitioner had any objections to the same, he was required to send in his objections on or before the llth of February, 1951, as the final order regarding the scheme would be made on the 15th of February, 1951."}}, {"text": "llth of February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14588, "end_char": 14610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th of January, .1951, the Swami received a notice from the Board stating inter alia that the Board was satisfied that in the interests of proper administration of the Math and its endowments, the settlement of a scheme was necessary A draft scheme was sent along with the notice and if the petitioner had any objections to the same, he was required to send in his objections on or before the llth of February, 1951, as the final order regarding the scheme would be made on the 15th of February, 1951."}}, {"text": "15th of February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14673, "end_char": 14695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th of January, .1951, the Swami received a notice from the Board stating inter alia that the Board was satisfied that in the interests of proper administration of the Math and its endowments, the settlement of a scheme was necessary A draft scheme was sent along with the notice and if the petitioner had any objections to the same, he was required to send in his objections on or before the llth of February, 1951, as the final order regarding the scheme would be made on the 15th of February, 1951."}}, {"text": "12th of February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14705, "end_char": 14727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 12th of February, 1951, the petitioner filed the petltlon, out of which this appeal anses, in the High Court of Madras praying for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Board from taking further steps in the matter of settling a scheme for the administration of the Math."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14803, "end_char": 14823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 12th of February, 1951, the petitioner filed the petltlon, out of which this appeal anses, in the High Court of Madras praying for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Board from taking further steps in the matter 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should\n\n6--97 S. C.Ind'a/59\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Sftirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras"}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16402, "end_char": 16430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merits, it was held that in the circumstances of the case the action of the Board was a perverse exercise of its jurisdiction and that it should\n\n6--97 S. C.Ind'a/59\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Sftirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16455, "end_char": 16464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J,\n\nThe Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ."}}, {"text": "Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16473, "end_char": 16524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J,\n\nThe Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras"}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16530, "end_char": 16558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J,\n\nThe Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "Judges pronounced quite a number of sections of the New Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16729, "end_char": 16788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16924, "end_char": 16938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges pronounced quite a number of sections of the New Act", "statute": "Judges pronounced quite a number of sections of the New Act"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17331, "end_char": 17345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges pronounced quite a number of sections of the New Act", "statute": "Judges pronounced quite a number of sections of the New Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18181, "end_char": 18193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18448, "end_char": 18458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19002, "end_char": 19016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19641, "end_char": 19650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19772, "end_char": 19811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Earlier Act provided for supervision of Hindu religious endowments through a statutory body known as the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20733, "end_char": 20743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra Thirthit Swamiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20978, "end_char": 21006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l''nts, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirthit Swamiar\n\nofSri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21047, "end_char": 21095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21394, "end_char": 21404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21744, "end_char": 21754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": 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23276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23524, "end_char": 23537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23679, "end_char": 23689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23858, "end_char": 23872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23917, "end_char": 23927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23998, "end_char": 24008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24562, "end_char": 24572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24821, "end_char": 24831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25067, "end_char": 25077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25532, "end_char": 25542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MukherjeaJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25864, "end_char": 25875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MukherjeaJ.\n\nST.JPREME COURT REPORTS [1954}\n\nobjects of the trust fail.", "canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ."}}, {"text": "Chapter VI of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25936, "end_char": 25957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 63 to 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25975, "end_char": 25992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26413, "end_char": 26423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26799, "end_char": 26809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26813, "end_char": 26911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26913, "end_char": 26923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27133, "end_char": 27143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27165, "end_char": 27175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Mathadhipati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27598, "end_char": 27610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court have taken the view that the respondent as Mathadhipati has certain well defined rights in the institution and its endowments which could be regarded as rights to property within the meaning of article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Mathadhipati"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27749, "end_char": 27762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27955, "end_char": 27968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28169, "end_char": 28179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sivalli Brahmins", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28503, "end_char": 28519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Math in question is really an institution belonging to Sivalli Brahmins, who are a section of the followers of Madhwacharya and hence constitutes a religious denomination within the meaning of article 26 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28641, "end_char": 28651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28732, "end_char": 28742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29032, "end_char": 29042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29132, "end_char": 29142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29183, "end_char": 29193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29488, "end_char": 29502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the other three points arc concerned, we will have to examine first of all the general contentions that have been raised by the learned Attorney-General, who appeared for the Union of India as an intervener in this and other connected cases, and the questions raised are, whether these articles of the Constitution are at all 'lvailable to the respondent in the present case and whether they give him any protection regarding the rights and privileges, of the infraction of which he complains."}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29819, "end_char": 29835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30214, "end_char": 30224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra Thirlha Swamiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30486, "end_char": 30513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commis sioner, Hindu Religious EndowM\n\nments, .\\>!i:1ras\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirlha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30741, "end_char": 30751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31330, "end_char": 31340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31361, "end_char": 31371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32430, "end_char": 32449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and is much larger than that of a Shebait in the debutter property It was held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court('), that Shebaitship itself is property, and this decision was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh v.\n\nLal Behary('), and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata ('),\n\n(t) Vide Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami, 48 I. A. ::;02 .'.2', ''i.--1(' .\\fonahai v. Bhupendra 6n Cal."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34245, "end_char": 34258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endow~\n\nments, Madras", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34998, "end_char": 35049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the beneficial interest which he enjoys is appurtenant to his duties ·\n\n(1) [1951) S.C.R. 1125\n\nThe Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endow~\n\nments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra T hirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36282, "end_char": 36295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36544, "end_char": 36554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "17th December, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36771, "end_char": 36790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "107 of 1952, decided by this court on the 17th December, 1953), an opinion was expressed by Patanjali Sastri\n\nC. J. that article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution is concerned only with the abstract right and capacity to acquire, hold and dispose of property and that it has no relation to concrete property rights."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36821, "end_char": 36837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "107 of 1952, decided by this court on the 17th December, 1953), an opinion was expressed by Patanjali Sastri\n\nC. J. that article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution is concerned only with the abstract right and capacity to acquire, hold and dispose of property and that it has no relation to concrete property rights."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36850, "end_char": 36863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38129, "end_char": 38145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38230, "end_char": 38240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39225, "end_char": 39235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39479, "end_char": 39489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39662, "end_char": 39672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39830, "end_char": 39861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mmts, .Madras v.\n\nSr£ Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar\n\nof Sri Shirur Mutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "Sankaracharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40466, "end_char": 40479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of theological teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers since then.", "canonical_name": "Sankaracharya"}}, {"text": "Sankara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40536, "end_char": 40543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu rdigion that we find in India at t:1e prrs\"nt ,cc; Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name,-in many cases it is the name of the founder,-and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation.", "canonical_name": "Sankaracharya"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40681, "end_char": 40686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu rdigion that we find in India at t:1e prrs\"nt ,cc; Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name,-in many cases it is the name of the founder,-and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation."}}, {"text": "Ramanuja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40960, "end_char": 40968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madliwacharya and other religious teachers."}}, {"text": "Vaishnabas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41004, "end_char": 41014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madliwacharya and other religious teachers."}}, {"text": "Madliwacharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41092, "end_char": 41105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madliwacharya and other religious teachers.", "canonical_name": "Madliwacharya"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41490, "end_char": 41500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41750, "end_char": 41760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42350, "end_char": 42360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43638, "end_char": 43656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 44(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43710, "end_char": 43723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jiiven", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43814, "end_char": 43820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Articles 25 and 26 of our Constitution are based for the most part upon article 44(2) of the Constitution of Eire and we have great doubt whether a definition of \"religion\" as Jiiven above could have been in the minds of our\n\nContitution-makers when they framed the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44514, "end_char": 44541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is notlllng el6e but a:\n\n(1) Vide Da11is v. Benso,,, 133 U.S. at 34Q.\n\nr he Commis~ .sinner, Hindu Religious Endour ·\n\nmtnts, Madras\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45250, "end_char": 45260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Latham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45263, "end_char": 45269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia while dealing with the provision of section 116 of the Australian Constitution which inter alia forbids the Commonwealth to prohibit the \"free exercise of any religion\" made the IO!lowing weighty observations ( 1 ) :\n\n\"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil Government should not interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion."}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45283, "end_char": 45306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia while dealing with the provision of section 116 of the Australian Constitution which inter alia forbids the Commonwealth to prohibit the \"free exercise of any religion\" made the IO!lowing weighty observations ( 1 ) :\n\n\"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil Government should not interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion."}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45343, "end_char": 45354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45945, "end_char": 45956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46492, "end_char": 46510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46579, "end_char": 46589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26(b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48226, "end_char": 48240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48247, "end_char": 48260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48866, "end_char": 48875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This association of persons loosely organised throughout Australia, U.S.A. and other countries regard the literal interpretation of the Bible as fundamental to proper religious beliefs."}}, {"text": "U.S.A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48877, "end_char": 48883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This association of persons loosely organised throughout Australia, U.S.A. and other countries regard the literal interpretation of the Bible as fundamental to proper religious beliefs."}}, {"text": "Laksltmindra Thirlha SWamiiJr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49219, "end_char": 49248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They refuse to take oath of allegiance to the king or other constituted\n\nTill Commis- Sioner, Hindu Religious EndoWments, Madras\n\nSri Laksltmindra Thirlha SWamiiJr\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50027, "end_char": 50038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50746, "end_char": 50753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The courts of America were at one time greatly agitated over the question of legality of a State regulation which required the pupils in public schools on pain of compulsion to participate in a daily ceremony of saluting the national flag, while reciting in unison, a pledge of allegiance to it in a certain set formula."}}, {"text": "Lilian", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51179, "end_char": 51185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case two small children, Lilian and William Gobitis, were expelled from the public school of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part of the daily exercise."}}, {"text": "William Gobitis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51190, "end_char": 51205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case two small children, Lilian and William Gobitis, were expelled from the public school of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part of the daily exercise."}}, {"text": "Gobitis family", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51351, "end_char": 51365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gobitis family were affiliated with \"Jehova's Witnesses\" and had been\n\n127. • ("}}, {"text": "S. 586", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51504, "end_char": 51510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53275, "end_char": 53277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53367, "end_char": 53402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "literature aµd S0liciting people to purchase certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by :.the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society."}}, {"text": "S. 624", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53777, "end_char": 53783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53801, "end_char": 53807, "source": "regex", 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58554, "end_char": 58564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58566, "end_char": 58576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commis sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 58594, "end_char": 58643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "section 53 .(beca.use courts have ample powers to meet these contingencies), section 54, clause (2) of section 55, section 56, clause (3)\n\nThe Commis sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur Mutt.", "canonical_name": "Commis-- sioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras"}}, {"text": "Lakshmindta Thirtha Swamiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58777, "end_char": 58804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras 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Somayya"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59395, "end_char": 59405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60645, "end_char": 60655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60940, "end_char": 60950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 1031", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61315, "end_char": 61321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62050, "end_char": 62060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62823, "end_char": 62833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62939, "end_char": 62949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63006, "end_char": 63016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63506, "end_char": 63516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63566, "end_char": 63576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L\"akshmindra Thirtha Swamiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 63863, "end_char": 63891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No exception can be taken to the section if those\n\nTlze Commis-\n\n, sioner, Hindu Religio'us Endow ..\n\nents, MadrtlJ\n\nSri L\"akshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "Muklierjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63914, "end_char": 63924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklierjea J.\n\n19~4\n\nThe Commissfoner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMut~.\n\nMukhrt; p. 408. : : ' \" .. ' ' ! '"}}, {"text": "Section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93258, "end_char": 93268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vide Sc'igrpan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93536, "end_char": 93550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that religious institutions do not want : hese services to be rendered to them and it\n\n(1) Vide Sc'igrpan's Essays on~Taxation, p. 409. ("}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra 'Thirtha Swamiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 93693, "end_char": 93721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sioner, l/indu 1 Religious EndOlllments, Madras '\n\nv • Sri Lakshmindra 'Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof SrilShirur\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94467, "end_char": 94477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95685, "end_char": 95695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95931, "end_char": 95941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vide Findlay Shirras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96061, "end_char": 96081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(t) Vide Findlay Shirras on \"Science of public Financ.-;\" Vol."}}, {"text": "Nambiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96353, "end_char": 96360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention, which has been raised by Mr. Nambiar in reference to article 27 of the Constitution is that the word \"taxes\", as used therein, is not confined ."}}, {"text": "article 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96377, "end_char": 96387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97387, "end_char": 97397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98066, "end_char": 98076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98196, "end_char": 98239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioiier~ Hiridu ReligiOUs", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 98416, "end_char": 98447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result, therefore, is that in our opinion sections 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 are the only sections which should be declared invalid as conflicting with the fundamental rights of the respondent as Mathadhipati of the Math in question and\n\n• •\n\n)954\n\nThe Commissioiier~ Hiridu ReligiOUs Endowments, M ddias\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thiiilia Swa'niiar\n\nof Sri ShirUr\n\nMutt."}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra Thiiilia Swa'niiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 98473, "end_char": 98503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result, therefore, is that in our opinion sections 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 are the only sections which should be declared invalid as conflicting with the fundamental rights of the respondent as Mathadhipati of the Math in question and\n\n• •\n\n)954\n\nThe Commissioiier~ Hiridu ReligiOUs Endowments, M ddias\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thiiilia Swa'niiar\n\nof Sri ShirUr\n\nMutt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmindra T hirtha Swa.ffliar"}}, {"text": "J{ukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98527, "end_char": 98537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J{ukherjea J.\n\nThe Commis\n\nsiontr, Hindu Reli'gious Endow\n\nrnents, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt."}}, {"text": "Commis", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 98546, "end_char": 98552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J{ukherjea J.\n\nThe Commis\n\nsiontr, Hindu Reli'gious Endow\n\nrnents, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt."}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98677, "end_char": 98687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MAHANT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 99033, "end_char": 99039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHANT SRI JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS\n\nAND ANOTHER v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 99044, "end_char": 99065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHANT SRI JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS\n\nAND ANOTHER v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "STATE OF ORISSA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 99087, "end_char": 99102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHANT SRI JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS\n\nAND ANOTHER v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99144, "end_char": 99163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, and GHULAM HAsAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "GHULAM HAsAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99182, "end_char": 99194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, and GHULAM HAsAN JJ.]", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99201, "end_char": 99222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 19(1)(1), 25, 26, 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99224, "end_char": 99250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hindtt Religious Endowments Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99258, "end_char": 99295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99311, "end_char": 99334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99336, "end_char": 99349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99365, "end_char": 99370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99408, "end_char": 99418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "art. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99450, "end_char": 99457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "ss. 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99471, "end_char": 99484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99504, "end_char": 99509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "Endowments Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99541, "end_char": 99561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99580, "end_char": 99603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 19(1)(£), 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99618, "end_char": 99643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99702, "end_char": 99707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "art. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99907, "end_char": 99914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99981, "end_char": 99986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100270, "end_char": 100280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100288, "end_char": 100309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_1046_1055_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "The Commis\n\nsiontr, Hindu Reli'gious Endow\n\nrnents, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar\n\nof Sri Shirur\n\nMutt.\n\n!954\n\nMarch 16.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954]\n\nsection 76 ( 1) is void as beyond the legislative competence of the Madras. State Legislature.\n\nThe rest of the Act is to be regarded as. valid.\n\nThe decision of the High Court will be modified to this extent, but as the judgment of the High Court is affirmed on its merits the appeal will stand dismissed with costs to the respondent.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nMAHANT SRI JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS\n\nAND ANOTHER v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, and GHULAM HAsAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, arts. 19(1)(1), 25, 26, 27-0rissa Hindtt Religious Endowments Act, 1939, as amended by Amending Act II of 1952, ss. 38 and 39 and proviso to s. 46-Whether ultra vires the Constitution-Section 49 of the Act-Whether ultra vires art. 27.\n\nHeld, that ss. 38 and 39 and the proviso to s. 46 of the Orissa Hindu Religious. Endowments Act, 1939 as amended by the Amending Act II of 1952 arc ultra vim arts. 19(1)(£), 25 and 26 of the Constitution.\n\nThe annual contribution provided in s. 49 of the Act is in the nature of a fee and not a tax and therefore it was \\Vithin the competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact such a provision.\n\nFurther an imposition like this is not hit by art. 27 of the Consti tution because the object of the contribution under s. 49 is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or of any denomi, nation within it but the proper administration of religious trusl; and institutions wherever they exist.\n\nCivil , Appeal No. 38 of 1953 referred to.\n\nOruGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. 405 of 1953, Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for\n\ntle enforcement of Fundamental Rights and\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1cT10N : Case No. 1 of 1950.\n\n1954 , Appeal under section 205 of the Governmc;:nt of India Act, 1935, from the Judgment and Decree, dated the 13th September, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature, Orissa, in First Appeal No. 39 of 1949, arising out of the Judgment and Decree, dated the 11th September, 1945, of tbe Court of the District Judge, Cuttack, in Original Suit No. 3 of 1943.\n\n- Mahant Sri Jagannath Rarnanl{j Das and Another v.\n\nN. C. Chatteriee ' (B. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad, with him) for the petitioners and appellants Nos. 1 to 13.\n\nS. P. Sinha (B. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad, with him) for appellants 14 to 16.\n\nM. , C. Setalvad ( G. N. Joshi, with him) for respondents in both the matters. Agent R. H. Dhebar.\n\n1954. March 16.\n\nThe Judgment of the . Court was delivered by MuKHERJEA J.-These two connected matters are taken up together for the sake of convenience and may be disposed of by one and the same judgment. Petition No. 405 of 1953 has been presented to this court under article 32 of the Constitution and the petitioners are the Mahants or superiors of two ancient and wellknown religious institutions of Orissa, both of which • have endowments of considerable value situated within and outside the Orissa State.\n\nAn Act, known as the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, was passed by the Orissa Legislative Assembly functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935, in the year 1939 and it received the assent of the Governor-General on the 31st August, 1939.\n\nThe object of the Act, as stated in the preamble, is \"to provide for the better administration and governance of certain Hindu religious endowments\" and the expression \"religious endow111ent\" has been defined comprehensively in the Act as meaning all property belonging to, or given or endowed for the support of Maths or temples or for the\n\nprformance of any service or charity connected therewith.\n\nThe whole scheme of the Act is to vest the control and supervision of public temples and Maths in a statutory authority designated as the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments and to confer\n\n7·1ie State of .\n\nOrissa and Another.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nOri:isa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukherjea ].\n\nupon him certain powers with a view to enable him to exercise effective control over the trustees of the Maths and the temples.\n\nThe Commissioner is required to be a member of the Judicial or Executive Service of the Province and his actions are subject to the general control of the Provincial Government. For the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Commissioner and his staff, every Math or temple, the annual income of which exceeds Rs. 250, is required under section 49 of the Act to pay an annual contribution at certain percentage of the annual income which increases progressively with the increase in the income.\n\nWith this Fontribution as well as loans and grants made by the Government, a special fund is to be constituted as provided by section 50 and the expenses of administering the religious endowments are to be met out of this fund.\n\nIn July, 1940, a suit, out of which the Case No. 1 of 1950 arises, was instituted in the court of the District Judge of Cuttack by a number of Mahants including the two petitioners in the petition under article 32 before us, praying for a declaration that the Orissa Religious Endowments Act of 1939 was ultra vires the Orissa Legislature and for other consequential reliefs.\n\nThe validity of the Act was challenged substantially on three grounds, namely, (i) that the subject matter of legislation was not covered by Entry 34 of List II in Schedule VII of the Government of India Act. 1935;\n\n(ii) that the contribution levied under section 49 was, in substance, a tax and could not have been imposed by the Provincial Legislature; and (iii) that as the provisions of the Act affected the income of properties situated outside the territorial limits of the Province, the Act was extra-territorial in its operation and hence inoperative.\n\nAll these contentions were overruled by the District Judge of Cuttack, who by his judgment, dated the 11th September, 1945, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.\n\nAgainst that decision, an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the High Court of Orissa and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench, consistng of Jagannadhadas and Narasimham JJ.\n\nThe learned Judges by two separate but concurring judgments, dated the 13th September, 1949, affirmed the decision\n\nof the District Judge and dismissed the appeal. It is against' this Judgment that Case No. 1 of 1950 has come to this court. .\n\nDuring the pendency of the appeal in this court the Constitution came into force on the 26th January, 1950, with its chapter on fundamental rights, and the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act also has been amended recently by the \"State Legislature of Orissa by amending Act II of 1952.\n\nIn view of these changes, the present application under article 32 of the Constitution has been filed by two of the Mahants who figured as plaintiffs in the Declaratory Suit of 1940 and the application has been framed comprehensively so as to include all points that could be urged against the validity of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act Off the basis of the provisions of the Constitution.\n\nIt is conceded by both the parties that in these circumstances it is not necessary for us to deal separately with the appeal.\n\nThe decision, which we would arrive at in the petition under article 32, will be our pronouncement on the validity or otherwise of the different provisions of the impugned Act.\n\nIt may be stated at the beginning that the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1939 follows closely the pattern of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1927 which has been now replaced by a later Act passed by the State Legislature of Madras in 1951 and described as the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. The grounds upon which the validity of the Orissa Act has been attacked before us are substantially the same as were urged in assailing the constitutional validity of the Madras Act, in Civil appeal No. 38 of 1953 (T lie Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endotvments, Madras v.\n\nSri Lakslimindra Tliirtlia Swamiar), the judgment in which has just been delivered. 1 The grounds urged can be classified conveniently under two heads. In the first place, some of the provisions of the impugned Act have been challenged as invalid on the ground that they invade the fundamental rights of the petitioners\n\nguara?ted under articles 19(1) (£), 25, 26 and 27 of the Const1tut10n.\n\nThe other branch of the contention\n\n(1) [ 1 9al s.c.R. 1005.\n\n195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj- Dat\n\nahd Anothtf'\n\nv • The State of\n\nOrissa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukher:jea J,\n\nklahant Sri\n\nJagannatk Ramanuj Das and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nOrissa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nrelates to the proVision for levying contribution on religious institutions under section 49 of the Act and this provision has been impeached firstly on the ground that the contribution being in substance a tax, it was beyond the competency of the Provincial Legislature to enact any such provision.\n\nThe other ground raised is, that the payment of such tax or imposition is prohibited by article 27 of the Constitution.\n\nThe general questions relating to the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights embodied in articles 19 ( l) ( f), 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution in connection with Maths and temples have been discmsed fully in our judgment in the Madras appeal referred to above and it would not be necessary to reiterate these discussions for purposes of t11e present case.\n\nWe can straightaway proceed to examine the different provisions of the Act to which objections have been taken by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the light of the principles which this court has laid down in the Madras appeal.\n\nIt may be said that many of the impugned provisions of the Orissa Act correspond more or less to similar provisions in the Madras Act.\n\nSection 11 of the Act has been objected to on the ground that it vests almost an uncontrolled and arbitrary power upon the Commissioner. This section corresponds to section 20 of the Madras Act and as has been pointed out in our judgment, in the Madras appeal, the powers, though seemingly wide, can be exercised only to ensure that Maths and temples are properly maintained and the endowments are properly administered.\n\nAs the object and purpose for which these powers could be exercised have been indicated precisely, we do not think that it could be said that the anthority vested in the Commissioner is in any way arbitrary or unrestricted.\n\nThe explanation attached to the section only makes it clear that the general power conferred upon the Commissioner extends to passing of interim orders as the Commissioner might think fit.\n\nSection 14 lays down the duties of the trustee and the care which he should exercise in the management\n\nof the affairs of the religious institutions.\n\nThe care, which he has to exercise, is what is demanded normally of every trustee m charge of trust estate and the standard is that of a man of ordinary prudence dealing with his own funds or properties. This is a matter. relating to the administration of the estate and does not interfere with any fundamental rights of the trustee.\n\nFor the same reason, we think, no objection could be taken to the provision of section 28 which lays down that the trustee of a temple shall be bound to obey all. orders issued under the provisions of the Act. by the Commissioner.\n\nIf the orders are lawful and made in pursuance of authority properly vested in the officer, no legitimate ground could be urged for not complying with the orders.\n\nThe sections of the Act, to which serious objections have been taken are sections 38, 39, 46, 47 and 49.\n\nSections 38 and 39 relate to the framing of a scheme.\n\nA scheme can certainly be settled to ensure due administration of the endowed property but the objection seems to be that the Act provides for the framing of a scheme not by a civil court or under its supervision but by the Commissioner, who is a mere administrative or executive officer.\n\nThere is also no provision for appeal against his order to the court.\n\nUnder section 58 of the Madras Act, al:hough the scheme is to be framed by the Deputy Commissioner, an appeal lies against his order to the Commissioner in the first place.\n\nA party aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner again has a right of suit in the ordinary civil court, with a further right of appeal to the High Court. It seems that sub-section ( 4) of section 39 of the impugned Act, as it originally stood, allowed the trustee or any person having an interest in the institution to file a suit in a civil court to modify or set aside an order framing a scheme; and under section 40, the order made under section 39 could be final only subject to the result of such suit. Subsection (4) of section 39, however, was deleted by the Amending Act of 1952, and under the new subsection (4), the order passed by the Commissioner has been made final and conclusive.\n\nStrangely, however, section 41. of , the Act has still been retained in its\n\n9-_97 S. C. Indla/59\n\nMahant Sri _Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Anoth1r\n\nThe State of Oris.la and\n\nAnother.\n\nMukherjea ].\n\nMahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Another v.\n\nThe State of Orissa and\n\nAnother.\n\n.~1ukherjea J.\n\noriginal shape and that speaks of an order settling a scheme being set aside or modified by the court.\n\nObviously, this is careless drafting and the Legislature did not seem to have adverted to the apparently contradictory provisions that it made. The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the State of rissa, has also conceded that these sections require redrafting.\n\nWe think that the settling of a scheme in regard to a religious institution by an executive officer without the intervention of any judicial tribunal amounts to an unreasonable restriction upon the right of property of the superior of the religious institution which is blended with his office.\n\nSections 38 and 39 of the Act must, therefore, be held to be invalid.\n\nThere is nothing wrong in the provision of section 46 itself but legitimate exception, we think, can be taken to the proviso appended to the section.\n\nUnder the law, as it stands, the Mahant or the superior of a Math has very wide powers of disposal over the surplus income and the only restriction that is recognised is that he cannot spend the income for his own personal use unconnected with the dignity of his office. The purposes specified in section 46 are all conducive to the oenerit of the institution and there is no reason why the discretion of the trustee in regard to the spending of surplus for such purposes also should be still further restricted by directions which the Commissioner may choose to issue. Section 47 ( 1) lays down how the rule of cy pres is to be applied not merely when the origi(lal purpose of the trust fails or becomes incapable of being carried out either in whole or in part by reason of subsequent events, but also where there is a surplus left after meeting the legitimate expenses of the institution.\n\nObjection apparently could be raised against the last provision of the sub-section, but as subsection ( 4) of section 47 gives the party aggrieved by any order of the Commissioner in this respect to file a suit in a civil court and the court is empowered to modify or set .aside such order of the. Commissioner, we do not think that there is any reasonable ground for complaint.\n\nThe only other section that requires consideration is section 49 under which every Math or remple having\n\nan annual income exceeding Rs. 250 has got to make an annual contribution for meeting the expenses of the Commissioner and the officers and servants working under him. The first question that arises with regard to this provision is, whether the imposition is a tax or a fee; and it is not disputed that if it is a tax, the Provincial Legislature would have no authority to cnacr such a provision. This question has been elaborately discussed in our judgment in the Madras appeal referred to above and it is not necessary to repeat the discussions over again.\n\nAs has been pointed out in the Madras appeal, there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee and both are different forms in which the taxing power of a State manifests itself.\n\nOur Constitution, however, has made a distinction between a tax and a fee for legislative purposes and white mere are various entries in the three lists with regard to various forms of taxation, there is an entry at the end of each one of these lists as regards fees which could be levied in respect of every one of the matters that are included therein.\n\nA tax is undoubtedly in the nature of a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes, the payment of which is enforced by law.\n\nBut the essential thing in a tax i~ that the impos1t10n is made for public purposes to •meet the general expenses of the State without reference to any special benefit to be conferred upon the payers 0£ the tax.\n\nThe taxes collected are all merged in the general revenue of the State to be applied for general public purposes.\n\nThus, tax is a common burden and the only return which the taxpayer gets is the participation in the common benefits of the State. Fees, on the other hand, are payments primarily in the public interest but for some special service rendered or some special work done for the benefit of those from whom payments are demanded.\n\nThus in fees there is always an element of quid pro quo which is absent in a tax.\n\nTwo elements are thus essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee.\n\nIt the first place, it: must be levied in consideration ' of certain service's which . the ' individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly;' (But' this by'itsdf iinot enough to make\n\n195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanid Das\n\na'7ld Aqther\n\nThe State of Orissa and\n\nAnoth~.\n\n~-- Mukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nThi State of\n\nO, Usa and\n\nAnother.\n\nMukherjea - ].\n\nthe imposition a fee, if the payments demanded for rendering of such services are not set apart or specifically appropriated for that purpose but are merged in the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes.\n\nJudged by this test, the contribution that is levied by section 49 of the Orissa Act will have to be regarded as a fee and not a tax. The payment is demanded only for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Commissioner and his office which is the machinery set up for due administration of the affairs of the religious institution.\n\nThe collections made are not merged in the general public revenue and are not appropriated in the manner laid down for appropriation of expenses for other public purposes. They go to constitute the fund which is contemplated by section 50 of the Act and this fund, to which also the Provincial Government contributes both by way of loan and grant, is specifically set apart for the rendering of services involved in carrying out the provisions of the Act. We think, therefore, that according to the principles which this court lias enunciated in the Madras appeal mentioned above, the contribution could legitimately be regarded as fees and hence it was within the competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact this provision.\n\nThe fact that the amount of kvy 1s graded according to the capacity of the payers though it gives it the appearance of an income-tax, is not by any means a decisive test.\n\nWe are further of opinion that an imposition like this cannot be said to be hit by article 27 of the Constitution.\n\nWhat is forbidden by article 27 is the specific appropriation of the proceeds of any tax in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.\n\nThe object of the contribution under section 49 is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or of any denomination within it; the purpose is to see that religious trusts and institutions wherever they exist are properly administered. It is the secular administration of the religious institutions that the Legislature seeks to control and the object, as enunciated in the Act, is to ensure that the endowments attached to the religious\n\ninstitutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for purposes for which they were founded or exist.\n\nAs there is no question of favouring any particular religion or religious denomination, article 27 could not possibly apply.\n\nThe result is that, in our opinion, the on! y sections of the Act, which are invalid, are sections 38, 39 and the proviso to section 46.\n\nThe application under article 32 is, therefore, allowed to this extent that a writ in the nature of mandamus would issue restraining the Commissioner and the State Government enforcing against the petitioners the prov!Slons of the sections mentioned above.\n\nThe other prayers of the petlt10ners are disallowed.\n\nNo separate order is necessary in Case No. 1 of 1950, which will stand dismissed.\n\nWe make no order as to costs either in the petition or in the appeal.\n\nRATILAL PANACHAND GANDHI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.\n\n(and connected appeal) [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, arts. 25 and 26-Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (Act XX!X of 1950), ss. 44, 47(3) (4) (5) (6), 55(c) and 56(1) -Whether ultra vires the Constitution-Section 58 of the Act- Whether ultra vires the State Legislature.\n\nHeld, that the provision of s. 44 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, relating to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of any public trust by the court without any reservation in regard to religious institutions Iike ten1ples and Maths is unconstitutional and must be held to be void.\n\nThe provisions of cl. (3) to (6) of s. 47 of the Act to the extent that they relate to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of a religious trust like temple and Math are unconstitutional and must be held to be void.\n\nA religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Cofistitution to tnanage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for religion and for religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nv • The State of Orissa and\n\nAnot,,,,..\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMarch 18.", "total_entities": 121, "entities": [{"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 233, "end_char": 239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "section 76 ( 1) is void as beyond the legislative competence of the Madras."}}, {"text": "MAHANT SRI JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 521, "end_char": 566, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHANT SRI JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS\n\nAND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 571, "end_char": 602, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 606, "end_char": 624, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 632, "end_char": 641, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 653, "end_char": 664, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HAsAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 670, "end_char": 686, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HAsAN JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 689, "end_char": 710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 19(1)(1), 25, 26, 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 712, "end_char": 738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hindtt Religious Endowments Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 746, "end_char": 783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 799, "end_char": 822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 824, "end_char": 837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 853, "end_char": 858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 896, "end_char": 906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "art. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 938, "end_char": 945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "ss. 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 959, "end_char": 972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 992, "end_char": 997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "Endowments Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1029, "end_char": 1049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1068, "end_char": 1091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 19(1)(£), 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1106, "end_char": 1131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1190, "end_char": 1195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "art. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1395, "end_char": 1402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1469, "end_char": 1474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1758, "end_char": 1768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act II of 1952", "statute": "Amending Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1776, "end_char": 1797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 205", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1912, "end_char": 1923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1947, "end_char": 1962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2338, "end_char": 2350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Sri Jagannath Rarnanl{j Das and Another v.\n\nN. C. Chatteriee ' (B. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad, with him) for the petitioners and appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2412, "end_char": 2423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (B. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad, with him) for appellants 14 to 16."}}, {"text": "B. K. Saran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2425, "end_char": 2436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (B. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad, with him) for appellants 14 to 16."}}, {"text": "M. , C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2491, "end_char": 2507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. , C. Setalvad ( G. N. Joshi, with him) for respondents in both the matters."}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2510, "end_char": 2521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. , C. Setalvad ( G. N. Joshi, with him) for respondents in both the matters."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2576, "end_char": 2588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2653, "end_char": 2662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by MuKHERJEA J.-These two connected matters are taken up together for the sake of convenience and may be disposed of by one and the same judgment.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2861, "end_char": 2871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2996, "end_char": 3002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "405 of 1953 has been presented to this court under article 32 of the Constitution and the petitioners are the Mahants or superiors of two ancient and wellknown religious institutions of Orissa, both of which • have endowments of considerable value situated within and outside the Orissa State."}}, {"text": "Orissa State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3090, "end_char": 3102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "405 of 1953 has been presented to this court under article 32 of the Constitution and the petitioners are the Mahants or superiors of two ancient and wellknown religious institutions of Orissa, both of which • have endowments of considerable value situated within and outside the Orissa State."}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3139, "end_char": 3163, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Orissa Legislative Assembly functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st August, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3339, "end_char": 3356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An Act, known as the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, was passed by the Orissa Legislative Assembly functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935, in the year 1939 and it received the assent of the Governor-General on the 31st August, 1939."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3995, "end_char": 4004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nOri:isa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukherjea ].", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4021, "end_char": 4042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nOri:isa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukherjea ].", "canonical_name": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nOri:isa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nOri:isa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukherjea ].", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nOri:isa"}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4572, "end_char": 4582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4857, "end_char": 4867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Judge of Cuttack", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5062, "end_char": 5087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1950 arises, was instituted in the court of the District Judge of Cuttack by a number of Mahants including the two petitioners in the petition under article 32 before us, praying for a declaration that the Orissa Religious Endowments Act of 1939 was ultra vires the Orissa Legislature and for other consequential reliefs."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5163, "end_char": 5173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5227, "end_char": 5251, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "List II in Schedule VII of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5490, "end_char": 5544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5593, "end_char": 5603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II in Schedule VII of the Government of India Act", "statute": "List II in Schedule VII of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "11th September, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6000, "end_char": 6020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these contentions were overruled by the District Judge of Cuttack, who by his judgment, dated the 11th September, 1945, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit."}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6123, "end_char": 6143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against that decision, an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the High Court of Orissa and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench, consistng of Jagannadhadas and Narasimham JJ."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6203, "end_char": 6216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against that decision, an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the High Court of Orissa and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench, consistng of Jagannadhadas and Narasimham JJ.", "canonical_name": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das"}}, {"text": "Narasimham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6221, "end_char": 6231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against that decision, an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the High Court of Orissa and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench, consistng of Jagannadhadas and Narasimham JJ."}}, {"text": "13th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6308, "end_char": 6328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges by two separate but concurring judgments, dated the 13th September, 1949, affirmed the decision\n\nof the District Judge and dismissed the appeal."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6569, "end_char": 6587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the appeal in this court the Constitution came into force on the 26th January, 1950, with its chapter on fundamental rights, and the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act also has been amended recently by the \"State Legislature of Orissa by amending Act II of 1952."}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6650, "end_char": 6674, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State Legislature of Orissa by amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6714, "end_char": 6757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6827, "end_char": 6837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Legislature of Orissa by amending Act", "statute": "State Legislature of Orissa by amending Act"}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7094, "end_char": 7118, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7361, "end_char": 7371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Legislature of Orissa by amending Act", "statute": "State Legislature of Orissa by amending Act"}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7534, "end_char": 7558, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7615, "end_char": 7639, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Charitable Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7814, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8428, "end_char": 8442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagannath Ramanuj-", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8564, "end_char": 8582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj- Dat\n\nahd Anothtf'\n\nv • The State of\n\nOrissa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukher:jea J,\n\nklahant Sri\n\nJagannatk Ramanuj Das and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nOrissa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nrelates to the proVision for levying contribution on religious institutions under section 49 of the Act and this provision has been impeached firstly on the ground that the contribution being in substance a tax, it was beyond the competency of the Provincial Legislature to enact any such provision.", "canonical_name": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nOrissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj- Dat\n\nahd Anothtf'\n\nv • The State of\n\nOrissa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukher:jea J,\n\nklahant Sri\n\nJagannatk Ramanuj Das and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nOrissa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nrelates to the proVision for levying contribution on religious institutions under section 49 of the Act and this provision has been impeached firstly on the ground that the contribution being in substance a tax, it was beyond the competency of the Provincial Legislature to enact any such provision.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nOri:isa"}}, {"text": "Jagannatk Ramanuj Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8669, "end_char": 8690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj- Dat\n\nahd Anothtf'\n\nv • The State of\n\nOrissa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukher:jea J,\n\nklahant Sri\n\nJagannatk Ramanuj Das and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nOrissa and\n\nAnother\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nrelates to the proVision for levying contribution on religious institutions under section 49 of the Act and this provision has been impeached firstly on the ground that the contribution being in substance a tax, it was beyond the competency of the Provincial Legislature to enact any such provision.", "canonical_name": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das"}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8835, "end_char": 8845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9142, "end_char": 9152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9267, "end_char": 9278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9923, "end_char": 9933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10088, "end_char": 10098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10760, "end_char": 10770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11325, "end_char": 11335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 38, 39, 46, 47 and 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11715, "end_char": 11745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11748, "end_char": 11766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12170, "end_char": 12180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12528, "end_char": 12538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12748, "end_char": 12758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12781, "end_char": 12791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12866, "end_char": 12876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13056, "end_char": 13066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13147, "end_char": 13168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of , the Act has still been retained in its\n\n9-_97 S. C. Indla/59\n\nMahant Sri _Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Anoth1r\n\nThe State of Oris.la and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das"}}, {"text": "State of Oris.la", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13186, "end_char": 13202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of , the Act has still been retained in its\n\n9-_97 S. C. Indla/59\n\nMahant Sri _Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Anoth1r\n\nThe State of Oris.la and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nOri:isa"}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13285, "end_char": 13300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Another v.\n\nThe State of Orissa and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nOri:isa"}}, {"text": "State of rissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13628, "end_char": 13642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the State of rissa, has also conceded that these sections require redrafting."}}, {"text": "Sections 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13999, "end_char": 14017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14113, "end_char": 14123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14518, "end_char": 14528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14791, "end_char": 14801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15224, "end_char": 15234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15548, "end_char": 15558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagannath Ramanid Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17883, "end_char": 17904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the ' individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly;' (But' this by'itsdf iinot enough to make\n\n195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanid Das\n\na'7ld Aqther\n\nThe State of Orissa and\n\nAnoth~.\n\n~-- Mukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nThi State of\n\nO, Usa and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das"}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17924, "end_char": 17939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the ' individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly;' (But' this by'itsdf iinot enough to make\n\n195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanid Das\n\na'7ld Aqther\n\nThe State of Orissa and\n\nAnoth~.\n\n~-- Mukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nThi State of\n\nO, Usa and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nOri:isa"}}, {"text": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17983, "end_char": 18004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the ' individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly;' (But' this by'itsdf iinot enough to make\n\n195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanid Das\n\na'7ld Aqther\n\nThe State of Orissa and\n\nAnoth~.\n\n~-- Mukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nThi State of\n\nO, Usa and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nO, Usa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18023, "end_char": 18039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the ' individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly;' (But' this by'itsdf iinot enough to make\n\n195+\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanid Das\n\na'7ld Aqther\n\nThe State of Orissa and\n\nAnoth~.\n\n~-- Mukherjea J.\n\nMahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nThi State of\n\nO, Usa and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nOri:isa"}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18362, "end_char": 18372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18871, "end_char": 18881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19630, "end_char": 19640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19684, "end_char": 19694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19900, "end_char": 19910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20532, "end_char": 20542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 38, 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20660, "end_char": 20675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20695, "end_char": 20705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20730, "end_char": 20740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "RATILAL PANACHAND GANDHI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21174, "end_char": 21198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RATILAL PANACHAND GANDHI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21209, "end_char": 21224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RATILAL PANACHAND GANDHI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21299, "end_char": 21308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(and connected appeal) [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21326, "end_char": 21338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(and connected appeal) [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HAsAN JJ."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21345, "end_char": 21366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21368, "end_char": 21383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21384, "end_char": 21413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 44, 47(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21434, "end_char": 21447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "statute": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21515, "end_char": 21525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "statute": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21610, "end_char": 21615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "statute": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21623, "end_char": 21652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21926, "end_char": 21931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22463, "end_char": 22484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Cofistitution to tnanage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for religion and for religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nv • The State of Orissa and\n\nAnot,,,,..\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMarch 18.", "canonical_name": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das"}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22507, "end_char": 22522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Cofistitution to tnanage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for religion and for religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nv • The State of Orissa and\n\nAnot,,,,..\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMarch 18."}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_1055_1077_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1055\n\ninstitutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for purposes for which they were founded or exist.\n\nAs there is no question of favouring any particular religion or religious denomination, article 27 could not possibly apply.\n\nThe result is that, in our opinion, the on! y sections of the Act, which are invalid, are sections 38, 39 and the proviso to section 46.\n\nThe application under article 32 is, therefore, allowed to this extent that a writ in the nature of mandamus would issue restraining the Commissioner and the State Government enforcing against the petitioners the prov!Slons of the sections mentioned above.\n\nThe other prayers of the petlt10ners are disallowed.\n\nNo separate order is necessary in Case No. 1 of 1950, which will stand dismissed.\n\nWe make no order as to costs either in the petition or in the appeal.\n\nRATILAL PANACHAND GANDHI\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.\n\n(and connected appeal) [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, arts. 25 and 26-Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (Act XX!X of 1950), ss. 44, 47(3) (4) (5) (6), 55(c) and 56(1) -Whether ultra vires the Constitution-Section 58 of the Act- Whether ultra vires the State Legislature.\n\nHeld, that the provision of s. 44 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, relating to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of any public trust by the court without any reservation in regard to religious institutions Iike ten1ples and Maths is unconstitutional and must be held to be void.\n\nThe provisions of cl. (3) to (6) of s. 47 of the Act to the extent that they relate to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of a religious trust like temple and Math are unconstitutional and must be held to be void.\n\nA religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Cofistitution to tnanage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for religion and for religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nv • The State of Orissa and\n\nAnot,,,,..\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMarch 18.\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nobtaining' in a particular institution.\n\nTo divert the trust property or funds for purposes which the Charity Commissioner or the court considers expedient or proper, although the original objects of the founder can still be carried out, is an unwarrantable encroachment on the freedom of religious institutions in regard to the management of their religious affairs.\n\nTherefore cl. (3) of s. 55., which contains the offending provision and the corresponding provision relating to the po, vers of the court occurring in the latter part of s. 56(1), must be held to be void.\n\nSection 58 of the Act is not ultra vires of the State Legislature because the contribution imposed under the section is not a tax but a fee which comes within the purview of entry 47 of List III in Schedule VII of the Constitution.\n\nCommissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, ([1954]\n\nS.C.R. 1005) Davis\n\nv. Beason (133 U.S. 333), Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth (67 C.L.R. 116, 124), and famshed Ji v. Soonabai [1919]\n\n(I.LR. 33 Born. 112) referred to. ·\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1954, and Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1954.\n\nAppeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 12th September, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Application No. 880 of 1952 and Miscellaneous Application No. 212 of 1952 respectively .\n\n. N. C. Chatterjee and, U. M. and I. N. Shroff, with them) Appeal No. 1 of 1954.\n\nTrivedi for the (H. H. Dalal appellants in\n\nRajinder Narain for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1954.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (G. N. Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, with them) for the respondents in both the appeals.\n\n1954. March 18. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-These two connected appeals are directed against a common judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, dated the 12th of September, 1952, by which the learned Judges dismissed two petitions under article 226 of the Constitution presented respectively by the appellants in the two appeals.\n\nThe petitioners in both the cases assailed the constitutional validity of the Act, known as the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Act XXIX of 1950), which was passed by the Bombay Legislature with a view to regulate and make better provisions for the administration of the public and religious trusts in the State of Bombay.\n\nBy a notification, dated the 30th of January, 1951, the Act was brought into force on and from the 1st of March, 1951, and its provisions were made applicable to temples, maths and all other trusts, express or constructive, for either a public, religious or charitable purpose or both.\n\nThe State of Bombay figures as the first respondent in both the appeals and the second respondent is the Charity Commissioner, appointed by the first respondent under section 3 of the impugned Act to carry out the provisions of the Act throughout the State of Bombay. In one of the appeals, namely, Appeal No. I of 1954, the Assistant Charity Commissioner for the region of Baroda has been impleaded as the third respondent.\n\nThe appellant in Appeal No. I of 1954 is a Swetamber Murtipujak Jain and a resident of Vejalpar in the district of Punchmahals within the State of.\n\nBombay ..\n\nHe is a Vahivatdar or manager of a Jain public temple or Derasar situated in the same village and the endowed properties appertaining to the temple are said to be of the value of Rs. 5 lakhs. The petition, out of which this appeal arises, was filed by the appellant on the 29th of May, 1952, before the High Court of Bombay, in its Appellate Side, against the three respondents mentioned above, praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or direction ordering and directing the respondents to forbear from enforcing or taking any steps for the enforcement of the Bombay Public\n\nTrusts Act, 1950; or of any of its provisions and particularly the provisions relating to registration of public and religious trusts managed by the appellant and payment of contributions levied in respect of the same.\n\nThe grounds urged in support of the petition were that a number of provisions of the Act conflicted with the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and that the\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State ef Bombq, .. and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukhei; jea J.\n\ncontribution levied on the trust was a tax which it was beyond the competence of the State Legislature to impose.\n\nA similar application under article 226 of the Constitution ana praying for almost the identical relief was filed by the appellants in the other appeal, namely, Appeal No. 7 of 1954 before the High Court in its Original Side on the 4th of August, 1952. The petitioners in this case purport to be the present trustees of the Parsi Punchayet Funds and Properties in Bombay registered under the Parsi Public Trusts Registration Act of 1936.\n\nThese properties constitute one consolidated fund and they are administered by the trustees for the benefit of the entire Parsi community and the income is spent for specified religious and charitabTe purposes of a public character as indicated by the various donors.\n\nThe petitioners challenged the validity of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, substantially on the grounds that they interfered. with the freedom of conscience of the petitioners and with their right freely to profess, practise and propagate . religion and also with their right to manage their wn affairs in matters of religion and thereby contravened the provisions of articles 25 and Z6 of the Constitution. The levy of contribution under section 58 of the Act was also alleged in substance and effect to be a tax on public, religious and charitable trusts, a legislauon upon which it was beyond the competency of the State Legislature to enact.\n\nAs practically the same questions. were involved m both the petitions, the learned Chief Justice of Bombay directed the transfer of the later petition from the Original Side to the Appellate Side of the High Court and both of them were heard together by a Division Bench consisting of the Chief Justice himself and Shah J.\n\nBoth the petitions were disposed of by one and the same judgment delivered on the 12th of September, 1952, and the learned Judges rejected all the contentions put forward on behalf of the respective applicants and dismissed the petitions.\n\nThe petitioners in both the cases have now come before us in appeal on the strength of certificates granted\n\nby the High Court under article 132(1) of the Constitution.\n\nTo appreciate the points that have been canvassed before us by the parties to these appeals, it may be convenient to refer briefly to the scheme and salient features of the impugned Act.\n\nThe object of the Act, as stated in the preamble, is to regulate and make better provisions for the administration of public, religious and charitable trusts within the State of Bombay.\n\nIt includes, within its scope, all public trusts created not mere! y for religious but for purely charitable purposes as well and extends to people of all classes and denominations in the State.\n\nThe power of superintendence and administration of public trusts is vested, under the Act, in the Charity Commissioner, who is to be appointed by the State Government in the manner laid down in Chapter II.\n\nThe State Government may also appoint such number of Deputy and Assistant Charity Commissioners as it thinks fit and these officers would be placed in charge of particular regions or particular trusts or classes of trusts as may be considered necessary.\n\nSection 9, with which Chapter III of the Act begins, defines what 'charitable purposes' are, and sections 10 and 11 lay down that a public trust shall not be void on the ground of uncertainty, nor shall it fail so far as a religious and charitable purpose is concerned, even if a non-charitable or non-religious purpose, which is included in it, cannot be given effect to.\n\nChapter IV provides for registration of public trusts.\n\nSection 18 makes it obligatory upon the trustee of every public trust to which the Act applies, to make an application for the registration of the trust, of which he is the trustee.\n\nIn case of omission on the part of a trustee to comply with this provision, he is debarred under section 31 of the Act from instituting a suit to enforce any right on behalf of sucl1 trust in a court of law. Chapter V deals with accounts and audit.\n\nSection 32 imposes a duty upon every trustee of a public trust, which has been registered under the Act, to keep regular accounts.\n\nUnder section 33, these accounts are to be audited annually in such manner as may be prescribed.\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\n'\" The State of Bombqy and\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRatilal Panachand Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nSUPREME COURTREPORTS [1954]\n\nSection 34 , prescribes it to be the duty of the auditor to prepare balance-sheets and to report all irregularities in the accounts.\n\nSection 35 lays down how trust money has to be invested, and section 36 prohibits alienation of immovable trust property except by way of leases for specified periods, without the previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner.\n\nSection 37 authorises the Charity Commissioner and his subordinate officers to enter on and inspect or cause to be entered on and inspected any pr9perty belonging to a public trust.\n\nA proviso is added to the section laying down that in entering upon any such property, the officers making the entry shall give reasonable notice to the trustee and shall have. due regard to the religious practices and usages. of the trust.\n\nAmong other powers and functions of the Charity Commissioner, which are detailea in Chapter VII, section 44 enables a Charity Commissioner to be appointed to act as a trustee of a public trust by a court of competent jurisdiction or by the author of the trust.\n\nSection 47 deals with the powers of the court to appoint new trustee or trustees and under clause (3) of this section, the court, after making enquiry, may appoint the Charity Commissioner or any other person as a trustee to fill up the vacancy.\n\nSection 48 provides . for the levy of administrative charges in cases where the Charity Commissioner is appointed a trustee.\n\nSection 50 appears to be a substitute for section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and contains provisions of almost the same character in respect to suits regarding ; public trusts.\n\nOne of the reliefs that can be claimed in such a suit is a declaration as to what proportion of the trust property or interest therein shall be allocated to any particular .object of the trust.\n\nSection 55 purports to lay down the rule of cy pres in relation to the administration of religious and charitable trusts; but it extends that doctrine much further than. is . warranted by the principles laid , down by the Chancery Courts in England or recognised by judicial pronouncements in this country.\n\nSection 56 deals . with the powers of the courts , in relation to the application of the cy pres doctrine.\n\nSection 57 provides for the establishment . of a fund . to be called 'The\n\nPublic Trusts Administration Fund' which shall vest in the Charity Commissioner and clause (2) lays down what sums shall be credited to this fund. Section 58 makes it obligatory on every public trust to pay to this fund a contribution at such time and ; n such manner as may be prescribed.\n\nUnder the rules prescribed by the Government on this subject, the contribution has been fixed at the rate of 2 per cent. per annum upon the gross annual income of every public trust.\n\nFailure to pay this contribution will make the trustee liable to the penalties provided for in section 66 of the Act.\n\nSection 60 provides that the Public Trusts Administration Fund shall, subject to the provisions of the Act and subject t<:> the general and special orders of the State Government, be applicable to the payment of charges for expenses incidental to the regulation of public trusts and generally for carrying out the provisions cif the Act.\n\nSections 62 to 66, which are comprised in Chapter IX of the Act, deal with the appointment and qualifications of assessors.\n\nThe function of the assessors is to assist and advise the Charity Commissioner or his subordinate officers in the matter of making enquiries which may be necessary under the provisions of the Act.\n\nChapter X prescribes the penalties that will be inilicted on trustees in case of the; r violating any of the provisions of the Act.\n\nChapter XI deals with procedural matters in connection with jurisdiction of courts and rights of appeal, and the twelfth or the . last . chapter deals with certain miscellaneous matters.\n\nThese, in grief, are the provisions of the Act which are material for our present purpose.\n\nThe contentions that have been raised by the learned counsel, who appeared in support of the appeals, may be considered under two heads. In the first place, a number of provisions of the Act have been challenged as invalid on the ground that they conflict with freedom of religion and the right of the religious denominations or sects, represented by the. appellants in each case, to manage their own affairs in matter of: religion guaranteed under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.\n\nThe sections of the Act, the validity of which has been challenged on this ground are sections 18, 31 to 37, 44,\n\n.1954\n\nRalilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay.and\n\nOthers.\n\nM.J;/ajea J\n\nRatilal Panachand Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukheijea ].\n\n47, 48, 50, clauses\n\n(e) and (g), 55, 58 and 66.\n\nThe second head of the appellants' argument relates to the levy of contribution as laid down in sections 57 and 58 of the Act and the argument is that this being in substance the levy of a tax, it was beyond the competence of the State Legislature to enact such a provision.\n\nAs regards the first branch of the contention, a good deal of argument has been advanced before us relating to the measure and extent of the fundamental rights guaranteed under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.\n\nIt will be necessary to addrqs ourselves to this question at the outset, because without a clear appreciation of the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights embodied in the two articles of the Constitution, it would not be possible to decide whether there has been a transgression of these rights by any of the provisions of the Act. This identical question came up for consideration before this court in Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1953 (The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar( 1 ) and it was discussed at some length in our judgment in that case.\n\nIt will be sufficient for our present purpose to refer succinctly to the main principles that this court enunciated in that judgment.\n\nArticle 25 of the Constitution guarantees to every person and not merely to the citizens of India the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.\n\nThis is subject, in every case, to public order, health and morality.\n\nFurther exceptions are engrafted upon this right by clause (2) of the article. Sub-clause (a) of clause (2) saves the power of the State to make laws regulating\n\nor restricting any economic, financial, political or other • secular activity which mav be associated with religious practice; and sub-clause\n\n(b) reserves the State's power to make laws providing for social reform and social welfare even though they might interefere with religious practices.\n\nThus, subject to the restrictions which this article imposes, every person has a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in such\n\n(1) [1954] S. C.R. ioo5.\n\novert acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and further to propagate his religious views for the edification of others.\n\nIt is immaterial also whether the propagation is made by a person in his individual capacity or on behalf of any church or institution.\n\nThe free exercise of religion by which is meant the performance of outward acts in pursuance of religious belief, is. as stated above, subject to State regulation imposed to secure order, public health and morals of the people.\n\nWhat sub-clause (a) of clause (2) of article 25 contemplates is not State regulation of the religious practices as such which are protected unless they rnn counter to public health or morality but of activities which are really of an economic, commercial or political character though they are associated with religious practices.\n\nSo far as article 26 is concerned. it deals with a particular aspect of the subject of religious freedom.\n\nUnder this article, any religious denomination or a section of it has the guarnteed right to establish and maintain institutions for religions and charitable purposes and to manage in its own way all affairs in matters of religion.\n\nRights are also given to such denomination or a section of it to acqmre and own movable and immovable properties and to administer such properties in accordance with law.\n\nThe language of the two clauses (b) and ( d) of article 26 would at once bring out the difference between the two.\n\nIn regard to affairs in matters of religion, the right of management given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take away.\n\nOn the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law.\n\nThis means that the State can regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted ; but here again it should be remembered that under article 26 ( d), it is the religions denomination itself which has been given the right to administer its property in accordance with anv law which the State may validly impose.\n\nA law, which takes away the right of 3-98 S. C. India./59\n\nRatila.j Pancchand Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bomba;· and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe Stat< of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMuklurJea J.\n\nadministration altogether from the religious nation and vests it in any other or secular would amount to violation of the right guaranteed by article 26( d) of the Constitution.\n\n[1954]\n\ndenomiauthority, which is\n\nThe moot point for consideration, therefore, is where is the line to be drawn between what are matters of religion and what are not ? Our Constitution-makers have made no attempt to define what 'religion' is and it is certainly not possible to frame an exhausti 1e definition of the word 'religion' which would be applicable to all classes of persons.\n\nAs has been indicated in the Madras case referred to above, the definition of 'religion' given by Fields J. in the American case of Davis v. Beason (1), does not seem to us adequate or precise. \"The term 'religion' '', thus observed the learned Judge in the case mentioned above, \"has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and character and of obedience to His Will. It is often confounded with culttis or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter\".\n\nIt may be noted that 'religion' is not necessacily theistic and in fact there are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in the existence of God or of any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a sys:cm of beliefs and doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion to be conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say, as seems to have been suggested by one of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religious faith and religious belief.\n\nA religion is not merely an op11110n, doctrine or belief.\n\nIt has its outward expression rn acts as well.\n\nWe may quote in this connection the observations of Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia in the case of Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth( 2 ), where the extent of protection given to religious freedom by section 116 of the Australian Constitution came up for consideration.\n\n(1) 133U.S.333.\n\n(2) 67 C. L. R. 116, 124\n\n\"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil Government should not interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion.\n\nIt 3ppears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction as relevant to the interpretation of section 116.\n\nThe section refers in express terms to the exercise of religion, and therefore it is intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion. Thus the section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion.\n\nIt protects also acts done in pµrsuance of religious belief as part of religion.\"\n\nIn our opinion, Madras case, these provision regarding in our Constitution.\n\nas we have already said in the observations apply fully to the religious freedom that is embodied\n\nReligious practices or performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines.\n\nThus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down that certain rites and ceremonies are to be performed at certain times and in a particular manner, it cannot be said that these are secular activities partaking of commercial or economic characte_r simply because they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests or the use of marketable commodities.\n\nNo outside authority has any right to say that these are not essential parts of religion and it is not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they like under the guise of administering the trust estate.\n\nOf course, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with these religious observances may be and is a matter of administration of property belonging to religious institutions; and if the expenses on these heads are likely to deplete the endowed properties or affect the stability of the institution, proper control can certainly be exercised by State agencies as the law provides.\n\nWe may refer in this connection to the observation of\n\nRatilal P aruu:l111nd\n\nGandhi\n\nTheStat,.f\n\nBombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRatilal Panachand Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombqy and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukhe>-jea J.\n\nDavar J. in the case of Jamshedji v. Soonabai(' ), and although they were made in a case where the questio!' was whether the bequest of property by a Parsi testator for the purpose of perpetual ce1ebration of ceremonies like Muktad baj, Vyezashni, etc., which are sanctioned by the Zoroastrian religion were valid charitable gifts, the observations, we think, are quite appropriate for our present purpose. \"If this is the belief of the community\" thus observed the learned Judge, \"and it is proved undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zoroastrian\n\ncommunity,-a secular Judge is bound to accept that belief-it is not for him to sit in judgment on that belief, he has no right to interfere with the conscience of a donor who makes a gift in favour of what he believes to be the advancement of his religion and the welfare of his community or mankind\".\n\nThese observations do, in our opinion, afford an indication of the measure of protection that 1s given by article 26(b) of our Constitution.\n\nThe distinction between matters of religion and those of secular administration of ; eligious properties may, at times, appear to be a thin one.\n\nBut in cases of doubt, as Chief Justice Latham pointed out in the case(2) referred to above, the court should take a common sense view and be actuated by considerations of practical necessity.\n\nIt is in the light of these principles that we will proceed to examine the different provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, the validity of which has been challenged on behalf of the appellants.\n\nWe will first turn to the provisions of the Act which relate to registration of trusts.\n\nUnder section 18, it is incumbent on the trustee of every public, religious or charitable trust to get the same registered.\n\nSection 66 of the Act makes it an offence for a trustee not to comply with this provision and prescribes punishment for such offence.\n\nSection 31 provides for further compulsion by laying down that no suit shall lie on behalf of a public trust to enforce its right in any court of law unless the trust is registered.\n\nA compulsory payment\n\n(1) 33 Born. 122. (2/ Vide Adelaide Company v The Commonwealthi 67 C. L. R. 116, 129.\n\nof a fee of Rs. 25 has also been prescribed by the rules framed by the Government for registration of a trust.\n\nThe provisions of registration undoubtedly have been made with a view to ensure due supervision of the trust properties and the exercise of proper control over them. These are matters relating to administration of trust property as contemplated by article 26( d) of the Constitution and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be an attempt at interference with the rights of religious institutions to manage their religious affairs.\n\nThe fees leviable under section 18 are credited to the Public Truit Administration Fund constituted under section 57 and are to be spent for meeting the charges incurred in the regulation of public trusts and for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe penalties provided are mere consequential prov1S1ons and involve no infraction of any fundamental right.\n\nIt has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that according to the tenets of the Jain religion the property of the temple and its income exist for one purpose only, viz., the religious purpose, and a direction to spend money for purposes other .than those which are considered sacred in the Jain scriptures would constitute interference with the freedom of religion.\n\nThis contention does not appear to us to be sound.\n\nThese expenses are incidental to proper management and administration of the trust estate like payment of municipal rates and taxes, etc., and cannot amount to diversion of trust property for purposes Other than those which are prescribed by any religion.\n\nThe next group of sections to which objections have been taken comprises sections 32 to 37.\n\nSection 32 compels a trustee of a public trust to keep accounts in such form as may be prescribed by the Charity Commissioner.\n\nSection 33 provides for the auditing of such accounts and section 34 makes it the duty of the auditor to prepare balance-sheets and to report irregularities, if any, that are found in the accounts.\n\nThese are certainly not matters of religion and the objection raised with regard to the validity of these provisions seem to be altogether baseless.\n\nSection 35 relates to investment of money belonging to trusts. It is a well\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nTiu Stat• of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMuk/uefea J.\n\nRatilal Panachand Gandhi v.\n\nTht Stat< of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukhtrjea J.\n\nsettled principle of law that trustees in charge of trust properties should not keep cash money in their hands which are not necessary for immediate expenses ; and a list of approved securities upon which trust money could be invested is invariably laid down in every legislation on the subject of trust. There is nothing wrong in section 36 of the Act.\n\nImmovable trust properties are inalienable by their very nature and a provision that they could be alienated only with the preyious sanction of the Charity Commissioner seems to us to be a perfectly salutary provision.\n\nSection 37 has been objected to on the ground that an unrestricted right of entry in any religious premises might offend the sentiments of the followers of that religion; but the section has expressly provided that the officers making the entry shall give reasonable notice of their intended entry to the trustees and shall have due regard to the religious practice and usages of the trust.\n\nObjection has next been taken to sections 44 and 47 of the Act. Section 44 lays down that the Charity Commissioner can be appointed to act as trustee of a public trust by a court of competent jurisdiction or by the author of the trust. If the author of the trust chooses to appoint the Charity Commissioner a trustee, no objection can possibly be taken to such action ; but if the court is authorised to make such appointment, the provisions of this section in the general form as it stands appear to us to be open to serious objection.\n\nIf we take for example the case of a religious institution like a Math at the head of which stands the Mathadhipati or spiritual superior.\n\nThe Mathadhipati is a trustee according to the provisions of the Act and if the court is competent to appoint the Charity Commissioner as a superior of a Math, the result would be disastrous and it would amount to a flagrant violation of the constitutional guarantee which religions institutions have under the Constitution in regard to the management of its religious affairs. This is not a secular affair at all relating to the administration of the trust property. The very object of a Math is to maintain a competent line of religious teachers for propagating and strengthening the religious\n\ndoctrines of a particular order or sect and as there could be no Math without a Mathadhipati as its spiritual head, the substitution of the Charity Commissioner for the superior would mean a destruction of the institution altogether.\n\nThe evil is further aggravated by the provision of clause ( 4) of the sect10n which says that the Charity Commissioner shall be the sole trustee and it shall not be lawful to appoint him as a trustee along with other persons.\n\nIn our opinion, the provision of section 44 relating to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of any public trust by the court without any reservation in regard to religious institutions like temples and Maths is unconstitutional and must be held to be void. The very same objections will apply to the provisions of clauses (3) to\n\n(6) of section 47. The court can certainly be empowered to appoint a trustee to fill up a vacancy caused by any of the reasons mentioned in section 47 (I), and it is quite a salutary principle that in making the appointment the court should have regard to matters specified in clause (4) of sedion 47; but the provision of clause (3) to the extent that it authorises the court to appoint the Charity Commissioner as the trustee-and who according to the provisions of clause (5) is to be the sole trustee-cannot be regarded as valid in regard to religious institutions of the type we have just indicated. To allow the Charity Commissioner to function as the Shebait of a temple or the superior of a Math would certainly amount to interference with the religious affairs of this institution. We hold accordingly that the provisions of clauses (3) to\n\n(6) of section 47 to the extent that they relate to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of a religious trust like temple and Math are invalid.\n\nIf these provisions of section 47 are eliminated, no objection can be taken to the provision of section 48 as it stands. This section will in that event be confined only to cases where the Charity Commissioner has been appointed a trustee by the author of the trust himself and the administrative charges provided by this section can certainly be levied on the trust.\n\nRatilal Panachand Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bomba)' and\n\nOthers. -= Mukhedea J.\n\nRa ilal ;·•anachand\n\n. Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.~\n\nWe now come to section 50 and exception has been taken to clauses ( e) and (g) of that section.\n\nIt is difficult to see how these provisions can at all be objected to.\n\nSection 50, as has been said above, is really a substitute for section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and relates to suits in connection with public trusts.\n\nClause ( e) of section 50 is an exact reproduction of clause ( e) of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and clause (g) also reproduces substantially the provision of clause (g) of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no question of infraction of any fundamental right by reason of these provisions.\n\nA more serious objection has been taken by the learned counsel for the appellants to the provisions of sections 55 and 56 of the impugned Act and it appears to us that the objections are to a great extent well founded.\n\nThese sections purport to lay down how the doctrine of cy pres is to be applied in regard to the administration of public trust of a religious or charitable character. The doctrine of cy pres as developed by the Equity Courts in England, has been adopted by our Indian courts since a long time past.\n\nThe provisions of sections 55 and 56, however, have extended the doctrine much beyond its recognised limits and have further introduced certain principles which run counter to well established rules of law regarding the administration of charitable trusts.\n\nWhen the particular purpose for which a charitable trust is created fails or by reason of certain circumstances the trust cannot be carried into effect either in whole or in part, or where there is a surplus left after exhausting the purposes specified by the senior, the court would not, when there is a general charitable intention expressed by the settlor, allow the trust to fail but would execute it cy pres, that is to say, in some way as nearly as possible to that which the author of the trust intended.\n\nIn such cases, it cannot be disputed that the court can frame a scheme and give suitable directions regarding the objects upon which the trust money can be spent.\n\nIt is well established, however, that where the donors' intention can be giyen effect to, the court has no authority to sanction any deviation from the intentions expressed\n\nby the settlor on the grounds of expediency and the court cannot exercise the power of applying the trust property or its income to other purposes simply because it considers them to be more expedient or more beneficial than what the settlor had directed(' ).\n\nBut this is exactly what has been done by the provision of section 55 ( c) read with section 56 of the Act.\n\nThese provisions allow a diversion of property belonging to a public trus.t or the income thereof to objects other than those intended by the donors if the Charity Commissioner is of opinion, and the court confirms its opinion and decides, that carrying out wholly or partially the original intentions of the author of the trust or the object for which the trust was created is not wholly or partially expedient, practicable, desirable or necessary ; and that the property or income of the public trust or any portion thereof should be applied to any other charitable or religious object.\n\nWhether a provision like this is reasonable or not is not pertinent to our enquiry and we may assume that the legislature, which is competent to legislate on the subject of charitable and religious trust, is at liberty to make any provision which may not be in consonance with the existing law ; but the question before us is, whether such provision invades any fundamental right guaranteed by our Constitution, and we have no hesitation in holding that it does so in the case of religious trusts.\n\nA religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Constitution to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for the religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by nsage obtaining in a particular institution.\n\nTo divert the trust property or funds for purposes which the Charity Commissioner or the court considers expedient or proper, although the original objects of the founder can still be carried out, is to our minds an unwarrantable encroachment on the freedom of religious institutions in regard to the management of their religious affairs.\n\nIt is perfectly true, as has been stated\n\n(I) Virle Rasbury, 2nd Edn., vol. IV, p. 228.\n\nRaJilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherj.a ].\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMakher)oa ].\n\nby the learned counsel for the appellants, that 1t 1s an established maxim of the Jain religion that Divadravya or religious property cannot be diverted to purposes other than those which are considered sacred in the Jain scriptures.\n\nBut apart from the tenets of the Jain religion, we consider it to be a violation of the freedom of religion and of the right which a religious denomination has under our Constitution to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to allow any secular authority to divert the trust money for purposes other than those for which the trust was created.\n\nThe State can step in only when the trust fails or is incapable of being carried out either in whole or in part.\n\nWe hold, therefore, that clause (3) of section 55, which contains the offending provision and the corresponding provision relating to the powers of the court occurring in the latter part of section 56(1), must be held to be void.\n\nThe only other section of the Act to which objection has been taken is section 58 and it deals with the levy of contribution upon each public trust, at certain rates to be fixed by the rules, in proportion to the gross annual income of such trust. This together with the other sums specified in clause (2) of section 57 makes up the Public Trusts Administration Fund, which is to be applied for payment of charges incidental to the regulation of public trusts and for carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.\n\nAs this contribution is levied purely for purposes of due administration of the trust property and for defraying the expenses incurred in connection with the same, no objection could be taken to the provision of the section on the ground of its infringing any fundamental rights of the appellants.\n\nThe substantial contention that has been raised in regard to the validity of this provision comes, however, under the second head of the appellants' arguments indicated above.\n\nThe contention is that the contribution which is made payable under this section is in substance a tax and the Bombay State Legislature was not competent to enact such provision within the limits of the authority exercisable by it under the Constitution. This raises a point of some importance which requires to be examined carefully.\n\nIt is not disputed before us that if the contribution that is levied under section 58 is a tax, a legislation regarding it would be beyond the competence of the State Legislature. Entries 46 to 62 of List II in Schedule VII of the Constitution specify the different kinds of taxes and duties in regard to which the State Legislature is empowered to legislate ; and a tax of the particular type that we have here is not covered by any one of them.. It does not come also under any specific entry in List III or even of List. I. The position, therefore, is that if the imposition is held to be a tax, it could come either under entry 97 of List I, which includes taxes not mentioned in Lists II and\n\nIII or under article 248 (1) of the Constitution and in either case it is Parliament alone that has the competency to legislate upon the subject. If, on the other hand, the imposition could be regarded as \"fees'', it can be brought under entry 47 of the Concurrent List, the Act itself being a legislation under entries 10 and 28 of that List. The whole controversy thus centers round a point as to whether the contribution leviable under section 50 is a fee or tax and what in fact are the indicia and characteristics of a fee which distinguish it from a tax. This identical question came up for consideration before this court in Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1953 referred to above, in connection with the provision of section 76 of the Madras Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, and the view which we have taken in that case regarding the proper criterion for determining whether an imposition is a fee or tax is in substantial agreement with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the present case. As the matter has been discussed at some length in the Madras case, it will not be necessary to repeat the same discussions over again. It will be enough if we indicate the salient principles that were enunciated by this court in its judgment in the Madras case mentioned above.\n\nWe may start by saying that although there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee and in fact they are only different forms in which the taxing power of a State manifests itself, our Constitution has, in fact, made a distinction between a tax and a fee for\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi v.\n\nTheStateof Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nM•kherjea ].\n\nRatilal Panachand Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nlegislative purposes.\n\nWhile there are various entries in the three legislative lists with regard to various forms of taxation, there is an entry at the end of each one of these lists as regards 'fees' which could be levied in respect of every one of the matters that are included therein. This distinction is further evidenced by the provisions of the Constitution relating to Money Bills which are embodied in articles 110 and 199.\n\nBoth these articles provide that a bill should not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition of fines or for the demand or payment of fees licences or fees for services rendered, whereas a bill relating to imposition, abolition or regulation of a tax would a!ways be reckoned as a Money Bill. There is no doubt that a fee resembles a tax in many respects and the question which presents difficulty is, what is the proper test by which the one could be distinguished from the other? A tax is undoubtedly in the nature of a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes, the payment of which is enforced by law. But the other and equally important characteristic of a tax is, that the imposition is made for public purpose to meet the general expenses of the State without reference to any special advantage to be conferred upon the payers of the tax.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that although a tax may be levied upon particular classes of persons or particular kinds of property, it is imposed not to confer any special benefit upon individual persons and the collections are all merged in the general revenue of the State to be applied for general public purposes.\n\nTax is a common burden and the only return which the taxpayer gets is participation in the common benefits of the State.\n\nFees, on the other hand, are payments primarily in the public interest, but for some special service rendered or some special work done for the benefit of those from whom the payments are demanded.\n\nThus in fees there is always an element of quid pro quo which is absent in a tax.\n\nIt may not be possible to prove in every case that the fees that are collected by the Government approximate to the expenses that are incurred by it in rendering any particular kind of services or in\n\nperforming any particular work for the benefit of certain individuals.\n\nBut in order that the collections made by the Government can rank as fees, there must be co-relation between the levy imposed and the expenses incurred by the State for the purpose of rendering such services.\n\nThis can be proved by showing that on the face of the legislative provmon itself, the collections are not merged in the general revenue but are set apart and appropriated for rendering these services.\n\nThus two elements are essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee.\n\nIn the first place, it must be levied . in c_onsideration of certain services which the individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount collected must be ear-marked to meet the expenses of rendering these services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes. As has been pointed out in the Madras case mentioned above, too much stress should not be laid on the presence or absence of what has been called the 'coercive' element.\n\nIt is not correct to say that as distinguished from taxation which is compulsory payment, the payment of fees is always voluntary, it being a matter of choice with individuals either to accept the service or not for which fees are to be paid.\n\nWe may cite for example the case of a licence fee for a motor car.\n\nIt is argued that this would be a fee and not a tax, as it is optional with a person either to own a motor car or not and in case he does not choose to have a motor car, he need nvt pay any fees at all. But the same argument can be applied in the case of a house tax or land tax.\n\nSuch taxes are levied onlv on those people who own lands or houses and it could be said with equal propriety that a man need not own any house or land and in that event he could avoid the payment of these taxes.\n\nIn the second place, even if the payment of a motor licence fee is a voluntary payment, it can still be regarded as a tax if the fees that are realised on motor licences have no relation to the expenses that the Government incurs in keeping an office or bureau for the granting of licences and the collections are not appropriated for that purpose but\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherJea J.\n\nRati/al Panachand\n\nGandhi v.\n\nTht State of Bombay and\n\nOt/tds.\n\nP\"~ Mukhnjea ].~-\n\ngo to the general revenue. Judging by this test, it appears to us that the High Court was perfectly right in holding that the contributions imposed under section 58 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act are really fees and not taxes.\n\nIn the first place, the contributions, which are collected under section 58, are to be credited to the Public Trusts Administration Fund as constituted under section 57.\n\nThis is a special fund which is to be applied exclusively for payment of charges for expenses incidental to the regulation of public trusts and for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act.\n\nIt vests in the Charity Commissioner and the custody and investments of the money belonging to the fund and the disbursement and payment therefrom are to be effected not in the manner in which general revenues . are disbursed, but in the way prescribed by the rules made under the Act.\n\nThe collections, therefore, are not merged in the general revenue, but they are earmarked and set apart for this particular purpose. It is true that under section 6A of the Act, the officers and servants appointed under the Act are to draw their pay and allowances from the Consolidated Fund of the State but we agree with what has been said by Mr. Justice Shah of the Bombay High Court that this provision is made only for the purpose of facilitating the administration and not with a view to mix up the fund with the general revenue collected for Government purposes. This would be clear from the provision of section 6B which provi-jea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1020, "end_char": 1029, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1031, "end_char": 1042, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1047, "end_char": 1063, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1066, "end_char": 1087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089, "end_char": 1104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1105, "end_char": 1134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 44, 47(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1155, "end_char": 1168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "statute": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1236, "end_char": 1246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "statute": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1331, "end_char": 1336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "statute": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1647, "end_char": 1652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Jagannath Ramanuj Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2184, "end_char": 2205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Cofistitution to tnanage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for religion and for religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nv • The State of Orissa and\n\nAnot,,,,..\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMarch 18."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Cofistitution to tnanage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for religion and for religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nv • The State of Orissa and\n\nAnot,,,,..\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMarch 18."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2261, "end_char": 2270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Cofistitution to tnanage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for religion and for religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage\n\nMahant Sri\n\nJagannath Ramanuj Das\n\nand Another\n\nv • The State of Orissa and\n\nAnot,,,,..\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMarch 18.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe>-jea"}}, {"text": "Ratilal Panachand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2286, "end_char": 2303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2317, "end_char": 2332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "State of Bombay.and"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2737, "end_char": 2742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2886, "end_char": 2894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3120, "end_char": 3132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 333", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3286, "end_char": 3292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3533, "end_char": 3547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3555, "end_char": 3576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3644, "end_char": 3678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 12th September, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and, U. M. and I. N. Shroff, with them) Appeal No."}}, {"text": "U. M.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and, U. M. and I. N. Shroff, with them) Appeal No."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and, U. M. and I. N. Shroff, with them) Appeal No."}}, {"text": "H. H. Dalal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3877, "end_char": 3888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Trivedi for the (H. H. Dalal appellants in\n\nRajinder Narain for the appellants in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3904, "end_char": 3919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Trivedi for the (H. H. Dalal appellants in\n\nRajinder Narain for the appellants in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3971, "end_char": 3985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (G. N. Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, with them) for the respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3990, "end_char": 4004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (G. N. Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, with them) for the respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4006, "end_char": 4017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (G. N. Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, with them) for the respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4022, "end_char": 4036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (G. N. Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, with them) for the respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th of January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification, dated the 30th of January, 1951, the Act was brought into force on and from the 1st of March, 1951, and its provisions were made applicable to temples, maths and all other trusts, express or constructive, for either a public, religious or charitable purpose or both."}}, {"text": "1st of March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4887, "end_char": 4905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification, dated the 30th of January, 1951, the Act was brought into force on and from the 1st of March, 1951, and its provisions were made applicable to temples, maths and all other trusts, express or constructive, for either a public, religious or charitable purpose or both."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bombay figures as the first respondent in both the appeals and the second respondent is the Charity Commissioner, appointed by the first respondent under section 3 of the impugned Act to carry out the provisions of the Act throughout the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5242, "end_char": 5251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Baroda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5449, "end_char": 5455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I of 1954, the Assistant Charity Commissioner for the region of Baroda has been impleaded as the third respondent."}}, {"text": "Swetamber Murtipujak Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5544, "end_char": 5569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I of 1954 is a Swetamber Murtipujak Jain and a resident of Vejalpar in the district of Punchmahals within the State of."}}, {"text": "Vejalpar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5588, "end_char": 5596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I of 1954 is a Swetamber Murtipujak Jain and a resident of Vejalpar in the district of Punchmahals within the State of."}}, {"text": "29th of May, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5934, "end_char": 5951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition, out of which this appeal arises, was filed by the appellant on the 29th of May, 1952, before the High Court of Bombay, in its Appellate Side, against the three respondents mentioned above, praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or direction ordering and directing the respondents to forbear from enforcing or taking any steps for the enforcement of the Bombay Public\n\nTrusts Act, 1950; or of any of its provisions and particularly the provisions relating to registration of public and religious trusts managed by the appellant and payment of contributions levied in respect of the same."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5964, "end_char": 5984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition, out of which this appeal arises, was filed by the appellant on the 29th of May, 1952, before the High Court of Bombay, in its Appellate Side, against the three respondents mentioned above, praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or direction ordering and directing the respondents to forbear from enforcing or taking any steps for the enforcement of the Bombay Public\n\nTrusts Act, 1950; or of any of its provisions and particularly the provisions relating to registration of public and religious trusts managed by the appellant and payment of contributions levied in respect of the same."}}, {"text": "Trusts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6254, "end_char": 6270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6637, "end_char": 6655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public\n\nTrusts Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bombay Public\n\nTrusts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6690, "end_char": 6715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds urged in support of the petition were that a number of provisions of the Act conflicted with the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and that the\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State ef Bombq, .. and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6721, "end_char": 6726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds urged in support of the petition were that a number of provisions of the Act conflicted with the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and that the\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State ef Bombq, .. and\n\nOthers."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6991, "end_char": 7002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public\n\nTrusts Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bombay Public\n\nTrusts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Parsi Punchayet Funds", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7287, "end_char": 7308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in this case purport to be the present trustees of the Parsi Punchayet Funds and Properties in Bombay registered under the Parsi Public Trusts Registration Act of 1936."}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7375, "end_char": 7391, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "petitioners challenged the validity of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8043, "end_char": 8054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The petitioners challenged the validity of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950", "statute": "The petitioners challenged the validity of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8114, "end_char": 8124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The petitioners challenged the validity of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950", "statute": "The petitioners challenged the validity of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8637, "end_char": 8641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were involved m both the petitions, the learned Chief Justice of Bombay directed the transfer of the later petition from the Original Side to the Appellate Side of the High Court and both of them were heard together by a Division Bench consisting of the Chief Justice himself and Shah J.\n\nBoth the petitions were disposed of by one and the same judgment delivered on the 12th of September, 1952, and the learned Judges rejected all the contentions put forward on behalf of the respective applicants and dismissed the petitions."}}, {"text": "12th of September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8728, "end_char": 8751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were involved m both the petitions, the learned Chief Justice of Bombay directed the transfer of the later petition from the Original Side to the Appellate Side of the High Court and both of them were heard together by a Division Bench consisting of the Chief Justice himself and Shah J.\n\nBoth the petitions were disposed of by one and the same judgment delivered on the 12th of September, 1952, and the learned Judges rejected all the contentions put forward on behalf of the respective applicants and dismissed the petitions."}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9019, "end_char": 9033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10089, "end_char": 10098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10111, "end_char": 10133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10186, "end_char": 10204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10519, "end_char": 10529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10799, "end_char": 10809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10952, "end_char": 10962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11090, "end_char": 11100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Ratilal Panachand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11182, "end_char": 11199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\n'\" The State of Bombqy and\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRatilal Panachand Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi"}}, {"text": "State of Bombqy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11216, "end_char": 11231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\n'\" The State of Bombqy and\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRatilal Panachand Gandhi v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "State of Bombay.and"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11365, "end_char": 11375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11499, "end_char": 11509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11560, "end_char": 11570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11727, "end_char": 11737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12249, "end_char": 12259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12414, "end_char": 12424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12661, "end_char": 12671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12787, "end_char": 12797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12829, "end_char": 12839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13164, "end_char": 13174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13405, "end_char": 13412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "warranted by the principles laid , down by the Chancery Courts in England or recognised by judicial pronouncements in this country."}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13472, "end_char": 13482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13580, "end_char": 13590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13802, "end_char": 13812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14225, "end_char": 14235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14249, "end_char": 14259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 62 to 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14588, "end_char": 14605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter IX of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14630, "end_char": 14651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15773, "end_char": 15791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 18, 31 to 37, 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15900, "end_char": 15925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ralilal Panachand\n\nGandhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15935, "end_char": 15960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sections of the Act, the validity of which has been challenged on this ground are sections 18, 31 to 37, 44,\n\n.1954\n\nRalilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay.and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay.and", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15966, "end_char": 15985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sections of the Act, the validity of which has been challenged on this ground are sections 18, 31 to 37, 44,\n\n.1954\n\nRalilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay.and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "State of Bombay.and"}}, {"text": "sections 57 and 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16232, "end_char": 16250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16589, "end_char": 16607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17360, "end_char": 17370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18907, "end_char": 18917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19212, "end_char": 19222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19762, "end_char": 19772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20370, "end_char": 20380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Stat< of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20718, "end_char": 20733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe Stat< of Bombay and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "State of Bombay.and"}}, {"text": "MuklurJea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20748, "end_char": 20757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuklurJea J.\n\nadministration altogether from the religious nation and vests it in any other or secular would amount to violation of the right guaranteed by article 26( d) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 26( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20904, "end_char": 20918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21358, "end_char": 21364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been indicated in the Madras case referred to above, the definition of 'religion' given by Fields J. in the American case of Davis v. Beason (1), does not seem to us adequate or precise. \""}}, {"text": "Fields", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21427, "end_char": 21433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been indicated in the Madras case referred to above, the definition of 'religion' given by Fields J. in the American case of Davis v. Beason (1), does not seem to us adequate or precise. \""}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22002, "end_char": 22007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that 'religion' is not necessacily theistic and in fact there are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in the existence of God or of any Intelligent First Cause."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22393, "end_char": 22410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a sys:cm of beliefs and doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion to be conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say, as seems to have been suggested by one of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religious faith and religious belief."}}, {"text": "Latham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22662, "end_char": 22668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may quote in this connection the observations of Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia in the case of Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth( 2 ), where the extent of protection given to religious freedom by section 116 of the Australian Constitution came up for consideration."}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22682, "end_char": 22705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may quote in this connection the observations of Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia in the case of Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth( 2 ), where the extent of protection given to religious freedom by section 116 of the Australian Constitution came up for consideration."}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22825, "end_char": 22836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.333", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22905, "end_char": 22910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23357, "end_char": 23368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukhe>-jea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25258, "end_char": 25268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhe>-jea J.\n\nDavar J. in the case of Jamshedji v. Soonabai(' ), and although they were made in a case where the questio!'", "canonical_name": "Mukhe>-jea"}}, {"text": "Davar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25273, "end_char": 25278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhe>-jea J.\n\nDavar J. in the case of Jamshedji v. Soonabai(' ), and although they were made in a case where the questio!'"}}, {"text": "article 26(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26230, "end_char": 26243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26902, "end_char": 26912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27021, "end_char": 27031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27156, "end_char": 27166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 26( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27808, "end_char": 27822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28029, "end_char": 28039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28111, "end_char": 28121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 32 to 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29143, "end_char": 29160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29163, "end_char": 29173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29291, "end_char": 29301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29349, "end_char": 29359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29640, "end_char": 29650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukhtrjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29855, "end_char": 29864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhtrjea J.\n\nsettled principle of law that trustees in charge of trust properties should not keep cash money in their hands which are not necessary for immediate expenses ; and a list of approved securities upon which trust money could be invested is invariably laid down in every legislation on the subject of trust.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe>-jea"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30200, "end_char": 30210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30444, "end_char": 30454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 44 and 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30869, "end_char": 30887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30900, "end_char": 30910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32606, "end_char": 32616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32931, "end_char": 32941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33064, "end_char": 33074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33780, "end_char": 33790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33961, "end_char": 33971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34034, "end_char": 34044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukhedea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34373, "end_char": 34381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-= Mukhedea J.\n\nRa ilal ;·•anachand\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe>-jea"}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34484, "end_char": 34494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34638, "end_char": 34648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34701, "end_char": 34711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34811, "end_char": 34821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34865, "end_char": 34875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34980, "end_char": 34990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 55 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35215, "end_char": 35233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 55 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35651, "end_char": 35669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37062, "end_char": 37072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37088, "end_char": 37098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Virle Rasbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38936, "end_char": 38949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is perfectly true, as has been stated\n\n(I) Virle Rasbury, 2nd Edn.,"}}, {"text": "RaJilal Panachand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38979, "end_char": 38996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RaJilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi"}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39874, "end_char": 39884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40025, "end_char": 40038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40137, "end_char": 40147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40375, "end_char": 40385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay State Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41171, "end_char": 41195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention is that the contribution which is made payable under this section is in substance a tax and the Bombay State Legislature was not competent to enact such provision within the limits of the authority exercisable by it under the Constitution."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41471, "end_char": 41481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41607, "end_char": 41619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42107, "end_char": 42118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42168, "end_char": 42178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. The position, therefore, is that if the imposition is held to be a tax, it could come either under entry 97 of List I, which includes taxes not mentioned in Lists II and\n\nIII or under article 248 (1) of the Constitution and in either case it is Parliament alone that has the competency to legislate upon the subject."}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42533, "end_char": 42543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42809, "end_char": 42819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Charitable Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42848, "end_char": 42873, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43787, "end_char": 43796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nlegislative purposes.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe>-jea"}}, {"text": "articles 110 and 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44213, "end_char": 44233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ratilal Panachand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48312, "end_char": 48329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the second place, even if the payment of a motor licence fee is a voluntary payment, it can still be regarded as a tax if the fees that are realised on motor licences have no relation to the expenses that the Government incurs in keeping an office or bureau for the granting of licences and the collections are not appropriated for that purpose but\n\nRatilal Panachand\n\nGandhi\n\nThe State of Bombay and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ratilal Panachand\n\nGandhi"}}, {"text": "MukherJea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48373, "end_char": 48382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MukherJea J.\n\nRati/al Panachand\n\nGandhi v.\n\nTht State of Bombay and\n\nOt/tds.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe>-jea"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48624, "end_char": 48634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48764, "end_char": 48774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48857, "end_char": 48867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49509, "end_char": 49519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49966, "end_char": 49976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50888, "end_char": 50898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51054, "end_char": 51066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51372, "end_char": 51382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51450, "end_char": 51453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51571, "end_char": 51581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51608, "end_char": 51618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51650, "end_char": 51660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. P. SHARMA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51795, "end_char": 51807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS\n\ntJ.\n\nSATISH CHANDRA, DIS1'RICT MAGISTRATE,\n\nDELHI, AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "SATISH CHANDRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51825, "end_char": 51839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS\n\ntJ.\n\nSATISH CHANDRA, DIS1'RICT MAGISTRATE,\n\nDELHI, AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "V1vIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51934, "end_char": 51945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MDKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, V1vIAN BosE, GHDLAM HASAN,\n\nBHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, arts.", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE"}}, {"text": "GHDLAM HASAN", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51947, "end_char": 51959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MDKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, V1vIAN BosE, GHDLAM HASAN,\n\nBHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, arts."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51962, "end_char": 51970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MDKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, V1vIAN BosE, GHDLAM HASAN,\n\nBHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, arts."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51972, "end_char": 51985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MDKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, V1vIAN BosE, GHDLAM HASAN,\n\nBHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, arts."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51991, "end_char": 52008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MDKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, V1vIAN BosE, GHDLAM HASAN,\n\nBHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, arts."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52015, "end_char": 52036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 19(1)(!) and 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52038, "end_char": 52062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 96(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52091, "end_char": 52099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52107, "end_char": 52133, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "art. 19(1~(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52170, "end_char": 52183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ratilol Panackarul", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52207, "end_char": 52225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(1~(!)-Search and seizure of\n\nRatilol Panackarul\n\nGandhi\n\nV, Tiet Stat."}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_1077_1097_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1077\n\nrendering services which the State considers beneficial in the public interests and which the people have to accept whether they are willing or not.\n\nOur conclusion, therefore, is that section 58 is not ultra vires of the State Legislature by reason of the fact that it is not a tax but a fee which comes within the purview of entry 47 of List III in Schedule VII of the Constitution.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that in our opinion the appeals are allowed only in part and a mandamus will issue in each of these cases restraining the State Government and the Charity Commissioner from enforcing against the appellants the following provisions of the Act to wit :- ( i) Section 44 of the Act to the extent relates to the appointment of the Charity s10ner as a trustee of religious public trust court,\n\nthat it Commisby the\n\n(ii) the provisions of clauses (3) to (6) of section 47, and\n\n(iii) clause (c) of section 55 and the part of clause ( 1) of section 56 corresponding thereto.\n\nThe other prayers of the appellants stand dismissed.\n\nEach party will bear his own costs m both the appeals.\n\nM. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS\n\ntJ.\n\nSATISH CHANDRA, DIS1'RICT MAGISTRATE,\n\nDELHI, AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MDKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, V1vIAN BosE, GHDLAM HASAN,\n\nBHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, arts. 19(1)(!) and 20(3)-Search warrant issued under s. 96(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898)-Whether ultra vires art. 19(1~(!)-Search and seizure of\n\nRatilol Panackarul\n\nGandhi\n\nV, Tiet Stat. ef\n\nBombay atlld\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjeo].\n\nMarch 15.\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magistrate,\n\nDelhi, and Others.\n\ndocuments under :s. 94 and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-\n\nT:Vhether compelltd production thereof-Within the meaning of art. 20(3).\n\nHeld, that the provision for the search warrant under the first alternative of s. 96( 1) of the Code of Crin1inal Procedure does not offend art. 19(1)(£) of the Constitution.\n\nA search and seizure is only a temporary interference with the right to hold the property searched and tht: articles seized.\n\nStatutory recognition in this behalf is a necessary and reasonable restriction and cannot per se be considered to be unconstitutional.\n\nA compelled production of incriminating documents by a person against whom a First Information Report has been made is testimonial compulsion within the meaning of art. 20(3) of the Constitution.\n\nBut a search and seizure of a document under the provisions of ss. 94 and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a compelled production thereof within the meaning of art. 20 ( 3) and hence does not offend the said Article.\n\nA power of search and seizure is, in any system of jurisprudence, an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of the fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, there is no justification for in:o.porting into it, a totally different fundamental right by some process of strained construction.\n\nScope and connotation of art. 20(3) explained. fohn Lilburn\"s Case (3 State Trials 1315), Boyd\n\nv. United States (116 U.S. 616), Weeks v. United States, (232 U.S. 383), Feliz Gould v. United States (255 U.S. 298), Entick v. Carrington (19 State Trials 1030), Hale v. Henkel (201 U.S. 43), and Satya Kinkar Roy v. Nikhil Chandra fyotis!iopadhaya (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 104) referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JuR1so1cT10N PETITIONS Nos. 372 and 375 of 1953.\n\nOriginal petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental right.\n\nVeda Vyas and Daulat Ram Kalia (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with them) for the petitioners.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General for India (Porus A. Mehta and A. M. Chatterjee, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1954. March 15.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNAD!cLD.\\S J.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-These two applications are for relief under article 32 of the Constitution arising out of similar and connected set of facts and are dealt with together.\n\nThey arise under the following circumstances. The Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies, Delhi State, lodged information with the Inspector- General, Delhi Special Police Establishment, to the following effect.\n\nMessrs.\n\nDalmia Jain Airways Ltd. was registered in his office on the 9th July, 1946, with an authorised capital of Rs. 10 crores and went into liquidation on the 13th June, 1952.\n\nAn investigation into the affairs of the company was ordered by the Government and the report of the inspector appointed under section 138 of the Indian Companies Act indicated that an organised attempt was made from the inception of the company to misappropriate and embezzle the funds of the company and declare it to be substantial loss, and to conceal from the shareholders the true state of affairs by submitting false accounts and balance-sheets.\n\nVarious dishonest and fraudulent transactions were also disclosed which show that false accounts with fictitious entries and false records were being maintained and that dishonest transfers of moneys had been made.\n\nIt was accordingly alleged that offences under sections 406, 408, 409, 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 477(a) of the Indian Penal Code had been committed.\n\nIt was also stated that Seth R. K. Dalmia who was the Director and Chairman of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. has been controlling certain other concerns, viz., ( 1) Dalmia Cement & Paper Marketing Co., Ltd., (2) Dalmia Jain Aviation Ltd. now known as Asia Udyog Ltd., and (3) Allen Berry & Co., Ltd. through his nominees and that all these concerns were utilised in order to commit the frauds.\n\nIt was further stated therein by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies that to determine the extent of the fraud, it was necessary to get hold of books not only of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. but also of the allied concerns controlled by the Dalmia group, some of which are outside the Delhi State. Lists of the offices and places in which and of the persons in whose custody the records may be available were furnished.\n\nSpeedy 4-36 S. C. !ndia.(59\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, and\n\nOthtrs\n\nJagannadha das].\n\nM. P. Sharma and Others.\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, arid\n\nOthers.\n\njagannadhadas J.\n\ninvestigation was asked for.\n\nThis information was recorded by the Special Police on the 19th November, 1953, as the First Information Report.\n\nOn the basis thereof an application was made to the District Magistrate, Delhi, under section % of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the issue of warrants for the search of documents and in the places, as per schedules furnished.\n\nPermission to investigate in respect of some of the non-cognisable offences mentioned in the First Information Report was also asked for.\n\nOn the same day, the District Magistrate ordered investigation of the offences and issued warrants for simultaneous searches at as many as 34 places. The searches were made on the 25th November, 1953, and subsequent days and a voluminous mass of records was seized from various places.\n\nThe petitioners pray that the search warrants may be quashed as being absolutely illegal, and ask for return of the documents seized.\n\nIn Petition No. 372 of 1953 there are four petitioners of whom the second is the Delhi Glass Works Ltd., and the first the Deputy-General Manager thereof, the third its Secretary and the fourth a shareholder therein.\n\nIn Petition No. 375 of 1953 there are five petitioners of whom the first is Messrs.\n\nAllen Berry & Co., Ltd., second Asia Udyog Ltd., the third Shri R. K.\n\nDalmia, the fourth the Secretary and General Attorney of the third and the fifth a shareholder of petitioners Nos. 1 and 2, and an officer of petitioner No. 2.\n\nIt will be seen that the petitioners in both the petitions belong to the four concerns, namely, ( 1) Delhi Glass Works Ltd., (2) Messrs. Allen Berry & Co., Ltd., (3) Asia Udyog Ltd., and (4) Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd.\n\nThe last three are stated to be Dalmia concerns but it does not appear from the records placed before us what exact connection Delhi Glass Works Ltd. has with them.\n\nHowever, it is admittedly one of the places for which a search warrant was asked for and against which the First Information Report appears to have been lodged.\n\nIn the petitions various questions were raised.\n\nBut such of them which raise only irregularities and illegalities of the searches and do not involve any consitutional violation are matters which may\n\nbe more appropriately canvassed before the High Court on applications under article 226 of the Constitution and we have declined to go into them.\n\nThe petitionen have, therefore, confined themselves before us to two grounds on which they challenge the constitutional validity of the searches. The contentions raised a:-e that the fundamental rights of the petitioners under article 20(3) and article 19(l)(f) have been violated by the searches in question.\n\nSo far as the contention based on article 19(1) (f) is concerned we are unable to see that the petitioners have any arguable case.\n\nArticle 19(1) (f) declares the right of all citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property subject to the operation of any existing or future law in so far as it imposes reasonable restr'.ctions, on the exercise of any of the rights conferred thereby, in the interests of general public.\n\nIt is urged that the searches and seizures as effected in this case were unreasonable and constitute a serious restnct1on on the right of the various petitioners, inasmuch as their buildings were invaded, their document< taken away and their business and reputation affected by these largescale and allegedly arbitrary searches and that a law (section 96(1), Cr.P.C.) which authorises such searches violates the constitutional guarantee and i> involved in this case in respect of the wauant.• on the right to hold and enjoy property.\n\nNo doubt a seizure and carrying away is a restriction of the possession and enjoyment of the property seized.\n\nThis, however, is only temporary and for the limited purpose of investigation.\n\nA search and seizure is, therefore, only a temporary interference with the right to hold the premises searched and the articles seized.\n\nStatntory rgulation m this behalf 1s necessary and reasunable restriction cannot per se be considered to be unconstitutional.\n\nThe damage, if any, caused by such temporary interference if found to be in excess of legal authority is a matter for redress in other proceedings.\n\nWe are unable to sec how any question of violation of article 19(1) (f) is invalid.\n\nBut, a search by itself is not a restriction m question which purport to be under the Erst\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand oth rs v.\n\n- Salish Chandra\n\nDistrict Magistratt, Delhi, and\n\nOthers.\n\nJagannadhadaa ].\n\nM.P. Sharma and Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, and Others.\n\nJagannadha\n\ndas].\n\nalternative of section 96(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe only substantial question, therefore, that has been raised is the one relating to article 20(3) which runs as follows :\n\n\"No person accused of any offence shall be COffif pelled to be a witness against himself.\"\n\nThe argument urged before us is that a search to obtain documents, for investigation into an offence is a compulsory procuring of incriminatory evidence from the accused himself and is, therefore, hit by article 20(3) as unconstitutional and illegal. It 1s not disputed that, prima facie, the article in question has nothing to indicate that it comprehends within its scope, the prohibition of searches and seizures of documents from the custody of an accused.\n\nBut it is urged that this is necessarily implied therein by certain canons of liberal construction which are applicable to the interpretation of constitutional guarantees.\n\nIn suppqrt of this line of argument great reliance has been placed upon American deciions in which similar questions were canvassed.\n\nThe argument on behalf of the petitioners is presented in the following wav.\n\nThe fundamental guarantee in article 20(3) comprehends within its scope not merely oral testimony given by an accused in a criminal case pending against him, but also evidence of whatever character compelled out of a person who is or is likely to become incriminated thereby as an accused.\n\nIt, therefore, extends not only to compelled production of documents by an accused from his possession, but also to such compelled production of oral or documentary evidence from any other person who may become incriminated thereby as an accused in future proceedings. If this view of the content of article 20(3) is accepted, the next step in the argument presented is that a forcible search and seizure of documents is, for purposes of constitutional protection of this guarantee, on the same footing as a compelled production of the said documents by the person from whom they are seized.\n\nThis chain of reasoning, if accepted in its entirety, would render searches and seizures of documents and any\n\nstatutory provisions in that behalf illegal and void, as being in violation of the fundamental right under article 20(3).\n\nThe question thus raised is of farreaching importance and reqmres careful consideration.\n\nArticle 20(3) embodies the principle of protection against compulsion of self-incrimination which is one of the fundamental canons of the British system of criminal 'jurisprudence and which has been adopted by the American system and incorporated as an article of its Constitution.\n\nIt has also, to a substantial extent, been recognised in the Anglo-Indian administration of criminal justice in this country by incorporation into various statutory provisions.\n\nIn order, therefore, to arrive at a correct appraisal of the scope and content of the doctrine and to judge to what extent that was intended to be recognised by our Constitution-makers in article 20(3), it is necessary to have a cursory view of the origin and scope of this doctrine and the implications thereof as understood in English law and in American law and as recognised in the Indian law.\n\nIn English law, this principle of protection against self-incrimination had a historical origin.\n\nIt resulted from a feeling of revulsion against the inquisitorial methods adopted and the barbarous sentences imposed, by the Court of Star Chamber, in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction.\n\nThis came to a head in the case of John Lilburn(') which brough~ about the abolition of the Star Chamber and the firm: recognition of the principle that the accused should not be put on oath and that no evidence should be taken from him.\n\nThis principle, in course of time, developed into its logical extensions, by way of privilege of witnesses against self-incrimination, when called for giving oral testimony or for production of documents.\n\nA change was introduced by the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 by making an accused a competent witness on his own behalf, if he applied for it.\n\nBut so far as the oral testimony of witnesses and the production of documents are concerned, the protection against\n\n(1) 3 State Trials 1315.\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magi.strait, Delhi, and\n\nOtl1'Ts.\n\nJ agannai/ha-\n\n. das].\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magis trate, Delhi, and\n\nOtliers.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nself-incrimination continued as before. (See Phipson on Evidence, 9th Edition, pages 215 and 474).\n\nThese principles, as they were before the statutory change in 1898, were carried into the American legal system and became part of its common law. (See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, pages 301 to 303).\n\nThis was later on incorporated into their Constitution by virtue of the Fifth Amendment thereof. The language of the Fifth Amendment was considered by the American Courts as being wide enough to cover all the aspects of the principle of protection against selfincrimination as administered under the English common law including oral testimony of witnesses and production of documents. (See Willis on Constitutional Law, pages 518 and 519).\n\nIn course of time further extensions of that privilege were recognised by the courts relating to searches and seizures.\n\nIt came to be held that unreasonable searches and seizures of documents fell equally within the mischief of the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments fBoyd v. United States(') ] , and that documents or other evidence so obtained were inadmissible in evidence [Weeks v.\n\nUnited States(')].\n\nIn the Indian law the extent to which this protection is recognised appears from the various relevant statutory provisions . from time to time.\n\nSection\n\nIII of Act XV of 1852 recognised that an accused in a criminal proceedings was not a competent or compellable witness to give evidence for or against himself.\n\nThis provision was repealed by the Evidence Act I of\n\n1872. But meanwhile the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861 in sections 204 and 203 thereof respectively provided that no oath shall be administered to the accused and that it shall be in the discretion of the Magistrate to examine him.\n\nThe Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 by section 250 thereof made a general questioning of the accused, after the witnesses for the prosecution had been examined, compulsory and section 345 thereof provided that no oath or affirmation shall be\n\n(•) II6 U.S. 616.\n\n(2) 232 U.S. 383.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REFCJ:'/, TS 1085\n\nadministered to the accused person.\n\nThese features have been continued in the later Codes of Criminal Procedure and have been incorporated into section 342 of the present Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. The only later statutory change, so far, in this behalf, appears to be that brought about by section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.\n\nBy virtue of that section an accused is a competent witness on his own application in respect of offences under that Act.\n\nSo far as witnesses are concerned, section III of Act XV of 1852 also declared the protection of witnesses against compulsion to answer incriminating questions.\n\nShortly thereafter in 1855, this protection was modified by section 32 of Act II of 1855 which made him compellable to answer even incriminating questions but provided immunity from arrest or prosecution . on the basis of such evidence or any other kind of use thereof in criminal proceedings except prosecution for giving false evidence.\n\nThis position has been continued under section 132 of the Evidence Act I of 1872 which. is still in force.\n\nSo far as documents are concerned, it does not appear that the Indian statutory law specifically recognised protection. against production of incriminating documents until Evidence Act I of 1872 was enacted which has a provision in this bel;@lf in section 130 thereof.\n\nIt is not quite clear whether this section which excludes parties to a suit applies to an accused.\n\nThus so far as the Indian law is concerned it may be taken that the protection against self-incrimination continues more or less as in the English common law,. so far as the accused and production of documents are concerned, but that it has been modified as regards oral testimony of witnesses, by introducing compulsion and providing immunity from prosecution on the basis of such compelled evidence.\n\nSince the time when the principle of protection against self-incrimination became established in English law and in other systems of law which have followed it, there has been considerable debate as to the utility thereof and serious doubts were held in some quarters that this principle has a tendency to d>feat justice.\n\nIn support of the principle it is .claimea that the protection\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nV, Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, and\n\nOthers.\n\nJagannadha\n\ndtisJ.\n\nM. P. Shanna\n\nand Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, and\n\nOthers.\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nof accused against self-incrimination promotes active investigation from external sources to find out the truth and proof of alleged or suspected crime instead of extortion of confessions on unverified suspicion. (See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, page 309).\n\nIt is also claimed that that privilege in its application to witnesses as regards oral testimony and production of documents affords to them in general a free atmosphere in which they can be persuaded to come forward to furnish evidence in courts and be of substantial help in elucidating truth in a case, with reference to material within their knowledge and in their possession. (See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, page 307).\n\nOn the other hand, the opinion has been strongly held in some quarters that this rule has an undesirable effect on social interests and that in the detection of crime, the State is confronted with overwhelming difficulties as a result of this privilege. It is said this has become a hiding place of crime and has outlived its usefulness and that the rights of accused persons are amply protected without this privilege and that no innocent person is in need of it. (See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII. pages 314 and 315).\n\nCertain passages at pages 441 and 442 of Vol. 1 of Stephen's History of the Criminal Law of England are also instructive in this context and show a similar divergence of opinion.\n\nIn view of the above background, there is no inherent reason to construe the ambit. of this fundamental right as comprising a very wide range.\n\nNor would it be legitimate to confine it to the barely literal meaning of the words used, since it is a recognised doctrine that when appropriate a constitutional provision has to be liberally construed, so as to advance the intendment thereof and to prevent its circumvention.\n\nAnalysing the terms in which this right has been declared in our Constitution, it may be said to consist of the following components. ( 1) It is a right pertaining to a person \"accused of an offence\"; (2) It is a protection against \"compulsion to be a ' witness\"; and (3) It is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his givinir evidence \"against himself\".\n\nThe cases with which we are concerned have been\n\npresented to us on the footing that the persons against whom the search warrants were issued, were all of them persons against whom the First Information Report was lodged and who were included in the category of accused therein and that therefore they are persons \"accused of an offence\" within the meaning of article 20 (3) and also that the documents for whose search the warrants were issued, being required for investigation into the alleged offences, such searches were for incriminating material.\n\nIt may be noticed that some of the accused enumerated in the First Information Report are incorporated companies.\n\nBut no question has been raised before us that the protection does not apply to corporations or to documents belonging to them-a question about which there has been considerable debate in the American Courts. On the above footing, therefore, the only substantial argument before us on this part of the case was that compelled production of incriminating documents from the possession of an accused is compelling an accused to be a witness against himself.\n\nThis argument accordingly raises mainly the issue relating to the scope and connotation of the second of the three components above stated.\n\nBroadly stated the guarantee m article 20(3) is against \"testimonial compulsion\".\n\nIt 1s suggested that this is confined to the oral evidence of a person standing his trial for an offence when called to the witness-stand.\n\nWe can see no reason to confine the content of the constitutional guarantee to this barely literal import.\n\nSo to limit it would be to rob the guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the substance for the sound as stated in certain American decisions. The phrase used in article 20(3) is \"to be a witness.\" A person can \"be a witness\" not merely by giving oral evidence but also by producing documents or making intelligible gestures as in the case of a dumb witness (see section 119 of the Evidence Act) or the like. \"To be a witness\" is nothing more than \"to furnish evidence\", and such evidence can be furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or of a document or in other modes.\n\nSo far as\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nSatish Chandra.\n\nDistrict Magistrate, Delhi, and\n\n0th.rs.\n\n]agannadkadas ].\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nSalish Chandra, Dhtrict Magistrat~, Delhi, and Others.\n\nJagannadhadas].\n\nproduction of documents is concerned, no doubt section 139 of the Evidence Act says that a person producing a document on summons is not a witness.\n\nBut that section is meant to regulate the right of cross-examination.\n\nIt is not a guide to the connotation of the word \"witness'', which must be understood in its. natural sense, i.e., as referring to a.person who furnishes evidence.\n\nIndeed, every positive volitional act which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as. opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part.\n\nNor is there any reason to think that the protection in respect of the evidence se> procured is confined to what transpires at the trial in the court room. The phrase used in article 20(3) is \"to be a witness\" and not to \"appear as a witness\":- It follows that the protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase \"to be a witness\"· is not mere1y in respect of testimonial compulsion in the court room but may well . extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him.\n\nIt is available therefore to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution. \\Vhether it is available to other persons in other situations does not call for decision in this case.\n\nConsidered in this light, the guarantee under article 20(3) would be available in the present cases to these petitioners against whom a First Information Report has been recorded as accused therein.\n\nIt would extend to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary documents which are reasonably likely - to support a prosecution against them.\n\nThe question then that arises next is whether search warrants for the seizure of such documents from the custody of these persons are unconstitutional and hence illegal on the ground that in effect they are tantamount to compelled production of evidence.\n\nIt is urged that both search .and seizure of a document uand a compelled production thereof on notice or summons serve the same purpose of being\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 1089\n\navailable as evidence in a prosecution against the . person concerned, and that any other view would defeat or weaken the protection afforded by the guarantee of the fundamental right.\n\nThis line of argument is not altogether without force and has the apparent support of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Boyd v. United States(').\n\nThe question there which came up for consideration was in fact the converse, namely, whether a compulsory production of documents on the facts of that case amounted to search and seizure. There are dicta in that decision to the effect that a compulsory production of a man's private papers is a search and seizure since it . affects the sole object thereof and that by this process the court extorts from the party his private books and papers to make him liable for penalty. It is necessary, therefore, to examine this decision rather closely in order to determine how far it can be a safe guide for our purpose.\n\nThe question therein arose under the following circumsta)lces.\n\nIn an Act to amend the Customs Revenue Laws, there was a provision which enabled the Government Attorney to make a written motion to the court for the issue of a notice to the opposite-party for production of papers in his possession. The motion could be made if in the Attorney's opinion those books contain materials which will prove an alleged fact in support of a charge of defrauding the revenues, jnvolving penalty and forfeiture of merchandise to which the fraud relates. It is also provided by the said section that if the court in its discretion allows the motion in which is set out the fact sought to be proved and calls upon the defendant to produce the documents, and the defendant fails or refuses to produce them without any proper and satisfactory explanation, the allegation of fact sought to be proved by such production may be deemed to have been confessed.\n\nThe question that thereupon arose was whether an order for production made by the court under that section did not violate the constitutional rights declared by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the\n\n(1) 116 U.S. 616.\n\nM. P. Sharma and Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magis trate, Delhi, and\n\nOthers.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n.MP. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nv . . Sa:ish Chandra\n\nDistrict Magis.\n\nJrate, Delhi, and\n\nOthers\n\n7agannadhadas J.\n\nAmerican Constitution. follows: These amendments are as\n\nAmendment IV. \"The right of the people to be secure m their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not . be violated; and no warrants shall issue, ' but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.\"\n\nAmendment V. \"No person ...... shall be compelled in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself ; ........ \" On the facts of the above case, there was no difficulty in holding that the production of documents m response to the motion granted by the court was a compelled production of incriminating evidence and that it violated the Fifth Amendment. The minority judgment brought this out clearly m. the following passage: . ''The order of the court under the statute is in effect a subpoena duces tecum; and though the penalty for the witness' failure to appear in court with the criminating papers is not fine and imprisonment, it is one which may be made more severe, namely, to have the charges against him of a criminal nature taken for confessed and made the foundation of the judgment of the court.\n\nThat this is within the protection which the Constitution intended against compelling a person to be a witness against . himself is, I think, quite clear.\" The majority Judges, however, went one step further and said as follows :\n\n\"The compulsory production of a man's private papers is search and seizure.\"\n\nand again thus \"We have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to . be used in evidence against him is soubstantialy different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.\"\n\nThus in the view that the order for production was tantamount to search and seizure and that in the case it was for a purpose prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, they held that the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches was also violated.\n\nThe minority Judges, however, did not accept this view and pointed out that there was an essential difference between the seizure of a document on search and the production of a document.\n\nBut even otherwise, it would appear on a careful consideration of the decision that the majority were at pains to make out that, in the circumstances of the case the order for production would amount to \"an unreasonable search and seizure\" and is hence unconstitutional as violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The case, therefore, does not lend support for any general doctrine that a search and seizure in all circumstances is tantamount to a compelled production in violation of the Fifth Amendn:1ent.\n\nThat decision itself expressly recognizes the legality of various kinds of searches and indeed the Fourth Amendment itself shows it.\n\nThus what that decision really established was that the obtaining of incriminating evidence by illegal search and seizure is tantamount to the violation of the Fifth Amendment.\n\nIt was in this light that subsequent cases have also understood this decision. [See Felix Gouled v. United States(')].\n\nBoyd's case(\") has relied on the famous judgment of Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington( 3 ), and learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on it Strenuously before us.\n\nWigmore in his Law of Evidence, Vol. VIII, page 368, has shown how some of the assumptions relating to it in Boyd's case(\"), were inaccurate and misleading.\n\nWhile no doubt Lord Camden refers to the principle of protection against self-accusation with great force, in his consideration of the validity of general search-warrants, that case does not treat a seizure on a search warrant as ipso facto tantamount to self-incrimination.\n\nAll that was said\n\n(1) 255 U.S. 298; 65 Law. Edn. 647 at 651 and 653.\n\n(2) 116 U.S. 616.\n\n(3) 19 State Trials 1030.\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Otbrs.\n\nSalish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, and'\n\nOthers.\n\nJagannadha\n\ndas J.\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, and\n\nOt,,,,.s.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nwas that the legal philosophy underlying both is the same, as appears from the following passage :\n\n\"It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle.\n\nThere too the innocent would be confounded with the guilty.\"\n\nIt may be noted that Lord Camden's judgment shows, by an elaborate dissertation, that the search warrant therein under consideration was unauthorised and illegal. Thus even the above dictum has reference only to an illegal search.\n\nIt is, therefore, impossible to derive from Boyd's case (1), support for the proposition that searches and seizures, in general, are violative of the privilege of protection against self-incrimination.\n\nNor is it possible to import that doctrine with its differentiation between legal and illegal searches into our Constitution because we have nothing in our Constitution corresponding to the Fourth Amendment enabling the courts to import the test of unreasonableness or any analogous criterion for discrimination between legal and illegal searches.\n\nIn the arguments before us strong reliance has also been placed on the provision of sections 94 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code in support of the broad proposition that a seizure of documents on search is in the contemplation of law a compelled production of documents. The sections run as follows :\n\n\"94(1).\n\nWhenever any court, or in any place beyond the limits of the towns of Calcutta and Bombay, any officer in charge of a police-station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such court or officer, such court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend\n\n(l) Jl6 u. s. 616\n\nand produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order. ,,\n\n\"96(1). Where any Court has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons or order under section 94 or a requisition under section 95, subsection ( 1), has been or might be addressed will not or would not produce the document or thing as required by such summons or requisition, or where such document or thing is not known to the court to be in the possession of any person, or where the court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served bv a general search or inspection, It may issue a search-warrant ; and the person to whom such warrant is directed, may search or inspect in accordance therewith and the provisions hereinafter mntained. ,,\n\nIt is pointed out that the procedure contemplated is that normally there should be a summons or notice for production under section 94 and it is only if there is no compliance therewith or if the Magistrate is satisfied about the likelihood of non-compliance that a search warrant is to be issued.\n\nIt is, therefore, urged that these provisions themselves show that in law search and seizure is a substitute for compelled production on 5ummons.\n\nThere has been some debate before us whether section 94 applies to an accused person and whether there is any element of compulsion in it. For the purpose of this case it is unnecessary to decide these points.\n\nWe may assume without deciding that the section is applicable to the accused as held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in a recent case in Satya Kinkar Roy v. Nikhil Chandra Jyotishopadhaya(' ). We may also assume that there is an element of complusion implicit in the process contemplated by section 94 because, in any case, noncompliance results in the unpleasant consequence of invasion of one's premises and rummaging of one's\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1951 Cal. IOI.\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Others\n\nSatish Chandra, District Magis~ trate, Delhi, and\n\nOthers.\n\nJagannmfha~\n\nd\"' ].\n\nM. P. Sharma\n\nand Othtrs\n\nV, Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, and\n\nOthers.\n\nJagannadha\n\ndasJ.\n\nprivate papers by the minions of law under a search warrant. Notwithstanding these assumptions we are unable to read sections 94 and 96(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as importing any statutory recognition of a theory that search and seizure of documents is compelled production thereof.\n\nIt is to be noticed that section 96( l) has three alternatives and that the requirement of previous notice or summons and the non-compliance with it or the likelihood of such noncompliance is prescribed only for the first alternative and not for the second . or the third.\n\nA \"general search\" and a \"search for a document or a thing not known to be in possession. of any particular person\" are not conditioned by any such requirement.\n\nIndeed in cases covered by the second alternative such a requirement cannot even be contemplated as possible.\n\nIt would, therefore, follow, on the theory propounded, that some at least of the searches within the scope of the second and third alternatives in section 96 ( 1) would fall outside the constitutional protection of article 20(3)-an anomalous distinction for which no justification can be found on principle.\n\nA consideration of the history of Indian statutory legislation relating to searches does not support the theory propounded.\n\nThe provisions for searches are to be found in the successive Codes of Criminal Procedure. In the earliest Code, Act XXV of 1861, there appears no provision for issuing summons or notices for production of documents, but there was only a provision for the issue of a search warrant by a Magistrate under section 114 thereof, which is in the following terms :\n\n\"When a Magistrate shall consider that the production of any thing is essential to the conduct of an enquiry . into an offence known or suspected to have been committed, he may grant his warrant to search for such thing ; and it shall be lawful for the officer charged with the execution of such warrant to search for such thing in any house or place within the jurisdiction of such Magistrate.\n\nIn such case the Magistrate may specify in his warrant the house or place, or part thereof, to which only the search shall extend.\"\n\nThere was also section 142 of the said Code which vested in an officer in charge of police station with the power to make a search suo moto in certain circumstances.\n\nIn the next Criminal Procedure Code, Act I of 1872, the relevant provisions were in sections 365, 368 and 379. Section 379 was more or less a repetition of section 142 of the previous Code (Act XXV of 1861) vesting power in a police officer to make a suo moto search.\n\nSection 3.65 appears to be the earliest statutory provision for the issue of a summons, either by a police officer or by a court for the production of a document required for ilwestigation.\n\nThis was followed by section 368 relating to the issue of searchwarrants which was in the following terms :\n\n\"When a Magistrate considers that the production of anything is essential to the conduct of an inquiry into an offence known or suspected to have been committed or to the discovery of the offender, or when he considers that such inquiry or discovery will be furthered by the search or inspection of any house or place, he may grant his search-warrant; and the officer charged with the execution of such warrant may search or inspect any house or place within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the District.\n\nThe Magistrate issuing such warrant may, if he sees fit, specify in his warrant the house or place, or part thereof, to which only the search or inspection shall extend; and the officer charged with the execution of such warrant shall then search or inspect only the house, place or part so specified.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that even when the procedure of summons for production of documents was introduced, as above in section 365, the provision for the issue of a search-warrant in section 368 had absolutely nothing to do with the question of non-compliance by the concerned person with the summons for production. It is only in the next Criminal Procedure Code, Act X of 1882, that the provisions, sections 94 and 96, appear which correspond to the present sections 94 and 96 of Act V of 1898, linking up to some extent the issue of 5-98 SC India.(59\n\nM.P. Shtmn•\n\nand OtherJ\n\ny, SatiJh Chandra,\\.\n\nDistrict Magistrate, Delhi, and\n\nOthers.\n\n]agannatfhadas J.\n\nM. P.Sharm•\n\nand Others\n\nr atiJh Chandra, District Magis- Jrate, Delhi, and\n\nOthers.\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nsearch-warrants with non-compliance or likelihood of non-compliance with a summons to produce.\n\nIt may be mentioned in passing that the provision for the issue of general search warrants appears for the first time in the Procedure Code of 1882 and even there the issue of such general warrants is not based on noncompliance with a previous summons for production.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that there is no basis in the Indian law for the assumption that a search or seizure of a thing or document is in itself to be treated as compelled production of the same.\n\nIndeed a little consideration will show that the two are essentially different matters for the purpose relevant to the present discussion.\n\nA notice to produce is addressed to the party concerned and his production in compliance therewith constitutes a testimonial act by him within the meaning of article 20(3) as above explained.\n\nBut search warrant is addressed to an officer of the Government, generally a police officer.\n\nNeither the search nor the seizure are acts of the occupier of the searched premises. They are acts of another to which he is obliged to submit and are, therefore, not his testimonial acts in any sense.\n\nEven in the American \n\nRao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another v.\n\nT1\" Stateof Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nBhagwati].\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe contents of the Panchnama before they appended their signatures thereto. That is however a far cry from coming to the conclusion that they acted m a highly irresponsible manner and their testimony was unreliable.\n\nThe circumstances under which the numbers of the currency notes were recorded m the Panchnama, the statement made by the appellant No. 1 to them and the confusion into which the app<\"llant No. 1 fell when he was questioned by the police authorities on the tallying of the numbers contained in the memo prepared when the raid was organised with the numbers of the currency notes actually found in the bedroom of the appellant No. 1 were events which would indelibly print themselves in the memory of these witnesses and even though they were examined in the Court of the Special Judge about 10 months after the occurrence, these events and particularly the fact that the appellant No. 1 claimed these moneys which were thus recovered as his own would certainly not be in any manner whatever forgotten by them.\n\nThe only suggestion which was made against the credibility of these witnesses on this point was th::it they must not have exactly remembered what transpired on that night in the bedroom of the appellant No. 1 and that they might have committed an honest mistake when narrating the events that had happened on that night.\n\nAn honest lapse of memory would no doubt be a possibility but having regard to the circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that the events that happened that night in the bedroom of the appellant No. 1 and which were deposed to by these witnesses were not such as to be easily forgotten by them and when these witnesses deposed to the fact that the appellant No. 1 claimed this sum of Rs. 25,000 as his own and was utterly confused when explanation was sought from him by the police authorities in regard to the tallying of the numbers of these Government currency notes, it is not easy to surmise that they were suffering from any lapse of memory.\n\nThe evidence of these witnesses in regard to the statement made by the appellant No. 1 before them was also attacked on the ground that Shanti Lal\n\nAhuja, the Additional District Magistrate's asking the appellant No. 1 to repeat the statement which he had earlier made before him to these witnesses was a mere camouflage. Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, knew very well that the statement made by the appellant No. 1 to him was not recorded under the provisions of section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code and was therefore inadmissible in evidence and he therefore resorted to these tactics of having the appellant No. 1 repeat the very same statement to these witnesses so as to avoid the bar of section 164.\n\nReliance was placed in this behalf on A.LR. 1940 Lahore 129 (Full Bench) where it was held that if on the facts of any case it was found that a statement made to a third person was in reality intended to be made t-0 the police and was represented as having been made to a third person merely as a colourablc pretence in order to avoid the provisions of section 162 the court would hold it excluded by the section.\n\nThe san1e ratio it was submitted applied to the statements made to these two witnesses because they were a colourable pretence to avoid the provisions of section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code which had certainly not been complied with by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate.\n\nIt has however to be observed that every statement made to a person assisting the police during an investigation cannot be treated as a statement made to the police or to the Magistrate and as such excluded by section 162 or section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question is one of fact and has got to be determined having regard to the circumstances of each case.\n\nOn a scrutiny of the evidence of these two witnesses and the circumstances. under which the statements came to be made by the appellant No. 1 to them we are of the opinion that tht appellant No. 1 was asked by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional, District Magistrate, to make the statements to these two witnesses not with a view to avoid the bar of section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code or by way of colourable pretence but by way of greater caution particularly having regard to the fact that the appellant No. 1 occupied the position of a Minister of\n\n6-98 S.C. India/59\n\nRao Shiv Bahatl\"'\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe Stak of VindfiJa Praduh.\n\nBhapati]•\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nTM State of Vindhya Prarksh.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nIndustries in the State of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nThe statements made by the appellant No. 1 to these witnesses therefore did not suffer from this disability and were admissible in evidence.\n\nThe evidence of these witnesses being thus worthy of credit and the statements made by the appellarit No. 1 to them being admissible in evidence there is no doubt that the appellant No. 1 claimed these moneys, viz:, Rs. 25,000, which were recovered from the top drawer of the dressing table in the bedroom of the appellant No. 1 as his own being the balance of Rs. 40,000 which he had brought from his home when he came to Delhi.\n\nIf this was so the very fact that the numbers of these Government currency notes of the value of Rs. 25,000 tallied with the numbers of the notes which had been handed over to Nagindas earlier when the raid was organised and which numbers were also specified in the memo prepared at that time was enough to establish the falsity of the allegation made by the appellant No. 1 that he had brought these moneys from his home. These moneys .were proved to have been provided by the police authorities and given to Nagindas when the raid was organised and were the instruments of the offence of the taking of the bribe or illegal gratification by the appellant No. 1.\n\nIf the numbers of these notes tallied with the numbers of the notes which were thus handed over by the police authorities to Nagindas they could not have belonged to the appellant No. 1 and were certainly brought there by Nagindas and handed over by him to the appellant No. l as alleged by the prosecution.\n\nA suggestion was made that there was opportunity for Nagindas to plant these moneys into the top drawer of the dresing table when the back of the appellant No .. 1 was turned upon him. Even assuming that there was that possibility it is sufficiently negatived by the fact that \"\".hei; i these moneys were recovered from the top drawer either at the instance of Nagindas as alleged by the appellant No. 1 or at the . instance of the appellant No. 1 as alleged by the prosecution the appellant No. 1 did. not .express any surprise at these moneys being thus found there. If the version of the appellant No. 1\n\nwas correct he had only brought about Rs. 25,000 from his house.\n\nRs. 15,000 has been already spent by him in the purchase of the car.\n\nAbout Rs. 10,000 were spent by him in the purchase of the ornaments and only a sum of Rs. 100 odd was the balance left with him.\n\nAccording to that version there was _not the slightest possibility of the sum of Rs. 25,000 being found in the top drawer of the dressing table. flar from expressing a surprise in this manner the appellant No. 1 claimed these moneys as his own.\n\nThe appellant No. 1 could not have by any mischance failed to appreciate that these Government currency notes which were thus recovered from the top drawer of the dressing table exceeded by far the amount which according to him he had left with him by way of balance and the most natural reaction to the recovery of this large sum of money would have been that he would have certainly denied that these moneys were llis and he would have been surprised at finding that such a large sum of money was thus found there.\n\nNo such reaction was registered on his face.\n\nOn the contrary if the evidence of the two witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar is to be believed and we see no reason why it should not be believed, the appellant No. 1 claimed this sum of Rs. 25,000 as his own being the balance out of the money which he had brought from his home when he came to Delhi. This is sufficient to establish that these moneys which earlier had been handed over by the police authorities to Nagindas found their way into the top drawer of the dressing table in the bedroom of the appellant No. 1 and were the primary evidence of the offence under section 161 having been committed by the appellant No. 1.\n\nThe further circumstance that on the numbers of these notes being tallied and his explanation in that behalf l?eing asked for by the police authorities the appellant No. 1 was confused and could furnish no explanation in regard thereto also supports this conclusion and there is no doubt left in our minds that the appellant No. 1 was guilty of the offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code with which he was charged.\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Vindll)1a Pradesh.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nRao Shiv Baharlur Singh and Another v.\n\nThe State of VindJrya Pradesh.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nWe cannot however leave this case without expressing our strong disapproval of the part which the police authorities and Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, took in this affair. As already observed this offence would never have been committed by the appellant No. 1 but for the fact that the police authorities provided Nagindas with the wherewithal of the commission of the offence.\n\nSir Chinubhai as it appears from the evidence was not in a pos1t1on to provide Nagindas with this sum of Rs. 25,000 or any large sum and in fact in spite of the telephone calls made by Nagindas upon him had not provided any amount beyond Rs. 3,000 which was meant for the other expenses of Nagindas, to him.\n\nNagindas was therefore not 111 a position to provide this sum of Rs. 25,000 for payment of the bribe or the illegal gratification to the appellant No. I.\n\nBut for the adventitious aid which he got from the police authorities the matter would not have progressed any further, and Nagindas would have left Delhi empty handed.\n\nThe police authorities however once they got scent of the intention of Nagindas thought that it was too good an opportunity to miss for entrapping the appellant No. 1 who occupied the position of the Minister of Industries in the State of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nThey therefore provided the sum of Rs. 25,000 on their own and handed it over to Nagindas. The police authorities in this step which they took showed greater enthusiasm than Nagindas himself in the matter of trapping the appellant No. 1.\n\nIt may be that the detection of corruption may sometimes call for the laying of traps, but there is no justification for the police authorities to bring about the taking of a bribe by supplying the bribe money to the giver where he has neither got it nor has the capacity to find it for himself.\n\nIt is the duty of the police authorities to prevent crimes being committed.\n\nIt is no part of their business to provide the instruments of the offence.\n\nWe cannot too strongly disapprove of the step which the police authorities took in this case in the matter of providing the sum of Rs. 25,000 to Nagindas who but for the\n\npolice authorities thus coming to his aid ould nc; ver have been able to bring the whole affair to its culromation.\n\nNot only did the police authorities thus become active parties in the matter of trapping the appellant No. 1 they also provided a handy and an ostensibly independent witness in the person of Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate. Even though he was a member of the judiciary he lent his services to the police authorities and became a limb of the police as it were.\n\nThe part which Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, took in this affair cannot be too strongly condemned.\n\nWe can only repeat in this connection the observations of the Privy Council in A.LR. 1936 Privy Council 253 at page 258 in regard to the Magistrates placing themselves in positions where they would have to step into the witness box and depose as ordinary citizens :-\n\n\"In their Lordships' view it would be particularly unfortunate if Magistrates were asked at all generally to act rather as police officers under section 162 of the Code; and to be at the same time freed, notwithstanding their position as Magistrates, from any obligation to make records under section 164.\n\nIn the result they would indeed be relegated to the position of ordinary citizens as witnesses and then would be required to depose to matters transacted by them in their official capacity unregulated by any statutory rules of procedure or conduct whatever .......... \"\n\nThe position was laid down with greater emphasis by Mr. Justice P. B. Mukharji in A.LR. 1951 Calcutta\n\n524 at page 528 where the learned Judge observed :-\n\n\"Before I conclude I wish to express this court's great disapprobation of the practice that seems to have become very frequent of sending Magistrates as witnesses of police traps.\n\nThe Magistrate is made to go under disguise to witness the trap laid by the police.\n\nIn this case it was Presidency Magistrate and in other cases which have come to our notice there have been other Magistrates who became such witnesses.\n\nTo make the Magistrate a party or a limb of the police during the police investigation seriously\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnoth11\n\nThe State of Vindh;'a PradtJli.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nRao Shiv Bahad111\n\nSingh atcd\n\nAnotl1er\n\nTht Stat1 of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nBhagwati].\n\nundermines the independence of the Magistrates and perverts their judicial outlook. The Magistrates are the normal custodians of the general administration of criminal justice and it is they who normally decide and pass judgments on the acts and conduct of the police.\n\nIt is not enough to say, therefore, that the Magistrate acting as a witness in a particular case does not himself try that case.\n\nThis practice is all the more indefensible here specially when there is no separation of the executive from the judiciary.\n\nThe basic merit of the administration of criminal justice in the State lies in the fact that the person arrested by th~ police is entitled to come before an independent and impartial Magistrate who is expected to deal with the case without the Magistrate himself being in any way a partisan or a witness to police activities.\n\nThere is another danger and that is the Magistrates are put in the unenviable and embarrassing position of having to give evidence as a witness and then being disbelieved.\n\nThat is not the way to secure respect for the Magistracy charged with tl1e administration of justice.\n\nIn my judgment this is a practice which is unfair to the accused and unfair to the Magistrates.\n\nIt is also unfair to the police.\n\nBecause charged with the high responsibility and duty of performing a great and essential public service of this State the police cannot afford to run the risk of opprobrium, even if unfounded, that they have enlisted the Magistrate in their cause.\n\nThat risk is too great and involves forfeiting public respect and confidence ............ \"\n\nWe perfectly endorse the above observations made by Mr. Justice P. B.\n\nMukharji and hope and trust that Magistrates will not be employed by the police authorities in the manner it was done by the Special Police Establishment in this case before us.\n\nThe independence of the judiciary is a priceless treasure to be cherished and safeguarded at all costs against predatory activities of this character and it is of the essence that public confidence in the independence of the judiciary should not be undermined by any such tactics adopted by the executive authorities. We\n\nhave therefore eliminated from our consideration the whole of the evidence given by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, and come to our conclusion in regard to the gilt of the appellant No. 1 relying solely on the testimony of the two independ- . ent witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar.\n\nThe result therefore is that the appeal of the appellant No. 1 will be dismissed except with regard to his conviction and sentence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and the convictions and sentences passed upon him by the Judicial Commissioner under section 465 and section 466 as also section 161 of the Indian Penal Code will be confirmed. The appeal of the appellant No. 2 will be allowed and he be acquitted Md discharged of the offences with which he was charged and immediately set at liberty.\n\nThe bail bond of the appellant No. 2 will be cancelled.\n\nV. M. SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY\n\nTHE ST A TE OF ANDHRA. (With Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAS, V1v1AN BosE and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, art. 14-Government of India Act, 1935, \"'\"Y 48 in List I/ of the Seventh Schedule-Madras .General Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution or Government of India Act, 1935-Rule 16(5) framed under the Act-Whether ultra vires s. 5 (vi) of the Act.\n\nHeld, that the Madras General Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939) is not ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935 as entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 was wide enough to cover a law imposing a tax on the purchaser of goods as well as on the seller.\n\nHeld, also that inasmuch as there was nothing to suggest that the purchasers of other commodities were similarly situated as the purchasers of hides and skins in the present case, the Act\n\nRao Shiv Bahadt11\n\nSi'flgh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe Stale of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nBhagwati].\n\nMarch111 ..", "total_entities": 149, "entities": [{"text": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 733, "end_char": 739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 747, "end_char": 773, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 893, "end_char": 899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. B. Mukherji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1738, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations of Mr. Justice P. B. Mukherji in the case of M. C. Mitra v. The State (A.LR.", "canonical_name": "P. B.\n\nMukharji"}}, {"text": "article 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2190, "end_char": 2207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2215, "end_char": 2236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jai Gopal Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2518, "end_char": 2533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi (K. B. Asthana, with him) for appellant No."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2535, "end_char": 2548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi (K. B. Asthana, with him) for appellant No."}}, {"text": "C. Isaacs", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2582, "end_char": 2591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Isaacs (Murtza Faz!"}}, {"text": "Murtza Faz! Ali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2593, "end_char": 2608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Isaacs (Murtza Faz!"}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2642, "end_char": 2656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta for the respondent."}}, {"text": "sections 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3006, "end_char": 3018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3046, "end_char": 3063, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3094, "end_char": 3106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3124, "end_char": 3141, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court of the Special Judge at Rewa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3225, "end_char": 3259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were tried in the Court of the Special Judge at Rewa under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Vindhya Pradesh took an appeal to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Rewa."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3844, "end_char": 3855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3865, "end_char": 3882, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3942, "end_char": 3953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3961, "end_char": 3978, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 465 and 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4075, "end_char": 4095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4103, "end_char": 4120, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Slate of V indhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4313, "end_char": 4338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 and in default ngorous imprisonment for\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe Slate of V indhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4400, "end_char": 4424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiv Bahadut\n\nSingh af'ld\n\nAnothlr\n\nVo The State of Vindhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4531, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4598, "end_char": 4609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4617, "end_char": 4634, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4724, "end_char": 4737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made to the Judicial Commissioner, Rew a, for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court the Judicial Commissioner granted the appellants leave to appeal under article 134( l) ( c) of the Constitution in regard to the four points of law raised in the case before him."}}, {"text": "article 134( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4809, "end_char": 4824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4998, "end_char": 5016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The constitutional points involved in the appeal came up for hearing before the Constitution Bench of this court and were dealt with by the Judgment of this court delivered on the 22nd May, 1953."}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The constitutional points involved in the appeal came up for hearing before the Constitution Bench of this court and were dealt with by the Judgment of this court delivered on the 22nd May, 1953."}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "20th October, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5629, "end_char": 5647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application was thereafter made by the appellants to this court for leave to urge additional grounds and this court on the 20th October, 1953, made an order that the appeal should be heard on merits."}}, {"text": "1st August, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5863, "end_char": 5879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement executed on the 1st August, 1936, between the Panna Durbar of the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate represented by Sir Chinubhai Madholal and Hiralal Motilal Shah of the other part, the Panna Durbar granted to the syndicate a lease to carry on dian10nd mining operations for a period of 15 years."}}, {"text": "Panna Durbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5893, "end_char": 5905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement executed on the 1st August, 1936, between the Panna Durbar of the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate represented by Sir Chinubhai Madholal and Hiralal Motilal Shah of the other part, the Panna Durbar granted to the syndicate a lease to carry on dian10nd mining operations for a period of 15 years."}}, {"text": "Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement executed on the 1st August, 1936, between the Panna Durbar of the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate represented by Sir Chinubhai Madholal and Hiralal Motilal Shah of the other part, the Panna Durbar granted to the syndicate a lease to carry on dian10nd mining operations for a period of 15 years."}}, {"text": "Chinubhai Madholal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5980, "end_char": 5998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement executed on the 1st August, 1936, between the Panna Durbar of the one part 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have a renewal of the lease for a further period of 15 years from the date of such expiration."}}, {"text": "Panna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6435, "end_char": 6440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were disputes between the syndicate on the one hand and the Panna Durbar on the other and by his order dated the 31st October, 1946, the Political Minister of Panna stopped the mining operations of the syndicate."}}, {"text": "31st October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6488, "end_char": 6506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were disputes between the syndicate on the one hand and the Panna Durbar on the other and by his order dated the 31st October, 1946, the Political Minister of Panna stopped the mining operations of the syndicate."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPanna", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6593, "end_char": 6608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nPanna became integrated in the Unit of Vindhya Pradesh in July, 1948, and the administration of Panna came under the control and superintendence of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh with its seat at Rewa under His Highness the Maharaja of Rewa as Rajpramukh and the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6642, "end_char": 6657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nPanna became integrated in the Unit of Vindhya Pradesh in July, 1948, and the administration of Panna came under the control and superintendence of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh with its seat at Rewa under His Highness the Maharaja of Rewa as Rajpramukh and the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Government of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6755, "end_char": 6784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nPanna became integrated in the Unit of Vindhya Pradesh in July, 1948, and the administration of Panna came under the control and superintendence of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh with its seat at Rewa under His Highness the Maharaja of Rewa as Rajpramukh and the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Rewa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6802, "end_char": 6806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nPanna became integrated in the Unit of Vindhya Pradesh in July, 1948, and the administration of Panna came under the control and superintendence of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh with its seat at Rewa under His Highness the Maharaja of Rewa as Rajpramukh and the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6850, "end_char": 6860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nPanna became integrated in the Unit of Vindhya Pradesh in July, 1948, and the administration of Panna came under the control and superintendence of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh with its seat at Rewa under His Highness the Maharaja of Rewa as Rajpramukh and the appellant No."}}, {"text": "1st September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7130, "end_char": 7149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nOn the 1st September, 1948, the syndicate appointed one Pannalal as Field Manager to get the said order of the Panna Durbar stopping the working of the mines rescinded."}}, {"text": "Pannalal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7179, "end_char": 7187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nOn the 1st September, 1948, the syndicate appointed one Pannalal as Field Manager to get the said order of the Panna Durbar stopping the working of the mines rescinded.", "canonical_name": "Pannalal"}}, {"text": "13th January, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7388, "end_char": 7406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pannalal made several applications for procuring the cancellation of the said order and on the 13th January, 1949, and the 26th January, 1949, Pannalal made two applications and handed them over personally to the appellant No."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pannalal made several applications for procuring the cancellation of the said order and on the 13th January, 1949, and the 26th January, 1949, Pannalal made two applications and handed them over personally to the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Chinubhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Pannalal went to Rewa the questionnaire was handed over to him on the 9th February, 1949, for being sent to Sir Chinubhai.", "canonical_name": "Chinubhai Madholal"}}, {"text": "Nagindas Mehta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Sir Chinubhai was ill he deputed hls Personal Assistant, Nagindas Mehta to go to Rewa and see the appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Nagindas Mehta"}}, {"text": "Nagindas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8558, "end_char": 8566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindas arrived at Rewa on the evening of the 6th March.", "canonical_name": "Nagindas Mehta"}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv Bahadur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8772, "end_char": 8788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I on the morning of the 8th March, 1949, but was asked\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe Stale qf Vindhya Prad11Jh.", "canonical_name": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of f indhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8895, "end_char": 8920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and Anothtr\n\nThe State of f indhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "Nagindas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8988, "end_char": 8996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 saw Nagindas at the Guest House here he had put up nd informed Nagindas that a third party was offenng Rs.", "canonical_name": "Nagindas Mehta"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9755, "end_char": 9761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 that he would talk over the matter with Sir Chinubhai in Bombay and would let him know about it."}}, {"text": "Bombav", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9819, "end_char": 9825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindas then left for Bombav but he reached Bombay on the 29th March, 1949."}}, {"text": "29th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9855, "end_char": 9871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindas then left for Bombav but he reached Bombay on the 29th March, 1949."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10498, "end_char": 10513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 who was on tour sent a telegram on the 1st April, 1949, to Sir Chinubhai pressing him to come the same week as his presence was essential to complete the matter which had been already delayed."}}, {"text": "4th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10660, "end_char": 10675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 4th April, 1949, Pannalal was informed by the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Pannalal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10677, "end_char": 10685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 4th April, 1949, Pannalal was informed by the appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Pannalal"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10763, "end_char": 10768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was leaving for Delhi that day and that he should go to Bombay and send Sir Chinubhai to Delhi to meet the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Panna Diamond Mining\n\nSyndicate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11055, "end_char": 11086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 left for Delhi on the 4th April, 1949, with the files of the Panna Diamond Mining\n\nSyndicate and reached Delhi on the 5th April, 1949."}}, {"text": "Bambawala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11957, "end_char": 11966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindas contacted Shri Bambawala, the Inspector- General of Police of the Special Police Establishment -0n the morning of the 10th April, 1949, before coming to meet the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Pandit Dhanraj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12227, "end_char": 12241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri\n\nBambawala referred Nagindas to Pandit Dhanraj, Superintendent, Special Police Establishment, and Nagindas told him the whole story of his harassment by the appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Pandit Dhanraj"}}, {"text": "11th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12965, "end_char": 12981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Nagindas had not received the moneys from Bombay, the following day, i.e., the 11th April, 1949, at 3 p.m. was fixed for the next meeting."}}, {"text": "Nagin-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13025, "end_char": 13031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagin- , das thereafter informed Pandit Dhanraj as to what had taken place at the aforesaid meeting between him and the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13312, "end_char": 13317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pannalal was already\n\nRao Shiv Bahadu1\n\nSingh and\n\nAnotf.er\n\nV• The State ef V indhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "State ef V indhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13340, "end_char": 13365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pannalal was already\n\nRao Shiv Bahadu1\n\nSingh and\n\nAnotf.er\n\nV• The State ef V indhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "State oj' Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13424, "end_char": 13449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BhagwatiJ.\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh anrl\n\nAnother\n\nT lu State oj' Vindhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "Shanti Lal Ahuja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14951, "end_char": 14967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindas and Pandit Dhanraj then proceeded to the house of Shri Shanti Lal Ahuja, Additional District Magistrate.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Lal\n\nAhuja"}}, {"text": "2nd April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16525, "end_char": 16540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 then signed the resumption order and put down the date thereunder as the 2nd April, 1949."}}, {"text": "Pandit Dhanraj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17508, "end_char": 17522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Additional District Magistrate and Pandit Dhanraj had disclosed their identity appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Pandit Dhanraj"}}, {"text": "Pandit Dhanrai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17699, "end_char": 17713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pandit Dhanrai then told appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Pandit Dhanraj"}}, {"text": "State of V indhya Pradesh~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17861, "end_char": 17887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 that he should produce the money which he had received, otherwise he would be\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnothtr\n\nThe State of V indhya Pradesh~\n\nBhagwatiJ ..\n\n.R.ao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nv ..\n\nThe S1ate af V indhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17953, "end_char": 17955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gadkari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18671, "end_char": 18678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile two respectable witnesses, Shri Gadkari, who was a member of the Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India, and Shri Perulakar, who was the Minister for Agriculture and Labour, Madhya Bharat, were brought to the bedroom of the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Central Electricity Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18704, "end_char": 18733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile two respectable witnesses, Shri Gadkari, who was a member of the Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India, and Shri Perulakar, who was the Minister for Agriculture and Labour, Madhya Bharat, were brought to the bedroom of the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18735, "end_char": 18790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile two respectable witnesses, Shri Gadkari, who was a member of the Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India, and Shri Perulakar, who was the Minister for Agriculture and Labour, Madhya Bharat, were brought to the bedroom of the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Perulakar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18801, "end_char": 18810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile two respectable witnesses, Shri Gadkari, who was a member of the Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India, and Shri Perulakar, who was the Minister for Agriculture and Labour, Madhya Bharat, were brought to the bedroom of the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18861, "end_char": 18874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile two respectable witnesses, Shri Gadkari, who was a member of the Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India, and Shri Perulakar, who was the Minister for Agriculture and Labour, Madhya Bharat, were brought to the bedroom of the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Additional District Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19087, "end_char": 19117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 repeated the said statement and gave the same explanation before these two witnesses which he had given and made before the Additional District Magistrate and Pandit Dhanraj a little while before."}}, {"text": "Naginuas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20300, "end_char": 20308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 with the documents which were produced before him by Naginuas antl also the list of notes and asked appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Nagindas Mehta"}}, {"text": "Nagindas, Nagindas", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21685, "end_char": 21703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25,000 by the police authorities and their banding over the sum to Nagindas, Nagindas would not have had the requisite amount with him and the offence under section 161 would never have been committ<; d.\n\nThe police authorities also exhibited an excessive zeal in the matter of bringing the appellant No."}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21775, "end_char": 21786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22350, "end_char": 22373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, also lent himself to the police authorities and became\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Vindh)'a Pradesh~\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of Vindh)'a Pradesh~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22392, "end_char": 22418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, also lent himself to the police authorities and became\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Vindh)'a Pradesh~\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23485, "end_char": 23496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24127, "end_char": 24138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24295, "end_char": 24306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24477, "end_char": 24488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25217, "end_char": 25228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nagindas", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25400, "end_char": 25408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If therefore the statement was thus eliminated from evidence nothing remained so far as the witnesses Nagindas and Pannalal on the one hand and the police witnesses as well a.s Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, on the other hand were concerned which could bring the guilt home to the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Pannalal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25413, "end_char": 25421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If therefore the statement was thus eliminated from evidence nothing remained so far as the witnesses Nagindas and Pannalal on the one hand and the police witnesses as well a.s Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, on the other hand were concerned which could bring the guilt home to the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Shanti Lal Ahuja", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25475, "end_char": 25491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If therefore the statement was thus eliminated from evidence nothing remained so far as the witnesses Nagindas and Pannalal on the one hand and the police witnesses as well a.s Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, on the other hand were concerned which could bring the guilt home to the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Stateof Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27001, "end_char": 27024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was cer- }\\ tainly indiscreet on their part not to have scrutinised • >\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another v.\n\nT1\" Stateof Vindhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "Shanti Lal\n\nAhuja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29264, "end_char": 29281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 before them was also attacked on the ground that Shanti Lal\n\nAhuja, the Additional District Magistrate's asking the appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Lal\n\nAhuja"}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29614, "end_char": 29625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29849, "end_char": 29860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30216, "end_char": 30227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30432, "end_char": 30443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30786, "end_char": 30797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30801, "end_char": 30812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31299, "end_char": 31310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Vindhya Prarksh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31650, "end_char": 31674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhapati]•\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nTM State of Vindhya Prarksh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35534, "end_char": 35545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35956, "end_char": 35967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35975, "end_char": 35992, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36021, "end_char": 36044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Vindll)1a Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of Vindll)1a Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36063, "end_char": 36089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Vindll)1a Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv Baharlur Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36104, "end_char": 36127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BhagwatiJ.\n\nRao Shiv Baharlur Singh and Another v.\n\nThe State of VindJrya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of VindJrya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36148, "end_char": 36173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BhagwatiJ.\n\nRao Shiv Baharlur Singh and Another v.\n\nThe State of VindJrya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39378, "end_char": 39389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39526, "end_char": 39537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. B. Mukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39875, "end_char": 39889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result they would indeed be relegated to the position of ordinary citizens as witnesses and then would be required to depose to matters transacted by them in their official capacity unregulated by any statutory rules of procedure or conduct whatever .......... \"\n\nThe position was laid down with greater emphasis by Mr. Justice P. B. Mukharji in A.LR.", "canonical_name": "P. B.\n\nMukharji"}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40484, "end_char": 40507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To make the Magistrate a party or a limb of the police during the police investigation seriously\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnoth11\n\nThe State of Vindh;'a PradtJli.", "canonical_name": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of Vindh;'a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40526, "end_char": 40543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To make the Magistrate a party or a limb of the police during the police investigation seriously\n\nRao Shiv Bahadur\n\nSingh and\n\nAnoth11\n\nThe State of Vindh;'a PradtJli.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}, {"text": "P. B.\n\nMukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42316, "end_char": 42331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That risk is too great and involves forfeiting public respect and confidence ............ \"\n\nWe perfectly endorse the above observations made by Mr. Justice P. B.\n\nMukharji and hope and trust that Magistrates will not be employed by the police authorities in the manner it was done by the Special Police Establishment in this case before us.", "canonical_name": "P. B.\n\nMukharji"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43264, "end_char": 43275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43285, "end_char": 43302, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43388, "end_char": 43399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43404, "end_char": 43415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43424, "end_char": 43435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43443, "end_char": 43460, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "V. M. SYED MOHAMMAD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43696, "end_char": 43715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY\n\nTHE ST A TE OF ANDHRA. ("}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43778, "end_char": 43796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAS, V1v1AN BosE and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, art."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43804, "end_char": 43813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAS, V1v1AN BosE and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, art."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43816, "end_char": 43825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAS, V1v1AN BosE and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, art."}}, {"text": "V1v1AN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43827, "end_char": 43838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAS, V1v1AN BosE and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, art."}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43844, "end_char": 43856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAS, V1v1AN BosE and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, art."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43863, "end_char": 43884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43886, "end_char": 43893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43894, "end_char": 43923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43951, "end_char": 43967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "General Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43976, "end_char": 43997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Whether ultra vires the Constitution or Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44011, "end_char": 44080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44133, "end_char": 44137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether ultra vires the Constitution or Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Whether ultra vires the Constitution or Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44236, "end_char": 44265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44281, "end_char": 44349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv Bahadt11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44638, "end_char": 44655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, also that inasmuch as there was nothing to suggest that the purchasers of other commodities were similarly situated as the purchasers of hides and skins in the present case, the Act\n\nRao Shiv Bahadt11\n\nSi'flgh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe Stale of Vindhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Stale of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44683, "end_char": 44707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, also that inasmuch as there was nothing to suggest that the purchasers of other commodities were similarly situated as the purchasers of hides and skins in the present case, the Act\n\nRao Shiv Bahadt11\n\nSi'flgh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe Stale of Vindhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesh~"}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_1117_1121_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1117\n\nhave therefore eliminated from our consideration the whole of the evidence given by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the Additional District Magistrate, and come to our conclusion in regard to the gilt of the appellant No. 1 relying solely on the testimony of the two independ- . ent witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar.\n\nThe result therefore is that the appeal of the appellant No. 1 will be dismissed except with regard to his conviction and sentence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and the convictions and sentences passed upon him by the Judicial Commissioner under section 465 and section 466 as also section 161 of the Indian Penal Code will be confirmed. The appeal of the appellant No. 2 will be allowed and he be acquitted Md discharged of the offences with which he was charged and immediately set at liberty.\n\nThe bail bond of the appellant No. 2 will be cancelled.\n\nV. M. SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY\n\nTHE ST A TE OF ANDHRA. (With Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAS, V1v1AN BosE and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, art. 14-Government of India Act, 1935, \"'\"Y 48 in List I/ of the Seventh Schedule-Madras .General Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution or Government of India Act, 1935-Rule 16(5) framed under the Act-Whether ultra vires s. 5 (vi) of the Act.\n\nHeld, that the Madras General Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939) is not ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935 as entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 was wide enough to cover a law imposing a tax on the purchaser of goods as well as on the seller.\n\nHeld, also that inasmuch as there was nothing to suggest that the purchasers of other commodities were similarly situated as the purchasers of hides and skins in the present case, the Act\n\nRao Shiv Bahadt11\n\nSi'flgh and\n\nAnother\n\nThe Stale of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nBhagwati].\n\nMarch111 ..\n\nV. M .• 'iy, d Mohammad and Company\n\nT ht St alt of.\n\nAndhra\n\nwas not void under art. 14 of the Constitution on the ground that the impugned Act singles out for taxing purchasers of certain specified commodities only but leaves out purchasers of other commodities.\n\nArticle 14 does not forbid classification for legislative purposes provided such classification is based on some differentia having a reasonable relation to the object and purpose of the law in question.\n\nRule 16(5) framed under the Act contravenes the provisions of s. 5(vi) of the Act but this sub-rule is severable and does not affect the validity of the rules which may otherwise lie within the ambit of the Act.\n\nChiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India ([1950] S.C.R.\n\n869) relied upon.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 187 and 188 of 1953.\n\nAppeals under article 132 of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 29th August, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Petitions Nos. 21 and 41 of 1952.\n\nK. V. Venkatasubramania Iyer (A. N. Rangaswami and M. S. K. Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant .\n\n. M. Sesliachalapathi for the respondent.\n\nK. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V. Raghavan, with him) for the intervener (State of Madras).\n\nT. R. Balakrishna Iyer and Sardar Bahadur for the intervener (State of Travancore-Cochin).\n\nNittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the intervener\n\n(State of Mysore).\n\nLal Narayan Sinha (B. K. P. Sinha, with him) for the intervener (State of Bihar).\n\n1954. March 11.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs J.-These two appeals arise out of Writ Petitions Nos. 21 and 41 of 1952 filed in the High Court of Judicature at Madras under article 226 questioning the validity of the Madras General Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939) and of the Turnover and Assessment Rules framed under that Act.\n\nThe petitioners are tanners carrying on business in Eluru, West Godawari District, which is now part of the newly created State of Andhra. They make large purchases of untanned hides and skins and after tanning them in their tanneries they export the tanned hides and skins or sell the same to local purchasers.\n\nIn the High Court the appellants impugned the Act and the rules on the following grounds :-\n\n(a) The Provincial Legislature had no power under the Government of India Act of 1935 to enact a law imposing a tax on purchasers ;\n\n(b) The liability to pay tax on sales is thrown on the purchaser not by the statute but by the rules.\n\nThis is an unconstitutional delegation by the legislature of its functions to the executive and the imposition of :the tax is accordingly illegal ; ( c) The Act has become void under article 14 of the Constitution, as it singles out for taxation purchasers in some trades and is, therefore, discrimina- tory; and ( d) The rules framed under the Act are inconsist- •ent with the provisions enacted in the body of the Act :and are void.\n\nThe High Court repelled each of the aforesaid grounds except that under item (d).\n\nIt held that rule 16(5) was ultra vires in that it offended against section 5 (vi) of the Act and dismissed their applications.\n\nHence the ; present appeals by the appellants under the certificate granted by the High Court that it was a fit case for :appeal to this court.\n\nLearned advocate appearing in support of these :appeals has not pressed the objection under item (b) but has insisted on the remaining grounds of objec- tion. In our opinion the decisions of the High Court on those grounds are substantially well-founded and correct.\n\nOn the question of legislative competency the learned advocate drew our attention to entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution •of India and argued that this entry clearly indicated that entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the •Government of India Act, 1935, under which the\n\nV. M.Syed Mohammad\n\nand Company v.\n\nThe State of\n\nAndhra\n\nDas J.\n\nV. M.Syed Afohammad and Company\n\nTiu Stale of\n\n'4 1dhra\n\nDas J.\n\nimpugned Act was passed, was much narrower in its scope and could not be read as authorising the making of a law with respect to taxes on the purchase of goods.\n\nThis argument appears to us to be fallacious, for the intention of the Constituent Assembly as expressed in entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution cannot be a guide for ascertammg the intention of a totally different body, namely, the British Parliament, in enacting entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nFurther, we agree with the High Court that entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, on a proper construction, was wide enough to cover a law imposing tax on the purchaser of goods as well and that the Constituent Assembly in entry 54 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution accepted this liberal construction of the corresponding entry 48 and expressed in clearer language what was implicit in that corresponding entry.\n\nThe next poi, n_t urged by the learned advocate was founded on the article 14 of the Constitution. The appellants' grievance is that the impugned Act singles out for taxing purchasers of certain specified commodities only but leaves out purchasers of all other commodities.\n\nThe principle under! ying the equal protection clause of the Constitution has been dealt with and explained in Chiranjitlal Chowdhury v.\n\nThe Union of India (1 ) and several subsequent cases and need not be reiterated.\n\nIt is well settled that the guarantee of equal protection of laws does not require that the same law should be made applicable to all persons.\n\nArticle 14, it has been said, does not forbid classification for legislative purposes, provided that such classification is based on some differentia having a reasonable relation to the object and purpose of the law in question.\n\nAs pointed out by the majority of the Bench which decided Chiranjitlal Chowdhury's case, there ts a strong presumption in favour of the validity of legislative. classification and it is for those who challenge it as.\n\n(1) (19soJ s.c.R: s69.\n\nunconstitutional to allege and prove beyond all doubt that the legislation arbitrarily discriminates between different persons similarly circumstanced.\n\nThere is no material on the record before us to suggest that the purchasers of other commodities are similarly situated as the purchasers of hides and skins.\n\nThe majority decision in Chiranjitlal Chowdhury's case( 1 ) clearly applies to the case before us and there is no getting away from the position that the appellants before us have not discharged the burden of proof that, according to the majority decision, was upon them to do.\n\nLastly, the learned advocate urges that rule 16(5) clearly contravenes the provisions of section 5(vi) of the Act. This sub-rule has been held to be ultra vires by the High Court and, indeed, the learned Advocate- General of Madras did not in the High Court, as before us, dispute that rule 16(5) was repugnant to section 5(vi).\n\nThat sub-rule, however, affects only unlicensed dealers and the appellants who are admittedly licensed dealers are not affected by that sub-rule.\n\nFurther, it . has not been suggested before us that the appellants were ever called upon to pay any tax on purchase of hides or skins in respect of which tax had been previously paid by some prior purchaser.\n\nThat sub-rule is clearly severable and cannot affect the validity of the rules which may otherwise be within the ambit of the Act. Our attention has not been drawn to any other infirmity in t11e rules.\n\nIn the premises appeals which must, costs.\n\nthere is no substance in these therefore, be dismissed with\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the respondent and for the interveners.\n\nStates of Madras, Mysore and Bihar: R. H. Dhebar.\n\n(x) (1950] S.C.R. 86g.\n\nV. M. Syed Mohammad\n\nand Compan)' ·\n\nThe Statt of Andhra\n\nDas].", "total_entities": 71, "entities": [{"text": "Gadkari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 315, "end_char": 322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ent witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar."}}, {"text": "Perulakar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ent witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 476, "end_char": 487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 497, "end_char": 514, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 616, "end_char": 627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 636, "end_char": 647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 655, "end_char": 672, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "V. M. SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 908, "end_char": 939, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. M. SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 1008, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1016, "end_char": 1025, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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V. Venkatasubramania Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2983, "end_char": 3011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Venkatasubramania Iyer (A. N. Rangaswami and M. S. K. Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant ."}}, {"text": "A. N. Rangaswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Venkatasubramania Iyer (A. N. Rangaswami and M. S. K. Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant ."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3034, "end_char": 3051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Venkatasubramania Iyer (A. N. Rangaswami and M. S. K. Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant ."}}, {"text": "M. Sesliachalapathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3086, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Sesliachalapathi for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. T.\n\nChari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3127, "end_char": 3139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V. Raghavan, with him) for the intervener (State of Madras)."}}, {"text": "V. V. Raghavan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3169, "end_char": 3183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V. Raghavan, with him) for the intervener (State of Madras)."}}, {"text": "T. R. Balakrishna Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3234, "end_char": 3256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and Sardar Bahadur for the intervener (State of Travancore-Cochin)."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3261, "end_char": 3275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and Sardar Bahadur for the intervener (State of Travancore-Cochin)."}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3296, "end_char": 3322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and Sardar Bahadur for the intervener (State of Travancore-Cochin)."}}, {"text": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3326, "end_char": 3348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the intervener\n\n(State of Mysore)."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3378, "end_char": 3392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the intervener\n\n(State of Mysore)."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3425, "end_char": 3440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nittoor Sreenivasa Rao, Advocate-General of Mysore (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the intervener\n\n(State of Mysore)."}}, {"text": "Lal Narayan Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narayan Sinha (B. K. P. Sinha, with him) for the intervener (State of Bihar)."}}, {"text": "B. K. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3463, "end_char": 3477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narayan Sinha (B. K. P. Sinha, with him) for the intervener (State of Bihar)."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3509, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narayan Sinha (B. K. P. Sinha, with him) for the intervener (State of Bihar)."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3717, "end_char": 3728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Eluru", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3920, "end_char": 3925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are tanners carrying on business in Eluru, West Godawari District, which is now part of the newly created State of Andhra."}}, {"text": "Godawari District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are tanners carrying on business in Eluru, West Godawari District, which is now part of the newly created State of Andhra."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3999, "end_char": 4005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are tanners carrying on business in Eluru, West Godawari District, which is now part of the newly created State of Andhra."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4693, "end_char": 4703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5097, "end_char": 5106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5683, "end_char": 5699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5832, "end_char": 5861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5938, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question of legislative competency the learned advocate drew our attention to entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution •of India and argued that this entry clearly indicated that entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the •Government of India Act, 1935, under which the\n\nV. M.Syed Mohammad\n\nand Company v.\n\nThe State of\n\nAndhra\n\nDas J.\n\nV. M.Syed Afohammad and Company\n\nTiu Stale of\n\n'4 1dhra\n\nDas J.\n\nimpugned Act was passed, was much narrower in its scope and could not be read as authorising the making of a law with respect to taxes on the purchase of goods."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6308, "end_char": 6324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6433, "end_char": 6451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument appears to us to be fallacious, for the intention of the Constituent Assembly as expressed in entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution cannot be a guide for ascertammg the intention of a totally different body, namely, the British Parliament, in enacting entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6477, "end_char": 6545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6603, "end_char": 6665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act", "statute": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7086, "end_char": 7096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act", "statute": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7658, "end_char": 7668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act", "statute": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Chiranjitlal Chowdhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7946, "end_char": 7968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by the majority of the Bench which decided Chiranjitlal Chowdhury's case, there ts a strong presumption in favour of the validity of legislative."}}, {"text": "s69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8124, "end_char": 8127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8810, "end_char": 8823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8946, "end_char": 8952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This sub-rule has been held to be ultra vires by the High Court and, indeed, the learned Advocate- General of Madras did not in the High Court, as before us, dispute that rule 16(5) was repugnant to section 5(vi)."}}, {"text": "section 5(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9035, "end_char": 9048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9804, "end_char": 9810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "States of Madras, Mysore and Bihar: R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9815, "end_char": 9820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "States of Madras, Mysore and Bihar: R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9822, "end_char": 9834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "States of Madras, Mysore and Bihar: R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "V. M. Syed Mohammad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9861, "end_char": 9880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(x) (1950] S.C.R. 86g.\n\nV. M. Syed Mohammad\n\nand Compan)' ·\n\nThe Statt of Andhra\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "V. M. SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY"}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_1122_1128_EN", "year": 1954, "text": ".March 16\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nHIMMATLAL HARILAL MEHTA\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DA>, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\n[1954]\n\nCoostitution of India, arts. 19(1) (g), 226, 286 (1) (a)-Central Provinces and Berar Sales Ta:r Act (Act XX! of 1947), as amended by Act XVI of 1949-Explanation II to section 2(g)-Whether ultra vires th~ Constitutian-Threat to use coercive rnachinery of Act for realising tax-Whether infringement of fundarnental rights under art. 19(J)(g) of the Constitution.\n\nHeld, (i) that explanation II to s. 2(g) of the Central Pro vinces PELLATE JuR1so1cTtoN : Civil Appeal No. 103 of 1952.\n\nAppeal under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 10th August, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur (Wanch6o and Bapna\n\nJJ.), in D. B.\n\nCivil Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 1951.\n\nK. S. Hajela, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, for the appellant.\n\nNo appearance for the respondents.\n\n1954. March 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under a certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under article 133 ( c) of the Comtitution of India against a judgment and order of that High Court in writ petition under article 226 holding the appointment of one Shri Sukhdeo Narain as invalid and directing that all proceedings taken by him as the Industrial Court under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV of 1947) are null and void.\n\nMarth 17\n\nThi State of\n\nRajasthan\n\nTht Mewar Tex\n\ntile Mills Ltd.,\n\nBhilwara and Ot™rs.\n\nGhulam HaJan ].\n\nWe are informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain has ceased to work as an Industrial Tribunal and the\". present appeal, therefore, becomes infructuous, but we are invited by the Advocate-General on behalf of the State of Rajasthan who is the appellant before us to decide the question as to the validity of the appointment, as it is likely to affect other awards made by tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nWe according! y proceed to give our decision.\n\nThe question involved in the case is whether the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain is invalid because he does not fulfil the qualifications laid down for a tribunal under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nSection 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Act says:-\n\n\"Where a tribunal consists of one member only, that member, and where it consists of two or more members, the chairman of the tribunal, shall be a person who-\n\n(a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or\n\n(b) is or has been a District Judge ;\n\n\" The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950 (Ordinance IV of 1950), by the Rajpramukh on January 24, 1950.\n\nBy this adaptation section 7 of the Industrial Act came to be applied to Rajasthan.\n\nShri Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notificati<; m which ran as follows :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State for the adjudication of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan.\"\n\nThe appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was objected to by the respondent on the ground that the\n\nwords \"a Judge of a High Court\" in section 7(3) mean\n\n\"a Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949\" and as Shri Sukhdeo Narain had been a Judge of the High Court of the former State of Jodhpur, he could not be held to be Judge of the High Court under section 7(3) of the Industrial Act. This objection was upheld by the High Court.\n\nThough the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain in the notification was based upon the fact that he was a retired Judge of the High Court of Jodhpur, in arguments it was also contended before the High Court that even if he was not qualified for appointment as a former Judge of a High Court, he was certainly qualified for appointment as a former District Judge.\n\nThe High Court repelled this contention.\n\nIt appears that the United State of Rajasthan came into existence on April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya was integrated with it on May 15, 1949.\n\nSection 5 of Ordinance No. IV of 1950 lays down that :\n\n\"For the purpose of the application of any Central law to Rajasthan, unless there be anything repugnant in the subject or context,-\n\n(ix) references therein to other civil, criminal and revenue courts, to public offices, and to Judges, Magistrates, officers or authorities shall be deemed to be references to such courts, offices and Judges, Magistrates, officers or authorities of or in Rajasthan.\"\n\nThe High Court held that the word \"Rajasthan\" as defined in Ordinance I of 1949 means the United State of Rajasthan and \"the Judges and other officers\" mentioned in section 5 (ix) must be held to be those in the service of the United State of Rajasthan.\n\nAccordingly they held that Shri Sukhdeo Narain could not be held to be a District Judge within the meaning of section 7(3) (b) and his appointment as an Industrial Tribunal under that section was, therefore, invalid.\n\nWe are of opinion that this_ appeal can be decided on a short ground.\n\nThe Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XL VIII of 1950) came into force on May 20, 1950.\n\nBy section 34 it was provided that the\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nv,.\n\nT ht Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara and Others.\n\nGhUlam Has an J.\n\nThe Stat1 ef\n\nRqjast!,.an\n\nTht Mewar T1xtile Mills Lld.,\n\n8hilwara and Others.\n\nOh~/am Hasan ]'\n\n1132 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS [1954]\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, shall be amended in the manner specified in the Schedule and the Schedule substituted sub-section (2) to section (1) of the Industrial Act as follows :-\n\n\"It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\"\n\nAs we have already stated the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was made on October 9, 1950, i.t:., after the Industrial Disputes Act had become applicable to Rajasthan.\n\nIt is not necessary therefore to invoke the provisions of Ordinance IV of 1950 in deciding the question of the validity of the appointment.\n\nThe argument based on section 34 of Act XL VIII of 1950 was put forward before the High Court at the time of the hearing of the application for leave to appeal and it was contended that in view of section 34 the provisions of Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950, namely section 5, subsections (vii) and (ix), stood amended or repealed but the High Court observed that even if this argument had been .raised before them in appeal, it would have made no difference.\n\nIt has been contended before us by Mr. Hajela, the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State, that after the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 was extended to Rajasthan by section 34 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, XLVIII of 1950, the provisions of the former stood amended by section 34 and could not be read subject to section 5 of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance IV of 1950.\n\nWe think there is force in this contention. ·, The effect of section 34, as we have already indicated, was to extend the territorial application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the whole of India including Rajasthan the exception being the State of Jammu and Kashmir only.\n\nThis being so the words \"A Judge of a High Court and a District Judge\" used in section 7(3) (a) and (b) respectively of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be held now to include \"A Judge of the High Court and a District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur\". There is now no room for the application of section 5 of Ordinance IV of 1950 according to which a Judge of the High Court\n\nand a District Judge could only mean a Judge of the High Court for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 and a District Judge of or in Rajasthan within the meaning of section 5 (ix) of Ordinance No. IV of 1950.\n\nAccordingly we hold that the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was perfectly valid.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the order of the High Court but without costs, as the respondent is not represented.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar.\n\nHEM RAJ\n\n().\n\nTHE STATE OF AJMER\n\n(And Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, art. 136(1)-Principles gorcrning the exercise of powers by the Supreme Court under art. 136(1)-Confessions-Whether can be corroborated by evidence already in possession of police.\n\nUnless it is shown that execeptional and special circumstan~ ces exist that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features _of sufficient gravity to war~ rant a review of the decision appealed against, the Supreme Court does not exercise its overriding powers under art. 136 ( 1) of the Constitution and the circumstance that the appeal has been admitted by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court.\n\nEven at the final hearing only those points can be urged which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked for.\n\nThe contention that confession cannot be corroborated by the use of materials already in the possession of the police is devoid of force. A confession made and recorded even during a trial can be corroborated by the evidence already recorded.\n\nIt may .be made and recorded in the court of committing magistrate and materia, ls already in the possession of the police may be used for purpose ef corroboration.\n\nTiu Stat• qf\n\nRaja.sthan\n\nTM Mewar T ,,,_ Iii< Mthq J, td.,\n\n, Bhilwara\n\nand Ot/urs.\n\nGhulam Ha.son ]. '\n\nMarth 17.", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD.,\n\nBHIL W ARA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD, BHILWARA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 201, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 252, "end_char": 259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 288, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 522, "end_char": 529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 549, "end_char": 572, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 898, "end_char": 909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 927, "end_char": 948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. S. Hajela", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1149, "end_char": 1161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1384, "end_char": 1407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under a certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under article 133 ( c) of the Comtitution of India against a judgment and order of that High Court in writ petition under article 226 holding the appointment of one Shri Sukhdeo Narain as invalid and directing that all proceedings taken by him as the Industrial Court under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (No."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1414, "end_char": 1425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1530, "end_char": 1541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sukhdeo Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1578, "end_char": 1592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under a certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under article 133 ( c) of the Comtitution of India against a judgment and order of that High Court in writ petition under article 226 holding the appointment of one Shri Sukhdeo Narain as invalid and directing that all proceedings taken by him as the Industrial Court under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (No.", "canonical_name": "Sukhdeo Narain"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1682, "end_char": 1691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1699, "end_char": 1722, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of\n\nRajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1775, "end_char": 1794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Marth 17\n\nThi State of\n\nRajasthan\n\nTht Mewar Tex\n\ntile Mills Ltd.,\n\nBhilwara and Ot™rs.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nRajasthan"}}, {"text": "Mewar Tex\n\ntile Mills Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1800, "end_char": 1826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Marth 17\n\nThi State of\n\nRajasthan\n\nTht Mewar Tex\n\ntile Mills Ltd.,\n\nBhilwara and Ot™rs.", "canonical_name": "Mewar Tex\n\ntile Mills Ltd."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2071, "end_char": 2089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "present appeal, therefore, becomes infructuous, but we are invited by the Advocate-General on behalf of the State of Rajasthan who is the appellant before us to decide the question as to the validity of the appointment, as it is likely to affect other awards made by tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2250, "end_char": 2273, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2495, "end_char": 2507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2515, "end_char": 2538, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2541, "end_char": 2553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2861, "end_char": 2960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 24, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3006, "end_char": 3022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Act says:-\n\n\"Where a tribunal consists of one member only, that member, and where it consists of two or more members, the chairman of the tribunal, shall be a person who-\n\n(a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or\n\n(b) is or has been a District Judge ;\n\n\" The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950 (Ordinance IV of 1950), by the Rajpramukh on January 24, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3044, "end_char": 3053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "statute": "The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950"}}, {"text": "Sukhdeo Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3115, "end_char": 3129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notificati<; m which ran as follows :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State for the adjudication of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan.\"", "canonical_name": "Sukhdeo Narain"}}, {"text": "October 9, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notificati<; m which ran as follows :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State for the adjudication of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan.\""}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3249, "end_char": 3258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "statute": "The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3266, "end_char": 3295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3314, "end_char": 3337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notificati<; m which ran as follows :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State for the adjudication of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan.\""}}, {"text": "Bhilwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3565, "end_char": 3573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notificati<; m which ran as follows :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State for the adjudication of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan.\""}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3723, "end_char": 3735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949", "statute": "Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949"}}, {"text": "High Court of Jodhpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4215, "end_char": 4236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain in the notification was based upon the fact that he was a retired Judge of the High Court of Jodhpur, in arguments it was also contended before the High Court that even if he was not qualified for appointment as a former Judge of a High Court, he was certainly qualified for appointment as a former District Judge."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the United State of Rajasthan came into existence on April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya was integrated with it on May 15, 1949."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the United State of Rajasthan came into existence on April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya was integrated with it on May 15, 1949."}}, {"text": "United State of Matsya", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4586, "end_char": 4608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the United State of Rajasthan came into existence on April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya was integrated with it on May 15, 1949."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4635, "end_char": 4647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the United State of Rajasthan came into existence on April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya was integrated with it on May 15, 1949."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4650, "end_char": 4659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949", "statute": "Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949"}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5197, "end_char": 5222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the word \"Rajasthan\" as defined in Ordinance I of 1949 means the United State of Rajasthan and \"the Judges and other officers\" mentioned in section 5 (ix) must be held to be those in the service of the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5272, "end_char": 5281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5472, "end_char": 5484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 20, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5737, "end_char": 5749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XL VIII of 1950) came into force on May 20, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5796, "end_char": 5814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 34 it was provided that the\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nv,.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nRajasthan"}}, {"text": "Mewar Textile Mills Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5826, "end_char": 5850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T ht Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara and Others.", "canonical_name": "Mewar Tex\n\ntile Mills Ltd."}}, {"text": "Bhilwara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5852, "end_char": 5860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T ht Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara and Others.", "canonical_name": "Bhilwara"}}, {"text": "GhUlam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5874, "end_char": 5880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GhUlam Has an J.\n\nThe Stat1 ef\n\nRqjast!,.an\n\nTht Mewar T1xtile Mills Lld.,"}}, {"text": "8hilwara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5950, "end_char": 5958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8hilwara and Others.", "canonical_name": "Bhilwara"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6025, "end_char": 6048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6262, "end_char": 6288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oh~/am Hasan ]'\n\n1132 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS [1954]\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, shall be amended in the manner specified in the Schedule and the Schedule substituted sub-section (2) to section (1) of the Industrial Act as follows :-\n\n\"It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\""}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6403, "end_char": 6426, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6627, "end_char": 6637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6802, "end_char": 6812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6831, "end_char": 6883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6892, "end_char": 6901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "statute": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950"}}, {"text": "Hajela", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7126, "end_char": 7132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been contended before us by Mr. Hajela, the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State, that after the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 was extended to Rajasthan by section 34 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, XLVIII of 1950, the provisions of the former stood amended by section 34 and could not be read subject to section 5 of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance IV of 1950."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7202, "end_char": 7225, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7263, "end_char": 7273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "statute": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7389, "end_char": 7399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "statute": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7433, "end_char": 7442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "statute": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7571, "end_char": 7581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950", "statute": "Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7662, "end_char": 7691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7709, "end_char": 7714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of section 34, as we have already indicated, was to extend the territorial application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the whole of India including Rajasthan the exception being the State of Jammu and Kashmir only."}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7872, "end_char": 7884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7917, "end_char": 7946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jodhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8047, "end_char": 8054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This being so the words \"A Judge of a High Court and a District Judge\" used in section 7(3) (a) and (b) respectively of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be held now to include \"A Judge of the High Court and a District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur\"."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8101, "end_char": 8110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8378, "end_char": 8387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8646, "end_char": 8658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "HEM RAJ", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8661, "end_char": 8668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HEM RAJ\n\n()."}}, {"text": "STATE OF AJMER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8679, "end_char": 8693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF AJMER\n\n(And Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8746, "end_char": 8757, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8781, "end_char": 8802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8804, "end_char": 8815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8867, "end_char": 8880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136(1)-Principles gorcrning the exercise of powers by the Supreme Court under art."}}, {"text": "art. 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8887, "end_char": 8898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9293, "end_char": 9301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ghulam Ha.son", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10202, "end_char": 10215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Ha.son ]. '", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN JJ."}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_1133_1144_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1133\n\nand a District Judge could only mean a Judge of the High Court for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 and a District Judge of or in Rajasthan within the meaning of section 5 (ix) of Ordinance No. IV of 1950.\n\nAccordingly we hold that the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was perfectly valid.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the order of the High Court but without costs, as the respondent is not represented.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar.\n\nHEM RAJ\n\n().\n\nTHE STATE OF AJMER\n\n(And Connected Appeal)\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, art. 136(1)-Principles gorcrning the exercise of powers by the Supreme Court under art. 136(1)-Confessions-Whether can be corroborated by evidence already in possession of police.\n\nUnless it is shown that execeptional and special circumstan~ ces exist that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features _of sufficient gravity to war~ rant a review of the decision appealed against, the Supreme Court does not exercise its overriding powers under art. 136 ( 1) of the Constitution and the circumstance that the appeal has been admitted by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court.\n\nEven at the final hearing only those points can be urged which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked for.\n\nThe contention that confession cannot be corroborated by the use of materials already in the possession of the police is devoid of force. A confession made and recorded even during a trial can be corroborated by the evidence already recorded.\n\nIt may .be made and recorded in the court of committing magistrate and materia, ls already in the possession of the police may be used for purpose ef corroboration.\n\nTiu Stat• qf\n\nRaja.sthan\n\nTM Mewar T ,,,_ Iii< Mthq J, td.,\n\n, Bhilwara\n\nand Ot/urs.\n\nGhulam Ha.son ]. '\n\nMarth 17.\n\nHem Ra].\n\nTill Sta\" qf\n\n- A.jmer\n\nMahajan C. ] 1\n\nQueen v. Thompson ([189}] 2 Q.B. 12) and Mata Emperor (A.I.R. 1931 Oudh 166) referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Appeals Nos. 58 and 87 of 1953.\n\n[1954]\n\nDin v. The\n\nCriminal\n\nAppeal by Special Leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 30th June, 1953, from the Judgment and Order dated the 25th April, 1953, of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Ajmer in Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1953 and Criminal Reference No. 19 of 1953 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 18th March, 1953, of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Ajmer in Sessions Trial No. 1 of 1953.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave granted by the Suprem~ Court on the 27th October, 1953, from the Judgment and Order dated the 25th April, 1953, of the Court of the judicial Commissioner at Ajmer in Criminal Appeals Nos. 14 and 15 of 1953 and Criminal Reference No. 15 of 1953 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 18th March, 1953, of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Ajmer in Sessions Trial No. 1 of 1953.\n\nBakhshi Tek Chand (Bhagwan Singh and Rajinder Narain, with him) for appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1953.\n\nB. D. Sharma for respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 58 and appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 1953.\n\nK. N. Agarwala for .respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 1953.\n\n1954. March 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN C. J.-Criminal Appeals Nos. 58 and 87 of 1953 relate to the same occurrence, and arise out of a common judgment delivered by the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer.\n\nBoth of them are before us by special leave granted by this court on different occasions.\n\nUnless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of\n\nthe decision appealed against, this court does not .exercise its overriding powers under article 136(1) of the Constitution and the circumstance that because the appeal has been admitted by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court. Even at the final hearing only those points can be urged which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked for. The question for consideration is whether this test is satisfied in either of these two appeals.\n\nAfter hearing the learned counsel in both the appeals we are satisfied that none of them raise any questions which fall within the rule enunciated above.\n\nOn the 16th of July, 1952, Mangilal deceased, partner of firm Rambhajan Mangilal 0£ Bijainagar, received by express delivery post a letter Exhibit P-5 in a closed .cover Exhibit P-6.\n\nThis letter was actually delivered to Mangilal's son Laduram who, on reading it, found that it purported to have been sent by \"Bhayankar Daku Dal\" demanding payment of Rs. 5,000 at 6-30 p.m. on the 17th of July at the crossing near the 27th milestone on the Ajmer-Bijainagar road and saying that \"if you cheat or do 420 or in case you inform the police, no other punishment except that of death . will be meted out to you and you will be shot dead and made to lie on the ground.\" Laduram took the miginal letter with the envelope to his uncle Ramjas at Ajmer and both of them saw the Superintendent of Police :and gave him the letter and the envelope and asked for immediate protection and investigation.\n\nThe Superintendent of Police, however, took no action in this behal£. Mangilal failed to comply with the demand to pay. On the 17th of July about 9-30 p.m. when he was sitting at his shop and his munim Gajanand was writing the accounts, two persons came from the neighbouring street.\n\nOne of them was dressed in a khaki suit and the other in a blue suit.\n\nThe man in blue jeaJ.\n\nwere similar in nature to charges 1 and they related to the petitioner's dealings firm known as Sunder Das Saw Mills.\n\n2 except that with another\n\nThe enquiry proceeded in the manner laid down in the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act.\n\nThe charges were read out to the petitioner and his plea of \"not guilty\" was formally recorded.\n\nEvidence was adduced both by the prosecutor and the defence and the witnesses on both sides were examined on oath and crossexamined and re-examined in the usual manner.\n\nThe Commissioner found, on a consideration of the evidence, that four of the charges under various sub-heads were proved against the petitioner and submitted a report to that effect to the Government on the 4th of May, 1953.\n\nBy a letter dated the 15th of May, 1953, the Government informed the petitioner that, on careful consideration of the report, the President accepted the opinion of the Commissioner and in view of the findings on the several charges arrived at by the latter, was provisionally of opinion that the petitioner should be dismissed.\n\nOpportunity was given to the petitioner by this letter in terms of article 311 (2) of the Constitution to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and it was stated that any representation, which he might desire to make, would be taken into consideration before the final order was passed.\n\nThe pet1t1oner, it seems, did make a representation which was considered by the Government and after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission the President finally decided to impose the penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner.\n\nThe order of dismissal was passed on the 17th of September, 1953. On the 23rd February, 1954, , the police submitted a charge-sheet against the pet1t10ner before the Special Judge, Sessions Court, Delhi, charging him with offences under sections 161/165 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and upon that, summons were issued by the learned Judge directing the petitioner to appear before his court on the 11th of March, 1954.\n\nIt is the legality of this proceeding that has been challenged\n\n, ,/\n\nbefore us in this writ petition.\n\nThe petitioner's case, in substance, is that the proceedings that have been started against him are without jurisdiction inasmuch as they amount to fresh prosecution for offences for which he has been prosecuted and punished already and this comes within the prohibition of article 20(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe sole point for our consideration is, whether in the events that have happened in this case, there has been a violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner under article 20(2) of the Constitution which would justify the issue of a writ for enforcement of the same?\n\nThe scope and meaning of the guarantee implied in article 20(2) of the Constitution has been indicated with sufficient fullness in the pronouncement of this court in M aqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay ( 1 ) • The roots of the principle, which this clause enacts, are to be found in the well established rule of English law which finds expression in the maxim \"Nemo debet bis\n\nvexari\" -a man must not be put twice in peril for the same offence. If a man is indicted again for the same offence in an English court, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former acquittal or conv:ction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of \"autrefois acquit\" or \"autrefois convict\".\n\nThe corresponding provision in the Federal Constitution of the U.S.A. is contained in the Fifth Amendment, which provides inter alia : \"Nor shall any person be subjected for the same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb\".\n\nThis principle has been recognised and adopted by the Indian Legislature and is embodied in the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act and section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nAlthough these were the materials which formed the background of the guarantee of the fundamental right given in article 20(2) of the Constitution, the ambit and contents of the guarantee, as this court pointed out in the case referred to above, are much narrower than those of the common law rule m England or the doctrine of \"double jeopardy\" in the American\n\n(•) [1953] S.C.R. 703.\n\nS. A. Venkataraman\n\nThe Unum of\n\nIndia and Another.\n\nMukherjea ].\n\nS. A. Venkata--\n\nram an v.\n\nThe Union of India and Another.\n\nMuldmjeaJ.\n\nConstitution. Article 20(2) of our Constitution, it is to be noted, does not contain the principle of \"autrefois acquit\" at all.\n\nIt seems that our Constitution makers did not think it necessary to raise one part of the common law rule to the level of a fundamental right and thus make it immune from legislative interference.\n\nThis has been left to be regulated by the general law of the land.\n\nIn order to enable a citizen to invoke the protection of clause (2) of article 20 of the Constitution, there must , have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence.\n\nThe words \"prosecuted and punished\" are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished.\n\nBoth the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted.\n\nThe position is also different under the American Constitution. There the prohibition is not against a second punishment but against the peril in which a person may be placed by reason of a valid indictment being presented against him, before a competent court, followed by proper arraignment and plea and a lawful impanelling of the jury. It is not necessary to have a verdict at ail(').\n\nIt has also been held by this court in M aq boo!\n\nHussain's case(' ) that the language of article 20 and the words actually used in it afford a clear indication that the proceedings in connection with the prosecution and punishment of a person must be in the nature of a criminal proceeding, before a court of law or judicial tribunal, and not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or an administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute, but which is not required by law to try a matter judicially and on legal evidence.\n\nIn that case the proceedings were taken under the Sea Customs Act before a Customs authority who ordered confiscation of goods.\n\nIt was held that such proceedings were not \"prosecution'', nor the order of confiscation a \"punishment\" within the meaning of article 20(2) inasmuch as the Customs authority was not a court or a judicial tribunal and merely exercised administrative powers vested in him for revenue purposes. (I) Vide Willis on Constitutional law, p. 528.\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. 703.\n\nThe facts of this case are no doubt different and the point that requires determination is, whether the petitioner can be _said to have satisfied all the conditions that are necessary to enable him to claim the protection of article 20(2).\n\nThe charges, upon which the petitioner is being prosecuted now, are charges under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nWe will assume for our present purpose that the allegations upon which these charges are based are substantially the same which formed the subjectmatter of enquiry under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850.\n\nThe question narrows down to this : whether the petitioner had already been (1) prosecuted and (2) punished _for these offences ?\n\nMr. Basu, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contends that his client was, in fact, prosecuted for these identical offences before the Commissioner appointed under Act\n\nXXXVII of 1850.\n\nThis, it is argued, was not a mere departmental enquiry of the type referred to in Maqbool Hussain's case(1 ). The Commissioner was a judicial tribunal in the proper sense of the expression.\n\nHe had to adjudicate on the charges judicially, on evidence, recorded on oath, which he was authorised by law to administer.\n\nThe prosecution was conducted by a prosecutor appointed under the Act, charges were read out to the accused person and his plea was taken ; witnesses on both sides were examined on oath and they were cross-examined and re-examined.\n\nThe Commissioner had all the powers of a court; he could summon witnesses, compel production of relevant documents and punish people for contempt.\n\nAt the close of the enquiry, the Commissioner did record his finding against the petitioner on some of the charges.\n\nHe had undoubtedly no power to impose any punishment and had only to forward his report to the Government. Under section 22 of the Act, however, the Government was entitled to pass such orders within its authority, as it considered proper and in exercise of this authority the President did impose upon the petitioner the penalty of dismissal.\n\n(r) [1953) S.C.R. 703.\n\nS. A. Venkataraman v.\n\nThe Union of India and Another.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nS. A. Venkataram an v.\n\nThe Union of India and Anothtr.\n\nMukheriea ].\n\nIt is immaterial, it is argued, for the purpose of article 20(2) of the Constitution that the prosecution was before one authority and punishment was inflicted by another.\n\nThe petitioner was both prosecuted and punished and he is sought to be prosecuted on the same charges over again.\n\nThis constitutes, according to the learned counsel, a clear violation of the guarantee implied in article 20(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe questions raised are undoubtedly of some importance and require to be carefully examined.\n\nIt is true that the Commissioner appointed to make an enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850 is invested with some of the powers of a court, particularly in the matter of summoning witnesses and compelling the production of documents and the report, which he has to make, has to be made on legal evidence adduced under sanction of oath and tested by cross-examination.\n\nBut from these facts alone the conclusion does not necessarily follow that an enquiry made and concluded under Act XXXVII of 1850 amounts to prosecution and punishment for an offence as contemplated by article 20(2) of the Constitution.\n\nIn order to arrive at a proper decision on this point, it is necessary to examine the entire background of the provisions relating to enquiry into the conduct of public serv.i!llts and to ascertain the exact scope and purpose of the enquiry as is contemplated by Act XXXVII of 1850 and the ultimate result that flows from it.\n\nIt is a well established principle of English law that, except where it is otherwise provided by a statute, all public officers and . servants of the Crown hold their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown.\n\nTheir services can be terminated without ass1gmng any reason and even if any public servant considers that he has been unjustly dismissed, his remedy is not by way of a law suit but by an appeal of an official or political character(t ). This principle of law was applied in India ever since the advent of British rule in this country and the servants in the employ of the East India Company also came within the purview of this\n\n(1) Vide Shenton v. Smith [1895] A.G. 229.\n\nrule.\n\nIt is to be remembered that it was during the period of the East India Company that the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act was passed in 1850.\n\nThe object of the Act, as stated in the preamble, was to regulate enquiry into the behaviour of public servants, not removal from service without the sanction of the Government.\n\nThe enquiry was quite optional with the Government and did not affect in any way the powers of the Government to dismiss its servants at pleasure and this was expressly provided by section 25 of the Act, the wording of which is as follows :\n\n\"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the authority of the Government to suspending or removing any public servant for any cause without an enquiry under the Act.\"\n\nAfter assumption of the Government of India by the Crown, this rule of English common law continued unaltered till 1919 when section %B was introduced by the amended Government of India Act of that year.\n\nSub-section ( 1) of section 96B of the Government of India Act, 1919, runs as follows :\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules made thereunder, every person in the civil service of the Crown in India holds office during His Majesty's pleasure and may be employed in any manner required by a proper authority within the scope of his duty, but no person in that service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed .................... \"\n\nThus one restriction imposed by this section upon the unfettered right of the Government to dismiss its servants at its pleasure, was that no servant could be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The section by its opening words also makes the exercise of the power subject to the rules made under the Act and it was in pursuance of the provision of section 96-B(Z) that the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules were framed which with the later amendments are in force even now.\n\nPart XII of these rules deal with Conduct and Discipline of Civil Servants and rule 49 of this part lays down that the different penalties provided\n\nS. A. Venkaa ..\n\nraman\n\nTk Union of India and Another.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nS. A. Venkata raman v.\n\nThe Union of India and Another.\n\nMukhujea J.\n\nby the different clauses of the rule may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed upon members of the services comprised in clauses (1) to (5) in rule 14. These penalties include, amongst others, censure, withholding of increment, dismissal, reduction in rank and removal. Rule 55, which finds a place in the same chapter, lays down the procedure to be followed before passing an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank against any member of the service.\n\nNo such order shall be passed unless the person concerned has been informed, in writing, of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action against him and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself.\n\nAn enquiry has to be made regarding his conduct and this may be done either in accordance with the provisions of the Public servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 or in a less formal and less public manner as is provided for in the rule itself.\n\nThese rules have no statutory force and it was held by the Privy Council that when an officer was dismissed from service without complying with the provisions of these rules, he had no right of action against the Crown('). In other words, the rules, which were not incorporated in a statute, did not impose any legal restriction upon the right of the Crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure.\n\nThe position was altered to some extent m the Government of India Act, 1935, and in addition to the restriction imposed by section 96-B ( 1) of the Government of India Act, 1919, that a civil servant could not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, a further statutory provision was made( 2 ), that a civil servant could not be dismissed or reduced in rank unless the person concerned was given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him.\n\nArticle 311(2) of the present Constitution has further added the word \"removal\" after \"dismissal\" and\n\n(I) Vi de V enkata Rao v. The Secretary of State for India, 64 I.A. 55.\n\n(2) Vide section 240 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nbefore \"reduction in rank\" and thus in all the three cases which are covered by rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules, a civil servant has now a constitutional right to claim a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.\n\nAs the law stands at present, the only purpose, for which an enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850 could be made, is to help the Government to come to a definite conclusion regarding the misbehaviour of a public servant and thus enable it to determine provisionally the punishment which should be imposed upon him, prior to giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, as is required under article 311(2) of the Constitution. An enquiry under this Act is not at all compulsory and it is quite open to the Government to adopt any other method if it so chooses.\n\nIt is a matter of convenience merely and nothing else.\n\nIt is against this background that we will have to examine the material provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 and see whether from the nature and result of the enquiry which the Act contemplates it is at all possible to say that the proceedings taken or concluded under the Act amount to prosecution and punishment for a criminal offence.\n\nIt may be pointed out that the words \"prosecution\" and \"punishment\" have no fixed connotation and they are susceptible of both a wider and a narrower meaning ; but in article 20(2) both these words have been used with reference to an \"offence\" and the word \"offence\" has to be taken in the sense in which it is used in the General Clauses Act as meaning \"an act or omission made punishable by any law for the rime being in force.\" It follows that the prosecution must be in reference to the law which creates the offence and the punishment must also be in accordance with what that law prescribes.\n\nThe acts alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in the present case and on the basis of which the charges have been framed against him do come within the d~nition of \"offences\" described in sections 161 and 16' of the Indian Penal Code and 9-98 S.C. India/59\n\nS. A. V tnkata~\n\nraman v, Tm Union of India and Anothtr.\n\nMukhMjea].\n\nS. A. Venkata~\n\nrama11\n\nThe Union of India and Another.\n\nMuklurjea J.\n\nsection 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Public Servants (Inquiries) Act does not itself create any offence nor does it provide any punishment for it.\n\nRule 49 of the Civil Services Rules mentioned above merely speaks of imposing certain pnalties upon public servants for good and sufficient reasjeaJ.\n\nwere similar in nature to charges 1 and they related to the petitioner's dealings firm known as Sunder Das Saw Mills."}}, {"text": "4th of May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4630, "end_char": 4646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner found, on a consideration of the evidence, that four of the charges under various sub-heads were proved against the petitioner and submitted a report to that effect to the Government on the 4th of May, 1953."}}, {"text": "15th of May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4671, "end_char": 4688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a letter dated the 15th of May, 1953, the Government informed the petitioner that, on careful consideration of the report, the President accepted the opinion of the Commissioner and in view of the findings on the several charges arrived at by the latter, was provisionally of opinion that the petitioner should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5419, "end_char": 5450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pet1t1oner, it seems, did make a representation which was considered by the Government and after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission the President finally decided to impose the penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner."}}, {"text": "17th of September, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5579, "end_char": 5602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of dismissal was passed on the 17th of September, 1953."}}, {"text": "23rd February, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5611, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd February, 1954, , the police submitted a charge-sheet against the pet1t10ner before the Special Judge, Sessions Court, Delhi, charging him with offences under sections 161/165 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and upon that, summons were issued by the learned Judge directing the petitioner to appear before his court on the 11th of March, 1954."}}, {"text": "sections 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5775, "end_char": 5787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5816, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5821, "end_char": 5833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5841, "end_char": 5869, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "11th of March, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 6004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd February, 1954, , the police submitted a charge-sheet against the pet1t10ner before the Special Judge, Sessions Court, Delhi, charging him with offences under sections 161/165 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and upon that, summons were issued by the learned Judge directing the petitioner to appear before his court on the 11th of March, 1954."}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6385, "end_char": 6398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6593, "end_char": 6606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6747, "end_char": 6760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7733, "end_char": 7743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7751, "end_char": 7770, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7775, "end_char": 7786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7933, "end_char": 7946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8120, "end_char": 8127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although these were the materials which formed the background of the guarantee of the fundamental right given in article 20(2) of the Constitution, the ambit and contents of the guarantee, as this court pointed out in the case referred to above, are much narrower than those of the common law rule m England or the doctrine of \"double jeopardy\" in the American\n\n(•) [1953] S.C.R. 703."}}, {"text": "S. A. Venkataraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8206, "end_char": 8224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. A. Venkataraman\n\nThe Unum of\n\nIndia and Another.", "canonical_name": "S. A. Venkata raman"}}, {"text": "Unum of\n\nIndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8230, "end_char": 8244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. A. Venkataraman\n\nThe Unum of\n\nIndia and Another."}}, {"text": "S. A. Venkata--", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8273, "end_char": 8288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. A. Venkata--\n\nram an v.\n\nThe Union of India and Another.", "canonical_name": "S. A. 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Smith [1895] A.G. 229."}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14876, "end_char": 14894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle of law was applied in India ever since the advent of British rule in this country and the servants in the employ of the East India Company also came within the purview of this\n\n(1) Vide Shenton v. Smith [1895] A.G. 229."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15485, "end_char": 15495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15889, "end_char": 15912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 96B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15948, "end_char": 15959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15967, "end_char": 15996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16801, "end_char": 16811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1919", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "S. A. 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A. Venkata~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21530, "end_char": 21544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. A. Venkata~\n\nrama11\n\nThe Union of India and Another.", "canonical_name": "S. A. Venkata raman"}}, {"text": "Muklurjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21587, "end_char": 21596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklurjea J.\n\nsection 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21601, "end_char": 21613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21621, "end_char": 21649, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22425, "end_char": 22442, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22450, "end_char": 22478, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23378, "end_char": 23396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23757, "end_char": 23767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24253, "end_char": 24263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24268, "end_char": 24278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24410, "end_char": 24420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24700, "end_char": 24717, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24728, "end_char": 24756, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25795, "end_char": 25808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.A, V .nkataram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25959, "end_char": 25975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.A, V .nkataram an v.\n\nTho Union of\n\nIndia and Anoth petitions, along with a number of other petitions preferred under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act and praying for the issue of a mandamus restraining the State from issuing the Notification under section 3 ( 1) of the said Act, were heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court of Madhya Bharat. The .court, by a majority judgment, declared that the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act No.\n\nXXVIII of 1951 was valid except as regards section 4(1) (g) and sub-clauses (iv) and (v) of clause 4 of Schedule I which were held illegal and inoperative. A writ of mandamus was directed to be issued to the State Government directing it not to give effect to the pmvisions of the impugned Act stated above. Leave te> appeal to the Supreme Court was granted to the parties and in pursuance of the leave the appellants preferred the appeal above mentioned and the State preferred the two cross appeals. The cross appeals were not pressed by the learned Attorney-General and nothing more need be said about them. They are therefore dismissed with costs.\n\nAs regards Civil Appeals Nos. 4 and 6 of 1953, the facts are : That in April, 1948, after the partition of India, and the formation of two Dominions, India and Pakistan, the Rulers of the States of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India being convinced that the welfare of the people of that region could best be secured by the establishment of a State compnsmg the territories of their respective Stares with a common Executive, Legislature and Judiciarv entered into an agreement for the formation of a United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat). It was resolved by them to entrust to a Constituent Assembly consisting of elected representatives of the people the drawing up of a democratic Constitution for the State within the framework of the Constitution of India to which the Rulers of these\n\nStates had acceded. The covenant entered into by these Rulers was published on the 7th October, 1948.\n\nThe Rulers agreed, under article III 'of the covenant, to elect a Rajpramukh of the United State, and by article VI the Ruler of each Covenanting State agreed to make over the administration of the State to the Rajpramukh not later than the first day of July, 1948, and it was agreed that thereupon all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain, or are incidental to, the Government of the Covenanting States shall vest in the United State and were thereafter to be exercisable only as provided by the covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder.\n\nBy article X it was agreed that as soon as practicable a Constituent Assembly, for the purpose of framing a Constitution for the United State within the framework of the covenant and the Constitution of India, was to be formed and clause (2) of the said article provided :\n\n\"The Rajpramukh shall constitute not later than the first day of August, 1948, an interim Legislative Assembly for the United State in the manner indicated in Schedule IV.\"\n\nSchedule IV laid down the following procedure for the constitution of the Legislative Assembly :\n\n\"I. The Legislative Assembly shall consist of- ( a) forty members elected by the members of the Gwalior Legislative Assembly ;\n\n(b) fifteen members elected by the members of the Indore Legislative Assembly ; and ( c) twenty members elected by an electoral college to be constituted by the Rajpramukh m consultation with the Government of India to represent Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore.\n\n2. The election shall be by proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.\n\n3. The Rajpramukh may make rules for carrying into effect the foregoing provisions of this Schedule and securing the due constitution of the interim Legislative As!'embly.\"\n\nRaj Rajendra Malojirao Shitoll\"\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat.\n\nMahajan C.J.\n\nRaj Rajendra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThe State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat. _,\n\nlv.!aha)an C.J.\n\nIn pursuance of this covenant the Rajpramukh took the oath of office on the 28th of May,\n\n1948. In the meantime 40 members representing the Indore group we're elected to the interim legislative assembly on the 8th and 9th of May, 1948, respectively. As regards the election of 20 members that had to be elected by an electoral college, what happened was this. The Ministry of States, Government of India, on the 5th July, 1948, informed the Rajpramukh that there were many practical difficulties in setting up an electoral college consisting of elected representatives of the various States, because in many of the smaller States there were no elected bodies of any kind.\n\nAfter considering the various difficulties it was suggested to the Rajpramukh that the twenty seats may be allocated between the different States in a certain manner mentioned in the latter and out of these, fourteen may be allotted to the nominees of the Praja Manda! and the remaining six may be nominated by the Rajpramukh himself. This suggestion was modified by a letter of the 19th of November, 1948, and it was fina:ly agreed upon that the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee may be asked to elect six persons to represent the smaller States in the Madhya Bharat interim legislative assembly. This suggestion was not exactly in accord with what had been indicated in clause 1 (c) of Schedule IV. These representatives were elected in the manner suggested in the two letters, on the 19th October, 1948, and they were declared to be validly elected in terms of the covenant.\n\nOn the 30th of October, 1948, the Rajpramukh promulgated an Ordinance entitled \"The Interim Legislative Assembly Ordinance Samvat 2005'', Ordinance No. 18 of 19\"r8.\n\nIn the preamble to the Ordinance it was dclared that in accordance with the prov1s10ns of the covenant the legislative assembly had already been duly constituted.\n\nThe various sections of the Ordinance provided for the working of the interim legislative essembly, i.e., the manner in which it could be summoned ai1d dissolved or prorogued, how its President and Deputy President were to be elected and how it was to exercise the power of\n\nVoting and what number of members would constitute the quorum. On the 6th . of December, 1948, the Ordinance was repealed and Act XXIII of 1949 took its place. The legislative assembly thus constituted 'was actual! y functioning on the 26th of January, 1950, \\v hen the Constitution of India came into force. In the meantime, by subsequent covenants, the Rulers of the Covenanting States had agreed to accept the Constitution of India as the Constitution of the United State of Madhya Bharat and had abandoned their covenant of forming a separate Constituent Assembly for framing a Constitution for the United State of Madhya Bharat. After the coming into force . of the Constitution of India the interim legislative assembly constituted by the Rajpramukh and which was functioning on the 26th of January, 1950, continued to function till some time in the year 1952 when new elections took place and a legislative assembly in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution ot India was duly constituted.\n\nOn the 30th of November, 1949, the Government of the State of Madhya Bharat introduced a Bill entitled the \"Madhya Bharat Abolition of J agirs Bill' before the interim legislative assembly and the Bill was passed into an Act on the 28th of August, 1951, and having been reserved for the consideration of the President received his assent on the 27th November,\n\n1951. It was published in the Madhya Bharat Gazette Extraordinary on the 7th of December, 1951. The said Act, by section 3, provided for a date to be appointed by the Government by notification for resumption of all jagir lands in the State and by section 4 it provided that as from such a date, the right, title and interest of every jagirdar and of every other person claiming through him in his jagir lands including forests, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds, watr-channels, ferries, pathways, village-sites, huts, bazars and mela grounds and mines and minerals whether being worked or not, shall stand resumed to the State free from all encumbrances. The Act also provided a scheme for assessment of compensation in respect of iag1rs thus resumed.\n\nRaj Rajtndra MaWjirao Shitol11\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat.\n\nMahajan C. J1\n\nRaj Rajen\"ra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThi State of Madhya Bharat.\n\nMahajan C. J.\n\nThe appellants contested the validity of this law on a number of grounds, and, inter alia, on the following :-\n\n(I) That the scrcalled legislature which passed the Act was not a legislature within the meaning of the covenant entered into by the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) or within the meaning of Schedule IV of the said covenant.\n\n(2) That the legislature of Madhya Bharat was not competent to enact the said Act and the said acquisition or resumption of jagirs was not for a public purpose and there was no provision for payment of compensation as understood in law, the compensation provided for being wholly illusory and the Act was a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nBefore the High Court, Mr. P. R. Das who appeared for most of the petitioners, confined his arguments to. some of the grounds mentioned in clause (2) above.\n\nHis first contention that the impugned Act was passed by a legislature not validly constituted, he reserved for arguing before this court as the Madhya Bharat High Court by a Full Bench decision in Shree Ram Dubey v. The State of Madhya Bharat('), had already repelled that contention. The two points argued by him before the High Court were : (I) That there was no public purpose behind the acquisition for the resumption of jagir lands and therefore the Act was unconstitutional and illegal.\n\n(2) That some of the provisions of the impugned Act were ultra vires in so far as they constituted a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nBoth these points which were urged before the High Court were not argued before us by the learned counsel. The point that there was no public purpose behind the acquisition was abandoned because it was concluded by the decision of this court in the Orissa Zamindari appeals, K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo and Others v. The State of Orissa(•).\n\n[I] A.LR. 1952 M.B. 57-178. [2] A.LR. 1s53 S.C. 375; [1954] S.C.R. 1.\n\nAs regards the second point, as already indicated, three provisions of the impugned Act had been declared void by the High Court :ind Mr. Das contented him- . self by accepting that decision. The State Government had impugned the correctness of the decision of the High Court declaring these three provisions of the Act to be void but it also did not press that point. The result of these concessions in this court is that the arguments in the two appeals were limited to the first point urged in the petition, namely, whether the impugned Act was passed by a Legislature not validly constituted under the covenant entered into by the Rulers of Madhya Bharat.\n\nMr. P. R. Das contended that as the Interim Legislative Assembly was not constituted according to the provisions of Schedule IV of the covenant it was a body of usurpers and therefore any laws made by it were wholly void and of no effect whatsoever.\n\nIt was urged that the two bodies, viz., Praja Manda! and the Provincial Congress Committee who, in two separate divisions, elected fourteen and six members, did not constitute an electoral college to fulfil the requiremer1t of clause 1 ( c) of Schedule IV, and the members elected could not be said to have been elected in the manner prescribed by the Schedule and that the Rajpramukh and the Government of India, in the absence of an amending covenant, had no power -to vary the provisions of the Schedule. It was said that the object of clause 1 ( c) of Schedule Iv' was that the election of 20 members should be by an electoral college constituted by the Rajpramukh in consultation with the Government of India to represent the Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore and that the election by the Praja Manda! and the Congress Committee of 14 and 6 members was in clear breach of the terms of the covenant and that in this manner no representation was give11 to the minorities and full effect was not given to the rule that the election should be by proprortional representation by means of single transferable vote. The learned Attorney-General met these contentions by urging, (1) that the question was not open having regard to the provisions of article 385 of the Constitution of India\n\n1954 •\n\nRaj Rajendra • Malojirao Shitolt' v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat;_\n\nMahajan C.J.\n\nRaj Rajendra Malujirao Shitole - v.\n\nT!te StateZof Maah; a Bharat.\n\nMaf..ajan C. J.\n\n(2) that the election of 20 members representing the eighteen States took place in literal compliance of the covenant,\n\n(3) that in any vent there was substantial compliance with the covenant, and lastly ( 4) that the declarations made in the Ordinance by the Rajpramukh and the provisions contained in the Ordinance were conclusive and were accepted by all the\n\nStates concerned and could no longer be challenged.\n\nAfter a careful consideration of the respective arguments addressed by Mr. P. R. Das and the learned Attorney-General we have reached the conclusion that it is not necessary to consider in detail all the points discussed by the learned counsel, as in our judgment the question seems to be concluded by the provisions of article 385 of the Constitution of India. There is no gainsaying the fact that the election of 20 members to represent the 18 States was not made strictly in the manner indicated in Schedule IV of the covenant, but it also cannot be disputed, and in fact was not disputed before the High Court, that the Legislative Assembly which passed the impugned Act was on the 26th of January, 1950, in spite of its defective constitution, in fact functioning as the Legislature of the State of Madhya Bharat. It had been declared to have come into existence by an Ordinance promulgated by the Rajpramukh and its factual existence is apparent from the laws that it made subsequent to its formation.\n\nPart XXI of the Constitution of India deals with \"Temporary and Transitional Provisions\".\n\nAbout two dozen articles in this Part concern themselves with the solution of the problems of their interval in between the repeal of the Government of India Act and the coming into being of bodies and authoritie!S formed by the Constitution.\n\nUntil the House or Houses of Legislature or bodies and authorities formed oy the Constitution could be duly formed it was necessary to say with certain definiteness as to what bodies or authorities would exercise and perform the duties conferred by the different provisions of the Constitution in the meantime. When a silent revolution was taking place and Princely kingdoms were fast\n\ndisappearing and a new democratic Constitution was being set up and a provision had to be made for the interval between the switch-over from one Constitu- . tion to another, there was hardly any time to enquire and consider whether the bodies or authorities or House or Houses of Legislature formed under the old Constitutions which were being scrapped had been formed in strict compliance with the provisions of those Constitutions or whether there were any defects in their. formation.\n\nThe Constitution-makers therefore took notice of their factual existence and gave th m recogmt10n under the Constitution and invested the bodies that were actually functioning as such, whether regularly or irregularly, with the authority to exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of the Constitution. That is clearly the scheme of all the articles mentioned in Part XXI of the Constitution. Particular reference may be made to articles 379, 382 and to article 385 which specifically governs the present case. Article 379 is in these. terms:\n\n\" ( 1) Until both Houses of Parliament have been. duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the. body functioning as the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India immediately before the' commence-. ment of this Constitution shall be the provisional Parliament and shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties conferred by the provisions of this.\n\nConstitution on Parliament.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of this clause,_ the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India includes- '\n\n(i) the members chosen to represent any State or. other territory for which representation is provided under clause (2), and\n\n(ii) the members chosen to fill casual vacancies m the said Assembly.\"\n\nThe provision made in this article in unambiguous terms makes the body fw1ctionlng as the Constitu' ent Assembly, whether constituted perfectly or--\n\n1~54-\n\nRaj 'Rajendra.\n\nMalojirao Shitol~,\n\nv .\n\nThe Slate of Madhya Bhatai;\n\nMahajan.C. J.\n\nRaj Rajendra Malojirao Shitole\n\nTht Slate of Madh]:l Bharat.\n\nMahl1jan C. ].\n\nimperfectly and whatever its membership on the date immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, as the provisional Parliament and vests it with all the functions and duties conferred by the provisions of the Constitution on the Parliament. The President was given power under the provisions of this article to add members to this body to give representation to certain States who were not previously represented, and it was specifically prescribed that if there are any vacancies then the vacancies could be filled up and the members returned to fill these vacancies will be considered members of the provisional Parliament. These specific provisions are indicative of the fact that the Constitution-makers, in enacting this article, took notice of the factual existence of certain bodies without concerning themselves with the question whether they had been validly constituted under the Constitution that brought them into being. Article 382 of the Constitution is similarly worded. It provides that until the House or Houses of the Legislature of each State specified in Part A of the First Schedule has or have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the House or Houses of the Le, gislature of the corresponding Province functioning immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on the House or Houses of the Legislature of such State. Article 385 is in exact conformity with the two earlier articles. It provides that-\n\n\"Until the House or Houses of the Legislature of a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule has or have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the body or authority functioning immediately before the commencement of this Constitution as the Legislature of the corresponding Indian State shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on the House or Houses of the Legislature of the State so specified.\"\n\nThe whole intent and purpose of these articles was to give recognition to those bodies or authorities or House or Houses of Legislature which were actually functioning before the 26th of January, 1950, and to invest them with the powers conferred by the provisions of this Constitution.\n\nThe Constitution-makers wanted to indicate the arrangements made by them for the interval with certain amount of definiteness in order to avoid any disputes during the interim period as to who the body or authority was, to exercise the powers conferred by the provisions of the Constitution.\n\nThey therefore chose the formula that whichever body or authority or House or Houses of Legislature was\n\nactu:illy functioning immediately before the commencement of the Constitution would be the body oc\n\nauthority or the House that would exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on the House, body or authority specified in the Constitution. They did not take any risk on this question and the bodies actually functioning were, like persona designata, invested with powers conferred by the- Constitution. That being the scheme of this Part and that being also the clear and unambiguous language of article 385 it follows that the Madhya Bharat Interim Legislative Assembly that was actually functioning on the 26th January, 1950,\n\nwas invested by the Constitution of India with powers conferred by the provisions of the Constitution, irrespective of the fact whether it had been properly constituted in accordance with the term~ of the covenant or not. The inquiry into this question thus became barred by adopting this procedure. Such a procedure was fully justified and was founded upon considerations of policy and necessity' for the protection of the public and individuals whose interests may be affected thereby. It is manifest that endless confusion would have resulted if the Constitution had not :adopted that formula and had not barred an inquiry into all questions as to the original formation of such bodies by giving validity and recognition to those bodies or authorities as were actually functioning on\n\nthe 26th of January, 1950. Not only did it give\n\n1 954\n\nRai Rajendra Malojirao Shitolt\n\nTlze State rf Madh_va Bharat.\n\nMahajan C. J,\n\nRaj Rqjendra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat.\n\nMahajan C.J.\n\nvalidity and recognition to those bodies which were in fact functioning then but it also invested these designated bodies and authorities with powers conferred by the provisions of the Constitution itself. That being our view as to the true meaning and intent of the language employed in article 385 of the Constitution it follows that the contention raised by Mr. P. R. Das as to the defective formation of the Interim Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat has no validity.\n\nEven if that body was not formed in strict compliance with the provisions indicated in Schedule IV of the covenant its defective formation does not affect the constitutionality of the impugned statute.\n\nThe impugned statute was passed in the year 1951 after the Constitution of India had given recognition to, and conferred powers on, the Assembly under article 385 of the Constitution. When it made this law it was exercising its powers under the Constitution of India and not under the covenant which brought it int<> existence.\n\nThe result therefore is that the only contention that Mr. P. R. Das argued before us cannot be sustained and it must be held that it is not well founded.\n\nFor the reasons given above we see no force in these two appeals and they are therefore dismissed with co its.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant in C. A. No. 4 : I. N. Shroff.\n\nAgent for the appellant in C. A. No. 6 : Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent : R. H. Dhcb11r ..", "total_entities": 142, "entities": [{"text": "RAJ RAJENDRA MALOJIRAO SHITOLE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJ RAJENDRA MALOJIRAO SHITOLE\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT."}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 174, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 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("}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of fagirs Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of fagirs Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 495, "end_char": 500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of fagirs Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of fagirs Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 504, "end_char": 514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of fagirs Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of fagirs Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 518, "end_char": 555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 844, "end_char": 857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was however, contended that the impugned Act\n\n(XXVIII of 1951) was void as it was not passed by a validly constituted legislature within the meaning of the covenant entered into by the Rulers of Madhya Bharat as the provisions of cl."}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 893, "end_char": 904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 995, "end_char": 1029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, that as the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly was actually functioning on the 26th janflary, 1950, the validity of the Acts passed by it could not be questioned in view of art."}}, {"text": "art. 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1156, "end_char": 1164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act"}}, {"text": "articles 379, 382 and 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1316, "end_char": 1341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1439, "end_char": 1453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1461, "end_char": 1482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. R. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1678, "end_char": 1687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1689, "end_char": 1695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath for the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1807, "end_char": 1821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and K. A. Chitale, Advocate-General of Madhya Bharat\n\n(Shiv Dayal, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. A. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1855, "end_char": 1868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and K. A. Chitale, Advocate-General of Madhya Bharat\n\n(Shiv Dayal, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shiv Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1906, "end_char": 1916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and K. A. Chitale, Advocate-General of Madhya Bharat\n\n(Shiv Dayal, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2012, "end_char": 2019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN C. J.-These appeals preferred on behalf of three zamindars of the State of Madhya Bharat against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature of that State dated the 4th Decqnber, 1952, raise common constitutional questions and can be disposed of by one judgment.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan C.J."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature of that State dated the 4th Decqnber, 1952,", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2137, "end_char": 2205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN C. J.-These appeals preferred on behalf of three zamindars of the State of Madhya Bharat against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature of that State dated the 4th Decqnber, 1952, raise common constitutional questions and can be disposed of by one judgment."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2410, "end_char": 2420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2428, "end_char": 2449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2834, "end_char": 2844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3040, "end_char": 3071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1953, Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole, is the proprietor of extensive landed properties in the State of Madhya Bharat comprising 260 villages under different Sanads granted to his ancestors by the Rulers of Gwalior from time to time.", "canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole"}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3241, "end_char": 3248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1953, Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole, is the proprietor of extensive landed properties in the State of Madhya Bharat comprising 260 villages under different Sanads granted to his ancestors by the Rulers of Gwalior from time to time."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya l)harat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3372, "end_char": 3395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,61,637 and that the State of Madhya l)harat, under purported exercise of its powers under section 3 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, was about to issue a Notification for resumption of all his land."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3442, "end_char": 3451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "7th December, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3588, "end_char": 3606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a petition dated the 7th December, 1951, preferred to the High Court he asked for a mandamus to restrain the State from issuing any Notification under section 3(1) of the Act in respect of his properties and from\n\nRqj RaJtndra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3718, "end_char": 3730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3817, "end_char": 3839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a petition dated the 7th December, 1951, preferred to the High Court he asked for a mandamus to restrain the State from issuing any Notification under section 3(1) of the Act in respect of his properties and from\n\nRqj RaJtndra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3842, "end_char": 3849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\n•954\n\nRaj Rajendra Maiojir® Skitole v.\n\nThe Stateof Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan C.J."}}, {"text": "Raj Rajendra Maiojir® Skitole", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3863, "end_char": 3892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\n•954\n\nRaj Rajendra Maiojir® Skitole v.\n\nThe Stateof Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole"}}, {"text": "Stateof Madhya Bharat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3901, "end_char": 3922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\n•954\n\nRaj Rajendra Maiojir® Skitole v.\n\nThe Stateof Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat"}}, {"text": "Mahajan C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3925, "end_char": 3937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C.J.\n\ninterfering with rights in the said property.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan C.J."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4224, "end_char": 4235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4424, "end_char": 4433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Bharat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4501, "end_char": 4528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These twe> petitions, along with a number of other petitions preferred under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Madhya Bharat Abolition 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5387, "end_char": 5392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 and 6 of 1953, the facts are : That in April, 1948, after the partition of India, and the formation of two Dominions, India and Pakistan, the Rulers of the States of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India being convinced that the welfare of the people of that region could best be secured by the establishment of a State compnsmg the territories of their respective Stares with a common Executive, Legislature and Judiciarv entered into an agreement for the formation of a United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat)."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5440, "end_char": 5448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 and 6 of 1953, the facts are : That in April, 1948, after the partition of India, and the formation of two Dominions, India and Pakistan, the Rulers of the States of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India being convinced that the 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gwalior Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7451, "end_char": 7479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Schedule IV laid down the following procedure for the constitution of the Legislative Assembly :\n\n\"I. 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The Legislative Assembly shall consist of- ( a) forty members elected by the members of the Gwalior Legislative Assembly ;\n\n(b) fifteen members elected by the members of the Indore Legislative Assembly ; and ( c) twenty members elected by an electoral college to be constituted by the Rajpramukh m consultation with the Government of India to represent Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore.", "canonical_name": "Rajpramukh"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7679, "end_char": 7698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Schedule IV laid down the following procedure for the constitution of the Legislative Assembly :\n\n\"I. The Legislative Assembly shall consist of- ( a) forty members elected by the members of the Gwalior Legislative Assembly ;\n\n(b) fifteen members elected by the members of the Indore Legislative Assembly ; and ( c) twenty members elected by an electoral college to be constituted by the Rajpramukh m consultation with the Government of India to represent Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore."}}, {"text": "Raj Rajendra Malojirao Shitoll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8036, "end_char": 8066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Rajendra Malojirao Shitoll\"\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8073, "end_char": 8095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Rajendra Malojirao Shitoll\"\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat"}}, {"text": "Raj Rajendra Malojirao Shitole", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8112, "end_char": 8142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C.J.\n\nRaj Rajendra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThe State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat. _,", "canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole"}}, {"text": "State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8148, "end_char": 8175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C.J.\n\nRaj Rajendra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThe State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat. _,", "canonical_name": "State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat"}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8232, "end_char": 8242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lv.!aha)an C.J.\n\nIn pursuance of this covenant the Rajpramukh took the oath of office on the 28th of May,\n\n1948.", "canonical_name": "Rajpramukh"}}, {"text": "28th of May,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8274, "end_char": 8292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lv.!aha)an C.J.\n\nIn pursuance of this covenant the Rajpramukh took the oath of office on the 28th of May,\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "9th of May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8416, "end_char": 8432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime 40 members representing the Indore group we're elected to the interim legislative assembly on the 8th and 9th of May, 1948, respectively."}}, {"text": "Ministry of States, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8562, "end_char": 8601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of States, Government of India, on the 5th July, 1948, informed the Rajpramukh that there were many practical difficulties in setting up an electoral college consisting of elected representatives of the various States, because in many of the smaller States there were no elected bodies of any kind."}}, {"text": "5th July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of States, Government of India, on the 5th July, 1948, informed the Rajpramukh that there were many practical difficulties in setting up an electoral college consisting of elected representatives of the various States, because in many of the smaller States there were no elected bodies of any kind."}}, {"text": "Praja Manda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9127, "end_char": 9138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After considering the various difficulties it was suggested to the Rajpramukh that the twenty seats may be allocated between the different States in a certain manner mentioned in the latter and out of these, fourteen may be allotted to the nominees of the Praja Manda!"}}, {"text": "19th of November, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9254, "end_char": 9276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suggestion was modified by a letter of the 19th of November, 1948, and it was fina:ly agreed upon that the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee may be asked to elect six persons to represent the smaller States in the Madhya Bharat interim legislative assembly."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9318, "end_char": 9361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suggestion was modified by a letter of the 19th of November, 1948, and it was fina:ly agreed upon that the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee may be asked to elect six persons to represent the smaller States in the Madhya Bharat interim legislative assembly."}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9553, "end_char": 9561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9569, "end_char": 9580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th October, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9668, "end_char": 9686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These representatives were elected in the manner suggested in the two letters, on the 19th October, 1948, and they were declared to be validly elected in terms of the covenant."}}, {"text": "30th of October, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9767, "end_char": 9788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th of October, 1948, the Rajpramukh promulgated an Ordinance entitled \"The Interim Legislative Assembly Ordinance Samvat 2005'', Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "6th . of December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10435, "end_char": 10458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th ."}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10601, "end_char": 10622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y functioning on the 26th of January, 1950, \\v hen the Constitution of India came into force."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10635, "end_char": 10656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10778, "end_char": 10799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10827, "end_char": 10856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, by subsequent covenants, the Rulers of the Covenanting States had agreed to accept the Constitution of India as the Constitution of the United State of Madhya Bharat and had abandoned their covenant of forming a separate Constituent Assembly for framing a Constitution for the United State of Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11036, "end_char": 11057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11381, "end_char": 11403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th of November, 1949, the Government of the State of Madhya Bharat introduced a Bill entitled the \"Madhya Bharat Abolition of J agirs Bill' before the interim legislative assembly and the Bill was passed into an Act on the 28th of August, 1951, and having been reserved for the consideration of the President received his assent on the 27th November,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11409, "end_char": 11449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th of November, 1949, the Government of the State of Madhya Bharat introduced a Bill entitled the \"Madhya Bharat Abolition of J agirs Bill' before the interim legislative assembly and the Bill was passed into an Act on the 28th of August, 1951, and having been reserved for the consideration of the President received his assent on the 27th November,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "28th of August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11606, "end_char": 11626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th of November, 1949, the Government of the State of Madhya Bharat introduced a Bill entitled the \"Madhya Bharat Abolition of J agirs Bill' before the interim legislative assembly and the Bill was passed into an Act on the 28th of August, 1951, and having been reserved for the consideration of the President received his assent on the 27th November,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "27th November,\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11719, "end_char": 11739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th of November, 1949, the Government of the State of Madhya Bharat introduced a Bill entitled the \"Madhya Bharat Abolition of J agirs Bill' before the interim legislative assembly and the Bill was passed into an Act on the 28th of August, 1951, and having been reserved for the consideration of the President received his assent on the 27th November,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "7th of December, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11808, "end_char": 11829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was published in the Madhya Bharat Gazette Extraordinary on the 7th of December, 1951."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11848, "end_char": 11857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11983, "end_char": 11992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raj Rajtndra MaWjirao Shitol11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12493, "end_char": 12523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Rajtndra MaWjirao Shitol11\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole"}}, {"text": "Raj Rajen\"ra Malojirao Shitole", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12569, "end_char": 12599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J1\n\nRaj Rajen\"ra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThi State of Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole"}}, {"text": "United State of Gwalior", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12983, "end_char": 13006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\nThe appellants contested the validity of this law on a number of grounds, and, inter alia, on the following :-\n\n(I) That the scrcalled legislature which passed the Act was not a legislature within the meaning of the covenant entered into by the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) or within the meaning of Schedule IV of the said covenant."}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13066, "end_char": 13077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13463, "end_char": 13472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the High Court, Mr. P. R. Das who appeared for most of the petitioners, confined his arguments to.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14768, "end_char": 14771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second point, as already indicated, three provisions of the impugned Act had been declared void by the High Court :ind Mr. Das contented him- ."}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15407, "end_char": 15418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provincial Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15603, "end_char": 15632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the Provincial Congress Committee who, in two separate divisions, elected fourteen and six members, did not constitute an electoral college to fulfil the requiremer1t of clause 1 ( c) of Schedule IV, and the members elected could not be said to have been elected in the manner prescribed by the Schedule and that the Rajpramukh and the Government of India, in the absence of an amending covenant, had no power -to vary the provisions of the Schedule."}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15769, "end_char": 15777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15786, "end_char": 15797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16081, "end_char": 16089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16098, "end_char": 16108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16803, "end_char": 16814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16822, "end_char": 16843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17008, "end_char": 17012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maf..ajan C. J.\n\n(2) that the election of 20 members representing the eighteen States took place in literal compliance of the covenant,\n\n(3) that in any vent there was substantial compliance with the covenant, and lastly ( 4) that the declarations made in the Ordinance by the Rajpramukh and the provisions contained in the Ordinance were conclusive and were accepted by all the\n\nStates concerned and could no longer be challenged."}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17756, "end_char": 17767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17775, "end_char": 17796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17938, "end_char": 17949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18461, "end_char": 18482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 379, 382", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20114, "end_char": 20131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20139, "end_char": 20150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20196, "end_char": 20207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20257, "end_char": 20267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "terms:\n\n\" ( 1) Until both Houses of Parliament have been."}}, {"text": "Slate of Madhya Bhatai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21192, "end_char": 21214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Slate of Madhya Bhatai;\n\nMahajan.", "canonical_name": "State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat"}}, {"text": "Article 382", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22255, "end_char": 22266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22411, "end_char": 22425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22841, "end_char": 22852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23010, "end_char": 23024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24689, "end_char": 24700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Interim Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24721, "end_char": 24763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That being the scheme of this Part and that being also the clear and unambiguous language of article 385 it follows that the Madhya Bharat Interim Legislative Assembly that was actually functioning on the 26th January, 1950,\n\nwas invested by the Constitution of India with powers conferred by the provisions of the Constitution, irrespective of the fact whether it had been properly constituted in accordance with the term~ of the covenant or not."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24801, "end_char": 24819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That being the scheme of this Part and that being also the clear and unambiguous language of article 385 it follows that the Madhya Bharat Interim Legislative Assembly that was actually functioning on the 26th January, 1950,\n\nwas invested by the Constitution of India with powers conferred by the provisions of the Constitution, irrespective of the fact whether it had been properly constituted in accordance with the term~ of the covenant or not."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24842, "end_char": 24863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rai Rajendra Malojirao Shitolt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25666, "end_char": 25696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not only did it give\n\n1 954\n\nRai Rajendra Malojirao Shitolt\n\nTlze State rf Madh_va Bharat.", "canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole"}}, {"text": "Raj Rqjendra Malojirao Shitole", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25744, "end_char": 25774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J,\n\nRaj Rqjendra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "Raj Rajendra Maloji Rao Shitole"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25780, "end_char": 25802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J,\n\nRaj Rqjendra Malojirao Shitole\n\nThe State of Madhya Bharat.", "canonical_name": "State of Jo..[adhva B!1arat"}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26107, "end_char": 26118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26382, "end_char": 26393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26557, "end_char": 26578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26649, "end_char": 26660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26743, "end_char": 26764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27155, "end_char": 27167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 : I. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27211, "end_char": 27226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 : Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhcb11r", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27256, "end_char": 27269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : R. H. Dhcb11r .."}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_761_767_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nZAMINDAR OF ETTAYAPURAM\n\n11.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS.\n\n(and connected appeals)\n\nrMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MuKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nMadras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, (Act\n\nXXV/ of 1948)-Volidity thereof-Article 31(~ of the Constitution.\n\n1he !v1adras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Acl, (Act XXVI of 1948) was passed by the Provincial Legislature of Madras functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935 and it received the assent of the Governor-General of India On the 2nd of April, 1949.\n\nAfter the advent of the Constitution. the ACt was reserved for the certification of the President and it \\Vas.\n\ncertified on the 12th of April, 1950 : Held, that in view of the provisions of art. 31(6) of the Constitution the validity of the Act could not be challenged on the ground that it contravened the provisions of s. 299(2) of the Govcrnn1ent of India Act, 1935 . . Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India ([1952] S.C.R. 89), The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singlr ((1952] S.C.K. 889) and Narayan Deo v. The State of Oriua ([1954J S.C.R. I) referred to. ·\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION :\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPEALS Nos. 170 to 176 and 178 to 183 of 1953.\n\nAppeals from the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd August, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 13386,. 13388, 13390, 7812, 12003, 13188, 13262, 7822, 13123, 13347, 13341, 12997, 12494 of 1950 and Order dated 8th September, 1952, in C. M. P. No. 13936 of 1950.\n\n' K. S . . Krishnaswamy Iyengar (K. S. Champakesa Iyengar, with him) for the appellants.\n\n. - ' V. K. T.\n\nChari, Advocate-General of Madras (R. Ganapathy Iyer and V. V. Raghavan, with him) for the respondent (State of Madras) in Civil Appeals Nos. 170 to 176 and 178 to 181.\n\n. M. Seshachalapathi for the respondent (State of Andhra) in Civil Appeals Nos. 182 and 183.\n\n1954. February 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MuKHERJEA J. 12-95 s. c. r./59\n\nI95t\n\n. Fe.biuary, 5\n\nZamindatof Etrayapuram\n\nTM Slate of\n\nMadras.\n\nMukhetjea J.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-These consolidated appeals, numbering foufteen in all, are directed against a common judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated the 23rd of August, 1952, by which the learned Judges dismissed the petitions of the different appellants made under article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe appellants are landholders of Madras, holding zamindaries within that State, and in their applications under rticle 226 of the Constitution they prayed for writs in the nature of mandamus, directing the State of Madras to forbear from notifying and taking over possession of the estates held by them and also to cancel the notifications already issued, in exercise of its powers under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, (Act XXVI of 1948).\n\nThis Act, the constitutional validity of which has been assailed by the appellants, was passed by the Provincial Legislature of Madras functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935, and it received the assent ) [1952) S.C.R. 889.\n\nI95-4\n\nZ•min'1•r•f E1ta;1apur11m\n\nThi S1a_l1 of\n\nMadr111.\n\nMukherjtaJ.\n\n~54\n\nZamindarof Ettayapuran v.\n\nThe Stale of\n\nMadras.\n\nMukh'1jea J.\n\nunder article 132( 1) of the Constitution and it is on the strength of these certificates that the appeals have come before us.\n\nMr. Ayyangar, appearing in support of these appeals, has taken his stand solely upon the doctrine of 'colourable legislation' as enunciated by the majority of this court in the Bihar case referred to above. He has very propertly not attempted to make any point as to the absence of a public purpose in regard to any of the items of acquisition, since it is clear that according to the majoriy view of this court, as explained in Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa (' ), the existence of a public purpose is not a justiciable issue in case of an enactment which having fulfilled the requirements of .clause ( 4) of article 31 of the Constitution enjoys the protection afforded by it.\n\nThe contentions of Mr. Ayyangar, in substance, are that the provisions of section 27(i) as well as of section 30 of the impugned Act are colourable legislative provisions which have been enacted in fraud of the Constitution Act of 1935.\n\nIt appears that in determining the amount of compensation, that is to be paid under the Act, in respect of an acquired estate, it is necessary, first of all, to ascertain what has been described as the 'basic annual sum' in regard to that estate. The basic annual sum comprises several items or parts which have been set out in section 27 and the subsequent sections of the Act, and it is upon the amount of the basis annual sum determined in accordance with the provisions of these sections that the total amount of compensation money payable to a proprietor is made to depend.\n\nMr. Ayyangar contends that section 27(i) of the Act, which lays down that in computing , the basic annual sum only one-third of the gross annual R yotwari demand of specified kinds is to be taken into. account, is a colourable provision which ignores altogether the actual income derived from the property and introduces an artificial and an arbitrary standard for determining the income or profits which has absolutely no relation to facts. Similarly, in computing the net miscellaneous revenue, which is an\n\n(1) [1945] S.C.R. 1. A.l.R. 1953 S. C. 375 at P. 3Bo.\n\n.element in the computation of the basic annual sum, what is to be taken into account under section 30 is not the average of net annual income which the proprietors themselves derived from the sources, mention- .ed in the Act, when they were in possession of tha estates, but which the Government might derive from them in future years after the date of notification.\n\nThus if on account of mismanagement or for other :reasons the Government does not derive any income from these sources, the proprietor would not have any compensation under this head at all. It is argued :that these are mere devices or contrivances aimed at -confiscation of private property and they neither lay down nor are based upon any principle of compensa- :tion.\n\nWhatever the merits of these contentions might be, it appears to us that there is an initial and an insuper- :able difficuity in the way of the learned counsel's\n\n-invoking the authority of the majority decision of this court in the case of The State of Bi liar v. M a!zarajadhi- .raja Sir Kameslzwar Singh( 1 ) to the circumstances of the present case.\n\nThe Bihar Land Reforms Act, which was the subject matter of decision in that case, was a legislation which was pending at the time when the Constitution came into force. It was reserved for consideration of the President and received his assent :in due course and consequently under clause ( 4) of article 31 of the Constitution it was immune from judicial scrutiny on the ground that the compensation provided by it was inadequate or unjust. With regarcl to two of the provisions of the Act, however, which were embodied in sections 4 (b) and 23(f) of the Act,\n\nit was held by the majority of this court that they were void as they really did not come within entry 42 of List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution,\n\nunder which they purported to have been enacted.\n\nEntry 42 of List III speaks of \"principles oq which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union 'or of a State or for any •other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 889.\n\n:(aminda. of Ettayapuram\n\nThi Stale of\n\nModrtJJ.\n\nMukhnjta ].\n\nZamin.dar of Ettayapuram\n\nThi State of\n\nMadras.\n\nM, kh,, feaJ.\n\nto be given.\" It was pointed out that entry 42 W:lS' undoubtedly the description of a legislative head and in deciding the competency of a legislation under this entry, the court was not concerned with thejustice or propriety of the principles upon which the determination of the compensation was to be made or the form or manner in which it was to be given. But even then, the legislation must rest upon some principle of giving compensation and not of denying or withholding it, and a legislation could not be supported which was based upon something which was non-existent or was unrelated to facts and consequently could not have a conceivable bearing on any principle of compensation. The initial difficulty in the way of invoking this doctrine in the present case lies in thefact that the legislation, which is impugned here, waspassed by the Madras Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935, and' there was no entry in any of the lists attached to the Act of 1935 corresponding to entry 42 in List III of the Indian Constitution. The only entry relevant to this point in the Act of 1935 was entry 9 of List II which spoke merely of 'compulsory acquisition of land' ; and it is clear that a duty to pay compensation or of laying down any principle regarding it was not inherent in the language of that entry. The guarantee for payment of compensation, so far as the Constitution Act of 1935 is concerned, was contained in section 299' clause (2) which was worded as follows :\n\n\"Neither the Federal Legislature nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land, or any commercial or industrial undertaking ........ unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and' either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which,. it is to be determined.\" The appellants could have very well relied uponthis guarantee if a bar had not been created in their way by the provision of article 31 ( 6) of the Constitution. That clause of article 31 stands of follows :\n\n\"Any law of the State enacted not more than eighteen months before the commencement of this Constitution may within three months from such commencement be submitted to the President for his certification ; and thereupon, if the President by public notification so certifies, , it shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2) of this article or has contravened the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935.\"\n\nIt is not disputed that the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 does fulfil all the requirements mentioned above.\n\nConsequently, it is not possible for us to allow the appellants to raise the contentions which the learned counsel on their behalf wants to raise. The result is that the appeals would stand dismissed, but in the circumstances of this case we shall make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : S. Subramanian.\n\nAgent for the respondents : R. H. Dhebar.\n\nTHE LIQUIDATORS OF PURSA LIMITED v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBIHAR.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS, GHULAM\n\nHASAN and JAGANNADHADAS JJ. J\n\nIncome-tax Act (XI of 1922) s. 10(2) (vii) proviso 2- Any such machinery or. plant must have been used in the account- Jng year-Section 66-Finding of fact-When appeal court can intervene.\n\nThe fundamental idea underlying the words used in the definition of \"business\" in s. 2( 4) of the Income-tax Act is the continuous exercise of an activity and the same central idea is implicit in the wr?s .\"carried on by him\" occurring in s. 10( 1) and those cr1ttcal \\Vords are an essential constituent of that which is to be produce the taxable income, and therefore the\n\nz..., Wlt1' ef it:H\"7\";-..\n\nT lw St behind the finding of fact of the tribunal, it is now well settled that where it is competent for a tribunal to make findings in fact which are excluded from review, the appeal court has alwavs jurisdiction tt> intervene if it appears either that the tribunal has misunderstood the statutory language-because the proper construction of the statutory language is a matter of law-or that the tribunal has made a finding for which there is no evidence or which is inconsistent with the evidence and contradictory of it. [See Lord Normand in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.\n\nFraser( 1)]. It appears to us that the tribunal misdirected itself in law as to the meaning and import of the relevant provisions of section 10 of the Act. It completely overlooked the fact which is plainly in evidence on the record that the machinery and plant which were sold had not at all been used for the purposes of the business carried\" on in the accounting year and consequently the second proviso to section 10\n\n(2) (vii) could have no application to the sale proceeds of such machinery and plant. In fact the entire decision of the tribunal was vitiated by its failure tokeep in view the true meaning and scope of section Hr\n\n(2) (vii) and cannot, therefore, be supported.\n\nIt further appears to us that in the statement of the case the tribunal was not merely stating something in the nature of a primary fact but was also drawing a conclusion which is to a certain extent contrary to the primary finding. As is stated clearly in the statement of tl1e case, the decision of the tribunal was based on\n\n(1) 24 Tax Cas. 498 at p. 501.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSl : EME COURT REPORTS 777\n\ntwo considerations. The first consideration was founded on an admission by the liquidators that the company had been carrying on its business up to the date of the sale of the machinery on the 7th December, 1943. This admission is quite consistent with the case that the company was only selling its stock of sugar and not doing any business of manufacture of sugar. Indeed, the manufacturing process does not begin until December of each year and the memorandum of agreement was made on the 7th December, 1943, and possession was delivered to the purchaser on the 10th December, 1943. It is nobody's case and it has not been found that the company had manufactured any sugar during the whole of the accounting year. Therefore, this finding that the company carried on its business up to the 7th December, 1943, certainly does not indicate that the company was also carrying on any business of growing sugarcane or manufacturing sugar by the use of the machinery or plant in question. The second finding that the company carried on business even after the sale of the machinery and the plant clearly indicates that that business had nothing\n\nto do with the machinery or plant. Both the findings, therefore, are inconclusive. The matter, however, does not rest there. It appears to us that the findings of fact, taken literlly, cannot support the decision of the tribunal. If, as held by the tribunal, \"the sale of the. machinery was a part of the applicant company's carrying on of the business\" then the sale must be regarded as an ordinary operation of such business and consequently the profits arising out of such ordinary business operation would be assessable under the provisions of section IO (I) and it would not be necessary to have recourse to tl1e statutory fiction\n\ncreated by the second proviso to clause (vii) under which the excess of the sale proceeds over the written down value is to be deemed to be profits of the business. If the profits on the sale of the machinery and plant are to be made assessable under the second proviso, as has been done by the tribunal, then it must be conceded that these deemed profits were not : in reality the profits of the business carried on by the\n\n(2) 24 Tax Casc9498 at p. 501.\n\nl 3-95 S. C. I-(59\n\nThi Liquidators of Pursa Limited v.\n\nCommiJsioner of\n\nIncome.Jax,\n\nBi/zar.\n\nDas].\n\n1h, Liquidators -0/ Pursa LimiJ1d\n\nCommissiorur of\n\nJncom1-lax~\n\nBihar.\n\nDas].\n\ncompany and, therefore, the sale transaction which brought in these profits was not in fact part of the company's business, which conclusion again will be inconsistent with the finding of fact if the business is not understood as limited only to the selling of sugar.\n\nFor reasons stated above, it appears to us that having misdirected itself in law as to the scope and effect of the relevant portions of section 10 of the Act the tribunal did not approach the facts from a proper angle and, further, that its findings cannot, in the circumstances of this case, be given such sanctity as would exclude the same from review by the High Court or this court. Turning to the facts to be gathered from the records it is quite clear that the intention of the company was to discontinue its business and the sale of the machinery and plant was a step in the process of the winding up of its busines.\n\nThe sale of the machinery and plant was not an operation in furtherance of the business carried on by the company but was a realisation of its assets in the process of gradual winding up of its business which eventually culminated in the voluntary liquidation of the company. Even if the sale of the stgck of sugar be regarded as carrying on of business by the company and not a realisation of its assets with a view to winding up, the machinery or plant not being used during the accounting year at all and in any event not having had any connection with the carrying on of that limited business during the accounting year, section 10\n\n(2) (vii) can have no application to the sale of any such machinery or plant. In this view of the matter, the answer to the first question should be in the negative and we answer accordingly.\n\nThe result is that this appeal is allowed and the respondent shall pay the costs of the appellants both in this court and in the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : B. N. Ghose.\n\nAgent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 495, "end_char": 506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 575, "end_char": 598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. Subramanian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 973, "end_char": 987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : S. Subramanian."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1018, "end_char": 1030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "THE LIQUIDATORS OF PURSA LIMITED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1033, "end_char": 1065, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE LIQUIDATORS OF PURSA LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1108, "end_char": 1131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. R. 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JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1183, "end_char": 1197, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1211, "end_char": 1219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948", "statute": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1311, "end_char": 1321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948", "statute": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 2( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1454, "end_char": 1462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948", "statute": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1470, "end_char": 1484, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1611, "end_char": 1620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2000, "end_char": 2008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3027, "end_char": 3043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3274, "end_char": 3307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th May, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Mitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3501, "end_char": 3514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukumar Mitra (S. N. Mul(herjee, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mul(herjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3516, "end_char": 3532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukumar Mitra (S. N. Mul(herjee, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3564, "end_char": 3578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary,."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3610, "end_char": 3624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3786, "end_char": 3802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was .delivered by DAs J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Patna High Court delivered on a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Indian Incometax Act."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3876, "end_char": 3889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4182, "end_char": 4192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4294, "end_char": 4308, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shearer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4418, "end_char": 4425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference came up for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Shearer and Sarjoo Prasad JJ."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4430, "end_char": 4443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference came up for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Shearer and Sarjoo Prasad JJ."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter thereupon was placed before a third Judge, Ramaswami J., who, after a fresh hearing delivered his judgment on the 16th May, 1951, agreeing with Sarjoo Prasad J. on the first question and with Shearer J. on the second ."}}, {"text": "16th May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4846, "end_char": 4860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter thereupon was placed before a third Judge, Ramaswami J., who, after a fresh hearing delivered his judgment on the 16th May, 1951, agreeing with Sarjoo Prasad J. on the first question and with Shearer J. on the second ."}}, {"text": "Pursa Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5700, "end_char": 5710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The controversy arose in course of the proceedings for the assessment of Pursa Ltd., to income-tax for the assessment year 1945-46, the relevant accounting year covering the period between the 1st October, 1943, to 30th September, 1944."}}, {"text": "1st October, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5820, "end_char": 5837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The controversy arose in course of the proceedings for the assessment of Pursa Ltd., to income-tax for the assessment year 1945-46, the relevant accounting year covering the period between the 1st October, 1943, to 30th September, 1944."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5842, "end_char": 5862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The controversy arose in course of the proceedings for the assessment of Pursa Ltd., to income-tax for the assessment year 1945-46, the relevant accounting year covering the period between the 1st October, 1943, to 30th September, 1944."}}, {"text": "Pursa Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5865, "end_char": 5875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursa Ltd., was a company incorporated in 1905 under the Indian Companies Act but all its shareholders and directors were ; residents in the United Kingdom."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5929, "end_char": 5942, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6006, "end_char": 6020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursa Ltd., was a company incorporated in 1905 under the Indian Companies Act but all its shareholders and directors were ; residents in the United Kingdom."}}, {"text": "9th August, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "affidavit and other materials placed before the tribunal and referred to by Sarjoo Prasad J. in his judgment it appears that on the 9th August, 1943, an inventory was prepared and a firm offer was received from Dalmia Jain & Company Ltd., for the purchase of the factory and stores as on that date."}}, {"text": "Dalmia Jain & Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7043, "end_char": 7069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "affidavit and other materials placed before the tribunal and referred to by Sarjoo Prasad J. in his judgment it appears that on the 9th August, 1943, an inventory was prepared and a firm offer was received from Dalmia Jain & Company Ltd., for the purchase of the factory and stores as on that date."}}, {"text": "16th August, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7153, "end_char": 7170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This offer was on the 16th August, 1943, communicated by cable to the directors in England."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7214, "end_char": 7221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This offer was on the 16th August, 1943, communicated by cable to the directors in England."}}, {"text": "20th August, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7230, "end_char": 7247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th August, 1943, the director$ asked the local managers in India to proceed with the matter in anticipation of the sanction of the shareholders which the directors expected to obtain at an extraordinary general meeting to be held very shortly."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7291, "end_char": 7296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th August, 1943, the director$ asked the local managers in India to proceed with the matter in anticipation of the sanction of the shareholders which the directors expected to obtain at an extraordinary general meeting to be held very shortly."}}, {"text": "8th October, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7516, "end_char": 7533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That meeting, however, was held on the 8th October, 1943, i.e., 8 days after the accounting year had starterl."}}, {"text": "7th December, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7818, "end_char": 7836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th December, 1943, a written memorandum of agreement was executed whereby the company agreed to sell and demise to Dalmia Jain & Company Ltd., free from all mortgages and charges at and for the price of rupees twenty-eight lacs all the lands, buildings, machinery and plant and all vats, reservoirs, cisterns, pumps, machinery, engines, boilers, plant, implements, utensils, tramways, furniture, stores, articles and things as on the ninth day of August, one ·\n\nthousand nine hundred and forty-three (subject to subsequent use and consumption in the ordinary course\n\nof business) used in connection with the said sugar factory, but excepting stocks of manufactured ."}}, {"text": "10th December, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8772, "end_char": 8791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dalmia Jain & Company Ltd., paid the sum of rupees twenty-eight lacs on the same day and on the 10th December, 1943, they g6t possession of the factory."}}, {"text": "20th June, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9834, "end_char": 9849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company went into voluntary liquidation on the 20th June, 1945."}}, {"text": "21st February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10314, "end_char": 10333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of these assessment proceedings the Income-tax Officer on the 21st February, 1947, wrote a letter to the liquidators asking for elucidation on certain points."}}, {"text": "LiquMDlorr qf .Pursa Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amongst other things, the Incometax Officer wanted to know the liquidators' objection why the company's activities during the previous\n\n195•\n\nThe LiquMDlorr qf .Pursa Limited\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlncotn4-ttJX,\n\nBihar."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10888, "end_char": 10902, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "17th May, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11405, "end_char": 11419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his letter dated the 17th May, 1947, the Income-tax Officer claimed that large profits which had been made by the company on the sale of their machinery and plant were taxable under the second proviso to section 10 (2) (vii) of the Income-tax Act and called upon the liquidators to retain sufficient funds and assets in their hands to meet the heavy tax liabilities that might eventually arise and also to warn the share!Jolders accordingly."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11588, "end_char": 11598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11616, "end_char": 11630, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11966, "end_char": 11980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The liquidators, in their letter in reply dated the 22nd May, 1947, did not agree that the profits were taxable, for the profits to which reference had been made were not profits arising from a business carried on by the company but were profits arising from the company ceasing to carry on business."}}, {"text": "21st June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12271, "end_char": 12286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer, however, by his order dated the 21st June, 1947, held that the profits of the sale of machinery and plant were liable to assessment nnder section 10 (2) (vii) of the Act and added a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12377, "end_char": 12387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th January, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12558, "end_char": 12576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Incoinetax having dismissed the liquidators' appeal on the 30th January, 1947, the liquidators went up on further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12627, "end_char": 12656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Incoinetax having dismissed the liquidators' appeal on the 30th January, 1947, the liquidators went up on further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "17th May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12681, "end_char": 12695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its order dated the 17th May, 1949, the tribunal dismissed that appeal."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12759, "end_char": 12769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13002, "end_char": 13012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15040, "end_char": 15050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15114, "end_char": 15124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15276, "end_char": 15285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shaw Wal/ace & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15476, "end_char": 15494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Shaw Wal/ace & Co.' s case( 1) the fundamental idea underlying each of these words is the continuous exercise of an activity and the same central idea is implicit in the words \"carried on by him\" occurring in section 10 (1) and those critical words are an essential constituent of that which is to produce the taxable income."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15685, "end_char": 15695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17388, "end_char": 17398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18263, "end_char": 18273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Liquidators of Pursa Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19243, "end_char": 19271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lncome-tax Appellate Tribunal found that :i; ugar continued to be sold for more than 6 months\n\nThe Liquidators of Pursa Limited\n\nCommiJsiofllf' of\n\nJncomt-tox,\n\nBihar."}}, {"text": "Normand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20443, "end_char": 20450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Lord Normand in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.\n\nFraser( 1)]."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20623, "end_char": 20633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20900, "end_char": 20910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24395, "end_char": 24405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25509, "end_char": 25519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. N. Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25899, "end_char": 25910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : B. N. Ghose."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25940, "end_char": 25958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_779_786_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE RAJAHMUNDRY ELECTRIC SUPPLY\n\nCORPORATION LTD. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ANDHRA. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MUKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.] Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act- { Madras Act XLIII of 1949)-Volidity of-No entry in the three Legislative Lists of seventh schedule of Government of India Act, 193_5.\n\nThe Madras Elee compensation payable to the licensee an amount which they consider to he the loss sustained by them.\n\nSection 11 prescribes the various deductions which the Government shall be entitled to make from the compensation payable under the Act. The manner of\n\npayment or deposit of compensation is laid down in section 12.\n\nSection 13 permits the Government to repay all loans, debentures, mortgages and the like outstanding on the vesting date at any time before the time fixed for repayment. Section 14 is the arbitration section. Section 15 provides for the termination of the managing agency.\n\nSection 16 authorises the Government to terminate the services of any person on the staff of the licensee immediately before the vesting date. Section 17 requires all licensees to prepare and hand over to the Government a complete inventory of all the assets. Section 18 gives power of entry to the Government or any officer authorised by the Government upon any land or premises in the possession of the lice'1see. Section 19 prescribes penalties for various defaults therein specified.\n\nSection 20 makes certain officers of a company liable for the offence committed by the company.\n\nSection 21 gives protection against suit or prosecution for anything done in good faith\n\nunder any rule or order made under the Act. Section 22 confers rule-making power on the Government.\n\nSection 23 provides that the provisions of certain Acts in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall have no effect. Section 24 gives power to the Government to do anything which appears to them necessary for the purpose of removing any difficulty. From the above summary it will be noticed that the Act does not purport to make any provision for the granting of licenses or maintenance of works for generating or transmitting energy or for supplying electrical energy as one would expect to find in a law dealing with electricity nor does the Act purport to make any provision for the incorporation, regulation or winding up of trading corporations. On the contrary, it is abundantly clear from the long title, the preamble and the sections that it is, in pith and substance, nothing but an Act to provide for the acquisition of electrical undertakings.\n\nSection 299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided that neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature would have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes\n\nTh• Rajalmwndry\n\nEkctric Supply Corporation ltd. ...\n\nTii• Stale of\n\nAndhra.\n\nDas].\n\nThe Rqjahmundry\n\nElect1ic Supply Corporation lid.\n\nThe State of\n\nA.ndhra.\n\nDas].\n\nof any land or any commercial or industrial undertaking or any interest in or in any company owning any commercial or industrial undertaking unless the law provided for the payment of compensation for the property acquired. Compulsory acquisition of property is undoubtedly an important sovereign right of the State but this right has to be exercised under a bw.\n\nThe legislative power of the State was distributed by sections 99 and 100 amongst the Federal Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures in the manner provided in the several lists set forth in the Seventh Schedule to the Act. Section 100 read with entry 9 in list II authorised the Provincial Legislature to make a law with respect to compulsory acquisition of land. There was no entry in any of the three lists relating to compulsory acquisition of any commercial or industrial undertaking, although section 299 (2) clearly contemplated a law authorising compulsory acquisition for public purposes of a commercial or industrial undertaking. The acquisition of a commercial or industrial undertaking not being the subject-matter of any entry in any of the three legislative lists, neither the Federal Legislature nor the Provincial Legislature could enact a law with respect to compulsory acquisition of a commercial or industrial undertaking. Under section 104, however, the Governor-General, in his individual discretion, could, by public notification, empower either the Federal Legislature or a Provincial Legislature to enact a law with respect to any matter not enumerated in any of the lists in the seventh schedule to the Act. It is, therefore, clear that although Parliament expressly entrusted the Provincial Legislature with power to make a law with respect to compulsory acquisition of land it did not straightaway grant any power, either to the Federal Legislature or the Provincial Legislature, to make a law with respect to compulsory acquisition of a .commercial or industrial undertaking but left it to the discretion of the Governor-General to empower either of the Legislatures to enact such a law. There is no suggestion that the Governor-General had, in exercise of his discretionary powers under section 104, authorised the Madras\n\nS.CJl.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 785\n\nLegislature to enact the impugned Act and, therefore, the Act was, prima facie, beyond the legislative competency of the Madras Legislature.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General of Madras urges that there was implicit in every entry in the legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, an inherent power to make a law with crespect to a matter ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry. His argument is that each entry in the list carried with it an inherent power to provide for the compulsory acquisition of any property, land or any commercial or industrial undertaking; while making a law under such entry. It is quite true that the powers of each Legislature to make laws with respect to the clifferent subjects assigned to it by the appropriate list were to be regarded as wide and plenary and also covering matters incidental or ancillary to such subject-matter, but it is, nevertheless, clear from the provision of the Act that the power to make a law for compulsory acquisition was, under entry 9 in list II, given only to Provincial Legislatures and that such power of the Provincial Legislatures was, under that entry, limited to m'aking a law for the compulsory acquisition of Janel only and that unless the Governor-General made an order under section 104 of the Act the Provincial Legislatures had no power to make a law for the compulsory acquisition of any property other than land and that the Federal Legislature had no power to make any law with respect to the compulsory acq'.lisition of any property at all. If the argument of the learned Advocate-General were correct then entry 9 in list II was wholly unnecessary for under entry 21 in list II the Provincial Legislatures could make a law for the compulsory . acquisition of land.\n\nA similar argument was repelled by this court in the State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadlziraja Sir Kameslzwar Singh( ). The matter is placed beyond any doubt or dispute by the provisions of section 127 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which provided that the Federal micrht, if it .deemed it necessary to acquire any land si; uate in a\n\n(1) [1952] S, C.R. 889.\n\n195~\n\nT/le Rojahmundry\n\nEkctric Supply Corporation LJd.\n\nTh• State of\n\nAndhra.\n\nDas],\n\n195{\n\nTh• Rqja/unundry\n\nEU.lri< SuHIJ Corpuration LJd.\n\nTh• State •f\n\nA.ndhr•.\n\nDasJ.\n\n[95{\n\nF1brnary 11.\n\nProvince for any purpose connected with a matter with respect to which the Federal Legislature had powi;. to' make laws, require the Province to acquire the land on behalf and at the expense of the Federation. If power inhered in the Federal Legislature to make a law for the acquisition of any property for any purpose connected with a matter with respect to which it had power to make laws then section 127 would not have been necessary at all.\n\nThe absence of any entry empowering any Legislature to make laws with respect to cmnpulsory acquisition of a commercial or industrial undertaking and the provisions of section 127 to which reference has just been made make it abundantly clear that the contentions urged by the learned Advocate-General cannot possibly be sustained.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, it must be held that the Madras Legislature had no legislative competency to enact the impugned law. This is sufficient to dispose of this appeal and it is not necessary to express any opinion on the other points raised in the court below.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed with costs both in the High Court as well as in tJ1is court.\n\nAppeal, allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nAgent for the respondent : R. H. Dhebar.\n\nAgent for the intervener : R.H. Dhebar.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR v.\n\nABDUL MAJID\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MUKlIEllJEA, S. R. DAs, VMAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nCivil servant-Wrongful dismissal-Suit for recovery of arl'ears of salary-Whether competent-Rule of English law-Civil servant-Holding office at the pleasure of Crotvn-Whether applic~ able in India.\n\nHeld, that the rule of English law that a civil servant cannot maintain a suit against the State or against the Crown for the-", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "THE RAJAHMUNDRY ELECTRIC SUPPLY\n\nCORPORATION LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE RAJAHMUNDRY ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 188, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras Act XLIII of 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 250, "end_char": 274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Volidity of-No entry in the three Legislative Lists of seventh schedule of Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 276, "end_char": 374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act XLIII of 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 446, "end_char": 470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 596, "end_char": 612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XLIII of 1949", "statute": "Madras Act XLIII of 1949"}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 637, "end_char": 652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 742, "end_char": 748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "articles 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1043, "end_char": 1055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1085, "end_char": 1106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1172, "end_char": 1206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal under articles 132 ( 1) and 133 ( 1) (b) of the Constitution of India from the J udgmeni: and Order dated the 27th April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and Satyanarayana Rao\n\nJ.) in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "U. Sethumadhava Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1319, "end_char": 1338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiyar (U. Sethumadhava Rao, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Seshachalapathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1370, "end_char": 1388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Seshachalapathi for the respondent."}}, {"text": "V. K. T. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1410, "end_char": 1424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (Porus A. Mehta and V. V. Raghavan, with him) for the Intervener (State of Madras)."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1454, "end_char": 1468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (Porus A. Mehta and V. V. Raghavan, with him) for the Intervener (State of Madras)."}}, {"text": "V. V. Raghavan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1473, "end_char": 1487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (Porus A. Mehta and V. V. Raghavan, with him) for the Intervener (State of Madras)."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1768, "end_char": 1779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2037, "end_char": 2050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras Act XLIII of 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2227, "end_char": 2240, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rajahmundry", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2341, "end_char": 2352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company was formed and registered under the Indian Companies Act in 1924 with the object, inter alia, of generating and supplying electrical energy to the public in Rajahmundry."}}, {"text": "18th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2520, "end_char": 2538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act received the assent of the Governor-General on the 18th January, 1950, and was published in the Official Gazette on the 24th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "24th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2589, "end_char": 2607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act received the assent of the Governor-General on the 18th January, 1950, and was published in the Official Gazette on the 24th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2618, "end_char": 2639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2665, "end_char": 2683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the Constitution of India coming into force on the 26th January, 1950, the Act was submitted to the President for his certification and on the 12th April, 1950, the President certified that the Act should not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravened the provisions of clause (2) of article 31 or it contravened the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "12th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2757, "end_char": 2773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the Constitution of India coming into force on the 26th January, 1950, the Act was submitted to the President for his certification and on the 12th April, 1950, the President certified that the Act should not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravened the provisions of clause (2) of article 31 or it contravened the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2924, "end_char": 2934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2990, "end_char": 3001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3009, "end_char": 3038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3075, "end_char": 3094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order in writing made on the 2nd September, 1950, the Government of Madras acting under section 4(1) of the Act declared that the undertaking of the appellant company should vest in the Government on the date specified therein."}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3100, "end_char": 3120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order in writing made on the 2nd September, 1950, the Government of Madras acting under section 4(1) of the Act declared that the undertaking of the appellant company should vest in the Government on the date specified therein."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3134, "end_char": 3146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3295, "end_char": 3307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "2nd April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3379, "end_char": 3394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the proviso to section 4(1) the Government from time to time postponed the date of vesting and the 2nd April, 1951, was the last extended date fixed for such vesting."}}, {"text": "29th March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3454, "end_char": 3470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th March, 1951, the appellant company filed C.M.P. No."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3531, "end_char": 3542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Shortly stated the contentions of the appellant before the High Court were that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3586, "end_char": 3673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3750, "end_char": 3768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly stated the contentions of the appellant before the High Court were that the Act was ultra vires in that (1) it was beyond the legislative competency of the Madras Legislature to enact it, (2) it was not enacted to subserve any public purpose, and (3) the compemation provided for was illusory."}}, {"text": "Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4096, "end_char": 4141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5933, "end_char": 5962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6398, "end_char": 6466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6551, "end_char": 6557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act is \"an Act to make provision for the acquisition of undertakings in the Province of Madras supplying electricity.\""}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6736, "end_char": 6745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act", "statute": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6805, "end_char": 6814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act", "statute": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6842, "end_char": 6851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act", "statute": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6970, "end_char": 6979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act", "statute": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7145, "end_char": 7154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act", "statute": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act", "statute": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act", "statute": "Turning to the Act it will be noticed that the long title of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7554, "end_char": 7563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7890, "end_char": 7899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8027, "end_char": 8037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8341, "end_char": 8351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8544, "end_char": 8554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8557, "end_char": 8567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8727, "end_char": 8737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8766, "end_char": 8776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8831, "end_char": 8841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8974, "end_char": 8984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9091, "end_char": 9101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9247, "end_char": 9257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9320, "end_char": 9330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9417, "end_char": 9427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9550, "end_char": 9560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9607, "end_char": 9617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9752, "end_char": 9762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10491, "end_char": 10502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10514, "end_char": 10543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rqjahmundry\n\nElect1ic Supply Corporation", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10790, "end_char": 10830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rqjahmundry\n\nElect1ic Supply Corporation lid."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nA.ndhra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10841, "end_char": 10858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nA.ndhra."}}, {"text": "sections 99 and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11286, "end_char": 11305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11431, "end_char": 11447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11460, "end_char": 11471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11735, "end_char": 11746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 104", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12184, "end_char": 12195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12507, "end_char": 12517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, clear that although Parliament expressly entrusted the Provincial Legislature with power to make a law with respect to compulsory acquisition of land it did not straightaway grant any power, either to the Federal Legislature or the Provincial Legislature, to make a law with respect to compulsory acquisition of a .commercial or industrial undertaking but left it to the discretion of the Governor-General to empower either of the Legislatures to enact such a law."}}, {"text": "section 104", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13052, "end_char": 13063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13381, "end_char": 13397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 104", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14425, "end_char": 14436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15107, "end_char": 15118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15126, "end_char": 15155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15875, "end_char": 15886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16094, "end_char": 16105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16692, "end_char": 16709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : M. S. K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16739, "end_char": 16751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : R. H. Dhebar.", "canonical_name": "R. H. Dhebar"}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16781, "end_char": 16792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the intervener : R.H. Dhebar.", "canonical_name": "R. H. Dhebar"}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16799, "end_char": 16813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR v.\n\nABDUL MAJID\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MUKlIEllJEA, S. R. DAs, VMAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "ABDUL MAJID", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16818, "end_char": 16829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR v.\n\nABDUL MAJID\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MUKlIEllJEA, S. R. DAs, VMAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16832, "end_char": 16850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR v.\n\nABDUL MAJID\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MUKlIEllJEA, S. R. DAs, VMAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "MUKlIEllJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16858, "end_char": 16869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR v.\n\nABDUL MAJID\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MUKlIEllJEA, S. R. DAs, VMAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VMAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16882, "end_char": 16891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR v.\n\nABDUL MAJID\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MUKlIEllJEA, S. R. DAs, VMAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]"}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_786_803_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "195{\n\nTh• Rqja/unundry\n\nEU.lri< SuHIJ Corpuration LJd.\n\nTh• State •f\n\nA.ndhr•.\n\nDasJ.\n\n[95{\n\nF1brnary 11.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954]\n\nProvince for any purpose connected with a matter with respect to which the Federal Legislature had powi;. to' make laws, require the Province to acquire the land on behalf and at the expense of the Federation. If power inhered in the Federal Legislature to make a law for the acquisition of any property for any purpose connected with a matter with respect to which it had power to make laws then section 127 would not have been necessary at all.\n\nThe absence of any entry empowering any Legislature to make laws with respect to cmnpulsory acquisition of a commercial or industrial undertaking and the provisions of section 127 to which reference has just been made make it abundantly clear that the contentions urged by the learned Advocate-General cannot possibly be sustained.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, it must be held that the Madras Legislature had no legislative competency to enact the impugned law. This is sufficient to dispose of this appeal and it is not necessary to express any opinion on the other points raised in the court below.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed with costs both in the High Court as well as in tJ1is court.\n\nAppeal, allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nAgent for the respondent : R. H. Dhebar.\n\nAgent for the intervener : R.H. Dhebar.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR v.\n\nABDUL MAJID\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MUKlIEllJEA, S. R. DAs, VMAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nCivil servant-Wrongful dismissal-Suit for recovery of arl'ears of salary-Whether competent-Rule of English law-Civil servant-Holding office at the pleasure of Crotvn-Whether applic~ able in India.\n\nHeld, that the rule of English law that a civil servant cannot maintain a suit against the State or against the Crown for therecovery of arrears of salary does not prevail in India and it has been negatived by the provisions of the statute law in India.\n\nSection 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, places restrictions and limitations on the exercise of the pleasure of. the C1own and these restrictions must be given effect to.\n\nThey arc imperative and mandatory. Therefore whenever there is a breach of restrictions imposed by the statute by the Government or the Crown the matter is justiciable and the aggrieved party is entitled to suitable relief at the hands of the court.\n\nGovernment servants are entitled to relief like any other person under the ordinary law, and that relief must be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nPuniab Provina v. Pandit Tara Chand ([1947]\n\nF.C.R. 89) approved.\n\nHigh Commissioner for India and Pakistan v. l.M. Lall ([1948] L.R. 75 I.A. 225) distinguished.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRisDicTION : Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1952.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 5th May, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lall and Mahabir Prasad JJ.) in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 2091 of 1946.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi and Porns A. Mehta, with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. P. Sinha (Numddin Ahmed, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1954. February 11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHA JAN C.J.-This is an appeal by the State of Rihar against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna whereby the High Court passed a decree for arrears of salary of the respondent against the State from the 30th July, 1940, up to the 'ant is a public servant, and that public policy, no matter on what ground it is based, demands the qualification. The next is that these qualifications are to be implied in the engagement of a public servant, no matter whether they have been referred to when the engagement was made or not. If these conclusions are justified by the authorities to which I have referred, then it would seem to follow that the rule based on public policy which has been enforced against military servants of the Crown, and which prevents such servants suing the Crown for their pay on the assumption that their only claim is on the bounty of the Crown and not for a contractual debt, must equally apply . to every public servant.\n\nIt also follows that this qualification must be read, as an implied condition, into every contract between the Crown and a public servant, with the effect that, in terms of their contract, they have no right. to their remuneration which can be\n\n(•) [1926] s. c. 842 .\n\nenforced in a civil court of justice, and that their only remedy under their contract lies 'in an appeal of an official or political kind'.\"\n\nThe observations made in M ulvenna v. The Admiralty('), which is a Scottish case, could not have been made if in the law of that country there were provisions similar to the provisions made in various sections of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to by the Federal Court in Tara Chand Pandit's case('). It was further urged that the same view was taken by\n\nPilcher J. in Lucas v. Lucas and the High Commissioner for India (8). There the question for consideration was whether the sterling overseas pay of an Indian civil servant was a debt owing and accruing within the meaning of rule 1 of Order XL V of the Rules of the Supreme Court and which could be attached in satisfaction of an order for the payment of alimony. The real point for decision in that case was whether the whole or any portion of the salary of a member of the Indian Civil Service was liable to attachment in England in satisfaction of the judgment debt.\n\nIt appears that the attention of the learned Judge was not invited to the provisions of section 60 and other relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the learned Judge applied the dictum of Lord Blackburn in Mulvenna v. The Admiralty( 1 ), to the case of a civil servant from India. As the application was made in England and the Civil Procedure Code did not apply there, the provisions of the Code were not noticed in that case. We are therefore of the opinion that the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in I. M. Lall's case('), without a consideration of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relevant to the inquiry and without a consideration of the reasoning of the Federal Court in Tara Chand Pandit's case('), cannot be treated, particularly because the matter was not directly involved in the suit, as the final word on the subject.\n\nWe are in no way bound by the decision given either in Tara Chand Pandif'.s case(' ), or by the\n\n(!) [r926] S. C. 842.\n\n(3) [r943] P. 68.\n\n<>) [r947] F.C.R. 89.\n\n(4) 75 I.A. 205.\n\nThi Stat1 ef\n\nBihar v.\n\nAbdul Mqjid.\n\nMahajan G'. ].\n\nT1\" State of\n\nBihar\n\nAbdul Majid.\n\nMahajan C. J.\n\ndecision given by the Privy Council in I. M. Lairs\n\ncase( 1 ). But on a consideration of the reasons given in the two judgments we think that the rule of English law that a civil servant cannot maintain a suit against the State or against the Crown for the recovery of arrears of salary does not prevail in this country and that it has been negatived by the provisions of the statute law in India.\n\nReliance was also placed by the learned Solicitor- General on the decision of the Federal Court in Suraj Narain Anand v. North West Frontier Province(2).\n\nIn that case Suraj Narain having been appointed a Sul>- Inspector of Police posted in the North West Frontier Province by the Inspector-General of Police of the Province was subsequently dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Failing to get relief by departmental proceedings he instituted a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Peshawar. The subordinate judge dismissed the suit as being unsustainable. This decision was upheld by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. The Federal Court held that the Courts below were not justified in dismissing the suit, that the plaintiff was at least entitled to a dedaration that the order of dismissal passed against him was void. That court accordingly set aside the decree of the Judicial Commissioner and remitted the case with a declaration that there shall be substituted for the decree appealed against a declaration in the terms above stated, with such further directions as the circumstances of the case may require in the light of the observations of their judgment. The Province appealed to the Privy Council against the decision of the Federal Court.\n\nIt was held by the Board in the first instance allowing the appeal of the North West Frontier Province and reversing the decision of the Federal Court of India, that the North West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1937, had become operative in 1938 at some date before April 25, 1938, when the respondent was dismissed, and that rule 16 ( 1) was a valid rule made under the authority conferred on the\n\n(I) 75 I.A. 225.\n\n(2) [1941] F.C.R. 37.\n\nappellant by section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that the respondent's suit was rightly dismissed, but subsequently on the petition of the respondent asking the Board to reconsider their decision -0n the ground that it had been ascertained that the\n\nPolice Rules of 1937 were in fact printed and published Qn April 29, 1938, that was, four days after the date Qf his dismissal, the Board heard the appeal further, when the respondent's allegation was admitted and, applying the reasoning in their previously delivered judgment, the Board reversed their former decision .and affirmed the judgment of the Federal Court which had held that the respondent's dismissal was void and inoperative.\n\nDuring the arguments before the Privy - Inspector of Police posted in the North West Frontier Province by the Inspector-General of Police of the Province was subsequently dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police.", "canonical_name": "Suraj Narain Anand"}}, {"text": "North West Frontier Province", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23265, "end_char": 23293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Board in the first instance allowing the appeal of the North West Frontier Province and reversing the decision of the Federal Court of India, that the North West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1937, had become operative in 1938 at some date before April 25, 1938, when the respondent was dismissed, and that rule 16 ( 1) was a valid rule made under the authority conferred on the\n\n(I) 75 I.A. 225."}}, {"text": "Federal Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23328, "end_char": 23350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Board in the first instance allowing the appeal of the North West Frontier Province and reversing the decision of the Federal Court of India, that the North West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1937, had become operative in 1938 at some date before April 25, 1938, when the respondent was dismissed, and that rule 16 ( 1) was a valid rule made under the authority conferred on the\n\n(I) 75 I.A. 225."}}, {"text": "North West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23361, "end_char": 23408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 25, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23459, "end_char": 23473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Board in the first instance allowing the appeal of the North West Frontier Province and reversing the decision of the Federal Court of India, that the North West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1937, had become operative in 1938 at some date before April 25, 1938, when the respondent was dismissed, and that rule 16 ( 1) was a valid rule made under the authority conferred on the\n\n(I) 75 I.A. 225."}}, {"text": "[1941] F.C.R. 37", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23614, "end_char": 23630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 243", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23646, "end_char": 23657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the North West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1937", "statute": "the North West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1937"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23665, "end_char": 23694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 29, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23960, "end_char": 23974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant by section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that the respondent's suit was rightly dismissed, but subsequently on the petition of the respondent asking the Board to reconsider their decision -0n the ground that it had been ascertained that the\n\nPolice Rules of 1937 were in fact printed and published Qn April 29, 1938, that was, four days after the date Qf his dismissal, the Board heard the appeal further, when the respondent's allegation was admitted and, applying the reasoning in their previously delivered judgment, the Board reversed their former decision .and affirmed the judgment of the Federal Court which had held that the respondent's dismissal was void and inoperative."}}, {"text": "December 4, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24664, "end_char": 24680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "60 of the Code\n\nQf Civil Procedure and to the decision of the Federal 'Court in Tara Chand Pandit's case('), and it was also noticed that following on the remit of the case to the Judicial Commissioner by the order of the Federal Court, dated December 4, 1941, the respondent had Obtained a decree for payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "6th August, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24936, "end_char": 24952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the appeal came before the Board for further hearing their Lordships on the 6th August, 1948, caused a letter to be addressed to the solicitor representing the appellant, informing him that their Lordships now proposed humbly to advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and stating that the order as to costs would not be varied."}}, {"text": "[1947] F.C.R. 89", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25836, "end_char": 25852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tiu Slat< of Bika", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25855, "end_char": 25872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tiu Slat< of Bika, v.\n\nAbdul Maiid."}}, {"text": "Abdul Maiid", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25878, "end_char": 25889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tiu Slat< of Bika, v.\n\nAbdul Maiid.", "canonical_name": ".Abdul Majid"}}, {"text": "November 4, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27918, "end_char": 27934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, it must be assumed that in spite of their decision in I. M. Lall's case('), their Lordships in this case, the judgment in which was delivered subsequent to the decision in /. M. La/l's case('), on November 4, 1948, did not reaffirm the propositioru\n\n(I) [1947] F.C.R. 89."}}, {"text": "[1947] F.C.R. 89", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27975, "end_char": 27991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28292, "end_char": 28302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28306, "end_char": 28333, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fraser", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29863, "end_char": 29869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fSee Fraser's Constitutional Law, page 126; Chalmer's Constitntional Law:\n\npage 186; Shenton v. Smit!i (2 ) ; Dunn v. T!ie Queen( 3 ) }."}}, {"text": "Chalmer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29902, "end_char": 29909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fSee Fraser's Constitutional Law, page 126; Chalmer's Constitntional Law:\n\npage 186; Shenton v. Smit!i (2 ) ; Dunn v. T!ie Queen( 3 ) }."}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30051, "end_char": 30062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30065, "end_char": 30076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31059, "end_char": 31086, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31089, "end_char": 31100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31108, "end_char": 31137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British India immediately before the commencement of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31173, "end_char": 31233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 100 to 104", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31321, "end_char": 31340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India immediately before the commencement of the Act", "statute": "British India immediately before the commencement of the Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31348, "end_char": 31377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31489, "end_char": 31505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31565, "end_char": 31592, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "is clear therefore that the Indian Legislatures were conferred by the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31638, "end_char": 31737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "These provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31884, "end_char": 31937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31997, "end_char": 32008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "These provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32048, "end_char": 32058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "These provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure which has the sanction of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32066, "end_char": 32149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32205, "end_char": 32216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure which has the sanction of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure which has the sanction of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Ridge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32663, "end_char": 32668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Ridge's Constitutional Law, eighth edition, page 295, and Fraser's Constitutional Law, page 164)."}}, {"text": "Ireland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33867, "end_char": 33874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nclaim was in respect of the amount of salary due to him as Master of the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland. ("}}, {"text": "Robertson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33877, "end_char": 33886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Robertson's Civil Proceedings by or against the Crown, page 338)."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34052, "end_char": 34079, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34200, "end_char": 34209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India, from the earliest times, the mode of procedure to proceed against the Crown has been laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure and the procedure of , petition of right was never adopted in this country, and the same seems to have been the rule in Australia and other Colonies."}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34230, "end_char": 34240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Judiciary Act, 1903", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34248, "end_char": 34267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34550, "end_char": 34565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nv. .Abdul Majid.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBihar"}}, {"text": ".Abdul Majid", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34570, "end_char": 34582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nv. .Abdul Majid.", "canonical_name": ".Abdul Majid"}}, {"text": "Government of the Colony", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34749, "end_char": 34773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "38, the Government of the Colony is liable to be sued in an action of tort as well as in contract."}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34840, "end_char": 34850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Judiciary Act, 1903", "statute": "the Judiciary Act, 1903"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1858", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34858, "end_char": 34887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35115, "end_char": 35131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It provided that \"all persons and bodies politic shall and\n\nmay have and take the same suits, remedies and proceedings legal and equitable, against the Secretary of State in Council of India as they could have done against the said company\" (the East India Company)."}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35187, "end_char": 35205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It provided that \"all persons and bodies politic shall and\n\nmay have and take the same suits, remedies and proceedings legal and equitable, against the Secretary of State in Council of India as they could have done against the said company\" (the East India Company)."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35230, "end_char": 35240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1858", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1858"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35248, "end_char": 35277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35415, "end_char": 35434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section (2) of that section ran as follows :- shall have the same remedies \"Every person against the Secretary have had against the Government of India been passed.\""}}, {"text": "State in Council as he might East India Company if the Act, 1858", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35453, "end_char": 35517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 176(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35562, "end_char": 35576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State in Council as he might East India Company if the Act, 1858", "statute": "State in Council as he might East India Company if the Act, 1858"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35584, "end_char": 35613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure from 1859", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36300, "end_char": 36333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36407, "end_char": 36417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure from 1859", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure from 1859"}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37310, "end_char": 37321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "ARKA PRASAD LAXMI NARAIN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37335, "end_char": 37359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DW ARKA PRASAD LAXMI NARAIN\n\nti."}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37370, "end_char": 37392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND\n\nTWO OTHERS."}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37438, "end_char": 37447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HAsAN and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37449, "end_char": 37460, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "GHULAM HAsAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37462, "end_char": 37474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HAsAN and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37479, "end_char": 37492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HAsAN and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37499, "end_char": 37520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37522, "end_char": 37533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Clause 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37546, "end_char": 37557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37849, "end_char": 37857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38433, "end_char": 38441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_803_817_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 803\n\nhands of the Crown has been made subject to the writ of civil court. It can be seized in execution of a decree attached. It is thus difficult to see on what grounds the claim that the Crown cannot be sued for arrears of salary directly by the civil servant, though his creditor can take it, can be based or substained.\n\nWhat could be claimed in England by a petition of right can be claimed in this country by ordinary process.\n\nFor the reasons given above we are of the opinion that this appeal is without force and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : & H. D/zebar.\n\nAgent for the respondent : S. P. Varma.\n\nMESSRS. DW ARKA PRASAD LAXMI NARAIN\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND\n\nTWO OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HAsAN and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 19(1) (g), 19 (6)-Clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953, tuhether ultra vires the Constitution.\n\nA law or order which confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power upon the executive in the matter of regulating trade or business in normally available commodities must be held to be un~ reasonable.\n\nUnder\n\ncl. 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953, the licensing authority has been given absolute power , 1 to grant or refuse to grant, rener or refuse to enew, suspend, revoke, cancel or modify any licence under this Order and the only thing he has to do is to record reasons for the action he takes.\n\nNot only so, the power could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller may choose to delegate the same, and the choice can be made in favour of any and every person. Such provisions cannot be held to be reasonable :\n\nHeld, therefore that the provision of cl. 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953, must be held to be void as\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nAbdul Majid.\n\nMahajan C. ].\n\nJanuary 11.\n\nMessrs. Dwarka\n\nPrasad Laxmi\n\nNarain\n\nThe il°late of Ultar Pradesh and\n\nTwo Others.\n\nimposing an unreasonable restriction upon the freedom of trade and business guaranteed under art. 19 (I ) (g) of the Constitution and not coming within the protection afforded by cl. ( 6) of the ; i, rticle.\n\nYick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U.S. 356 at 373) referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JuRismcnoN : Petition No. 326 of 1953.\n\nOriginal Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India.\n\nS. C. Isaacs (S. K. Kapur, with him) for the petitioners.\n\nH. /. U mri gar for the respondents.\n\n1954. January 11. The 'Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J .-This is an application presented by the petitioners under article 32 of the Constitution, complaining of infraction of their fundamental rights guaranteed under article 14 and clauses (f) and (g) of article 19 ( 1) of the Constitution and praying for enforcement of the same by issue of writs in the nature of mandamus.\n\nTo appreciate the contentions that have been raised on behalf of the petitioners, it would be necessary to give a short narrative of the material facts.\n\nThe petitioners are a firm of traders who had, prior to the cancellation of their licence, been carrying on the business of retail sellers of coal at a coal depot held by them in the town of Kanpur.\n\nIt is said that the District Magistrate of Kanpur as well as the District Supply Officer, who figure respectively as respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in the petition, had been for a considerable time past issuing directives from time to time upon the petitioners as well as other coal depot holders of the town, imposing restrictions of various kinds upon the sale of coal, soft coke, etc. It is stated that . prior to the 14th of February, 1953, the prices that were fixed by the District Officers left the coal dealers a margin of 20 per cent porfit upon the sale of soft coke and 15 per cent profit on the sales of hard coke and steam coal, . such profits being allowed on the landed costs of the goods up to the depot. The landed costs\n\ncomprised several items and besides ex-colliery price, the middleman's commission and the railway freight, there were incidental expenses of various kin\\ls including labour duty, loading and unloading charges, cartage and stacking expenses. After making a total of these cost elements, an allowance was given for shortage of weight at the rate of 5 mds. and odd seers per ton in the case of soft coke and 3 mds. and odd seers in the case of hard coke and steam coal, and it was on the basis of the net weight thus arrived at that the price was calculated. On the 14th of February, 1953, the District Supply Officer issued a directive reducing the selling prices of coke, coal, etc., much below the existing rates.\n\nThis reduction was effected in a three-fold manner. In the first place, the allowance for shortage of weight was made much less than before ; second! y, a sum of Rs. 4-12-0 only was allowed for all the incidental expenses, and thirdly, the margin of profit was cut down to 10 per cent. On the 22nd of May, 1953, a representative petition was filed by seven colliery depot holders of Kanpur including the present petitioners challenging the validity of the executive order, dated the 14th of February, 1953, mentioned above inter alia on the ground that it infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners under articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.\n\nThere was an application for ad interim .stay in connection with this petition which came up for hearing before the learned Vacation Judge of this court on the 1st of July,\n\n1953. On that day an undertaking was given by the State of Uttar Pradesh to the effect that they would withdraw the order of the 14th February, '.1953, and apparently the consideration that weighed with the State in giving this undertaking was that it was a purely executive order without any legislative sanction behind it. The order of the 14th February was in fact withdrawn, but on the 10th of July, 1953, the State of Uttar Pradesh promulgated. by a notification an order intituled \"The Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953\" purporting to act in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by _section 3(2) of the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, read with the notified order of the Government of India issued under\n\nMessrs. Dwarka\n\nPrasad Laxmi\n\nNarain v.\n\nThe Stale of Uttar Pradesh aM\n\nTwo Others.\n\nMukhtrjea ] .. •\n\nMtssrs. Dwarka\n\nPraJad Laxmi\n\nNarain\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and Two Others.\n\nMukh•r.J'a J.\n\nsection 4 of the Act. As the constitutionality of this Coal Control Order is the main object of attack by the petitioners in the present proceeding, it would be convenient to set out the material provisions of the order in respect of which the controversy between the parties primarily centers :\n\n\"THE UTTAR PRADESH COAL CoNTROL\n\nORDER, 1953.\n\n2. In this Order unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context\n\n(a) \"Coal\" includes coke but does not include cinder and ashes.\n\n( c) \"The Licensing Authority\" means the District Magistrate of the District or any other officer authorised by him to perform his functions under this Order and includes the District Supply Officer of the district. ( d) \"Licensee\" means a person holding a licence under the provisions of this Order in Form 'A' or in Form 'B'.\n\n3. (1) No person shall stock, sell, store for sale or utilise coal for burning bricks or shall otherwise dispose of coal in this State except under a licence in Form 'A' or 'B' granted under this Order or in accordance with the provisions of this Order.\n\n(2) Nothing contained in sub-clause (1)-\n\n(a) Shall in so far as it relates to taking out a licence for stocking or storing coal for their own consumption, apply to the stocks held by persons or undertakings obtaining coal on permits of the District Magistrate or the State Coal Controller for their own consumption.\n\n(b) Shall apply to any person or class of persons exempted from any provision of the above sub-dame by the State Coal Controller, to the extent of their exemption.\n\n4. (1) Every application for licence under this Order shall be made in the form given in Schedule I appended to this Order. ·\n\n(2) A licence granted under this Order shall be in Form 'A' or Form 'B' appended to this Order and the holder of a licence granted under this Order shall comply with any directions that may be issued to him by the Licensing Authority in regard to the purchase, sale, storage or distribution of coal.\n\n(3) The Licensing Authority may grant, refuse to grant, renew or refuse to renew a licence and may suspend, cancel, revoke or modify any licence or any terms thereof granted by him under the Order for reasons to be recorded. Provided that every power which is under this Order exercisable by the Licensing Authority shall also be exercisable by the State Coal Controller or any person authorised by him in this behalf.\n\n7. The State Coal Controller may by written order likewise require any person holding stock of coal to sell the whole or any part of the stock to such person or class of persons and on such terms and prices as may be determined in accordance with the provisions of clause (8).\n\n8. (1) No licensee in Form 'B' and no person acting on his behalf shall sell, agree to sell or offer for sale, coal at a price exceeding the price to be declared by the Licensing Authority in accordance with the formula given in Schedule III.\n\n(2) A licensee in Form 'A' or any other person holding stock of coal or any other person acting for or on behalf of such licensees or person transferring or disposing of such stocks to any person in accordance with clause 6 or clause 7 shall not charge for the coal a price exceeding the landed cost, plus incidental and handling charges, plus an amount not exceeding 10\n\nper cent of the landed cost as may be determined by the Licensing Authority or the State Coal Controller.\n\nExplanations :-( 1) Landed cost means the excolliery price of the coal plus the L.D.C.C. and Bihar Sales tax plus middleman's commission actually paid and railway freight.\n\nMessrs. Dwarlca\n\nPrasad Laxmi\n\nNarain v.\n\nThe Staie of Uttar Pradesh and\n\nTwo Others.\n\nMukherJea. J.\n\nMems. Dwarka\n\nPrasad Laxmi\n\nNarain\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and\n\nTwo Othtrs.\n\nMukMrjea J.\n\n(2) Incidental and handling charges mean the cost of unloading from wagons, transporting to stacking site, unloading at the stacking site, plus godown rent, plus choukidari cliarges, if any, not exceeding Rs. 8-8-0 per ton as may be determined by the Licensing Authority or the State Coal Controller according to local conditions.\n\n11. The District Magistrate shall within a week of the commencement of this Order prepare and publish in a local paper a list of persons carrying on the business of sale of coal in his district and upon the publication of the list, the persons included therein will be deemed for purposes of this Order to be licensee until three months next following the publication of the list in Form A or B as may be specified.\n\n12. If any person contravenes any of the provisions of this Order, or the conditions of licence granted thereunder, he shall be punishable under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both and without prejudice to any other punishment to which he may be liable ........ \"\n\nSchedule III referred to in the Order is as follows :\n\nSCHEDULE III.\n\n(Formula for declaration of prices of soft coke/hard coke/steam coal).\n\nEx-colliery Price\n\nL.D.C.C. and Bihar Sales tax 3.\n\nMiddleman's commission\n\nRailway freight 5.\n\nIncidental and handling charges including\n\n(i) Unloading from wagons.\n\n(ii) Transport upto premises of stacking\n\n(iii) Unloading and stacking at the premises or depot.\n\nActuals.\n\nActuals.\n\nActuallv paid subject to the maximum'Iaid down under clause 6 of the Government of India\n\nColliery Control Order, 1g45.\n\nActuals.\n\nMaximum of Rs. 8-8-o per ton aa\n\nmay be determined by the Licensing Authority according to local conditions, provided that at places which are\" extraordinarily distant from the railway head a higher rate may be a_llowed by the Licensing Autho rity.\n\n(iv) Godown rent and chaukidari\n\ncharges, if any\n\n(v) \\.Yeigl1ing charg, s, if any.\n\nLocal taxes Octroi, etc.\n\nShortage\n\nProfit\n\nActuals.\n\n1\\1ot exceding ~~! maunds per ton in the case of soft coke and 2~ maunds in the case of hard coke and stf'am coal as mav be determin..:d by the Licensing Authority.\n\nAt 10 per cent on total items 1 to 6\n\nabov;: except item No. 5.\n\nIt is said that on the 16th of July, 1953, the respondmt No. 2 issued a declaration whereby he fixed\n\nthe retail rates for the sale of soft coke, coal, etc. at precisely the same figures as they stood in the directive issued on the 14th of February, 1953. The result, according . to the petitioners, was that the selling prices were reduced so much that it was not possible for the coal traders to carry on their business at all. In accordance with the provision of clause 11 of the Control Order set out above, the petitioners' name appeared in the lis\\ of B licence holders and they did apply for a licence in the proper form as required by clause (4). The licence, it is said, was prepared, though not actually delivered over to the petitioners.\n\nBy a letter dated the 3rd of October, 1953, the Area Rationing Officer, Kanpur,. accused t11e petitioners of committing a number of irregularities in connection with the carrying on of the coal depot. The charges mainly were that there were two other depots held and financed by the petitioners themselves in the names of different persons and that the petitioners had entered into agreements for sale of coal at more than the fixed rates. The petitio'.1ers submitted an explanation which was not .considered to be satisfactorv and bv an order elated the 13t:1 of October, 1953; the District Supply Officer, Kanpur, cancelled the petitioners' licence.\n\nIn the present petition the petitioners have challenged the valiclitv of the Coal Control Order of the 10th of July, 1953, the declaration of prices made on the 16th of July following and also the order cancelling tf1e eti tioners' licence on the 13th of October, 1953. 15-95 s. c. I./59\n\nMeJsrr. Dworka\n\nPrasad Laxmi\n\n, h'Orain\n\nTht State of Uttar PradeJh atid\n\nTwo Others.\n\nMuAherjea J.\n\nl954\n\nMessrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi\n\n}larairi\n\n\"· The Stale of Uttar Pradesh and\n\nTw1 Others.\n\nMuk lerjea 1,\n\nThe constitutional validity of the littar Pradesh Coal Control Order has been assailed before us substantially on the ground that its provisions vest an unfettered and unguided discretion in the licensing authority or tl1e State Coal Controller in the matter of granting or revoking licenses, in fixing prices of coal and imposing conditions upon the traders ; and these arbitrary powers cannot only be exercised by the officers themselves but may be delegated at their option to any person they like. It is argued t'.lat these provisions imposing as they do unreasonable rt strictions upon the right of the petitioners to carry on their trade and business conflict with their fundamental rights under article 19 ( 1) (g) of the Constitution and are hence void. With regard to the order oated the 16th of July, 1953, by which the prices of coke, coal, etc. were fixed, it is pointed out that it was not only made in exercise of the arbitrary pow.er onferred upon the licensing authority by the Coal Control Order, but the prices as fixed, are palpably discriminatory as would appear from comparing them with the prices fixed under the very same Control Order in other places within the State of Uttar Pra( esh like Allahabad, Lucknow and Aligarh. The order of the 13th October, 1953, cancelling the petitioners' licence is challenged on the ground that the charges made against the petitioners were vague and indefinite and '.hat the order was mde with the ulterior object of driving the petitioners out of the coal business altogether. It is said further that as a resuit of the cancellation order, the petitioners have bern made incapable of disposing of the stocks already in their possession, though at the same time the holding of such stock after the cancellation of their licwce has become an offence under the Coal Control Order.\n\nIt is not disputed before us that coal is an essential commodity under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946, and by virtue of the delegation of powers by the Central Government to the Provincial Government under section 4 of the Act, t1ie Uttar Pradeslf Government was competent to make proviiohs, by notified order, for regulating the supply and\n\ndistribution of coal in such a way as they considered proper with a view to secure the objects as specified in section 3 of the Act. All that is necessary is that these proYisions should not infringe the fundamental rights of the citizens guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and if they impose restrictions upon the carrying on of trade or business, they must be reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the general public as laid down in article 19 ( 6) of the Constitution.\n\nNobody can dispute that for ensuring equitable distribution of commodities considered essential to the community and their availability at fair prices, it is quite a reasonable thing to regulate sale of these commodities through licensed vendors to whom quotas are allotted in specified quantities and who are not permitted to sell them beyond the prices that are fixed by the con trolling authorities. The power of granting or withholding licences or of fixing the prices of the goods would necessarily have to be vested in certain public officers or bodies and they would certainly have to be left with some amount of discretion in these matters. So far no exception can be taken ; but the mischief a.rises when the power conferred on such officers is an arbitrary power unregulated by any rule or principle and it is left entirely to the discretion of particular persons to do anything they like without any check or control by any higher authority. A law or order, which .confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power upon the executive in the matter of regulating trade or business in normally available commodities cannot but be held to be unreasonable. As has been held by this court in Chintamon v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('), the phrase \"reasonable restriction\" connotes that the limitation imposed upon a person in enjoyment of a right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public.\n\nLegislation, which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right, cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness, and unless it strikes a proper bala•1ce between the freedom guaranteed under\n\n(1) [1950] S. C.R. 759,\n\nJ954\n\nMessrs, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi\n\nNarain\n\n\"· The State of Uttar Pradesh anti\n\nTwo Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMessrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi\n\nNarain\n\nThe Stale of Uttar Pradesh and Two Others.\n\nMukh\"i•• J.\n\narticle 19 ( 1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause ( 6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting in reasonableness. It is in the light of these principles that we would proceed to examine the provisions of this Control Order, the validity of which has been impugned before us on behalf of the petitioners.\n\nThe provision contained in clause 3( 1) of the Order that \"no person shall stock, sell, store for sale m otherwise utilise or dispose of coal except under a licence granted under this Order\" is quite unexceptional as a general provision ; in fact, that is the primary o':ject which the Control Order is intended to serve.\n\nThere are two exceptions engrafted upon this general rule: the first is laid down in sub-clause (2) (a) and to tl11t no objection has been or can be taken.\n\nThe Second exception, which is embodied in subclause (2) (b) has been objected to by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners,. This exception provides that nothing in clause 3 (1) shall apply to any person or class of persons exempted from any provision of the above sub-clause by the State Coal Controller, to the extent of such exemption. It will be seen that the Control Order nowhere indicates what the grounds for exemjXion are, nor have any rules been framed on this point. An unrestricted power has been given to the State Co:1trolkr to make exemptions, and even if he acts arbitrarily or from improper motives, .there is no check over it ancl no way of obtaining redress.\n\nClause 3 (2) (b) of the Control Order seems to us, therefore, prim a facie to be unreasonable.\n\nV.l e agree, however, with Mr. Umrigar that this portion of the Control Order, even though bad, is severable from the rest and we are not really concerned with the validity or otherwise of this provision in the present case as no action taken under it is the subject matter of any complaint before us.\n\nThe more formidable objection has been taken on bel11lf of the petitioners against clause 4 (3) of the Coctrol.\n\nOrder which relates to the granting and refusing of licences. The licensing authority has been\n\ngivn absolute power to grant or refuse to grant, renew or refuse to renew, suspend, revoke, cancel or\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REi•Cmrs 813\n\nmodify any licence under this Order and the only thing he has to do is to record reasons for the action he takes. Not only so, the power could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller may choose to delegate the same, and the choice can be made in favour of any and every person. It seems to us that such provision cannot be held to be reasonable.\n\nNo rules have been framed and no directions given on these matters to regulate or guide the discretion of the l, nsing officer.\n\nPractically the Order commits to 'M'f1e unrestrained will of a single individual the power\n\n\\;.to grant, withhold or cancel licences in any way he\n\nchooses and there is nothing in the Order which could ensure a proper execution of the power or operate as a check upon injustice that might result from improper execution of the same. Mr. Umrigar contends that a sufficient safeguard has been provided against any abuse of power by reason of the fact that the licensing authority has got to record reasons for what he does.\n\nThis safeguard, in our opinion, is hardly effective ; for there is no higher authority prescribed in the Order who could examine the propriety of these reasons and revise or review the decision of the subordinate officer. The\n\nre:>sons, therefore, which are required to be recorded are only for the personal or subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority and not for furnishing any remedy to the aggrieved person. It was pointed out and with perfect propriety by Mr. Justice Matthews in the well-known American case of Yic!( Wo v.\n\nHopkins('), that the action or non-action of officers placed in such position may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favouritism and other improper influences and motives which are easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, and consequently the injustice capable of being wrought under cover of such unrestricted power becomes apparent to every man, without the necessity of detailed investigation. In our opinion, the provision of clause 4 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order must be held to be void as imposing an unreasonable restriction upon the freedom\n\n(1) 118 U. S .. 356 at 373.\n\n;954\n\nMessrs. Dwarka\n\nPrasad Laxmi\n\nNttrain\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and\n\nTwo Others.\n\nMeJ,· rs. Dwark4\n\nPro rad Laxmi\n\nNarain\n\nT:.e State of Uttar Pradesh and\n\nT:vo Other1.\n\nMukherj•a ].\n\nof trade and business guaranteed under article 19 ( 1)\n\n(g) of the Constitution and not coming within the protection afforded by clause ( 6) of the article.\n\nAs this provision forms an integral part of the entire structure of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, the order cannot operate properly unless the provision of clause 4 (3) is brought in conformity with the constitutional requirements indicated above. The licence of the petitioners having been cancelled in pursuance with the above clause of the Control Order, Sit• cancellation itself should be held to be ineffective an~.,,' it is not necessary for us to enquire further whether or not the grounds upon which the licensing authority purported to act were vague or idefinite or could constitute proper grounds for cancellation.\n\nThe two other clauses of the Control Order to which exception has been taken on behalf of the petitioners are clauses (7) and (8). Clause (7) empowers the State Coal Controller to direct, by written order, any person holding stock of coal to sell the whole or any part of the stock to such person or class of persons and on such terms and prices as may be determined in accordance with the provision of clause (8). Clause 8 (1) provides that no licensee in Form 'B' shall sell o; agree\n\nto sell coal at a price exceeding the price to be declared by the licensing authority in accordance with the formula given in Schedule III. With regard to both these clauses, the contention of the petitioners' counsel, in substance, is that the formula for determining the price, as laid down in Schedule Ill, is per se unreasonable as it is made dependent on the exercise of an unfettered and uncontrolled discretion by the licensing authority.\n\nAn unfair determination of the price by the licensing authority, it is argued, would be totally destructive of the business of the coal traders and the grievance of the petitioners is that that is exactly what has been done by the declaration of prices made on the 16th of July, 1953.\n\nWe have examined the formula given in Schedule Ill to the Control Order with some care and on the materials that have been actually placed before us, we are\n\nnot in a position to say that the formula is unreasonable. The prices, as said already, are calculated on the basis of the landed costs of coke and coal up to the depot, to which a profit of 10 per cent is added.\n\nThe landed costs comprise seven items in all which are enumerated in Schedule III. With regard to items !, .. 2, 3, 4 and (j of the Schedule the actual costs are taken into account and to that no objection can possibly be taken. The entire dispute is with regard to incidental .-. cjxl!fges specified in item 5 and the allowance for \" hortage which forms item 7.\n\nSo far as incidental charges are concerned, the Schedule allows a maximum of Rs. 8-8-0 per ton to be determined by the licensing authority according to local conditions.\n\nThe rates undoubtedly vary according to local conditions and some amount of discretion must have to be left in such cases to the local authorities. The discretion given to the licensing authority in fixing these rates is, however, not an unlimited discretion, but has got to be exercised with reference to the condition prevalent in the locality with which the local officers must be presumed to be familiar. The grievance of the petitioners is that in the declaration of 16th of July, 1953, the licensing authority allowed incidental chrges 011ly at the rate of Rs. 4-12-0 per ton and that is grossly unfair.\n\nIt is pointed out that at Lucknow, Aligarh, Allahabad and other places much higher rates were allowed, though the local conditions of these places are almost identical ; and there has been consequently a discrimination in this respect which makes the declaration void altogether. The statements that have\n\n'1 •' I.\n\nbeen made by the petitioners in this connection are not supported by any affidavit of any person who is familiar with the local conditions in the other places\n\nand on the materials that we have got here we are unable to say that the rates fixed by the licensing authority of Kanpur are really discriminatory. It is certain! y not open to us to substitute our own determination in the matter of fixing the prices for that of the licensing authority and provided we are satisfied that the discretion that has been vested in a public officer Js not an uncontrolled discretion an@ no unfair\n\nMessrs. Dwarka\n\nPraJad Laxmi\n\nNarain v. 1 he State of Uttar Pradesh and Two Others.\n\nMukhtrjea J.\n\n!954\n\ni-r1.t,.srs. Dwuta\n\nPrasasd L12xmi\n\nNarain\n\nThe Stale of Utto.r Pradesh and\n\nTwo Othtrs.\n\nMukl\"1i•• J.\n\ndiscrimination has resulted from the exercise of it, we cannot possibly raham (9 M.I.A. 199) relied upon.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 155 of 1953.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 15th July, 1953, of the Election Tribunal, Nagpur, in Election Petition No. 3 of 1952.\n\nB. Sen and T P. Naik for the appellant.\n\nVeda Vyas (S. K. Kapur with him) for respondent No. 1. 1954.\n\nFebruary\n\n15. The Judgment of th<' Court was defo ere.cl by BosE J.-This is an appeal against a decision of the Nagpur Election Tribunal.\n\nThe contest before • the tribunal was about two seats rn the Bhandara Parliamentary Constimency.\n\nThe elections were held on five days in December, 1951, and January, 1952.\n\nThirteen candidates filed nomination papers among them the petitioner.\n\nOf these, six contested the seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes.\n\nOne of these was Gangaram Thaware who has since died.\n\nThe Scheduled Caste in question is the Mahar caste.\n\nObjection was taken to Thaware's nomination for the reserved seat on the ground that he was not a Mahar.\n\nIt is admitted that he was born a Mahar, but later in life he joined the Mahanubhava Pantli.\n\nThis, according to the appellant, is a sect which does not believe in caste, and alternativdv that it forms a separate caste in itself.\n\nThe contention was that when Gangaram Thaware joined the Panth he ceased to be a member of the Mahar caste.\n\nThe objection succeeded and his nomination was rejected.\n\nThe nomination of another Scheduled Caste camli- .datc was also rejected and five others were withdrawn before the election, among them was the present petitioner.\n\nThat left six candidates of whom three were eligible for the reserved seat.\n\nThe two who were elected were Tularam Sakhare, for the Scheduled Caste seat, and Chaturbhuj J asani, for the general seat.\n\nJasani's election was challenged -0n the ground that he was subject to the disqualifications set out in section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act (Act XLIII of 1951) as he \\Yas interested in a contract for the supply of goods to the Central Government.\n\nThe Election Tribunal held that the rejection of Gangaram Thaware's nomination was improper as he\n\ncontinued to be a member of the Mahar caste despite his conversion to the tenets of the Mahanubhava Panth.\n\nIt also held that Chaturbhuj J asani had a <:ontract with the Central Government, so he was disqualified.\n\nAccordingly it set aside the whole election.\n\nWe will deal with Chaturbhuj Jasani's election first.\n\nSection 7 ( d) is in these terms: \"A person shall be dissqualified for being chosen as, and for being, .a member etc.\n\n* * * *\n\nChatturhhuj Vithaldas Jasani v.\n\nMoreshwar Parashram and Others.\n\nBose].\n\nChattwbhuj Vithaldas\n\nJasani\n\nMoreshwar Parashram and Ot/urs.\n\nBoseJ.\n\n( d) if. .. .. . hy himself ...... he has any share or interest in a contract for the supply of goods to ..... . the appropriate Government.\"\n\nChaturbhuj Jasani was, and still is, a partner in the firm of Moolji Sicka & Company, and it is said that at all material times the firm had a contract for the supply of bidis to the Government for the troops.\n\nMoolji Sicka & Company is a firm of bidi manufacturers.\n\nThe Central Government was interested in stocking and purchasing bidis for sale to its troops throngh its canteens.\n\nAccordingly, it placed two of the brands of bidis manufactured by this firm on its approved list and entered into an arrangement with the firm under which the firm was to sell, and the Government was to buy from the firm, from time to time, these two brands of bidis.\n\nIt was argued that this amounted to a contract for the supply of goods within the meaning of the section.\n\nIt was said that the contract was embodied in four letters.\n\nWe do not intend to analyse thee letters in detail here.\n\nIt is enough to say that in our opinion no binding engagement can be spelt out of them except to this extent: Moolji Sicka & Company undertook to sell to the canteen contractors only through the Canteen Stores and not direct and undertook to pay a commission on all sales.\n\nThis, in our opinion, constituted a continuing arrangement under which the Canteen Stores, i.e., the Government, would be entitled to the commission on all orders placed and accepted in accordance with the arrangement; and in fact the Canteen Stores did obtain a sum of Rs. 7,500 in satisfaction of a claim of this kind.\n\nThis money was paid long before the dates which are crucial here but the settlcmcnr illustrates that there was an arrangement of that nature and that it was a contmumg one.\n\nIn our opinion, it continued in being even after that and the mere fact that there was no occasion for any claim subsequent to the settlement • does not indicate that it was no longer alive. But except for this, the letters merely set out the terms on which the parties were ready to do business with\n\neach other if and when orders were placed and executed.\n\nAs soon as an order was placed and accepted a contract arose.\n\nIt is true this contract would be governed bv the terms set out in the letters but until an order as placed and accepted there was no contract.\n\nAlso, each separate order and acceptance constituted a different and distinct contract: see Rose and Fran!( Co. v. J. R. Crompton & Bros. Ltd.( 1).\n\nThe crucial dates with which we are concerned are 15th November, 1951, the last date for putting in the nominations, and 14th February, 1952, the date on which the results were declared. The section runs-\n\n\"A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as ...... n\n\nThe words which follow, \"and for being'', need not he considered as it is enough for our purposes to use only the former.\n\nNow the words of the section are \"shall be disqualified for being chosen.\" The choice is made by a series of steps starting with the nomination and ending with the announcement of the election. lt follows that if a disqualification attaches to a candidate at any one of these stages he cannot be chosen.\n\n The disqmlificatwn alleged in this case is that Chaturbhuj Jasani had an interest in a contract, ur a series 0£ contracts, for the supply of goods to the Central Government.\n\nHe hail this interest because the contracts were made with Moolji Sicka & Company, a firm of which Jasani is one of the partners.\n\nThe fact of partnership is admitted but the other facts are denied. \\Ve have therefore to see whether any contract for the supply of goods to Government by Moolji Sicka & Company existed at any time on or between the relevant dates.\n\nExhibit C is a tabular statement which sets out the dealings between the parties during certain months.\n\nIt is accepted as correct by both sides.\n\nThe following extracts from this statement show that Moolji Sicka & Company had an interest in a series of contracts for the sale of bidis to the Canteen Stores at and between the relevant dates .\n\n. (1) [1925] A.C. 445.\n\nC/iatturbh11i\n\nVithaldaS\n\nJasani v.\n\nMareshwar LParashram artd Others.\n\n~'.-.. :- Bose].\n\nChatturbhuj\n\nVilhaldas\n\nJasani v.\n\nMoreshwar Parashram and Others.\n\nBose].\n\nDate of ord<:>r Date of invoice Price of Date of by and goods pay- Canteen Stores Despatch supplied me-nt ---..\n\n8-10-1951 18-10-1951 Rs. 1 ,684-13-9 19-12-1951 8-10-1951 19-10-1951 3,373-9-3 d.:; 17-8-1951 26-10-1951\n\nI 2,662- 8-0 do 12-9-1951 26-10-1951 I l,426-14-6 do\n\nI 1-10-1951 26-10-1951 8,411-14-0 do 21-10-1951 30-11-1951\n\nIO, 125-2-9 do 9-8-1951 29-8-1951 25,812-12-0 24-12-1951 8-10-1951\n\n18-10-195 I 4,793-4-9 do 14-n-1951 22-11-1951 l ,887-9-9 5-1-1952 17-10-1951 8-J I-I 95 l 16,554-2-0 22-1-1952 12-11-1951 20-l 1-1951 4,205-15-0 do 13-12-1951 l0-1-1952 13,97,079-7-9 12-2-1952 14-1-1952 22-1-1952 1,691-11-9 do 21-12-1951 l0-1-1952 16,983-8-0 18-2-1952\n\n12-II-1951 22-n-1951 8,411-14-0 13-3-1952 9-1-1952 16-1-1952 5,888-4-9 do 23-1-1952 28-1-1952 8,411-14-0 20-3-1 <)52\n\nThis statew.ent reveals that various contracts aggregating Rs. 15,39,345-6-0 less some small sums for railway freight, were outstanding at one time or another between the two crucial dates and that payments in discharge of these liabilities were made at various dates between 15th November, 1951, and 20th March, 1952.\n\nIt also shows that orders were placed and accepted for goods priced at Rs. 84,659-14-3 before 15th November, 1951, and that payment was not made till after that date.\n\nTherefore, on 15th November, 1951, goods worth Rs. 84,659-14-3 had still to be paid for.\n\nThen between 15th November, 1951, and 14th February, 1952, further orders for goods v:ilued at Rs. 39,695-8-9 were placed and accepted and they were not paid for till after 14th February, 1952.\n\nIt was argued that there is nothing to show that the goods were not supplied before 15th November, 1951, and before 14th February, 1952.\n\nIt was said on behalf of the appellant that these are the only dates which are crucial, so if Moolji Sicka & Company had fully\n\nexecuted their part of the contracts before the two crucial dates the disqualification would not apply.\n\nThat raises these questions: (1) Does a person who has fully executed his part of a contract continue to have an interest in it till the goods are paid for?; and\n\n(2) were these contracts fully executed so far as Moolji Sicka & Company's part was concerned?\n\nThe parties are not agreed about this, so it will now be necessary to examine their letters in detail to determine the terms of the various contracts.\n\nThe correspondence discloses that the Canteen Stores and Moolij Sicka & Company dealt with each .,. -Other from time to time under various arrangements which ,!hey called \"systems\".\n\nThe earliest letter we have about the transactions between these parties is one dated 30th March, 1951.\n\nIt shows that the \"system\" which they called the \"Direct Supply System\" was in use at that time The .details of the \"system\" are set out in an order dated 17th April, 1951.\n\nUnder it Moolji Sicka & Company had to send supplies of bidis direct to the Canteen Stores contractors as and when ordered.\n\nThe value of the goods so supplied was to be recovered from the .contractors direct and the Canteen Stores were to he informed of the sales and were to be paid a certain .comm1ss1on.\n\nThis led to some friction and in their letter of 30th March. 1951,. the Canteen Stores complain that information about some of the sales to the contractors had been suppressed with the result that the Canteen Stores lost their c.ommission.\n\nMoolji Sicka & Company replied to this on 24th April, 1951, and suggested a slight change in the system, namely that all orders for the goods should in future be placed through the Canteen Stores and that there should be no dealings with the contractors direct except to supply them with the goods ordered by the Canteen stores; then, they said, there would be no complaint about their having been kept in the dark.\n\nThis appears to have been agreed to because such of the subsequent orders as arc on record were placed by the Canteen Stores.\n\nChatturhhuj\n\nVithaldas Jasani. v.\n\nMoreshwar Parashram and Others.\n\nBose J.\n\nChatturhhuj\n\nVithaldas\n\n:Ja.1an1\n\nMore.Jltwcu Parashram and Other.J\".\n\nBose].\n\nThe or.: v. Truscott( 1 ) is nearer the language of our Act.\n\nHe hesitatingly proceeded on the debtor and . creditor basis.\n\nWe need not go further than this because, as we have said, if these decisions cannot be distinguished, then we must with respect differ. We hold therefore that these contracts which Moolji Sicka & Company had entered into with the Government subsisted on 15th November, 1951, and on 14th February, 1952, and that as Chatturbhuj Jasani, the appellant, was a partner in the firm he also had both a share and an interest in them on the crucial dates.\n\nThat brings us to article 299(1) of me Constitution.\n\nIt states:- \"All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President. ..... and all such contracts ... made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President ... by such persons and in 'uch manner as he may direct or authorise.\"\n\nThe contention was that as these contracts were not expressed to be made by the President they are void.\n\nCases were cited to us under the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935.\n\nCertain sections in these Acts were said to be similar to article 299. We do not think that they are, but in any case the rulings under section 30(2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, as amended bv the Government of India Act of 1919 disclose a diffrence of opinion. Thus, Krishnaji Nilkant v. Secretary of State(') ruled that comracrs with the Secretary of State must be by a deed executed 011 behalf of the Secretary of State for India and in his\n\nname.\n\nThey cannot be made by correspondence or orally.\n\nSecretary ot State v. Bhagwandas(') and Devi Prasad Sri Krishna Prasad Ltd. v. Secretary of State(') held they could be made by correspondence. Secretary of State v.\n\nO.T. Sarin & Company(') took an intermediate view and held that though contracts in the prescribed form could not be enforced by either side,\n\n(1) 21 T.L.R. 319. (>) A.LR. 1937 Born. 449, 451.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1938 Born. 168.\n\nI08\n\n(4) A.LR. i941 A\\\\. 377.\n\n(5) I.L.R. 11Lah. 375.\n\n195+\n\nC/, alturbhtd\n\nVithaldas\n\nJasani .,, Mores11war\n\nParas/, ram and Other:..\n\nBose].\n\nChatturb,'1uj\n\nVit'ialdas\n\n]asani -,, J.\\{oreshwar\n\nPar ashram nr.d Others.\n\na claim for compensation under section 70 of the Indian Contract Act would lie. Province of Bengal v. S. L.\n\nPuri(') took a strict view and held that even letter~ headed \"Government of India\" did not comply with the rule in section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThe Federal Court was called upon to construe section 40 (1) of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nIt held that the directions m n were only directory and not mandatory, and the same view was taken of article 166 (1) of the present Constitution by this court in Dattatreya Moreshtuar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay(').\n\nNone of these provisions is quite the same as article 299.\n\nFor example, in article 166, as also in section 40(1) of the Government of India Act of 1935, there is a clause which says that \"orders\" and \"instruments\" and \"other proceedings\" \"made\" and \"expressed\" in the name of the Governor or Governor-General in Cou'ilcil and \"authenticated\" in the manner prescribed shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an \"order\" or \"instrument\" etc. \"made\" or \"executed\" by the Governor or Governor-General in Council.\n\nIt was held that the provisions had to be read as a whole and when that was done it became evident that the intention of the legislature and the Constitution was to dispense with proof of the due \"making\" and \"execution\" when the form prescribed was followed but not to invalidate orders and instruments otherwise valid.\n\nArticle 299( 1) does not contain a similar clause, so we are unable to apply the same reasoning here.\n\nIn our opinion, this is a type of contract to which section 230(3) of the Indian Contract Act would apply.\n\nThis view obviates the inconvenience and injustice to innocent persons which the Federal Court felt in f. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. The King- Emperor(3) and at the same time protects Government.\n\nWe feel that some reasonable meaning must\n\n(1) ;;1 C.W.N. 753\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R. 612 at 63,, 633.\n\n(3) [1947] F.C.R. 141 at 156, 157\n\nbe attached to article 299 ( 1).\n\nWe do not think the provisions were inserted for the sake of mere form.\n\nWe feel they are there to safeguard Government against unauthorised contracts.\n\nIf in fact a contract is unauthorised or in excess of authority it is right that Government should be safeguarded.\n\nOn the other hand, an officer entering into a contract on behalf of Government can always safeguard himself by having recourse to the proper form.\n\nIn between is a large class of contracts, probably by far the greatest in numbers, which, though authorised, are for one reason or other not in proper form.\n\nIt is only right that an innocent contracting party should not suffer because of this and if there is no other defect or objection we have no doubt Government will always accept the responsibility.\n\nIf not, its interests are safeguarded as we think the Constitution intended that they should be.\n\nIn the present case, there can be no doubt that the Chairman of the Board of Administration acted on behalf of the Union Government and his authority to contract in that capacity was not questioned. There can equally be no doubt that both sides acted in the belief and on the assumption, which was also the fact, that the goods were intended for Government purposes, namely, amenities for the troops.\n\nThe only flaw is that the contracts were not in proper form and so, because of this purely technical defect, the principal could not have been sued.\n\nBut that is just the kind of case that section 230(3) of the Indian Contract Act is designed to meet. It would, in our opinion, be disastrous to hold that the hundreds of Government officers who have daily to enter into a variety of contracts, often of a petty nature, and sometimes in an\n\nemergncy, cannot contract orally or through correspondence and that every petty contract must be effected by a ponderous legal document couched in a parti- <:ular form.\n\nIt may be that Government will not be bound by the contract in that case, but that is a very different thing from saying that the contracts as such are void and of no effect.\n\nIt only means that the principal cannot be sued; hut we take it there would\n\nChat.urb.izy'\n\nVi.haldas\n\nJasani v.\n\nA1 ores/, wa1\n\nParashram and Ot.'iers.\n\nBou J.\n\n195t\n\nC , atturhhu}\n\nVitlial; fas\n\nJasani v.\n\nJ foreshwar Para1-hram and Ot '1ers,\n\nBose]\n\nbe nothing to prevent ratification, especially if that was for the benefit of Government.\n\nThere is authority for the view that when a Government officer acts in excess of au, hority Government is bound if it ratifies the excess: see The Collector of Masulipatam v.\n\nCavaly Venkata Narrainapah(' ).\n\nWe accordingly hold that the contracts in question here are not voici simply because the Union Government could not have been sued on them by reason of article 299 ( 1).\n\nNow section 7 ( d) of the Representation of the People Act does not require that the contracts at which it strikes should be enforceable against the Government; all it requires is that the contracts should be foe the supply of goods to the Government. The contracts in question are just that and so are hit by the section.\n\nThe purpose of the Act is to maintain the purity of the legislatures and to avoid a conflict between duty and interest.\n\nIt is obvious that the temptation to place interect before duty is just as great when there is likely to be some difficulty in recovering the money from Government (for example, if Government were to choose not to ratify the contracts) as when there is none.\n\nIn our opinion, the Election Tribunal was right in disqualifying Cbatturbhuj Jasani.\n\nWe now turn to Gangaram Thaware. He stood as a Scheduled Caste candidate and his nomination was rejected on the ground that he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste in question, namely the Mahars.\n\nThe only question here is whether he ceased to be a Mahar when he joined the Mahanubhava Panth. This gave rise to much controversy and we have been presented with many conflicting opinions.\n\nThus, the Imperial Gazetteer of India, Volume XXI, page 301, states that the founder of the sect repudiated the caste system as also a multiplicity of Gods and insisted on the monotheistic principle.\n\nAt the same time it says that he taught his disciples to eat with none but\n\n(1) 8 M.I.A. 529 at 554\n\nthe initiated and to break off all former ties of caste and religion.\n\nRussell in Volume IV of his Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces says that the Manbhaos (Mahanubhau) is a religious sect or order which has \"now\" (1911) become a caste.\n\nThe Central Provinces Ethnographic Survey, Volume IX, says the same thing at page 107 and at page 110 and adds that members of the sect often act as priests or gurus to the Mahars.\n\nAs against this, the Election Tribunal has quoted a number of opinions which tend the other way.\n\nThus, V. B. Kolte says at page 247 of his Shri Chandradhar Charitra that no serious attempt has been made by them to abolish caste, and Ketkar says at page 76, Volume XVIII of the 1926 edition of his Maha. rashtriya Dhnyankosh that there are two divisions among the Mahanubhavas, one of Sanyasis who renounce the world and the other a secular one. The latter observe the caste system and follow the ritmls of their own caste and cirry on social contacts with their caste people and marry among them. Similar views are expressed by Bal Krishna Mahanubhav Shastri.\n\nBut we are not really concerned with their theology.\n\nWhat we have to determine are the social and political consequences of such conversions and that, we feel, must be decided in a common sense practical way rather than on theoretical and theocratic grounds.\n\nConversion brings many complexities in its train, for it imports a complex composite composed of many ingredients.\n\nReligious beliefs, spiritual experience and emotion and intellectual conviction mingle with more material considerations such as severance of family and social ties and the casting off or retention of old customs and observances. The exact proportions of the mixture vary from person to person. At one extreme there is bigoted fanaticism bitterly hostile towards the old order and at the other an easy going laxness and tolerance which makes the convenion only nominal.\n\nThere is no clear cut dividing line and it is not a matter which can be viewed from only one angle.\n\nCf.attUrb'iu)\n\nVitkaldas\n\nJaasni\n\nv~ .\n\nMOreshwa'r\n\nPafashrr.im and Otaers.\n\nBose J.\n\nChauurb ;.j\n\nVit aldas\n\n]1JJani\n\nv Moru1War\n\nParas .ram and Ot.'ps.\n\nLooked at from tbe secular point of view, there are three factors which have to be considered:\n\n(1) the reactions of the old body, (2) the intentions of the individual himself and (3) the rules of the new order.\n\nIf the old order is tolerant of the new faith and sees no reason to outcaste or ex-communicate the convert and the individual himself desires and intends to retain his old social and political ties, the conversion is only nominal for all practical purposes and when we have to consider the legal and political rights of the old bodv the views of the new faith hardlv matter.\n\nThe new body is free to ostracise and outcaste the convert from its fold if he does not adhere to its tenets, but it can hardly claim tbe right to interfere in matters which concern the political rights of the old body when neither the old body nor the convert is seeking either legal or political favours from the new as opposed to purely spiritual advantage.\n\nOn the otber hand, if the convert has shown by his conduct and dealings that his break from the old order is so complete and final that he no longer regards himself as \" member of the old body and there is no reconversion and readmittance to the old fold, it would be wrong to hold that he can nevertheless claim temporal privileges and political advantages which are special to the old order.\n\nIn our opinion, broadly speaking, the principles laid down by the privv Council in the case of a Hindu convert to Christianity apply here: not, of course, the details of the decision but the broad underlying principle. In Abraham\n\nv. Abraham (1 ), their Lordships say:-\n\n\"He\" (the convert) \"may renounce the old law by which he was bound, as he has renounced his old religion, or, if he thinks fit, he may abide by the old law, notwithstanding he has renounced the old religion.\"\n\nThe only modification here is that it is not only his choice which must be taken into account but also the views of the body whose religious tenets he has\n\n(1) g M.I.A. 199 at 242, 243 and 214\n\nrenounced because here the right we are considering is the right of the old body, the right conferred on it as a special privilege to send a member of its own fold to Parliament.\n\nBut with that modification the observations which follow apply in their broad outline\n\n\"The profession of Christianity releases the con- . vert from the trammels of the Hindu law, but it iis..C.- ·\n\nmissio11n MIJ-IM\"\n\nC1tiif~-·:.\n\nSClitia, ·.Aj1Uf>·.\n\nand Ollwrl. ,. -, Mahf!fon•C. :l•''\n\nCoor trade can be regulated.\n\nWhen the contract is thrown open to public auction, it cannot be said that there is exclusion of competition and thereby a monopoly is created.\n\nFor all these reasons we are of opinion that the contention that the provisions of the regulation are unconstitutional as they abridge the rights of the petitioner to carry on liquor trade freely cannot be sustained.\n\nThe next contention that the charge of fee by public auction is excessive and is not in the nature of a fee but a tax ignores the fact that that licence fee described as a licence fee is more in the nature of a tax than a licence fee.\n\nOne of the purposes of the regulation is to raise revenue. By the provisions of section 24, duties can be imposed on the manufacture, import, export and transport of liquor and other excisable articles.\n\nRevenue is also collected by the grant of contracts to carry on trade in liquors and these contracts are sold by auction.\n\nThe grantee is given a licence on payment of the auction price. The regulation specifically authorises this.\n\nIt is not a fee levied without authority of law as was the situation in Rashid Ahmad's case( 1).\n\nAs regards the other contentions of the learned counsel, it is sufficient to say that if there has been any breach of the rules framed under the regulation by the officers concerned, the remedy for such breaches is provided for in the regulation itself. Mere irregularities committed in conducting an auction sale connot be said to have abridged the petitioners's fundamental rights and so article 32 is not attracted. It is open to the petitioner under article 226 to approach the High Court for a mandamus if the officers concerned have i•) [1950] S.C.J. 324.\n\nconducted themselves not in accordap.ce with law or if they have acted in excess of their jurisdiction. The same is the answer to the petitioner's next contention that the sale could not be confirmed by the Minister and that under the rules it was only the Chief Comm1ss10ner who was authorised to confirm it. The point of discrimination was not seriously argued before us.\n\nFor the reasons given above we see no validity in this application and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the peut10ner: S. D. Sekhri.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nTHE VICE-CHANCELLOR, UTKAL\n\nUNIVERSITY AND OTHERS\n\nfl.\n\nS. K. GHOSH AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN. C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VrVIAN BosE and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, art. 226-Mandamus petition-High Court-Whether can constitute itself as court of appeal-Resolu~ ti<>ns passed by University Syndicate-Validity of-Notice of meeting issued to all-T¥ant of due notice waived-Substantial compliance with spirit of law.\n\nIn the present case there were two meetings of the University Syndicate, consisting of twelve members.\n\nProper notices of both meetings were issued to all the members but one member did not attend one meeting and another n1e111ber did not attend the other meeting. 1'he defect \\Vas that the subject matter of the present case was not included in the agenda of either meeting but one of the items in the agenda of both the notices was \"other matters_, if any.\" The subject matter consisted of leakage of examination papers and the cancellation of results. fhose present passed the resolution on both occasions unanimously.\n\nThe High Court held that want of notice in the two cases invalidated the resolutions\n\n!954\n\nCoovetjee B. Bharucha v.\n\nThe Excise Commissioner and the\n\nChief Commis~\n\nsioner, Ajmer and Others.\n\nMahajan C . .].\n\nJariuary 15.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 289, "end_char": 304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The costs of the petitions here and in the High Court should, in our opinion, be paid by the State of Orissa."}}, {"text": "B P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 394, "end_char": 409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: B P. Maheshwari."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 439, "end_char": 457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "COOVERJEE B. BHARUCHA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 460, "end_char": 481, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COOVERJEE B. BHARUCHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE EXCISE COMMISSIONER AND\n\nTHE CHIEF COMMISSIOKER, AJMER,\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 483, "end_char": 554, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE EXCISE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AJMER, AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 571, "end_char": 578, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mahajan C.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 595, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 597, "end_char": 608, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHuLAM HAsAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 610, "end_char": 622, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM\n\nHASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 627, "end_char": 644, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 647, "end_char": 668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 670, "end_char": 677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 780, "end_char": 787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 975, "end_char": 982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1035, "end_char": 1041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Biswambhar\n\nSingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1905, "end_char": 1922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grantee\n\nBiswambhar\n\nSingh\n\nThe State of\n\nOrissa and Others."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nOrissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1928, "end_char": 1944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grantee\n\nBiswambhar\n\nSingh\n\nThe State of\n\nOrissa and Others."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1958, "end_char": 1962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nJanuary 13\n\nCooverju B. Bharucha\n\nThe Excise Commissioner and the\n\nChief Commissioner, Ajmer,\n\nand OJhers."}}, {"text": "Cooverju B. Bharucha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 1999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nJanuary 13\n\nCooverju B. Bharucha\n\nThe Excise Commissioner and the\n\nChief Commissioner, Ajmer,\n\nand OJhers.", "canonical_name": "COOVERJEE B. BHARUCHA"}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2512, "end_char": 2519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2527, "end_char": 2548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2551, "end_char": 2563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2585, "end_char": 2599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Portts A Mehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Portts A Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2629, "end_char": 2643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Portts A Mehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2774, "end_char": 2784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Collector of Excise, Ajmer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2859, "end_char": 2885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector of Excise, Ajmer, respondent No."}}, {"text": "Chhoga Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3119, "end_char": 3129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, Chhoga Lal, offered bids at the auction sale.", "canonical_name": "Chhoga Lal"}}, {"text": "Chhoga Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3480, "end_char": 3490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhoga Lal, however, deposited Rs.", "canonical_name": "Chhoga Lal"}}, {"text": "18th March, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3584, "end_char": 3600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,000 on the 18th March, 1953, i.e., two days after the due date, contrary to the provisions of sub-rule 8(a) of rule 6 of the auction rules..\n\nIn spite of this the sale was eventually confirmed in his favour by the Minister of EJtcise."}}, {"text": "Chhoga Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4000, "end_char": 4010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, when apprised of this irregularity, sent a telegram to the Collector of Excise stating that\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS 875\n\nthe sale should not be confirmed in favour of Chhoga Lal as he had failed in paying the price according to the mks and expressing his willingness to take the licence on the price fetched at that auction sale.", "canonical_name": "Chhoga Lal"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4610, "end_char": 4623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5144, "end_char": 5154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Minister for Excise", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Minister for Excise, respondent No."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cooverjee B. Bharutha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5983, "end_char": 6004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and are thus inconsistent with article 19\n\n(1) (g) of the Constitution and that the provisions of the regulation regarding levy of licence fee with the avowed object of raising a big source of revenue also\n\nCooverjee B. Bharutha\n\nTiu Excise Com ..\n\nmisioner and lhe\n\nChiefCommiJ .. sioner, Ajmer, and Others.", "canonical_name": "COOVERJEE B. BHARUCHA"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6086, "end_char": 6093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan c. J.\n\nCoove'ljee B. Bharucha v.\n\nThe Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissianer, Ajmeri\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan C."}}, {"text": "Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissianer, Ajmeri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan c. J.\n\nCoove'ljee B. Bharucha v.\n\nThe Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissianer, Ajmeri\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Mahajan C.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6201, "end_char": 6211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. ].", "canonical_name": "Mahajan C."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Beawar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6851, "end_char": 6857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c) to grant a licence to the petitioner to deal in country liquor with his place of business at or near Chang Gate, Beawar."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7270, "end_char": 7280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7530, "end_char": 7535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that the petitioner, a citizen of free India, had an unfettered right to carry on trade and business in liquor and this right had been guaranteed to him under article 19 (1)\n\n(g) of the Constitution, and that being so, the provision; of the regulation which confer discretion on the Excise Commissioner to restrict the number of liquor shops, and to license them by auction to the highest bidder amount to creation of a monopoly in liquor trade and are void."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7650, "end_char": 7660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8197, "end_char": 8207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Merwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8543, "end_char": 8556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to determine the validitv of these contentions, it is necessary to refer to th~ relevant provisions of the regulation which consolidates and amends the law relating to import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and possession of intoxicating liquors and of intoxicating drugs, in the Provinces of Ajmer-Merwara."}}, {"text": "has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8562, "end_char": 8661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8662, "end_char": 8678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "It has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9200, "end_char": 9210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "It has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9386, "end_char": 9396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "It has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9532, "end_char": 9542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935", "statute": "It has been enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by the Government of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9927, "end_char": 9937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10105, "end_char": 10115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11066, "end_char": 11076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11297, "end_char": 11307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11308, "end_char": 11318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11683, "end_char": 11693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 31 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11742, "end_char": 11760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11975, "end_char": 11985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12227, "end_char": 12237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12815, "end_char": 12825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Field", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15300, "end_char": 15305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention stands answered by what Field J. said in Crowley v. Christensen('):\n\n\"There is iti this position an assumption of a fact which does not exist, that when the liquors are taken in excess the injuries are confined to the party offending."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17186, "end_char": 17199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18191, "end_char": 18201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Porter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19000, "end_char": 19006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of Lord Porter in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales( )."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20690, "end_char": 20700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rashid Ahmad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21119, "end_char": 21131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not a fee levied without authority of law as was the situation in Rashid Ahmad's case( 1)."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21535, "end_char": 21545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21599, "end_char": 21610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. D. Sekhri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22239, "end_char": 22251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the peut10ner: S. D. Sekhri."}}, {"text": "VICE-CHANCELLOR, UTKAL\n\nUNIVERSITY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22305, "end_char": 22339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE VICE-CHANCELLOR, UTKAL\n\nUNIVERSITY AND OTHERS\n\nfl."}}, {"text": "S. K. GHOSH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22357, "end_char": 22368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. GHOSH AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22422, "end_char": 22431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VrVIAN BosE and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VrVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22433, "end_char": 22444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VrVIAN BosE and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ.]", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE"}}, {"text": "GHULAM\n\nHASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22449, "end_char": 22462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VrVIAN BosE and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ.]", "canonical_name": "GHULAM\n\nHASAN"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22469, "end_char": 22490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22492, "end_char": 22500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_883_892_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 883\n\nconducted themselves not in accordap.ce with law or if they have acted in excess of their jurisdiction. The same is the answer to the petitioner's next contention that the sale could not be confirmed by the Minister and that under the rules it was only the Chief Comm1ss10ner who was authorised to confirm it. The point of discrimination was not seriously argued before us.\n\nFor the reasons given above we see no validity in this application and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the peut10ner: S. D. Sekhri.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nTHE VICE-CHANCELLOR, UTKAL\n\nUNIVERSITY AND OTHERS\n\nfl.\n\nS. K. GHOSH AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN. C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VrVIAN BosE and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, art. 226-Mandamus petition-High Court-Whether can constitute itself as court of appeal-Resolu~ ti<>ns passed by University Syndicate-Validity of-Notice of meeting issued to all-T¥ant of due notice waived-Substantial compliance with spirit of law.\n\nIn the present case there were two meetings of the University Syndicate, consisting of twelve members.\n\nProper notices of both meetings were issued to all the members but one member did not attend one meeting and another n1e111ber did not attend the other meeting. 1'he defect \\Vas that the subject matter of the present case was not included in the agenda of either meeting but one of the items in the agenda of both the notices was \"other matters_, if any.\" The subject matter consisted of leakage of examination papers and the cancellation of results. fhose present passed the resolution on both occasions unanimously.\n\nThe High Court held that want of notice in the two cases invalidated the resolutions\n\n!954\n\nCoovetjee B. Bharucha v.\n\nThe Excise Commissioner and the\n\nChief Commis~\n\nsioner, Ajmer and Others.\n\nMahajan C . .].\n\nJariuary 15.\n\nThe Vice Chancellor, Utkal\n\nUniversity and Others.\n\nS. K. G'wsh\n\nand Ot'LtTs.\n\nBose].\n\nand issued a 1nandan1us directing the syndicate to take steps for the publication of the results : Held, that \\vant of due notice can be \\vaived in given circum~ stances.\n\nIn the present case the two absentees did in fact attend one or other of the meetings and expressed their views, not individually but as members of a meeting which was considering the n1atter and there was unanimity on both occasions.\n\nThe substance is more important than the form and if there is substantial compliance \\Vith the spirit and substance of the law, an unessential defect in form shpuld not be allowed to defeat what is otherwise a proper and valid resolution.\n\nAs in the present case, there was actual appearance without objection at meetings properly convened and there was complete unanimity on bOth occasions the two resolutions were not invalid because whatever may be thought about each taken separately, the defects, if any, are cured when two are read together and regarded as a whole.\n\nHeld further, that in a 1nandamus petition the High Court cannot constitute itself into a court of appeal from the authority against which appeal is sought.\n\nIt is not the function of courts of law to substitute their wisdom and discretion for that of the persons to \\Vhose judgment the matter in question is entrusted by the law. 1'he present was not the sort of case in which a mandamus ought to issue.\n\nRadha Kishan faikishan v. Municipal Committee, Khandwa (61 I.A. 125) and Young v. Ladies Imperial Club (89 L.J.K.B. 563) referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1952.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order, dated 9th and 17th August, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Orissa in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 80 of 1951, and Order dated the 20th August,, 1951, in Supreme Court Appeal No. 15 of 1951, on the. file of the said High Court.\n\nDr. Bakshi Tek Chand (G. C. Mathur and H. Mohapatra, with him) for the appellants.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee ( V. S. Sawhney and R. Patnaik, with him) for respondents Nos. 1-8, 10-16, 18-23 and 25-34.\n\n1954. January 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-This appeal arises out of a petition made by certain students of the Utkal University of Orissa\n\nto the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack seeking a mandamus under article 226 of the Constitution against the Vice-Chancellor of the University and certain other persons connected with it.\n\nIn view of an undertaking given before us on behalf of the University, the questions at issue lose most of their practical importance and only two questions of principle remain.\n\nBecause of this we do not intend to examine the matters which arise at any length.\n\nThe facts are as follows.\n\nThe first M.B.B.S.\n\nExamination of the University included Anatomy as one of its subjects. This examination was divided into three parts.\n\nThe theoretical portion, which was written, was fixed for the 9th and 10th of April, 1951.\n\nThe practical was fixed for the 19th and the viva t•oce for the 20th.\n\nAt 7 o'clock on the morning of the 9th, before the examination began, a member of the Senate was to!sary to examine the general principle at any length because, in our opinion, this case is. governed by its own facts.\n\nIt may well be that when there is a statutory requirement about notice the provisions of the statute cannot be evaded or ignored_ It may also be, though we do not stop to enquire whether it is that when the constitution of a nonstatutory body requires notice to be given, then als0< there cannot be any relaxation of the rule.\n\nThe reason for the stricter rule laid down in the cases cited before us is that though an incorporated body like an University is a legal entity it has neither a living mind nor voice. It can only express its will in a formal way by a formal resolution and so can onlyact in its corporate capacity by resolutions properly considered, carried and duly recorded in the manner laid down by its constitution.\n\nIf its rules require such resolutions to be moved and passed in a meeting called for the purpose, then every member of the body entitled to take part in the meeting must be given. notice so that he can attend and express his views.\n\nIndividual assents given separately cannot be regarded as equivalent to the assent of a meeting because the incorporated body is different from the persons of which it is composed.\n\nHence, an omission to give proper notice even to a single member in these circumstances would invalidate the meeting and that in turn would invalidate resolutions which purport to have been passed at it. But this is only when such inflexible rigidity is imposed by the incorporating constitution.\n\nThe position is different when, either by custom or by the nature of the body or by its constitution and rules\" greater latitude and flexibility are permissible. Each:\n\n(1) 61 I.A. 125.\n\ncase must be governed by its own facts and no universal rule can be laid down; also it may well be that in the same body certain things, such as routine matters, can be disposed of more easily and with less formality than others.\n\nIt all depends on the nature of the body and its rules.\n\nIn the present case, there were not one but two meetmgs.\n\nProper notices of both meetings were issued to all the members including the two absentees. The only defect is that the matter we are concerned with was not included in the agenda of either meeting. We need not decide here whether this must always be done-there are English cases which indicate that that is not always necessary, see for example T lie King v.\n\nPulsford( '), La Compagnie De Mayville v. Whitley(') and Parker and Cooper Ltd v. Reading(•); also, in the present case one of the items in the agenda of both notices was \"other matters, if any.\" But it is not necessary to go into that because in this case these members did in fact attend one or other of the meetings and expressed their views, not individually, but as members of a meeting which was considering the matter; and there was unanimity on both occasions.\n\nEven on the stricter view taken in the cases relied on by counsel it is pointed out that want of due notice can be waived in given circumstances. Thus, if a person who was not noticed appears at the meeting and waives the irregularity, the defect is cured; so also when a person is too far away to be reached in time to enable him to communicate with the Committee before the meeting: the sending of a notice is then excused.\n\nSee Radlza Kislzan Jaikislzan v. Municipal Committee, Klzandwa(') and Young v. Ladies Imperial Club, Lim.(•).\n\nThe substance is more important than the form and if there is substantial compliance with the spirit and substance of the law, we are not prepared to let an unessential defect in form defeat what is otherwise a proper and valid resolution.\n\nWe, however, confine our\n\n(1) rn8 E.R. !073-\n\n(2) [1896] I Ch. 788.\n\n(3) [1926) I Ch. 975\n\n(4) 61 I.A. 125.\n\n(5) 89 L.J.K.B. 563.\n\nThe Vit.e-Chan·\n\ntellor, Utl.al\n\nUn.iVlr.sity and Others.\n\nS. K. Ghosh: and Others .\n\n. Bo.seJ.\n\nThe Vire-Chancellor, Utkal\n\nUniver!ily and Others.\n\nS. K. Ghosh and Others.\n\nremarks to the facts of this case where there was actual appearance without objection at meetings pmperly convened and where there was complete unanimity on both occasions.\n\nWhether it would be proper to reach the same conclusion when there is a dissentient voice we are not prepared to say.\n\nIn our opinion, the High Court was wrong in holding that the two resolutions were invalid.\n\nWhatever may be thought about each taken separately, the defects, if any, are, in our judgment, cured when the two are read together and regarded as a whole.\n\nWe also think the High Court was wrong on the second point.\n\nThe learned fudges rightly hold that in a mandamus petition the High Court cannot constitute itself into a court of appeal from the authority against which the appeal is sought, but having said that they went on to do just what they said they could not. The learned r udges appeared to consider that it is not enough to have facts established from which a leakage can legitimately be inferred by reasonable minds but that there must in addition be proof of its quantum and amplitude though they do not indicate what the yard-stick of measurement should be. That is a proposition to which we are not able to assent.\n\nWe are not prepared to perpetrate the error into which the learned High Court Judges permitted themselves to be led and examine the facts for ourselves as a court of appeal but in view of the strictures the High Court has made on the Vice-Chancellor and the syndicate we are compelled to observe that we do not feel they are justified.\n\nThe question was one of urgency and the Vice-Chancellor and the members of the syndicate were well within their rights in exercising their discretion in the way they did.\n\nIt may be that the matter could have been handled in some other way, as, for example, in the manner the learned r udges indicate, but it is not the function of courts of law to substitute their wisdom and discretion for that of the persons to whose judgment the matter in question is entrusted by the Law.\n\nThe University authorities acted honestly as reasonable and responsible\n\nmen confronted with an urgent situation are entitled to act.\n\nThey had experts of their own on their body.\n\nThey examined others \"\\Vho in their opinion might throw light on the incident.\n\nThey themselves compared tl:ie two papers and, after a deliberation of some six hours, arrived at an unanimous decision and then they reviewed the matter afresh at a second meeting with the assistance of one of their number who was not present on the first occasion. It is inaccurate to describe that as haste and unjust to characterise their action as unreasonable and lacbng due care.\n\nThis is decidedly not the sort of case in which a mandamus ought to issue. We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court.\n\nWe now come to the undertaking given on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor.\n\nAs we have observed, the syndicate reached the conclusion that there had been a leakage and so cancelled the examinations and ordered fresh ones.\n\nHad the High Court not stepped in, those examinations would have be_en held nearly two and a half years ago and it is possible that all the students who were successful then would have passed again, or at any rate many of them would. But because of the High Court's order the examinations could not be held and the University was virtually directed to regard the examinations already held and the results already declared as good.\n\nThe result has been that the students who passed have been studying and sitting for examinations in the higher classes for some two and a half years.\n\nIf the status quo which would result from our setting aside of the High Court's order were to be resumed it would mean that those students would be put back to where they were two and a half years ago and would be compelled to do the courses which they have already covered all over again.\n\nIn order to avoid such injustice we were told at the outset by counsel on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor that the University did not want to penalise them and so gave us the following undertaking drafted by the appellants' counsel :\n\n\"The students who are declared to have passed' the first M. B. B. S. Examination of the Utkal University-\n\nT h1 Jiice-C'Aan.\n\nce!lnr, l!tkal\n\nUniversity and Ot,.ers.\n\nS.K. Gho; h\n\nand Otrters,\n\nBose].\n\n1954 r ht V ict-Chanrellor, Utkal\n\nClniversity and Others.\n\nS. K. Ghosh and Others.\n\nBose].\n\n_7anuary 20.\n\nheld in April, 1951, shall be deemed passed that examination and shall not appear again in Anatomy.\"\n\nto have duly be required to\n\nThe appeal is allowed. The High Court's order is set aside and the petition for mandamus filed before it is dismissed, but without costs.\n\nThere will be no order about costs in this \"court either.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Raiinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 1-8, 10-16, 18-23 and 25-34: S. P. Varma.\n\nJAGANNATH\n\nJASW ANT SINGH AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN. C.J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs,\n\nVIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN. JJ.j Representation of the People Act (XL/II of 1951), s. 82- Election petition-Non-compliance with the provisions of s. 82- Proper party omitted frorn the list of respondents-Defect u1hcther fatal.\n\nHeld, (i) that non-con1pliance with the provisions of s. 82 of the Representation of the People Ac_t, 1951 (XLIII of 1951), and the omission of a proper party from the list of respondents is not fatal and the tribunal is entitled to deal \\Vith the tnatter in accordance with the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure which have been ma 6-96 S.C. lndia/59.\n\nJagan-Nath\n\nJaswant Sinti\n\nand Otht1s.\n\n.Mahajat1 C,],\n\nJagan Nath\n\nJaswanl Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan C. J.\n\nto see that people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices.\n\nIn cases where the election law does not prescribe the consequence or does not lay down penalty for non-compliance with certain procedural requirements of that law, the jurisdiction of the tribunal entrusted with the trial of the case is not affected.\n\nIt is in these circumstances necessary to set out the different provisions of the Act relevant to the matter canvassed before us.\n\nPart VI of the Act deals with \"Disputes regarding Elections.\" Chapter I of this Part is the definition chapter.\n\nChapter II consists of six sections. Section 80 provides that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part.\n\nSection 81 provides that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) of sections 100 and\n\n101 to the Election Commission by any candidate at such election or any elector in such form and within such time but not earlier than the date of publication of the name or names of the returned candidate or candidates at such election under section 67, as may be prescribed; that an election petition shall be deemed to have been presented to the Election Commission- \"(a) when it is delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or to such other officer as may be appointed by the Election Commission in this behalf- ( i) by the person making the petition, or\n\n(ii) by a person authorized in writing in this behalf by the person making the petition; or\n\n(b) when it is sent by registered post and 1s delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or the officer so appointed.\"\n\nSection 82 provides as follows:- \"A petitioner shall join as respondent to his petition all the candidates who were duly nominated at the election other than himself if he was so nominated.\"\n\nSection 83 states that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of pleadings.\n\nIt further provides that the petition shall be accompanied by a list signed and verified in like manner setting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice which the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt or illegal practice and the date and place of the commission of. each such practice.\n\nProvision is also made in the section empowering the tribunal to obtain further particul.ars by allowmg an amendment.\n\nSection 84 concerns the relief which a petitioner may claim, and\n\nsection 85 provides that if the provisions of sections 81, 83 or 117 are not complied with, the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition.\n\nPower is however given to the Commission to condone delay in making the petition for sufficient cause.\n\nChapter III of Part VI deals with the trial of election petitions.\n\nIt consists of 21 sections.\n\nSection 86 provides that if the petition is not dismissed under section 85, the Election Commission shall appoint an election tribunal for the trial of the petition.\n\nProvision is then made for constituting the tribunal and the place where the trial should take place.\n\nSection 90 prescribes the procedure to be followed by the tribunal.\n\nSub-section\n\n(2) of section 90 is in these terms:-\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits.\"\n\nSub-s.ection ( 4) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in section 85, the tribunal may dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of sections 81, 83 or 117.\n\nIt is significant that both the Election Commission and the tribunal have been given powers in express\n\nJagan Nath\n\nJaswant Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan C. J.\n\nJagan Nath v.\n\nJaswant Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan C. J.\n\nterms to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the requirements of sections 81, 83 or 117, but no such powers are given to dismiss a petition in limine which does not comply with the provisions of section 82.\n\nSuch a petition can only be dismissed at the conclusion of the trial and on grounds sufficient to dismiss it (section 98).\n\nSpecific provisions have been made to ensure that allegations of corrupt practice etc. are not lightly or frivolously made by providing that the petition must be properly verified and the allegations contained therein stated with a certain amount of definiteness and accuracy and 1t 1s an express prov1S1on of Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and where a petition complies with sections 81, 83 or 117, the Commission is bound to refer the petition to an election tribunal and the tribunal, unless it is of the opinion that the petition is not in accordance with sections 81, 83 or 117, is bound to try it and decide it according to the provisions of law.\n\nProvision has been made in section 90( 1) for any other candidate st!biect to the provisions of section 119, to have himself impleaded as a party in the case within a prescribed period. This provision indicates that the array of parties as provided by section 82 is not final and conclusive and that defects can be cured.\n\nProvisions of sections 110, 115 and 116 of Chapter IV\n\nof this Part also support this view. Section 110 provides the procedure for the withdrawal of a petition.\n\nIt says that any person who might himself have been a party may within 14 days of the publication of the notice of withdrawal in the official gazette apply to be substituted as a petitioner in the place of the party withdrawing it.\n\nSection 115 provides that such a person can be substituted as a petitioner ori the death of the original petitioner while section 116 provides that if a sole respondent dies or gives notice that he does not wish to oppose the petition or any of the respondents dies or gives such notice and there is no other respondent who is appearing in the petition, the tribunal shall\n\ncause notice of such event to be published in the official gazette and thereupon any person who might have been a petitioner may within 14 days of such publication apply to be substituted in the place of such respondent and oppose the petition and shall be entitled to continue the proceedings on such terms as the tribunal may think fit.\n\nThese provisions suggest that ii any proper party is omitted from the lists of respondents, such a defect is not fatal and the tribunal is entitled to deal with it under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Order I, rules 9, 10 and 13.\n\nBaijnath was a candidate who had withdrawn his candidature and had not contestea the election.· By reason of his absence or presence having regard to the grounds on which the petition was based no prejudice was likely to result to the respondent No. 1 because the main ground on which the petition was based was that the petitionar's nomination paper had been wrongly rejected.\n\nBaijnath did not ciaim that he had acquired any substantive rights by reason of the failure of the petitioner to implead him within the period prescribed and there is no question of depriving him of any such rights.\n\nIn our opinion, the tribunal rightly disallowed the preliminary objection.\n\nMr. Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the appellant, drew our attention to certain decisions given by the different election tribunals constituted under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in support of his contention.\n\nOn a careful perusal of the different decisions given by the various election tribunals it appears that there is no uniformity of opinion between them on this point.\n\nConflicting opinions have been expressed by these tribunals. It is unnecessary to discuss all these decisions in detail.\n\nIt will be sufficient to say that we are in entire agreement with those decisions which have held that non-compliance with the provisions of section 82 is not fatal to the petition.\n\nThe matter has to be determined in accordance with the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure which have been made expressly applicable. ' Mr. Chatterjee laid emphasis on the decision of the Election Tribunal.\n\nLucknow, presided over by\n\nJagan .Nath v.\n\nJaswant Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajanC.J.\n\nJagan .Nath v.\n\nJaswant Singh and Others.\n\nMahajan C. J.\n\nShri N. S. Lokur in Election Petition No. 287 of 1952 published in the Gazette of India dated 20th December, 1951, Part II, Section 3, page 1034.\n\nIn that case two persons who had been duly nominated as candidates but who had withdrawn their candidature were not impleaded as respondents as required by section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.\n\nIt was held that the non-joinder was fatal to the petition.\n\nIt was said that the wording of the Act is peremptory and mandatory and it makes it incumbent on the petitioner to join as respondents all candidates duly nominated and it gives him no option and the failure to do so involves rejection of the pet1t10n.\n\nReliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935, and the decision of another Election Tribunal, Quilon, , in Sri Ramchandra Nair. v. Sri Ramchandra Das reproduced at page 2396e, Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part I, Section l, dated the 11th of November, 1952.\n\nIt was said that unless all the requirements of rules 81, 82 and 83 are complied with the election cannot be questioned.\n\nAs regards the omission of section 82 from the provisions of sec•. ion 85, it was observed that the Election Commission an at once discover whether the provisions of sections 81, 83 and 117 are complied with but the same cannot be said about the requirements of section 82 and that the Election Commission will have to hold an inquiry as to who were the candidates duly nominated before determining whether all of them had been joined or not, that this burden of inquiry was not thrown on the Commission but it was left for the determination of the tribunal, and hence it was that section 82 was not included in section 85.\n\nBoth the reasons given oy the tribunal cannot, . in our opinion, be sustained.\n\nThe provisions of section 82 are in terms similar to the provisions of Order XX XIV, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nTherein it is provided that all persons having an interest either in the mortgage security or in the right of redemption shall be joined as parries to any suit relating . to the\n\nmortgage.\n\nThere is ample authority for the view that this is merely a directory provision and non-joinder of any party is not a fatal defect and a decree can be passed so far as the parties actually on record are concerned unless the party omitted is a necessary party in the sense that in his absence no relief could be given at all even as regards parties actually on record.\n\nThere is no valid reason for treating the word \"shall\" in section 82 in a manner different from the same word used in Order XXXIV, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nIt is one of the rules of construction that a provision like this is not mandatory unless non-compliance with it is made penal.\n\nAs regards the dictum of the Lucknow Tribunal that no inquiry is required to be made in the case of non-compliance with the provisions of sections 81, 83 and 117 but that an inquiry would be necessary to determine whether certain parties were nominated c\"ndidates or not, in our opinion it cannot stand scrutiny.\n\nWhether a petition has been presented by a person who has purported to sign it or by someone else or whether an agent who has signed the petition is a duly authorized agent or not are as much matters of inquiry as the question of determination of the names of nominated candidates.\n\nThis fact can be easily determined by reference to the Returning Officer.\n\nThat this reasoning of the tribunal is not sound is fully demonstrated by a reference to the next case cited by the learned counsel and decided by the same tribunal presided over by Shri N. S. Lokur.\n\nIn that case the question arose whether the petition was July verified and whether it was accompanied by all the necessary lists required by secion 83 (2).\n\nAn elaborate inquiry had to be conducted to determine the point whether the petition was typed on blank paper signed by the petitioner or whether it was signed by him or some person authorized on his behalf after it had been typed.\n\nIt is thus clear that it is no valid explanation to say that section 82 was omitted from the provisions of section 85 simply on the ground that the Election Commission was absolved . from the duty of making elaborate inquiries at the stage when it had . to say whether the provisions of sections 81, 83 and\n\nJaga,. Natk\n\n•· Jaswant Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan C. J.\n\n 1954\n\nJagan Nath\n\nJaswant Singh\n\nand Others.\n\n'Mahajhn C. J.\n\n117 had been complied with. From the circumstance that section 82 does not find a place in the provisions of section 85 the conclusion follows that the directions contained in section 82 were not considered to be of such a character as to involve the dismissal of a petition in limine and that the matter was such as could be dealt with by the tribunal under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically made applicable to the trial of election petitions.\n\nThe Bombay . Tribunal, presided over by Shri B. D. Nandkarni has taken a contrary view in Election Petition No. 72 of 1952, page 286, Gazette of India Extraordinary, dated the 5th February, 1953.\n\nThe issue in this case was whether Shri T. C. Patil, was a necessary party and whether by the omission to implead him the whole petition was bad. The tribunal held that the defect was not fatal.\n\nIn another case, Petition No. 113 of 1952, decided on 28th July, 1953, the majority of the Bombay Tribunal, decided otherwise. The view of the majority was that the mandatory nature of the provisions of section 82 itself contains within it the consequence of dismissal for non-compliance with its provisions and a separate provision for the dismissal of the petition for non-compliance with its provisions was not necessary and it would have been superfluous.\n\nThese observations run counter to the scheme of the Act itself as envisaged by section 85.\n\nThe provisions of section< 81, 83 and 117 are also mandatory and still in section 85 it is provided in specific terms that the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition if it is not in accordance with the provisions of those sections.\n\nThe tribunal is given a similar power by section 90( 4).\n\nThe member of the tribunal who dissented from the majority view gave cogent and sound reasons for holding that non-joinder of a duly nominated candidate who has withdrawn was not necessarily fatal to the petition.\n\nIn Election Petition No. 83 of 1952, decided by the Election Tribunal presided over by Shri B. C. Vakil, the tribunal took the view that such a defect was fatal.\n\nA Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Special\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2017 of 1952; decided' on the 19th of December, 1952, allowed even a defective verification to be amended.\n\nIt is not necessary to express any final opinion on matters specifically covered by sections 81, 83 and 117 and dealt with by section 85 of the Act but at .the same time it is not possible to accept the view that in spite of the provisions of , section 85 failure to comply strictly with . the provisions of section 82 has the same consequences as are contained in section 85.\n\nIn our opinion the determination of the question whether the parties to the petition have been properly impleaded is a matter not for the Election Commission but for the tribunal. .Various provisions of the Act referred to above show that the election petition qoes not necessarily abate or fail by reason of the death of the petitioner or any of the respondents or hy their ceasing to take any interest in the trial of the petition once that petition has been referred to the tribunal.\n\nOn the other hand, any person who could be a petitioner can continue the petition in spite of the death of either the petitioner or the respondents to the petition and on the original parties failing to prosecute it.\n\nThese provisions have' been made to ensure that the election process on which the democratic system of Government is based is not abused or misused by any candidate and that inquiry is not shut out by collusion between persons made parties to the petition or by their respective deaths.\n\nIt is therefore clear that the provisions of the law relating to th!' impleading of parties are not necessarily fatal and can be cured.\n\nIt is for the tribunal to determine the matter as and when it arises in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nFor the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the decisions of the tribunal and of the High Court in this case were right. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant:· N. H. Hingorani.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1: K. L. Mehta.\n\nJa_idh Nath\n\nJaswant Singh and Others.\n\nMahajan C. J.", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Raiinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 509, "end_char": 524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Raiinder Narain."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 587, "end_char": 598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-8, 10-16, 18-23 and 25-34: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "JAGANNATH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 610, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jagan Nath", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JASW ANT SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 612, "end_char": 637, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JASWANT SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 654, "end_char": 661, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 670, "end_char": 679, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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C. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1971, "end_char": 1987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1989, "end_char": 2000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2032, "end_char": 2043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (R .. Patnaik, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2152, "end_char": 2159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN C. J .-This is an appeal by special leave against the decision of the Delhi Election Tribunal, dated the 11th November, 1952, in Election Petition No.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Jagan Nath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2338, "end_char": 2348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Jagan Nath was elected a member of the Delhi State Legislative Assembly from Constituency No.", "canonical_name": "Jagan Nath"}}, {"text": "Jaswant Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2649, "end_char": 2662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th April, 1952, which was the last date under the law for the presentation of an election petition, Jaswant Singh (respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Jaswant Singh"}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2759, "end_char": 2768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) presented such a petition before the Secretary of the Election Commission at New Delhi challenging the election, of the appellant and contesting the order of the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination paper."}}, {"text": "Brahma Sarup", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2940, "end_char": 2952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the petition he impleaded as respondents, Brahma Sarup, Ram Prashad Poddar and the appellant, Jagan Nath, but he omitted to implead, as required by section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Baijnath, -0ne of the candidates, whose nomination had been accepted but who had withdrawn his candidature .subsequently."}}, {"text": "Ram Prashad Poddar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2954, "end_char": 2972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the petition he impleaded as respondents, Brahma Sarup, Ram Prashad Poddar and the appellant, Jagan Nath, but he omitted to implead, as required by section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Baijnath, -0ne of the candidates, whose nomination had been accepted but who had withdrawn his candidature .subsequently."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3046, "end_char": 3056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Baijnath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3104, "end_char": 3112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the petition he impleaded as respondents, Brahma Sarup, Ram Prashad Poddar and the appellant, Jagan Nath, but he omitted to implead, as required by section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Baijnath, -0ne of the candidates, whose nomination had been accepted but who had withdrawn his candidature .subsequently.", "canonical_name": "Baij. nath"}}, {"text": "14th July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3234, "end_char": 3249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 14th July, 1952, the Election Commissioner appointed an Election Tribunal comprising respondents 5 to 7."}}, {"text": "26th August, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3505, "end_char": 3522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th August, 1952, which was the first date of hearing before the tribunal, the\n\n<1 ppellant raised a preliminary objection that the omission to implead Baijnath, a duly nominated candidate as a respondent in the petition was fatal to its\n\nJagan Nath\n\nJaswant Singh\n\n, and Others."}}, {"text": ".\\fahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3830, "end_char": 3839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".\\fahajan C. J.\n\nmaintainability."}}, {"text": "Baij. nath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3895, "end_char": 3905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner contended that Baij.", "canonical_name": "Baij. nath"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4074, "end_char": 4094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Baiinath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal decided the preliminary point in favour of the petitioner and held that the non-joinder of Baiinath as a respondent was not fatal to the petition.", "canonical_name": "Baij. nath"}}, {"text": "Bai1nath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4450, "end_char": 4458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the finding, however, that Bai1nath was a proper party to be impleaded in the case, the tribunal directed that he be added as a respondent in the petition and notice of the petition be served on him.", "canonical_name": "Baij. nath"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5025, "end_char": 5042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant being dissatisfied with this decision, made an application to the Punjab High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the tribunal on the ground that it was without jurisdiction and for an order that the election petition be dismissed as there was no valid petition before the Election Tribunal for trial."}}, {"text": "articles 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5049, "end_char": 5069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5077, "end_char": 5098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "27th November, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5410, "end_char": 5429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition was summarily rejected by the High Court on the 27th November, 1952."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5475, "end_char": 5486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5691, "end_char": 5729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6326, "end_char": 6336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "sections 81, 82, 83 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6397, "end_char": 6424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6677, "end_char": 6687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6938, "end_char": 6965, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jagan-Nath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8202, "end_char": 8212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagan-Nath\n\nJaswant Sinti\n\nand Otht1s.", "canonical_name": "Jagan Nath"}}, {"text": "Jaswanl Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8270, "end_char": 8283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Mahajat1 C,],\n\nJagan Nath\n\nJaswanl Singh\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Jaswant Singh"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8298, "end_char": 8305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\nto see that people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Part VI of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8794, "end_char": 8812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8944, "end_char": 8954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI of the Act", "statute": "Part VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9099, "end_char": 9109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI of the Act", "statute": "Part VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 100 and\n\n101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9266, "end_char": 9287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI of the Act", "statute": "Part VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9295, "end_char": 9314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 81 provides that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) of sections 100 and\n\n101 to the Election Commission by any candidate at such election or any elector in such form and within such time but not earlier than the date of publication of the name or names of the returned candidate or candidates at such election under section 67, as may be prescribed; that an election petition shall be deemed to have been presented to the Election Commission- \"(a) when it is delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or to such other officer as may be appointed by the Election Commission in this behalf- ( i) by the person making the petition, or\n\n(ii) by a person authorized in writing in this behalf by the person making the petition; or\n\n(b) when it is sent by registered post and 1s delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or the officer so appointed.\""}}, {"text": "section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9527, "end_char": 9537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI of the Act", "statute": "Part VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "Election Commission-", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9633, "end_char": 9653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 81 provides that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) of sections 100 and\n\n101 to the Election Commission by any candidate at such election or any elector in such form and within such time but not earlier than the date of publication of the name or names of the returned candidate or candidates at such election under section 67, as may be prescribed; that an election petition shall be deemed to have been presented to the Election Commission- \"(a) when it is delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or to such other officer as may be appointed by the Election Commission in this behalf- ( i) by the person making the petition, or\n\n(ii) by a person authorized in writing in this behalf by the person making the petition; or\n\n(b) when it is sent by registered post and 1s delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or the officer so appointed.\""}}, {"text": "Section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10062, "end_char": 10072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10254, "end_char": 10264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10463, "end_char": 10490, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11041, "end_char": 11051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11107, "end_char": 11117, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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{"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "sections 81, 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12277, "end_char": 12292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12334, "end_char": 12353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that both the Election Commission and the tribunal have been given powers in express\n\nJagan Nath\n\nJaswant Singh\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "sections 81, 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12604, "end_char": 12619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12734, "end_char": 12744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12857, "end_char": 12867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13181, "end_char": 13260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 81, 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13315, "end_char": 13330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code", "statute": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code"}}, {"text": "sections 81, 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13499, "end_char": 13514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code", "statute": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code"}}, {"text": "section 90( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13620, "end_char": 13634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code", "statute": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code"}}, {"text": "section 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13689, "end_char": 13700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code", "statute": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13845, "end_char": 13855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code", "statute": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code"}}, {"text": "sections 110, 115 and 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13930, "end_char": 13955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code", "statute": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14008, "end_char": 14019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code", "statute": "Part VI itself that the procedure of the tribunal is to be governed by the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14311, "end_char": 14322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14433, "end_char": 14444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15213, "end_char": 15240, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15948, "end_char": 15958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the appellant, drew our attention to certain decisions given by the different election tribunals constituted under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in support of his contention."}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16103, "end_char": 16141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16604, "end_char": 16614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16710, "end_char": 16737, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Election Tribunal.\n\nLucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16835, "end_char": 16862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee laid emphasis on the decision of the Election Tribunal."}}, {"text": "N. S. Lokur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17002, "end_char": 17013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\nShri N. S. Lokur in Election Petition No.", "canonical_name": "N. S. Lokur"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17121, "end_char": 17130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17300, "end_char": 17310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17318, "end_char": 17356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "11th of November, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18008, "end_char": 18030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Sri Ramchandra Das reproduced at page 2396e, Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part I, Section l, dated the 11th of November, 1952."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18182, "end_char": 18192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "sections 81, 83 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18321, "end_char": 18344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18417, "end_char": 18427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18736, "end_char": 18746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18767, "end_char": 18777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Reliance was placed on certain decisions of Election Tribunals given under the election rules in force under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18878, "end_char": 18888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18955, "end_char": 18982, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19602, "end_char": 19612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19683, "end_char": 19703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lucknow Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19864, "end_char": 19880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the dictum of the Lucknow Tribunal that no inquiry is required to be made in the case of non-compliance with the provisions of sections 81, 83 and 117 but that an inquiry would be necessary to determine whether certain parties were nominated c\"ndidates or not, in our opinion it cannot stand scrutiny."}}, {"text": "sections 81, 83 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19973, "end_char": 19996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "N. S. Lokur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20694, "end_char": 20705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this reasoning of the tribunal is not sound is fully demonstrated by a reference to the next case cited by the learned counsel and decided by the same tribunal presided over by Shri N. S. Lokur.", "canonical_name": "N. S. Lokur"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21159, "end_char": 21169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21205, "end_char": 21215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 81, 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21385, "end_char": 21400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagan Nath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21472, "end_char": 21482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan C. J.\n\n 1954\n\nJagan Nath\n\nJaswant Singh\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Jagan Nath"}}, {"text": "Mahajhn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21513, "end_char": 21520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Mahajhn C. J.\n\n117 had been complied with.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21583, "end_char": 21593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21637, "end_char": 21647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21704, "end_char": 21714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21905, "end_char": 21932, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "B. D. Nandkarni", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22044, "end_char": 22059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tribunal, presided over by Shri B. D. Nandkarni has taken a contrary view in Election Petition No."}}, {"text": "T. C. Patil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22236, "end_char": 22247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The issue in this case was whether Shri T. C. Patil, was a necessary party and whether by the omission to implead him the whole petition was bad."}}, {"text": "28th July, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22446, "end_char": 22461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "113 of 1952, decided on 28th July, 1953, the majority of the Bombay Tribunal, decided otherwise."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22595, "end_char": 22605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22932, "end_char": 22942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23019, "end_char": 23029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 90( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23227, "end_char": 23241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. C. Vakil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23551, "end_char": 23562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "83 of 1952, decided by the Election Tribunal presided over by Shri B. C. Vakil, the tribunal took the view that such a defect was fatal."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23646, "end_char": 23663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Special\n\nCivil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "19th of December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23723, "end_char": 23745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2017 of 1952; decided' on the 19th of December, 1952, allowed even a defective verification to be amended."}}, {"text": "sections 81, 83 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23885, "end_char": 23908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23927, "end_char": 23937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24046, "end_char": 24056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24109, "end_char": 24119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24166, "end_char": 24176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25416, "end_char": 25443, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25670, "end_char": 25685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant:· N. H. Hingorani."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25716, "end_char": 25727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1: K. L. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Ja_idh Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25730, "end_char": 25741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ja_idh Nath\n\nJaswant Singh and Others."}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_904_912_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "Ja11uary 29.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1954J\n\nKARNAL SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nf),\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB.\n\n[BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 34 and 149-Scop<\" of-Charge under s. 302 read with s. 149-Conviction under s. 302' 1ead tvith s. 34-Whether valid.\n\nIt was contended that the conviction of the appellants under s. 302, Indian Penal Code, read with s. 34 was illegal when they had been charged only under s. 302 read with s. 149 because the scope of s. 149 was different from that of s. 34, that while what s. 149 required was proof of a common object, it would be necessary under s. 34 to establish a common intention and that there- . fore when the charge against the accused was under s. 149, it could' not be convrted in appeal into one under s. 34.\n\nHeld, that it is true that there is substantial difference between the two sections but they also to some extent overlap an to protect them from being imposed on by those with\n\ninfluence or in positions of authority and power, and to prevent the machinery , f Government from being used in furtherance of a candidate's return.\n\nBut at the same time it is not the policy of the law to disenfranchise them or to denude them altogether of their rights as ordinary citizens of tlie land. The balance between the two has, in our opinion, been struck in the manner indicated above.\n\nBut though it is permissible for a candidate to go that far, he cannot go further and if the procurement of Government servants to propose and second a nomination is part of a plan to procure their assistance for the furtherance of the candidate's prospects in other ways than by vote, then section 123(8) is attracted, for in that case, the plan, and its fulfilment, must he viewed as a connected whole and the acts of proposing or seconding which are innocent in themselves cannot be separated from the rest.\n\nOur conclusion on the preliminarv issue may also be supported on another ground.\n\nThe maior corrupt practice referred to in clause (8) of section 123 consists in obtaining. or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent etc., any assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of the candidate's election from any person serving under the Government of India or the Government of any State other than the giving of vote by such person.\n\nIn order, therefore, to bring a case within the mischief of that clause the assistance must be for the furtherance of the prospects of tl1e candidate's election.\n\nSection 79(b) defines a candidate as meaning\n\n\"a person who has been or claims to have been nominated as a candidate at any election, and any such person shall be deemed to hav~ been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in prospect, he began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate.\"\n\nUnless, therefore, a case falls within the latter half of the definition a person becomes a candidate under the first pan of the defipition only when he has been duly nominated as a candidate and the furtherance of\n\n'Jidj 'Krushna\n\n, Bdse \"\"' v. I liin\"Bd Kanungo\n\nan~ iJlhtrs. -· _:t DasJ.\n\nR•j Kns/rM\n\nBose\n\nBinod K(]fSUn10\n\nani Ot tJrs.\n\nDos.].\n\nthe prospects of a candidate's election must, therefore, in such case commence from after that stage. Although evidence was adduced on both sides, there has been no finding so far on questions of fact which may or may not bring the case within the second part of the definition. In the absence of such a finding the case must be regarded, for the purpose of the preliminary issue, as governed by the first part of the definition and as such the proposing and seconding by a Government servant cannot be regarded as \"assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of the candidate's election.\" In this view of the matter also, the judgment of the Election Tribunal cannot be sustained.\n\nWe set aside the order of the tribunal and remit the case to the Election Commission with directions to it to reconstitute the tribunal which tried this case and to direct the tribunal to give its findings on all the issues raised 1nd to make a fresh order.\n\nOur power to make such an order was not questioned but it was said that when the legislature states that the orders of a tribunal under an Act like the one here shall be conclusive and final (section 105), then we should not interfere.\n\nIt is sufficient to say that the powers conferred on us by article 136 of the Constitution and on the High Courts under article 226 cannot be taken awy or whittled down by the legislature.\n\nSo long as these powers remain, our discretion and that of the High Courts is unfettered.\n\nWe wish to record our disapproval of the way in which this tribunal shirked its work and tried to take a short cut.\n\nIt is essential that these tribunals should do t11eir work in foll.\n\nThey are ad hoc bodies to which remands cannot easily be made as in ordinary courts of law.\n\nTheir duty under section 99 is, \"where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt or illegal practice having been committed at the election\"\n\nto record\n\n\"a finding whether any corrupt or illegal practice has or has not been proved to have been committed ..... . and the nature of that corrupt or illegal practice.\"\n\nAlso,\n\n\"to give the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice and the nature of that practice.\"\n\nTheir duty does not end by declaring an election to be void or not because section 99 provides that in addition to that\n\n\"at the time of making an order under section 98 the tribunal shall also make an order etc ...... \"\n\nA number of allegations were made in the petition about corruption and illegal practices, undue influence and bribery.\n\nIt was the duty of the tribunal not only to enquire into those allegations, as it did, but also to complete the enquiry by recording findings about those allegations and either condemn or clear the candidate of the charges made.\n\nWe make no order about costs.\n\nBosE J.-I agree on all but one point. I have :some doubt about the reason given by my learned brother which is based on the d<:hnition of \"candidate\" in the Act. I prefer not to express any opinion on :that one point.\n\nCase remanded.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ratnaparkhi Anant Govind.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1. .-1.. D. Mathur.\n\nSRI SRI SRI KISHORE CHANDRA SINGH DEO\n\n'BABU GANESH PRASAD BHAGAT AND OTHERS.\n\n[MuKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM\n\nHASAN and\n\nVENKAIARAMA\n\nAYYAR TJ.)\n\nIndian Registration Act (XVI of 1908), ss. 32, 33-\"Resides\", .1neaning -of-Pou•er-of-attorney containing mistaken endorsement, .effect of-Applicability of ss. 32 and 33 to such a case-Legal .effect of decision under s. 33(1), proviso (i).\n\nKaj Krus/ma\n\nBose\n\nBinod Kanungo\n\nand Others,\n\nla.r J.\n\nMarth 9.", "total_entities": 73, "entities": [{"text": "913\n\nRAJ KRUSHNA BOSE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "913\n\nRAJ KRUSHNA BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 136 and 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193, "end_char": 210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Representation of the people Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 33(2), 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 271, "end_char": 284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the people Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the people Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 326, "end_char": 332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the people Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the people Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "arts. 136 and 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the people Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the people Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 643, "end_char": 656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) The unfettered discretionary powers conferred on the Supreme Court and the High Courts by arts."}}, {"text": "arts. 136 and 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the people Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the people Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation -Of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 819, "end_char": 858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1014, "end_char": 1019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation -Of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation -Of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089, "end_char": 1095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1119, "end_char": 1157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1550, "end_char": 1555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "S. B. fathar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1784, "end_char": 1796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. fathar for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1817, "end_char": 1828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (R. Patnaik, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1830, "end_char": 1840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (R. Patnaik, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1907, "end_char": 1914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Mahajan C.J .• Mukherjea, .", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1922, "end_char": 1931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Mahajan C.J .• Mukherjea, .", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1935, "end_char": 1938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das and Ghulam Hasan JJ."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1943, "end_char": 1955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das and Ghulam Hasan JJ.", "canonical_name": "GHULAM\n\nHASAN"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1986, "end_char": 1997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by Das J.\n\nVivian Bose J. delivered a separate Judgment.", "canonical_name": "Vivian Bose"}}, {"text": "Raj KntSh11a", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2157, "end_char": 2169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195+\n\nRaj KntSh11a\n\nBose v.\n\nBi'twd Kanungo and Others."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2171, "end_char": 2175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195+\n\nRaj KntSh11a\n\nBose v.\n\nBi'twd Kanungo and Others."}}, {"text": "Bi'twd Kanungo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195+\n\nRaj KntSh11a\n\nBose v.\n\nBi'twd Kanungo and Others.", "canonical_name": "BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Orissa Legislative Assemblv", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2409, "end_char": 2436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was nominated as a candidate for the Orissa Legislative Assemblv and was later declared to have been elected."}}, {"text": "section 123(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3550, "end_char": 3564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3572, "end_char": 3610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4424, "end_char": 4435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "sections 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4689, "end_char": 4699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4707, "end_char": 4745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5163, "end_char": 5182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the latter-\n\n\"The obtaining or procuring or abetting ........ by a <:andidate or his agent or, by any other person with the connivance of a candidate or his agent, any assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of the <:andidate's election from any person serving under the Government of India or the Government of any State other than the giving of vote by such person\" shall be deemed to be a major corrupt practice for -the purposes of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5427, "end_char": 5437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5625, "end_char": 5635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 33(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5814, "end_char": 5827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6014, "end_char": 6025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6077, "end_char": 6090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6206, "end_char": 6219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6924, "end_char": 6935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7478, "end_char": 7489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8387, "end_char": 8400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9229, "end_char": 9243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9588, "end_char": 9599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 79(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10092, "end_char": 10105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Binod K(]fSUn10", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10710, "end_char": 10725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t DasJ.\n\nR•j Kns/rM\n\nBose\n\nBinod K(]fSUn10\n\nani Ot tJrs."}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11501, "end_char": 11520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We set aside the order of the tribunal and remit the case to the Election Commission with directions to it to reconstitute the tribunal which tried this case and to direct the tribunal to give its findings on all the issues raised 1nd to make a fresh order."}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11887, "end_char": 11898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11991, "end_char": 12002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12052, "end_char": 12063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12509, "end_char": 12519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13064, "end_char": 13074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13148, "end_char": 13158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ratnaparkhi Anant Govind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13852, "end_char": 13876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ratnaparkhi Anant Govind."}}, {"text": "D. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13913, "end_char": 13922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".-1.. D. Mathur."}}, {"text": "KISHORE CHANDRA SINGH DEO\n\n'BABU GANESH PRASAD BHAGAT", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13937, "end_char": 13990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SRI SRI SRI KISHORE CHANDRA SINGH DEO\n\n'BABU GANESH PRASAD BHAGAT AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14017, "end_char": 14028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MuKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM\n\nHASAN and\n\nVENKAIARAMA\n\nAYYAR TJ.)", "canonical_name": "Vivian Bose"}}, {"text": "GHULAM\n\nHASAN", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14031, "end_char": 14044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MuKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM\n\nHASAN and\n\nVENKAIARAMA\n\nAYYAR TJ.)", "canonical_name": "GHULAM\n\nHASAN"}}, {"text": "VENKAIARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14050, "end_char": 14068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MuKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM\n\nHASAN and\n\nVENKAIARAMA\n\nAYYAR TJ.)"}}, {"text": "Indian Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14075, "end_char": 14098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 32, 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14114, "end_char": 14124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act", "statute": "Indian Registration Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 32 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14230, "end_char": 14243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act", "statute": "Indian Registration Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14291, "end_char": 14299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act", "statute": "Indian Registration Act"}}, {"text": "Kaj Krus", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14315, "end_char": 14323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kaj Krus/ma\n\nBose\n\nBinod Kanungo\n\nand Others,\n\nla.r J.\n\nMarth 9."}}, {"text": "Binod Kanungo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14334, "end_char": 14347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kaj Krus/ma\n\nBose\n\nBinod Kanungo\n\nand Others,\n\nla.r J.\n\nMarth 9.", "canonical_name": "BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS"}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_919_930_EN", "year": 1954, "text": ":S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 919\n\nAlso,\n\n\"to give the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice and the nature of that practice.\"\n\nTheir duty does not end by declaring an election to be void or not because section 99 provides that in addition to that\n\n\"at the time of making an order under section 98 the tribunal shall also make an order etc ...... \"\n\nA number of allegations were made in the petition about corruption and illegal practices, undue influence and bribery.\n\nIt was the duty of the tribunal not only to enquire into those allegations, as it did, but also to complete the enquiry by recording findings about those allegations and either condemn or clear the candidate of the charges made.\n\nWe make no order about costs.\n\nBosE J.-I agree on all but one point. I have :some doubt about the reason given by my learned brother which is based on the d<:hnition of \"candidate\" in the Act. I prefer not to express any opinion on :that one point.\n\nCase remanded.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ratnaparkhi Anant Govind.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1. .-1.. D. Mathur.\n\nSRI SRI SRI KISHORE CHANDRA SINGH DEO\n\n'BABU GANESH PRASAD BHAGAT AND OTHERS.\n\n[MuKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM\n\nHASAN and\n\nVENKAIARAMA\n\nAYYAR TJ.)\n\nIndian Registration Act (XVI of 1908), ss. 32, 33-\"Resides\", .1neaning -of-Pou•er-of-attorney containing mistaken endorsement, .effect of-Applicability of ss. 32 and 33 to such a case-Legal .effect of decision under s. 33(1), proviso (i).\n\nKaj Krus/ma\n\nBose\n\nBinod Kanungo\n\nand Others,\n\nla.r J.\n\nMarth 9.\n\nSri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra\n\nSingh Dto\n\nBabu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat and Othrrs.\n\nThe word \"resides\" in s. 33( 1) (a) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, is not defined in the statute.\n\nIt contemplates not only permanent residence but also temporary residence.\n\nResidence only connotes that a person eats, drinks and sleeps at that place and it is not ~:ecessary that he should own it.\n\nFor purposes of s. 32( c) of the Act, a power-of-attorney needs, in vie\\v of the provisions of s. 33 of the Act, no registration but is only required to be execcted before and authenticated by the Registrar.\n\nHence an endorse1nent mistakenly 1nad::: on such power-of-attorney that it was presented for registration must be ignored and does not affect the validity of subsequent authentication by the Registrar \\vhich \\Vas an independent act complete in itself and valid under s. 33.\n\nA decision of the Registrar under s. 33( 1) proviso (i) of the Indian llegistration Act that an applicant is suffering from bodily infirmity and is unable to attend the Registration Office or court without risk or serious inconvenience relates to a matter of mere procedure and even if erroneous does not affect his jurisdiction ..\n\nThe finding is on a matter which is within his exclusive jurisdiction, and cannot be questioned in a court of la\\v.\n\nfambu Prasad v. Maham mad Aftar Ali Khan ( 42 I.A. 22), Sharat Chandar Basu v. Bijay Chand Mahtab (64 I.A. 77), Ma Pwa May v. Chettiar Firm (56 I.A. 379) and Mujibunnissa v.\n\nAbdul' Rahim (28 I.A. 15) referred to.\n\nCML\n\nAPPELLATE JuRrsmcTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1 and 2 of 1949.\n\nAppeals from the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd December, 1942, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in First Appeals Nos. 10 and 11 of 1939 ansmg out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 23rd November, 1936, of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampore in Original Suit No. 11 of 1935 ..\n\nD. V. Narasinga Rao and M. S. K. Sastri for the appellant.\n\nS. L. Chhibber and R. C. Prasad for respondents Nos. 1-4, 6-9, 11 and 12.\n\n1954. March 9.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These appeals anse out of a suit instituted by the respondents to enforce a mortgage deed, Exhibit A, dated 5th April, 1923, executed by the defendant in favour of one Radha.\n\nPrasad Bhagat.\n\nThe subject-matter of the mortgage is an estate called the Bodogodo Zemin situated in\n\nwhat was the District of Ganjam in the Province of Madras and now comprised in the State of Orissa, and governed by the provisions of the Madras Impartible Estates Act II of 1904.\n\nThe mortgage is for Rs. 1,25,000 and the deed recites that a sum of Rs. 12,500 was advanced to the mortgagor on a promissory note executed on 30th March, 1923, that the balance of Rs. 1,12,500 was paid to him in cash, and that the entire amount was borrowed for meeting the expenses of the marriage of his second daughter with the eldest son of the Rajah of Talcher.\n\nThe marriage, in fact, took place on 27th April, 1923. Though the deed recites that Rs. 1,12,500 was paid iri cash, the case of the plaintiffs is that it was, in fact, paid on 14th April, 1923, on the authority of the defendant to his manager, one Mr. Henry Tapp, after the mortgage bond was registered, which was on 10th April, 1923.\n\nIn 1926 and 1927 the defendant made several payments towards the mortgage, in all aggregating to Rs. 42,000.\n\nThe mortgagee died on 18th November, 1933, and thereafter his legal representatives filed the suit, out of which these appeals arise, for recovery of the balance due under the mortgage by sale of the hypothecated property.\n\nThe defendant resisted the suit on several grounds.\n\nHe pleaded that the mortgage was supported by consideration only to the extent of Rs. 25,000, and that it had become discharged by the payments made in 1926 and 1927.\n\nHe also contended that the mortgage bond was not duly attested or validly registered, and that it was therefore void and unenforceable.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge of Berhampur who heard the suit held that no consideration passed for the promissory note for Rs. 12,500 dated 30th March, 1923,.\n\nExhibit J, and that it was really a salami; but that the balance of Rs. 1,12,500 was paid to Mr. Tapp unJer the authority of the defendant.\n\nHe also held t11at the mortgage bond was duly attested and validly registered, and a decree was passed in accordance with these findings.\n\nRoth the parties took up the matter in appeal to the High Court of Patna.\n\nThe plaintiffs filed A. S.\n\nSri S•i Sti Kish.ore Chandro.c\n\nSingh .Veo\n\nBabu.Ganesh Prasad Bhagat\n\nand Others.\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\n1954-\n\nSri Sri S1i\n\nJlis:'.cr~ Ci:andru\n\nSingh Dee>\n\nBabu Cants.·:\n\nPruad Bhagt1.t and Ot/, crs.\n\n.i:tnkaiarau; a\n\nAy)\"ar ].\n\nNo. 10 of 1937 claiming that Exhibit J was supported by consideration, and the defendant filed A. S.\n\nNo. 11 of 1937 pleading that the alleged payment of Rs. 1,12,500 to Mr.\n\nTapp was unauthorised, and that the mortgage bond was void, as it was neither duly attested nor properly registered. The High Court concurred with the Subordinate Judge in finding that that Rs. 1,12,500 was paid to Mr. Tapp under the authority of the defendant, and that the bond was duly attested and registered.\n\nBut as regards the promissory note, Exhibit J, it held differing from the Subordinate Judge that it was also supported by consideration.\n\nAgainst this decision, the defendant appeals, and repeats all the contentions urged by him in the courts below.\n\n• • • :t(c [The court held on a consideration of the evidence that the mortgage bond was supported by consideration and that it was duly attested.] The last contention of the appellant was that the deed was not validly registered in accordance with the provisions of sections 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, and that it was therefore void. Section 32 enacts that,\n\n\"Except in the cases mentioned ;11 sections 31, 88 and 89 every document to be registered under this Act ............ shall be presented ..... .\n\n(a) by some person executing or claiming under the saITle, ........ or\n\n(b) by the representative or assign of such person, or ( c) by the agent or such person, representative or assign, duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinatter mentioned.\"\n\nSection 33, so far as is material for the present purpose, runs as follows: • 33(1) \"For the purposes of section 32, the following powers-of-attorney shall alone be recognized, namelv:-\n\n(;) if the principal at the time of executing the power-of-attorney resides in any part of (the Provinces) in which this Act is for the time being in force, a\n\npover-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides; ....\n\nProvided that the following persons shall not be required to attend at any registration office or court for the purpose of executing any such power-of-attorney as is mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of this section, name! v:-\n\n(i) persons who by reason of bodily infirmity arc unable without risk or serious inconvenience so to attend;\n\n(ii) persons who are in jail under civil or criminal proces.s; and\n\n(iii) persons exempt c y law from personal appearance in court.\n\n(2) In the case of every such person the Registrar or Sub-Registrar or Magistrate, as the case may be, if satisfied that the power-of-attorney has been volunta rily executed by the person purporting to be the principal, rr:.oy attest the sJme without requiring his personal attengance at the office or court aforesaid.\n\n(3) To obtain evidence as to the voluntary nature of the execution, the Registrar or Sub-Registrar or Magistrate may either himself go to the house of the person purporting to be the principal, or to the jail in which he is confined, and examine him, or issue a commission for his examination.\" The substance of these provisions is that a document must be presented for registration either by a party to it or his legal representative or assign or by his agent 11olding a power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in accordance with section 33 of the Act.\n\nIn Jambu Prasad\n\nv. Muhammad Aftar Ali Khan(') it was observed by the Judicial Committee approving: of the decision in Ishri Prasad v. Baijnat!z(2) that,\n\n\" .... the terms of sections 32 and 33 of Act III of 1877 are imperative, and that n presentation of a document for registration by agent ...... ., who has not been duly authorized in accordance with those\n\n(r) 4' I.A. 22. ·\n\n(2) I.L.R. 2B All. 707.\n\n!954\n\nSri S1i Sri !1' is ho re Liiandrs\n\nSingh Deo , .• Babu Ganesh\n\nPraad BJ; agat\n\nan.i Ot/; ef', f.\n\nT/'enkataramo:\n\n~);'rnr.J.\n\nSri Sri Sri KishiJre Clandra\n\nSing.'i Deo v.\n\nBabu 'Ganesh Prasad Bhagat and Others.\n\nVenkatarama AY.yar J.\n\nsections, does not give to indispensable foundation the document.\"\n\nthe Registering Officer the of his authority to register\n\nVi'here, therefore, a document is presented for registration by a person other than a part to it or his legal representative or assign or by a person who is not an agent authorized in the manner prescribed in section 33, such presentation is wholly inoperative, an the registration of such a document is void.\n\nIn the present case, Exhibit A was presented for registration by Mr. Tapp as the agent of the defendant under a power-of-attorney executed by him, Exhibit B, and the question is whether that power satisfies the requirements of section 33.\n\nExhibit B was executed by the defendant before the Registrar at the residence of the Chief of Hindol at Cuttack and was authenticated by him. It was argued for the appellant that the authentication was invalid on three grounds: (1) that the defendant was not residing at Cuttack at the time of the execution of Exhibit B, and consequently the Registrar at Cuttack had no jurisdiction to authenticate the deed under section 33 (1) (a); (2) that Exhibit B was presented for registration by one Sundaram who described himself as the personal assistant of the defendant, but was, in fact, a person not authorised to present the document as required by section 32, and therefore the authentication of the power based on such presentation was void; and (3) that the authentication of the power under the proviso to section 33 (1) at the residence of the defendant was bad, as he was, in fact not suffering from any bodily infirmity at that time, and that in consequence the registration of Exhibit A pursuant thereto was void.\n\nWith reference to the first contention that the defendant was not residing at Cuttack at the date of Exhibit B, and that consequently the Registrar of that place had no jurisdiction to register it under section 33 (1) (a), the finding of the courts below is that the defendant had been resi :ling at Cuttack for a week prior to the date of Exhibit B, and that that was sufficient for the purposes of section 33 ( 1) (a).\n\nSharat Chandra Basu v. Bijay Chand Mahtab (1) the Privy Council, observed:\n\n\"The expression 'resides', as used in section 33, is not defined in the statute; but there is no reason for assuming that it contemplates only permanent residence and excludes temporary residence.\"\n\nIt must therefore be taken as settled that even temporary residence at a place j5 sufficient to clothe the Registrar of that place with jurisdiction under section 33 ( 1) (a). It was argued for the appellant that his permanent place of residence was at Bodogodo, that he owned no house at Cuttack, that the house\n\nhere Exhibit B was registered belonged to his brother-in-law, the Chief of Hindol, and that he stayed there on! y for the purpose of registering the power, and that on these facts, it cou 1.d not be held that there was residence even of a temporary character at Cuttack.\n\nThe fact that the house did not belong to the appellant is not material for this purpose; because residence only connotes that a person eats, drinks and sleeps at that place, and not that he owns it. Whether the stay of the appellant at Cuttack was of a casual nature, or whether it amounted to residence must \n\nBabu Cants.·:", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AY.yar"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6237, "end_char": 6239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tapp", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,12,500 to Mr.\n\nTapp was unauthorised, and that the mortgage bond was void, as it was neither duly attested nor properly registered."}}, {"text": "sections 32 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7356, "end_char": 7374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7382, "end_char": 7398, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7432, "end_char": 7442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 31, 88 and 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7492, "end_char": 7514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7889, "end_char": 7899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7994, "end_char": 8004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9715, "end_char": 9725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 32 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9914, "end_char": 9932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10155, "end_char": 10157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KishiJre Clandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10289, "end_char": 10305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nSri Sri Sri KishiJre Clandra\n\nSing.", "canonical_name": "Kishore Chandra Singh Deo"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama AY.yar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10363, "end_char": 10381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama AY.yar J.\n\nsections, does not give to indispensable foundation the document.\"", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AY.yar"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10721, "end_char": 10731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11050, "end_char": 11060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cuttack", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11167, "end_char": 11174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit B was executed by the defendant before the Registrar at the residence of the Chief of Hindol at Cuttack and was authenticated by him."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11478, "end_char": 11488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sundaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11555, "end_char": 11563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued for the appellant that the authentication was invalid on three grounds: (1) that the defendant was not residing at Cuttack at the time of the execution of Exhibit B, and consequently the Registrar at Cuttack had no jurisdiction to authenticate the deed under section 33 (1) (a); (2) that Exhibit B was presented for registration by one Sundaram who described himself as the personal assistant of the defendant, but was, in fact, a person not authorised to present the document as required by section 32, and therefore the authentication of the power based on such presentation was void; and (3) that the authentication of the power under the proviso to section 33 (1) at the residence of the defendant was bad, as he was, in fact not suffering from any bodily infirmity at that time, and that in consequence the registration of Exhibit A pursuant thereto was void.", "canonical_name": "P. Sundaram"}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11711, "end_char": 11721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11872, "end_char": 11882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12288, "end_char": 12298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12485, "end_char": 12495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12621, "end_char": 12631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12937, "end_char": 12947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bodogodo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13035, "end_char": 13043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued for the appellant that his permanent place of residence was at Bodogodo, that he owned no house at Cuttack, that the house\n\nhere Exhibit B was registered belonged to his brother-in-law, the Chief of Hindol, and that he stayed there on!"}}, {"text": "Hindol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13171, "end_char": 13177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued for the appellant that his permanent place of residence was at Bodogodo, that he owned no house at Cuttack, that the house\n\nhere Exhibit B was registered belonged to his brother-in-law, the Chief of Hindol, and that he stayed there on!"}}, {"text": "Kishore Chandra Singh Deo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14097, "end_char": 14122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then there is the endorsement of the Registrar on Exhibit B, and that runs as follows:\n\n\"Having visited and examined at his residence the principal Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo, son of Durga Mahtab Singh Deo, of at present Hindol House .... by profession Zamindar, who is personally .known to me, I am satisfied that this power-of-attorney has been voluntarily executed by him and I ac- <:ordingly authenticate it under section 33 of Act XVI of 1908.\"", "canonical_name": "Kishore Chandra Singh Deo"}}, {"text": "Durga Mahtab Singh Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14131, "end_char": 14153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then there is the endorsement of the Registrar on Exhibit B, and that runs as follows:\n\n\"Having visited and examined at his residence the principal Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo, son of Durga Mahtab Singh Deo, of at present Hindol House .... by profession Zamindar, who is personally .known to me, I am satisfied that this power-of-attorney has been voluntarily executed by him and I ac- <:ordingly authenticate it under section 33 of Act XVI of 1908.\""}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14366, "end_char": 14376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sharat Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14402, "end_char": 14416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sharat Chandra the endorsement on follows:\n\nBasu v. Bijay Chand Mahtab(') the power-of-attorney was as\n\nSri Sri Sri Kis!iore Chandra\n\nSingkDeo\n\nBabu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Kis!iore Chandra\n\nSingkDeo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14518, "end_char": 14544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sharat Chandra the endorsement on follows:\n\nBasu v. Bijay Chand Mahtab(') the power-of-attorney was as\n\nSri Sri Sri Kis!iore Chandra\n\nSingkDeo\n\nBabu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14546, "end_char": 14571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sharat Chandra the endorsement on follows:\n\nBasu v. Bijay Chand Mahtab(') the power-of-attorney was as\n\nSri Sri Sri Kis!iore Chandra\n\nSingkDeo\n\nBabu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "BABU GANESH PRASAD BHAGAT AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14586, "end_char": 14597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama\n\nA; yar].", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AY.yar"}}, {"text": "BabuGamsh Prasad Bhagat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14653, "end_char": 14676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra\n\nSing:i Deo v.\n\nBabuGamsh Prasad Bhagat\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "BABU GANESH PRASAD BHAGAT AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "enkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14693, "end_char": 14703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V enkatarama\n\nAy)'Of J.\n\n\"Executed in my presence at the Hazaribagh Registration Office on krgust 8, 1916, by Sharat Chandra Basu, son of Nalinaksha Basu of Burdwan, at present of Hazaribagh in Hazaribagh, who is personally known to me and I accordingly authenticate it under s.:ction 33.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AY.yar"}}, {"text": "Burdwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15147, "end_char": 15154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Privy Council ob1ir Mavat v. The State of Bombay and Others and Noor Mohammad Ali Mohammad v. The State of Bombay and Othrs (Criminal Appeals Nos. 65 and 66 of\n\n1952) in' wh1ch we have just delivered judgment we have held that section 7 of the Act is void as against a citizen of India being an encroachment on his fundamental right under article 19 (1) (e) of the Constitution.\n\nFollowing that decision we hold that the order of removal of the petitioner is liable to be set :1.side .\n\nMr. Umrigar, who appeared for the petitioner, pointed out that the Judicial Commissioner has ; i]ready held that the petitioner is a citizen of India and that it will serve no useful purpose by remanding\n\nEirahim V azir\n\nMavai\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and Oth; rs.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nEbrahim Vazir\n\nMavat v.\n\nThe State af Bombay and Otkrs.\n\nGhuh.m Hasan J.\n\nthe case to him for an inquiry into the question. The Solicitor-General on behalf of the Union of India has read to us the order of the Judicial Commissioner and admits that this is so.\n\nIt is, therefore, not necessary to adopt the course that we have taken in the aforesaid appals involving the validity of section 7. We accordingly hold that the order passed against the petitioner is void and set it aside.\n\nMr. Umrigar requests that the order should be communicated to the petitioner through the High Commissioner for India in Karachi to whom the petitioner sent a representation praying that he should be allowed to return to India.\n\nThis request is granted.\n\nCriminal Appeals Nos. 65 and 66 of 1952, No. 5 of 1953 and No. 19 of 1953 and Petitions No. 170 of 1952, No. 19 of 1953 and No. 57 of 1953.\n\nDAs J.-I regret I am unable to agree with the judgment just delivered.\n\nFour Criminal Appeals namely, Criminal Appeals Nos. 65 and 66 of 1952, No. 5 of 1953 and No. 19 of 1953 and three Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions, namely Petition No. 170 of 1952, No. 19 of 1953 and No. 57 of 1953, were posted for hearing and were heard by us one after another.\n\nIn each one of those appeals and petitions the appellants or the petitioners, as the case may be, challenged the constitutional validity of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949 (Act XXIIl of 1949).\n\nLearned advocate appearing in support of petitions No. 170 of 1952 and No. 19 of 1953 asked for leave to withdraw them with liberty to file fresh petitions in the High Court. Such leave having been given, nothing further need be said about those two petitions. The facts of each of the remaining appeals and the remaining petition have been set out in. the judgment just delivered and need not be repeated. Suffice it to say that the appellants in Appeals Nos. 65 and 66 of 1952 first came to India from Pakistan on temporary permits issued by the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan but stayed on after the expiry of the\n\nperiod and were convicted under section 5 of the Act.\n\nLater on they returned to -Pakistan on a temporary permit issued by the High Commissioner for Pakistan in India and eventually came back to India on a permanent permit issued by the High Commissioner for India in Pakisµn.\n\nThat permanent permit was cancelled on the allegation that it had been obtained on the strength of a \"no objection\" certificate which had been obtained by them by the suppression of material facts, namely, that they had previously come to India on a temporary permit.\n\nThe appellant in Appeal No. 5 of 1953 came to India from Pakistan on a permanent permit which was subsequently cancelled ori the allegation that it had been obtained by fraud.\n\nThe appellant in Appeal No. 19 of 1953 came to India from Pakistan without any permit and was prosecuted and convicted under section 5 of the Act and later on arrested and sent back to Pakistan. The petitioner in Petition No. 57 came to India without any permit at all. On this petitioner as well as on the appellants orders had been made under section 7 of the impugned Act to the effect, that unless they left India within the time specified in the respective orders they would be bodily removed from India. '.fhese orders were made on the ground that they had entered India in violation of section 3 of the Act and/ or the rules and order made thereunder. Each of these persons claimed that they were citizens of India and complained that the orders made against them violated their fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. .\n\nIt will be recalled that on the 15th August, 1947, there was a partition of India and two Dominions were formed under the Indian Independence Act,\n\n1947. A grave emergency arose on the partition of India resulijlg in mass-migration of population from one Dominion to the other accompanied , by riots, arson, murder, rape and loot. Intense bitterness and hatred were generated in the minds of the people of one Dominion against those of the other Dominion.\n\nEven in one Dominion there was suspicion in the 2-97 S. C. India/59\n\nEbrahim V azir\n\nMavat v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Ot/; ers.\n\n./Jas J.\n\nEbrahim V az:ir\n\nMaval v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Otf.ers.\n\nDas].\n\nminds of the members of one community against those of the other. In those circumstances the uncontrolled and indiscriminate entry of persons, Hindu or Muslim, from Pakistan into India was naturally regarded as fraught with the possibility of espionage and sabotage the prevention of which was essential for the security of the Dominion of India. Further, an uncontrolled entry of large numbers of people was calculated to place and in fact placed a tremendous strain on the economy of India and on the law and order situation in the country.\n\nIt was in order to prevent such result that it was necessary to exercise some control over such influx of persons from Pakistan into India. Accordingly, the Influx from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XVII of 1949) was promulgated on the 19th July, 1948, by the Governor-General in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThe preamble to that Ordinance recited that an emergency had arisen which made it necessary to control the admission into and regulate the movements in India of persons from Pakistan.\n\nThereafter the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XXXIV of 1948) was issued on the 10th November, 1948, replacing the earlier Ordinance.\n\nThis Ordinance applied to persons entering into India from both West Pakistan and East Pakistan.\n\nIt substantially reproduced all the sections of the previous Ordinance. Finally, on the 22nd April, 1949, the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act (XXIII of 1949) replaced the second Ordinance.\n\nSections 3 and 7 of this Act substantially reproduced the provisions of sections 3 and 7 of the Ordinance. The Permit Srtem Rules of 1948 were replaced on the 20th May, 1949, by the Permit System Rules of 1949.\n\nThis Act, however, was repealed on the 15th October, 1952, by Act LXVI of 1952.\n\nSection 3 of this repealing Act, howe'\"\"r, expressly preserved the application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.\n\nAlthough the In.flux from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949 has been repealed and the number of persons who, like the appdlants and the petitioners before. us, are affected by tht Act is small, nevertheless the matter has t)\n\nbe scrutinised ciosely, for our decision may conceivably affect the passport regulations which have replaced, the permit system.\n\nThe contention advanced in these appeals and the petition is that sections 3 and 7 of the Act have, since the commencement of the Constitution, become void in that they violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14 and 19(1) (d) and (e) of the Constimtion.\n\nThe provisions of these two sections, which have been sufficiently set out in the judgment just delivered, will at once show that they applied to all persons coming from Pakistan, whether they were citizens or noncitizens and irrespective of the community to which they belonged or the religion which they professed.\n\nIt will also appear that, as regards citizens they did not touch all citizens but affected only such of them as came from Pakistan, whether they were Hindus, Muslims or Christians.\n\nIt is, therefore, quite clear that the Act applied to a small well defined class of persons who were grouped together on an obviously reasonable basis of classification as explained in the previous decisions of this court.\n\nIn this view of the matter no question of unconstitutional discrimination can arise at all and, indeed, the plea based on the equal protection clause of the Constitution has not been seriously pressed.\n\nThe main contest has centred round the question whether these two sections offend against the provisions of article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution.\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General appearing for the respondents contends that those sections are protected by article 19(5) as being reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights guaranteed by sub-clauses ( d) and ( e) of clause ( 1) of that article.\n\nIn State of Madras v.\n\nRow ) Patanjali Sastri\n\nC. J. observed:-\n\n\"It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.\n\n(I) [r:52] 3 S. C. R .. 597 at p. 607\n\n. 1954\n\nEbf'ahiTir Vazir\n\nMavat\n\nThe State qf\n\nBombay and Othtr.r.\n\nDas].\n\nEbrahim Vatir\n\nMavat v. 7 he State of Bombay and Otkrs.\n\nDa.s J.\n\nThe nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.\n\nIn evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authonsmg the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.\"\n\nThe impugned sections have, therefore, to be examined in the light of the above observations.\n\nI find nothing unconstitutional about section 3 of the impugned Act. It does not debar the entry of any person absolutely.\n\nIt only requires that a person entering India from any place in Pakistan must be in possession of a permit or a valid passport or be exempted from such requirements.\n\nPassport regulations obtain in every civilised country including even those the constitutions whereof confer similar fundamental rights on their citizens, e.g., Switzerland (articles 43-45), Wiemer Germany (article III), Czechoslovakia (article 108), Jugoslavia (article 10), Danzig (article 75) and Albania (section 202). Such regulations serve to check up the persons who enter the territories of the State and are necessary for the safety of the State.\n\nSeeing that such regulations obtain everywhere and have a definite utility for the protection of the general public by securing the safety of the State I have no manner of doubt in my mind that such restrictions as are contemplated by section 3 must be regarded as reasonable restrictions permissible under\n\nclause (5) of article 19 of the the objection of section 3 has pressed before us.\n\nConstitution. Indeed, not been seriously\n\nThe main objection urged by learned counsel appearing i11 support of these appeals and petitions was directed to the question of the validity of section 7.\n\nIn the first place, it is clear that no objection can be taken to section 7 in so far as it affected persons who were not citizens of India, for article 19 guarantees certain fundamental rights to the citizens of India only. In the next place, this section did not affect all citizens but touched only a well defined small class of citizens, namely, those who went to Pakistan and intended to return to India.\n\nThe question is whether qua these citizens section 7 can also be regarded as a reasonable restriction within the meaning of clause (5) of article 19.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay has held, and in my opinion quite correctly, that the provisions of section 7 cannot but be regar.ded as consequential to the provisions of section 3.\n\nSuppose at the check-post a person from Pakistan, whether a citizen or not, tried to cross the broder without a permit.\n\nSurely, the officer at the check-post would have been well within the law to prevent a violation of section 3 of the Act and with that end in view to prevent that person, who had no permit, from crossing the border and entering India.\n\nI have no doubt that the officer might also have prevented a person from Pakistan from crossing the border if he suspected that the permit produced by the person was forged or otherwise irregular and left him to take up the matter with the higher authorities from Pakistan.\n\nSuppose the man who sought to enter India without a permit or with - a permit which was suspected to be spurious forcibly crossed the border and took a step or two on our side of the line, the Indian officer would certainly have been entitled to throw him back to the other side of the line. Surely, such, a person could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong and could not be heard to say that, in such circumstances, he. had, by his wrong doing, acquired a better right. than the person\n\nEbrahim V azir\n\nMavat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombqy and Others.\n\nDas]\n\nEbrahim V Mir\n\nMavat v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nDas].\n\nwho had not the temerity to violate the provisions of section 3.\n\nIf this is so then, logically, I can see no difference if the man ran into the Indian territory for some distance and the Indian officer ran after him, overtook him and took him back to the. check-post and pushed him out of our side of the line.\n\nIt is futile, in such a situation, to expect or to say that the officer should have held a judicial enquiry and come to a judicial decision after hearing an argument as to the validity of the permit or as to the status of the permit holder or the fundamental rights of a citizen of India to move freely in India and to settle anywhere he liked in .India.\n\nThe truth and substance of the matter are that in acting in the way indicated above the officer simply performed an executive act and prevented a person who held no permit or held a permit which appeared to the officer to be spurious from entering India from Pakistan in violation of section 3 of the Act.\n\nTo throw out such a person was not to inflict any punishment on him or to do him any greater injury than what was imposed on or done to a person who, not having a permit, was stopped at the check-post and not allowed to enter India at all. The man thus thrown out was placed under no greater disability than the man who had initially been prevented from entering India at the check-post barrier.\n\nIn both cases such a person might, while staying in . Pakistan, have taken steps to obtain a permanent permit upon proof of his status as an Indian citizen and if such permit was illegally withheld from him he might have through some agent in India taken proceedings in Indian courts for appropriate reliefs.\n\nTo my mind the position of the person who entered India on a temporary permit but who, in violation of the rules or order made under the Act, stayed on after the period of the permit expired, was, as from that date, logically the same as that of the person who entered India without a permit.\n\nTo arrest such a person, after the expiry of the period of the temporary permit, with a view to sending him back to where he came from and to actually send him back there did not involve or\n\nconstitute a judicial act all but was a rough and ready executive act for enforcing giving effect to the provisions of section 3 of the Act. To arrest and send such a person back to Pakistan was not to inflict a punishment but was only to restore the status quo and to put him back to the position he would have been in but for his illegal act.\n\nIn my opinion the act authorised by section 7 was, in essence a purely executive act for implementing the provisions of section 3.\n\nWithout such a provision it would have been impossible for the State to control the admission into India of persons from Pakistan and to prevent the concomitant dangers referred _to above.\n\nThe act authorised by the section being an executive act, discretion had perforce to be left to the executive Government which, by reason of the information available to it, was in a much better position than the courts to know and judge the antecedents of such a person and his ultimate purpose.\n\nSuppose an Indian citizen, no matter whether he was a Hindu or a Muslim, had entered India from Pakistan without a permit and suppose be was, upon confidential reports which could not be safely disclosed, suspected to be engaged in espionage in the interests of Pakistan, would it have been safe enough in those hectic days to have only nrosecuted him under section 5 and inflicted on him a fine of rupees one thousand or a term of imprisonment not exceeding a year and then to have left him free, after the term of imprisonment was over, to surreptitiously carry on his nefarious activities of espionage and sabotage against our State wh.ile embarking upon a protracted judicial enquiry to ascertain the truth or otherwise of his claim to Indian citizenship ? It cannot be overlooked that there are long common borders between Pakistan and India both on the west and on the east. The Kashmir situation had also aggravated the emergency brought above by the partition of India.\n\nHaving regard to all the circumstances, the tension, bitterness and hatred between the two countries that were generated at the time of the partition and all which must enter into the judicial verdict, the provisions of section 7 appear' to me to have been eminently reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the\n\nEbrahim Vazir\n\nMavai\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nDas].\n\nEbrahim Vazir\n\nMar; at\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nDas].\n\ngeneral public upon the exercise by Indian c1t1zen coming from Pakistan without a permit of the rights conferred by article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution.\n\nThe Indian citizen who was thrown out for not having the proper permit or who was suspected to have violated the provisions of the Act was placed in no worse position than an Indian citizen who, not having a permit, had not been permitted to enter into India at ail.\n\nThey were by no means without remedy. They could from the other side of the border take steps under the rules to obtain valid permanent permits upon proof of their citizenship of India and if such permits were illegally withheld from them they could move the appropriate High Court under article 226 or even this court under article 32 while they were outside India and might, on proof of their citizenship, have got appropriate writs or orders directing the State or its officers to issue suitable permits and to desist from otherwise preventing them from entering India or interfering with their movement while in India. It is said that if such a person would have been entitled to a permit on proof of his status as an Indian citizen then why should he have been thrown out at all unless and until he failed to establish his claim to Indian citizenshio ?\n\nThere occur to mv mind several answers to this 'question.\n\nIn the first . place, it would have been putting a vremium on wrong doing.\n\nIn the second place, the person would have been left free to carrv on his secret activities, if any, while judicial proceedings would have been going on for ascertaining his status.\n\nIn the third place. if the person could not be thrown out before his status had been judicially determined there would have been no incentive on his part to take proceedings in court to establish his status and it would have thrown upon the State the duty of initiating proceedings and of discharging the onus of proving the negative fact of his not being a citizen of India. In view of all the circumstances prevailing at the time the law was enacted and remained in force and in view of the considerations hereinbefore alluded to I have no doubt in my mind-except what\n\narises out of my respect for the opinions of my Lord and other learned brothers-that the provisions of section 7 were necessary and reasonable and fell within clause (5) of article 19. In my Judgment the four appeals as well as Petition No. 57 of 1952 should be dismissed.\n\nAppeals allowed, cases remanded.\n\nAgents for the appellants and petitioners : S.\n\nShukla, R.\n\nGovind, Sardar Bahadur and P. K.\n\nChatterji.\n\nAgents for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha and C. P. Lal.\n\nSARDAR SOMA SINGH AND OTHERS\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF PEPSU AND UNION OF INDIA.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs ..\n\nVIVIAN BoSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.J Constitution of India, art. 286(3)-The Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (XXXIII\n\nof 2006)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution.\n\nHeld, that the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (No. XXXIII of 2006) promulgated on 6th November, 1949, is not ultra vires art. 286(3) of the Constitution.\n\nClause (3) of art. 286 conten1plates a post-Constitution law, for it must be a law made by a \"Legislature of a State\" which must refer to the legislature of a State created by the Constitution.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTJON : Petition No. 325 of 1953.\n\nPetition to the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nS. P. Sinha (Bakshi Man Singh, with him) for the petitioners.\n\nC. K Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India' and ]. N. Kaushal (P. G. Gokhale, with them) for respondent No. 1.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No. 2. ·\n\nEbrahim V a.tir\n\nMavat v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nMarch 11.", "total_entities": 263, "entities": [{"text": "EBRAHIM VAZIR MAVAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EBRAHIM VAZIR MAVAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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'"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5182, "end_char": 5191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 (b) defines \"officer of Government\" as any officer of the Central Government and 2 (c) defines\n\n\"permit\" as a \"permit issued or renewed or the period where of has been extended in accordance with the rules made under this Act\"."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Passport Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ebrahim V azir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5869, "end_char": 5883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ebrahim V azir\n\nMavai\n\n\"· Tfz~ Stat1 of\n\nBombay and Otlurs.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM VAZIR MAVAT"}}, {"text": "Chulam Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chulam Hasan J.\n\nEbrahim V azir\n\nMav•t\n\nTiu Stole of Bombay and Otmrs.", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN JJ."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Has•n", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Has•n J.\n\nSection 4 empowers the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to make rules:\n\n(a) prescribing the authorities by which and the conditions subject to which permits may be issued or renewed or the period thereof extended, the condition to be satisfied by the applicants for such permits and the forms and classes of such permits;\n\n(b) regulating the movements m India of any person who is in possession of a permit; ( c) providing for the exemption, either absolutely or on conditions, of any person or class of persons from the requirement of being in possession of a permit or from the operation of any rule made under the section ; and\n\n(d) ............................................. .", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN JJ."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6019, "end_char": 6028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Passport Act, 1920", "statute": "the Indian Passport Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6838, "end_char": 6847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6923, "end_char": 6932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7144, "end_char": 7153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7209, "end_char": 7218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7286, "end_char": 7295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7624, "end_char": 7633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7694, "end_char": 7703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7807, "end_char": 7816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8252, "end_char": 8261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8264, "end_char": 8273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8445, "end_char": 8454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9116, "end_char": 9129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9321, "end_char": 9331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ebrahim Vair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J~.\n\nEbrahim Vair\n\nAfavat\n\nThe State of Bomba)' and Others.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM VAZIR MAVAT"}}, {"text": "State of Bomba", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10247, "end_char": 10261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J~.\n\nEbrahim Vair\n\nAfavat\n\nThe State of Bomba)' and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs"}}, {"text": "article 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10338, "end_char": 10348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10400, "end_char": 10409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10474, "end_char": 10483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11048, "end_char": 11057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12468, "end_char": 12477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even so the penalty imposed upon a citizen by his own Government merely upon a breach of the permit Regulations", "statute": "Even so the penalty imposed upon a citizen by his own Government merely upon a breach of the permit Regulations"}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14150, "end_char": 14156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice ( Chagla C. J.) took the view that section 7 is consequential to section 3 and held ."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14183, "end_char": 14192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14213, "end_char": 14222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14242, "end_char": 14251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14305, "end_char": 14314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14400, "end_char": 14409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14449, "end_char": 14458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14554, "end_char": 14563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ebrahim V azir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14634, "end_char": 14648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ebrahim V azir\n\nMavat v.\n\nTh1, State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM VAZIR MAVAT"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14665, "end_char": 14693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ebrahim V azir\n\nMavat v.\n\nTh1, State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs"}}, {"text": "Ebrahim V .zir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14713, "end_char": 14727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\nEbrahim V .zir\n\nMiwot\n\nTl1' State •f\n\nBombay an!", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM VAZIR MAVAT"}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14771, "end_char": 14783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasen J.\n\nto pass the same order independently of these prov1S1ons even where there is no conviction and a. reasonable suspicion exists that an offence has been committed.", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN JJ."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14975, "end_char": 14984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15005, "end_char": 15014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15407, "end_char": 15416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15439, "end_char": 15448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15538, "end_char": 15558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shabbir Hussain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anotlzer( 1 ' the Allahabad High Court held that a law allowing the removal from a territory of India of any citizen is in contravention of article 19 (1) (d) and ( e) of the Constitution and is void in view of article 13 (1)."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15660, "end_char": 15670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15731, "end_char": 15741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15808, "end_char": 15817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 11, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15882, "end_char": 15899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "147 of 1951 decided on December 11, 1951, a Bench of the Punjab High Court (Weston C. J. and Harnam Singh J.) while setting aside the order under section 7 against a citizen of India who had entered India without a permit and was first convicted and then ordered to be extcrned observed : \"The powers of removal or banishment given by section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, connot be invoked against citizens of India."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15916, "end_char": 15933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "147 of 1951 decided on December 11, 1951, a Bench of the Punjab High Court (Weston C. J. and Harnam Singh J.) while setting aside the order under section 7 against a citizen of India who had entered India without a permit and was first convicted and then ordered to be extcrned observed : \"The powers of removal or banishment given by section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, connot be invoked against citizens of India."}}, {"text": "Weston C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15935, "end_char": 15944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "147 of 1951 decided on December 11, 1951, a Bench of the Punjab High Court (Weston C. J. and Harnam Singh J.) while setting aside the order under section 7 against a citizen of India who had entered India without a permit and was first convicted and then ordered to be extcrned observed : \"The powers of removal or banishment given by section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, connot be invoked against citizens of India."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15952, "end_char": 15964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "147 of 1951 decided on December 11, 1951, a Bench of the Punjab High Court (Weston C. J. and Harnam Singh J.) while setting aside the order under section 7 against a citizen of India who had entered India without a permit and was first convicted and then ordered to be extcrned observed : \"The powers of removal or banishment given by section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, connot be invoked against citizens of India."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16005, "end_char": 16014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16194, "end_char": 16203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16339, "end_char": 16348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17046, "end_char": 17055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17188, "end_char": 17197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17316, "end_char": 17325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17411, "end_char": 17421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17705, "end_char": 17714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17732, "end_char": 17745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17827, "end_char": 17840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18350, "end_char": 18362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAM HASAN J .-The appellant in this case is a resident of Godhra, District Panchmahals, in the State of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN JJ."}}, {"text": "Godhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18411, "end_char": 18417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAM HASAN J .-The appellant in this case is a resident of Godhra, District Panchmahals, in the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18457, "end_char": 18463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAM HASAN J .-The appellant in this case is a resident of Godhra, District Panchmahals, in the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "May 30, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18527, "end_char": 18539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He went to Pakistan in March, 1948, and returned to India on May 30, 1949, after obtaining a permit for permanent return to India from the High Commissioner for India."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18677, "end_char": 18686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 5, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18861, "end_char": 18877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently on December 5, 1952, he was served with a notice\n\n( ) [1953] S. C.R. 730."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19173, "end_char": 19184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19201, "end_char": 19210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19256, "end_char": 19274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 15, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19539, "end_char": 19556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was summarily dismissed on December 15, 1952, whereupon leave to appeal to this court was granted under article 132 (1) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19616, "end_char": 19627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19729, "end_char": 19738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GHuLAM\n\nHASAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19872, "end_char": 19885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHuLAM\n\nHASAN.", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN JJ."}}, {"text": "Haji Faqir Ahmad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19906, "end_char": 19922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-The appellant, Haji Faqir Ahmad, is a resident of Rewa in Vindhya Pradesh and alleges that he is a citizen of India."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19949, "end_char": 19964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.-The appellant, Haji Faqir Ahmad, is a resident of Rewa in Vindhya Pradesh and alleges that he is a citizen of India."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20032, "end_char": 20041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20208, "end_char": 20217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20272, "end_char": 20283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20308, "end_char": 20319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20327, "end_char": 20353, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20467, "end_char": 20476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20521, "end_char": 20528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Asthana, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, raised a further question that the order was void under article 14 inasmuch as it discriminated against members of a particular community coming from Pakistan.", "canonical_name": "Asthana"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20627, "end_char": 20637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Yick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21226, "end_char": 21230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case in Yick W o v. Peter Hopkins( 1 ) is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case."}}, {"text": "GHuLAM HAsAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21495, "end_char": 21507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHuLAM HAsAN J.-These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution raise the constitutional validity of section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, XXIII of 1949.", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN JJ."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21533, "end_char": 21543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21601, "end_char": 21610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21789, "end_char": 21800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22141, "end_char": 22151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Inamullah Khan alias Qamar Jamali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22175, "end_char": 22208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAM HASAN J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution by Inamullah Khan alias Qamar Jamali for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas 'corpus directing that the petitioner, who is illegal!"}}, {"text": "State of Bhopal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22589, "end_char": 22604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further prayed that the State of Bhopal and the Superintendent of Central Jail, Bhopal, where he was being detained be restrained from putting into effect the said order."}}, {"text": "March 11, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22762, "end_char": 22776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was made on March 11, 1953."}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22854, "end_char": 22860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is stated that the petitioner is a citizen of India having been born in Bhopal in 1922,.. He was employed in Bhopal for 5 years immediately preceding\n\n{I) 118 U.S. 356; 30 Law."}}, {"text": "S. 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22943, "end_char": 22949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22998, "end_char": 23013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ebrahim Vazir\n\nMavat v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others .", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombo,1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23075, "end_char": 23092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghi:.lam Ha.ran J.\n\nEbrahim V azir\n\nMavai\n\nThe State of\n\nBombo,1 and Othtrs.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23147, "end_char": 23168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 24, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23401, "end_char": 23418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was arrested on November 24, 1952, by the Sub-Inspector of Police at Ibrahimpura, Bhopal, under section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, XXIII of 1949 and was told that he would be removed to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23481, "end_char": 23490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 448", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23663, "end_char": 23674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1st Class Magistrate, Bhopal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23714, "end_char": 23742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of the arrest the petitioner was being tried under section 448, Indian Penal (', ode, in the court of 1st Class Magistrate, Bhopal, and was on bail."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23970, "end_char": 23979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24000, "end_char": 24013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24027, "end_char": 24045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pakisun", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24248, "end_char": 24255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit on behalf of the State mentions that the petitioner had gone to Pakisun in May, 1952, and returned in August, 1952, without a permit."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24563, "end_char": 24574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 25, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24578, "end_char": 24595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner filed an application through his uncle before the Judicial Commissioner, Bhopal, under article 226 on November 25, 1952, challenging the order."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24725, "end_char": 24742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was dismissed on February 23, 1953, and the interim order was vacated on March 10, 1953."}}, {"text": "March 10, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24781, "end_char": 24795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was dismissed on February 23, 1953, and the interim order was vacated on March 10, 1953."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25307, "end_char": 25321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superintendent of Jail sent it to the Chief Secretary on March 13, 1953."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25525, "end_char": 25538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was returned to him on the 19th with the remark that it should be forwarded to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Kotah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25848, "end_char": 25853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day a telephonic communication was sent by the Registrar of this court through the States Ministry directing that the petitioner should be detained if he was still in India, but it appears that the petitioner had been handed over to the Rajasthan Police at Kotah on March 12, 1953, and a reply was\n\nreceived by the Inspector-General of Police, Jaipur, that the petitioner had crossed the border on March 18, 1953."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25857, "end_char": 25871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day a telephonic communication was sent by the Registrar of this court through the States Ministry directing that the petitioner should be detained if he was still in India, but it appears that the petitioner had been handed over to the Rajasthan Police at Kotah on March 12, 1953, and a reply was\n\nreceived by the Inspector-General of Police, Jaipur, that the petitioner had crossed the border on March 18, 1953."}}, {"text": "Jaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25935, "end_char": 25941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day a telephonic communication was sent by the Registrar of this court through the States Ministry directing that the petitioner should be detained if he was still in India, but it appears that the petitioner had been handed over to the Rajasthan Police at Kotah on March 12, 1953, and a reply was\n\nreceived by the Inspector-General of Police, Jaipur, that the petitioner had crossed the border on March 18, 1953."}}, {"text": "March 18, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25989, "end_char": 26003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day a telephonic communication was sent by the Registrar of this court through the States Ministry directing that the petitioner should be detained if he was still in India, but it appears that the petitioner had been handed over to the Rajasthan Police at Kotah on March 12, 1953, and a reply was\n\nreceived by the Inspector-General of Police, Jaipur, that the petitioner had crossed the border on March 18, 1953."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26890, "end_char": 26899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27002, "end_char": 27012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27154, "end_char": 27161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Umrigar, who appeared for the petitioner, pointed out that the Judicial Commissioner has ; i]ready held that the petitioner is a citizen of India and that it will serve no useful purpose by remanding\n\nEirahim V azir\n\nMavai\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and Oth; rs."}}, {"text": "State af Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27459, "end_char": 27474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\nEbrahim Vazir\n\nMavat v.\n\nThe State af Bombay and Otkrs.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs"}}, {"text": "Ghuh.m Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27487, "end_char": 27499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghuh.m Hasan J.\n\nthe case to him for an inquiry into the question."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27812, "end_char": 27821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karachi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28035, "end_char": 28042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Umrigar requests that the order should be communicated to the petitioner through the High Commissioner for India in Karachi to whom the petitioner sent a representation praying that he should be allowed to return to India."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29529, "end_char": 29538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30346, "end_char": 30355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30566, "end_char": 30575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30814, "end_char": 30823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31051, "end_char": 31072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31109, "end_char": 31126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be recalled that on the 15th August, 1947, there was a partition of India and two Dominions were formed under the Indian Independence Act,\n\n1947."}}, {"text": "India and two Dominions were formed under the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31153, "end_char": 31222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32070, "end_char": 32087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In those circumstances the uncontrolled and indiscriminate entry of persons, Hindu or Muslim, from Pakistan into India was naturally regarded as fraught with the possibility of espionage and sabotage the prevention of which was essential for the security of the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "West Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32455, "end_char": 32468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Influx from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XVII of 1949) was promulgated on the 19th July, 1948, by the Governor-General in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "19th July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32527, "end_char": 32542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Influx from West Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XVII of 1949) was promulgated on the 19th July, 1948, by the Governor-General in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32614, "end_char": 32624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32632, "end_char": 32661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "10th November, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32939, "end_char": 32958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XXXIV of 1948) was issued on the 10th November, 1948, replacing the earlier Ordinance."}}, {"text": "East Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33076, "end_char": 33089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Ordinance applied to persons entering into India from both West Pakistan and East Pakistan."}}, {"text": "22nd April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33180, "end_char": 33196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, on the 22nd April, 1949, the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act (XXIII of 1949) replaced the second Ordinance."}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33285, "end_char": 33301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33357, "end_char": 33373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "20th May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33444, "end_char": 33458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Permit Srtem Rules of 1948 were replaced on the 20th May, 1949, by the Permit System Rules of 1949."}}, {"text": "15th October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33536, "end_char": 33554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act, however, was repealed on the 15th October, 1952, by Act LXVI of 1952."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33578, "end_char": 33587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33660, "end_char": 33669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33677, "end_char": 33702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34122, "end_char": 34138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34270, "end_char": 34291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35360, "end_char": 35376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35513, "end_char": 35526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ebf'ahiTir Vazir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36042, "end_char": 36058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1954\n\nEbf'ahiTir Vazir\n\nMavat\n\nThe State qf\n\nBombay and Othtr.r."}}, {"text": "State qf\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36071, "end_char": 36087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1954\n\nEbf'ahiTir Vazir\n\nMavat\n\nThe State qf\n\nBombay and Othtr.r.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay arid Othtrs"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37303, "end_char": 37312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Switzerland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37717, "end_char": 37728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Passport regulations obtain in every civilised country including even those the constitutions whereof confer similar fundamental rights on their citizens, e.g., Switzerland (articles 43-45), Wiemer Germany (article III), Czechoslovakia (article 108), Jugoslavia (article 10), Danzig (article 75) and Albania (section 202)."}}, {"text": "articles 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37730, "end_char": 37741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Czechoslovakia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37777, "end_char": 37791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Passport regulations obtain in every civilised country including even those the constitutions whereof confer similar fundamental rights on their citizens, e.g., Switzerland (articles 43-45), Wiemer Germany (article III), Czechoslovakia (article 108), Jugoslavia (article 10), Danzig (article 75) and Albania (section 202)."}}, {"text": "article 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37793, "end_char": 37804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jugoslavia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37807, "end_char": 37817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Passport regulations obtain in every civilised country including even those the constitutions whereof confer similar fundamental rights on their citizens, e.g., Switzerland (articles 43-45), Wiemer Germany (article III), Czechoslovakia (article 108), Jugoslavia (article 10), Danzig (article 75) and Albania (section 202)."}}, {"text": "article 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37819, "end_char": 37829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Danzig", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37832, "end_char": 37838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Passport regulations obtain in every civilised country including even those the constitutions whereof confer similar fundamental rights on their citizens, e.g., Switzerland (articles 43-45), Wiemer Germany (article III), Czechoslovakia (article 108), Jugoslavia (article 10), Danzig (article 75) and Albania (section 202)."}}, {"text": "article 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37840, "end_char": 37850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Albania", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37856, "end_char": 37863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Passport regulations obtain in every civilised country including even those the constitutions whereof confer similar fundamental rights on their citizens, e.g., Switzerland (articles 43-45), Wiemer Germany (article III), Czechoslovakia (article 108), Jugoslavia (article 10), Danzig (article 75) and Albania (section 202)."}}, {"text": "section 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37865, "end_char": 37876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38248, "end_char": 38257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38335, "end_char": 38345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38370, "end_char": 38379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38591, "end_char": 38600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38669, "end_char": 38678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38748, "end_char": 38758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39057, "end_char": 39066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39152, "end_char": 39162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39169, "end_char": 39189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay has held, and in my opinion quite correctly, that the provisions of section 7 cannot but be regar.ded as consequential to the provisions of section 3."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39258, "end_char": 39267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39330, "end_char": 39339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39563, "end_char": 39572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40662, "end_char": 40671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41561, "end_char": 41570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42895, "end_char": 42904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43158, "end_char": 43167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43242, "end_char": 43251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44100, "end_char": 44109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44941, "end_char": 44950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ebrahim Vazir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45045, "end_char": 45058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to all the circumstances, the tension, bitterness and hatred between the two countries that were generated at the time of the partition and all which must enter into the judicial verdict, the provisions of section 7 appear' to me to have been eminently reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the\n\nEbrahim Vazir\n\nMavai\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM VAZIR MAVAT"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45287, "end_char": 45303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45890, "end_char": 45901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45927, "end_char": 45937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47454, "end_char": 47463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47524, "end_char": 47534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nShukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47703, "end_char": 47713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agents for the appellants and petitioners : S.\n\nShukla, R.\n\nGovind, Sardar Bahadur and P. K.\n\nChatterji."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nGovind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47715, "end_char": 47725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agents for the appellants and petitioners : S.\n\nShukla, R.\n\nGovind, Sardar Bahadur and P. K.\n\nChatterji."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47727, "end_char": 47741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agents for the appellants and petitioners : S.\n\nShukla, R.\n\nGovind, Sardar Bahadur and P. K.\n\nChatterji."}}, {"text": "P. K.\n\nChatterji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47746, "end_char": 47762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agents for the appellants and petitioners : S.\n\nShukla, R.\n\nGovind, Sardar Bahadur and P. K.\n\nChatterji."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47793, "end_char": 47811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agents for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha and C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47816, "end_char": 47825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agents for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha and C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "SARDAR SOMA SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47828, "end_char": 47845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARDAR SOMA SINGH AND OTHERS\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF PEPSU AND UNION OF INDIA."}}, {"text": "STATE OF PEPSU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47867, "end_char": 47881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARDAR SOMA SINGH AND OTHERS\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF PEPSU AND UNION OF INDIA."}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47886, "end_char": 47900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARDAR SOMA SINGH AND OTHERS\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF PEPSU AND UNION OF INDIA."}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47904, "end_char": 47922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs ..\n\nVIVIAN BoSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.J Constitution of India, art."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BoSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47955, "end_char": 47966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs ..\n\nVIVIAN BoSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.J Constitution of India, art.", "canonical_name": "Vivian Bose"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47989, "end_char": 48010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48012, "end_char": 48023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48028, "end_char": 48098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48171, "end_char": 48241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48317, "end_char": 48328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006", "statute": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006"}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48365, "end_char": 48373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006", "statute": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48633, "end_char": 48643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006", "statute": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48651, "end_char": 48672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bakshi Man Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48726, "end_char": 48742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (Bakshi Man Singh, with him) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "C. K Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48776, "end_char": 48789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India' and ].", "canonical_name": "C. K. Daplitary"}}, {"text": "N. Kaushal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48827, "end_char": 48837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Kaushal (P. G. Gokhale, with them) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48839, "end_char": 48852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Kaushal (P. G. Gokhale, with them) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48888, "end_char": 48902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "C. K. Daplitary"}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_955_957_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 955\n\narises out of my respect for the opinions of my Lord and other learned brothers-that the provisions of section 7 were necessary and reasonable and fell within clause (5) of article 19. In my Judgment the four appeals as well as Petition No. 57 of 1952 should be dismissed.\n\nAppeals allowed, cases remanded.\n\nAgents for the appellants and petitioners : S.\n\nShukla, R.\n\nGovind, Sardar Bahadur and P. K.\n\nChatterji.\n\nAgents for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha and C. P. Lal.\n\nSARDAR SOMA SINGH AND OTHERS\n\ntJ.\n\nTHE STATE OF PEPSU AND UNION OF INDIA.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs ..\n\nVIVIAN BoSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.J Constitution of India, art. 286(3)-The Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (XXXIII\n\nof 2006)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution.\n\nHeld, that the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (No. XXXIII of 2006) promulgated on 6th November, 1949, is not ultra vires art. 286(3) of the Constitution.\n\nClause (3) of art. 286 conten1plates a post-Constitution law, for it must be a law made by a \"Legislature of a State\" which must refer to the legislature of a State created by the Constitution.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTJON : Petition No. 325 of 1953.\n\nPetition to the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nS. P. Sinha (Bakshi Man Singh, with him) for the petitioners.\n\nC. K Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India' and ]. N. Kaushal (P. G. Gokhale, with them) for respondent No. 1.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No. 2. ·\n\nEbrahim V a.tir\n\nMavat v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nMarch 11.\n\nSardar Soma\n\nSingh and Otf, ers\n\nThe State of Pepsu and Union\n\nof India.\n\nDas].\n\n1954.\n\nMarch 11.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs J.-The short point raised on this petition filed in this court under article 32 of the Constitution is whether the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (No. XXXIII of\n\n2006) which was promulgated on the 6th November, 1949, has become void since the date of the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 286 ( 3) of the Constitution of India runs as follows:-\n\n\"286.\n\n(3) No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.\"\n\nThe Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation of Tax on Sale or Purchase) Act, 1952 (Central Act No.\n\nLII of 1952) declared certain commodities as essential for the life of the community.\n\nIn the schedule appended to the Act item 8 relates to \"all cloth, woven on handlooms, coarse and medium cotton cloth made in mills or woven on power looms.\" Section 3 of the same Act provides as follows :-\n\n\"3.\n\nRegulation of tax on sale or purchase of essential goods :- No law made after the commencement of this Act by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods declared by this Act to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.\"\n\nThe petitioners are dealers in coarse cloth and medium cloth and their contention is that these commodities having been declared as essential for the life of the community they are not liable to pay sales tax on them.\n\nIn the petition an allegation has been made that section 3 of Act LII of 1952 is in direct contravention of article 286(3) of the Constitution.\n\nThere\n\ndoes not appear to be any substance in this contention. Section 3 is in line with article 286(3) and there is no inconsistency between that section and the relevant provision of the Constitution.\n\nThe peut10ners are sought to be taxed under the Ordinance XXXIII of 2006, which, as an existing law ; has been continued by article 372.\n\nThe question is whether that Ordinance contravenes the provisions of article 286(3)\n\nor, has since been altered, repealed of amended by any competent legislative authority. It is quite clear that section 3 of Act LII of 1952 does not affect the Ordinance, for the Ordinance was not made after the commencement of that Act.\n\nThe only question, therefore, is whether the Ordinance runs counter to clause (3) of article 286 of the Constitution. A perusal of that clause will at once indicate that that clause contemplates a post-Constitution law, for it must be a law made by a \"Legislature of a State\" which must 'refer to the Legislature of a State created by the Constitution.\n\nFurther, and what is more important, it contemplates a law which can be but has not been reserved for the consideration of the President and has not received his assent.\n\nThis provision clearly points to post-Constitution law, for there can be no question of an existing law continued by article 372 being reserved for the consideration of the President for receiving his assent.\n\nAs we are concerned in this application with a pre-Constitution law, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to the validity or otherwise of a law made after the commencement of the Constitution but before the coming into operation of Act LI! of 1952.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that there is no substance in this petition and we dismiss it with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioners : Sardar Singh.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : R. H. Dhebar .\n\nSardar Soma\n\nSingh and Others\n\nTh, State of Pepsu and Union\n\nof India.\n\nDas].", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nShukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 387, "end_char": 397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agents for the appellants and petitioners : S.\n\nShukla, R.\n\nGovind, Sardar Bahadur and P. K.\n\nChatterji."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nGovind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agents for the appellants and petitioners : S.\n\nShukla, R.\n\nGovind, Sardar Bahadur and P. 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H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5683, "end_char": 5695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : R. H. Dhebar ."}}, {"text": "Sardar Soma\n\nSingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5699, "end_char": 5717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Soma\n\nSingh and Others\n\nTh, State of Pepsu and Union\n\nof India.", "canonical_name": "Sardar Soma\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "State of Pepsu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5734, "end_char": 5748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Soma\n\nSingh and Others\n\nTh, State of Pepsu and Union\n\nof India."}}]} {"document_id": "1954_1_976_982_EN", "year": 1954, "text": "Ka{ranpur_ Lime\n\nWorks Lid.\n\nStatt of Bihar and Another.\n\nChui.am Hasan J.\n\nMarch 11,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954]\n\nnot the case.\n\nWe think, however, that though we decline to give a decree for specific performance of the contract for the short period, there is no reason why the Lime Co. should be deprived of compensation.\n\nThe plaintiff had prayed for a decree for compensation in the plaint and the trial court had decreed compensation for the period commencing from 1st April, 1948, till the date of getting possession of the leasehold property and the amount of compensation was left to be ascertained in subsequent proceedings.\n\nAs no question of possession arises in the view that we have taken in the case. it follows that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation from the 1st April, 1948, tili the 31st March; 1954.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and direct that the plaintiff shall be allowed a decree for compensation from the 1st April, 1948, to the 31st March, 1954, the amount of compensation to be ascertained by the trial court.\n\nAfter determining tl1e amount, the trial court will pass an appropriate decree.\n\nWe make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : S. p. Varma.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 2: B. P. Maheswari.\n\nSULEMAN ISSA\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs,\n\nVIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), s. 517-Person prosecuted undff s. 61-E of the Bombay District Police Act (Bombay Act TV of 1890)-Confiscation of gold worth about 3 lakhs- Propriety of.\n\nUnder s. 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the court is empowered on the conclusion of an enquiry or trial to make an\n\norder for the disposal of any property or document produced before it or in its custody or regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or which had been used for the commission of any offf'nce. The power of the court extends to the confiscation of the property in the custody of the court but it is not in every case in which the court must necessarily pass an order of confiscation irrespective of the ci.rcun1stances of the case.\n\nHeld, that the confiscation of gold worth about 3 lakhs of rupees was singularly inappropriate in a case like the present where the prosecution story that the gold in question was smuggled into India from Africa was not accepted by the court and the accused was convicted for an offence under s. 6l~E of the Bombay District Police Act, 1890, which provides a maximum sentence of three months and a fine of Rs. 100 and which does not contain any substantial provision such as the Sea Customs Act imposing the penalty of confiscation.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1smcnoN : Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1951.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order, dated 26th June, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Dixit and Chainani JJ.) in Criminal Appeal No. 784 of 1949.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (H. /. Umrigar and S. P. Varma, with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1954. March 11.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was bject of the contribution under the section is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu reli gion or any denomination under it but the proper administration\n\not rc.li